generated: '2026-07-25'
method: searched
source: openapi/route-mobile-rcs.yml, openapi/route-mobile-sms.yml, openapi/route-mobile-viber.yml,
  openapi/route-mobile-whatsapp-business.yml, openapi/route-mobile-sendclean-email.yml
docs:
- https://developer.rmlconnect.net/route-mobile-project/docs/whatsapp-login
- https://developer.rmlconnect.net/route-mobile-project/reference/sendsmssecured
- https://developer.rmlconnect.net/route-mobile-project/docs/email
description: >-
  Route Mobile's authentication is legacy CPaaS rather than telco-standard, and it is not
  uniform: four different credential models across five products. There is no OAuth 2.0, no
  OpenID Connect, no discovery document (/.well-known/openid-configuration and
  /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server 404 on every host), and no scopes — so no scopes/
  artifact is emitted for this provider. Two of the models (SMS query-parameter credentials,
  SendClean body-carried token) are not expressible as OpenAPI securitySchemes and are
  therefore absent from the specs; they were harvested from the documentation and from the
  operation parameters.
summary:
  types: [apiKey, http, query-credentials, body-credentials]
  api_key_in: [header, query, body]
  oauth2_flows: []
  oauth2: false
  openid_connect: false
  mtls: false
  scopes: false
  uniform_across_products: false
schemes:
- name: jwt
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: Authorization
  description: >-
    JWT minted by POST /auth/v1/login/ on apis.rmlconnect.net and carried in the Authorization
    header. Declared as an apiKey-in-header scheme in the RCS and Viber definitions.
  sources:
  - openapi/route-mobile-rcs.yml
  - openapi/route-mobile-viber.yml
- name: BearerAuth
  type: http
  scheme: bearer
  bearerFormat: JWT
  description: >-
    JSON Web Token obtained from the WhatsApp Login API (POST /auth/v1/login/). Include the
    token in the `Authorization` header as `Bearer <token>`. Tokens expire after one hour by
    default.
  sources:
  - openapi/route-mobile-whatsapp-business.yml
- name: AuthorizationToken
  type: apiKey
  in: header
  parameter: Authorization
  description: >-
    Static authorization token issued by Route Mobile, used only by the MoEngage and WebEngage
    integration endpoints on the SMS API.
  sources:
  - openapi/route-mobile-sms.yml
- name: sms-query-credentials
  type: query-credentials
  in: query
  parameters: [username, password]
  description: >-
    The core SMS API authenticates with the account username and password passed as URL query
    parameters on every GET request over HTTPS. Not expressible as an OpenAPI securityScheme;
    documented on the SMS reference pages and present as required parameters on every
    operation. A separate GET /bulksms/generatetoken mints a short-lived token consumed by
    GET /bulksms/bulksubmit.
  sources:
  - openapi/route-mobile-sms.yml
  - https://developer.rmlconnect.net/route-mobile-project/reference/sendsmssecured
- name: sendclean-body-credentials
  type: body-credentials
  in: body
  parameters: [owner_id, token]
  description: >-
    SendClean carries `owner_id` and `token` inside the JSON request body of every POST (and
    as URL-encoded query parameters on the single HTTP GET operation). No Authorization header
    is used. Declared in the spec as the reusable AuthFields schema rather than as a
    securityScheme.
  sources:
  - openapi/route-mobile-sendclean-email.yml
token_lifecycle:
  whatsapp: JWT expires after one hour by default; re-login on 401.
  rcs_viber: JWT from POST /auth/v1/login/; expiry not documented.
  sms: >-
    Username/password are long-lived account credentials; the optional generatetoken token is
    short-lived and single-purpose.
  sendclean: Long-lived account token; no documented rotation endpoint.
transport_security:
  https_required: true
  legacy_plaintext: >-
    The SMS definition still lists http://api.rmlconnect.net as an "SGN Non-secured (HTTP) —
    legacy only" server. Sending account credentials as query parameters over that host would
    expose them in cleartext; use the HTTPS servers (port 443 or 8443) only.
gaps:
- No OAuth 2.0 / OpenID Connect anywhere, hence no scopes and no consent surface.
- Credentials in URLs (SMS) leak into proxy, gateway and browser-history logs.
- No mutual TLS, no signed requests, and no key-rotation endpoint outside SendClean's webhook key.
related:
  conventions: conventions/route-mobile-conventions.yml
  domain_security: security/route-mobile-domain-security.yml
  conformance: conformance/route-mobile-conformance.yml