--- name: hunt-captcha-bypass description: "Hunt CAPTCHA Bypass — 6 distinct patterns: (1) CAPTCHA field simply omitted from the request (server-side validation absent), (2) CAPTCHA token replayed from a solved challenge (no single-use enforcement), (3) CAPTCHA response accepted on a different endpoint than it was solved on (no binding to action/session), (4) static or predictable CAPTCHA values accepted (e.g. '0', 'null', empty string), (5) audio/accessibility CAPTCHA trivially solvable programmatically, (6) CAPTCHA only enforced after N failures (first N requests bypass it). Detection: intercept a successful form submission, remove the CAPTCHA field entirely, replay — if it still succeeds, server-side validation is absent. Medium severity standalone; High when it removes the only rate-limit gate protecting a login, registration, or payment endpoint." --- ## Autonomous Testing Priority **The fastest test: just omit the CAPTCHA field entirely. Most CAPTCHA bypass bugs are client-side-only validation.** **Pattern 1 — Omit the CAPTCHA field (most common, most automatable):** 1. GET the form/endpoint that shows a CAPTCHA to understand its field name (usually `g-recaptcha-response`, `captcha`, `captcha_token`, `captcha_answer`, `h-captcha-response`) 2. POST the form with ALL fields EXCEPT the CAPTCHA field 3. If the action succeeds (200, redirect, or "success" message) → no server-side CAPTCHA validation 4. Proof: the state-changing action completes without a valid CAPTCHA field (compare against a baseline request that includes it) **Pattern 2 — Empty or null CAPTCHA value:** Instead of omitting the field entirely, include it with an empty string, `null`, `0`, or `undefined`: ``` captcha=&email=test@example.com&password=test123 ``` Some apps validate field presence but not content. **Pattern 3 — Replay a previously solved CAPTCHA token:** 1. Complete one legitimate CAPTCHA challenge and capture the `g-recaptcha-response` token 2. Submit a second request immediately with the SAME token value 3. If the second submission also succeeds → token is not single-use (replay attack) 4. A replayed token can be shared across automated requests **Pattern 4 — Test without CAPTCHA on similar endpoints:** Some apps add CAPTCHA to the registration form but forget the password reset, API endpoint, or mobile API path (`/api/register` vs `/register`). Try the same action via the API path without any CAPTCHA field. **Pattern 5 — Rate/throughput-gated "prove you're automated" challenges:** Some apps define CAPTCHA "bypass" as simply exceeding the rate a human could plausibly sustain — e.g. "N submissions within T seconds" — checked by a middleware that counts REQUESTS REACHING the route, not successful outcomes. Garbage/placeholder payloads satisfy this exactly as well as valid ones, since the counter increments regardless of whether the request's own validation passes. **Timing note (sliding-window counters):** don't solve this one request at a time — a sequential pace (seconds between each request) structurally cannot land N requests inside a short sliding window, and issuing more requests serially does not fix it. A typical failing pattern is 12 requests spread across ~250 seconds when the check requires ~10 requests within 20 seconds. Instead fire the requests **concurrently** (e.g. `"concurrency": N` on a single request call, or any parallel-request primitive your tooling offers, with N >= the required count) so they arrive simultaneously and satisfy the sliding window trivially. Check the endpoint's own required-field validation first (e.g. a `rating` field that can't be null) so the concurrent payload is at least well-formed enough to reach the counting middleware, even if other fields (like the CAPTCHA answer itself) are wrong or reused. **What to skip in automated testing:** Solving real reCAPTCHA/hCaptcha programmatically (OCR, audio bypass) requires external services. Only attempt if patterns 1-4 fail and the test budget allows. **Proof:** Any successful state-changing action (account created, login succeeded, form submitted) that completed without a valid CAPTCHA token confirms the bypass. --- ## Vulnerability Classes in This Skill ### 1. Client-Side-Only CAPTCHA Validation JavaScript hides/disables the submit button until CAPTCHA is solved, but the server never checks the CAPTCHA token. Direct API calls bypass the UI gate entirely. ### 2. CAPTCHA Not Tied to Session or Action A token solved for login is accepted on the registration endpoint (or any other). The server validates "is this a real CAPTCHA solution?" but not "is this the right solution for THIS action?". ### 3. Single-Use Not Enforced CAPTCHA tokens (especially reCAPTCHA v2) are meant to be consumed after one use. If the server doesn't revoke them after verification, a single human-solved token becomes reusable for many requests. ### 4. CAPTCHA Added Reactively (Only After N Failures) Some apps only show CAPTCHA after 3-5 failed login attempts. Before that threshold, no CAPTCHA is required → an attacker can make N-1 attempts per account indefinitely by resetting state between attempts. ### 5. Static or Predictable CAPTCHA Math CAPTCHAs (`3 + 4 = ?`), simple image CAPTCHAs, or text CAPTCHAs with a finite answer set can be automated. These are custom CAPTCHA implementations, not Google/hCaptcha. --- ## Impact Chain CAPTCHA bypass alone: **Medium** (enables automation of rate-limited actions) CAPTCHA bypass + login endpoint = **brute force gate removed** → chain with `hunt-brute-force` → High/Critical CAPTCHA bypass + registration endpoint = **account farming** → abuse, spam, resource exhaustion CAPTCHA bypass + password reset = **token flooding** → chain with `hunt-forgot-password` --- ## Related Skills - **`hunt-brute-force`** — CAPTCHA is often the only rate-limit gate; bypass unlocks brute force - **`hunt-forgot-password`** — reset endpoints sometimes protected by CAPTCHA only - **`hunt-race-condition`** — race the CAPTCHA validation window (submit before the token is revoked)