indicator,type,threat,confidence,recommended_action,reason,source_url,description,notes,sources 185.99.255.28,ipv4,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Reddit r/msp and Blackpoint reports,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,Attacker ScreenConnect relay (hostname screen) that serves the rogue client installer and receives the rogue clients pushed through hijacked MSP panels; Sophos saw curl.exe download ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi from it.,"ASN: AS27176 DataWagon LLC (US), VPS hosting; not in Spamhaus DROP; open ports 80/81/135/445/3389/5357; newnewnew.gotdns.org and soxnewwork.homedns.org resolve here; corroborated: Huntress and Sophos X-Ops observed it independently; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed 155.94.150.39,ipv4,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Confirmed C2 in Reddit r/msp report,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,Secondary C2 server (hostname WIN-FB5CKHMU4E1) behind sc.payproofkit.com in the ScreenConnect panel-hijack campaign.,"ASN: AS27176 DataWagon LLC (US), VPS hosting; not in Spamhaus DROP; open ports 80/5357; sc.payproofkit.com resolves here; Huntress only (r/msp post, support advisory and SCKit blog; not in Sophos's report); on the block list; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect newnewnew.gotdns.org,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Confirmed C2 in Reddit r/msp report,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,C2 hostname used by the rogue ScreenConnect clients in the panel-hijack campaign against MSPs.,"Dynamic DNS hostname; block this exact name, not gotdns.org; resolves to the attacker relay 185.99.255.28; on the block list; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect soxnewwork.homedns.org,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Confirmed C2 in Reddit r/msp report,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,C2 hostname used by the rogue ScreenConnect clients in the panel-hijack campaign against MSPs.,"Dynamic DNS hostname; block this exact name, not homedns.org; resolves to the attacker relay 185.99.255.28 per Huntress; on the block list; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect sc.payproofkit.com,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Confirmed C2 in Reddit r/msp report,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"Secondary C2 hostname for the ScreenConnect panel-hijack campaign, hosted on 155.94.150.39.","Certificates for payproofkit.com first seen 7 Sep 2026; on the block list; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect cdn007-digitaldownloads.com,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Confirmed C2 in Huntress report,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,Configured Access MSI source and C2 domain for the ScreenConnect panel-hijack campaign; Huntress listed it as C2 and Blackpoint APG retrieved a configured installer from it.,"Behind Cloudflare; not in URLhaus; Huntress's SCKit blog now lists it as a C2 domain (first flagged by Blackpoint, which has now published its own report); BleepingComputer found a July 2026 VirusTotal sample (SSA-themed batch file that checks for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091) downloading ScreenConnect installers from it; on the block list; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://ns.mo7sen.dev/EadF.php?p=4,url,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Reddit r/msp and Blackpoint reports,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html,Stager URL that PowerShell (run with execution-policy bypass) fetches the second-stage toolkit from in the ScreenConnect panel-hijack campaign.,"Host is behind Cloudflare, so block the URL rather than its IPs; corroborated: Huntress and Sophos X-Ops observed it independently; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026)",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed Panel-Lateral.ps1,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/,Script the actor uses to pivot from a compromised technician workstation into other ScreenConnect panels.,Huntress file IOC; name can change,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ Run-Lateral-Full.bat,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/,Batch file used for lateral movement in the ScreenConnect panel-hijack campaign.,Huntress file IOC; name can change,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ runnew.cmd,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/,Command script dropped in the ScreenConnect panel-hijack campaign.,"Huntress file IOC; generic name, check the folder and parent process",https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ ToolboxRelayUploader.exe,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/,Executable used to stage payloads through the ScreenConnect Toolbox in the panel-hijack campaign.,Huntress file IOC; name can change,https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ 2588ef5c15954b10,other,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Sophos report; alert only,https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,Rogue ScreenConnect client ID installed on managed endpoints; it appears in the rogue ScreenConnect client service name and command line.,"Corroborated: Huntress and Sophos X-Ops; hunt service names and command lines, then remove the rogue client; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ ed630cc2c873b091,other,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Sophos report; alert only,https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,Second rogue ScreenConnect client ID installed on managed endpoints; it appears in the rogue ScreenConnect client service name and command line.,"Corroborated: Huntress and Sophos X-Ops; BleepingComputer also found it checked by a July 2026 batch file; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ d905b2b1b165d0a9,other,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Sophos report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed,"ScreenConnect instance ID that Sophos saw issuing the malicious commands; it is likely a compromised MSP instance, not attacker-owned.","Single source (Sophos X-Ops); a hit means your ScreenConnect client reports to a compromised MSP instance, so contact the MSP rather than blocking",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed 4b8f4089ddaac6a9,other,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Sophos report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed,"ScreenConnect instance ID that Sophos saw issuing the malicious commands; it is likely a compromised MSP instance, not attacker-owned.","Single source (Sophos X-Ops); a hit means your ScreenConnect client reports to a compromised MSP instance, so contact the MSP rather than blocking",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed df1f7ef0cfacd0d8,other,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Sophos report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed,"ScreenConnect instance ID that Sophos saw issuing the malicious commands; it is likely a compromised MSP instance, not attacker-owned.","Single source (Sophos X-Ops); a hit means your ScreenConnect client reports to a compromised MSP instance, so contact the MSP rather than blocking",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed TrapWatch,other,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Hunt lead; not a network or file indicator,https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect,Scheduled task that runs the trap component as SYSTEM every 10 seconds to keep the rogue ScreenConnect client and toolkit in place.,"Huntress only; scheduled task name, remove before lifting isolation",https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap\,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect,Folder holding the trap component that impersonates the MSP's legitimate ScreenConnect client and its logs.,Huntress only; folder path,https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect C:\Windows\Temp\sc.msi,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed,Path where curl.exe saved the rogue ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi before msiexec.exe installed it silently.,"Single source (Sophos X-Ops); file name is generic, so pair with curl.exe and msiexec.exe activity",https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed amexsafekeyupdate.com,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in BleepingComputer report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/,Domain that a July 2026 SSA-themed batch file contacted for installer commands before checking for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091; it imitates American Express SafeKey branding.,Behind Cloudflare; not in URLhaus or ThreatFox; single source (BleepingComputer VirusTotal research); earlier activity whose link to the November campaign is not confirmed; alert only,https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ 60142ea5daebbf94a2dec4009f673d9822a2fd796ac55478be1edea3136ef4bb,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in BleepingComputer report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/,"SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat, a batch file impersonating a Social Security statement that adds Defender exclusions, persists through the Startup folder and Run key, installs ScreenConnect and checks for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091.",First uploaded to VirusTotal 25 Jul 2026; not in MalwareBazaar; single source (BleepingComputer); link to the November campaign not confirmed; alert only,https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ SSA-2026-STATEMENT-15518787.bat,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/,File name of the July 2026 SSA-themed batch file that installs ScreenConnect and checks for rogue client ID ed630cc2c873b091.,Single source (BleepingComputer); name can change,https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ 94b93c649b0ae0281352da9d01761fa9195ab1e6ac7010af3b9ba1646355eb11,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Huntress report; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of Panel-Lateral-free.ps1, the SCKit worm script without its config file; it lists the attacker's own panel on a skip list.","Huntress SCKit blog and Blackpoint APG independently published this hash; not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 7a9aca9fdd4dcc13fe497cabdb13ca1e5d6a529271c8aa495e5ca1c1c80271ec,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of Panel-Lateral.ps1, the SCKit worm script that steals a technician's ScreenConnect login cookie and pushes an upload to every session the technician can reach.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ b93f10f30ee453d1e1c046fec9d141c41d7680be5cd46c3aeb3febe0f4953b4d,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of LabConfig.ps1, the SCKit helper library that decrypts cookies, probes ScreenConnect panels and builds rogue client installer URLs.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 3c7a98f0fdb6235b8076319c74dc1085f7b349b6d750416dd0cadb07d7972ec4,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Huntress report; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of RelayTrap.cs, the C# source of the relay trap that takes the legitimate ScreenConnect client's place on the MSP relay; it is compiled per host into RelayTrap.exe.","Huntress SCKit blog and Blackpoint APG independently published this hash; not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ d2ed7a7bf4f8ac9c7969e9b3a07ebd4dda0d858f372c876ac0a041611698de9a,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Huntress report; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of TrapWatch.ps1, which runs as SYSTEM every 10 seconds, stops the legitimate ScreenConnect client and takes over its connection slot.","Huntress SCKit blog and Blackpoint APG independently published this hash; not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 4a1dd3cd2ea14368afadf7e9dfdd63b104e3981ef8c85bbb6510919b810af04b,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of the SCKit trap install.ps1, which sets up C:\ProgramData\RelayTrap, the TrapWatch task, the RelayTrapLiteAlert Run key and SRP/AppLocker rules that block files pushed through ScreenConnect temp folders.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 8cb5f48bbe70b5248db7f327f3d1ad6649df5c767d2a7e0711ee147fd92e06af,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Huntress report; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, a 32-bit .NET tool that joins a session as the technician with a stolen token, uploads a payload to the panel's Shared Toolbox and deletes it after the broadcast.","Huntress SCKit blog and Blackpoint APG independently published this hash; not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ cf50d73fa8117a758093b1344de41cd6a6ccddc645cdda1fa91a9264efe93956,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of Lite-Alert.ps1, which runs at logon and logs ScreenConnect file-run events (Event ID 201) and new ScreenConnect client services with on-screen alerts turned off.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 81cc2baa35b798d6084bd078662fa29ff28df02c46c6ccdb2b43bde97d19f781,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,alert,Named in Huntress report; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of Stage0Loader.ps1, which fetches a host-keyed payload from EadF.php?p=1, decrypts it to %TEMP%\k.ps1, runs it hidden and deletes it.","Huntress SCKit blog and Blackpoint APG independently published this hash; not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026); corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ c31e6f075cd77e01839aebce32ed35659a9ee962d102aca53040bb5e297410a9,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect,"SHA256 of Release-Machine.cmd, the SCKit removal script that deletes the TrapWatch task, kills RelayTrap.exe, clears the SRP/AppLocker rules and restarts ScreenConnect client services.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect deda7c30d798a19b6699a45fbcba503cf778594df9163c61c2f96bb2d2b9fb45,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect,"SHA256 of Recover-ExecutionPolicy.cmd, an SCKit script that deletes only the SRP/AppLocker rules and stops the AppLocker service when they have blocked powershell.exe.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect 0bd84c776dc01f784a617e73fc77b269f847fc4a062ffd489e4692869724bf08,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect,"SHA256 of lab-context.json, the SCKit config that points the worm at the attacker panel and holds the RSA key and rogue client IDs.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect 454c43d296b1276bde9a4f6ff1da2221cb35ccdb2fc7991bdd572e45bce12a8a,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of TRAP-PROOF.bat, the SCKit trap test payload that writes %PUBLIC%\RELAY-TRAP-PROOF.txt; in full mode the dropper is placed beside it as Run-Lateral-Full.bat.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 5dd3a6ba806ac472663e243cfc1c034c534d5d9a42ec362c3dbf0f8d950148d0,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of Stop-LabTrap.bat, which runs the SCKit decoder in cleanup mode, fetches Stop-LabTrap.ps1 from EadF.php?p=6 and re-arms the new kit.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 43b7a5e56f9e6c7b74e1ce2b7b5af63f383084625fcc2d3a5985fa1059e2db95,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of Run-Lateral-Full.bat, the SCKit dropper that downloads the decoder from EadF.php?p=4 to %TEMP%\sckit-decoder.ps1 and copies itself into the trap payload folder for the next machine.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 50659748723e906c8b3d3c0386bd4cf692f693a3e23639398c1a14d0c31fed61,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Huntress report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of runnew.cmd, which downloads EadF.php with curl.exe to %TEMP%\sckit-loader.ps1 and runs it hidden; full mode pushes it to every target.","Single source (Huntress SCKit blog); not in MalwareBazaar; Huntress says hashes are weak here because scripts are rebuilt per host and RelayTrap.exe is compiled on each host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://ns.mo7sen.dev/EadF.php?p=5,url,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Huntress and Blackpoint reports,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html,"Stager URL that delivers a copy of the SQLite command-line tool, which SCKit uses to read browser cookie databases and steal ScreenConnect session cookies.","Same Cloudflare-fronted host as the p=4 stager, so block the URL rather than its IPs; not in URLhaus; this path is from Huntress (SCKit blog); on the block list; corroborated by Blackpoint APG (SCKit report, 11 Nov 2026)",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html ns.mo7sen.dev,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Blackpoint and Reddit r/msp reports,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,Attacker staging host that serves the SCKit loader and later encrypted stages through EadF.php.,"Blackpoint APG recovered the loader and subsequent stages from this host while it was still responding; Huntress and Sophos also saw it as the stager; behind Cloudflare, so block this exact hostname rather than its IPs; on the block list; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.reddit.com/r/msp/comments/1xts3f2/active_malware_campaign_abusing_screenconnect/ https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://support.huntress.io/hc/en-us/articles/57422935234195-2026-November-ScreenConnect https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://ns.mo7sen.dev/EadF.php,url,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Blackpoint and Huntress reports,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html,"SCKit staging endpoint that serves the p=1, p=3, p=4, p=5 and p=6 payloads used to bootstrap the toolkit.","Blackpoint lists this URL as the initial staging and bootstrap path; the p=4 and p=5 query variants are already on the block list; behind Cloudflare, so block the URL rather than its IPs; on the block list",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/active-screenconnect-attacks-breach-msps-impact-dozens-of-organizations/ https://www.connectwise.com/company/trust/advisories https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ https://www.sophos.com/en-us/blog/malicious-screenconnect-deployments-observed a1937467fd862916f89342cdd61f55c4bc405fb35b6e1379e27cfbfdba77dcdc,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Blackpoint report; medium confidence, alert only",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/,"SHA256 of SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1, which deploys two unauthorised ScreenConnect Access clients and stages RelayTrap components.","Single source (Blackpoint APG); hashes can change per host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ 338e37f58043635ebab64ee5fdc919935e55cb146ca97834b358f934e55e88ec,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Blackpoint report; medium confidence, alert only",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/,SHA256 of the p=4 decoder retrieved from EadF.php and saved as sckit-decoder.ps1.,"Single source (Blackpoint APG); hashes can change per host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ 8e6912deed82e80bb6bd66f73509d024b1f78b993515366d8317e69a97cff4f4,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Blackpoint report; medium confidence, alert only",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,SHA256 of the decoded p=3 toolkit bundle that holds most SCKit archive members.,"Single source (Blackpoint APG); hashes can change per host, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only; corroborated by Microsoft Threat Intelligence (SCKit report, 13 Nov 2026)",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ d85315bd7602b6f5c13dc0eada2c9cba0892c7cd3b1eb7dacb1bffdd536ceb21,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Blackpoint report; medium confidence, alert only",https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/,SHA256 of a configured ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi that Blackpoint recovered from the campaign's staging infrastructure.,Single source (Blackpoint APG); the MSI uses genuine ScreenConnect binaries pointed at attacker relays; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ C:\Windows\Temp\sckit-run.bat,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html,Batch dropper written during the initial SCKit deployment; it fetches the p=4 decoder from EadF.php.,Named by Huntress and Blackpoint; the sckit-* prefix is more durable than a single hash; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html sckit-decoder.ps1,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html,PowerShell decoder saved after the p=4 request to EadF.php; it then pulls the encrypted p=3 bundle.,Named by Blackpoint and The Hacker News; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html SilentForceInstall-WithUninstall.ps1,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html,Installation script that deploys two unauthorised ScreenConnect Access clients and prepares RelayTrap.,Named by Blackpoint and The Hacker News; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/sckit-malware-targets-screenconnect.html Stop-LabTrap.ps1,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/,PowerShell cleaner retrieved through EadF.php?p=6 and saved as Stop-LabTrap.ps1.,Single source (Blackpoint APG); alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ LabConfig.ps1,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/,Technician-side script in the p=3 archive that is used to recover ScreenConnect .ASPXAUTH cookies; it is not always copied in the active full delivery path.,Single source (Blackpoint APG); absence of this file does not rule out the delivered panel script; alert only,https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ Stage0Loader.ps1,filename,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,Filename; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/,Stage-0 loader that requests a host-keyed payload from EadF.php?p=1 and decrypts it with a key derived from MachineGuid and the X-Lab-Half header.,Named by Huntress and hashed by both Huntress and Blackpoint; alert only,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect https://blackpointcyber.com/blog/screenconnect-attack-sckit/ 61a672a13f03a9e81f573535ee92b1ed6cb7e848a33a06048865312d4e185ae2,sha256,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Microsoft report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA256 of the sc.msi ScreenConnect installer package served by the unauthorized panel, which enrols the endpoint as a rogue client of the attacker's instance.","Single source (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov 2026); not a known-good file and not in MalwareBazaar; installer and script hashes can change per build, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 0be01e7bd69cfdd222645d49bb5ad9961372fef2,sha1,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Microsoft report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,SHA1 of the sc.msi ScreenConnect installer package served by the unauthorized panel.,"Single source (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov 2026); not a known-good file and not in MalwareBazaar; installer and script hashes can change per build, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 3f81c9c874a896c46e4bccea2fad2eaa3d9f2054,sha1,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Microsoft report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,SHA1 of the staged SCKit toolkit ZIP fetched from the ns.mo7sen.dev stager.,"Single source (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov 2026); not a known-good file and not in MalwareBazaar; installer and script hashes can change per build, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 13ce33b19daee3963f7e15d461b191c38f6bc0d3,sha1,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),med,alert,"Named in Microsoft report; medium confidence, alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/,"SHA1 of ToolboxRelayUploader.exe, the tool that uploads a payload to the panel's Shared Toolbox using a stolen technician session.","Single source (Microsoft Threat Intelligence, 13 Nov 2026); not a known-good file and not in MalwareBazaar; installer and script hashes can change per build, so a miss does not clear a host; alert only",https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/13/sckit-abuses-screenconnect-deploy-remote-access-target-technician-sessions/ 185.241.211.197,ipv4,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Huntress report,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect,Server hosting the rogue UpdateConnect ScreenConnect client in the 13 Nov 2026 SCKit wave; victims had a netsh portproxy redirecting 127.0.0.1:88 to it on port 80.,"ASN: AS210558 1337 Services GmbH (NL), bulletproof hosting per Huntress; inside Spamhaus DROP range 185.241.211.0/24 (SBL696402); 007.from-ak.com resolves here",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect 007.from-ak.com,domain,ScreenConnect cloud panel hijack (MSPs),high,block,Named in Huntress report,https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect,Attacker relay (port 88) that the rogue UpdateConnect ScreenConnect clients connect to in the 13 Nov 2026 SCKit wave.,"Dynamic DNS hostname; block this exact name, not from-ak.com; resolves to 185.241.211.197, which sits in a Spamhaus DROP range",https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect