Phantom — Delegate supported API work to AI

Phantom

**Your agent can use the key. It never sees it.** Delegate more to AI without putting real keys in agent context. Phantom replaces project secrets with scoped `phm_` placeholders. Applications use those placeholders through an authenticated local proxy, while agents use value-blind MCP tools for inventory, diagnostics, and governed requests. [![GitHub stars](https://img.shields.io/github/stars/ashlrai/phantom-secrets?style=for-the-badge&logo=github&color=blue&labelColor=0b0b14)](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/stargazers) [![CI](https://img.shields.io/github/actions/workflow/status/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/ci.yml?style=for-the-badge&label=CI&logo=github&labelColor=0b0b14)](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [![Verified GitHub release](https://img.shields.io/badge/verified_GitHub_release-v0.7.9-2f81f7?style=for-the-badge&labelColor=0b0b14)](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/tag/v0.7.9) [![Source version](https://img.shields.io/badge/source_version-v0.7.9-f5a623?style=for-the-badge&labelColor=0b0b14)](CHANGELOG.md#079---2026-09-06) [![Pinned toolchain: Rust 1.95](https://img.shields.io/badge/pinned_toolchain-Rust_1.95-CE412B?style=for-the-badge&logo=rust&labelColor=0b0b14)](rust-toolchain.toml) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg?style=for-the-badge&labelColor=0b0b14)](LICENSE) [**Quick start**](#quick-start) · [**Delegate safely**](docs/delegation-quickstart.md) · [**Why Phantom?**](#why-phantom) · [**MCP setup**](#mcp-integration-claude-code-cursor-windsurf-codex) · [**Docs**](docs/README.md) · [**Contribute**](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [**phm.dev**](https://phm.dev)
--- ![phantom init swaps the real keys in .env for phm_ tokens; phantom list shows the vault without values](docs/assets/phantom-secrets-demo.gif) ## Install ```bash brew tap ashlrai/phantom brew trust --formula ashlrai/phantom/phantom brew install ashlrai/phantom/phantom ``` macOS via Homebrew; installs `phantom` and `phantom-mcp` (reviewed `v0.7.9`). Linux and Windows: use the matching [release asset](#exact-v079-github-assets). Then run `phantom init` in your project and `phantom setup --client claude` (or `cursor`, `windsurf`, `codex`). Full walkthrough: [Quick Start](#quick-start). > **▶ [Historical v0.4 demo — current behavior differs](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.4.0/phantom-demo.mp4)**  ·  > **🛡 [Security model](SECURITY.md)**  ·  > **📋 [Threat model](THREAT_MODEL.md)**  ·  > **💬 [Discussions](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/discussions)** ## Start here Choose the smallest path that answers your next question. The first path uses no credential, makes no network request, and does not install or configure Phantom. | Goal | Start | What it establishes | |---|---|---| | See the delegation boundary with no secret or setup | Run `node examples/first-five-minutes/run.mjs`, then read the [first-five-minutes walkthrough](examples/first-five-minutes/README.md) | A deterministic, read-only example contract; not vault, proxy, provider, or deployment acceptance. | | Protect a real local project | Follow [Quick Start](#quick-start) with the reviewed `v0.7.9` GitHub release | Local initialization and diagnostics on your machine. | | Connect an AI coding client | Complete the [first MCP task](#first-mcp-task-verify-the-boundary) | Value-blind capability, status, and repository checks; no provider action. | | Copy a tested client or CI setup | Run the [Claude Code](examples/claude-code/README.md), [Cursor](examples/cursor/README.md), or [GitHub Actions](examples/github-actions/README.md) recipe (`node examples//run.mjs`) | Each recipe runs your `phantom` binaries (from `PATH` or `--phantom `) in a temporary HOME with a fake, non-provider key and is exercised in CI. | | Define a bounded task for an agent | Use the [safe delegation quickstart](docs/delegation-quickstart.md) | A reviewable task contract with explicit authority and acceptance boundaries. | | Evaluate a team rollout | Use the [enterprise adoption guide](docs/enterprise-adoption.md) | A controlled evaluation plan; not a claim of commissioned cloud or enterprise service. | | Audit the trust model first | Read the [security model](SECURITY.md) and [threat model](THREAT_MODEL.md) | Documented controls, assumptions, and residual risks. | ## Why Phantom? AI coding agents routinely work in repositories that also contain local credentials. Once a real API key enters an agent context, transcript, tool call, or generated file, you have lost control of where that value may persist. Traditional secrets managers focus on keys *at rest* and *in transit*. Phantom adds a boundary for agent **context**: - 🔒 **Reduces one credential-exposure path** — managed project dotenv files contain sensitive `phm_` mappings, MCP responses remain value-blind, and exact proxy routes inject their own configured authentication values. Unmanaged files, broader shell authority, and same-user processes remain in the threat model. - ⚡ **Fast local setup** — after installing the reviewed `v0.7.9` GitHub release, `phantom init` protects a project without requiring an account, DNS changes, or a custom CA. - 🧰 **Agent-native integrations** — setup helpers and value-blind MCP workflows for Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and Codex, plus project instructions for GitHub Copilot. - 🦀 **Open source, local-first, MIT** — secrets use the native OS credential store when it is available, with an explicit encrypted-file fallback. Optional cloud sync encrypts vault payloads client-side before the server stores them. ### Project status and trust boundary Phantom's implemented user-facing surfaces are the CLI, vault, authenticated local proxy, MCP server, and optional cloud/team workflows documented below. Cloud and team behavior additionally depends on the deployed service, account plan, and provider configuration; source code alone is not deployment or customer-acceptance evidence. The conversation facade is intentionally narrow: - `phantom_do` is **proposal-only**. It canonicalizes a closed Cargo action and reports its digest, effect, and activation blockers; `execute` is hard denied. - `phantom_setup_workspace` can propose setup, create a bearerless request, and report authenticated status. Applying a request remains a separate trusted-terminal operation. - Advanced MCP tools remain a compatibility catalog, disabled by default, with separate explicit confirmation and informed terminal-approval gates. They are not governed by the conversation facade's capability card. - `phantom grant` retains value-blind lifecycle metadata and design-source foundations, but 0.7.9 hard-denies every live provider issuance/renewal path before credential or network access. A provider grant is not an execution-kernel **authority grant**, broker lease, or permission for an agent to execute work. - The authority, broker, runtime, session, and evidence crates are **inactive, fail-closed foundations**. They do not establish live Locus authority, broker credentials, execute agent actions, or produce externally trusted receipts today. See the [documentation map](docs/README.md), [architecture](docs/architecture.md), [security policy](SECURITY.md), and [threat model](THREAT_MODEL.md) for the evidence behind those boundaries. ## Measured: leak rate on a scripted adversary Reproduce with `python3 eval/leak-rate/harness.py 5` (about 3 minutes, Linux, phantom 0.7.9; fake canary keys only, no paid keys). Method and limits: [eval/leak-rate/README.md](eval/leak-rate/README.md). | setup | in-boundary attacks that exposed a canary key | | --- | --- | | plain `.env`, no protection | 210 of 450 | | after `phantom init` | **0 of 450** | 450 = 30 attack techniques x 3 secrets x 5 runs (`cat .env`, `printenv`, `/proc/self/environ`, base64 and hex dumps, `git add -f`, `ps eww`, `phantom reveal`/`export`/`exec`, every MCP tool called with `confirm=true`, and a README prompt injection the scripted agent obeys). Per-technique table: [eval/leak-rate/table.md](eval/leak-rate/table.md). What this does not show: it is a scripted worst case, not an LLM, so it measures where a key can appear, not how often a model goes looking. One out-of-scope case is reported separately: an unmanaged key file the developer never put in `.env` stays readable (15 of 15 in both setups). Same-user access to the OS keychain is outside the documented boundary and is not tested. Proxy use of a key on an allowed route is by design. One machine, no external audit. ## Quick Start Install both binaries from the reviewed [`v0.7.9` GitHub release](#installation). On macOS, the Homebrew formula is the shortest path; it installs the reviewed `v0.7.9` binaries: ```bash $ brew tap ashlrai/phantom $ brew trust --formula ashlrai/phantom/phantom $ brew install ashlrai/phantom/phantom ``` For exact `v0.7.9` on macOS, Linux, or Windows, use the matching release asset in [Installation](#installation). Then protect and verify the project: ```bash $ phantom init # Auto-detects .env, .env.local, or .env in subdirectories # Stores real secrets in the native credential store or encrypted vault, # then rewrites .env with phantom tokens # Auto-configures Claude Code MCP server if detected $ phantom agent doctor # One human-readable readiness check for AI-agent safety $ phantom exec -- claude # Authenticated proxy running on an ephemeral 127.0.0.1 port # App/test processes use phantom tokens; agents use value-blind metadata ``` For a task contract you can hand to Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Windsurf, or Copilot, use the [safe delegation quickstart](docs/delegation-quickstart.md) and the [copyable policy and task templates](examples/agent-delegation/README.md). Teams evaluating a controlled rollout can start with the [enterprise adoption guide](docs/enterprise-adoption.md). ### Windows The same core command surface is implemented for native Windows, with remaining native acceptance limits tracked in the platform matrix. Install the exact `v0.7.9` Windows ZIP for your architecture from [Installation](#installation), verify its published `.sha256` sidecar, and place both executables on `PATH`. WSL is a separate Linux environment with its own filesystem and credential-store context. For an explicitly supervised foreground proxy, run `phantom start` with stdin, stdout, and stderr each attached to a trusted terminal. Terminal attachment is an admission check, not proof of who controls a PTY. The CLI detects your shell and prints the matching env-var syntax; copy those exports into the terminal that launches the client, keep the owning terminal open, and press Ctrl-C there to stop. Detached `--daemon` mode and external process control are fail-closed until Phantom has a separately reviewed private cross-platform control channel. `phantom stop` only authenticates a legacy v0.7.3 `.phantom.pid` session to report migration guidance; v0.7.3 had no authenticated shutdown endpoint, so the new binary never kills that process or deletes its record. Stop it from its owning v0.7.3 terminal with Ctrl-C, or use the bounded recovery procedure in [Troubleshooting](docs/troubleshooting.md). For reference: **PowerShell:** ```powershell $env:OPENAI_BASE_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:PORT/openai/_phantom/TOKEN/" $env:PHANTOM_PROXY_PORT = "PORT" $env:PHANTOM_PROXY_TOKEN = "TOKEN" ``` **cmd.exe:** ```cmd set OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:PORT/openai/_phantom/TOKEN/ set PHANTOM_PROXY_PORT=PORT set PHANTOM_PROXY_TOKEN=TOKEN ``` **Git Bash / WSL:** use the `export X=Y` syntax from the main quick-start. Notes: - `PHANTOM_PROXY_TOKEN` is the proxy session authenticator. By default, `phantom exec` and `phantom start` include it in local `*_BASE_URL` values as `/_phantom/TOKEN/` so unmodified SDKs work. Header-aware clients can set `PHANTOM_PROXY_HEADER_AUTH_ONLY=1` and send `x-phantom-proxy-token: $PHANTOM_PROXY_TOKEN` instead. - If `phantom.exe` is blocked by Windows application-control policy, do not automatically remove Mark-of-the-Web. First verify the archive checksum and both binary identities against the release metadata. If local policy permits the verified binaries, a user may then remove the mark explicitly with PowerShell: `Get-ChildItem "$env:USERPROFILE\.phantom-secrets\bin\*.exe" | Unblock-File`. - The pre-commit hook installed by `phantom init` is a `#!/bin/sh` script. Native git from the command line invokes it via Git for Windows' bundled `sh.exe`, which is what the official Git for Windows installer ships. GUI clients (GitHub Desktop, some IDE integrations) may run with a stripped-down `PATH` that lacks `sh.exe` and silently skip the hook — for these, run commits from a terminal, or use `phantom check --staged` directly. CI is the durable safety net regardless. - The immutable `v0.7.9` release contains x64 and ARM64 Windows ZIPs, and both native Windows rows passed the tag-bound release acceptance workflow. The archives are not Authenticode-signed; this receipt does not prove every enterprise application-control policy will accept them. See the [platform support matrix](docs/platform-support.md). ## How It Works ``` .env file (AI read denied) OS Keychain / Vault +--------------------------+ +---------------------+ | OPENAI_API_KEY=phm_a7f3 | ---> | sk-real-secret-key | | STRIPE_KEY=phm_c9d1... | | sk_live_real-key... | +--------------------------+ +---------------------+ | | v v App / test process Phantom Proxy (127.0.0.1) +--------------------------+ +------------------------------+ | Loads phm_ tokens | | Intercepts HTTP requests | | Agent gets MCP metadata | ---> | Injects route-owned auth key | | Makes API calls to proxy | | Forwards over TLS to real API| +--------------------------+ +------------------------------+ ``` 1. `phantom init` reads `.env`, stores real secrets in the native OS credential store or encrypted-file fallback, and rewrites `.env` with `phm_` tokens 2. `phantom exec -- claude` starts a local reverse proxy, sets SDK-compatible service base URLs such as `OPENAI_BASE_URL=http://127.0.0.1:PORT/openai/_phantom/TOKEN/`, exposes `PHANTOM_PROXY_TOKEN` to the child process, and launches the command 3. API calls hit the proxy, which authenticates the local session, removes its local auth token, injects only the matched route's vault value into that route's exact configured authentication header, and forwards over TLS. Client-controlled headers and bodies never resolve `phm_` tokens. 4. When the session ends, the proxy shuts down and its bearer is invalid. `phantom exec` also replaces project tokens with fresh child-process tokens for that run. Project `phm_` values persist until rotation; they are not provider credentials and are never client-resolved, but a process controlling an authenticated active proxy can still invoke its configured provider routes. Phantom does not grant AI tools permission to read `.env` or other dotenv files. `phantom setup` removes legacy Phantom-managed dotenv read grants and preserves deny rules; agents use value-blind MCP inventory instead. ### Provider grants `phantom grant` retains value-blind lifecycle metadata and provider protocol design foundations. In 0.7.9, all live provider issuance, enrollment exchange, refresh, renewal, and revocation execution is hard-denied before Phantom reads a provider credential or opens a provider network connection. Do not use grant or rotation commands expecting a vendor-side change. Test-only mocks demonstrate local transaction behavior only; they are not live-provider acceptance. In these docs, **provider grant** means design-era credential lifecycle metadata; no live grant flow runs in 0.7.9. **Authority grant** means the inactive, value-free execution authority type in `phantom-authority`. A provider grant cannot be reinterpreted as an authority grant, Locus credential, broker lease, or execution permit. See the [design-era grant lifecycle specification](docs/grants-spec.md); the [issuance contract](ISSUANCE_CONTRACT.md) is the original design contract and retains design-era status language. ## MCP Integration (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex) Phantom ships an MCP server so AI coding tools can inspect value-blind metadata and request gated lifecycle operations. MCP responses do not return real secret values. ### First MCP task: verify the boundary Use this read-only path before exploring the full tool catalog: 1. Install both binaries from the reviewed [`v0.7.9` GitHub release](#installation). 2. From the project you want to inspect, run `phantom setup --client codex`, replacing `codex` with `claude`, `cursor`, or `windsurf` when appropriate. 3. Restart the AI client so it loads the generated MCP configuration. 4. Ask the client: “Call `phantom_capability`, then `phantom_status`. Report the value-blind authority, hard denials, project ID, dotenv protection counts, and service mappings. Do not request or reveal secret values.” 5. Ask the client: “Call `phantom_check` with no arguments. Report findings without changing files or credentials.” These calls inspect the configured local surface. They do not prove that cloud, team, deployment, provider, authority-kernel, or customer workflows are active or accepted. - **Conversation facade** — `phantom_capability` reports authority and hard denials for the small facade (not the separately gated advanced compatibility catalog); `phantom_do` canonicalizes one closed Cargo action and reports the exact activation blockers without executing it; `phantom_setup_workspace` proposes an exact value-blind plan, creates a bearerless apply request after revalidation, or reads authenticated request status. Provisioning the machine-local seal key and creating a request both require `confirm` plus an out-of-band approval token; MCP never claims or applies the request. - **Vault** — `phantom_list_secrets`, `phantom_status`, `phantom_init`, `phantom_add_secret_interactive`, `phantom_add_secret` (deprecated; refuses plaintext), `phantom_remove_secret`, `phantom_rotate`, `phantom_copy_secret` - **Detection + diagnostics** — `phantom_doctor`, `phantom_why`, `phantom_check`, `phantom_env`, `phantom_validate_secret`, `phantom_validate_all` - **Local-to-cloud** — `phantom_wrap`, `phantom_unwrap`, `phantom_sync`, `phantom_cloud_push`, `phantom_cloud_pull`, `phantom_cloud_status` - **Teams** — `phantom_team_list`, `phantom_team_create`, `phantom_team_members`, `phantom_team_invite`, `phantom_team_key_publish`, `phantom_team_vault_push`, `phantom_team_vault_pull` - **Advanced audit, rotation, expiry, and compliance** — `phantom_audit_recent`, `phantom_audit_stats`, `phantom_audit_analytics`, `phantom_audit_anomalies`, `phantom_audit_anomalies_realtime`, `phantom_audit_hotspot_alerts`, `phantom_audit_incidents`, `phantom_leak_incidents_realtime`, `phantom_audit_alerts`, `phantom_audit_export_report`, `phantom_compliance_status`, `phantom_rotate_with_candidate`, `phantom_rotate_promote`, `phantom_rotate_provider`, `phantom_rotate_with_expiry`, `phantom_list_with_expiry`, `phantom_secret_rotation_due`, `phantom_validation_schedule`, `phantom_validation_history`, `phantom_secrets_expiry_check`, `phantom_secrets_auto_rotate`, `phantom_expiry_enforce`, `phantom_rotation_schedule_next`, `phantom_apply_expiry_policy` `phantom_secrets_auto_rotate` and `phantom_rotate_with_expiry` are deprecated compatibility names for approved local `phm_` token remaps. They do not rotate a provider credential, renew TTL/`rotated_at` metadata, clear leak incidents, or sync credentials. `phantom_rotate_provider` is also hard-denied before credential or network access in 0.7.9. Team invites may assign only `member` or `admin`; ownership transfer is not an invite role. Tools that write state, retrieve or use credentials, or make provider/network requests are disabled by default. They can reach their `confirm: true` and one-use `approval_token` gates only when the operator sets `PHANTOM_MCP_EFFECTS=trusted-terminal` in a server environment outside agent authority. `phantom mcp-approve` requires attached stdin/stderr, shows the bounded value-blind effect plus exact parameters, and requires a fresh typed challenge before approval. A same-user shell or agent-controlled PTY can defeat that ceremony; leave effects disabled unless the approval command and `~/.phantom` approval storage are outside the requesting agent's authority. Conditional tools keep their inspection mode ungated and activate both gates only for the effectful parameters. Real secret values are never accepted as MCP tool arguments; new secrets are entered out-of-band in a trusted terminal. The exact 54-tool names, descriptions, and JSON schemas are mirrored from runtime `tools/list` into [`mcp-registry/server.json`](mcp-registry/server.json), and release smoke tests reject any drift. `phantom_rotate_with_candidate` and `phantom_rotate_promote` remain in the 54-tool compatibility catalog as deprecated hard denials. They never create, validate, or promote a candidate and never change vault or shadow metadata; `phantom_rotate_provider` is also hard-denied before credential or network access in 0.7.9. `phantom add` creates new names only and refuses existing-name replacement before reading a value. Replacing a credential therefore requires a separately reviewed provider rotation plus an explicit trusted-terminal remove-and-add sequence; those are distinct, non-atomic operations. Workspace setup is deliberately split across trust boundaries. MCP can call `phantom_setup_workspace` with `phase=propose`, then `phase=request_apply` using the exact returned `plan_id` and `pre_state_id`. The first proposal requires dual approval only when it must provision the machine-local plan-seal key; `request_apply` always requires dual approval because it persists a value-free request outside the repository. Apply it from an attached trusted terminal with `phantom workspace apply --request `; MCP has no claim or apply operation. One command per AI client — Phantom writes the right config file in the right place: ```bash phantom setup --client claude # project MCP; see docs/claude-code.md for v0.7.9 migration phantom setup --client cursor # ~/.cursor/mcp.json phantom setup --client windsurf # ~/.codeium/windsurf/mcp_config.json phantom setup --client codex # ~/.codex/config.toml phantom setup --client gemini # ~/.gemini/settings.json (Gemini CLI) phantom setup --client claude --print # snippet to stdout for any other client ``` Install both `v0.7.9` release binaries before setup. Version `0.7.9` records the running `phantom` executable with `mcp serve` when it can resolve that executable, otherwise it looks for a local standalone `phantom-mcp`. Setup has no network package-runner fallback and fails closed when neither local runtime is executable. Inspect the generated entry, then restart the AI tool so it picks up the new config. Phantom's stdio MCP server can be configured in MCP clients that support local command servers. The setup writer currently has reviewed presets for Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, Codex, and Gemini CLI; other clients require their own compatible configuration. ## Cloud backup + Dashboard Back up and restore a vault on the same keychain machine with client-side encryption. Phantom Cloud receives the encrypted vault payload rather than the decrypted secret values; endpoint, client, account, and OS-keychain security remain part of the trust boundary. The cloud encryption key is generated and stored in the local OS keychain. Phantom does not currently ship key transfer or recovery, so account sign-in without that key cannot decrypt this backup. Login, logout, cloud push/pull, and browser open are not headless agent actions: run them with stdin, stdout, and stderr attached to a terminal outside the requesting agent's authority and complete each fresh exact typed challenge. The public hosted service is not currently commissioned for authenticated cloud or dashboard use. The commands below document the source-backed flow for a future verified deployment and entitled account; they are not a live-service acceptance receipt. ```bash $ phantom login # Opens GitHub OAuth (device code flow) $ phantom cloud push # After commissioning: encrypted client-side and uploaded to the configured service $ phantom cloud pull # restore on the machine that holds the original cloud key # Downloaded and decrypted locally $ phantom open # After commissioning: opens the configured read-only dashboard. ``` Cloud backup uses ChaCha20-Poly1305 with a random client-side passphrase stored in the OS keychain and derived via Argon2id for encryption. The server stores only ciphertext. Team vaults are separate: they wrap a shared vault key to each registered member's X25519 public key; that does not make personal cloud backups portable. ## Team vaults (source-backed pilot) The repository includes fixed-membership team-vault workflows intended for a planned hosted Pro pilot. Pilot eligibility, team and vault limits, and pricing are TBD; no self-serve checkout is commissioned. The service path stores ciphertext plus per-member encrypted key shares. Team roles gate invitation management, but all members can read and write the shared vault; member removal and atomic offboarding rotation are not shipped. Treat this as a pilot capability until the hosted service and account entitlement are commissioned. CLI team mutations require the same attached trusted-terminal ceremony before credential, keypair, vault-value, or network access. MCP team reads and writes are provider requests and remain disabled by default behind `confirm` plus a one-use out-of-band approval token. ```bash $ phantom team create "engineering" # Creates a team; you become the owner. $ phantom team invite # Invites by GitHub login. $ phantom team key-publish # Registers your X25519 public key on the team. # (Run once per team; the private key stays in the OS keychain.) $ phantom team vault-push # Encrypts the current project's vault with a fresh symmetric key, # wraps that key (X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305) for every member that # has a registered public key, then uploads. $ phantom team vault-pull # on a teammate's machine # Pulls, decrypts the per-member share with their private key, # decrypts the vault, writes secrets locally. ``` ### Experimental: X-Wing hybrid team share The `pq-hybrid` cargo feature adds an experimental X-Wing (X25519 + ML-KEM-768) team key share. It is off by default and does not change default behavior: the default build keeps the X25519 share described above. The X-Wing share is local only. phm.dev does not accept it yet, because the hosted team key route takes 32-byte public keys and an X-Wing public key is 1216 bytes. The `x-wing` and `ml-kem` crates are unaudited, and X-Wing is pre-1.0. Do not rely on it for production secrets. ### Proxy upstream TLS key exchange The proxy's HTTPS client uses the aws-lc-rs provider and offers the hybrid X25519MLKEM768 group first, then X25519, secp256r1 and secp384r1. A hybrid key exchange is used only if the upstream server supports it. A hermetic test confirms that a local server accepting only X25519MLKEM768 negotiates it with the proxy, and that a server sharing no group with the proxy fails the handshake. Which group a given provider negotiates is not tested. To see the groups this build offers, read from the proxy's own TLS config: ```bash phantom doctor --pq ``` After a hosted deployment is commissioned and accepted, its read-only team dashboard is designed to show team memberships and member lists. ## Command Reference | Command | Description | |---------|-------------| | `phantom init` | Import `.env` secrets into vault and rewrite with phantom tokens. Use `--empty` to initialize a new project before its first `phantom add`; `add` does not auto-create project state. `--all ` processes eligible repositories found by the bounded five-level scan; discovery stops below the first matching repository. Use `--dry-run` to inspect the exact set and `--jobs N` / `-j N` to control parallelism. An existing `.env.example` is left unchanged. | | `phantom exec -- ` | Start an authenticated proxy and run a command with secret injection | | `phantom start` | Run an explicitly supervised foreground proxy; keep its trusted terminal open and press Ctrl-C there to stop | | `phantom start --daemon` / `phantom stop` | Detached start fails closed; stop is a TTY-only legacy-state diagnostic that never kills or deletes, not current process control | | `phantom list` | Show secret names stored in vault (never values; `--json` for machine-readable output) | | `phantom add ` | Create a new secret name transactionally in an initialized project through a hidden terminal prompt or trusted `--stdin` producer; existing names are denied before any value read and are never replaced | | `phantom remove ` | After exact trusted-terminal confirmation, transactionally remove the vault value, lifecycle config, and exact managed-dotenv mapping; headless use fails before value access or mutation | | `phantom reveal ` | From an attached trusted terminal, review and type the exact challenge before printing one value or copying it for an auto-cleared 30-second clipboard window | | `phantom status` | Show vault/mapping state and whether the machine-local lifecycle lock is held; a held lock does not authenticate or identify a listener. `--json` emits the value-free [status contract](docs/hub-status-contract.md) | | `phantom rotate` | After an exact attached-terminal challenge bound to the project, config, managed dotenv, and sorted protected-name digest, regenerate every local phantom token (old mappings become invalid). Headless use fails before vault access or mutation. Provider-backed `--name`/`--provider` execution is hard-denied before credential or network access in 0.7.9. | | `phantom grant add ` | Reserved provider-enrollment surface; hard-denied before credential or network access in 0.7.9. See [Provider grants](#provider-grants). | | `phantom grant list` / `status` | Read provider-grant names, providers, lifecycle state, and expiry metadata without returning credential values. | | `phantom grant revoke ` | Reserved remote-revocation surface; currently fails closed before local mutation because provider revocation is not wired. | | `phantom doctor` | Check configuration and vault health (`--fix` to auto-repair). Reports install source, vault backend, audit-log status, Argon2 params, and MCP wiring per client | | `phantom agent report` | Emit a read-only AI-agent readiness report (`--json` for automation). Reports `unsafe`, `protected`, `verified`, `team-ready`, or `compliance-ready` | | `phantom agent doctor` | Human-readable agent readiness view backed by the same policy engine; `--json` emits the value-free [preflight contract](docs/agent-preflight-contract.md) (`--vault` to probe the vault, `--strict` for verdict exit codes) | | `phantom agent setup` | Preview or apply safe defaults for agent use (`--dry-run` first, `--apply` to write changes) | | `phantom workspace plan [--json]` | Build an exact sealed setup plan and create a value-free pending request; does not change the workspace or vault | | `phantom workspace apply --request ` | Recompute and claim the exact request in an attached trusted terminal, require typed confirmation, then apply transactionally with rollback on failure | | `phantom workspace status --request [--json]` | Read authenticated, value-free request state | | `phantom vault migrate-linux` | From an attached trusted terminal on a headed Linux desktop, copy and exactly verify this project's keyutils credentials in Secret Service, retain the source entries, and publish the private backend marker last | | `phantom check` | Scan for unprotected secrets (pre-commit hook, `--staged`, `--runtime`) | | `phantom sync` | Push secrets to Vercel / Railway (`--dry-run --json` previews safely; `--only PATTERN` filters by glob, repeatable) | | `phantom pull` | Pull secrets from Vercel / Railway into vault | | `phantom setup` | Wire Phantom into an AI client. `--client claude` (default), `cursor`, `windsurf`, `codex`, or `gemini`. Add `--print` to emit the config snippet to stdout. `--status` is read-only: it reports which clients have Phantom wired (`--json` for automation) | | `phantom mcp serve` | Run the MCP stdio server in-process; this is the entry `phantom setup` writes into AI-client configs | | `phantom mcp-approve ` | From an attached trusted terminal, review the bounded value-blind effect and exact parameters for a pending MCP nonce, type its fresh challenge, and receive the one-use `approval_token` | | `phantom env` | Generate `.env.example` for team onboarding | | `phantom export` | From an attached trusted terminal, review an exact value-blind plan, type its fresh challenge, and enter a dedicated passphrase through the hidden prompt. Export `--passphrase-file`, plaintext export, argv passphrases, existing targets, symlinks, and paths outside the project fail closed. | | `phantom import` | From an attached trusted terminal, review and type the exact source/target/name/overwrite challenge before restoring a backup or importing Doppler, Infisical, dotenvx, 1Password, or env data. `--force` selects the reviewed overwrite set but never bypasses consent. A bounded private passphrase file is accepted only on non-Windows platforms and still requires the terminal ceremony. | | `phantom audit show` | Print recent audit events from the newest 8 MiB of the log (`--last N`, `--op OP`, `--name NAME`, `--json`); says when older events were not examined or lines were skipped. Requires `PHANTOM_AUDIT=1` | | `phantom audit tail` | Follow the audit log live (`--op`, `--name` filters) | | `phantom audit path` | Print the absolute path to the audit log file | | `phantom audit verify` | Verify HMAC-SHA256 chain integrity; exits 1 if tampering detected | | `phantom leaks plan` | Read-only dry run of what leak response would do for active incidents (`--min-confidence`, `--json`). Writes nothing, makes no network calls, prints names only. Reads the optional `[leak_response]` policy (`on_leak = "off" | "plan" | "revoke"`, default `plan`; `revoke` needs `allow_revoke = true` and still only plans because live revoke is disabled in shipped builds) | | `phantom login` | From an attached trusted terminal, approve an exact network plan, then separately approve browser opening/polling and keychain persistence | | `phantom logout` | From an attached trusted terminal, approve deletion of persistent cloud authorization from the OS keychain | | `phantom cloud push` | After exact trusted-terminal confirmation, push a client-encrypted vault. Refused before the prompt when a secret is overdue under enforced rotation, demoted to read-only, or has unreadable lifecycle metadata. A remote success followed by local reconciliation failure is partial success and must not be retried automatically. | | `phantom cloud pull` | After exact trusted-terminal confirmation, pull and decrypt a vault. With `force=false`, skipped existing entries preserve the prior merge base and block later push until a fully reconciled approved pull. | | `phantom cloud status` | Authenticated provider read; requires attached trusted terminals and an exact challenge before stored-bearer or network access | | `phantom wrap` | Wrap package.json scripts with `phantom exec` automatically | | `phantom unwrap` | Restore original package.json scripts | | `phantom watch` | Watch managed dotenv files and report new unprotected secrets. `--auto` hard-denies before mutation in 0.7.9; use transactional `phantom init`. | | `phantom why ` | Explain why a key is or is not protected and how `phantom exec` delivers it (`no_route` means no built-in proxy route injects it). Works before init; `--json` prints the same shape as MCP `phantom_why` | | `phantom copy ` | Copy a secret to an initialized target after exact trusted-terminal confirmation; refuses existing target vault, config, or managed-dotenv ownership rather than overwriting | | `phantom team list/members` | Authenticated, value-blind provider reads. CLI requires attached trusted terminals and an exact challenge before bearer/network access; MCP requires `confirm` plus out-of-band approval. | | `phantom team create/invite/key-publish/vault-push/vault-pull/rotate-vault` | Run CLI team effects only from an attached trusted terminal and complete the exact challenge before credential, keypair, vault-value, or network access. Invites assign only `member` or `admin`. | | `phantom validate` / `--watch` | Send selected credentials to configured validators only after exact trusted-terminal consent; watch authorization ends when config or the vault name set changes | | `phantom validate schedule` | Read status without mutation; setting or disabling persistent scheduler policy requires attached terminals and an exact typed challenge | | `phantom expiry set` | Persist lifecycle policy only after attached-terminal confirmation; `expiry enforce` is read-only, while `expiry rotate` is only a deprecated local token remap | | `phantom secrets-expiring-soon` | List expired or expiring secrets (`--days N`, default 7; `--json`). `--auto-rotate` is a deprecated local `phm_` token remap only; provider credentials and expiry metadata stay unchanged, and `--sync` is rejected | | `phantom open [page]` | From an attached trusted terminal, open only the reviewed aliases `dashboard`, `billing`, `team`, `docs`, `pricing`, `github`, `issues`, or `site`; arbitrary URLs, paths, and unknown aliases are rejected | | `phantom upgrade` | `--check-only` performs a read-only version lookup only for an eligible standalone install. Live standalone replacement requires attached terminals and two exact challenges; managed installs route to their owner, ambiguous installs fail closed, and `--force` is rejected. | | `phantom completion ` | Print a shell-completion script (bash, zsh, fish, powershell, elvish) | | `phantom crypto inventory` | List the algorithms and format tags Phantom uses, with role, status and quantum class (`--format text` or `json`). Reads no vault, key, or config; not a CycloneDX CBOM | ## Rotating real provider credentials Phantom 0.7.9 does **not** execute live provider issuance or rotation. Every provider path—single-provider CLI, batch CLI, MCP, grant enrollment, additive issuance, and destructive/rolling refresh—is hard-denied before provider credential access and before network I/O. Operators must rotate at the vendor, then use Phantom's trusted local secret-entry path. Source adapters and exact `cfg(test)` mocks are transaction-design evidence, not provider activation, commissioning, or acceptance. ### Provider support matrix | Provider | Support | Notes | |----------|---------|-------| | `vercel` | Hard denied | Additive issuance can orphan a live successor after a local failure; no provider call in 0.7.9 | | `google` | Hard denied | Secret Manager version creation remains disabled pending durable successor recovery and verified abort | | `github` | Hard denied | GitHub App installation-token issuance remains disabled pending the same recovery contract | | `stripe` | Hard denied | Raw keys are manual; rolling OAuth refresh can invalidate the predecessor before successor recovery | | `aws` | Hard denied | SigV4 access-key-pair rotation is not implemented | | `sentry` | Hard denied | Installation-token issuance remains disabled pending durable successor recovery | | `supabase` | Hard denied | PAT rotation is manual; OAuth/additive issuance paths are not commissioned | `phantom rotate --batch` remains metadata-only discovery/manual guidance and fails closed before vendor execution. No single-provider exception exists. ## Features - **Encrypted vault** -- macOS Keychain, Linux keyutils by default, or Windows Credential Manager, with a ChaCha20-Poly1305 encrypted-file fallback for CI and headless environments. Linux keyutils entries do not survive a reboot; a headed Linux project can run `phantom vault migrate-linux` from a trusted terminal to copy and verify its vault in persistent Secret Service before switching. Phantom does not claim Secure Enclave hardware binding. Argon2id uses m=64 MiB, t=3, p=1. - **Phantom tokens** -- 256-bit CSPRNG `phm_` placeholders in `.env`, rotatable on demand - **Authenticated proxy sessions** -- each proxy run generates a fresh `PHANTOM_PROXY_TOKEN`; CLI-generated SDK URLs include it for compatibility, and header-aware clients can opt into `x-phantom-proxy-token` with `PHANTOM_PROXY_HEADER_AUTH_ONLY=1` - **Route-owned credential injection** -- Client headers and bodies never resolve `phm_` tokens. After authenticating and matching an exact built-in route, the proxy injects that route's configured vault secret only into its fixed authentication header; a missing mapping fails before any upstream call. Request bodies are still collected under a hard byte cap before forwarding. Custom routes: `phantom start` serves custom routes from `.phantom.toml`; `phantom exec` refuses them and runs only Phantom's exact built-in routes. The reason: `phantom start` is run by a person on project config they have reviewed. `phantom exec` launches an agent, and anything in the repository, `.phantom.toml` included, may have been written by that agent or by an untrusted change, so accepting custom routes there would widen the attack surface. - **Full SSE/streaming support** -- Response streaming preserved end-to-end for OpenAI, Anthropic, and other streaming APIs - **Smart detection** -- Heuristic engine distinguishes secrets (`*_KEY`, `*_TOKEN`, `sk-*`, `ghp_*`) from config (`NODE_ENV`, `PORT`) - **Platform sync** -- Push/pull secrets to Vercel and Railway - **Pre-commit hook** -- Runs `phantom check --staged` when Git invokes the hook; it checks staged dotenv content plus a bounded set of hardcoded-key prefixes. Hooks can be bypassed or skipped, so CI and a broader secret scanner remain necessary. - **MCP server** -- value-blind vault, diagnostics, cloud, team, audit, rotation, validation, expiry, and compliance responses for Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, and Codex; effectful compatibility tools remain separately gated and disabled by default - **Cloud backup** -- client-encrypted same-keychain-machine backup and restore; key transfer and recovery are not shipped, and deployed-service and account configuration remain separate operational gates - **Export/import** -- Encrypted export requires an attached terminal, exact challenge, and hidden passphrase; export passphrase files, plaintext, and argv passphrases are disabled. Import uses its own exact terminal ceremony; only non-Windows encrypted-backup import may read a bounded private passphrase file. Competitor imports support Doppler, Infisical, dotenvx, 1Password, and plain `.env`. - **Tamper-evident audit log** -- `PHANTOM_AUDIT=1` writes vault events as JSONL to `~/.phantom/audit.log`. Each entry is chained with HMAC-SHA256; `phantom audit verify` detects tampering. `phantom audit show/tail/path` for log access. - **Response scrubbing** -- Scrubs configured secret values from supported API response paths before returning data to the caller - **Script wrapping** -- `phantom wrap` wraps selected runtime/build scripts (`dev`, `start`, `serve`, `build`, `deploy`; anything else, such as `preview`, only with `--only`) and deliberately leaves test, lint, type, and format scripts alone, with the same selection in the CLI and the MCP `phantom_wrap` tool; a script that is a shell command line (`VAR=value cmd`, `a && b`, pipes) is left unchanged and reported, because `phantom exec` runs one program without a shell - **Watch mode** -- `phantom watch` reports new unprotected secrets; legacy `--auto` hard-denies before mutation, so protection stays a reviewed transactional `phantom init` - **Multi-project scanner** -- `phantom init --all ` processes eligible repositories found within a five-level bounded scan and stops below the first matching repository; use `--dry-run` to verify the exact set and `--jobs N` to control parallelism - **Multi-IDE setup** -- `phantom setup --client claude|cursor|windsurf|codex|gemini` writes the right MCP config for each AI tool, or `--print` for a generic snippet - **Agent readiness** -- `phantom agent doctor` and `phantom agent report --json` report bounded protection findings and activation gaps; they do not certify a repository or agent as safe - **Enriched diagnostics** -- `phantom doctor` reports install source, vault backend, audit-log status, Argon2 params, and MCP wiring per client - **Secret explainer** -- `phantom why ` explains detection heuristics - **Cross-project copy** -- `phantom copy` shares secrets between project vaults - **Team vaults** -- Fixed-membership encrypted sharing; owner/admin roles gate invitations, while current vault access is member-wide and offboarding rotation is not shipped - **Fail-closed service routing** -- agentic proxy sessions accept Phantom's exact built-in OpenAI, Anthropic, Stripe, Supabase, and other reviewed routes; repository-defined destinations are rejected pending trusted-terminal approval support - **Threat model** -- See [THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md) for assets, actors, mitigations, and known gaps ## Installation ### Homebrew (macOS; formula at v0.7.9) Homebrew 6 requires explicit formula trust for third-party taps: ```bash $ brew tap ashlrai/phantom $ brew trust --formula ashlrai/phantom/phantom $ brew install ashlrai/phantom/phantom ``` This formula installs both `phantom` and `phantom-mcp` from the immutable [`v0.7.9` GitHub release](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/tag/v0.7.9). The tap was bumped from `v0.7.8` to `v0.7.9` in ashlrai/homebrew-phantom#7. A `v0.7.8` Homebrew install wrote Claude Code MCP registration to the legacy location; see the [Claude Code guide](docs/claude-code.md) for the manual `.mcp.json` step, or use the `v0.7.9` assets below. ### Exact v0.7.9 GitHub assets Use the asset matching your OS and architecture. Download its adjacent `.sha256` file from the release, verify it before extraction, and place both `phantom` and `phantom-mcp` (`.exe` on Windows) on `PATH`. | Platform | `v0.7.9` archive | Published checksum | |---|---|---| | macOS Apple Silicon | [`phantom-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz) | [`sha256`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz.sha256) | | macOS Intel | [`phantom-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz) | [`sha256`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-x86_64-apple-darwin.tar.gz.sha256) | | Linux x86_64 | [`phantom-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz) | [`sha256`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz.sha256) | | Linux ARM64 | [`phantom-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz) | [`sha256`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-aarch64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz.sha256) | | Windows x64 | [`phantom-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip) | [`sha256`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-x86_64-pc-windows-msvc.zip.sha256) | | Windows ARM64 | [`phantom-aarch64-pc-windows-msvc.zip`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-aarch64-pc-windows-msvc.zip) | [`sha256`](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/releases/download/v0.7.9/phantom-aarch64-pc-windows-msvc.zip.sha256) | On Linux, verify with `sha256sum -c .sha256`. On Windows, compare `Get-FileHash -Algorithm SHA256 ` with the published sidecar. ### Build the exact release source The `v0.7.9` tag resolves to source commit `7a51ce512ec4aee12cc29ff859036af63fbe93db`: ```bash $ git clone https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets.git $ cd phantom-secrets $ git checkout 7a51ce512ec4aee12cc29ff859036af63fbe93db $ cargo build --release --locked --bin phantom --bin phantom-mcp ``` Do not treat unpinned package-manager commands as `v0.7.9`. In the exact 2026-09-29 registry snapshot, npm `latest` remains `0.6.0`; the immutable npm `0.7.4` wrappers exist only under `release-candidate` after failing cross-platform acceptance. No npm `0.7.9`, crates.io `0.7.9`, or MCP Registry `0.7.9` publication is represented by this GitHub release receipt. Homebrew is separately published and verified through its tap, which now installs `v0.7.9` (requeried 2026-10-12). ### Release-state snapshot > [!IMPORTANT] > **Release-state snapshot (verified 2026-09-29):** the current release is the > immutable `v0.7.9` GitHub release at source commit > `7a51ce512ec4aee12cc29ff859036af63fbe93db`. Its 19-asset release set, > checksums, archive-specific SPDX SBOMs, GitHub provenance and SBOM > attestations, and all six native release rows are bound to that immutable > release record by tag-bound workflow > [34153902556](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/actions/runs/34153902556). > Exact public registry endpoints were requeried on 2026-09-29. The Homebrew > formula now installs `v0.7.9` (requeried 2026-10-12); > npm `latest` is `0.7.9` as of 2026-10-12 (it was `0.6.0` at this snapshot), and the npm > `0.7.4` wrappers remain quarantined under `release-candidate` after failed > npm-channel acceptance. The GitHub receipt alone does not prove the separately > verified Homebrew formula, an npm or crates.io package, MCP Registry entry, hosted-service > commissioning, provider activation, signing/notarization, certification, or > customer acceptance. See > [release readiness](docs/release-readiness.md) and > [platform support](docs/platform-support.md). ### Connect an MCP client ```bash $ phantom setup --client claude # or cursor, windsurf, codex, gemini ``` ## Architecture The Rust workspace is organized as product crates plus fail-closed execution-kernel foundations. Presence in the workspace does not mean a foundation is activated in production. | Layer | Crate | Role and current status | |-------|-------|-------------------------| | Product | `phantom-core` | Config, dotenv parsing/rewriting, tokens, auth, cloud client, audit, validation, and shared policy. | | Product | `phantom-vault` | `VaultBackend` trait, OS keychain and encrypted-file backends, and shared cryptography. | | Product | `phantom-proxy` | Authenticated loopback reverse proxy with fixed route-owned auth-header injection, inert client tokens, response scrubbing, and streaming support. | | Product | `phantom-cli` | Operator CLI for initialization, proxy lifecycle, readiness, audit, import/export, sync, team, and workspace workflows. | | Product | `phantom-mcp` | Stdio MCP server. The governed conversation facade is narrow; the advanced compatibility catalog uses separate legacy gates. | | Product | `phantom-core/src/issuance`, CLI `grant` | Provider protocol/design foundations and value-free grant metadata. All live provider issuance/enrollment execution is hard-denied before credential or network access in 0.7.9. | | Local effect layer | `phantom-core::fs`, `phantom-vault` transactions | Retained project/config directory capabilities, exact identity/content/permission before-images, no-follow targets, single-link checks, and typed durable, committed-verified-with-durability-warning, or `CommittedButUncertain` (**Partial**) effects. | | Setup kernel | `phantom-workspace` | Value-blind discovery, sealed planning, and recoverable trusted-terminal setup transactions. Non-Unix durable mutation fails closed. | | Inactive foundation | `phantom-authority` | Closed authority contracts and deny-all production verification boundary. No live Locus verifier. | | Inactive foundation | `phantom-locus-contract` | Value-free compatibility contract describing requirements for a future Phantom/Locus integration. | | Inactive foundation | `phantom-broker` | Bounded broker protocol and durable replay/accounting primitives. No active transport, lease issuer, or runtime connection. | | Inactive foundation | `phantom-runtime` | Closed engineering action schemas with a deny-all production executor. | | Inactive foundation | `phantom-session` | Crash-explicit session journal. Not wired into active execution. | | Inactive foundation | `phantom-evidence` | Value-free evidence and receipt primitives. Not externally anchored or wired into active execution. | Project-local effects resolve from the retained root acquired with the project transaction lock; global editor configuration is separately bounded beneath a retained user-config authority. A renamed ambient path and replacement decoy do not redirect those in-progress governed writes. These controls are not a same-user sandbox: local locks coordinate Phantom writers, and another process with equivalent user authority remains inside the threat model. See the [architecture](docs/architecture.md), [threat model](THREAT_MODEL.md), and [platform evidence matrix](docs/platform-support.md). Initialization retains the reviewed project-root identity and exact dotenv/config leaf snapshots before vault provisioning, then revalidates root and leaf identity, bytes, and permissions under the project lock before mutation. On Windows, new private anchored files/directories establish a protected current-user DACL before content bytes, while replacements preserve the reviewed exact DACL and inheritance state before writing. Those Windows properties are source contracts; protected native Windows CI acceptance remains pending. `CommittedVerifiedButDurabilityUncertain` is committed, exactly verified success with a value-free warning/receipt and must not be rolled back or retried. `CommittedButUncertain` is the distinct **Partial** case requiring operator reconciliation because verification or durability remains unresolved. Vault-backed mutations resolve machine-local vault/application authority before the project transaction lock, then compare the acquired root identity and reread the exact config through that lock. This avoids the shared process-environment/project-lock inversion without trusting project bytes during the gap. Phantom also tracks a pinned [Rama-derived engineering standard](docs/rama-design-standard.md) for explicit network stacks, modular crates, runnable examples, and tiered platform CI. Rama is a benchmark, not a dependency, and the comparison is not a feature or platform-parity claim. **`apps/web`** contains the Next.js site and backend routes for cloud vault sync, GitHub device authentication, and Stripe billing. The repository source and local tests are separate evidence from the currently deployed state at [phm.dev](https://phm.dev). **Registry tracks**: npm `latest` currently resolves [`phantom-secrets`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/phantom-secrets) and [`phantom-secrets-mcp`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/phantom-secrets-mcp) at `0.6.0`. Exact `0.7.4` wrappers remain public only under `release-candidate` after failing native npm-channel acceptance; do not use that candidate as the reviewed `v0.7.9` GitHub release path. CI runs locked, all-target workspace builds and tests on macOS, Linux, and Windows runner environments, plus formatting, Clippy, and npm release-mapping checks. Release builds and native end-to-end acceptance are separate evidence layers; see [Platform support](docs/platform-support.md). ## Security - **Managed dotenv replacement** -- after successful initialization, Phantom-managed dotenv values are tokens; unmanaged files, backups, logs, and external tools remain outside this claim - **ChaCha20-Poly1305** encryption for file vault and cloud sync, **Argon2id** key derivation - **Client-encrypted cloud vaults** -- the cloud vault API stores ciphertext; decryption happens in the authenticated client. This claim does not cover plaintext sent intentionally to deployment providers during `phantom sync`. - **256-bit CSPRNG tokens** -- `phm_` prefix distinguishes Phantom tokens from supported real-key formats; random collisions are cryptographically negligible, not mathematically impossible - **Proxy binds 127.0.0.1 only** -- not bound to a non-loopback interface; same-user local-process and bearer theft remain in the threat model - **Targeted memory zeroization** for major vault retrieval, serialization, and decrypted-file buffers; some proxy lookup copies remain ordinary strings, so zeroization is defense in depth rather than a complete memory-erasure guarantee - **Allowlist model** -- proxy only injects secrets for explicitly configured service patterns See [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) for the responsible disclosure policy and [THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md) for the full threat model (assets, actors, mitigations, known gaps, cryptography summary). ## Open source and commercial offerings | Current offering | What it covers | Commercial boundary | |---|---|---| | Open source ($0) | Use, modify, and distribute the local CLI, vault, proxy, MCP server, and deployment-sync workflows under MIT | No hosted entitlement or support commitment is included | | Enterprise (written scope) | Reversible evaluation, environment-specific integration, security review, and support terms | Scope, deliverables, price, schedule, and acceptance are defined in a separate agreement | | Government (written scope) | Bounded public-sector evaluation and integration in a named non-production environment | No authorization, certification, contract vehicle, procurement schedule, hosted service, or SLA is represented | A Pro hosted pilot remains roadmap direction only. It is not a current public offering, has no commissioned self-serve checkout, and has no published price or entitlement. See the [enterprise adoption guide](docs/enterprise-adoption.md) for shipped-versus-planned gates, or contact `mason@ashlr.ai` to discuss a written scope. ## Links - [phm.dev](https://phm.dev) -- Hosted site; deployment and authenticated acceptance remain separate from source - [Documentation map](docs/README.md) - [Getting Started Guide](docs/getting-started.md) - [Safe delegation quickstart](docs/delegation-quickstart.md) - [Enterprise adoption guide](docs/enterprise-adoption.md) - [Agent delegation templates](examples/agent-delegation/README.md) - [Examples index](examples/README.md) - [Security Model](SECURITY.md) - [Threat Model](THREAT_MODEL.md) - [Roadmap](ROADMAP.md) - [Troubleshooting](docs/troubleshooting.md) - [Changelog](CHANGELOG.md) - [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) - [Support](SUPPORT.md) - [Governance](GOVERNANCE.md) - [Citation](CITATION.cff) ## Part of the Ashlr ecosystem Phantom Secrets is one of the open-source tools from [Ashlr](https://ashlr.ai), a forward-deployed engineering company. Its siblings: [Lexicon](https://github.com/ashlrai/lexicon), [Locus](https://github.com/ashlrai/locus), [Ashlr Stack](https://github.com/ashlrai/ashlr-stack), [Ashlr Markdown](https://github.com/ashlrai/ashlr-md), [Ashlr plugin](https://github.com/ashlrai/ashlr-plugin). ## Contributing Focused contributions are welcome. Start with [`CONTRIBUTING.md`](CONTRIBUTING.md), the [examples index](examples/README.md), or a [discussion](https://github.com/ashlrai/phantom-secrets/discussions). The project does not assume that a `good first issue` label is populated. Follow [`CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`](CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md), and use [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) rather than a public issue for vulnerabilities. ## Star history Phantom Secrets star history ## License MIT — see [LICENSE](LICENSE).