

Threat modeling, Defi Derivatives : Option Model

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Presented by @ChainHunters



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
S3: Security Analysis

S4: Limitation & Future Work

Introduction

- About US
- Motivation
- Summary of project
- Final Vulnerability Analysis Results
- Defi Option Audit Matching Table

About US



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Interest in
DeFi Option?

On-chain
Pricing
Implementation?

Not conducting
audits after a new
service launch?

Applications level
implementation
of the option?

On-chain
Derivatives
System?

This research is conducted to identify and address vulnerabilities caused by the lack of standardization in DeFi option models. **This will allow threats to the DeFi ecosystem to be blocked in advance.**

Three Sigma



Based on Three Sigma research and analysis of defi options, implementing the intricate option structures of traditional finance on the blockchain could introduce severe risks and potential financial problems.

Summary of project

S0: Introduction

3. Summary of project

Step 1

1. Derivatives: Options Research

- TradFi Exchange-Based Research
- CeFi Exchange-Based Research
- TradFi vs CeFi Analysis
- Common Vector and Category Selection Tasks
- Review research findings within the team

Step 3

3. Smart contract Vulnerability analysis

- Matching table-based contract auditing
- Create possible scenarios and create a mitigation plan
- Review common threats and the level of each vulnerable code.
- Smart contract code review

Step 2

2. Pre-Study DeFi Options Protocols

- Optional Common Vector-Based Analysis Tasks
- Protocol implementation model classification tasks
- Comparing features in protocol documents
- Review research findings within the team

Step 4

4. Create deliverables


- Write a vulnerability analysis report
- Defi Option Contract Matching Table Enhancements

Step 2

Step 4

Final Vulnerability Analysis Results

Classification by vulnerability type



Defi Option Protocol

A grid of four rounded rectangular cards, each representing a DeFi Option Protocol. Each card contains the protocol's logo, name, and the number of vulnerabilities reported or reported to.

Protocol	Reported / Reporting
Oryn	Reported 1
Lyra	Reporting 1
Dopex	Reported 2
Ribbon	Reporting 1

Defi Option Audit Matching Table

S0: Introduction

5. Defi Option Audit Matching Table

Category



Oryn



Ribbon



Dopex



Lyra

Vulnerable

Centralized

OK

On-Off Chain



Market Maker



Risk Managing



Margin



Oracle



Liquidate



Option Pricing



Role



Proof of Position



Option Write/Buy



Expire/Strike



Related Work

- Derivatives: Options ELI5
- Preliminary Findings: TradFI Structured Flowchart

Related Work

- Derivatives: Options ELI5

Options?

- The right to buy or sell an underlying asset at an strike price on a future expiration date.

CALL/PUT

- **CALL**, The right to buy asset at a specific price
- **PUT**, The right to sell asset at a specific price

Buyer/Writer

- **Buyer (Long Position)**, a person who buys the right to strike a call/put option.
- **Writer (Short Position)**, a person who sells an option after it is issued for the purpose of earning an option premium.

Options: Type of strike price

S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5

Type

- **European option**, right on expiration date
- **American option**, right can be exercised at any time within the expiration date

* Strike Price = Sp, Underlying Asset Price = Up

Type	Call Options	Put Options
ITM (In The Money)	$Sp < Up$	$Sp > Up$
ATM (At The Money)	$Sp == Up$	$Sp == Up$
OTM (Out Of The Money)	$Sp > Up$	$Sp < Up$

Options: Trade Type

S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5

Type


- **OTC**, based on over-the-counter trading, where both parties trade directly.
- **ETD**, trades that are listed on an exchange and guaranteed to default through a clearinghouse



Options: Trading Process

S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5




Options: Margin

S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5

Margin

- **Initial Margin**, Deposit to open a trade
- **Maintenance Margin**, Maintain Margin Balance
- **Margin Call**, Notification to deposit additional margin if Maintenance Margin $>$ margin balance




Options: Payoff (Call/Put)


S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5

Call Options (Long-Buyer) Strike:100, Call:95



Put Options (Long-Buyer) Strike:100, Put:95




Options: Premium

S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5

Premium

- **Intrinsic Value**, The realized value of exercising an option immediately
- **Time Value**, the probability value that the market price of the underlying asset will change in the option buyer's favor by the expiration date.





Volatility

- **Market Volatility**, Realized Price fluctuation of an asset
- **Implied Volatility**, Market's future price movement expectations
- **Historical Volatility**, Market's past price movement



**Historical
Volatility**

**Implied
Volatility**


Options: Black-Scholes Model & Greeks

S1: Related Work

1. Derivatives: Options ELI5


Black-Scholes Model

- Indeed used to calculate the price of call&put options
- The financial markets are efficient, and the price of the underlying asset follows a geometric Brownian motion with constant volatility



Greeks

- **Delta**, Change in option premium in response to a change in the underlying asset price
- **Gamma**, Change in delta for a change in the price of an underlying asset
- **Vega**, Change in option premium for an implied volatility of 1%
- **Theta**, Change in option price over time to expiration



Complicated Market

- Macro market risk management options that affect asset prices are affected by all elements of risk.

Price Volatility

- The premium paid for an option depends on several factors, in addition to the price of the underlying token.

Selling Risks

- The option buyer can only lose the premium paid, but there are many additional risks. holder exercises the right => may include early exercise or margin calls on leveraged positions.

Time Decay


- Highly volatile value over time, as it decreases as it approaches expiration

Related Work


- Preliminary Findings: TradFI Structured Flowchart

Preliminary Findings: TradFI Structured Flowchart


S1: Related Work
2. TradFI Structured Flowchart



Preliminary Findings: CeFi Structured Flowchart



Preliminary Findings: DeFi Structured Flowchart



Our Approach

- Approach for Option Target Selection
- Findings from Protocol Analysis
- Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Our Approach

- Approach for Option Target Selection


Findings from Protocol Analysis

TVL-based Top 10 DeFi Option Protocol & Implementation Level Classification

TVL Rankings


1	Lyra 3 chains	-0.30%	-5.93%	-18.58%	\$42.48m
2	Dopex 4 chains	+0.97%	-6.75%	-22.55%	\$23.42m
3	Oryn 3 chains	-0.08%	-13.06%	-23.10%	\$22.04m
4	Cega 2 chains	-0.05%	+1.11%	+162%	\$16.01m
5	Premia 5 chains	+1.17%	-3.07%	-15.78%	\$12.13m
6	Delta Financial 1 chain	-0.39%	-6.81%	-20.72%	\$10.09m
7	Ribbon Finance 4 chains	+0.37%	+5.32%	-8.25%	\$8,556,657
8	Hegic 2 chains	-0.96%	-1.48%	-20.76%	\$8,336,753
9	Bumper Finance 1 chain	-0.04%	-0.02%	-0.09%	\$6,373,327
10	Buffer Finance 2 chains	+1.95%	-18.36%	-47.36%	\$4,690,284

Options Implementation Model



Findings from Protocol Analysis

TVL-based Top 10 DeFi Option Protocol & Implementation Level Classification



Our Approach

- Findings from Protocol Analysis

Option: Order Book Model (Opyn Protocol)



Oryn: Gamma Protocol

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis

Oryn (Order Book Model) Specific issue



Oryn

Category

Market Creation

Strategies should be implemented to maintain their liquidity without relying on other projects.

Whitelist

The whitelist should be updated appropriately and determined accurately whether it corresponds to when used.

Centralized Authority

Counterplan should be implemented against a decrease in confidence in asset prices and malicious price fluctuations.


Counterparty

A solution should be implemented when the trading is delayed due to the inability to find a counterparty in the event of a lack of liquidity.

Vault Template

When providing a DOV structure to users, it should be designed with an efficient and secure framework.

Opyn Gamma Contract Service Flow




Opyn Core Contract Access Tag

Owner	Setter Contract	whitelist/blacklist
Oracle	Disputer / Pricer	
Pauser	System Pause	
Farmer	Withdraw excess Balance	


Oryn: Gamma Protocol

Trading Process



Opyn: Gamma Protocol

Trading Process




Oryn: Gamma Protocol

Operations Method

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis



PROS

1. Since it is an ERC-20 token, it can be traded in various markets
2. Buyers can quickly settle accounts without opening the vault or doing anything else
3. Strike Price can be set as seller's likes without interval restrictions
4. Since it provides a template, individuals or users can easily operate DOVs

CONS

1. Certain users have price adjustment rights, which violates decentralization
2. Centralization problems arise because the order book goes back from off-chain
3. The width of assets handled is narrow because Whitelist is designated

Our Approach

- Findings from Protocol Analysis

Option: Struct Producted Model (Ribbon Protocol)



Ribbon.
Finance

Ribbon: Treasury Vault

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis

Oryn (Order Book Model) Specific issue



Category

Custom Investment Strategies

Users with appropriate permissions should choose safe products to manage their assets.

Automated Strategies

It should be chosen as a haven for market changes.

Market Fluctuations Response

While the market is changing rapidly, there must be a way for users to react to it.


Option Selling Price Determination

Calculate option prices appropriately and be transparent about how they are calculated.

Staking Reward

An attractive compensation scheme must exist to maintain liquidity for option sellers.

Ribbon Treasury Contract Service Flow




Ribbon Core Contract Access Tag

Keeper	Setter (*Price,*Fee)	Offer
	Round (Close/Open)	Option Price
User	Deposit / Withdraw	Round Close
	Position Close / Open	Set Price willing to pay
Owner	Setter(Price, Fee)	

Ribbon: Treasury Vault

Trading Process




Operations Method

- Concept => rounds based on weekly expiry options
- At the end of the round, the next week will be counted as the next round
- Trade Only with vault deposit, as vault does the execution for you
- Yield farming using the governance token, the Vault Stake Token (RBN)
- Conduct auctions based on Gnosis Auction for option buyers

Ribbon: Treasury Vault

Operations Method: Round

End Vault Round





Ribbon: Structured Product Model

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis

Token & Governance Structure

- RBN, veRBN(vote-escrowed RBN) Token
- Re-distribute protocol fees based on stake
- Lock \rightarrow RBN Token, Earn \leftarrow veRBN (Reward distribution over time)
- Following Bravo's standard of one vote per token
- Voting is done through governance tokens and snapshots



PROS

1. Save on gas by having a keeper process users' combined funds at once when selling options.
2. The keeper automatically trades the option for you, so you don't have to take any action.
3. The vault is configured to allow you to select different underlying assets and strategies.
4. Does not charge protocol fees in case of option losses
5. Earn additional income by staking share tokens

CONS

1. Centralized option pricing with keepers
2. It is impossible to hedge against rapid market movements within a round.
3. 1-week delay in processing deposits and withdrawals, so you cannot immediately access assets
4. Protocol fees are high due to centralized processing by keepers

Our Approach

- Findings from Protocol Analysis

Option: AMM Model (Lyra Protocol)



Lyra Specific issue



Lyra

Category

Internal AMMs

AMM liquidation should be standardized based on the collateral options.

AMM Liquidity Provide

The profit structure based on liquidity provision should account for the losses incurred due to sustained trader win rates.

AMM Settlement

Option expiration settlements should be conducted by immediately reflecting the Chainlink price feed after maturity through the Keeper bot.

withdrawal Delay

Liquidity providers should be unable to withdraw funds from the pool during the cooldown period for stability.

AMM Insurance Fund

An insurance system should be in place to mitigate the volatility of option prices based on liquidity demand and supply.

AMM Price Calculation

The algorithmic price adjustment should be conducted based on the inherent volatility of option prices, considering the demand and supply dynamics at different price levels.

GMX / Synthetix Delta Neutrality


Based on AMM price management, price protection should be implemented through a Delta-list hedging pool.

Lyra: AMMs Model

Trading Process


S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis



How trading works?: AMM Option Pricing

- Market Composition determines the Market Value of IV, which is the time-based expected volatility.
- Change in the cost of the same option based on the rate of change in IV.
- AMM IV management core mechanism, IV price adjustment based on supply and demand
(Demand \uparrow IV \downarrow | Supply \uparrow IV \downarrow)



X * IV Price

\$ 1923

\$ 1932

How trading works?: Dynamic Fees used to VEGA

- Dynamically change the value based on Vega sensitivity, determined by differences in the Following variables

Fees 💰

- Fixed Fee (Option Price)
- Fixed Fee (Exchange Price)
- **Dynamic Fee**
(Liquidity Pool Vega Risk)

baseIV * GWAIV * Trade Strike Skew ratio * vega


Lyra: AMMs Model

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis

Operations Method: Unlimited deposit/withdrawal type for options products

- Dynamically change the value based on Vega sensitivity, determined by differences in the Following variables




Lyra: AMMs Model

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis


Operations Method: Unlimited deposit/withdrawal type for options products

- Implement a structure for deposit/withdraw funds to and from AMMs at any time without incurring withdrawal fees and delays





Operations Method: AMM Pool Protected use Circuit Breaker System

- Protect existing LPs, it's build with circuit breakers
- If any of the circuit breakers are triggered, all deposits/withdrawals are blocked until
- The condition is resolved.
- CoolDown Timer will start, during which deposits/withdrawals will continue be blocked



Token & Governance Structure

- Naive Token: LYRA (L2)
- Governance => Protocol System
- Lyra Council representation centered on a committee of five LYRA token holders, elected by the public.
- LEAP Framework
- Elect a new Council after 4 months of activity



PROS

1. Based on the AMM model, it is possible to manage liquidity pools using ERC-20 tokens in a market-based approach, utilizing the skew adjusted pricing model.
2. Hedge the risks generated by liquidity providers using Synthetix/GMX to maintain more liquidity in the protocol.
3. Apply the Black-Scholes option pricing model to handle non-permanent losses and the pricing of unbuyable options.
4. Hedge LP delta lists by leveraging the underlying assets through the AMM model.
5. Quantify the vega risk and integrate it into a dynamic fee structure to support risk reduction in order to facilitate advantageous trades.

CONS

1. If there is insufficient liquidity for delta-neutral positions in Synthetix/GMX, position management may be restricted.
2. Incorrect price estimation, delayed liquidation, and settlement errors can occur due to flaws in third-party protocols, resulting in losses for the AMM.
3. Centralized processing through the Keeper bot, including critical operations such as Black-Scholes coefficients and major settlement processing, can lead to system limitations in case of malfunctions.
4. During periods of high pool utilization, liquidity providers may face restrictions on withdrawing funds from the pool after the cooldown period.

Our Approach

- Findings from Protocol Analysis

Option: SSOV Model (Dopex Protocol)



Dopex (Single Staking Option Vault) Specific issue



Dopex

Category

Option writer constraints

If the option seller's collateral has not been utilized, it should be possible to withdraw.

Option writer constraints

The option seller must be able to specify a minimum option price.

Limitations on Strike Scope


There should be a range of strike prices that the option seller and buyer can specify.

Staking Reward

If the value of the staking reward decreases, it should be changed to an attractive one.

Strategy Product

When constructing strategy instruments, consider the minimum amount of swaps.



Dopex Core Contract Access Tag

Keeper	Save settlement price	Option Pricing Volatility Update
Buyer	Purchase spread option	Settle with NFT receipt
Writer	Write option(deposit collateral)	Withdraw using LP token

Dopex: Odte

Trading Process

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis




Operations Method

- Concept => rounds-based 1-day expiry spread strategy options.
- Option writers can't select which strike price they want to sell the option. The short option's strike price must be deep OTM than the long option.
- Option buyer selects call or puts option spread.
- At the end of the round, Option Buyer settled pnl.
- The option writer's collateral will automatically roll over.
- Fully-funded margin is possible since Odte is a spread strategy option.



Me want protected position
Me sell option
Me buy option
Me position protected

Spread buyer Pepe



Dopex: Pros and Cons

S2: Our Approach

2. Findings from Protocol Analysis

PROS

1. Reduce liquidation risk with fully-funded margins
2. Enable option selling through the Vault method to provide liquidity in the Fully-Funded method
3. Provide liquidity for selling options by offering to stake rewards to cover impermanent and infinite losses on the seller's side.
4. Reward distribution is proportional to the time deposited and utilization is on a FIFO basis, allowing option sellers to quickly deposit collateral to enable option purchases.

CONS

1. No MM concept makes it impossible to sell/buy options at the time wanted
2. Exposure to collateral risk when constructing a strategy with a fully-funded margin structure
3. Unable to set desired option price because options are sold by depositing into a vault.

Our Approach

- Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: margin

Category	
Margin	- Hold the initial margin sufficiently to cover the option buyer's max pnl in Fully-Funded.
Liquidate	
Oracle	- Prevent bad debt by continuously evaluating the collateral value and appropriately notifying margin calls.
Option Pricing	
Management to Risk	
Role	- Ensure that the necessary margin is properly calculated to prevent damage to the protocol.
Strike Style	
Proof of Position	
Market Maker	
Option Writer / Buyer	
On-Off Chain	

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Liquidate

Oryn

Category

Margin

Liquidate

Oracle

Option Pricing

Management to Risk

Role

Strike Style

Proof of Position

Market Maker

Option Writer / Buyer

On-Off Chain

- Evaluate the value of collateral with liquidation robots to keep its position safe.

- Make liquidation more active by paying users rewards for liquidation.

- The price interval should be appropriately selected, If an auction is held for each block to proceed with liquidation

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Oracle

Category	
Margin	
Liquidate	
Oracle	- Bring a reliable Oracle price to protect the reliability of the protocol.
Option Pricing	
Management to Risk	
Role	- Derive accurate computational results by taking recent data safe from manipulation accurately.
Strike Style	
Proof of Position	
Market Maker	- Determine Values used as self-updates, such as IV by voting like governance notes
Option Writer / Buyer	
On-Off Chain	- users should not have permission to set prices.

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Option Pricing

Lyra

Category

Margin

Liquidate

Oracle

Option Pricing

Management to Risk

Role

Strike Style

Proof of Position

Market Maker

Option Writer / Buyer

On-Off Chain

- Use the correct formula and avoid making a mistake in calculation.

- Update Indicators in an appropriate cycle to reflect the flow of the market,
If implemented on-chain

- Manage the implementation formula transparently if implemented off-chain.

- Assign weights and values of uniform frequency to the intrinsic rate of change, determining the price of black Scholes.

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Management Risk

Category	
Margin	- The ability to stop the system in an emergency must be present to prevent protocol disruption
Liquidate	
Oracle	- Asset Prices should not be manipulated by external factors.
Option Pricing	
Management to Risk	- Countermeasures must be taken to prevent damage caused by abnormal asset prices in the case a market event occurs
Role	
Strike Style	- Insurance fund or other countermeasures should be prepared in case of liquidation failure or lack of liquidity
Proof of Position	
Market Maker	
Option Writer / Buyer	
On-Off Chain	

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Role

Category	
Margin	- A governance vote shall determine the keeper who sets the round, updates the volatility, and sets the expiry date.
Liquidate	
Oracle	- Dangerous tasks when set by ordinary users should be properly identified and approved by guaranteed users.
Option Pricing	
Management to Risk	- The qualification requirements should be properly evaluated When granting centralization rights to users
Role	
Strike Style	
Proof of Position	
Market Maker	
Option Writer / Buyer	
On-Off Chain	

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Strike Style

Dopex

Ribbon

Category

Margin

Liquidate

Oracle

Option Pricing

Management to Risk

Role

Strike Style

Proof of Position

Market Maker

Option Writer / Buyer

On-Off Chain

- Prices should be standardized through Strike intervals to increase market efficiency.

- Calculate Premiums, rewards, pnl, etc., through appropriate calculation formulas minimizing errors or errors.

- The setting of the settlement price should be limited to one time so that the settlement price cannot be overwritten.

- Tokens for position verification should be incinerated when settlement is completed to prevent duplicate settlement.

- verify that the settlement price has been set at the time of settlement.

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Proof of Position

Category	
Margin	- To prevent ERC4626 vault share token inflation, each share token minting implementation must ensure that it operates within a specified range.
Liquidate	
Oracle	- When handling ERC721 receives proper validation should be added to avoid accessing internal state variables and giving them excessive scope.
Option Pricing	
Management to Risk	- If the token value is used in practical services, token allocation, and retrieval should be carried out appropriately.
Role	
Strike Style	- Manage status data to ensure accurate matching of information about options in the token and have it verified by internal reviewers and validators.
Proof of Position	
Market Maker	- If the user's position information is stored as a local variable, it should be updated promptly to ensure that there are no problems with the settlement process.
Option Writer / Buyer	
On-Off Chain	

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Market Maker

Category

Margin

Liquidate

Oracle

Option Pricing

Management to Risk

Role

Strike Style

Proof of Position

Market Maker

Option Writer / Buyer

On-Off Chain

- Ensure that underlying and collateral assets that the maker provided liquidity are validated within the protocol.
- A dynamic algorithm should be applied to set the price range so that the compensation of makers complies with the allowed value.

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: Option Writer / Buyer

Oryn

Lyra

Category

Margin

Liquidate

Oracle

Option Pricing

Management to Risk

Role

Strike Style

Proof of Position

Market Maker

Option Writer / Buyer

On-Off Chain

- Make sure that the strike price is the strike price used in the round to prevent abnormal PNLs and utilize collateral.

- Bad debits should be prevented by ensuring that only as many options can be purchased as the vault's liquidity allows.

- Make sure that the deposit of collateral and the purchase of options are in the corresponding rounds, so that it is not possible to deposit collateral in a round that has already taken place, or to purchase options in a round that has not yet taken place.

- Prevent option sellers from settling for more than the collateral they have deposited.

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Common matching category: On-Off Chain

Dopex

Category

Margin

Liquidate

Oracle

Option Pricing

Management to Risk

Role

Strike Style

Proof of Position

Market Maker

Option Writer / Buyer

On-Off Chain

- Ensure that the Maker's liquidity supply is healthy and that the underlying and collateral assets are validated assets within the protocol.

- To prevent liquidity supply inflation, weights, verification levels, and access from unauthorized accounts should be considered.

- Dynamic algorithms should be applied to set price ranges to ensure that Makers' reward issuance adheres to the allowed values.

- When implementing on-chain options, it is important to be aware of the situations where MEVs are possible and have a plan in place to deal with them.

- On-chain, it is important to recognize that the expiration of an option does not mean that the option's settlement price is set, and ensures that the the settlement price is set at settlement.

Contract Design Pattern based on Audit Matching Table

Threat modeling: Options Model implementation-unique issues

Order Book

- Market Creation
- OTC Transactions
- Centralized Authority
- Counterparty
- Expiration Date Liquidity
- Liquidation System

AMMs

- Internal AMMs
- AMM Liquidity Provide
- AMM Settlement
- Withdrawal Delay
- AMM Insurance Fund
- AMM Price Calculation
- GMX/Synthetix Delta-Neutrality

Structured Products

- Custom Investment Strategies
- Automated Strategies
- Market Fluctuations Response
- Option Selling Price Determination
- Staking Reward

Single Staking Vault

- Option Writer Constraints
- Limitations on option trading-range
- Staking Reward
- Strategy product

Security Analysis

- Dopex: Lack of check on settlementPrice

Lack of check on settlementPrice

Critical

Fixed

On-Chain<->Off-chain Network

Strike Style

DOPEX 

Inspection Checklist for Defi Option Matching Table.

S3: Security Analysis

1. Lack of check on settlementPrice

Common Category Table



Dopex

Category

On-Chain<->Off-chain Network

Must recognize that the On-chain expiration of an option does not mean that a settlement price has been set.


Strike Style

When creating an option protocol, make sure that the settlement price is set, not just the time of settlement.

Dopex: vulnerability flow

1. Lack of check on settlementPrice

Lack of check on settlementPrice Critical



Audit Matching Tag

On-Chain<->Off-chain Network

Strike Style

Vulnerability Flow Tree

- 0 The attacker purchase Odte put option as much as possible
- 1 The settlementPrice of the put option purchased by the attacker is written to storage as 0 until it is set by the keeper after expiration.
- 2 The attacker calls the settlement function when the purchased The ODTE option expires.
- 3 If the attacker can settle before the settlementPrice is set, the attacker will be able to settle a put spread option that was purchased with a settlementPrice of zero.

Dopex: Code Review

S3: Security Analysis

1. Lack of check on settlementPrice

Zdte._recordSpreadCount()

```
657 function _recordSpreadCount(uint256 positionId) internal {
658     uint256 expiry = getCurrentExpiry();
659     if (!expiryInfo[expiry].begin) {
660         expiryInfo[expiry] = ExpiryInfo({
661             expiry: expiry,
662             begin: true,
663             lastProcessedId: 0,
664             startId: positionId,
665             count: 1,
666             settlementPrice: 0
667         });
668     } else {
669         expiryInfo[expiry].count++;
670     }
671 }
```

0 When buying an option, Odte sets the settlement price to zero and stores it in expiryInfo, which records the purchase information for the same expiration date.

Zdte.saveSettlementPrice()

```
465 function _saveSettlementPrice(uint256 expiry, uint256 settlementPrice) internal whenNotPaused returns (bool) {
466     require(expiry < block.timestamp, "Expiry must be in the past");
467     require(expiryInfo[expiry].settlementPrice == 0, "Settlement price saved");
468     expiryInfo[expiry].settlementPrice = settlementPrice;
469     emit SettlementPriceSaved(expiry, settlementPrice);
470     return true;
471 }
```

1 To set the settlementPrice, call saveSettlementPrice() after expiration.

Zdte.expireSpreadOptionPosition()

```
380 /// @notice Expires an spread option position
381 /// @param id ID of position
382 ftrace | funcSig
382 function expireSpreadOptionPosition(uint256 id) public whenNotPaused nonReentrant isEligibleSender {
383     require(zdtePositions[id].isOpen, "Invalid position ID");
384     require(zdtePositions[id].isSpread, "Must be a spread option position");
385
386     require(zdtePositions[id].expiry <= block.timestamp, "Position must be past expiry time");
387
388     uint256 pnl = calcPnl(id);
```

Zdte.calcPnl()

```
621 function calcPnl(uint256 id) public view returns (uint256 pnl) {
622     ZdtePosition memory zp = zdtePositions[id];
623     uint256 markPrice = zp.expiry < block.timestamp ? expiryInfo[zp.expiry].settlementPrice : getMarkPrice();
```

2 The settlement function only checks if the option has expired when settling after the expiry and uses the settlementPrice stored in expiryInfo as the settlement price.

Dopex: POC

S3: Security Analysis

1. Lack of check on settlementPrice

Normal Process

```
[PASS] testPoC() (gas: 1703270)
Logs:
  Block Number: 88812643

  zdte WETH Balance:: 28.190573922855092630
  zdte USDC Balance:: 59485.066840

  [User's position]
  Mark Price:: 1841.36000000
  Long Strike:: 1825.00000000
  Short Strike:: 1675.00000000
  Option Amount:: 116.00000000000000000000

  [Epoch Ends]
  User's USDC Before settlement:: 36317.473807
  Mark price at expiry: 1841.36000000
  User's USDC After settlement:: 36317.473807

Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; finished in 12.42ms
```

setup

Block Number: 88812643
strategy = put option spread

Diff Resource



Settle before the keeper sets the settlementPrice

Exploit Process

```
[PASS] testPoC() (gas: 1715307)
Logs:
  Block Number: 88812643

  zdte WETH Balance:: 28.190573922855092630
  zdte USDC Balance:: 59485.066840

  [Attacker's position]
  Mark Price:: 1841.36000000
  Long Strike:: 1825.00000000
  Short Strike:: 1675.00000000
  Option Amount:: 116.00000000000000000000


  [Epoch Ends]
  Attacker's USDC Before settlement:: 36317.473807
  Mark price at expiry: 1841.36000000
  Mark Price is above long strike but...
  Attacker's USDC After settlement:: 53717.473807

Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; finished in 12.63ms
```

Dopex: Vulnerability Impact

S3: Security Analysis

1. Lack of check on settlementPrice



Audit Matching Tag

On-Chain<->Off-chain Network

Strike Style

Impact

Credibility issues with option sellers

Due to the nature of option vaults, using fully-funded margin, the option seller's collateral is directly exposed to the risk of the contract.

Due to the nature of Option vault, where there are no market makers, it is impossible to buy options if there are no option sellers.

Difficulty detecting attacks

This attack only requires a settlement just before the keeper sets the settlementPrice, making the previous option purchase look like a normal option purchase. This makes the attack unpredictable, making it easier for the attack to succeed.

Dopex: Vulnerability Mitigations

S3: Security Analysis

1. Lack of check on settlementPrice

Zdte.expireSpreadOptionPosition()

```
@@ -390,10 +390,10 @@ contract Zdte is ReentrancyGuard, AccessControl, Pausable, ContractWhitelist {
390 390
391 391     /// @notice Expires an spread option position
392 392     /// @param id ID of position
393 -   function expireSpreadOptionPosition(uint256 id) public whenNotPaused nonReentrant isEligibleSender {
393 +   function expireSpreadOptionPosition(uint256 id) internal whenNotPaused nonReentrant isEligibleSender {
394 394         require(zdtePositions[id].isOpen, "Invalid position ID");
395 395         require(zdtePositions[id].isSpread, "Must be a spread option position");
396 -
396 +         require(expiryInfo[getCurrentExpiry()].settlementPrice != 0, "Settlement price not saved");
397 397         require(zdtePositions[id].expiry <= block.timestamp, "Position must be past expiry time");
398 398
399 399         uint256 pnl = calcPnl(id);
```

 Validate if the settlement price is zero on expiration

Limitation & Future Work

Limitation & Future Work

Unfinished Tasks

- Complete multiple protocol validation and modeling tasks based on the DeFi Option Audit Matching Table.

Future Work

- Research to formalize and model the threats posed by implementing or operating trading strategy-structures outside the traditional options model structure at the code level.
- Conduct a global threat modeling study for DeFi option protocols implemented in multi-chain, non-EVM environments.
- Research the threats to chains that only apply DeFi services rather than scaling and rollups to solve problems caused by blockchain delays.



Conclusion

The standards for DeFi options protocols have yet to mature, and security still needs to be established.

DeFi has introduced trading strategy structures and options systems from several existing off-chain-environments. However, there are several threat levels due to vulnerabilities in the intelligent contract code level for options systems and-vulnerabilities for each implemented option model.

If developers identify these model-specific vulnerabilities and share standardized option model-specific audit matching tables, option protocols can be designed more safely.





Thank You

