# fluxgit-mcp-sidecar `mcp-name: io.github.fluxgit-hq/fluxgit-mcp-server` [![License](https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache--2.0-blue.svg)](LICENSE) [![Glama score](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/fluxgit-hq/fluxgit-mcp-server/badges/score.svg)](https://glama.ai/mcp/servers/fluxgit-hq/fluxgit-mcp-server) [![MCP](https://img.shields.io/badge/MCP-2026--07--28-6E56CF.svg)](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) **Safety-first Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Git.** > AI agents inspect. FluxGit keeps control. A Rust MCP server with **38 contracts** for AI code agents: **25 read-only tools** and **13 human-gated operation tools** (12 proposals plus cancellation of a pending proposal). The sidecar never executes a Git write; it bridges approved proposals to the [FluxGit](https://fluxgit.com) desktop application. ![An AI agent proposes a merge; FluxGit shows the diff, reason and conflict preflight, then waits for human approval.](docs/demo-approve.gif) For context-budget comparisons, see the public [Git context token benchmark](https://fluxgit.com/research/git-context-token-benchmark/). It publishes the fixture, raw outputs, scripts and checksums, including both the broad CLI sweep and a smaller hand-tuned counterexample. --- ## Why this exists AI coding agents are increasingly asked to navigate real repositories: explain branch state, summarize diffs, find lost commits, recommend safe next steps. To do this well, an agent needs Git context that is richer than `git status` and structured enough to reason over. To do this safely, an agent must never be able to silently mutate refs, force-push, discard work, or apply patches without a human approving the consequence. Other MCP Git servers face a choice: stay strictly read-only (limited utility) or expose write tools directly (dangerous — agents hallucinate, prompts can be poisoned, mistakes are destructive). This sidecar chooses neither. Inspection is schema-validated and bounded; operations go through a **write-with-UI-handshake**: the agent proposes, FluxGit shows the preview, the user approves in the app, and FluxGit executes through its safety pipeline with restore points and audit. --- ## What's exposed ### 25 read-only tools | Tool | Purpose | |---|---| | `repo.brief` | **One-call situational awareness** — branch, ahead/behind, in-progress operation, working-tree summary, stashes, aggregated submodule drift, recent commits, detected conventions and next-step hints. The recommended first call of an agent session; replaces 6-10 raw git calls and is token-budgeted by design | | `repo.scope` | **Monorepo scoping** — one subtree's working-tree changes, recent commits, churn (commits + authors over a window) and CODEOWNERS owners in a single call | | `repo.status` | Working tree, current branch, dirty paths | | `repo.refs` | Branches, tags, remotes, stashes | | `repo.branchStack` | Current branch vs upstream / base / related | | `repo.history` | Paginated commit history | | `repo.reflog` | Movement timeline with recovery hints | | `repo.conflictPreflight` | Predict merge/rebase outcome before running | | `conflict.read` | **Active conflict as structured data** — in-progress operation, ours/theirs producing commits, per-file stage classification, base/ours/theirs contents (size-capped, binary-flagged) and marker region line ranges. No more parsing `<<<<<<<` soup | | `commit.details` | Single commit metadata + changed files | | `worktree.changes` | Per-path working tree change summary | | `worktree.list` | All worktrees (main + linked) with branch/detached, HEAD SHA and locked/prunable flags — the read-only base for parallel agent worktrees | | `submodule.status` | Submodule list and state | | `diff.text` | Standard text patch (`git diff` compatible) | | `diff.semantic` | Capability-negotiated semantic explanation | | `diff.semanticFallbacks` | Paths that fell back from semantic to text | | `fleet.radar` | Multi-repo attention queue | | `fleet.digest` | **What changed across the fleet since a time** — HEAD and local-branch reflog moves of many repositories, newest first, bounded by `maxEvents` (default 200, max 1000). `repoPaths`, or FluxGit's registered repositories inside the allowed roots when omitted. `identity` is exactly what Git recorded (the configured identity, not proof of a person or an agent); `rewrote` flags moves that dropped the previous tip (reset, amend, rebase, forced moves). Reads reflog files only; nothing is fetched or written | | `agents.presence` | **Which other coding agents are working in this repository** — from local sources only (running agent processes and their children, the agents' own session stores, files they keep in the repository, editors with built-in agents, and FluxGit MCP presence records). Per agent: `state` (working/open/recent), `sources`, branch, last tool and repository-relative files when known. Names are what each tool or MCP client declares about itself. Your own MCP record is excluded; findings that are probably your own session are marked `likelyCaller`. Never returns prompts, messages or file contents | | `safety.timeline` | Synthesized safety events from restore points + reflog | | `safety.eventDetails` | Drill-down into one timeline event | | `flux.latestRestorePoint` | Newest FluxGit restore point | | `flux.restorePoints` | List of restore points | | `flux.restorePointDetails` | One restore point with before/after refs | | `operation.status` | Authoritative asynchronous status by `previewId`; poll after a preview returns `accepted: true` and do not report a Git outcome before it becomes terminal | ### 13 write-with-UI-handshake tools All 12 `operation.preview.*` proposals dispatch through the FluxGit gateway when configured. The sidecar POSTs the proposal, performs one bounded status read, and normally returns immediately with `accepted: true`, the canonical `previewId`, current status and `nextAction.tool: "operation.status"`. The FluxGit app renders a “Requested by AI agent” approval card while human review continues asynchronously. Code `10003` is reserved for a bridge that is absent, invalid or unreachable; it is not a human-approval timeout. All 12 preview schemas accept an optional bounded `idempotencyKey`. Reuse it only when retrying the same logical intent; the sidecar scopes it to the operation type so that retry resolves to the existing gateway proposal. Omit it for a new intent—even when the other arguments match—and the sidecar sends a fresh UUID-backed key. Preview tools therefore continue to advertise `idempotentHint: false`. | Tool | Purpose | Gateway dispatch | |---|---|---| | `operation.preview.merge` | Propose a merge for human review | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/merge` → approval card in FluxGit | | `operation.preview.rebase` | Propose a non-interactive rebase | `interactive: true` fails schema validation before POST/card creation; accepted requests POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/rebase` and open a rewrites-history warning card | | `operation.preview.discard` | Propose discarding working-tree changes | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/discard` → path-specific warning; FluxGit requires a safety stash before it discards matching changes | | `operation.preview.reset` | Propose soft / mixed / hard reset | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/reset` → mode-aware card (hard mode forces strong confirmation) | | `operation.preview.patch` | Propose applying an agent-generated patch | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/patch` → monospace patch preview + applyToIndex toggle | | `operation.preview.plan` | Propose a 1-10 step sequence using the five supported plan-step types (`merge`, `rebase`, `discard`, `reset`, `patch`) | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/plan` → numbered step card; destructive steps require an explicit checkbox. A `rebase` step with `interactive: true` is rejected by schema validation before dispatch; execution stops at the first failure. Its pre-plan checkpoint anchors only the branch commit: guarded recovery restores HEAD/tracked files, while the original index, working tree and untracked files require the separate step snapshots/Safety Timeline recovery surfaces | | `operation.preview.worktree` | Propose creating an isolated worktree for a parallel task (non-destructive; never touches history) | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/worktree` → approval card with branch + target path + reason; runs through the same worktree-create action a manual click uses | | `operation.preview.commit` | Propose staging + committing with a message (non-destructive; amend not supported) | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/commit` → approval card lists the exact files that will be staged and committed; runs through the normal commit pipeline (hooks, signing, policy); completion returns the new SHA | | `operation.preview.push` | Propose pushing a branch to a remote (optional set-upstream; force-with-lease shows a HIGH-risk warning) | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/push` → approval card with remote + branch + force warning when applicable; runs the guarded push flow | | `operation.preview.branch` | Propose creating (and optionally checking out) a branch from a start point | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/branch` → approval card with name + start point + checkout choice | | `operation.preview.branchDelete` | Propose deleting merged local branches in one or more repositories (`targets`, up to 20 repositories × 20 branches, 100 in total). The agent names branches; FluxGit decides which are deletable. Remote branches are never touched | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/branchDelete` → the card inspects every branch natively and keeps any branch with commits not in HEAD or its upstream, checked out anywhere, or whose tip moved; each deleted tip is journaled in the Fleet branch-deletion history, where Restore recreates it. Completion returns per-branch `deleted`/`failed`/`skipped` results | | `operation.preview.submodulePointer` | Propose recording (`record`, requires `message`) or returning to (`return`) one submodule pointer at any depth (`parentPath` + `relativePath`). Optional `expectedRecordedOid` / `expectedCheckedOutOid` pins, as read from `submodule.status` | POST `/v1/mcp/operation/preview/submodulePointer` → `record` commits only the gitlink in the parent through Git's own commit (hooks and signing apply; nothing is pushed); `return` checks out the recorded commit detached, journaling the previous checkout as a restore point. The submodule must be initialized, clean and differ from its recorded pointer | | `operation.cancel` | Cancel the agent's own still-pending proposal by previewId | POST cancel; the card disappears from the user's queue like an expired proposal | All write proposals require a free-text `reason` so the user sees the agent's justification in the approval modal. All reuse the same durable gateway lifecycle (`pending → approved → executing → completed|failed`, with rejection/cancellation/expiry branches) and the same Tauri bridge in the UI. Six shims cover pending, recoverable, approve, claim, reject and complete. After restart, Approved proposals may resume only after repo/ref revalidation and claim; Executing proposals are shown for explicit reconciliation and are never blindly re-executed. When an approved operation captures a restore point, the completion `result` exposes that recovery metadata so the agent can report it without guessing. The boundary is deliberately fail-closed at approval time. FluxGit resolves the proposal's `repoPath` to its canonical open-repository id and requires it to match the repository the human is reviewing; an unresolved path, mismatch, or repository switch blocks execution. Tool arguments are validated before dispatch and again by the gateway. An optional declarative agent policy can deny proposals before a card opens. Its rules match the `agentId` the sidecar forwards (the sanitized, self-declared `clientInfo.name`, such as `claude-code`) and can limit that agent to operations, refs and, with `pathConstraints`, repository and worktree path prefixes. If `FLUXGIT_MCP_AGENT_POLICY` is configured but the file is missing, unreadable, malformed, or unsupported, the gateway does not start. With no configured policy, compatibility remains permissive, but per-operation human approval is still mandatory. ### Other agents in the same repository (collision hints) Every `operation.preview.*` result may carry an optional `otherAgents` object: the other agents `agents.presence` finds in the proposal's repository and, when both sides name their files (discard and commit `paths`, patch headers, plan steps, the submodule directory of `submodulePointer`), the `overlappingPaths`. It is informational only: it is added after the gateway decided, never blocks a proposal and never changes how it is approved. It is absent when agent detection is disabled. ```json "otherAgents": { "informational": true, "agents": [{ "agent": "codex", "state": "working", "sources": ["process", "session"], "branch": "codex/fix-login", "lastTool": "apply_patch", "files": ["src/login.rs"], "overlappingPaths": ["src/login.rs"], "pid": 4242, "lastActivityMs": 1790000000000, "mcpClient": null, "sameAgentAsCaller": false }], "agentCount": 1, "overlappingAgentCount": 1, "proposalPathsKnown": true, "omittedLikelyCaller": 1, "note": "Informational only: ..." } ``` Detection is local and read-only: other agents' SQLite stores are opened read-only and only repository-relative paths, tool names, branches and times leave the detector. `FLUXGIT_MCP_AGENT_DETECTION_DISABLED` (any value) turns it off: `agents.presence` then returns `10011` and previews carry no hint. Each sidecar also records which repositories its client used, so the desktop and other sidecars can see it: `/presence/mcp/.json` (0600) with the self-declared `clientInfo` name and version and, per repository, the canonical path, time and last tool name. Only calls that were accepted are recorded (a proposal the agent policy or a missing FluxGit refused is not); the file is removed on clean exit. `FLUXGIT_MCP_PRESENCE_DISABLED` turns it off. ### Write protocol details Every `operation.preview.*` call follows the same wire protocol. Example for `operation.preview.merge`: **1. Sidecar POSTs the proposal:** ```http POST /v1/mcp/operation/preview/merge HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:59647 Content-Type: application/json { "previewId": "1f3c5b9a-...-uuid", "agentId": "external-mcp-sidecar", "operationType": "merge", "repoPath": "/Users/dev/projects/checkout", "sourceRef": "feature/cart-redesign", "targetRef": "main", "reason": "Cart redesign work is complete; tests pass on the feature branch.", "strategy": "merge", "requestedAt": "2026-05-28T11:42:09.512Z" } ``` **2. Gateway responds 202 Accepted:** ```json { "previewId": "1f3c5b9a-...-uuid", "status": "pending", "expiresAt": "2026-05-28T11:47:09.512Z" } ``` **3. Sidecar performs one bounded status read:** ```http GET /v1/mcp/operation/status/1f3c5b9a-...-uuid HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:59647 ``` If the proposal is still live, the preview tool returns promptly: ```json { "tool": "operation.preview.merge", "readOnly": false, "accepted": true, "previewId": "1f3c5b9a-...-uuid", "status": "pending", "nextAction": { "tool": "operation.status", "data": { "previewId": "1f3c5b9a-...-uuid" } } } ``` This is a successful proposal submission, **not** a successful Git operation. **4. Client polls `operation.status` until the gateway reports a terminal state:** ```json { "previewId": "1f3c5b9a-...-uuid", "operationType": "merge", "status": "completed", "result": { "commitSha": "9a8b7c6d...", "restorePointId": "rp_2026_05_28_1142", "conflicts": [] } } ``` `completed` returns `isError: false`. A live `pending` or `approved` proposal also returns as a successful accepted result, but it does not claim Git changed. Any non-completed terminal state (`rejected`, `failed`, `expired`, `cancelled`) returns `isError: true` with the structured payload, so the agent can report the real outcome instead of inventing one. The same pattern applies to all 12 `operation.preview.*` tools. Only the request body fields and result shape differ; proposal submission, the one immediate read, asynchronous `operation.status` continuation and error semantics are shared. The public contract summary is maintained at [fluxgit.com/features/mcp-agent-git](https://fluxgit.com/features/mcp-agent-git/). --- ## Boundary: free shell vs FluxGit-powered The sidecar speaks MCP without FluxGit installed. Standard Git inspection works (status, refs, history, reflog, diff.text, etc). The tools that require FluxGit return JSON-RPC error code `10001` with an `upgradeHint` pointing the agent at the install/configure flow. Tier classification: - **Free shell** — work with local `git` only: `repo.brief`, `repo.scope`, `repo.status`, `repo.refs`, `repo.branchStack`, `repo.history`, `repo.reflog`, `commit.details`, `worktree.changes`, `worktree.list`, `submodule.status`, `diff.text`, `conflict.read`, `fleet.digest`. `agents.presence` also needs no FluxGit: it reads local agent state (and FluxGit's MCP presence records when present). - **Hybrid** — work locally with documented fallback, enriched by FluxGit: `fleet.radar`, `diff.semantic`, `diff.semanticFallbacks`, `repo.conflictPreflight`. - **FluxGit-required** — return `gateway_not_configured` without FluxGit because synthesizing them from local refs alone would mislead the agent: `safety.timeline`, `safety.eventDetails`, `flux.latestRestorePoint`, `flux.restorePoints`, `flux.restorePointDetails`. - **Write handshake** — route through FluxGit UI approval via the gateway handshake server. The 12 `operation.preview.*` tools return an accepted live proposal promptly and continue through `operation.status`; `operation.cancel` withdraws a pending proposal owned by the same agent. Code `10003` is used only when the bridge cannot accept or serve the handshake. --- ## Quick start Install the published crate (puts `fluxgit-mcp-sidecar` on your `PATH`): ```bash cargo install fluxgit-mcp-sidecar --locked ``` To install the current source branch instead: ```bash cargo install --git https://github.com/fluxgit-hq/fluxgit-mcp-server fluxgit-mcp-sidecar --locked ``` Or build from a clone: ```bash # Build cargo build --release # Run as MCP server (stdin/stdout transport) ./target/release/fluxgit-mcp-sidecar ``` ### Connect any MCP-compatible agent Paste the generic block below into any MCP host config. No client-specific install required. ```json { "mcpServers": { "fluxgit": { "type": "stdio", "command": "/absolute/path/to/fluxgit-mcp-sidecar", "env": { "FLUXGIT_MCP_HANDSHAKE_ADDR": "127.0.0.1:59647", "FLUXGIT_MCP_AUDIT_LOG": "/optional/path/to/audit.jsonl" } } } } ``` `FLUXGIT_MCP_HANDSHAKE_ADDR` is the canonical bridge address generated by FluxGit Quick Connect. `FLUXGIT_GATEWAY_ADDR` and `FLUXGIT_GATEWAY_URL` remain compatibility fallbacks. The sidecar accepts only plain HTTP on a loopback host with an explicit port; a remote host, credentials, path, query, fragment, HTTPS, or missing port is rejected. Without a valid local bridge, the free-shell tier still works. `FLUXGIT_MCP_AUDIT_LOG` enables an append-only JSONL audit log of every `tools/call`. Arguments are hashed; raw paths and identifiers are never written verbatim. --- ## Semantic diff contract `diff.semantic` is the most-used tool for AI agents and the easiest to misuse. The rule is strict: > A result may only be called *semantic* if `data.supported` is exactly `true`. When the FluxGit semantic engine is not available (FluxGit app not running, gateway address not configured, or the repository not registered in FluxGit), `diff.semantic` returns: ```json { "tool": "diff.semantic", "readOnly": true, "data": { "supported": false, "fallback": "diff.text", "reason": "Semantic diff is not available in local sidecar fallback mode.", "textDiffArguments": { "repoPath": "...", "base": "...", "head": "...", "path": "..." } } } ``` With the FluxGit app running and the repository registered in FluxGit, the same call is served by the FluxGit diff-engine through the gateway's read-only bridge and returns `supported: true` with per-file semantic hunks: ```json { "tool": "diff.semantic", "readOnly": true, "source": "fluxgit-gateway", "data": { "supported": true, "engine": "fluxgit-diff-engine", "files": [ { "path": "src/main.rs", "fallbackToText": false, "hunks": [{ "header": "fn main", "lines": [{ "type": "modified", "oldLine": 3, "newLine": 3, "content": "let x = 2;", "oldContent": "let x = 1;", "changedTokens": ["2"], "oldChangedTokens": ["1"] }] }] }, { "path": "logo.bin", "fallbackToText": true, "hunks": [], "reason": "The semantic engine could not parse this file (unsupported language, binary or unreadable source); use a text diff for it.", "textDiffArguments": { "repoPath": "...", "base": "...", "head": "...", "path": "logo.bin" } } ], "changedFiles": 2, "filesTruncated": false } } ``` Honesty is per file, not just per call: files the engine could not parse arrive with `fallbackToText: true`, a reason, and ready-to-use `textDiffArguments` — never as synthesized semantic hunks. `diff.semanticFallbacks` follows the same split and, when connected, lists the engine's real per-file fallback records. Connected agents must: 1. Call `diff.semantic`. 2. Read `data.supported`. 3. If `true`, use the semantic payload and label results as semantic — except entries with `fallbackToText: true`, which must be presented as text fallbacks. 4. If `false`, call `diff.text` with `data.textDiffArguments` and present results as a text-diff fallback. 5. Never infer function- or class-level moves from a text patch alone. Allowed wording: *"FluxGit reported a text-diff fallback for this file"*. Prohibited wording: *"This is a semantic diff"* when `supported=false`. --- ## Presence file (which agent is working where) Unless `FLUXGIT_MCP_PRESENCE_DISABLED` is set, each sidecar process keeps one local file, `/presence/mcp/.json`, so the FluxGit desktop app can show which coding agent is connected and which repository it is working on. It holds only the client name and version the agent declared in `initialize`, and per repository (at most 16) the checked `repoPath`, the time of the last call and the tool name. No other arguments, no results. Unlike the audit log, the repository path is stored as-is so the desktop can match it; the file is private (`0600` in a `0700` directory), rewritten atomically, deleted on clean exit, swept after 24 hours, and writing it never affects a tool call. The client name is self-declared, not an authenticated identity. --- ## Audit log Unless `FLUXGIT_MCP_AUDIT_DISABLED` is set, the sidecar attempts to append each `tools/call` to the shared JSONL ledger. The gateway attempts human-decision appends through the same writer. `FLUXGIT_MCP_AUDIT_LOG` overrides the path; otherwise both processes use `/audit/mcp.jsonl` (including `FLUXGIT_RUN_DIR`): ```json { "id": "bdeca765-488c-4e2a-b86b-25cd734f2988", "timestamp": 1712345678901, "auditSchemaVersion": 1, "auditChainVersion": 1, "sequence": 42, "segmentId": "7ab6fa7a-c5bf-4d82-86a8-26b4728b5acd", "previousHash": "sha256:...", "entryHash": "sha256:...", "tool": "repo.status", "event_type": "tool_call", "repo_scope": "repoPath:sha256:...", "args_fingerprint": "sha256:...", "risk": "read", "approval": "none", "result": "success", "session_id": "my-agent", "duration_ms": 12, "summary": "...", "readOnly": true, "sidecarReadOnly": true, "signature": "base64url-ed25519", "signatureKeyId": "1a2b3c4d5e6f7a8b", "signatureVersion": 3 } ``` Sensitive paths and identifiers are hashed, never stored verbatim. One stable cross-process lock protects validation, rotation and the complete append plus sync. Lines are limited to 256 KiB. The active segment rotates at 4 MiB and at most four rotated segments are retained, with a signed checkpoint when signing is configured. ### Per-entry Ed25519 signatures (shipped 2026-05-28) Audit signing is opt-in. When `FLUXGIT_MCP_AUDIT_SIGN_KEY` points to a PEM PKCS8 Ed25519 private key, every appended entry is signed with that key. Signed entries add: - `signature` — base64url (no padding) Ed25519 signature over the **canonical JSON** of the entry without the signature field. - `signatureKeyId` — 16-char hex prefix of the matching public key, so rotated keys can co-exist in the same JSONL. - `signatureVersion: 3` — current chained signing domain; the key id, sequence, previous hash and entry hash are included in the signed bytes. **Canonical JSON rule** (verifier must match exactly): recursively sort every object's keys lexicographically by UTF-8 byte order; arrays preserve order; strip `signature`; serialize compactly. For versions 2 and 3, keep `signatureKeyId` and `signatureVersion` in the signed object. For legacy signed entries with no version, the verifier also strips `signatureKeyId`. If the env var is unset, new entries are chained but unsigned for backward compatibility. If it is explicitly set, an empty, missing, unsafe, oversized or invalid key fails audit startup closed; it never degrades to unsigned output. ### Verifying an audit log The sidecar binary doubles as a verifier: ```bash fluxgit-mcp-sidecar verify-audit /path/to/mcp.jsonl --pubkey /path/to/install.pub.pem ``` The CLI streams the active file and retained rotations with bounded memory. It validates sequence, hashes, segment names, checkpoints and signatures, then reports only bounded counters (`entries`, `chained`, `legacy`, `signed`, `unsigned`, `segments` and the retained sequence range). Legacy per-entry records remain readable and verifiable but are reported as `legacy`, never as part of the tamper-evident chain. For a strict evidence gate, run: ```bash fluxgit-mcp-sidecar verify-audit /path/to/mcp.jsonl --pubkey /path/to/install.pub.pem --require-signed ``` Exit code is `0` on success, `3` for malformed data, broken chain/rotation, a bad signature and, in strict mode, any unsigned entry; usage errors return `2`. Programmatic full-ledger verification uses `verify_audit_ledger`; the older `verify_audit_event_signature` remains available for compatible per-entry checks. A local chain cannot prove deletion or replacement of the entire retained history (or its local checkpoint) without an independently trusted external anchor. Signed retained entries do prevent an attacker without the private key from recomputing a modified chain. Audit configuration (including an explicit signing key) fails closed at startup. A later filesystem/full-disk append failure is logged as degraded but does not undo a tool response or an already-durable gateway lifecycle transition; the gateway lifecycle journal remains authoritative for recovery. --- ## Protocol details The server supports two protocol eras: - **`2026-07-28` (preferred, stateless):** call `server/discover`, then include `params._meta.io.modelcontextprotocol/protocolVersion` and `params._meta.io.modelcontextprotocol/clientCapabilities` on every request. Modern results carry `resultType: "complete"` and server metadata; list results add `ttlMs` and `cacheScope`. `tools/list` includes `title`, `inputSchema`, `outputSchema` and annotations. `tools/call` includes both presentational `content` and the same payload in `structuredContent`. Only the proposal tools and `operation.status` advertise `previewId`, `status`, `accepted` and `nextAction` in their `outputSchema`; schema objects are open unless they say `"additionalProperties": false`. - **`2024-11-05` (legacy compatibility):** older hosts continue to use `initialize`. Modern-only fields are omitted from legacy results. Stdio output is standard newline-delimited JSON-RPC 2.0: exactly one compact JSON value per line. The JSON in a result's `content[0].text` is compact too (no indentation), with the same keys and values as `structuredContent`. Pre-standard `Content-Length` framing remains accepted as **input only** for old FluxGit clients; the server never emits it. Frames are limited to 8 MiB. JSON-RPC notifications receive no response, and request methods sent without an id are not executed. There are 38 tools in modern `tools/list`: 25 advertise `annotations.readOnlyHint: true`; the 12 `operation.preview.*` tools and `operation.cancel` advertise `readOnlyHint: false`. These annotations describe effects for the host; they are not authorization. Error codes: | Code | Meaning | |---|---| | `-32700` | Parse error | | `-32600` | Invalid request (malformed JSON-RPC) | | `-32601` | Method not found | | `-32602` | Invalid params or unknown tool | | `-32603` | Internal error | | `-32022` | Unsupported modern MCP version; `data` contains `supported` and `requested` | | `10001` | Gateway not configured — install/start FluxGit to use FluxGit-required tools | | `10002` | A configured FluxGit bridge had no payload to serve (for example, a local fallback lacked an absolute `repoPath`) | | `10003` | The local write-handshake bridge is absent, invalid or unreachable; no accepted proposal should be inferred | | `10004` | Proposal ended without completion (`rejected`, `failed`, `expired` or `cancelled`) | | `10005` | The gateway does not know the requested `previewId` (wrong/never-accepted id or pruning after terminal retention). Restart alone does not justify a new proposal: Approved/Executing records recover durably and a possibly-started Git outcome must be reconciled first. | | `10006` | Gateway refused the proposal before opening a card (policy, validation or quota) | | `10007` | Gateway returned a malformed/unsafe canonical `previewId`; the sidecar refuses to follow it | | `10010` | Local read-only Git command failed | | `10011` | Agent detection is disabled (`FLUXGIT_MCP_AGENT_DETECTION_DISABLED`); `agents.presence` cannot answer | --- ## Status This is a working MCP server. The read-only surface and all 12 `operation.preview.*` routes are implemented; `operation.cancel` manages only a pending proposal owned by the same self-reported agent id. The write handshake renders an approval card in FluxGit and completes through the app's guarded pipeline. Clients receive structured lifecycle results instead of a synthetic success. `clientInfo.name` is sanitized attribution for policy, quota and audit; it is self-reported and must never be treated as authenticated identity. ## Roadmap - **End-to-end demo video** — public recording of the agent-proposes → user-approves → FluxGit-executes loop, captured from a live install. - **Audit log exportable CSV/JSON** — shipped: per-entry Ed25519 signing (2026-05-28). Remaining: exportable CSV/JSON and retention policy for the FluxGit app's audit panel. - **HTTP / SSE transport** — for cloud / shared MCP host deployments. - **Official MCP Registry** — [`io.github.fluxgit-hq/fluxgit-mcp-server`](https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0.1/servers?search=io.github.fluxgit-hq%2Ffluxgit-mcp-server) is live and resolves to the published [`fluxgit-mcp-sidecar`](https://crates.io/crates/fluxgit-mcp-sidecar) crate. ## License Apache-2.0. See `LICENSE`. ## Related - [FluxGit](https://fluxgit.com) — the desktop app that produces the FluxGit-powered context. - [MCP agent Git](https://fluxgit.com/features/mcp-agent-git/) — public product and protocol overview. - [Claude Code](https://fluxgit.com/for/claude-code), [Cursor](https://fluxgit.com/for/cursor), and [Codex](https://fluxgit.com/for/codex) — setup and workflow guides. - [Git context token benchmark](https://fluxgit.com/research/git-context-token-benchmark/) — reproducible fixture, raw outputs, scripts and checksums. - [Public source](https://github.com/fluxgit-hq/fluxgit-mcp-server) — this Apache-2.0 server.