generated: '2026-09-13'
method: searched
source: >-
  https://success.mitratech.com/TAP/TAP_Solutions/APIs_and_Integrations/TAP_API_Documentation +
  https://success.mitratech.com/TeamConnect/TeamConnect_Setup_and_Development/TeamConnect_REST_API_Modernization_(TCE_7.2)/TeamConnect_RESTAPIs_-_Authentication +
  https://mitratech.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
docs:
- https://success.mitratech.com/TAP/TAP_Solutions/APIs_and_Integrations/TAP_API_Documentation
- https://success.mitratech.com/TeamConnect/TeamConnect_Setup_and_Development/TeamConnect_REST_API_Modernization_(TCE_7.2)/TeamConnect_RESTAPIs_-_Authentication
summary: >-
  Every Mitratech programmatic surface is OAuth 2.0, but the three surfaces use three different flows
  and three different token issuers. The harvested TAP Swagger 2.0 document declares NO
  securityDefinitions at all — the auth model exists only in prose on the Success Center, which is why
  this artifact is method: searched rather than derived from the spec.
apis:
- api: Mitratech TAP Workflow Automation API
  schemes:
  - id: tap_oauth2_password
    type: oauth2
    flow: password
    grant_type: password
    token_endpoint: https://{tenant}.tap.thinksmart.com/{tenant}/auth/identity/connect/token
    token_endpoint_staging: https://{tenant}.stagingtap.thinksmart.com/{tenant}/auth/identity/connect/token
    content_type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
    parameters:
    - name: grant_type
      value: password
    - name: scope
      value: api
    - name: redirect_uri
      value: tapredirect
      note: Typical default value; the docs say to confirm it with Mitratech.
    - name: username
      note: The registered TAP user to be authorized.
    - name: password
      note: That user's password.
    - name: client_id
      note: Obtained from Mitratech — not self-serve.
    - name: client_secret
      note: Obtained from Mitratech — not self-serve.
    token_type: Bearer
    expires_in: 3600
    presentation: 'Authorization: Bearer <access_token>'
    authorization_model: >-
      The token inherits the permissions of the TAP user account it was issued for. Mitratech's own
      documentation warns that a non-Super-Admin account will silently return incomplete result sets
      rather than a 403 — an authorization pitfall an agent cannot detect from the response.
    spec_declared: false
    spec_note: >-
      openapi/_original/mitratech-tap-swagger.json has no securityDefinitions and no security block on
      any of its 49 operations. A client generated from the spec alone would send no credentials.
- api: Mitratech TeamConnect REST API
  schemes:
  - id: teamconnect_oauth2_authorization_code
    type: oauth2
    flow: authorizationCode
    authorization_endpoint: https://{your-tc-instance}/webservice/enterprise/oauth/authorize
    token_endpoint: https://{your-tc-instance}/webservice/enterprise/oauth/token
    client_authentication: Basic auth header
    token_type: Bearer
    note: >-
      Available in TeamConnect Enterprise 7.2 and later only. Backward compatibility with pre-7.2
      REST APIs was deliberately dropped.
  - id: teamconnect_oauth2_client_credentials
    type: oauth2
    flow: clientCredentials
    token_endpoint: https://{your-tc-instance}/webservice/enterprise/oauth/token
    client_authentication: Basic auth header
    token_type: Bearer
    note: Server-to-server integrations without a user in the loop.
  client_registration: >-
    API clients are registered inside the customer's own TeamConnect instance —
    Setup > System Settings > API Client Settings — where an admin supplies a Name, Description,
    Homepage URL and Callback URL and TeamConnect issues an API Client ID. There is no central
    Mitratech developer console and no self-serve key.
  token_lifetime:
    model: rolling idle expiration
    idle_window_days: 30
    note: >-
      Mitratech documents that TeamConnect access tokens use a rolling 30-day idle expiration and that
      each valid use resets the window. It also documents that the `expires_in` value in the token
      response is a hardcoded server response that clients should IGNORE. This is a real agent hazard:
      the machine-readable field in the response contradicts the documented behaviour.
- api: Mitratech MCP Server
  schemes:
  - id: mcp_oauth2_authorization_code_pkce
    type: oauth2
    flow: authorizationCode
    issuer: https://mitratech.com
    authorization_endpoint: https://mitratech.com/oauth/authorize
    token_endpoint: https://mitratech.com/oauth/token
    revocation_endpoint: https://mitratech.com/oauth/revoke
    pkce: S256
    grant_types: [authorization_code, refresh_token]
    scopes: [mcp]
    token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported: [none]
    client_id_metadata_document_supported: true
    bearer_methods_supported: [header]
    discovery:
    - well-known/mitratech-oauth-authorization-server.json
    - well-known/mitratech-oauth-protected-resource.json
    method: probed
gaps:
- No API key or personal-access-token option is documented on any surface.
- >-
  TAP's only documented grant is the OAuth 2.0 resource owner password credentials grant, which
  OAuth 2.1 and RFC 9700 (BCP for OAuth 2.0 Security) both deprecate. It requires the integration to
  hold a real TAP user's password.
- >-
  TAP client_id and client_secret are issued by Mitratech on request, not through self-service, so
  there is no path from reading the public docs to making an authenticated call.
- The TAP Swagger document carries no securityDefinitions, so the auth model is not machine-readable.