indicator,type,threat,confidence,recommended_action,reason,source_url,description,notes,sources 57.129.54.120,ipv4,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,block,Named in Wiz report,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"Attacker-controlled OVH server (AS16276, Germany) used from 15 to 26 October 2026 as the main address for assuming Qubole-trusted roles in customer AWS accounts, enumeration and credential harvesting. It also hosted sso_agent.iso, which beacons back to TCP 23458. May be reassigned after October 2026; review hits in that window.",Primary attacker address; OVH VPS; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploit-quboles-trusted-aws.html 2001:41d0:70d:7800::,ipv6,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,block,Named in Wiz report,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,Attacker-used OVH IPv6 address (AS16276) seen from 16 to 24 October 2026 enumerating and verifying stolen credentials.,OVH IPv6; credential enumeration; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-exploit-quboles-trusted-aws.html 45.83.220.211,ipv4,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,med,alert,Shared VPN space; alert only,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"Mullvad VPN exit (31173 Services AB, AS39351) that assumed Qubole-trusted roles in customer accounts on 14 and 15 October 2026. Shared VPN exit: alert, do not block.",Mullvad shared exit; alert only; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild 185.209.199.73,ipv4,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,med,alert,Shared VPN space; alert only,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"Mullvad VPN exit (31173 Services AB, AS39351) used from 18 to 21 October 2026 to assume integration roles across several victim accounts in quick succession. Shared VPN exit: alert, do not block.",Mullvad shared exit; alert only; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild 89.37.63.175,ipv4,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,med,alert,Shared VPN space; alert only,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"Mullvad VPN exit on Datacamp Limited (AS212238) used on 25 October 2026 to assume roles in customer accounts. Shared VPN exit: alert, do not block.",Mullvad shared exit; alert only; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild 65f061281c9a712e9502793dc4c5035cae490b84da05f7d4223cefa65ad396e4,sha256,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,block,Named in Wiz report,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"SHA256 of sso_agent.iso, a bootable Linux image hosted on 57.129.54.120 that collects disk and interface details, uploads them, polls TCP 23458 for shell scripts for 90 minutes, then hard-reboots to erase traces; it loads the ntfs3 driver, suggesting Windows targets.",sso_agent.iso; Wiz (no deployment seen),https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild 1c7437dac21630f53c0b888b50662c6487e23fd7,sha1,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,block,Named in Wiz report,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"SHA1 of sso_agent.iso, the bootable Linux image hosted on the attacker's OVH server.",sso_agent.iso; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild 086d4a83181971e883c53a4c44f46da2,md5,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,block,Named in Wiz report,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"MD5 of sso_agent.iso, the bootable Linux image hosted on the attacker's OVH server.",sso_agent.iso; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild 805246085872,other,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,monitor,Named in Wiz report; alert only,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"AWS account that Qubole's platform uses to assume roles in customer accounts, and the source of every attacker role assumption. Also carries legitimate traffic: hunt for AssumeRole from it with a non-AWS source address.","Vendor AWS account ID; hunt key, not a block indicator",https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS,other,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,alert,Hunt lead; not a network or file indicator,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,IAM user principal ID in account 805246085872 seen only in the attacker's activity. Any CloudTrail event with this principal warrants investigation.,IAM principal ID; attacker-only per Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW,other,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,med,alert,Hunt lead; not a network or file indicator,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"Second IAM user principal ID in account 805246085872, used by the attacker from 18 October 2026 but also by legitimate Qubole traffic from AWS infrastructure. Alert only when the source address is not an AWS address.",IAM principal ID; shared with legitimate traffic,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild quiam-*,other,Qubole cross-account AWS role abuse,high,alert,Named in Wiz report; alert only,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild,"Role session name prefix the attacker used for every assumed-role session, such as quiam-enum and quiam-scope-full.",Role session name pattern; Wiz,https://www.wiz.io/blog/qubole-cross-account-access-abused-in-the-wild