generated: '2026-08-13'
method: searched
source: https://reprise.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/50081170817691-The-Reprise-MCP-Meet-your-AI-Demo-Engineer
docs: https://reprise.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/50081170817691-The-Reprise-MCP-Meet-your-AI-Demo-Engineer
note: >
  Reprise publishes no OpenAPI and its RFC 8414 authorization-server metadata does not advertise
  a scopes_supported array, so there is no machine-readable scope registry to derive from. The
  one scope Reprise documents by name is read_only. Effective authorization is not
  scope-carried: every MCP token inherits the authorizing user's existing Reprise RBAC role, and
  the MCP boundary can only narrow that, never widen it.

schemes:
  - name: MCPOAuth2
    source: well-known/reprise-oauth-authorization-server.json
    issuer: https://app.getreprise.com
    flows:
      - flow: authorizationCode
        authorizationUrl: https://app.getreprise.com/r/mcp/oauth/authorize
        tokenUrl: https://app.getreprise.com/r/mcp/oauth/token
    scopes_supported_advertised: false

scopes:
  - scope: read_only
    description: >
      Requested at token issue time (scope=read_only) to give an AI assistant read access to
      Reprise content while blocking every write. Writes are rejected at the MCP boundary rather
      than in the backend.
    flows: [authorizationCode]
    sources:
      - https://reprise.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/50081170817691-The-Reprise-MCP-Meet-your-AI-Demo-Engineer

implicit_scoping:
  - mechanism: endpoint selection
    description: >
      Product-scoped MCP endpoints act as a coarse capability scope. /v2/mcp/tour/ exposes only
      tour_* tools, /v2/mcp/injection/ only injection_*, /v2/mcp/clone/ only clone_*, while
      /mcp/ exposes the full catalog. Reprise recommends the scoped endpoints for AI clients
      that silently drop tools past a cap.
  - mechanism: RBAC inheritance
    description: >
      The token carries the user's Reprise role. Custom roles, builder vs presenter licensing,
      group sharing and folder-level permissions all apply unchanged to MCP calls.
  - mechanism: tenant isolation
    description: >
      Enforced in three layers per Reprise — an MCP scope check, request-context client binding,
      and an ORM client= filter on every backend query.

x-evidence:
  fetched: '2026-08-13'
  url: https://app.getreprise.com/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server
  http_status: 200