generated: '2026-08-29' method: probed source: https://api.takeoff.com/ — unauthenticated HTTP probes, 2026-08-29 description: >- Takeoff Technologies publishes no developer portal, no API reference and no machine-readable contract anywhere on the public web, but api.takeoff.com is a live, actively-maintained API gateway. This profile is what could be established about its authentication model from OUTSIDE the wall, by unauthenticated probing only. It is NOT derived from a provider-published specification, and nothing here should be read as documentation Takeoff publishes — no `Authentication` pointer is wired into apis.yml for exactly that reason. host: https://api.takeoff.com gateway: platform: Google Cloud (via 1.1 google, HTTP/2, alt-svc h3) certificate_issuer: Google Trust Services WR3 certificate_reissued: '2026-07-16' default_response: HTTP 404 with a zero-length body for any unrouted path request_correlation: >- Every routed response carries an `x-request-id` header holding a UUIDv4 — a real request-tracing convention, observable without credentials. observed_schemes: - scheme: unknown-header evidence: >- HTTP 401 application/json {"code":"401", "message":"Missing authentication header."} on every path under /auth/ and /sites/. The gateway names the requirement ("authentication header") but does not name the header, the scheme, or a token endpoint, and returns no WWW-Authenticate header. www_authenticate: null note: >- No OAuth metadata is served: /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource and /.well-known/openid-configuration all 404 on this host, and /oauth, /oauth2, /token and /sso are unrouted. Whether the scheme is bearer, an API key header, or mTLS cannot be determined from outside. routes_observed: - path: /auth status: 401 body: '{"code":"401", "message":"Missing authentication header."}' note: >- Prefix routes — every child path probed (/auth/, /auth/login, /auth/v1, /auth/health, /auth/openapi.json, /auth/api-docs, /auth/v3/api-docs, /auth/swagger-ui.html, /auth/actuator/health) returns the same 401, so no spec or health endpoint is reachable unauthenticated. - path: /auth/token status: 404 body: '{"code":"404", "message":"Path not found : /auth/token"}' note: >- A DIFFERENT 404 shape from the gateway default — a JSON body naming the path. This proves routing exists inside /auth and that the 404 is issued by the service, not by the load balancer. - path: /sites status: 401 body: '{"code":"401", "message":"Missing authentication header."}' - path: /webhooks status: 403 body: '{"message":"Forbidden", "path": ""}' note: >- A webhook surface exists behind the gateway. It is NOT publicly documented, so no `Webhooks` pointer is wired. - path: /identity status: 403 body: '{"message":"Forbidden", "path": ""}' unrouted_probed: note: >- All of these returned the gateway default (404, zero-length body), i.e. no such route is published at the edge. paths: - / - /v1 - /v2 - /v3 - /api - /api/v1 - /docs - /developer - /graphql - /mcp - /openapi.json - /openapi.yaml - /swagger.json - /api-docs - /swagger-ui - /health - /healthz - /status - /ping - /version - /metrics - /login - /oauth - /oauth2 - /token - /sso - /orders - /inventory - /catalog - /users - /products - /items - /picking - /fulfillment - /stores - /wms - /oms - /events - /admin - /gateway - /public - /partner - /integrations - /reports - /analytics - /notifications - /config - /tenants - /accounts - /devices - /telemetry - /mfc limits: - No credentials were used and none were sought; nothing behind the wall was accessed. - >- The header name, token format, scope model, expiry and refresh behaviour are all unknown and are deliberately left unrecorded rather than guessed.