# Developer Protocol **Server:** attack-surface-mcp-server **Version:** 0.6.0 **Framework:** [@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core) `^0.13.22` **Engines:** Bun ≥1.4.4, Node ≥24.0.0 **MCP SDK:** `@modelcontextprotocol/server` ^2.4.0 **Zod:** ^4.6.7 > **Read the framework docs first:** `node_modules/@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/CLAUDE.md` contains the full API reference — builders, Context, error codes, exports, patterns. This file covers server-specific conventions only. --- ## Authorized-use posture This is a defensive external-attack-surface-mapping (EASM) server. It is **passive and non-intrusive by mandate**: it reads public records (Certificate Transparency, DNS, RDAP/WHOIS) and each target's *own* published surface (TLS handshakes and HTTP GETs). It does **not** port-scan, exploit, brute-force, fuzz, or probe for vulnerabilities — that capability is excluded from the surface by design, never gated behind a flag. Output is descriptive (what exists, what the posture is), never an exploitation plan. - **Keep the framing in the surface.** The server `instructions`, the `attacksurface_map_domain` description, and `attacksurface_recon_guidance` all state the target must be owned or authorized for assessment. Preserve that when editing any of them. Don't add active/intrusive capability or a `mode: active` toggle — excluding it structurally is the safety property. - **The SSRF guard is the security spine.** TLS, HTTP and registration connections pass `assertSafeDomain` / `assertSafeUrl` / `resolveSafeHost` (`src/utils/ssrf-guard.ts`) before connecting. Guarded hostnames require public A/AAAA evidence from the first configured resolver and validated system answers; resolved addresses never appear in rejection text. DNS-only evidence uses explicit configured resolvers validated by `assertSafeResolverIp`, without connecting to the queried host. Private DNS answers remain evidence. Keep the trusted private-target opt-out and URL scheme validation. Never route a new connection path around the guard. - **No fabricated signal.** Report detections with their triggering evidence; report absent CT/DNS/RDAP fields as unknown. No invented confidence composites. - **Registration authority and literal evidence.** CIDRs require one decimal prefix in the family range; zone identifiers are rejected. RDAP IP paths preserve literal delimiters. WHOIS parses only recognizable authoritative referral responses, with typed `no_match` for explicit negatives and `source_unavailable` for unavailable/unsupported responses. Normalize allocation ranges to exact CIDRs while retaining invalid text in `rawWhois`. Registration/HTTP/TLS/DNS/Shodan formatters render upstream values through `literalText`; raw WHOIS uses a complete collision-safe fenced block. --- ## Core Rules - **Logic throws, framework catches.** Tool/resource handlers are pure — throw on failure, no `try/catch`. Plain `Error` is fine; the framework catches, classifies, and formats. Use error factories (`notFound()`, `validationError()`, etc.) when the error code matters. - **Use `ctx.log`** for request-scoped logging. No `console` calls. - **Use `ctx.state`** for tenant-scoped storage. Values round-trip as JSON; never access persistence directly. - **Secrets in env vars only** — never hardcoded. - **Cut noise.** Add only what earns its place: no speculative generality, no guards for states the framework already prevents (Zod-validated params, classified errors), no abstraction until a third caller proves it, no option nothing sets. - **Close the loop on issues.** When implementing work tracked by a GitHub issue, comment on the issue with what landed and close it. Do both — a comment without a close leaves stale issues open; a close without a comment leaves no record of what shipped. The comment is for future readers — state the concrete changes, not the conversation that produced them. --- ## Patterns ### Tool Real tools live in `src/mcp-server/tools/definitions/*.tool.ts`. `attacksurface_inspect_tls` is representative — a multi-target read-only tool with a typed error contract, per-target graceful degradation, and a `format()` twin. The display `title` is set explicitly to the snake_case tool name (never a Title Case label). ```ts import { tool, z } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core'; import { JsonRpcErrorCode } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/errors'; import { getTlsService } from '@/services/tls/tls-service.js'; import { isValidHost } from '@/utils/validation.js'; export const inspectTlsTool = tool('attacksurface_inspect_tls', { title: 'attacksurface_inspect_tls', description: 'Inspect TLS/SSL posture for one or more hosts via a real read-only handshake … SSRF-guarded; per-host failures degrade to a per-host error. Use only on assets you own or are authorized to assess.', annotations: { readOnlyHint: true, openWorldHint: true, idempotentHint: true }, input: z.object({ hosts: z.array(z.string().describe('Hostname or IP to inspect.')).min(1).max(1000) .describe('Hosts to inspect (1–1000); process the first 50 and resubmit remainingHosts.'), port: z.number().int().min(1).max(65535).default(443).describe('TLS port to connect to.'), }), output: z.object({ results: z.array(/* TlsResultSchema */ z.unknown()).describe('Per-host results.'), processedCount: z.number().describe('Number of hosts processed, at most 50.'), remainingHosts: z.array(z.string()).describe('Exact unprocessed suffix; resubmit to continue.'), }), // Typed contract: `ctx.fail('invalid_host', …)` is type-checked against this reason union; // baseline codes (Timeout, ServiceUnavailable, …) bubble freely without declaring. errors: [ { reason: 'invalid_host', code: JsonRpcErrorCode.ValidationError, when: 'A supplied host is not a syntactically valid hostname or IP.', recovery: 'Provide bare hostnames or IPs (no scheme/path), e.g. "secure.example.com".' }, ], async handler(input, ctx) { for (const host of input.hosts) { if (!isValidHost(host)) { throw ctx.fail('invalid_host', `"${host}" is not a valid hostname or IP.`, { ...ctx.recoveryFor('invalid_host'), }); } } // The service SSRF-checks each host before connecting; one failing host → per-host error, not a throw. const results = await getTlsService().inspectHosts(input.hosts.slice(0, 50), input.port); return { results, processedCount: Math.min(input.hosts.length, 50), remainingHosts: input.hosts.slice(50) }; }, // format() populates content[] — the markdown twin of structuredContent. Different clients read // different surfaces (Claude Code → structuredContent, Claude Desktop → content[]); both must // carry the same data. Enforced at lint time: every output field must appear in the rendered text. format: (result) => [{ type: 'text', text: `Processed ${result.processedCount}; remainingHosts=${JSON.stringify(result.remainingHosts)}\n${renderTlsResults(result.results)}` }], }); ``` ### Resource The one resource, `attacksurface://surface/{domain}` (`src/mcp-server/resources/definitions/surface.resource.ts`), is a thin standard-depth `map_domain`. Validate the param at the edge; throw factories on bad input / no surface. ```ts import { type Context, resource, z } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core'; import { notFound, validationError } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/errors'; import { isValidDomain, normalizeDomain } from '@/utils/validation.js'; export const surfaceResource = resource('attacksurface://surface/{domain}', { description: "Read-once snapshot of a domain's mapped external surface … Assess only assets you own or are authorized to test.", name: 'domain-surface-snapshot', title: 'attacksurface://surface/{domain}', mimeType: 'application/json', params: z.object({ domain: z.string().describe('Apex domain to snapshot (e.g. "example.com").') }), async handler(params: { domain: string }, ctx: Context) { const domain = normalizeDomain(params.domain); if (!isValidDomain(domain)) throw validationError(`"${params.domain}" is not a valid domain.`, { domain: params.domain }); // … CT enumerate → resolve liveness → per-host TLS/HTTP summary … // throw notFound(...) when no subdomains and the apex did not resolve }, }); ``` There are **no prompts** — the workflow is action-oriented and `attacksurface_recon_guidance` supplies the one "structure the next steps" pattern as a state-aware tool (reachable by tool-only clients) rather than a static template. ### Server config ```ts // src/config/server-config.ts — lazy-parsed, separate from framework config. No var is required — // the keyless core (CT/DNS/TLS/HTTP/RDAP) boots on an empty environment. import { z } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core'; import { parseEnvConfig } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/config'; const ServerConfigSchema = z.object({ shodanApiKey: z.string().optional().describe('Shodan API key for host intelligence.'), certspotterApiKey: z.string().optional().describe('Certspotter API key for higher CT-fallback rate limits.'), defaultResolvers: z.string().default('8.8.8.8,1.1.1.1,9.9.9.9').describe('Comma-separated default DNS resolver IPs.'), httpUserAgent: z.string().default('attack-surface-mcp-server/passive-recon (+…)').describe('Default User-Agent for HTTP probes.'), maxSubdomains: z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(5000).default(200).describe('Map/snapshot resolution cap; enumeration resolves min(this value, 50, requested limit) candidates per page.'), rdapBootstrapUrl: z.string().url().default('https://rdap.org').describe('RDAP bootstrap base URL.'), }); let _config: z.infer | undefined; export function getServerConfig() { _config ??= parseEnvConfig(ServerConfigSchema, { shodanApiKey: 'SHODAN_API_KEY', certspotterApiKey: 'CERTSPOTTER_API_KEY', defaultResolvers: 'ATTACKSURFACE_DEFAULT_RESOLVERS', httpUserAgent: 'ATTACKSURFACE_HTTP_USER_AGENT', maxSubdomains: 'ATTACKSURFACE_MAX_SUBDOMAINS', rdapBootstrapUrl: 'ATTACKSURFACE_RDAP_BOOTSTRAP_URL', }); return _config; } ``` `parseEnvConfig` maps Zod schema paths → env var names so errors name the variable (`SHODAN_API_KEY`) not the path (`shodanApiKey`). Throws `ConfigurationError`, which the framework prints as a clean startup banner. **`ATTACKSURFACE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_TARGETS` is deliberately *not* in this schema** — the SSRF guard (`src/utils/ssrf-guard.ts`) reads it directly from `process.env`, since the guard is a shared util consumed by the dns/tls/http services rather than a service with config access. Setting it `true` permits non-public target ranges for trusted internal-network assessment. URL parsing and HTTP(S) scheme checks remain enforced; IPv6 range checks use parsed numeric addresses, including recognized IPv4 embeddings. For env booleans use `z.stringbool()`, never `z.coerce.boolean()` — `Boolean("false")` is `true`, so a coerced flag can't be disabled through the environment. `z.stringbool()` parses `true/false/1/0/yes/no/on/off` and rejects anything else, so `=false` actually disables. ### Server identity and instructions `createApp()` accepts optional identity fields forwarded to the SDK's `initialize` response and the server manifest (`/.well-known/mcp.json`): ```ts await createApp({ name: 'my-mcp-server', title: 'My Server', // human-readable display name websiteUrl: 'https://github.com/owner/repo', // canonical homepage URL description: 'One-line description.', // wins over MCP_SERVER_DESCRIPTION icons: [{ src: 'https://example.com/icon.png', sizes: ['48x48'], mimeType: 'image/png' }], instructions: 'Use shortcut alpha for the most common case.', // session-level context }); ``` `instructions` is optional server-level orientation, sent on every `initialize` as session-level context. Use it for deployment guidance (connection aliases, regional notes, scope hints) instead of repeating the same context across tool descriptions. Client adoption is uneven, but there's no downside when set. ### Session posture and shutdown Two more `createApp()` options shape how the server runs rather than how it presents itself: ```ts await createApp({ sessionMode: 'stateless', // or { default: 'stateful', require: 'stateful' } setup(core) { startMyWatcher(core.config); }, async teardown() { await stopMyWatcher(); }, }); ``` `sessionMode` declares the HTTP session posture in `src/` instead of leaving it to a deployment's `MCP_SESSION_MODE`, which still wins whenever it carries a meaningful value (an empty string and an unsubstituted `${…}` placeholder read as unset and fall through to the option). Add `require: 'stateful'` when a tool asks the caller for input mid-handler via `ctx.requestInput`: startup then fails with a `ConfigurationError` rather than serving a mode in which a 2025-era client can never answer the prompt. Stdio is never refused. `teardown(core)` is the `setup()` counterpart — release a watcher, socket, or non-`unref()`'d timer there. It runs after the transport stops and before the logger closes, on every shutdown path, and a signal-triggered shutdown then exits the process explicitly (0, or 1 if a step never settles within the framework's 10 s ceiling). **This server** declares `sessionMode: 'stateless'` in `src/index.ts` — it holds no per-session state and never calls `ctx.requestInput` — and passes no `teardown`: every service allocates its sockets and timers per request, so `setup()` leaves nothing to release. `tests/integration/session-mode.test.ts` pins both the default and the env override. --- ## Context Handlers receive a unified `ctx` object. Key properties: | Property | Description | |:---------|:------------| | `ctx.log` | Request-scoped logger — `.debug()`, `.info()`, `.notice()`, `.warning()`, `.error()`. Auto-correlates requestId, traceId, tenantId. | | `ctx.fail` / `ctx.recoveryFor` | Typed-error throw — `ctx.fail(reason, msg, …)` against a tool's declared `errors[]` reason union; `ctx.recoveryFor(reason)` pulls the declared recovery metadata. The primary error path here (see every `*.tool.ts`). | | `ctx.enrich` | Attach out-of-band metadata to a result — `ctx.enrich({ … })`, `ctx.enrich.notice(msg)`, `ctx.enrich.truncated({ shown, cap })`. Used to disclose the subdomain cap and "nothing found" guidance. | | `ctx.signal` | `AbortSignal` for cancellation — wired into the service-layer fetch/handshake timeouts. | | `ctx.requestId` | Request ID shared by log records and error envelopes (`data.requestId`). | | `ctx.tenantId` | Tenant ID from JWT or `'default'` for stdio. | This server is stateless and non-interactive — it does not use `ctx.state` or the `inputRequired` elicitation surface. --- ## Errors Handlers throw — the framework catches, classifies, and formats. **Recommended: typed error contract.** Declare `errors: [{ reason, code, when, recovery, retryable?, severity?, thrownBy? }]` on `tool()` / `resource()` to receive `ctx.fail(reason, …)` typed against the reason union. TypeScript catches typos at compile time, `data.reason` is auto-populated for observability, linter enforces conformance against the handler body. `recovery` is required (≥ 5 words, lint-validated) — the single source of truth for the agent's next move. The framework puts it on the wire whenever a failure carrying that `reason` arrives without a hint — a bare `ctx.fail('reason')` or a service throw with `data: { reason }` — as `data.recovery.hint`, mirrored into `content[]` text unless the message already contains it verbatim; override with an explicit `{ recovery: { hint: '...' } }` when dynamic runtime context matters. Every error envelope also carries `data.requestId`, the id the server's log records for that call carry, and `content[]` closes with `(reason … · request )`. Mark an entry the service layer throws with `thrownBy: 'service'` so `error-contract-unthrown` skips it — lint-only metadata, nothing at runtime reads it. Baseline codes (`InternalError`, `ServiceUnavailable`, `Timeout`, `ValidationError`, `SerializationError`, `RequestCancelled`) bubble freely and don't need declaring. ```ts import { JsonRpcErrorCode } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/errors'; errors: [ { reason: 'no_match', code: JsonRpcErrorCode.NotFound, when: 'No item matched the query', recovery: 'Broaden the query or check the spelling and try again.' }, ], async handler(input, ctx) { const item = await db.find(input.id); if (!item) throw ctx.fail('no_match', `No item ${input.id}`); return item; } ``` **Declare contracts inline on each tool.** The contract is part of the tool's public surface — one file should give the full picture. Don't extract a shared `errors[]` constant; per-tool repetition is the intended cost of locality. **Fallback (no contract entry fits):** throw via factories or plain `Error`. ```ts // Error factories — explicit code import { notFound, serviceUnavailable } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/errors'; throw notFound('Item not found', { itemId }); throw serviceUnavailable('API unavailable', { url }, { cause: err }); // Plain Error — framework auto-classifies from message patterns throw new Error('Item not found'); // → NotFound throw new Error('Invalid query format'); // → ValidationError // McpError — when no factory exists for the code import { McpError, JsonRpcErrorCode } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/errors'; throw new McpError(JsonRpcErrorCode.InitializationFailed, 'Connection failed', { pool: 'primary' }); ``` See framework CLAUDE.md and the `api-errors` skill for the full auto-classification table, all available factories, and the contract reference. --- ## Structure ```text src/ index.ts # createApp() entry point — registers tools/resources, inits 6 services config/ server-config.ts # Server-specific env vars (Zod schema) utils/ ssrf-guard.ts # SSRF guard — assertSafeDomain / assertSafeUrl / assertSafeResolverIp validation.ts # Host / domain / registration-target validators + normalizeDomain services/ # init/accessor pattern; each with a types.ts ct/ # crt.sh + Certspotter + TLS-SAN fallback chain dns/ # node:dns multi-resolver + reverse PTR tls/ # node:tls read-only handshake http/ # fetch GET + security-header audit + tech fingerprint registration/ # RDAP (rdap.org bootstrap) + WHOIS fallback shodan/ # Shodan REST (optional-key) mcp-server/ tools/definitions/ *.tool.ts # 8 tool definitions (+ index.ts barrel) resources/definitions/ surface.resource.ts # attacksurface://surface/{domain} (+ index.ts barrel) ``` No `prompts/` directory — this server ships no prompts. --- ## Naming | What | Convention | Example | |:-----|:-----------|:--------| | Files | kebab-case with suffix | `search-docs.tool.ts` | | Tool/resource/prompt names | snake_case | `search_docs` | | Directories | kebab-case | `src/services/doc-search/` | | Descriptions | Single string or template literal, no `+` concatenation | `'Search items by query and filter.'` | --- ## Skills Two skill trees live at the project root, written for different readers: | Tree | For | Written by | |:-----|:----|:-----------| | `framework-skills/` | The agent developing this server — framework skills (`metadata.audience: external`) plus any development-time skills of the server's own | `init` and the `maintenance` sync (framework skills); you (your own) | | `skills/` | The agents that install the server and call its tools — tool chains, identifier sources, gates | You, deliberately, with the `add-skill` skill. Absent by default; usually none is needed | Development skills are modular instructions. Read them directly when a task matches — e.g., `framework-skills/add-tool/SKILL.md` when adding a tool. `bun run list-skills` prints the full registry. Their directory is deliberately not `skills/`: Claude Code and Codex auto-load a plugin's root `skills/`, so a server that ships `.claude-plugin/` or `.codex-plugin/` would hand them to every agent that installs it. A published skill in root `skills/` reaches plugin installs and the `.mcpb` bundle as-is, ships in the npm package and the Docker image, and reaches MCP clients when the server opts in with `createApp({ skills: 'skills' })`. `lint:packaging` validates the tree. **Agent skill directory:** Copy skills into the directory your agent discovers (Claude Code: `.claude/skills/`, others: equivalent). Skills then load as context without referencing `framework-skills/` paths. After framework updates, run the `maintenance` skill — Phase B re-syncs the agent directory. Available skills: | Skill | Purpose | |:------|:--------| | `setup` | Post-init project orientation | | `design-mcp-server` | Design tool surface, resources, and services for a new server | | `add-tool` | Scaffold a new tool definition | | `add-app-tool` | Scaffold an MCP App tool + paired UI resource | | `add-resource` | Scaffold a new resource definition | | `add-prompt` | Scaffold a new prompt definition | | `add-skill` | Author a skill the server publishes in root `skills/` for the agents that use it — when one earns its place, structure, validation, delivery | | `add-service` | Scaffold a new service integration | | `add-test` | Scaffold test file for a tool, resource, or service | | `field-test` | Exercise tools/resources/prompts with real inputs, verify behavior, report issues | | `tool-defs-analysis` | Read-only audit of MCP definition language across the surface — voice, leaks, defaults, recovery hints, output descriptions | | `security-pass` | Audit server for MCP-flavored security gaps: output injection, scope blast radius, input sinks, tenant isolation | | `code-simplifier` | Post-session cleanup against `git diff` — modernize syntax, consolidate duplication, align with the codebase | | `polish-docs-meta` | Finalize docs, README, metadata, and agent protocol for shipping | | `git-wrapup` | Land working-tree changes as a commit stack — version bump, changelog, verify, commit by concern, release commit on top. No tag, no push to main; opens the release PR when the project declares release PR mode | | `release-pr-review` | Review pass on an open release PR — simplifier + correctness review, fixes as ordinary commits on top of the stack, PR body kept in sync. Release PR mode only | | `release-and-publish` | Fast-forward merge (release PR mode) + tag + push + npm + MCP Registry + GH Release + Docker. Picks up from `git-wrapup` | | `maintenance` | Investigate changelogs, adopt upstream changes, sync skills to agent dirs | | `orchestrations` | Chain task skills into a gated multi-phase pipeline — build-out, QA-fix, update-ship — when you can spawn sub-agents | | `report-issue-framework` | File a bug or feature request against `@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core` via `gh` CLI | | `report-issue-local` | File a bug or feature request against this server's own repo via `gh` CLI | | `api-auth` | Auth modes, scopes, JWT/OAuth | | `api-canvas` | DataCanvas: register tabular data, run SQL, export, plus the `spillover()` helper for big result sets — Tier 3 opt-in | | `api-config` | AppConfig, parseConfig, env vars | | `api-context` | Context interface, RequestContext, logger, state, multi-round-trip input | | `api-errors` | McpError, JsonRpcErrorCode, error patterns | | `api-linter` | Definition linter rule catalog — invoked by `bun run lint:mcp` and `devcheck` | | `api-services` | LLM, Speech, Graph services | | `api-testing` | createMockContext, test patterns | | `api-utils` | Formatting, parsing, security, pagination, scheduling, telemetry helpers | | `api-telemetry` | OTel catalog: spans, metrics, completion logs, env config, cardinality rules | | `api-workers` | Cloudflare Workers runtime | | `api-mirror` | MirrorService: persistent self-refreshing local mirror (embedded SQLite + FTS5) of a bulk upstream dataset — Tier 3 opt-in. Not used here. | | `techniques` | Catalog of response/data-shaping techniques — overflow handling, payload shaping, retrieval patterns | **Chaining skills into pipelines.** When the user wants a multi-phase effort — build this server out, QA-and-fix the surface, update-and-ship — *and you can spawn sub-agents*, `framework-skills/orchestrations/SKILL.md` sequences the task skills above into a gated pipeline with verification at each step. Read it to drive the run. Optional: skip it if you can't orchestrate sub-agents, and ignore it entirely if you were *spawned* as one — you've already been scoped to a single phase. When you complete a skill's checklist, check the boxes and add a completion timestamp at the end (e.g., `Completed: 2026-03-11`). --- ## Commands **Runtime:** Scripts use Bun's native TypeScript execution — `bun run ` is the standard invocation. `npm run ` also works (npm delegates to bun). | Command | Purpose | |:--------|:--------| | `bun run build` | Compile TypeScript | | `bun run rebuild` | Clean + build | | `bun run clean` | Remove build artifacts | | `bun run devcheck` | Lint + format + typecheck + security + changelog sync | | `bun run audit:fix` | `bun audit fix` — upgrade vulnerable packages to the lowest safe version within existing ranges (`--dry-run` previews, `--latest` rewrites ranges). First response when `devcheck` flags a transitive advisory; then `bun update `, then `bun dedupe` | | `bun run audit:refresh` | Delete `bun.lock` and reinstall. Last resort after `audit:fix`, `bun update `, and `bun dedupe` — re-resolves every ranged dep (the framework pin included) and rewrites the lockfile as `lockfileVersion: 2` | | `bun run lint:mcp` | Run the MCP definition linter standalone (rule catalog: `api-linter` skill) | | `bun run lint:packaging` | Check environment variable parity, `.mcpbignore` coverage, plugin manifests, and published skills (run by devcheck) | | `bun run list-skills` | Print the skill registry | | `bun run tree` | Generate directory structure doc | | `bun run format` | Auto-fix formatting (safe fixes only) | | `bun run format:unsafe` | Also apply Biome's unsafe autofixes — review the diff; they can change behavior | | `bun run test` | Run tests (Vitest — use `bun run test`, not `bun test`) | | `bun run start:stdio` | Production mode (stdio) | | `bun run start:http` | Production mode (HTTP) | | `bun run changelog:build` | Regenerate `CHANGELOG.md` from `changelog/*.md` | | `bun run changelog:check` | Verify `CHANGELOG.md` is in sync (used by devcheck) | | `bun run bundle` | Build, pack, and clean a `.mcpb` for one-click Claude Desktop install | **CI is one file.** `.github/workflows/codeql.yml` (scaffolded) is the only GitHub Actions workflow: CodeQL is GitHub-owned end to end, and the file runs only while the repo's CodeQL *default setup* is turned off. Verification — `devcheck`, tests, the release gates — runs locally; don't add a workflow that re-runs it. --- ## Bundling `bun run bundle` produces a stdio `.mcpb` bundle for Claude Desktop. Put every repository-only path in `.mcpbignore` with a root-anchored pattern such as `/docs/`. Root `skills/` ships with the server. After packing, `scripts/clean-mcpb.ts` prunes development dependencies, removes agent docs at each installed dependency's root and dependency `SKILL.md` files at any depth, and retains runtime modules such as the SDK's `dist/ext/skills/`. It also removes platform-specific bindings, node-gyp build artifacts, and build-only framework files. `bun run lint:packaging` checks the resulting bundle. **Adding an env var requires both files:** `server.json` (registry discovery, `environmentVariables[]`) and `manifest.json` (bundle install UX, `mcp_config.env` + `user_config`). `lint:packaging` (run by `devcheck`) verifies the env var names match, that every `user_config` option is wired into `mcp_config.env` as `"X": "${user_config.X}"` (the host substitutes nothing else — `"${X}"` reaches the server as that literal string), and that an optional string option carries `"default": ""`. **README install badges** (Claude Desktop `.mcpb`, Cursor, VS Code) and the `base64` / `encodeURIComponent` config-generation commands are ship-time concerns — run the `polish-docs-meta` skill, which carries the badge format, layout, and generation snippets in `framework-skills/polish-docs-meta/references/readme.md`. --- ## Changelog Directory-based, grouped by minor series via the `.x` semver-wildcard convention. Source of truth: `changelog/.x/.md` (e.g. `changelog/0.1.x/0.1.0.md`) — one file per release, shipped in the npm package. At release, author the per-version file with a concrete version and date, then run `npm run changelog:build` to regenerate the rollup. `changelog/template.md` is a **pristine format reference** — never edited or moved; read it for the frontmatter + section layout when scaffolding. `CHANGELOG.md` is a **navigation index** (header + link + summary per version), regenerated by `npm run changelog:build` — devcheck hard-fails on drift; never hand-edit it. Each per-version file opens with YAML frontmatter: ```markdown --- summary: "One-line headline, ≤350 chars" # required — powers the rollup index breaking: false # optional — true flags breaking changes security: false # optional — true ONLY for a source-code security fix, never a dependency CVE bump --- # 0.1.0 — YYYY-MM-DD ... ``` `breaking: true` renders a `· ⚠️ Breaking` badge — use it when consumers must update code on upgrade (signature changes, removed APIs, config renames). `security: true` renders a `· 🛡️ Security` badge and pairs with a `## Security` body section — set it only for a security fix in this server's *own source code*, never for a routine dependency or transitive CVE bump (record those under `## Dependencies`). When both are set, badges render `· ⚠️ Breaking · 🛡️ Security`. `agent-notes` is an optional free-form field for maintenance agents processing the release downstream. Content here won't appear in the rendered CHANGELOG — it's consumed by agents running the `maintenance` skill. Use it for adoption instructions that don't fit the human-facing sections: new files to create, fields to populate, one-time migration steps. Omit entirely when there's nothing to say. **Section order:** the Keep a Changelog sequence — Added, Changed, Deprecated, Removed, Fixed, Security — then `Dependencies` last. Include only sections with entries — don't ship empty headers. **Tag annotations** render as GitHub Release bodies via `--notes-from-tag`. They must be structured markdown — never a flat comma-separated string. Subject omits the version number (GitHub prepends it). See `changelog/template.md` for the full format reference. --- ## Publishing **Every release goes through a release PR, straight-through** — `git-wrapup`'s "Release PR mode", mode `straight-through`. One run: `git-wrapup` lands the commit stack on `release/`, pushes it, and opens the PR (title = the release commit subject, body = the release digest: theme line, `## Changes`, `## Gates`, changelog link last); `release-and-publish` then fast-forwards `main` locally with `git merge --ff-only`, creates the tag on `main`'s tip, pushes `main` and the tag, deletes the branch, and publishes. A caller's brief may run a given release as `gated` instead — a `release-pr-review` pass on the open PR before `release-and-publish`. **Never merge through the GitHub UI or `gh pr merge`**: squash and rebase-merge are disabled in the repo settings because both rewrite the stack (rebase-merge also strips the SSH signatures), and a merge commit breaks the linear history. --- ## Imports ```ts // Framework — z is re-exported, no separate zod import needed import { tool, z } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core'; import { McpError, JsonRpcErrorCode } from '@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/errors'; // Server's own code — via path alias import { getTlsService } from '@/services/tls/tls-service.js'; import { assertSafeDomain } from '@/utils/ssrf-guard.js'; import { isValidHost, normalizeDomain } from '@/utils/validation.js'; ``` --- ## Checklist - [ ] Zod schemas: all fields have `.describe()`, only JSON-Schema-serializable types (no `z.custom()`, `z.date()`, `z.transform()`, `z.bigint()`, `z.symbol()`, `z.void()`, `z.map()`, `z.set()`, `z.function()`, `z.nan()`) - [ ] Optional nested objects: handler guards for empty inner values from form-based clients (`if (input.obj?.field && ...)`, not just `if (input.obj)`). When regex/length constraints matter, use `z.union([z.literal(''), z.string().regex(...).describe(...)])` — literal variants are exempt from `describe-on-fields`. - [ ] JSDoc `@fileoverview` + `@module` on every file - [ ] `ctx.log` for logging (this server is stateless — no `ctx.state`) - [ ] **Any outbound connection to a user-supplied target passes the SSRF guard** (`assertSafeDomain` / `assertSafeUrl` / `assertSafeResolverIp`) before connecting — no new path routes around it - [ ] **Passive-only preserved** — no active/intrusive capability added; authorized-use framing kept in `instructions`, `attacksurface_map_domain`, and `attacksurface_recon_guidance` - [ ] Handlers throw on failure — error factories or plain `Error`, no try/catch - [ ] `format()` renders all data the LLM needs — different clients forward different surfaces (Claude Code → `structuredContent`, Claude Desktop → `content[]`); both must carry the same data - [ ] If wrapping external API: raw/domain/output schemas reviewed against real upstream sparsity/nullability before finalizing required vs optional fields - [ ] If wrapping external API: normalization and `format()` preserve uncertainty; do not fabricate facts from missing upstream data - [ ] If wrapping external API: tests include at least one sparse payload case with omitted upstream fields - [ ] Registered in `createApp()` arrays (directly or via barrel exports) - [ ] Tests use `createMockContext()` from `@cyanheads/mcp-ts-core/testing` - [ ] `.codex-plugin/plugin.json` populated — `name`, `version`, `description`, `repository`, `license` from `package.json`; `interface.displayName` = the unscoped repo name (never the npm scope — `lint:packaging` enforces this); `interface.shortDescription` from `package.json` description - [ ] `.codex-plugin/mcp.json` updated — server name key is the unscoped repo name; every user-supplied variable (API key, contact email, instance URL) is listed in `env_vars` so Codex forwards it from the user's environment. Never write `"KEY": ""` into `env` — an empty value replaces the user's exported key and is read as unset - [ ] `.claude-plugin/plugin.json` populated — `name`, `version`, `description`, `author`, `repository`, `license`, `keywords` from `package.json`; inline `mcpServers` entry keyed by the unscoped repo name. Every user-supplied variable is declared under `userConfig` (`type`, `title`, `description`; `sensitive: true` for keys and tokens; `required: true` or `default: ""`) and referenced from `env` as `"KEY": "${user_config.