generated: '2026-08-13'
method: probed
source: >-
  https://mcp.ontraport.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource and
  https://app.ontraport.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, both fetched 2026-08-13
  with HTTP 200; corroborated by https://ontraport.com/support/My-account/mcp-server
docs: https://ontraport.com/support/My-account/mcp-server
description: >-
  Ontraport publishes exactly one OAuth scope, and it exists only on the MCP surface. The
  REST API has no OAuth at all — it authenticates with a pair of static account-level
  headers and has no scope concept, which means an Ontraport API key is unscoped and carries
  whatever the owning user can do. The single mcp:tools scope is coarse: it grants the whole
  47-tool surface, including the commerce tools that charge and refund cards. Ontraport's
  compensating control is client-side, not server-side — a per-connection configure panel
  where the account holder enables or disables individual tools after connecting.
scheme: oauth2
grant_types:
- authorization_code
- refresh_token
pkce: S256
dynamic_client_registration: true
resource: https://mcp.ontraport.com
authorization_server: https://app.ontraport.com
endpoints:
  authorization: https://app.ontraport.com/oauth/authorize
  token: https://app.ontraport.com/oauth/token
  registration: https://app.ontraport.com/oauth/register
  revocation: https://app.ontraport.com/oauth/revoke
scope_count: 1
scopes:
- name: mcp:tools
  description: >-
    Access to the tools exposed by the Ontraport MCP server. The only scope advertised in
    both the protected-resource metadata and the authorization-server metadata, and the
    scope named in the WWW-Authenticate challenge returned by an unauthenticated tools/list.
  grants: >-
    The full published MCP tool surface — CRUD, Query, Manage and Commerce. Not
    read/write-separated and not resource-separated.
  source: >-
    scopes_supported in https://mcp.ontraport.com/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource
rest_api:
  oauth: false
  scopes: false
  note: >-
    The REST API at https://api.ontraport.com/1 uses Api-Key + Api-Appid headers with no
    scope parameter. Authorization is bounded instead by Ontraport package-level and
    user-level permissions, which have applied to API requests since 2019-02-01, and by the
    per-object Access column (many object types are GET-only) published in the Accessible
    Objects table.
gaps:
- >-
  One scope for a surface that includes process_transaction, refund_transaction and
  cancel_subscription. There is no way to grant an agent read-only access at the
  authorization layer.
- >-
  No scope separates the schema-mutating surface from the data surface, though in practice
  Ontraport has kept field editing off the MCP server entirely.
- >-
  REST API keys have no scopes and no expiry, so key-based MCP connections bypass the scope
  model altogether.