syntax = "proto3";

// Master feed messages
/*
message Epoch {
  bytes key = 1;
  uint64 endsAt = 2;
  // fn readTopic () { Hash(key) }
  // fn writeTopic() { Hash('w'+key) }
}*/

// A statement, originally appended to a user feed.
// Then sparsely replicated across a temporary swarm
// and conditionally be recorded by a moderator/witness
message Statement {
  // An officially recorded statement lacking context
  // can have unintended consequences..
  // On the other hand, forcing a global name space will
  // also have consequences. Statements can embed context in app-data
  // removing the need for a protocol-level header.
  // This field might be removed in future versions.
  required string context = 1;

  // Application data
  required bytes data = 3;

  // The statement signature must exist in order to prove
  // that a recording/copy was un-altered.
  required bytes signature = 4; // sign(sk, [context, data, key, sequence])
  required bytes key = 5; // Author key / Original Feed key
  required uint32 sequence = 6; // index of this msg in orignal feed.

  // Speculating that the statement format should allow the recorder
  // to include a footnote.
  // This field should be enforced empty by non recording peers
  bytes recording_remark = 7;
}

/*
forward-assert:  // conditional relay
  Stmt.key === Feed.key
  Stmt.sequence === index of Entry that holds Stmt.
  Stmt.signature === verify(Stmt.key, [context, data, key, sequence])
  // At this point we have validated that the Statement truly originates from
  // the author in it's unaltered form.
  // Now we should be able to start application-assertions.
  App.assert(Stmt)
If forward assertion fails, immediately exclude peer and feed.
Consequences:
  - Sharing/Forwarding unverifiable statements should prevent them from
  being relayed and effectively limit network access for adversaries.
*/