AISI | AI SECURITY INSTITUTE

AI Security Research in the UK Government

An introduction to the AI Security Institute, our research, and what it means for you.

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SHOW OF HANDS

Who here has heard of AISI?

01

ABOUT AISI

What is AISI?

Equipping governments with a scientific understanding of the risks posed by advanced AI.

01 About AISI

A research organisation inside government

2023

Founded after the Bletchley AI Safety Summit

First

institute of its kind, followed by others

Like a startup

within government, with £66M+ per year in funding

100+

world-class technical staff

01 About AISI

What we do

Testing frontier AI models

before release, and collaborating with top AI companies to improve safety

Informing policymakers

across the UK and allied governments

Advancing research

into solutions, both in-house and through grants

01 About AISI

Research focused on the most severe risks

Cyber and Autonomous Systems

Cyber capability and loss of control

Chem-Bio

Chemical and biological risks

Human Influence

How AI changes what people believe and do

Red Team

Stress-testing safety features and building mitigations

Model Transparency

Understanding AI's inner workings

Engineering

Building and open-sourcing the tools and infrastructure that enable research

02

RESEARCH

AI risks and our research

02 Research

Safeguards can be bypassed, but our red team is making them stronger

aisi.gov.uk · February 2026 ↗

Our red team

tries to break safeguards

Universal jailbreak


68% of dangerous biology questions answered

About $330

the cost of the automated attack

Fixed before release

OpenAI and Anthropic changed their defences, so everyone is safer



A scrambled prefix in front of a dangerous request slips it past the safety filter.

02 Research


AI rebuilt restricted biology tools from the paper alone

aisi.gov.uk · October 2026 ↗

Dual-purpose biology tools
kept private for safety

AI systems reconstructed several
from the paper alone

Under $20
for the simpler tools



How close each rebuilt tool came to the original. Left: simpler tools. Right: the most complex.

02 Research

AI can sway political opinions

Published in Science · December 2025 ↗

AI changed people's political views

after a short conversation

76,000

participants and 700 political issues

Cheap open weight models

can be trained to be more effective than frontier models

The most persuasive arguments

were the least accurate



Science

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HOME > SCIENCE > VOL. 390, NO. 6777 > THE LEVERS OF POLITICAL PERSUASION WITH CONVERSATIONAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

RESEARCH ARTICLE | LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS

The levers of political persuasion with conversational artificial intelligence

KOBI HACKENBURG, BEN M. TAPPIN, LUKE HEWITT, ED SAUNDERS, SID BLACK, HAUSE LIN, CATHERINE FIST, HELEN MARGETTS, DAVID G. RAND, AND CHRISTOPHER SUMMERFIELD Authors Info & Affiliations

SCIENCE • 4 Dec 2025 • Vol 390, Issue 6777 • DOI: 10.1126/science.aea3884

Published in Science, December 2025, with the Oxford Internet Institute, LSE, Stanford and MIT.

03

CYBER

This year, predicted cyber risks became real

03 Cyber


AI cyber ability is doubling every 4.7 months

aisi.gov.uk · May 2026 ↗

On hacking challenges
we have developed

12 hours
of expert work, now within reach

Faster
than we estimated a year ago



Each dot is an AI model. Higher means it can finish longer hacking tasks on its own.

03 Cyber

In April one model finished our hardest range and completed 100% of sandbox escape tests

aisi.gov.uk · March and April 2026 ↗

32 steps


a full simulated attack on a company network, completed end to end for the first time

56%

the number of sandbox scenarios escaped when paper published in March

100%

of our sandbox-escape scenarios solved by Claude Mythos Preview, weeks after publication



Our sandbox-escape benchmark. The AI starts inside a deliberately weakened sandbox and has to break out to reach a flag; a sealed outer layer stops it going any further.

03 Cyber


Every model we tested cheated on its tasks

aisi.gov.uk · July 2026 ↗

8 to 14%
of test runs

Did not reliably report
when asked if they had cheated

Under half
said it was wrong when asked



How often each model tried to cheat on our hacking tests.

03 Cyber

Timeline

APRIL

Mythos Preview

First end-to-end cyber range. Controlled escapes of every sandbox scenario.

JULY

OpenAI and Hugging Face

Agents under test found a way online and broke into Hugging Face.

JULY

Our own incident

Agents under test targeted real people online - quickly contained and no harm caused.

OCTOBER

PHP2Shell

A 14-year-old flaw in PHP, found with AI, affecting 70% of the internet.

03 Cyber

Open weight models are 4 to 7 months behind the closed frontier

aisi.gov.uk · July 2026 ↗


4 to 7 months
behind the frontier, down from 6 to 10 last year

A fraction
of the cost to run

Fewer safeguards
once a model can be downloaded

Recent open weight models compare to frontier models released 4-5 months prior on narrow cyber tasks

Recent open models and frontier closed models evaluated on 70 of AISI's narrow cyber tasks—spanning four difficulty tiers and covering a range of cybersecurity-relevant capabilities.



*GPT-5.3-Codex omitted for legibility; it was released same day as Opus 4.6 with similar performance.

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Success on our hacking tasks, by release date. Dotted lines link each downloadable model to the closed model it matches.

04

ACT

What this means for you

Attacks are getting faster, cheaper and more sophisticated.

04 Act

Minimum expectations - follow the NCSC's advice

NCSC and AISI · March 2026 ↗

NCSC Early Warning

Free, and takes minutes to join

Cyber Essentials


Get your technical teams accredited, or your country's equivalent

04 Act

How we layer our own defences around the agents we test

Assume any single layer can fail.

AISI · October 2026 ↗



04 Act

Three small asks

1

Spread the word

Everything here is public

2

Tell me what risks you are seeing

Have you faced AI cyber attacks?

3

Follow the NCSC guidance

Early Warning and Cyber Essentials

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QUESTIONS?

Thank you

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