--- name: django description: "Use when building, reviewing, securing, testing or shipping a Django app — models, migrations, QuerySets/managers, FBV/CBV views, forms, the admin, settings split, and Django REST Framework (serializers, ModelViewSet, permissions). NOT async FastAPI/Pydantic services (that is `fastapi`), NOT Postgres schema/index work (that is `postgresdb`)." tags: [python, django, orm, drf, backend, web] recommends: [postgresdb, secure-coding, deployment, testing-py, api-design] origin: risco --- # Django web applications The single authoritative skill for building, reviewing, securing, testing and shipping a **Django** app — the batteries-included, ORM-first, request/response Python framework. Mental model: **a Django project is apps composed of fat-but-thin-enough models (domain + query logic on the model/manager), views that orchestrate (FBV/CBV/DRF) and never own SQL, an admin/forms layer, and a settings module split by environment.** The ORM, migrations, auth, admin, CSP and the test runner are all first-party. Reach for the framework before you add a dependency. ## Pinned stack (2026-06) - **Django 5.2 LTS** — the production default. Released 2025-04-02, security fixes until ~April 2028, supports Python 3.10–3.14. New in 5.2: all models auto-imported in `shell`, `CompositePrimaryKey`, `BoundField` customization. - **Django 6.0** — released 2025-12-03 (non-LTS, ~8 months until 6.1). Choose it only when you want the new built-in **Tasks framework** (background jobs without Celery) or **native CSP** (`ContentSecurityPolicyMiddleware`, `SECURE_CSP`) and can take the shorter support window. Drops Python 3.10/3.11; supports 3.12–3.14. - **Django REST Framework 3.17.1** (2026-03-24) — adds Django 6.0 + Python 3.14 support. - Python 3.12+, `pytest-django`, `factory_boy`. ruff/uv and type-hint policy live in `python`. **Version rule:** default to 5.2 LTS. Pick 6.0 only for a concrete Tasks/CSP need, and say so. ## Route elsewhere | Situation | Route to | |---|---| | Async service, `fastapi`/`pydantic`/uvicorn, async SQLAlchemy | `fastapi` | | Postgres schema design, EXPLAIN ANALYZE, indexing strategy, RLS, pooling | `postgresdb` | | Cross-stack OWASP/STRIDE threat modeling | `secure-coding` | | Container/Compose/CI, gunicorn prod tuning, collectstatic pipeline | `deployment` | | REST contract design (cursor vs offset, status codes, versioning) | `api-design` | | ruff/uv/general type hints, packaging | `python` | ## Project shape Split settings by environment; never ship one `settings.py` toggled by `DEBUG`. ```text src/ manage.py config/ settings/ base.py # shared; reads secrets from os.environ dev.py # from base import *; DEBUG=True; local hosts prod.py # from base import *; DEBUG=False; SECURE_*; CSP catalog/ # an app = a bounded domain models.py managers.py views.py serializers.py urls.py admin.py migrations/ tests/ ``` - Read secrets with `os.environ["SECRET_KEY"]` (or `django-environ`). **Never** commit a literal `SECRET_KEY` — a leaked key forges sessions and signed tokens. - Select env via `DJANGO_SETTINGS_MODULE=config.settings.prod`, not an `if DEBUG` branch. - One app = one domain. Resist a single `core` app that accretes everything. ## Models Put domain and query logic on the model and its manager. The view stays thin. ```python # managers.py from django.db import models class ArticleQuerySet(models.QuerySet): def published(self): return self.filter(status=Article.Status.PUBLISHED) def for_reader(self): # composes; reused everywhere, tested once return self.published().select_related("author") # models.py class Article(models.Model): class Status(models.TextChoices): DRAFT = "draft", "Draft" PUBLISHED = "published", "Published" tenant = models.ForeignKey("Tenant", on_delete=models.CASCADE) slug = models.SlugField() author = models.ForeignKey("Author", on_delete=models.PROTECT) status = models.CharField(max_length=16, choices=Status.choices, default=Status.DRAFT) published_at = models.DateTimeField(null=True, blank=True) objects = ArticleQuerySet.as_manager() class Meta: constraints = [ models.UniqueConstraint(fields=["tenant", "slug"], name="uniq_tenant_slug"), models.CheckConstraint( check=models.Q(status="draft") | models.Q(published_at__isnull=False), name="published_needs_date", ), ] indexes = [models.Index(fields=["tenant", "status"])] ``` - **Constraints live in the DB, not just Python.** A `UniqueConstraint`/`CheckConstraint` is enforced under concurrency; a `clean()` check is not. Validate-in-Python-only is a foot-gun. - `on_delete` is mandatory and load-bearing: `CASCADE` deletes children, `PROTECT` blocks the delete, `SET_NULL` orphans. Choosing wrong silently destroys data — pick deliberately. - Multi-column PK (5.2+): `pk = models.CompositePrimaryKey("tenant_id", "id")`. - Bad→Good for business logic: ```python # Bad: logic in the view — untested, unreusable, duplicated across endpoints def publish(request, pk): a = Article.objects.get(pk=pk) a.status = "published"; a.published_at = timezone.now(); a.save() # Good: a method on the model — one place, testable, reused by view/admin/command class Article(models.Model): def publish(self): self.status = self.Status.PUBLISHED self.published_at = timezone.now() self.save(update_fields=["status", "published_at"]) ``` ## QuerySet performance The N+1 is the single most common Django defect: one query for the list, then one more per row. ```python # Bad: 1 + N queries — each .author touches the DB inside the loop for a in Article.objects.all(): print(a.author.name) # Good: 2 queries total (FK -> JOIN; reverse/M2M -> second query) for a in Article.objects.select_related("author").prefetch_related("tags"): print(a.author.name, [t.name for t in a.tags.all()]) ``` | You are following | Use | Cost | |---|---|---| | Forward `ForeignKey` / `OneToOne` | `select_related(...)` | SQL JOIN, 1 query | | Reverse FK, `ManyToMany` | `prefetch_related(...)` | 2nd query, joined in Python | | Prefetch that itself needs filter/order | `Prefetch("x", queryset=...)` | controlled 2nd query | - Need existence, not rows? `qs.exists()`, never `len(qs)` or `if qs.count()`. - Need a few columns of a wide row? `.only("id", "slug")` / `.defer("body")`. - Computed totals belong in the DB: `annotate(...)` / `aggregate(...)`, not a Python loop. - Many inserts: `bulk_create(objs)` — one round-trip, not N `.save()` calls. - Never `Model.objects.all()` then slice/filter in Python; push it into the QuerySet. Deeper recipes (`assertNumQueries`, `Prefetch`, `.explain()`, ORM indexing) → [references/orm-performance.md](references/orm-performance.md). ## Views & URLs Keep views thin: validate input, call a model/manager method, return a response. No SQL. | Need | Use | |---|---| | One bespoke action, custom flow | function-based view (FBV) | | Standard list/detail/create/update/delete on a model | generic CBV (`ListView`, `DetailView`, …) | | JSON API consumed by a client/SPA | drop to DRF (do **not** hand-roll `JsonResponse` CRUD) | For the DRF surface — serializers, `ModelViewSet`, routers, permissions, throttling, pagination, filtering, nested-serializer N+1, versioning — see [references/drf.md](references/drf.md). The thin-view rule still holds: a fat serializer that walks relations per row is just an N+1 wearing a tie. ## Migrations ```bash python manage.py makemigrations catalog # generate from model diff python manage.py migrate # apply python manage.py makemigrations --check # CI gate: fail if a model drifts from migrations ``` - **Never edit a migration that has been applied anywhere.** Add a new one. Editing rewrites history and breaks every environment that already ran it. - Data backfills go through `migrations.RunPython(forward, reverse)` with a reverse, not a one-off script. Use the historical model from `apps.get_model(...)`, not the imported class. - Schema changes on a live table that you cannot afford to lock are expand-and-contract; the Postgres-side mechanics (lock modes, batching) live in `postgresdb`. ## Security Set these in `prod.py`. Then prove it: `python manage.py check --deploy` must come back clean. | Setting | Value | Why | |---|---|---| | `DEBUG` | `False` | `True` leaks settings + a stack-trace shell to the world | | `ALLOWED_HOSTS` | explicit domains | `['*']` enables Host-header attacks | | `SECRET_KEY` | from `os.environ` | a literal in source forges signed cookies/tokens | | `SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT` | `True` | force HTTPS | | `SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS` | `31536000` (+ include-subdomains, preload) | the `check --deploy` warning you saw is this being 0 | | `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE` / `CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE` | `True` | stop cookie leak over HTTP | | `SECURE_CSP` (Django 6.0) | a real policy + nonce | native CSP; pre-6.0 use `django-csp` | - CSRF protection is on by default — keep `CsrfViewMiddleware`; do not blanket-exempt views. - The ORM parameterizes queries. Only `.raw()`, `.extra()` and `cursor.execute()` with an f-string/`%`-built string reopen SQL injection. Pass params, never interpolate. Full `SECURE_*` checklist, CSP nonce/report-only, upload/SSRF, ORM-injection → [references/security.md](references/security.md). ## Testing ```python import pytest from rest_framework.test import APIClient @pytest.mark.django_db def test_owner_only(article, owner): client = APIClient() assert client.get(f"/api/articles/{article.pk}/").status_code == 403 # anon client.force_authenticate(owner) assert client.get(f"/api/articles/{article.pk}/").status_code == 200 ``` - `pytest-django` + `@pytest.mark.django_db`; run with `--reuse-db` to skip rebuilds locally. - `TestCase` wraps each test in a rolled-back transaction (fast). Use `TransactionTestCase` only when you test `on_commit` hooks or real commit behavior. - Lock in N+1 fixes with `assertNumQueries(2)` — it fails the build when a relation regresses. - Build instances with `factory_boy`, not 30 lines of `Model.objects.create(...)`. Setup, fixtures, transactional DB, coverage → [references/testing.md](references/testing.md). ## Background work | Need | Use | |---|---| | New project on Django 6.0, simple enqueue-and-forget jobs | the built-in **Tasks framework** | | Pre-6.0, or you need schedules/retries/fan-out/result backends/workers at scale | **Celery** | Either way: enqueue from the model/service layer, never block the request thread. ## Anti-patterns | Anti-pattern | Why it bites | Do instead | |---|---|---| | Business logic in the view | untested, duplicated across endpoints | method on the model/manager | | f-string SQL into `.raw()`/`.extra()`/`cursor.execute` | SQL injection | parameterized queries | | Looping rows touching `.author` | N+1 queries | `select_related`/`prefetch_related` | | `DEBUG=True` in prod | leaks settings + stack traces | `DEBUG=False` in `prod.py` | | `SECRET_KEY` literal in source | forged sessions/tokens | `os.environ` | | Validation only in `clean()` | races under concurrency | DB `UniqueConstraint`/`CheckConstraint` | | `Model.objects.all()` in a template loop | one query per iteration | prefetch in the view | | `ModelViewSet` with no `permission_classes` | endpoint open to the world | explicit permission class | | Fat serializer walking relations | N+1 per response | prefetch + `assertNumQueries` | | Editing an applied migration | breaks every env that ran it | new migration | | `len(qs)` / `qs.count()` to test existence | full fetch/COUNT | `qs.exists()` | | Swallowing `Model.DoesNotExist` silently | hidden bugs | `get_object_or_404` or handle explicitly | ## Verify `scripts/verify.sh [TARGET]` greps tracked Django source for high-signal foot-guns: FAIL on a literal `SECRET_KEY`, `ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']`, or f-string SQL in `.raw()`/`.extra()`/`cursor.execute`; WARN on `DEBUG = True` outside a dev settings file and a `ModelViewSet`/`APIView` with no `permission_classes`. Read-only, exit 0 on a clean or empty target. It is a lint, not a substitute for `manage.py check --deploy` or the test suite.