# Apple Root Program Policy **Version 2.0** **Effective 2026-08-01** ## Introduction Apple uses public key infrastructure (PKI) to secure and enhance the experience of Apple users. Apple operating systems and applications (such as Safari and Mail) use a common store for Root CA Certificates; see [https://support.apple.com/103272](https://support.apple.com/103272) and [https://support.apple.com/103255](https://support.apple.com/103255). Apple requires certification authority (CA) Owners to meet certain criteria, as documented herein. *Note*: The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [BCP 14](https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/bcp14). ## Definitions **Baseline Requirements**: Industry-standard requirements published by the CA/Browser Forum or other standards bodies that govern the issuance and management of publicly-trusted certificates. Specific Baseline Requirements applicable to each Trust Purpose are defined in [Appendix A](#appendix-a-trust-purposes). **CA Owner**: The organization or legal entity that is either represented in the subject DN of the CA certificate or in possession or control of the corresponding private key capable of issuing new certificates, if not the same organization or legal entity directly represented in the subject DN of the certificate. This definition includes CA Owners whose CA certificates are not directly included in this root program but chain to those that are. **Current Version**: For audit criteria, the version in effect at the beginning of the audit period. For other requirements, the version in effect at the time of assessment or compliance. **Detailed Controls Report (DCR)**: A report, or its equivalent, that documents a CA's controls and the auditor's procedures and results for testing those controls. The minimum required contents are specified in Section 1.2.3.1. **Externally Operated Subordinate CA**: An organization or legal entity that possesses and controls the private key of a Subordinate CA, and is a distinct legal entity from the owner of the issuing parent CA. **Policy Document**: For the purposes of this document, this term refers to a Certificate Authority's Certificate Policy (CP), Certification Practice Statement (CPS), or a combined CP/CPS document. **Trust Purpose**: A designated use case for certificates as defined in [Appendix A](#appendix-a-trust-purposes), such as Server Authentication, Secure Email, or VMC. **VMC**: A Verified Mark Certificate (VMC) is an AuthIndicators Working Group-defined certificate for Brand Indicators for Message Identification (BIMI) that confirms an organization’s identity and its right to use a logo. ## Table of Contents 1. [Program Requirements](#1-program-requirements) * [1.1 Audit Requirements](#11-audit-requirements) * [1.2 Audit Engagement Requirements](#12-audit-engagement-requirements) * [1.3 Standards and Policy Document Compliance Requirements](#13-standards-and-policy-document-compliance-requirements) * [1.4 Communication Requirements](#14-communication-requirements) * [1.5 Inclusion Requirements](#15-inclusion-requirements) * [1.6 Due Diligence Requirements](#16-due-diligence-requirements) * [1.7 Subordinate CA Requirements](#17-subordinate-ca-requirements) 2. [Policy Requirements](#2-policy-requirements) * [2.1 General](#21-general) * [2.2 TLS Trust Purposes](#22-tls-trust-purposes) * [2.3 S/MIME Trust Purposes](#23-smime-trust-purposes) * [2.4 VMC Trust Purpose](#24-vmc-trust-purpose) 3. [Incidents](#3-incidents) 4. [Root Inclusion Submission Process](#4-root-inclusion-submission-process) 5. [Root Program Management](#5-root-program-management) * [5.1 Constraints](#51-constraints) [Appendix A: Trust Purposes](#appendix-a-trust-purposes) ## Change Log | Version | Date | Change Description | | :------ | :--- | :----------------- | | 2.0 | 2026-08-01 | Added Appendix A defining Trust Purposes and their required Extended Key Usage values. Separated the SSL Baseline and Network Security audit criteria, and added Network Security audits for S/MIME and VMC. Effective 2026-08-01, Subordinate CA Certificates MUST contain an Extended Key Usage extension and MUST NOT assert anyExtendedKeyUsage, Externally Operated Subordinate CAs require Apple approval before issuance, and Root Inclusion Requests require a minimum of RSA 4096-bit or ECDSA 384-bit. Effective 2027-02-01, S/MIME subscriber certificates MUST include at least one rfc822Name. Effective 2027-07-01, Subordinate CA Certificates MUST be dedicated to a single Trust Purpose and each CP/CPS MUST be a Markdown document scoped to a single Trust Purpose. Detailed Controls Report attestation requirements apply to audit periods starting on or after 2027-07-01. | | 1.0 | 2023-08-15 | Last version before versioning was introduced | ## 1. Program Requirements ### 1.1 Audit Requirements CA Owners MUST meet the audit obligations for all Trust Purposes (as defined in Appendix A) for which they are enabled within the Apple Root Program. CA Owners MUST provide audit reports in the Common CA Database (CCADB). *Note*: The presence of qualifications in an audit report is not, by itself, considered reason to remove a CA Owner from the Apple Root Program. The purpose of audits is to honestly and thoroughly assess a CA Owner's compliance with requirements which are necessary to assure a secure and stable ecosystem. Audit findings, including qualifications, can help to identify opportunities for improvement, whether for individual CA Owners or for the wider industry as a whole. All CAs MUST be audited at least annually against the Current Version (and MAY use a newer version if effective during the audit period) of at least one of the below: * WebTrust (Preferred) * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * ETSI (Accepted on a case-by-case basis) * "ETSI EN 319 411-1" LCP, NCP, or NCP+ The audit engagement MUST also assess the CA's compliance with any requirements from newer versions of the criteria that took effect during the audit period. The CA's compliance with such new requirements MUST be assessed from the effective date of the requirement through the end of the audit period. #### 1.1.1 TLS CA Owners CAs capable of issuing TLS certificates (i.e. contain id-kp-serverAuth EKU with non-EV Policy OID) MUST be audited at least annually against the Current Version (and MAY use a newer version if effective during the audit period) of at least one of the following sets of criteria. Every criterion in the chosen set MUST be met: **WebTrust Set 1 (Preferred)** * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - SSL Baseline" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Network Security" **WebTrust Set 2 (Accepted)** * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - SSL Baseline with Network Security" **ETSI Set 1 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI EN 319 411-1" LCP and DVCP **ETSI Set 2 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI EN 319 411-1" LCP and OVCP **ETSI Set 3 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI EN 319 411-1" NCP and EVCP #### 1.1.2 EV TLS CA Owners CAs capable of issuing EV TLS (i.e. contain id-kp-serverAuth EKU with EV Policy OID) certificates MUST be audited at least annually against the Current Version (and MAY use a newer version if effective during the audit period) of at least one of the following sets of criteria. Every criterion in the chosen set MUST be met: **WebTrust Set 1 (Preferred)** * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - SSL Baseline" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Network Security" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation SSL" **WebTrust Set 2 (Accepted)** * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - SSL Baseline with Network Security" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Extended Validation SSL" **ETSI Set 1 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI EN 319 411-1" NCP and EVCP #### 1.1.3 S/MIME CA Owners CAs capable of issuing S/MIME certificates (i.e. contain id-kp-emailProtection EKU) MUST be audited at least annually against the Current Version (and MAY use a newer version if effective during the audit period) of at least one of the following sets of criteria. Every criterion in the chosen set MUST be met: **WebTrust Set 1 (Preferred)** * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Network Security" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - S/MIME" **ETSI Set 1 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI TS 119 411-6" LCP **ETSI Set 2 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI TS 119 411-6" NCP **ETSI Set 3 (Accepted on a case-by-case basis):** "ETSI TS 119 411-6" NCP+ #### 1.1.4 VMC CA Owners CAs capable of issuing VMC certificates (i.e. contain BrandIndicatorforMessageIdentification EKU) MUST be audited at least annually against the Current Version (and MAY use a newer version if effective during the audit period) of all of the following criteria: * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Network Security" * "WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Verified Mark Certificates" #### 1.1.5 Lifecycle Event Reporting CA Owners MUST ensure all keys intended for use in a CA Certificate are included in lifecycle reports as part of their annual auditing procedures. When Lifecycle Events have occurred during an audit period, they MUST be addressed either in: * the annual audit report(s) supplied to the Apple Root Program; or * separate reports supplied to the Apple Root Program within 90 calendar days of such Events concluding. Such reporting MUST minimally cover the following Lifecycle Events: * for keys intended for use in a Root CA Certificate and keys intended for use by an Externally Operated Subordinate CA: * Key Generation Ceremony * for keys intended for use in a CA Certificate: * Key Backup, Storage, and Recovery * Key Transport * Key Destruction ### 1.2 Audit Engagement Requirements #### 1.2.1 Auditor Annual Training CA Owners MUST ensure auditors involved in external audit engagements undergo and/or have undergone annual training specific to the subject matter assessed within the Audit Criteria outlined in [Section 1.1](#11-audit-requirements). *Note*: CA Owners and auditors are encouraged to reach out to the Apple Root Program with questions and for recommendations. By way of example, if the auditor has undergone training to review the changes made to the Audit Criteria they're assessing, that would meet this requirement. CA Owners are not required to share with Apple the evidence used to verify Auditor Annual Training compliance. #### 1.2.2 Firm and Auditor Qualifications CA Owners MUST ensure audits comply with the firm and auditor qualification requirements specified in CCADB Policy. *Note*: Audit statements MUST include auditor qualification documentation as required by CCADB Policy. #### 1.2.3 Additional Requirements or Obligations Apple reserves the right to require a CA Owner to complete additional audit engagements, appoint or reject an auditor, or require submission of a Detailed Controls Report. #### 1.2.3.1 Detailed Controls Report A Detailed Controls Report documents a CA Owner's certification authority system and the design and operating effectiveness of its controls. The Detailed Controls Report MUST, at a minimum, contain the following core elements for each tested requirement: 1. The specific requirement or criterion being assessed. 2. The CA Owner's control(s) that address the requirement. 3. The auditor's test procedures used to evaluate the control(s). 4. The results of the auditor's tests. For WebTrust audits, the CA Owner MUST ensure the auditor prepares the Detailed Controls Report in accordance with the Detailed Controls Report process defined by CPA Canada. For ETSI audits, the CA Owner MUST ensure the auditor prepares an equivalent report that contains the four core elements above. The Detailed Controls Report is scoped to the same systems, controls, and certificates covered by the corresponding audit. The Detailed Controls Report MAY be a single, consolidated document covering all audit criteria applicable to the CA Owner for the audit period. Effective for audit periods starting on or after 2027-07-01, the CA Owner MUST: 1. Ensure the auditor produces a report containing these core elements. 2. Ensure the auditor contract allows for the Detailed Controls Report to be shared with Apple. 3. Review the report before attestation letter finalization. 4. Provide written attestation to Apple by adding a Case Comment to the 'CASE PROGRESS' tab of the CCADB "Add/Update Root Request" case for that audit confirming review and accuracy of the Detailed Controls Report. Apple MAY request any completed Detailed Controls Report required under this section, at any time. CA Owners MUST retain all such reports for seven years (or less where applicable law requires earlier destruction) and MUST provide any that Apple requests within 30 calendar days. The CCADB Case Comment attestation that the Detailed Controls Report (or its equivalent) has been generated MUST be added at the time the CA Owner submits the corresponding audit report to CCADB. Apple will treat any Detailed Controls Report provided to Apple as confidential. Apple will not publish it and will not disclose it to third parties except as required by law. Redactions are acceptable only where required by applicable law. Where redactions are made, the CA Owner MUST state the legal basis. CA Owners MUST ensure the Detailed Controls Report includes enough detail to explain the basis for the auditor's findings, while excluding information restricted by privacy laws. #### 1.2.4 Incidents CA Owners MUST ensure audit reports include incident information as required by the [CCADB Policy](https://www.ccadb.org/policy). ### 1.3 Standards and Policy Document Compliance Requirements CA Owners MUST strictly adhere to: * the Current Version of the [CCADB Policy](https://www.ccadb.org/policy), including but not limited to: * Annual self-assessment requirements; * Cross-certificate EKU requirements; * CRL disclosure and availability requirements; * Incident reporting guidelines; * Audit statement content requirements; * Firm and auditor qualification requirements; * their Policy Documents as disclosed in the CCADB; and * the Baseline Requirements specified in Appendix A for their designated Trust Purpose(s). When new versions of the [CCADB Policy](https://www.ccadb.org/policy) are published without a future Effective Date, CA Owners MUST adhere to the new version within 14 calendar days of its publication. **Conflict Resolution:** Where this policy imposes requirements that are more restrictive than CCADB Policy or applicable Baseline Requirements (such as minimum key sizes for new root inclusions, required domain validation methods, or CP/CPS formatting), CA Owners MUST comply with the more restrictive requirement. CA Owners uncertain about which requirement applies should contact the Apple Root Program for clarification before taking action. #### 1.3.1 Policy Document Requirements CA Owners MUST incorporate and commit to compliance with the Baseline Requirements applicable to their designated Trust Purpose(s) in their CP/CPS document. Effective 2027-07-01, all Policy Documents MUST adhere to the following: 1. **Format:** Documents MUST be a combined Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement (CP/CPS) in Markdown format with .md file extension. The Markdown file is the authoritative version in CCADB. CA Owners MAY publish additional formats for convenience. 2. **Content Integrity:** Each CP/CPS document MUST be self-contained with respect to the CA Owner's specific practices and procedures. Policy Documents MUST describe the specific processes and controls used to meet requirements, not simply state that requirements are met. Incorporation by reference is permitted to cite the source of a requirement, but it MUST NOT be used as a substitute for describing the CA's corresponding practice. Citing the governing Baseline Requirements, RFC, or other standard as the source of a requirement is permitted and does not violate this requirement; the CA Owner MUST additionally describe its own corresponding practice rather than reproduce the cited text in full. 3. **Trust Purpose Scoping:** * Each CP/CPS document MUST be scoped to a single Trust Purpose (as defined in Appendix A), except that: * A CP/CPS document MAY combine "Server Authentication" and "Legacy TLS". * A CP/CPS document MAY combine "Secure Email" and "Legacy S/MIME". * The Trust Purpose(s) and required EKU(s) MUST be stated in Section 1.4 of the CP/CPS. * A Root CA Certificate hierarchy supporting multiple Trust Purposes MUST provide a distinct CP/CPS document for each Trust Purpose, subject to the combined-pair exceptions above. * Multiple Root CA Certificate hierarchies MAY reference the same CP/CPS document if they share the same Trust Purpose or combined pair. * Certificates and hierarchies not aligned to an Apple-recognized Trust Purpose MUST be covered by at least one CP/CPS document (see Appendix A for Subordinate CA Certificates signed before 2026-08-01 and Section 1.7 for those signed on or after 2026-08-01). ### 1.4 Communication Requirements * CA Owners MUST maintain up to date contact details in the CCADB. * CA Owners are accountable for staying current on discussions in the following forums (where applicable) and implementing any changes necessary to conform with communications from them: * CA communications from Apple (typically via CCADB) * [CA/Browser Forum Public Discussion List](https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/public) * [CA/Browser Forum Server Certificate Working Group](https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/servercert-wg) * [CA/Browser Forum Validation Subcommittee](https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/validation) * [CA/Browser Forum Network Security Working Group](https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/netsec) * [CA/Browser Forum SMIME Certificate Working Group](https://groups.google.com/a/groups.cabforum.org/g/smcwg-public) * [CCADB Public Discussion List](https://groups.google.com/a/ccadb.org/g/public) * CA Owners MUST notify Apple if they anticipate any change in control or ownership of any CA Certificate (whether directly included or subordinate thereto). The acquiring CA MUST disclose its ownership, jurisdiction, continuity of audits with independent WebTrust/ETSI auditor confirmation that all evidence since root signing is retained, and its plans for managing legacy roots and key material. Continued inclusion requires Apple approval and is not transferable. * CA Owners MUST receive approval from Apple prior to issuing each Subordinate CA Certificate (or cross-signed certificate) to an Externally Operated Subordinate CA. * CA Owners MUST respond to requests from Apple within the timeframe specified in the communication, or within 14 calendar days if unspecified. ### 1.5 Inclusion Requirements * CA Owners and their Root CA Certificates MUST provide broad value to Apple's users. * CA Owners applying for inclusion in the Apple Root Program are expected to meet all applicable Program and Policy requirements prior to submitting an application. * CA Owners MUST strictly limit the number of Root CA Certificates per CA Owner, especially those capable of issuing multiple types of certificates. * CA Owners MUST complete all fields required in the CCADB Root Inclusion Request Case. * Root Inclusion Requests will only be accepted for Root CA hierarchies dedicated to a single Trust Purpose (as defined in Appendix A) with a single combined CP/CPS document in Markdown format (.md file extension). * Root Inclusion Requests MUST only contain Root CA Certificates that have a minimum key size of RSA 4096-bit or ECDSA 384-bit. ### 1.6 Due Diligence Requirements The Apple Root Program reserves the right to require additional clarifying information to resolve ambiguities that arise during routine due diligence. These requests will be communicated to the CA Email Alias(es) present in CCADB with a subject that includes "Due Diligence Request". CA Owners MUST respond to such requests within 14 calendar days. If a CA Owner requires additional time, they MUST notify Apple within the initial 14-day period with an estimated completion date and get Apple approval for the extension. ### 1.7 Subordinate CA Requirements A Subordinate CA Certificate signed on or after 2026-08-01 MUST contain an Extended Key Usage extension and MUST NOT assert anyExtendedKeyUsage (2.5.29.37.0). A Subordinate CA Certificate signed on or after 2026-08-01 and before 2027-07-01 MUST meet either (a) or (b): * (a) It is dedicated to a single Trust Purpose as defined in [Appendix A](#appendix-a-trust-purposes). * (b) All of the following are true: * it is issued under a Root CA Certificate that supports multiple Trust Purposes; * it contains no Extended Key Usage associated with a Trust Purpose defined in Appendix A; and * its use case (for example, Document Signing) is covered by a CP/CPS within the scope of the CA Owner's annual audit. A Subordinate CA Certificate signed on or after 2027-07-01 MUST be dedicated to a single Trust Purpose as defined in [Appendix A](#appendix-a-trust-purposes). For the purposes of this Section, a renewal, re-key, or cross-sign produces a new Subordinate CA Certificate whose signing date is the date of that issuance. Apple MAY require a CA Owner to discontinue issuance from a Subordinate CA Certificate qualifying under (b) at any time. *Note*: This requirement is consistent with and may overlap with requirements in applicable CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements. ## 2. Policy Requirements *Note*: For effective dates related to certificate issuance, the requirement is enforced for certificates signed on or after the specified date at 00:00:00 UTC. ### 2.1 General * CA Owners SHOULD be aware that issuance of a precertificate or certificate chaining up to an included CA Certificate constitutes authorization by the CA Owner for that certificate. * CA Owners SHOULD be aware that participation in the Apple Root Program constitutes a Root Certificate distribution agreement, as referenced in Section 9.9 of the TLS Baseline Requirements or S/MIME Baseline Requirements, between the CA Owner and Apple. #### 2.1.1 CA Disclosure CA Owners MUST disclose all CA Certificates in the CCADB as required by the CCADB Policy, including the requirement that CRL URLs be available for successful retrieval every 4 hours under normal operating conditions. *Note*: CA Certificates not disclosed in the CCADB MAY not function on Apple Devices. It is RECOMMENDED that CA Owners disclose CA Certificates in the CCADB at least 14 calendar days before beginning to issue from the CA Certificate. #### 2.1.2 CRLs CA Owners MUST populate CRL information in the CCADB as required by the CCADB Policy. #### 2.1.3 Single-Purpose Root CAs CA Owners applying to the Apple Root Program MUST submit only Root CA Certificates dedicated to a single Trust Purpose as defined in [Appendix A](#appendix-a-trust-purposes). All Subordinate CA Certificates in these hierarchies MUST contain only the EKU(s) specified in [Appendix A](#appendix-a-trust-purposes) for the designated Trust Purpose. A Subordinate CA Certificate in these hierarchies MUST NOT contain the same public key as any other certificate that asserts an EKU the Subordinate CA Certificate does not contain. *Note*: Root CA Certificates included before this policy version that support multiple Trust Purposes MAY continue operating. Apple reserves the right to require transition to single-purpose operation. ### 2.2 TLS Trust Purposes For Server Authentication and Legacy TLS Trust Purposes: CA Owners MUST support at least one of the following domain validation methods from the TLS Baseline Requirements: * 3.2.2.4.7 DNS Change * 3.2.2.4.18 Agreed-Upon Change to Website v2 * 3.2.2.4.19 Agreed-Upon Change to Website - ACME * 3.2.2.4.20 TLS Using ALPN *Note*: TLS subscriber certificates MUST comply with the [Apple Certificate Transparency Policy](https://support.apple.com/103214) to be accepted for connection establishment on Apple devices. ### 2.3 S/MIME Trust Purposes For Secure Email and Legacy S/MIME Trust Purposes: Effective 2027-02-01, all newly signed Subscriber certificates that contain the id-kp-emailProtection EKU MUST include at least one rfc822Name in the subjectAltName extension. ### 2.4 VMC Trust Purpose For the VMC Trust Purpose: Apple's platforms recognize Verified Mark Certificates that meet the requirements in Appendix A. ## 3. Incidents Failure to comply with this policy in any way is considered an incident. Section 1.3 requires compliance with the applicable Baseline Requirements, the CCADB Policy, and the CA Owner's own Policy Documents. Failing any of these is therefore an incident. CA Owners MUST follow the [CCADB Incident Reporting Guidelines](https://www.ccadb.org/cas/incident-report) for all incidents. ## 4. Root Inclusion Submission Process To begin the submission process, [request access](https://www.ccadb.org/cas/request-access) to the CCADB and create a [Root Inclusion Request Case](https://www.ccadb.org/cas/inclusion) in the CCADB. Once all minimum requirements are met, submit the Root Inclusion Request Case in CCADB. CA Owners will be contacted if any additional information is required, and when consideration of the Root Inclusion Request is complete. For more information on the CCADB, please see [https://www.ccadb.org/cas](https://www.ccadb.org/cas). ## 5. Root Program Management Apple accepts and removes Root CA Certificates and CA Owners as it deems appropriate at its sole discretion. Apple prioritizes Root Inclusion Requests as it deems appropriate at its sole discretion. ### 5.1 Constraints The Apple Root Program MAY apply additional constraints to CA Certificates and their hierarchies under exceptional circumstances. These constraints MAY include, but are not limited to, any of the following: * leaf certificates signed before, after, or between configured date(s) will not validate * the maximum allowed validity period for leaf certificates is constrained * the set of policy OIDs asserted in leaf certificates is constrained to a subset of the policy OIDs otherwise allowed for the CA Certificate's designated Trust Purpose * the domain names and/or top-level domains for which leaf certificates will validate are constrained to a subset of what is otherwise allowed for the CA Certificate's designated Trust Purpose ## Appendix A: Trust Purposes The Apple Root Program recognizes the following Trust Purposes: | Trust Purpose | Required EKU(s) | Baseline Requirements | |---------------|-----------------|----------------------| | Server Authentication | id-kp-serverAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1) | TLS BR
EV Guidelines (when issuing EV) | | Legacy TLS | id-kp-serverAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1)
id-kp-clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) | TLS BR
EV Guidelines (when issuing EV) | | Secure Email | id-kp-emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4) | S/MIME BR | | Legacy S/MIME | id-kp-emailProtection (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.4)
id-kp-clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) | S/MIME BR | | Client Authentication | id-kp-clientAuth (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2) | CA-defined (subject to Apple approval) | | Time Stamping | id-kp-timeStamping (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.8) | RFC 3161 and CA-defined (subject to Apple approval) | | VMC | id-kp-BrandIndicatorforMessageIdentification (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.31) | VMC Requirements | **Baseline Requirements Definitions:** * **TLS BR**: CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates * **EV Guidelines**: CA/Browser Forum Guidelines for the Issuance and Management of Extended Validation Certificates * **S/MIME BR**: CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted S/MIME Certificates * **VMC Requirements**: AuthIndicators Working Group Minimum Security Requirements for Issuance of Mark Certificates **Additional Notes:** * For all Trust Purposes, Subordinate CA Certificates (including Cross-Signed CA Certificates) signed on or after 2026-08-01 MUST contain only the EKU(s) specified for that Trust Purpose. * For all Trust Purposes, subscriber (end-entity) certificates MUST contain one or more of the EKU(s) specified for that Trust Purpose. * For "Legacy S/MIME," the id-kp-clientAuth EKU MUST be used only for S/MIME-related client authentication as permitted by the S/MIME Baseline Requirements. * Root CA Certificates included before this policy version that support multiple Trust Purposes MAY continue operating under existing configurations, except where explicitly mentioned in this policy. Apple reserves the right to require transition to single-purpose operation. * For the "Legacy TLS" and "Legacy S/MIME" Trust Purposes, a single CP/CPS governs the issuance of subscriber certificates containing either the base EKU alone (`id-kp-serverAuth` or `id-kp-emailProtection`, respectively) or the combination of the base EKU and `id-kp-clientAuth`. Certificates containing only `id-kp-clientAuth` are not permitted under these Trust Purposes and MUST be issued under a CP/CPS scoped to the "Client Authentication" Trust Purpose. * Any certificate containing one or more EKUs listed in the Trust Purposes table is considered to be issued exclusively for the corresponding Trust Purpose(s) and MUST adhere to the Baseline Requirements specified for that purpose in the table. * Subscriber certificates issued under a Trust Purpose defined in this Appendix and signed before 2027-07-01 MAY contain EKU combinations that do not conform to the single Trust Purpose scoping defined in this Appendix, provided the certificate otherwise complies with all applicable Baseline Requirements. * Subordinate CA Certificates signed before 2026-08-01 MAY be multi-purpose. Subscriber certificates issued from them MAY contain EKUs not defined in this Appendix, provided such use cases are covered by a compliant audit against the WebTrust or ETSI criteria listed in Section 1.1, or another framework Apple has approved in writing, and those details are documented within a corresponding CP/CPS.