generated: '2026-09-01'
method: searched
source: https://github.com/trusona/atop-agent-skill/blob/HEAD/reference/webhooks.md,
  openapi/trusona-verification-api-openapi.yml,
  openapi/trusona-driver-license-verification-api-openapi.yml
spec_type: none
asyncapi_published: false
note: 'Trusona publishes NO AsyncAPI document (searched the docs, the GitHub org and
  /asyncapi.yaml on every host). It DOES document a real callback/webhook surface, so
  this artifact captures that surface and a Webhooks pointer is wired instead of an
  AsyncAPI one. The surface is deliberately thin: callbacks are completion signals, not
  payloads to act on.'
surface:
  style: per-request callback URL
  registration: 'Per request, not per account. The caller sets `callbackUrl` on the
    create call; there is no webhook-endpoint registration API, no subscription
    management, and no event-type selection.'
  transport: HTTPS POST to the caller-supplied URL
events:
- name: verification.completed
  trigger: 'The verification reaches a terminal state after the subject scans.'
  registered_by: 'callbackUrl on POST /api/v1/verifications (createVerification) and on
    POST /api/v1/encrypted/verifications (createEncryptedVerification)'
  payload_schema: null
  note: 'The specs describe result delivery to the callback URL but do not define the
    callback body schema.'
- name: id_verification.completed
  trigger: The asynchronous DMV/MNO driver-license match resolves.
  registered_by: 'callbackUrl on POST /api/v1/id_verifications (createIdVerification)'
  payload_schema: null
  example_callback_url: https://example.com/webhooks/id-verification
security:
  signing: none
  shared_secret: none
  note: 'Trusona states plainly that the specs "do not define a webhook signing header
    or shared-secret verification scheme". Its published guidance is therefore: treat the
    inbound callback as a completion signal, then RE-FETCH the result over the
    authenticated API before deciding, and never trust callback body fields as a final
    outcome. Recommended mitigation from the same doc is a high-entropy path segment
    unique to each request, so a leaked URL cannot be replayed across workflows.'
  guidance_url: https://github.com/trusona/atop-agent-skill/blob/HEAD/reference/webhooks.md
alternative:
  polling: 'Both APIs are pollable instead of callback-driven — poll-verification.sh and
    poll-id-verification.sh in the agent skill. Verification lifecycle status is
    WAITING | SCANNED | EXPIRED; ID verification uses per-source PENDING | SUCCESS |
    FAILURE | FATAL on `dmv` and `mno`.'