# Bandit configuration for the template research repository.
#
# exclude_dirs: skip third-party and non-authored trees so local pre-push stays
# fast when developers keep per-project `.venv/` trees under `projects/` (tens
# of thousands of `.py` files otherwise). Same policy in CI (harmless no-ops
# when those dirs are absent on a clean checkout).
exclude_dirs:
  # Non-rendered typed project subfolders hold private/rotating WIP — not held
  # to the exemplar security floor. Keep in sync with
  # infrastructure.project.discovery.NON_RENDERED_SUBDIRS.
  - "projects/working"
  - "projects/ongoing"
  - "projects/published"
  - "projects/archive"
  - "projects/other"
  - ".venv"
  - "site-packages"
  # Vendored Lean/Lake package cache (e.g. actinf_policy_entanglement_lean's
  # lean/MathlibProofs/.lake/packages/mathlib). Third-party, non-authored;
  # same policy as .venv/site-packages. Harmless no-op on clean checkouts.
  - ".lake"
  # Optional upstream Kmyth git submodule. Third-party C sources and tooling;
  # template-owned Python integration is in infrastructure/steganography/*.py.
  - "infrastructure/steganography/kmyth"
  # Rotating research projects: research WIP intentionally NOT held to the
  # exemplar security floor (the same documented rotating-project exception
  # that applies to coverage and mypy). The security gate stays strict on
  # `infrastructure/`, `scripts/`, and the canonical exemplars
  # (`template_active_inference` / `template_code_project` / `template_prose_project` — all clean); rotating
  # research code must not block every contributor's push/CI. Harmless no-op
  # when a name is absent on a given checkout (these rotate to the already-
  # excluded typed subfolders `projects/working/` … `projects/archive/`).
  - "projects/BeeStack"
  - "projects/cogant"
  - "projects/crescent_city"
  - "projects/deep_temporal_affect"
  - "projects/biology_textbook"
  - "projects/actinf_policy_entanglement_lean"
  - "projects/_test_project"
#
# Policy: CI runs Bandit at MEDIUM+ severity (`-ll`) over `infrastructure/`,
# `scripts/`, and `projects/` (minus `exclude_dirs` above). The skips below silence LOW-severity findings
# that are systemically safe in this codebase, so a stricter scan
# (`bandit -r --severity-level low`) also runs clean. Documented at
# `docs/rules/security.md` and `.github/AGENTS.md`.
#
# Each skipped test is justified below. New findings outside these IDs MUST
# be triaged: either fix the code or add a targeted `# nosec <ID> reason: …`.

skips:
  # B101 — assert_used.
  # Asserts in `infrastructure/` express internal invariants and are validated
  # by tests, not relied on for security boundaries. Coverage gates ensure
  # they are exercised. Suppressing B101 reduces noise without weakening
  # security review of real issues. (Mirrors `[tool.bandit]` in
  # `pyproject.toml`.)
  - B101

  # B311 — pseudo-random generators.
  # `random.random()` is used only for retry-jitter (thundering-herd
  # mitigation in `infrastructure/core/runtime/retry.py`). It is never used
  # for tokens, secrets, or anything cryptographic. Cryptographic randomness
  # uses `secrets` / `os.urandom` directly where required.
  - B311

  # B403 — pickle import.
  # Imported only by `infrastructure/validation/integrity/checks.py` to
  # validate already-trusted, locally-produced pickle artifacts during
  # output integrity checks. No untrusted pickle data is loaded; the file
  # carries an explicit `noqa: S403` comment.
  - B403

  # B404 — subprocess import.
  # Subprocess is unavoidable for our orchestrator pattern: launching the
  # local Ollama server, invoking `pdflatex`/`pandoc` for rendering,
  # running `ruff`/`mypy`/`bandit` from gate scripts, and executing
  # discovered `scripts/` analysis modules. All call sites use fixed-list
  # argv with `shell=False`. Importing the module itself is not a risk.
  - B404

  # B405 — xml.etree Element import.
  # The single occurrence in
  # `infrastructure/search/literature/backends.py` re-exports `Element`
  # solely as a type-hint target. Actual XML parsing uses `defusedxml`.
  - B405

  # B603 — subprocess_without_shell_equals_true.
  # Same systemic justification as B404. Every call site passes a fixed
  # argv list with the default `shell=False`; no user-controlled string is
  # concatenated into a command. The one run-varying token — a project slug
  # — is path-traversal-validated by
  # `infrastructure.orchestration.discovery.validate_project_slug` before it
  # reaches any argv list.
  - B603

  # B607 — start_process_with_partial_path.
  # Partial paths are restricted to well-known, hard-coded executables
  # (`bandit`, `pip-audit`, `safety`, `which`, `rm`, `kpsewhich`, `git`)
  # invoked from gate / fixture / discovery scripts. Resolution relies on
  # the developer / CI runner `PATH`, which is treated as trusted.
  - B607