--- name: loom-threat-model description: Threat modeling methodologies (STRIDE, DREAD, PASTA, attack trees) for secure architecture design. allowed-tools: - Read - Grep - Glob - Bash - WebFetch triggers: - threat modeling - threat model - STRIDE - DREAD - PASTA - LINDDUN - attack tree - attack surface - trust boundary - data flow diagram - DFD - threat analysis - risk assessment - adversary - threat actor - threat vector - mitigation - security architecture - attack scenario - defense in depth --- # Threat Modeling Structured identification of what can go wrong in a *design*, before code exists. Answers four questions (Shostack): **What are we building? What can go wrong? What are we doing about it? Did we do a good job?** This skill is architecture-time analysis — for finding vulns in existing code use `loom-security-scan`/`loom-security-audit`; for auth mechanism details use `loom-auth`. ## When New system design, architecture review, significant feature or trust-boundary change, third-party integration, or compliance evidence. Re-run when the architecture changes — a threat model is a living document, not a one-time deliverable. ## Methodologies ### STRIDE — the default; apply *per element* of the DFD The core technique isn't "brainstorm STRIDE" — it's walking each DFD element and each data flow crossing a trust boundary, asking which STRIDE categories apply to *that* element. | Threat | Violates | Typical control | | ------ | -------- | --------------- | | **S**poofing | Authentication | Strong authn, mTLS, signed tokens | | **T**ampering | Integrity | Signatures, HMAC, input validation, WORM logs | | **R**epudiation | Non-repudiation | Audit logs, signed receipts | | **I**nformation disclosure | Confidentiality | Encryption, least-privilege, error hygiene | | **D**enial of service | Availability | Rate limits, quotas, timeouts, autoscale | | **E**levation of privilege | Authorization | AuthZ checks, sandboxing, least privilege | Element→likely-STRIDE heuristic: external entities → S, R; processes → all six; data flows → T, I, D; data stores → T, I, D (and R if logs). ### DREAD — risk scoring (use with caution) Score Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected users, Discoverability (1–10); risk = mean. ⚠ DREAD is widely criticized as **subjective and inconsistent** across raters (Microsoft dropped it). Prefer a simple **Likelihood × Impact** matrix, or **CVSS** for concrete vulns, when you need defensible numbers. Whatever the scale, rank threats to drive mitigation order. ### PASTA / LINDDUN - **PASTA** — 7-stage, risk-centric, business-objective-driven (objectives → tech scope → decomposition → threat analysis → vuln analysis → attack modeling → risk & mitigation). Use for high-stakes systems needing business alignment. - **LINDDUN** — the STRIDE-equivalent for **privacy** threats (Linkability, Identifiability, Non-repudiation, Detectability, Disclosure, Unawareness, Non-compliance). Reach for it on GDPR/PII-heavy systems. ## Process ### 1. Scope & assets List assets and *why an attacker wants them* — this drives everything. | Asset | Classification | Impact if compromised | | ----- | -------------- | --------------------- | | Credentials/secrets | Confidential | Account/system takeover | | Payment data | PCI-DSS | Financial + compliance loss | | PII | GDPR | Privacy breach, fines | ### 2. DFD with trust boundaries (the load-bearing step) **Threats concentrate at trust boundaries** — every arrow crossing one is where authn/authz/validation must live. Mark: external entities, processes, data stores, data flows, and boundaries (internet↔DMZ, DMZ↔internal, tenant↔tenant, host↔container, user↔kernel). ```text [User] --HTTPS--> ║ DMZ ║ [API Gateway] --> ║ Internal ║ [App] --> [DB] ↑ boundary: authn, TLS ↑ boundary: authz, network policy, mTLS ``` A boundary you didn't draw is a check you won't add. Enumerate every flow: source, destination, protocol, data classification, boundary crossed. ### 3. Enumerate threats (STRIDE per element) ```markdown ### API Gateway | STRIDE | Threat | Likelihood | Impact | | ------ | ------ | ---------- | ------ | | S | Forged/`alg:none` JWT | Med | High | | I | Verbose error leaks stack/version | High | Med | | D | Rate-limit bypass | Med | High | | E | BOLA/IDOR → other users' objects | High | Critical | ``` ### 4. Attack trees (for high-value goals) Decompose a goal into OR/AND paths; the cheapest leaf is the likely attack and shows where to spend defense. ```text Steal User Data (goal) ┌──────────┼──────────┐ (OR) Compromise Exploit App Social Credentials Vulnerability Engineering ┌───┴───┐ ┌───┴───┐ Phishing Brute SQLi BOLA [L:H I:H][L:M] [L:M I:C][L:H I:H] ``` ### 5. Mitigations — track to closure ```markdown | Threat | Mitigation | Priority | Status | | ------ | ---------- | -------- | ------ | | BOLA/IDOR | Object-level ownership checks (loom-auth) | P0 | Not started | | SQLi | Parameterized queries | P0 | In progress | | JWT forgery | Pin alg, validate aud/iss/exp (loom-auth) | P1 | Done | ``` Every high/critical threat needs a mitigation, an accepted-risk decision (with owner + justification), or a transfer. Silence = unmanaged risk. ## High-Signal Threats & Their Real Controls - **BOLA / IDOR (broken object-level authz)** — #1 API threat: any object accessed by id must verify caller ownership/tenant, not just "logged in". Details + wrong-vs-right in `loom-auth`. - **SSRF** — attacker makes your server fetch an internal URL (cloud metadata `169.254.169.254`, `localhost`, internal services). **Defense is an allowlist of permitted hosts/schemes — never a blocklist.** Blocklists are bypassed by DNS-rebinding, HTTP redirects, IPv6 (`[::1]`), and decimal/octal/hex-encoded IPs (`http://2130706433/`). Also disable unused URL schemes and block redirects to non-allowlisted hosts. - **Injection (SQL/NoSQL/command/LDAP/XXE)** — parameterize/allowlist; treat every trust-boundary input as hostile. - **Mass assignment** — client sets fields it shouldn't (`role`, `isAdmin`, `tenant_id`); bind explicit allowlists. - **Cloud metadata & IAM escalation** — SSRF-to-credentials via the metadata endpoint; enforce IMDSv2, least-privilege roles. - **Supply chain** — dependency confusion, typosquat, unsigned artifacts (see `loom-dependency-scan`). ## Component Quick-Reference | Component | Watch for | | --------- | --------- | | Web app | XSS, CSRF, clickjacking, open redirect, session fixation | | API | Broken authn/authz (BOLA/BFLA), mass assignment, rate-limit bypass, injection | | Database | SQLi, privilege escalation, unencrypted data/backups | | Auth | Credential stuffing, session fixation, token leakage, MFA bypass | | File upload | Malware, path traversal, RCE via content, storage exhaustion | | Cloud/infra | Public buckets, IAM escalation, SSRF→metadata, exposed control plane | | Containers/K8s | Vulnerable base images, secrets in env/layers, privileged pods, RBAC gaps, container escape | | 3rd-party/webhooks | API-key exposure, webhook spoofing (verify HMAC), supply-chain | | ML systems | Data poisoning, evasion/adversarial input, model inversion/extraction, PII leakage in outputs | ## Threat Model Document Template ```markdown # Threat Model: (v1.0, YYYY-MM-DD, author, reviewers) 1. Executive summary — key risks & recommendations 2. System description — purpose, architecture, data classification, trust boundaries 3. Assets — table (asset, classification, owner) 4. Analysis — DFD, STRIDE-per-component, attack trees 5. Risk assessment — table (threat, likelihood×impact or CVSS, level) 6. Mitigations — table (threat, mitigation, owner, timeline, status) 7. Residual risks — accepted risks + justification 8. Review schedule — trigger conditions to revisit ``` ## Verification Checklist - [ ] DFD drawn with **every trust boundary** marked; each boundary-crossing flow enumerated - [ ] STRIDE applied **per element**, not brainstormed globally - [ ] Assets tied to attacker motivation and classification - [ ] Every high/critical threat has a mitigation, accepted-risk, or transfer with an owner - [ ] BOLA/IDOR checked on every object-addressing endpoint; SSRF defenses are allowlist-based - [ ] Risk ranking uses a defensible scale (Likelihood×Impact or CVSS, not raw DREAD gut-feel) - [ ] Model versioned and has a re-review trigger; privacy threats covered (LINDDUN) if PII-heavy