Voice and Political Engagement: Evidence From a Field Experiment*

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Abstract

We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giving party supporters more voice increases their engagement in the party's electoral campaign. In the experiment, the party asked a random subset of supporters for their opinions on the importance of different policy areas. Giving supporters opportunities to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the campaign as measured using behavioral data from the party's smartphone application. Survey data reveals that giving voice also increases other margins of campaign effort as well as perceived voice. Our evidence highlights the importance of voice for increasing political engagement.

Keywords: Political engagement, Inclusion, Voice, Agency, Natural Field Experiment, Canvassing
JEL Classification: D8, P16

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1 Introduction

Modern democracies' success relies on political parties which manage to represent their members' and voters' interests. Yet, major established parties have lost a large fraction of their members (Biezen and Poguntke, 2014). One of the recurring criticisms of mainstream parties is that they do not pay sufficient attention to their members' and voters' views and interests (Grzymala-Busse, 2019). Indeed, survey data from the US indicates that a large fraction of voters disagree with the statement that "being a member of a political party makes my voice more powerful" (CIRCLE, 2018). When members feel that they are not heard by their party, they may feel discouraged from engaging (Hirschman, 1970). To counteract such disengagement, political parties can implement policies aiming to increase their members' voice.

In this paper, we test whether giving voice to supporters of a major European party affects their engagement in the party's electoral campaign. In our natural field experiment the party invites supporters to take part in a survey to organise the upcoming campaign. Approximately 1000 supporters complete the survey. A random subset of these supporters is assigned to receive the opportunity to share their opinions with the party. Half of the treated supporters are asked for their opinions on the importance of different topics to improve the electoral success of the campaign (instrumental voice treatment), while the other half of the treated supporters are asked for their opinions on the importance of different topics for them personally (intrinsic voice treatment). To influence respondents' perceptions of the credibility of the party's intentions to take supporters' views into account, we cross-randomize whether supporters are informed that they will be provided with feedback in the form of a summary of the survey results (feedback treatment). To test how these different treatments affect engagement in the party's electoral campaign, we employ both survey data on intended participation in different campaign activities and behavioral data on actual participation in door-to-door campaigning collected via the party's smartphone application.

We provide several results about the relationship between voice and political engagement. First, the survey data shows that a large fraction of party supporters feel that they are not given enough opportunities to voice their opinions to the party leadership or that their

opinions are not considered. For example, only 24% of supporters state that their opinion is taken into account in the context of the electoral campaign, and 32% of members state that their opinion is "definitely not" or "rather not" heard within the party.

Second, perceptions of being heard by the party are strongly positively associated with party supporters' subsequent willingness to participate in their party's electoral campaign. This holds for both survey measures and behavioral data on canvassing. A one-standard deviation higher index of perceived voice is associated with 0.59 higher intended number of campaign activities ($p < 0.01$) and a 1 percentage point higher likelihood of participating in the canvassing campaign ($p < 0.05$), as measured by the app data.

Third, the natural field experiment reveals that giving supporters the opportunity to voice their opinions increases their subsequent campaign effort. The voice treatments increase the likelihood of canvassing by 2.6 percentage points ($p < 0.01$), which is a large relative effect size given the low levels of baseline activity measured in the app (with a control group mean close to zero).[1] The effect could reflect either higher actual canvassing activity or higher app usage, both of which are costly contributions to the party's campaign. We also document increases in intended campaign effort based on survey data. Party supporters in the voice treatment groups plan to increase the total number of campaign activities, on average, by 0.21 ($p < 0.05$), corresponding to a 9 percent increase relative to 2.42 activities in the control group. Differences across the voice treatments are not statistically different.

Fourth, we show that our voice treatments positively impact supporters' perceptions of the party's interest in their views and their level of identification with the party. The treatment effects are strongest for supporters exposed to the voice treatment in which members are offered an opportunity to provide input into the electoral campaign. At the same time, the voice treatments do not systematically change supporters' beliefs about the effectiveness of the party's electoral campaign strategy.

Our paper builds on the idea that facing unsatisfactory performance of a private or public sector organization, members of the organization can either voice their discontent to initiate improvement, or become inactive (Hirschman, 1980). We provide direct causal evidence on

[1] Campaign activities were unusually low possibly due to a relatively unpopular main candidate. Moreover, it is possible that not all canvassers used the party's app to report their canvassing activities as the app only became available just prior to the beginning of campaign season.

whether giving voice increases political engagement with a natural field experiment.[2] Our findings highlight that even a small intervention can have sizable effects on engagement in the party's campaign.

Our findings are relevant for a broad and growing literature concerned with civic engagement. In particular, our study contributes to a literature investigating the motivation and behavior of political activists such as party supporters (Enos and Hersh, 2015; Hager et al., 2021a,b, 2022b; Perez-Truglia and Cruces, 2017) and protesters (Acemoglu et al., 2018; Bursztyn et al., 2021; Cantoni et al., 2017, 2019; Enikolopov et al., 2020a,b; González, 2020; Hager et al., 2022a; Manacorda and Tesei, 2020; McClendon, 2014; Passarelli and Tabellini, 2017). We contribute to this literature by providing new evidence on an intervention aiming to increase engagement of party supporters by providing them with more voice.

Our paper relates to a large literature on incentives in organizations more broadly (Gibbons, 1998). In recent years, this literature has put particular emphasis on the role of social incentives in organizations (Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018; Cassar and Meier, 2018; Khan, 2021). We also contribute to a growing literature on voice and worker representation in firms (Adhvaryu et al., 2021; Harju et al., 2021; Jäger et al., 2021). Adhvaryu et al. (2021) show that workers quit when wage increases do not meet their expectations, but enabling voice mitigates this exit. More broadly, our findings on the mechanisms, which highlight a role for members being valued by the party, relate to the idea that the extent to which workers feel valued, is a key determinant of firm performance (Adhvaryu et al., 2019; Ashraf and Bandiera, 2018; Bandiera et al., 2009; Hoffman and Tadelis, 2021).[3] Our work contributes to this literature by providing new evidence on the importance of vertical relationships between the leadership of a political organization and its supporters.

[2]Our findings relate to work by Trucco et al. (2017) who studies the impact of government responsiveness to citizens' complaints about public goods provision.

[3]Bashshur and Oc (2015) review the management literature studying the effects of voice.

2 Setting and Design

2.1 Setting

Our field experiment took place in the run-up to a recent general election in a Western European country.[4] The experiment was implemented in collaboration with a major political party to study party supporters' actual participation in the party's door-to-door canvassing campaign. The experimental manipulation was administered in an online survey sent out, on behalf of the party, roughly five weeks before the election. After the intervention, we measure intended campaign effort along several margins, and track party supporters' real canvassing efforts throughout the campaign until election day.

The party promoted the use of a novel smartphone application to register canvassing activities in the ongoing campaign.[5] All canvassing volunteers were instructed to record every canvassed door in this application as a way to help the party organize the ongoing and future campaigns. The data from the application provide unique behavioral outcomes on actual canvassing behavior.

2.2 Sampling and Procedures

Our original sample comprises all party supporters who had signed up to the party's online campaign email list about 5 weeks prior to the election. This list contained around 12,000 party supporters who had expressed an interest in receiving information about online and door-to-door campaign activities.[6] In the first week of the official start of the party's electoral campaign, we contacted these supporters with an email invitation on behalf of the party. The email asked supporters to participate in an online survey to help organize the campaign.[7] The invitation email was designed and sent by the party to preserve the natural environment and ensure that participants would not be aware of being part of an experiment. A reminder

[4] We agreed to maintain the party's anonymity and hence cannot reveal the country of study.

[5] None of our emails or surveys contained a link to the smartphone application.

[6] This list is not identical to the list of party members which is orders of magnitudes larger.

[7] It is possible that all respondents perceived the email invitation to participate in an online survey as an increase in their voice within the party. This implies that our estimates may constitute lower bounds as the control group may also have experienced an increase in perceived voice.

email was sent seven days later.

In total 1,007 party supporters responded to the online survey for this experiment and saw the treatment screen. This corresponds to a response rate of 8 percent.[8] Random assignment to the different treatment conditions and the experimental manipulation took place within the online survey. The natural field setting mitigates concerns about experimenter demand effects (de Quidt et al., 2018).

Table A1 displays basic characteristics of our sample. 20% of the respondents to our survey are female. Respondents have an average age of 48 years. 95% of them are actually members of the party. Party supporters in our sample have been affiliated with the party for an average of 15.6 years. 78% of the respondents have some experience with campaign activities. 51% report to have previous experience in canvassing.

Pre-registration The analysis was pre-registered at the AsPredicted registry before the start of the data collection (`https://aspredicted.org/v5ec6.pdf`).[9]

2.3 Experimental Design

2.3.1 Background Characteristics

All party supporters who followed the invitation link to the party's online survey were asked a set of questions eliciting basic background characteristics and beliefs. For example, we elicit prior experience with different campaign activities and perceived voice in the party.

[8]Compared to the population of party members, our final sample is roughly representative in terms of gender. However, participants in our experiment are substantially younger than the average party member. The sample for this experiment has also participated more in past electoral campaigns than participants of previous experiments in the same context.

[9]Contrary to our expectations, the party only provided us with data on the total number of doors knocked on during the campaign and not on the number of days of activity. Therefore, we do not observe the number of days of canvassing and hence cannot include it in our analyses, as we had pre-specified. However, in past data collected via the same canvassing app, the number of days spent canvassing and the number of knocked doors are highly correlated (Hager et al., 2022b).

2.3.2 Voice Treatments

One third of our respondents proceed straight to the intended campaign activities after the initial survey block. This group of respondents constitutes the control group. Two thirds of respondents are assigned to a treatment that was designed to increase their perceived voice within the party. Half of those are assigned to an "intrinsic voice" treatment, while the other half are assigned to an "instrumental voice" treatment. We designed the experimental treatments in close collaboration with the party to ensure that the treatments would feel natural to respondents. Figure 1 provides an overview of our experimental design.[10] We describe these treatment conditions in more detail below.

Intrinsic voice treatment Respondents in the "intrinsic voice" treatment receive the following set of instructions:

> Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics are close to your heart. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions. How much do you personally care about the following issues?

The idea behind the "intrinsic voice" treatment is to provide supporters with an opportunity to share their opinions about the types of topics they care about.

To elicit these opinions, respondents are initially shown a matrix table listing nine different topics. These topics are selected based on the main elements of the party's campaign manifesto and comprise topics, such as "economy" and "foreign policy and national security". Respondents are able to indicate how much they personally care about each of these topics on a 4-point Likert scale. On the subsequent survey page, respondents are then also given the opportunity to add more thoughts on which topics they personally care about the most via an open text box.

Instrumental voice treatment Respondents in the "instrumental voice" treatment, on the other hand, receive the following set of instructions:

[10] Appendix section C.2 contains the full set of instructions.

> Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics seem important to you based on your experience in your constituency. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions. Your answers help us to make the election campaign more effective. What do you think: How much should we emphasize the following issues in the current national election campaign?

The idea behind the instrumental voice treatment is to provide supporters with an opportunity to express their opinions on how to improve the effectiveness of the electoral campaign based on their impressions and experiences made in the local constituency.[11] This treatment thus provides respondents with an opportunity to express their opinions to potentially influence a core instrumental concern of the party: achieving success in the upcoming general election.

The implementation of this treatment closely follows the procedure described above for the intrinsic voice treatment. Respondents are first asked to indicate which topics the party should emphasize in the general election campaign based on a matrix table listing nine different topics.[12] Similarly to the intrinsic voice treatment, respondents are then offered the opportunity to provide further discussion of the topics which they consider important for the success of the party's electoral campaign via an open text field.

2.3.3 Feedback Treatment

To credibly signal that supporters' views are being acknowledged and considered, organizations may choose to offer supporters feedback on the views they had expressed. We aim to test the relevance of such feedback by cross-randomizing, among respondents in the voice treatments, whether members are told that they will receive a summary of the survey results. In particular, respondents in the feedback condition are told that "[a]fter completing the survey, we will send you a summary of the results" as part of the introductory text of the voice treatment and then again on the next survey page with the open text box: In prac-

[11] While we shared respondents' opinions with party representatives responsible for the electoral campaign, allowing these representatives to take party supporters' opinions into account, evidence from the US casts doubts about the accuracy of party supporters' perceptions of the issues voters care about (Enos and Hersh, 2015).

[12] We hold the wording constant across voice treatment conditions.

tice, the results from the survey were shared with all party supporters a few days before the election.

Balance Appendix Table A2 shows that the within-survey randomization was generally successful in creating treatment and control groups that do not differ systematically in terms of observable characteristics.

2.4 Measures of Campaign Effort

We study the campaign effort of party supporters by combining both behavioral outcome data on canvassing as well as survey data capturing several effort margins.

Survey based outcomes At the end of the survey, all respondents are asked about their intentions to contribute to the current election campaign. Respondents can select all items from a list of activities they intend to engage in throughout the electoral campaign. The list includes (i) canvassing, (ii) putting up posters, (iii) participating in campaign booths, (iv) online advertisements for the party (e.g. sharing campaign materials on social media), (v) calling supporters, and (vi) talking to family, friends and acquaintances about the party's election program. Moreover, among respondents who indicate that they plan to canvass, we elicit the intended number of days of canvassing. The intended number of days for respondents who do not plan to canvass is coded as zero days.

Post-treatment beliefs Finally, we elicit a range of different beliefs to examine the extent to which our intervention changed members' perceptions of the party. We first measure supporters' perceived agency in the party by asking for their agreement with the statement that *"[they] can make a difference through [their] involvement in [partyname]"*. Second, we measure the extent to which they think *"[their] opinion matters for improving the campaign strategy"*. Third, we elicit supporters' perception of whether *"[they] have the feeling that the party is interested in [their] opinion"*. Fourth, to measure supporters' identification with the party we measure their agreement with the statement that *"[they] feel connected to the party"*. Based on these four questions we then build an index of voice, which aims to capture the extent

to which members feel heard by their party. As an additional distinct mechanism, we also measure our respondents' beliefs about the effectiveness of the party's campaign strategy.

Smartphone application data To assess actual behavioral change, we use data from the party's smartphone application. Members were encouraged to use the application as it would help to plan current and future campaign activities. We employ two pre-specified behavioral outcomes: first, an indicator for whether a supporter knocks on any doors; second, the number of doors a supporter knocks on (winsorized at the 99^{th} percentile).[13]

Given that our data allows us to link supporters' survey responses to their actual canvassing behavior in the field, we can study how intentions are related to actual canvassing behavior. We find that people's intentions to do any canvassing are significantly related to whether they actually canvass ($\rho = 0.19$, $p < 0.001$). Canvassing intentions and behavior are also correlated when controlling for the full set of control variables (see Online Appendix Table A5).

These statistically significant correlations show that intentions are predictive of subsequent actual behavior. However, the fact that these correlations are far below one, highlights that self-reported intentions and actual behavior of supporters underscores the need to collect behavioral outcomes in addition to self-reported intentions.

3 Descriptive Evidence on Voice

In this Section, we provide descriptive evidence on voice. First, we characterize the extent to which members feel heard by the party. Second, we examine associations between voice and measures of campaign effort.

3.1 Perceptions of Voice

We use two measures of perceived voice to investigate the fraction of supporters feeling that they are not heard by the party. First, we asked respondents directly whether they are feeling heard by the party as part of the set of basic questions administered to all respondents.

[13] Individuals who do not appear in the application data are coded as not having canvassed.

Second, we construct a voice index based on the four post-treatment beliefs described in section 2.4.

Figure A1 highlights substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which people feel that their views are heard based on the pre-treatment distribution of perceived voice. 32% of members feel that they are "definitely not" or "rather not" heard within the party. 22% of members are unsure, while the remaining 45% of members feel that they are rather or definitely heard by the party.

Figure A2 describes the correlates of these two measures of perceived voice. The only predictor of voice across both measures is the vote share that supporters expect their own party to obtain. For both voice measures, a one standard deviation increase in this expectation is associated with 0.25 and 0.29 standard deviations more perceived voice ($p < 0.01$), respectively. Demographic characteristics and party membership are generally not significantly related to perceived voice in a consistent manner.[14]

3.2 Association between Voice and Engagement

Our post-treatment measure of voice is strongly correlated with both campaign intentions and actual canvassing behavior. Panel A of Figure 2 shows an almost linear, positive relationship between the voice index and the number of activities that supporters report intending to engage in throughout the electoral campaign. A one standard deviation increase in the voice index is associated with 0.59 more intended activities ($p < 0.001$). Panel B of Figure 2 shows the same correlation for actual canvassing behavior. The correlation is also positive with a one standard deviation increase in the index being, on average, associated with a one percentage point increase in canvassing activity. However, this association appears to be strongest for individuals in the top decile of the voice index. In the next section, we examine whether an increase in party supporters' perceived voice causally influences campaign effort.

[14]The opinions which treated party supporters voice in the open text fields indicate a high demand for voice (see Appendix C for details).

4 Results from the Natural Field Experiment

In this Section, we present the results from the natural field experiment.

4.1 Empirical Specification

We begin by estimating the effect of being exposed to any voice treatment. To maximize statistical power for the main treatment effect estimates, we pool across all cross-randomized treatment arms. We use the following specification:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 treatment_i^{pooled} + \beta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where Y_i is the outcome of interest and $treatment_i^{pooled}$ is an indicator for receiving any voice treatment. X_i includes all available control variables: age, gender, party membership dummy, years of party membership, high perceived prior voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities in which a supporter states to have engaged in previously), and z-scored expected vote shares for the own party and the two main competitors. We display robust standard errors throughout.

We also examine whether the type of voice provided to supporters matters for their subsequent engagement in the campaign. To estimate the effects of the intrinsic and instrumental voice treatments, we use the following specification:

$$Y_i = \delta_0 + \delta_1 treatment_i^{instrumental} + \delta_2 treatment_i^{intrinsic} + \delta X_i + \varepsilon_i$$

where $treatment_i^{instrumental}$ is a dummy taking value one for respondents in the instrumental voice treatment and $treatment_i^{intrinsic}$ is a dummy taking value one for respondents in the intrinsic voice treatment.[15]

4.2 Behavioral Outcome Data on Canvassing

We first examine the effect of being assigned to any voice treatment on actual canvassing behavior. The estimates from the natural field experiment reveal that receiving any voice

[15] We display fully disaggregated results in section A.1 of the Online Appendix.

treatment significantly increases respondents' canvassing activity as measured through the party's smartphone application. The treatment increases individuals' propensity to canvass by 2.6 percentage points and the average number of doors canvassed by 1.2 (both $p < 0.01$; Panel A of Table 1).[16] While these effects are small in absolute terms, they are large relative to the low level of recorded canvassing activity in the control group. In absolute terms, these estimates imply that the marginal canvasser in the treatment group canvassed 46 doors (Table A6 further displays the absolute levels of canvassing activity across treatment groups). The modest levels of engagement in the campaign could be a result of relatively low levels of popularity of the main candidate or the caution caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it may also reflect that not all canvassers report their canvassing in the application. To the extent that under-reporting of canvassing is uniform across treatment arms, this would only result in an attenuation of treatment effects.

The results in Panel B of Table 1 indicate that the effects are particularly pronounced for party supporters in the instrumental voice treatment. The treatment effect on any canvassing and the number of canvassed doors are both about 50% larger for supporters in the instrumental voice treatment than for supporters in the intrinsic voice treatment (columns (1) and (2) in Panel B of Table 1). However, despite the large relative difference in treatment effects, the instrumental voice treatment and the intrinsic voice treatment are not significantly different from each other as a result of limited statistical power ($p = 0.49$ and $p = 0.53$, respectively).

In Panel C of Table 1, we examine the effects of the voice treatment with and without feedback on supporters' engagement. We find no differential impact on canvassing behavior of the feedback treatment. While the point estimates tend to be somewhat larger for respondents from the feedback treatment, we are unable to reject any of the tests of equality of the two coefficients.

Given the observed treatment effects on real canvassing behavior, it is possible that receiving the opportunity to voice their opinions also affected other dimensions of supporters' effort. We explore this possibility in the next subsection.

[16]The results are also robust to not using control variables and to estimating non-linear Logit regressions Tables A8 and A7, respectively).

4.3 Number of Intended Campaign Activities

Next, we examine the effects of the voice interventions on the overall number of intended campaign activities. While we only observe behavioral outcomes for canvassing, we ask respondents about their intentions to participate in a range of other campaign-related activities. Column (3) of Table 1 displays the treatment effect on the number of intended campaign activities. We find that the intervention increases the intended number of activities by 0.21 ($p < 0.05$), on average. This corresponds to an increase in the number of activities by approximately 9 percent compared to a control group mean of 2.42 activities. This suggests that supporters broadly increased their intended campaign effort across a range of dimensions.

Columns (2) to (8) in Panel A of Appendix Table A9 decompose this effect by examining treatment effects on supporters' intentions to engage in a wide range of campaign activities. The effects on canvassing intentions (measured both at the extensive and the intensive margin) are positive with effect sizes mimicking those on observed, real canvassing behavior. However, due to higher control group means these are not statistically significant as the standard deviation of the outcomes are much smaller in the application data. We observe the largest treatment effects on supporters' intentions to participate in campaign booths and to convince friends and family members, with increases of 5.7 and 5.4 percentage points, respectively (both $p < 0.10$).

In Panel B of Table 1, we show that the treatment effects on intended campaign activities tend to be somewhat larger for the instrumental voice treatment. However, the difference in estimated treatment effects between the instrumental and intrinsic voice treatments are never significantly different because of limited statistical power.

In Panel C of Table 1, we find that the treatment effect on the number of intended campaign activities is somewhat larger in the presence of the feedback treatment ($\beta = 0.28$ vs $\beta = 0.15$), yet the difference is not significantly different ($p = 0.25$). Similarly, Appendix Table A9 shows that there are no significant differences between the voice treatment with and without feedback on supporters' intentions to participate in any of the different campaign activities.

Overall, our results suggest that the voice treatments increased supporters' willingness

to participate and exert effort in multiple campaign dimensions.

Reconciling effect sizes While the absolute effect sizes on canvassing intentions and behavior are comparable (close to approximately 2 percentage points), the relative effect sizes are much larger in the application data than in the survey data. One potential explanation for this finding is the presence of heterogeneous treatment effects. If treatment effects are stronger for respondents who are more inclined to engage in the party's campaign based on their predetermined characteristics, and if participating in campaign activities is sufficiently costly (relative to simply stating the intention to participate), we may expect differences in effect sizes between survey-based intentions and actual behavior. In particular, we might observe higher levels of intended engagement, but not actual participation for the control group, while treated individuals with comparable characteristics are actually more likely to follow through with their intentions. This scenario is consistent with the observed pattern of relatively similar absolute treatment effect sizes and smaller relative effect sizes on supporters' intentions (when compared to the relative effect size on supporters' actual behavior). Indeed, we provide evidence in Section 4.6 that treatment effects for the app data and perceived voice are more pronounced for supporters with stronger pre-treatment perceived voice, i.e. supporters that are more likely to canvass to begin with.

The differences in effect sizes between the survey and smartphone application data can also be interpreted through the lens of the intention-behavior gap, i.e. people's failure to act on their intentions (Sheeran and Webb, 2016). The correlation between intentions and behavior is indeed significantly higher in the treatment group compared to the control group (Table A10). This is consistent with the idea that perceived voice is a potential determinant of whether supporters manage to translate their intended campaign effort into actual (costly) behavior. Alternatively, the difference could also reflect differential willingness to report canvassing activities in the party's smartphone application. Given that usage of the application was encouraged by the party and that it is costly to participants to use the application, we view this as a different form of costly campaign effort.

4.4 Mechanisms

To shed light on potential mechanisms through which the voice treatments may affect campaigning effort, we examine treatment effects on an index of perceived voice and its individual components, as well as the perceived effectiveness of the campaign.[17] The voice index captures the extent to which party members feel valued by the party leadership and the extent to which members identify with the party (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). This measure relates to a behavioral explanation for the observed increase in party supporters' engagement in response to the opportunity to voice their opinion: the psychological utility party supporters receive from a better relationship with the party leadership (and vice versa the psychological utility cost party supporters may experience when they feel disconnected from the party and/or not valued by the party leadership).

In contrast to the above behavioral channel captured by the voice index, we also consider a more standard channel to explain party supporters' change in behavior: the voice treatments may impact supporters' marginal benefit of effort by influencing supporters' beliefs about the effectiveness of the party's electoral campaign. We measure these by eliciting supporters' perceived effectiveness of the campaign.

Voice Column (4) in Panel A of Table 1 presents the results of the pooled treatment effect analysis. The estimated effects on the voice index are positive but insignificant after controlling for pre-determined variables ($\beta = 0.082$, $p = 0.16$).

While the average effects are not significant, Panel B of Table 1 shows that there is indeed a larger impact on supporters' perceived voice in case of the instrumental voice treatment (column (4) of Table 1). The treatment effect for the voice index is 0.13 standard deviations for the instrumental version and only 0.03 standard deviations for the intrinsic version of the voice treatment. This difference is significant at the 10% level. Panel C of Table 1 examines heterogeneity in the effects by feedback. Column 4 of Table 1 shows that the feedback treatment caused a significant increase in the voice index ($\beta = 0.12$, $p < 0.1$) while the impact of the voice treatment without feedback is not significant ($\beta = 0.05$, $p = 0.41$). The difference is not significantly different ($p = 0.29$).

[17] This analysis was not pre-registered.

Panel B of Table A11 shows that such differences between the effects of the intrinsic and instrumental voice treatments also exist for two of the four index components, particularly on supporters' feeling of being heard in the party and supporters' perception of the party's interest in their opinion.

Overall, these results suggest that explicitly linking the elicitation of voice to an issue of high instrumental relevance, in our context to the objective to improve the effectiveness of the party's electoral campaign, can increase perceived voice.

Perceived Effectiveness We further test whether the treatment changed individuals' perceptions of the effectiveness of the party's campaign strategy, which could have affected supporters' decisions to exert effort during the campaign. It is conceivable that supporters believe that the party's interest in their views increases the overall quality and, hence, effectiveness of the campaign. However, our empirical analysis reveals an insignificant treatment effect on beliefs about campaign effectiveness of -0.07 standard deviations (Table A12). Similarly, the treatment effects of the instrumental and intrinsic version of the voice treatment are both negative, small, and insignificant (Panel B of Table A12). Taken together, this suggests that the observed effects on campaign behavior are not driven by an increase in the perceived effectiveness of the party's campaign strategy.

4.5 Voiced opinions

The open-ended text provided by respondents in the voice treatment arms may provide a useful lens to better understand mechanisms. Indeed, it is conceivable that the voiced opinions might differ across voice treatment arms. Table A17 shows that neither the instrumental treatment nor the feedback treatment affect the likelihood of making any comment or making a constructive comment. Respondents in the instrumental treatment are 2 percentage points less likely to make a nonsense comment ($p < 0.05$). Moreover, supporters that were randomly assigned to the feedback condition write more characters compared to respondents in a treatment condition that did not include a feedback announcement ($p < 0.05$). Appendix section C.2 provides additional details.

4.6 Heterogeneity

Finally, we examine heterogeneous treatment effects by members' perceived pre-treatment voice. Figure A3 shows the treatment effects on the application data (Panel A) and the voice index (Panel B) separately for respondents with above and below median pre-treatment voice. The figure highlights that treatment effects are more pronounced for respondents with above-median pre-treatment voice. These results suggest that a relatively light touch intervention might be most effective in influencing the behavior of party supporters who already perceive higher levels of voice and are potentially more inclined to participate in the campaign to begin with. These heterogeneous effects suggest that the estimated treatment effects may not carry over to a broader and less committed sample of party supporters. We examine the issue of external validity in the next section.

5 External validity

Given that only a small subset of party supporters participated in our survey, it is not clear how our results translate to less engaged party supporters and the broader public. To somewhat address concerns about external validity we recruit a broadly representative sample of citizens in our country of study in August 2022. The sample consists of almost 500 respondents which are broadly representative for the general population in terms of age, gender, education and employment status (see Appendix section D for additional details on the sample and survey design). To assess the role of perceived voice in a general population sample, we use hypothetical survey questions which allow us to assess self-reported intentions of political engagement under different hypothetical scenarios. In particular, we ask respondents to indicate their likelihood of joining their preferred party or engaging in that party's campaign under a status quo scenario and a scenario in which parties change their organizational structures to provide their members with more voice.

Respondents indicate they would be 3.87 p.p. or 14 percent ($p < 0.01$) more likely to join their preferred political party in the higher voice scenario (Table A20). Similarly, respondents state a 3.4 p.p. or 11 percent ($p < 0.01$) higher likelihood of engaging in the political cam-

paign of their preferred party in the scenario with more opportunities to voice opinions. We find that the effects of voice are relatively homogeneous in our sample and not statistically distinguishable for members and supporters of the party we collaborated with compared to the rest of our sample ($p = 0.55$). This suggests that a perceived lack of opportunities for voice in political organizations is considered an important barrier to political engagement also in broader samples of the population.

6 Conclusion

We conduct a natural field experiment with a major European party to test whether giving voice to its members increases their subsequent engagement in the party's campaign. In the experiment, the party provides a random subset of party supporters the opportunity to voice their opinions. Giving supporters more opportunities to voice their opinions increases their engagement in the campaign as measured through the party's smartphone application. Finally, our survey data also suggests that the voice treatment effects operate through members' increased perceived voice and agency within the party rather than through increases in the perceived effectiveness of the campaign. One possibility is that increasing supporters' voice increases the extent to which they feel valued by the party. A promising avenue for future research is to test whether giving voice is necessary to increase engagement or whether increasing esteem (e.g., through praise) is sufficient to motivate supporters.

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7 Main Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Experimental design



Notes: Figure 1 illustrates the experimental design.



Figure 2: Relationships between voice and canvassing behavior

Notes: Figure 2 shows binscatter plots of the post-treatment voice index and campaign intentions and behavior in the full sample. Data is divided in decile bins. Panel A shows the relationship between the voice index and the number of intended campaign activities. Panel B shows the relationship between the voice index and whether individuals conducted any canvassing according to the smartphone application data.

Table 1: Main treatment effects

	App data		Survey data	
	(1) Any	(2) Doors (wins)	(3) # intended activities	(4) Voice index (z)
Panel A: Main effects				
Any voice treatment	0.026***	1.207***	0.209**	0.082
	(0.007)	(0.352)	(0.103)	(0.058)
Panel B: Type of voice				
Instrumental	0.030***	1.424***	0.240**	0.134**
	(0.010)	(0.523)	(0.117)	(0.066)
Intrinsic	0.021**	0.990**	0.178	0.030
	(0.009)	(0.462)	(0.119)	(0.065)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic)	0.49	0.53	0.59	0.09
Panel C: Feedback announcement				
Feedback announcement	0.025**	1.360**	0.277**	0.116*
	(0.010)	(0.541)	(0.118)	(0.067)
No feedback announcement	0.027***	1.057**	0.145	0.050
	(0.009)	(0.439)	(0.117)	(0.064)
p(Feedback = No feedback)	0.88	0.66	0.25	0.28
Control mean	0.00	0.10	2.42	-0.00
Number of Observations	1007	1007	964	955

Notes: Table 1 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. Columns (1) and (2) show treatment effects on canvassing behavior measured using the smartphone application. Column (3) shows the impact on the number of planned campaign activities. Column (4) shows the impact on the voice index measured through the survey. All specifications include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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A Appendix Tables

Table A1: Summary table

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
Individual level characteristics						
Female	0.20	0.40	0.00	0	1	1007
Age	47.51	17.39	48.00	18	77	1007
Party member	0.95	0.22	1.00	0	1	1007
Years of party membership (winsorized)	15.55	15.30	10.00	0	56	1007
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale)	3.19	1.24	3.00	1	5	1007
Prior experience						
Any experience campaigning	0.78	0.42	1.00	0	1	1007
Experience: door canvassing	0.51	0.50	1.00	0	1	1007
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized)	13.70	32.62	1.00	0	200	1007
Experience: sticking poster	0.62	0.48	1.00	0	1	1007
Experience: campaign booth	0.69	0.46	1.00	0	1	1007
Experience: social media	0.45	0.50	0.00	0	1	1007
Experience: phone canvassing	0.19	0.39	0.00	0	1	1007
Experience: convince friends	0.66	0.47	1.00	0	1	1007
Experience: other	0.13	0.34	0.00	0	1	1007
Post treatment attitudes (control)						
I can make a difference through my involvement in [partyname].	3.37	1.07	4.00	1	5	326
I feel connected to [partyname].	4.24	0.81	4.00	1	5	326
My opinion is being taken into account to improve the party's election campaign.	2.75	1.08	3.00	1	5	326
I have the feeling that [partyname] is interested in my opinion.	3.02	1.09	3.00	1	5	326
The [partyname] has an effective campaigning strategy.	2.48	1.10	2.00	1	5	326
Post treatment intentions (control)						
# intended activities	2.42	1.77	2.00	0	6	330
Has no plans	0.16	0.37	0.00	0	1	330
Intention: door canvassing	0.31	0.46	0.00	0	1	330
Intention: # days door canvassing	2.24	5.57	0.00	0	35	328
Intention: sticking posters	0.39	0.49	0.00	0	1	330
Intention: campaign booth	0.56	0.50	1.00	0	1	330
Intention: social media	0.47	0.50	0.00	0	1	330
Intention: phone canvassing	0.12	0.33	0.00	0	1	330
Intention: convince friends	0.70	0.46	1.00	0	1	330
Intention: other	0.13	0.34	0.00	0	1	330
Post treatment behavior (control)						
Knocked on any door	0.00	0.05	0.00	0	1	335
# doors knocked	0.10	1.75	0.00	0	32	335
Provided comments (all treatment)						
Any comment	0.51	0.50	1.00	0	1	672
Nonsense comment	0.02	0.13	0.00	0	1	672
Constructive comment	0.38	0.49	0.00	0	1	672
Comment length	104.52	193.55	7.00	0	1037	672

Notes: Table A1 presents summary statistics of the experimental sample.

Table A2: Pooled balance table

	Control	Treatment	Δ	p($\Delta = 0$)
Individual level characteristics				
Female	0.21	0.20	-0.01	0.68
Age	48.10	47.21	-0.89	0.44
Party member	0.94	0.95	0.01	0.49
Years of party membership (winsorized)	15.12	15.76	0.64	0.53
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale)	3.11	3.23	0.12	0.15
Expected vote share own party (z)	0.01	-0.11	-0.12	0.06
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z)	-0.00	0.01	0.01	0.91
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z)	0.00	-0.04	-0.05	0.51
Prior experience				
Any experience campaigning	0.77	0.78	0.01	0.85
Experience: door canvassing	0.49	0.52	0.03	0.42
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized)	13.79	13.65	-0.13	0.95
Experience: sticking poster	0.59	0.64	0.04	0.19
Experience: campaign booth	0.70	0.69	-0.02	0.61
Experience: social media	0.42	0.47	0.05	0.11
Experience: phone canvassing	0.19	0.19	0.01	0.75
Experience: convince friends	0.67	0.66	-0.01	0.77
Experience: other	0.12	0.14	0.02	0.47

Notes: Table A2 presents a balance table for the pooled treatment variable. P-value of the joint test of insignificance is 0.21.

Table A3: Balance table by instrumental treatment

	(1) Control	(2) Instrumental	(3) Intrinsic	(4) p(Inst=Cont)	(5) p(Intr=Cont)	(6) p(Intr=Inst)
Individual level characteristics						
Female	0.21	0.20	0.20	0.73	0.72	0.98
Age	48.10	48.38	46.03	0.84	0.13	0.08
Party member	0.94	0.97	0.93	0.03	0.53	0.01
Years of party membership (winsorized)	15.12	15.82	15.71	0.55	0.62	0.93
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale)	3.11	3.20	3.27	0.39	0.10	0.44
Expected vote share own party (z)	0.01	-0.09	-0.14	0.20	0.04	0.43
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z)	-0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.70	0.88	0.58
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z)	0.00	-0.11	0.02	0.15	0.83	0.11
Prior experience						
Any experience campaigning	0.77	0.79	0.77	0.67	0.91	0.59
Experience: door canvassing	0.49	0.52	0.52	0.47	0.51	0.94
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized)	13.79	11.54	15.78	0.36	0.46	0.08
Experience: sticking poster	0.59	0.66	0.61	0.07	0.66	0.16
Experience: campaign booth	0.70	0.70	0.68	0.86	0.49	0.60
Experience: social media	0.42	0.49	0.45	0.07	0.37	0.35
Experience: phone canvassing	0.19	0.18	0.21	0.80	0.43	0.29
Experience: convince friends	0.67	0.67	0.65	0.94	0.55	0.50
Experience: other	0.12	0.15	0.12	0.28	0.89	0.34

Notes: Table A3 presents a balance table by type of voice.

Table A4: Balance table by feedback treatment

	(1) Control	(2) Feedback	(3) No feedback	(4) p(Feed=Cont)	(5) p(No Feed=Cont)	(6) p(Feed=No Feed)
Individual level characteristics						
Female	0.21	0.20	0.19	0.85	0.60	0.74
Age	48.10	47.19	47.23	0.50	0.51	0.98
Party member	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.52	0.57	0.94
Years of party membership (winsorized)	15.12	16.64	14.92	0.20	0.86	0.15
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale)	3.11	3.24	3.23	0.19	0.24	0.88
Expected vote share own party (z)	0.01	-0.13	-0.10	0.08	0.11	0.75
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z)	-0.00	-0.03	0.04	0.69	0.60	0.33
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z)	0.00	-0.09	0.00	0.23	1.00	0.23
Prior experience						
Any experience campaigning	0.77	0.80	0.75	0.35	0.57	0.13
Experience: door canvassing	0.49	0.55	0.49	0.15	0.97	0.14
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized)	13.79	14.57	12.77	0.76	0.69	0.46
Experience: sticking poster	0.59	0.65	0.62	0.11	0.49	0.35
Experience: campaign booth	0.70	0.73	0.65	0.46	0.12	0.02
Experience: social media	0.42	0.46	0.48	0.24	0.12	0.74
Experience: phone canvassing	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.77	0.79	0.97
Experience: convince friends	0.67	0.69	0.63	0.60	0.31	0.12
Experience: other	0.12	0.14	0.13	0.44	0.63	0.77

Notes: Table A4 presents a balance table by feedback announcement.

Table A5: Correlation between canvassing intentions and actual canvassing

	Any door		Doors (wins)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Intention: Any canvassing	0.057***	0.053***	2.967***	2.646***
	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.751)	(0.735)
Control mean	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.10
Number of Observations	964	964	964	964
Control variables		X		X

Notes: Table A5 presents the correlations between a dummy indicating any canvassing intention and observed canvassing behavior. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Levels of canvassing activity across treatment groups

	Control	Any treatment	Instrumental + feedback	Intrinsic + feedback	Instrumental + no feedback	Intrinsic + no feedback
# Individuals with any canvassing	1	20	4	6	7	3
Average doors (conditional on any canvassing)	32	46.5	62.25	45.5	37.86	47.67
Average doors	0.01	1.38	1.54	1.63	1.51	0.86
Number of observations	335	672	162	168	176	166

Notes: Table A6 presents absolute levels of canvassing activities across treatment groups.

Table A7: Treatment effect on any doors: Logit estimation

	Any canvassing (app data)	
	(1)	(2)
Panel A: Main effects		
Any voice treatment	2.327**	2.359**
	(1.027)	(1.106)
Marginal effect	0.030	0.033
Panel B: Type of voice		
Instrumental	2.419**	2.574**
	(1.048)	(1.137)
Intrinsic	2.225**	2.154*
	(1.057)	(1.132)
Marginal effect: Instrumental	0.100	0.092
Marginal effect: Intrinsic	0.098	0.077
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic)	0.67	0.37
Panel C: Feedback announcement		
Feedback	2.345**	2.339**
	(1.052)	(1.145)
No feedback	2.309**	2.379**
	(1.052)	(1.117)
Marginal effect: Instrumental	0.101	0.083
Marginal effect: Intrinsic	0.098	0.086
p(Feedback = No feedback)	0.94	0.93
Control mean	0.00	0.00
Number of Observations	1007	1007
Controls		X

Notes: Table A7 presents the main treatment effects estimated using logit regressions. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. The table displays logit coefficients and marginal effects. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Main treatment effects without control variables

	App data		Survey data	
	(1) Any	(2) Doors (wins)	(3) # intended activities	(4) Voice index (z)
Panel A: Main effects				
Any voice treatment	0.027***	1.288***	0.327***	0.120*
	(0.007)	(0.362)	(0.119)	(0.068)
Panel B: Type of voice				
Instrumental	0.030***	1.425***	0.388***	0.177**
	(0.010)	(0.520)	(0.138)	(0.078)
Intrinsic	0.024**	1.150**	0.265*	0.062
	(0.009)	(0.485)	(0.137)	(0.079)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic)	0.67	0.69	0.37	0.15
Panel C: Feedback announcement				
Feedback announcement	0.027***	1.486***	0.401***	0.145*
	(0.010)	(0.550)	(0.138)	(0.079)
No feedback announcement	0.026***	1.097**	0.258*	0.096
	(0.010)	(0.455)	(0.137)	(0.078)
p(Feedback = No feedback)	0.94	0.58	0.30	0.54
Control mean	0.00	0.10	2.42	-0.00
Number of Observations	1007	1007	964	955

Notes: Table A8 presents the main treatment effects without control variables. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. Columns (1) and (2) show treatment effects on canvassing behavior measured using the smartphone application. Column (3) shows the impact on the number of planned campaign activities. Column (4) shows the impact on the voice index measured through the survey. All specifications do not include control variables. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A9: Treatment effects on overall campaign activity

	(1) # activities	(2) Campaign booth	(3) Phone canvassing	(4) Stick posters	(5) Convince friends	(6) Online campaigning	(7) Any canvassing	(8) # days canvassing
Panel A: Main effects								
Any voice treatment	0.209**	0.057*	0.009	0.016	0.054*	0.007	0.021	0.336
	(0.103)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.028)	(0.344)
Panel B: Type of voice								
Instrumental	0.240**	0.056	0.027	0.013	0.048	-0.014	0.034	0.252
	(0.117)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.393)
Intrinsic	0.178	0.057	-0.008	0.018	0.060*	0.028	0.007	0.420
	(0.119)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.416)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic)	0.59	0.98	0.12	0.89	0.68	0.18	0.42	0.69
Panel C: Feedback announcement								
Feedback announcement	0.277**	0.057	0.016	0.025	0.055*	0.019	0.017	0.077
	(0.118)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.394)
No feedback announcement	0.145	0.056	0.003	0.007	0.052*	-0.004	0.024	0.577
	(0.117)	(0.035)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.417)
p(Feedback = No feedback)	0.25	0.98	0.58	0.60	0.92	0.45	0.84	0.25
Control mean	2.42	0.56	0.12	0.39	0.70	0.47	0.31	2.24
Number of Observations	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	961

Notes: Table A9 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. Column (1) presents the effects on the number of planned campaign activities. Columns (2) to (7) present impacts on the individual planned activities. Column (8) presents the effects on the number of planned canvassing days. All regressions include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A10: Correlation of canvassing intentions and behavior by treatment status

	Any door		Doors (wins)	
	(1) Treatment	(2) Control	(3) Treatment	(4) Control
Intention: Any canvassing	0.079***	0.010	3.889***	0.317
	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.995)	(0.316)
Group outcome mean	0.03	0.00	1.38	0.10
Number of Observations	672	335	672	335
p-value(control=treatment)	0.00		0.00	

Notes: Table A10 presents the correlations between canvassing intentions and canvassing behavior by treatment status. Columns (1) and (2) show correlations between canvassing intentions and a dummy for any canvassing activity. Columns (3) and (4) show correlations between canvassing intentions and the number of canvassed doors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A11: Treatment effects on supporters' perceptions

	(1) Voice index	(2) Diff through engagement	(3) Being heard	(4) Feels connection	(5) Party interested
Panel A: Main effects					
Any voice treatment	0.082	0.092	0.041	0.084	0.041
	(0.058)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.064)	(0.057)
Panel B: Type of voice					
Instrumental	0.134**	0.123*	0.106	0.097	0.096
	(0.066)	(0.069)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.068)
Intrinsic	0.030	0.062	-0.024	0.070	-0.013
	(0.065)	(0.070)	(0.069)	(0.074)	(0.065)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic)	0.09	0.35	0.07	0.69	0.11
Panel C: Feedback announcement					
Feedback announcement	0.116*	0.105	0.069	0.092	0.100
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.067)
No feedback announcement	0.050	0.080	0.015	0.076	-0.013
	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.065)
p(Feedback = No feedback)	0.28	0.70	0.44	0.82	0.09
Control mean	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Number of Observations	955	955	955	955	955

Notes: Table A11 presents the treatment effects on supporters' perceptions. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. Column (1) shows treatment effects on a voice index. Columns (2) to (5) show treatment effects on the index components. All specifications include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A12: Treatment effects on perceived campaign effectiveness

	Effective campaign (z)
	(1)
Panel A: Main effects	
Any voice treatment	-0.072
	(0.068)
Panel B: Type of voice	
Instrumental	-0.084
	(0.076)
Intrinsic	-0.060
	(0.080)
p(Instrumental = Intrinsic)	0.76
Panel C: Feedback announcement	
Feedback announcement	-0.074
	(0.080)
No feedback announcement	-0.071
	(0.077)
p(Feedback = No feedback)	0.97
Control mean	0.00
Number of Observations	955

Notes: Table A12 presents the treatment effects on respondents' perceptions of the effectiveness of the campaign. Panel A displays pooled treatment effects. Panel B displays heterogeneity by type of voice. Panel C displays heterogeneity by whether supporters saw the feedback announcement. Column (2) includes the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

A.1 Fully disaggregated regressions

Table A13: Balance table - disaggregated

	Control	Instrumental	Instrumental + Feedback	Intrinsic	Intrinsic + Feedback	p-value joint significance
Individual level characteristics						
Female	0.21	0.21	0.19	0.17	0.22	0.80
Age	48.10	48.38	48.38	46.01	46.04	0.47
Years of party membership (winsorized)	15.12	14.63	17.10	15.22	16.19	0.55
Years of party membership (winsorized)	15.12	14.63	17.10	15.22	16.19	0.55
Perceived voice within party (1 - 5 Likert scale)	3.11	3.24	3.15	3.21	3.33	0.40
Expected vote share own party (z)	0.01	-0.07	-0.11	-0.14	-0.14	0.32
Expected vote share competitor party 1 (z)	-0.00	0.04	0.01	0.04	-0.07	0.77
Expected vote share competitor party 2 (z)	0.00	-0.06	-0.16	0.07	-0.03	0.35
Prior experience						
Any experience campaigning	0.77	0.75	0.83	0.76	0.78	0.43
Experience: door canvassing	0.49	0.46	0.59	0.52	0.51	0.19
Experience: # days door canvassing (winsorized)	13.79	10.31	12.88	15.37	16.19	0.45
Experience: sticking poster	0.59	0.65	0.68	0.59	0.63	0.32
Experience: campaign booth	0.70	0.64	0.76	0.66	0.70	0.14
Experience: social media	0.42	0.47	0.51	0.48	0.42	0.29
Experience: phone canvassing	0.19	0.18	0.18	0.21	0.21	0.88
Experience: convince friends	0.67	0.63	0.72	0.63	0.66	0.44
Experience: other	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.12	0.79

Notes: Table A13 presents a disaggregated balance table.

Table A14: Main treatment effects - disaggregated

	App data				Survey data	
	(1) Any	(2) Any	(3) Doors (wins)	(4) Doors (wins)	(5) Voice index (z)	(6) Voice index (z)
Treatment: instrumental	0.037**	0.039***	1.410**	1.452**	0.187**	0.130*
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.694)	(0.678)	(0.092)	(0.074)
Treatment: instrumental + feedback	0.022*	0.021*	1.442*	1.412*	0.165*	0.146*
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.769)	(0.774)	(0.100)	(0.084)
Treatment: intrinsic	0.015	0.014	0.766	0.639	0.003	-0.028
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.565)	(0.571)	(0.099)	(0.079)
Treatment: intrinsic + feedback	0.033**	0.028**	1.529**	1.293*	0.125	0.088
	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.775)	(0.724)	(0.095)	(0.079)
Control mean	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.10	-0.00	-0.00
Number of Observations	1007	1007	1007	1007	955	955
Controls		X		X		X

Notes: Table A14 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Columns (1) to (4) show treatment effects on canvassing behavior measured using the smartphone application. Columns (5) and (6) show the impact on the voice index measured through the survey. Even columns include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A15: Treatment effects on overall campaign activity - disaggregated

	(1) # activities	(2) Campaign booth	(3) Phone canvassing	(4) Stick posters	(5) Convince friends	(6) Online campaigning	(7) Any canvassing	(8) # days canvassing
Treatment: instrumental	0.225	0.045	0.004	0.009	0.066*	-0.016	0.049	0.394
	(0.139)	(0.043)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.494)
Treatment: instrumental + feedback	0.270*	0.073*	0.054*	0.019	0.030	-0.008	0.017	0.009
	(0.145)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.507)
Treatment: intrinsic	0.074	0.071*	0.004	0.005	0.040	0.008	0.000	0.818
	(0.147)	(0.042)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.547)
Treatment: intrinsic + feedback	0.307**	0.047	-0.018	0.034	0.083**	0.046	0.022	0.286
	(0.140)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.042)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.473)
Control mean	2.42	0.56	0.12	0.39	0.70	0.47	0.31	2.24
Number of Observations	964	964	964	964	964	964	964	961

Notes: Table A15 presents the main treatment effects with control variables. Column (1) presents the effects on the number of planned campaign activities. Columns (2) to (7) present impacts on the individual planned activities. Column (8) presents the effects on the number of planned canvassing days. All regressions include the following control variables: include age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A16: Effect on perceptions - disaggregated

	Voice index		Diff through engagement		Being heard		Feels connection		Party interested	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Treatment: instrumental	0.187**	0.126*	0.198**	0.140*	0.144	0.090	0.109	0.081	0.138	0.086
	(0.092)	(0.074)	(0.089)	(0.079)	(0.098)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.083)	(0.096)	(0.080)
Treatment: instrumental + feedback	0.165*	0.143*	0.144	0.105	0.129	0.124	0.161*	0.116	0.088	0.106
	(0.100)	(0.084)	(0.099)	(0.088)	(0.103)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.086)	(0.105)	(0.089)
Treatment: intrinsic	0.003	-0.026	0.053	0.019	-0.037	-0.061	0.084	0.072	-0.091	-0.114
	(0.099)	(0.078)	(0.099)	(0.083)	(0.098)	(0.087)	(0.096)	(0.090)	(0.101)	(0.081)
Treatment: intrinsic + feedback	0.125	0.090	0.156*	0.107	0.051	0.016	0.082	0.069	0.105	0.094
	(0.095)	(0.078)	(0.095)	(0.085)	(0.095)	(0.083)	(0.093)	(0.088)	(0.093)	(0.076)
Control mean	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00	-0.00
Number of Observations	955	955	955	955	955	955	955	955	955	955
Controls		X		X		X		X		X

Notes: Table A16 presents the treatment effects on supporters' perceptions. Columns (1) and (2) show treatment effects on a voice index. Columns (3) to (10) show treatment effects on the index components. Even columns include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B Appendix Figures



Figure A1: Distribution of perceived voice prior to treatment



Figure A2: Correlates of perceived voice

Notes: Figure A2 presents the regression coefficients of a regression of perceived voice (z-scored) on all available pre-determined variables. All independent variables are standardized. Prior voice (z) is the standardized measure of the question described in Figure A1. The voice index is an index of four questions measured after treatment administration. The sample for the voice index regression is restricted to the control group. Bars represent 95% confident intervals.



Figure A3: Heterogeneous effects by prior voice

Notes: Figure A3 presents the impacts of the treatment by prior voice. High prior voice indicates above median prior voice (the top two categories displayed in Figure A1). Panel A shows treatment effects on canvassing activity. Panel B shows impacts on the voice index. All available pre-determined variables are included as controls. Bars represent 95% confident intervals. Stars indicate significance levels of a test of equality of treatment effects across the two groups. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Additional results on voiced opinions

C.1 Descriptives

Open-ended responses Treated party supporters were able to provide their opinions in an open text box. These opinions indicate that a substantial fraction of party supporters experience high demand for voice.[18] Table A1 illustrates that 51 percent of supporters give voluntary input when offered the opportunity to share their opinions via an open-ended text box. Moreover, 36 percent of these party supporters provide constructive input. The most commonly mentioned topics are related to the general campaign strategy, the topics that should be emphasized more heavily in the campaign, and the party's candidate selection decisions. Overall, the open-ended data thus suggests both a high engagement of survey participants and a significant demand for voice.

C.2 Mechanisms: Text data on voiced opinions

In this section, we analyze treatment effects on the text data consisting of the opinions party supporters voice in the open text box.

Measurement and coding We measure the voluntary provision of information through the text provided by supporters using the open text field which was part of all voice treatment conditions. Our main outcomes are a dummy taking value one if a respondent made any comment, a dummy taking value one if a nonsensical comment was provided, a dummy taking value one if a respondent made a constructive comment, and finally the length of the written text as measured by the number of characters winsorized at the 99^{th} percentile).[19]

Specification Empirically, we estimate the following equation among all respondents who received any voice treatment:[20]

$$Y_i = \phi_0 + \phi_1 treatment_i^{type} + \phi X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

where Y_i is either dummy whether a (specific type of) comment was provided or the length of the comment provided, and where $treatment_i^{type}$ is a dummy indicating whether the supporter received a specific type of the voice treatment (either the instrumental version of the voice treatment or a voice treatment with an announcement of feedback).

Results Table A17 shows the treatment effects of the instrumental treatment (Panel A) and the feedback treatment (Panel B). The Table highlights that neither the instrumental treatment nor the feedback treatment affect the likelihood of making any comment or making a constructive comment. Respondents in the instrumental treatment are 2 percentage points

[18] We observe this open-ended data for respondents in any of the voice treatments, but not for respondents in the control group.

[19] All of our results are robust, but estimated less precisely if we do not apply the winsorization.

[20] We cannot include supporters in the control group in this analysis as they were not given the opportunity to share their views.

less likely to make a nonsense comment ($p < 0.05$), compared to a mean of 3 percent in the intrinsic voice treatment group. Moreover, anticipated feedback increases the length of the written text. Supporters that were randomly assigned to the feedback condition write, on average, 33 characters more compared to respondents in a treatment condition that did not include a feedback announcement ($p < 0.05$). This suggests that the anticipation of feedback may help increase information flows in organizations by encouraging the rank and file to increase their willingness to share suggestions with the party leadership.

Table A17: Effect of feedback on provided information

	(1) Any comment	(2) Nonsense comment	(3) Constructive comment	(4) Length (characters)
Panel A: Type of voice				
Instrumental	0.008	-0.020**	0.026	10.895
	(0.037)	(0.009)	(0.037)	(14.092)
Intrinsic group mean	0.50	0.03	0.36	98.16
Panel B: Feedback announcement				
Feedback announcement	0.022	-0.005	0.006	32.604**
	(0.037)	(0.009)	(0.036)	(13.645)
No feedback group mean	0.50	0.02	0.38	85.19
Number of Observations	672	672	672	672

Notes: Table A17 presents treatment effects on the extensive and intensive margins of provided comments. Panel A shows the effects of type of voice. Panel B shows the effects of the feedback announcement. The pure control group is not included as they were not asked for comments. Length of comment is winsorized at the 99^{th} percentile. All specifications include the following control variables: age, gender, membership dummy, years of party membership, above median perceived voice dummy, campaign experience (dummies for all past activities), and z-scored expectations for the vote shares of the own party and the two main competitors. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A18: Effect of feedback on provided information - no control variables

	(1) Any comment	(2) Nonsense comment	(3) Constructive comment	(4) Length (characters)
Panel A: Type of voice				
Instrumental	0.024	-0.021**	0.049	12.652
	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.037)	(14.932)
Intrinsic group mean	0.50	0.03	0.36	98.16
Panel B: Feedback announcement				
Feedback announcement	0.024	-0.008	0.008	39.356***
	(0.039)	(0.010)	(0.038)	(14.945)
No feedback group mean	0.50	0.02	0.38	85.19
Number of Observations	672	672	672	672

Notes: Table A18 presents treatment effects on the extensive and intensive margins of provided comments. Panel A shows the effects of type of voice. Panel B shows the effects of the feedback announcement. The pure control group is not included as they were not asked for comments. Length of comment is winsorized at the 99^{th} percentile. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Survey instrument

- **Introduction**

  Welcome,

  we are conducting a short survey among our supporters to plan our election campaign. Your participation helps us to use our campaign resources optimally. We will treat your answers confidentially. The survey only takes 5 minutes.

  Thank you very much for your help!

- **Sex**

  What is your sex?

- **Age**

  How old are you?

- **Party member**

  Are you a member of [party name] party?

- **Years of party membership** (asked if respondent is party member)

  For how many years have you been a member of [party name] party?

- **Campaigning experience**

  Have you ever campaigned for the [party name] in the past?

- **Prior campaigning experience: margins**

  In which election campaign activities have you participated at least once? Please select all that apply.

  Canvassing
  Sticking posters
  Participate in campaign booth
  Online advertisements for the party (e.g. sharing campaign materials on social media)
  Call supporters
  Talk to family, friends and acquaintances about the [party name] election program
  Other

- **Canvassing: Intensive Margin**

  On how many days did you go from door to door for [party name] in the past?

- **Canvassing workshop**

  Have you ever participated in a canvassing training workshop?

- **Pre-treatment belief about voice**

  Do you feel that your opinion is heard within the party?

- **Perceived vote shares**

  What do you think: How many percent will the following parties receive in the national election on [date]?
  Party name 1
  Party name 2
  Party name 3

- **Treatment: Instrumental**

  Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics seem important to you based on your experience in your constituency. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions. Your answers help us to make the election campaign more effective.

  Environment, nature and climate protection
  Economy
  Internal security
  Health and care
  Work and social policies
  Digitization
  Education and Research
  Budget, Finance and Taxes
  Foreign Policy and Security Policy

  Would you like to tell us more about which issues we should particularly emphasize in the election campaign? [open-text box]

- **Treatment: Instrumental + Feedback**

  Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics seem important to you based on your experience in your constituency. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions. Your answers help us to make the election campaign more effective.

  After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the results.

  What do you think: How much should we emphasize the following issues in the current national election campaign? Environment, nature and climate protection
  Economy
  Internal security

Health and care
Work and social policies
Digitization
Education and Research
Budget, Finance and Taxes
Foreign Policy and Security Policy

Would you like to tell us more about which issues we should particularly emphasize in the election campaign? After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the results. [open-text box]

- **Treatment: Intrinsic**

  Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics are close to your heart. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions.

  How much do you personally care about the following topics?
  Environment, nature and climate protection
  Economy
  Internal security
  Health and care
  Work and social policies
  Digitization
  Education and Research
  Budget, Finance and Taxes
  Foreign Policy and Security Policy

  Would you like to tell us more about which topics are particularly close to your heart? [open-text box]

- **Treatment: Intrinsic + Feedback**

  Your opinion is very important to us. We are particularly interested in which topics are close to your heart. We would therefore like to ask you a few questions.

  After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the results.

  How much do you personally care about the following topics?
  Environment, nature and climate protection
  Economy
  Internal security
  Health and care
  Work and social policies
  Digitization

Education and Research
Budget, Finance and Taxes
Foreign Policy and Security Policy

Would you like to tell us more about which topics are particularly close to your heart? After the completion of the survey, we will send you a summary of the results. [open-text box]

- **Intended campaigning experience: margins**

  How do you intend to contribute to the current election campaign?

  Canvassing
  Sticking posters
  Participate in campaign booth
  Online advertisements for the party (e.g. sharing campaign materials on social media)
  Call supporters
  Talk to family, friends and acquaintances about the [partyname] election program
  Other

- **Intensive margin** (asked if extensive margin is yes)

  On how many days do you plan to canvass during this election campaign?

- **Post-treatment beliefs**

  To what extent do you agree with each of the following statements?
  I can make a difference through my involvement in [partyname].
  I feel connected to [partyname].
  My opinion is being taken into account to improve the party's election campaign.
  I have the feeling that [partyname] is interested in my opinion.
  The [partyname] has an effective campaigning strategy.

- **Debrief** Thank you very much for your participation

D Vignette Experiment

This section describes the vignette experiment implemented with a broadly representative sample in the country of study. We recruited respondents using the online panel provider Luc.id, which is widely used in social science research (Haaland et al., 2021). The study took place in August 2022.

All respondents who successfully passed a pre-specified attention check and then completed the vignette questions at the end of the survey described in section D.2 are included in the sample. Table A19 displays summary statistics for this sample.

We analyze the data following the pre-analysis plan included in section E. Specifically, we estimate the following regression equation on a reshaped data set with two observations per respondent (one per hypothetical scenario):

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Improved voice}_i + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where $Improved\_voice_i$ indicates the improved voice scenario. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. Table D.1 presents the results of this regression.

Figure A4 further displays the cumulative distribution functions of the outcomes in each scenario.

D.1 Vignette results

Table A19: Vignette experiment summary statistics

	Mean	SD	Median	Min.	Max.	Obs.
Individual level characteristics						
Male	0.54	0.50	1.00	0	1	496
Age	39.08	17.79	33.00	18	77	496
Vocational degree	0.60	0.49	1.00	0	1	496
College degree	0.27	0.44	0.00	0	1	496
Working	0.67	0.47	1.00	0	1	496
Student	0.10	0.30	0.00	0	1	496
Retired	0.15	0.35	0.00	0	1	496
Party member	0.11	0.32	0.00	0	1	496

Notes: Table A19 presents the summary statistics for the vignette sample.

Table A20: Vignette experiment

	Probability of joining the party	Probability of joining the campaign
Improved voice	3.870***	3.411***
	(0.797)	(0.766)
Mean status quo	28.63	31.76
Number of Observations	878	992

Notes: Table A20 presents the results of a vignette experiment testing the importance of voice described in section D. The is sample representative of the population in country of study in terms of age, gender, region, and income. Column (1) shows the effect of improved voice on the probability of joining respondents' preferred political party within the next two years. This is not asked of individuals who are already member of a political party. Column (2) shows the effect of improved voice on the probability of joining the next federal election campaign for respondents' preferred party. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Panel A: CDF of probability of joining the party



Panel B: CDF of probability of joining electoral campaign



Figure A4: Cumulative distribution function of vignette experiment outcomes

Notes: Figure A4 presents the cumulative distribution functions for the outcomes of the vignette experiment described in section D. Panel A shows cumulative distribution functions for the probability of joining respondents' preferred party within the next two years. Panel A shows cumulative distribution functions for the probability of joining the next electoral campaign of respondents' preferred party.

D.2 Vignette survey

- The next question addresses the following problem. In surveys like this one, there are sometimes participants who don't read the questions carefully and just "click" through the questionnaire quickly. As a result, there are many random answers that falsify the results of the study. In order to show that you read our questions carefully, we ask you to indicate 333 as the answer to the next question.

  What's your favorite number?

- First a few questions about yourself.
  - How old are you?
  - What is your gender? (Male, Female, Divers, Do not want to answer.
  - Which of the following categories best describes you? (I work full-time; I work part-time; I am unemployed; I am a student; I am retired; housewife/househusband; Other)
- What is your highest professional qualification? (No completed vocational training; Vocational training; University or technical college degree)

  page break
- Are you a member of a political party? (Yes; No)

  page break
- Which political party are you a member of? (XXX)

  page break
- Do you support a specific political party? (Yes; No)

  page break
- Which political party do you most support? (XXX)

  page break
- In the past, have you campaigned for the party you are most likely to support? (Yes; No)

  page break
- Imagine if the political party you are most likely to support retained its current organizational structure.

  What is the probability (in %) that you would join this party within the next 2 years? (slider 0 to 100)

What is the probability (in %) that you would get involved with this party in the next federal election campaign? (slider 0 to 100)

page break

- Imagine if the political party you are most likely to support changed its organizational structure to give its members more say.

  What is the probability (in %) that you would join this party within the next 2 years? (slider 0 to 100)

  What is the probability (in %) that you would get involved with this party in the next federal election campaign? (slider 0 to 100)

E Pre-analysis plans

The data collections were pre-registered in the AsPredicted registry (#73332 and #103944). The pre-analysis plans for the main experiment and the vignette experiment are available on the following links: `https://aspredicted.org/v5ec6.pdf` and `https://aspredicted.org/c53jd.pdf`. They are also displayed on the subsequent pages.

Voice and Political Engagement (#73332)

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1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
In this paper, we examine the extent to which parties can increase engagement by creating a more inclusive party platform that attempts to give more voice and inclusion to party supporters.

To examine the effectiveness of "giving voice" we will run a natural field experiment with a major European party in the context of a 2021 national election. We leverage a sample of 11,500 party supporters registered in the party's campaign newsletter who are invited to join our survey. Within our survey, a random subset of supporters is asked for their input to the campaign, in particular, which topics should be primarily covered in the campaign.

The main hypothesis is that giving supporters a chance to express their opinions ("giving supporters voice") will increase engagement with the party.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
Our main outcomes are people's engagement with the campaign as measured by their intentions to be engaged in the party's campaign as well as their actual participation in the campaign. Our main survey-based outcomes are thus the following:

A dummy for whether respondents want to take part in the door-to-door campaign.
The number of days respondents plan to take part in the door-to-door campaign (this is coded as zero for people who don't plan to take part in the door-to-door campaign.
The number of activities our respondents plan to engage in this electoral campaign (this includes 1) participation in the door-to-door campaign, 2) sticking posters, 3) Participate in the campaign booth, 4) engage in online campaigning, 5) call supporters, 6) campaign with family members. We may also analyze these activities individually.

We will measure actual participation in the campaign via a smartphone application developed by the political party with whom we are collaborating. At the time of writing, the application is currently under review to address minor technical issues. It is our expectation that the smartphone application will be ready for use at the time of the survey rollout which will allow us to link survey responses, treatment status, and actual behavior in the field. In particular, we intend to study the following main outcomes based on the data derived from the smartphone application:

Whether the respondent knocked on at least one door according to the party's app.
The number of days respondents actually took part in the door-to-door campaign according to the party's app.
The number of doors visited according to the party's app.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
5 treatment groups:

Control group. (1/3 of the sample)

Voice - Intrinsic: People are asked to tell the party which topics are important to them personally. (1/6 of sample)
Voice + Feedback - Intrinsic: People are asked to tell the party which topics are important to them personally. People are also told that the party will give them feedback on their views as measured in the survey. (1/6 of sample)

Voice - Extrinsic: People are asked to tell the party which topics should be emphasized more in the electoral campaign. (1/6 of sample)

Voice + Feedback - Extrinsic:People are asked to tell the party which topics should be emphasized more in the electoral campaign. People are also told that the party will give them feedback on their views as measured in the survey. (1/6 of sample)

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We will run simple regressions with OLS of our main outcomes on dummies for the different treatment groups. If there are no statistically significant differences across groups 2-5, we plan to pool them for the main analysis.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.

There will be no outliers in our survey data as all outcome variables are bounded above.
In the app data on the number of doors, we will report data winsorized at the 99th and also at the 95th percentile.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.
The political party with which we are collaborating has a list of email addresses for a total of 11,500 supporters. We will invite all of these supporters to participate in our survey. The exact number of participants depends on the response rate.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
N/A

Voice-Vignettes-August 2022 (#103944)

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1) Have any data been collected for this study already?
No, no data have been collected for this study yet.

2) What's the main question being asked or hypothesis being tested in this study?
Hypothesis: People would be more likely to join and engage in political parties if these parties offered their members more opportunities to voice their opinions.

3) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured.
Our key dependent variables are the following:
- likelihood of joining the preferred political party within the next 2 years.
- likelihood of engaging in the next national electoral campaign of the preferred political party.

4) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to?
Three treatment conditions.

Control group: no change in opportunities to voice opinions in the preferred party.
Increase in voice: changes in the organizational structure which increase opportunities to voice opinions in the preferred party

5) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis.
We estimate the following specification:

Y_is = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 HighVoice_is + \varepsilon_is

Where Y_is is the outcome of interest.
HighVoice_is takes value 1 for respondents in the scenario s in which respondents are asked to imagine that there are changes in the organizational structure which increase opportunities to voice opinions in the preferred party. It takes value 0 for respondents where voice remains at the status quo.

We cluster standard errors at the individual level.

6) Describe exactly how outliers will be defined and handled, and your precise rule(s) for excluding observations.
We only include participants in our study that pass a basic attention screener at the start of the survey.
Our main outcomes are bounded by 0 and 100, so we don't need to deal with outliers.

7) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise about exactly how the number will be determined.
We plan to recruit 500 respondents.

8) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., secondary analyses, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual analyses planned?)
No.