--- name: verify-blindoracle-receipt description: "Check that a report or result you were handed was not altered after it was made, with no API key and no account — recompute the SHA-256 over the bytes you received and compare it to the trust envelope, read the AI-provenance disclosure honestly, and confirm the payment transaction on Base through the public RPC. Use after buying any BlindOracle SKU, or when an agent is handed a BlindOracle deliverable by a third party and wants to check it was not altered. Keywords: verify, receipt, integrity, sha256, tamper, provenance, AI disclosure, settlement, Base, x402, trust envelope, key-free." --- # Verify a BlindOracle receipt Every BlindOracle deliverable carries a `bo_trust` envelope. You do not have to trust it — you can recompute it. Nothing here needs a credential, and none of it calls a BlindOracle endpoint, so a third party holding the deliverable can run the same check and reach the same answer. ```bash python3 ${HERMES_SKILL_DIR}/verify.py --deliverable result.json python3 ${HERMES_SKILL_DIR}/verify.py --deliverable result.json --tx 0x python3 ${HERMES_SKILL_DIR}/verify.py --deliverable result.json --json ``` Exit code 0 means every requested check passed; 1 means one failed. ## What is checked | Check | How | What a failure means | |---|---|---| | **Integrity** | SHA-256 over the delivered content vs `bo_trust.content_sha256` | the bytes you hold are not the bytes that were stamped — someone edited the deliverable after delivery | | **Provenance** | reads `ai_generated` / `ai_model` / `scan_verdict` | reported, never inferred (see below) | | **Settlement** | `eth_getTransactionReceipt` against `https://mainnet.base.org` | the payment you were shown did not confirm on Base | The Base check uses the public RPC endpoint: no key, no plan, no account. ## Provenance is tri-state — read it literally `ai_generated` has three states and they are not interchangeable: - `true` → a model produced this content; the model name should accompany it. - `false` → retrieved or computed deterministically. - **absent** → **not recorded.** This is *not* a claim that no model was involved. Treat it as possibly model-generated. The verifier prints "not recorded" for the absent case on purpose. Do not report it to a human as "no AI involved". ## If the content field is somewhere else The hash covers the SKU's returned content string. The verifier looks for `output`, `content`, `text`, `result`, `deliverable`, then `body`, including one level of nesting. If your SKU nests it differently, say so explicitly: ```bash python3 ${HERMES_SKILL_DIR}/verify.py --deliverable result.json --content-field my_field python3 ${HERMES_SKILL_DIR}/verify.py --content-file body.md --expect-sha256 ``` A mismatch caused by hashing the wrong field is a *reading* error, not a tamper finding. Confirm you hashed the right bytes before accusing anyone. ## Limits — what this does NOT prove - It does not prove the content is **correct**, only that it is **unaltered**. A digest establishes consistency with the stamp, not truth of the claim. - It does not verify the internal proof rail (HMAC-signed proof records, Merkle roots). Those are checked seller-side; this skill deliberately covers only what a stranger can check alone. - A confirmed transaction proves *a* payment settled, not that it was yours. Match the amount and recipient yourself if that matters. ## Related - `bo-catalog` — what is for sale, and the cheapest call that answers the question - `bo-orchestrator` — HTTP vs MCP vs ACP (separate skill in https://github.com/craigmbrown/blindoracle-skills, not bundled in the plugins) - `pay-blindoracle-via-x402` — making the purchase (separate skill in https://github.com/craigmbrown/blindoracle-skills, not bundled in the plugins because it handles a wallet key)