# Incident disclosure 2026-11-10 ## Summary - On 10 November 2026 an attacker stole about $38,200 of Curve DAO fee revenue from the `CowSwapBurner` contract on Ethereum[[1]](#references). The stolen funds have not been recovered. - No user funds were affected. The burner holds only admin fees that have already been collected for the DAO. Pools, lending markets and crvUSD were not involved. - The burner approved CoW Protocol orders without checking that the order it had inspected was the order being executed. The attacker used this to sell accumulated token balances for USDC and direct the proceeds to their own address[[3]](#references). - The regular weekly conversion completed normally, generating 97,317.74 crvUSD revenue for the DAO. The attacker stole $38,200 from other accumulated balances, mostly below the 500 crvUSD sale minimum. - The Emergency DAO disabled the burner at 13:59 UTC the same day. DAO vote 1524 proposes replacing the vulnerable burner[[5]](#references). ## Background Curve collects admin fees from its pools and markets into the `FeeCollector`[[2]](#references) and converts them to crvUSD once a week. Fees are moved to a burner contract on Monday, the burner sells them during a 24-hour exchange window that opens on Tuesday at 00:00 UTC, and the crvUSD is distributed on Wednesday. Since June 2024 the burner on Ethereum has been the `CowSwapBurner`. For each fee token it holds, it offers a standing order on CoW Protocol: sell the whole balance for crvUSD, deliver the crvUSD to the `FeeCollector`, and accept no less than 500 crvUSD. To allow this, it grants CoW Protocol an unlimited allowance for each token. CoW Protocol validates the burner's orders through ERC-1271 by calling `isValidSignature(orderHash, signature)` and requiring the ERC-1271 success value. Before the incident the burner had settled 6,420 orders and delivered about 20.5 million crvUSD. ## Details of vulnerability `isValidSignature` receives two things: the hash of the order CoW Protocol is about to execute, and a block of signature data. For the burner, the signature data contains a full description of an order. The burner checked that the described order was one of its own (crvUSD out, the `FeeCollector` as receiver, at least 500 crvUSD) and returned the ERC-1271 success value. It never checked that the described order was the one identified by the hash. The function explicitly ignored `_hash`: ```python def isValidSignature(_hash: bytes32, signature: Bytes[1792]) -> bytes4: """ @notice ERC1271 signature verifier method @param _hash Hash of signed object. Ignored here @param signature Signature for the object. (GPv2Order.Data, PayloadStruct) here """ ``` In effect, anyone could submit an order in the burner's name, selling any token it held for any other token and to any receiver, and attach the description of a genuine burner order as the signature data. The only requirement was that the exchange window was open. ## Details of exploit The exchange window opened at 00:00 UTC on Tuesday 10 November 2026 and the burner's regular orders began to fill. At 00:07 UTC the first forged order settled[[6]](#references). It sold the burner's YB balance for USDC and named the attacker as receiver. Attached to it was the burner's own genuine order for YB. The attacker then reused that same attachment for 137 further orders selling other tokens. 133 orders filled within 17 minutes and the remaining five over the following hours, the last at 11:10 UTC[[7]](#references). | | Orders | Tokens | Proceeds | Paid to | | :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | :--- | | Regular | 36 | 35 | 97,317.74 crvUSD | `FeeCollector` | | Forged | 138 | 135 | 38,205.76 USDC | Attacker | The forged orders were otherwise ordinary: priced close to market and filled by solvers competing as usual. The two groups did not overlap: the forged orders sold only tokens that the regular orders did not. These were mostly balances too small to meet the burner's 500 crvUSD minimum, which had built up unsold over time. The median forged order was worth about $254 and only two were worth more than $500. For the tokens that had been sold before, the median time since the last sale was 161 days. Every order settled for the burner since its deployment, 6,558 in total, was checked. These 138 are the only ones not paid to the `FeeCollector`. ### Movement of funds Within four hours the attacker swapped 37,611.76 USDC to ETH, split it across four addresses, bridged it to Arbitrum and deposited 37,229.89 USDC into Hyperliquid[[8]](#references), where it was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1, a Monero-linked asset. As of 16 November that balance had not moved. On 15 November the remaining 594 USDC was swapped to ETH, and 0.3 ETH was deposited into Tornado Cash[[9]](#references). ## Details of fix Immediate mitigation. At 13:59 UTC on 10 November the Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and exchange on the Ethereum `FeeCollector`[[4]](#references). The burner only approves orders while exchange is enabled, so from that block it rejects every order, and no new fees can reach it. The same was done on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC as a precaution[[10]](#references). No forged orders were found on Arbitrum or Gnosis. Fee conversion on Ethereum is paused in the meantime. Fees continue to accrue and are not lost. Replacement. DAO vote 1524[[5]](#references), which closes on 20 November 2026, proposes replacing the `CowSwapBurner` with a new burner that sells fees through a descending-price auction. When it accepts a CoW Protocol order, it requires the hash it is given to match the order it has checked. ## Timeline of events All times are UTC. - 12 June 2024: `CowSwapBurner` deployed on Ethereum. - 25 October 2026: Attacker's address funded. - 10 November 2026, 00:00: Exchange window opens. - 00:07: First forged order settles. - 00:24: 133 forged orders have settled. - 03:53: Proceeds have reached Hyperliquid. - 11:10: Last forged order settles. - ~12:40: An external report describing the vulnerability and the ongoing exploitation is received. - 13:39: Emergency DAO transaction to disable collection and exchange is proposed. - 13:59: Transaction executed. The burner can no longer approve orders. - 16:55: Equivalent transactions executed on Arbitrum and Base. - 13 November 2026: DAO vote 1524 opened. - 17 November 2026, 02:57–03:00: The Emergency DAO swept residual token balances from the old burners on Ethereum, Base and Arbitrum back to their respective `FeeCollector` contracts[[11]](#references). ## Third party disclosure The `CowSwapBurner` code is public and has been reused outside Curve. Operators of known deployments derived from it were notified before this disclosure was published. ## References 1. `CowSwapBurner`: https://etherscan.io/address/0xC0fC3dDfec95ca45A0D2393F518D3EA1ccF44f8b#code 2. `FeeCollector`: https://etherscan.io/address/0xa2Bcd1a4Efbd04B63cd03f5aFf2561106ebCCE00 3. Attacker's address: https://etherscan.io/address/0x356E0178B0f07fe7d97C3A61e502cE52bc5564B8 4. Emergency DAO transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf89f33c24158ff1004e9d9d50dc6dc0da9cc7df6dd4a63dd786582d85c4d3106 5. DAO vote 1524: https://www.curve.finance/dao/ethereum/proposals/1524-ownership (replacement burner: https://etherscan.io/address/0xc014A92C76709D6c7f7c7841823b7164D6D2AbD4) 6. First forged order: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x1b4c0fe616a35217ad177169eab7e2331a0c27632d8cdd61e689db8a923100e1 7. Last forged order: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x868dba0d821b76b6d6e7746f6479d82c049439c6e87bff9be80fd62b50b87fba 8. Hyperliquid bridge on Arbitrum (https://arbiscan.io/address/0x2Df1c51E09aECF9cacB7bc98cB1742757f163dF7), funded from: - https://arbiscan.io/address/0xCC7a8aD339d319115fdEac897c67B46ED333F77B - https://arbiscan.io/address/0xCfbc16b35907540f4C9E61e8588987929951D33E - https://arbiscan.io/address/0xd8e2c01fF9039125629d0141dCAf06242775aa6a - https://arbiscan.io/address/0x670C0d1C980aB07649Df9a5e60635aC32d5916Ab 9. Swap of the remaining USDC, followed by the Tornado Cash deposits: https://etherscan.io/tx/0xf3ed011840e2d1ebd1511c4b45c81840f8810b81d8cd290892f5a2e9a581d114 10. Emergency DAO transactions on other chains: - Arbitrum: https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x09a5125b5d8ffb7fceb852594e0b97f2617062c6484ab06e7538db30098ed281 - Base: https://basescan.org/tx/0x7139eed24775c1e857284f3c16d86e575a92bd547bca894232f2a6b604cdbd8d 11. Emergency DAO residual-balance sweeps: - Ethereum, first transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x842355c318645b1dff90bae0141cf4fa944a78d6ed4d3c3724b884c1bfbebe3d - Ethereum, second transaction: https://etherscan.io/tx/0x2f0eed4f6f7e20b12a634c5859d5ac8b623523ad105810c16d558e28cf6b386e - Base: https://basescan.org/tx/0xcf5eaa402fe54fd72a3ac57d485f84452c126f2699353d29ef182e65b2f1d259 - Arbitrum: https://arbiscan.io/tx/0x4e4273d9c173c5eeaf620a55b86cb65ab966ab27f8f5de43fa2c35cc3c0dc152