#!/usr/bin/env python3 # Impacket - Collection of Python classes for working with network protocols. # # Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies # # All rights reserved. # # This software is provided under a slightly modified version # of the Apache Software License. See the accompanying LICENSE file # for more information. # # Description: # Python script to read and manage the Discretionary Access Control List of an object # # Authors: # Charlie BROMBERG (@_nwodtuhs) # Guillaume DAUMAS (@BlWasp_) # Lucien DOUSTALY (@Wlayzz) # import argparse import binascii import codecs import json import logging import os import sys import traceback import datetime from enum import Enum from impacket import version from impacket.examples import logger, utils from impacket.ldap import ldap, ldapasn1, ldaptypes from impacket.ldap.ldap import escape_filter_chars, get_entry_dn, get_entry_value, get_entry_values from impacket.msada_guids import SCHEMA_OBJECTS, EXTENDED_RIGHTS from impacket.uuid import string_to_bin, bin_to_string from impacket.examples.utils import (ldap_login, parse_identity, ldap_value_to_bytes, as_string, as_sid_string, search_entries, log_ldap_error) OBJECT_TYPES_GUID = {} OBJECT_TYPES_GUID.update(SCHEMA_OBJECTS) OBJECT_TYPES_GUID.update(EXTENDED_RIGHTS) # Universal SIDs WELL_KNOWN_SIDS = { 'S-1-0': 'Null Authority', 'S-1-0-0': 'Nobody', 'S-1-1': 'World Authority', 'S-1-1-0': 'Everyone', 'S-1-2': 'Local Authority', 'S-1-2-0': 'Local', 'S-1-2-1': 'Console Logon', 'S-1-3': 'Creator Authority', 'S-1-3-0': 'Creator Owner', 'S-1-3-1': 'Creator Group', 'S-1-3-2': 'Creator Owner Server', 'S-1-3-3': 'Creator Group Server', 'S-1-3-4': 'Owner Rights', 'S-1-5-80-0': 'All Services', 'S-1-4': 'Non-unique Authority', 'S-1-5': 'NT Authority', 'S-1-5-1': 'Dialup', 'S-1-5-2': 'Network', 'S-1-5-3': 'Batch', 'S-1-5-4': 'Interactive', 'S-1-5-6': 'Service', 'S-1-5-7': 'Anonymous', 'S-1-5-8': 'Proxy', 'S-1-5-9': 'Enterprise Domain Controllers', 'S-1-5-10': 'Principal Self', 'S-1-5-11': 'Authenticated Users', 'S-1-5-12': 'Restricted Code', 'S-1-5-13': 'Terminal Server Users', 'S-1-5-14': 'Remote Interactive Logon', 'S-1-5-15': 'This Organization', 'S-1-5-17': 'This Organization', 'S-1-5-18': 'Local System', 'S-1-5-19': 'NT Authority', 'S-1-5-20': 'NT Authority', 'S-1-5-32-544': 'Administrators', 'S-1-5-32-545': 'Users', 'S-1-5-32-546': 'Guests', 'S-1-5-32-547': 'Power Users', 'S-1-5-32-548': 'Account Operators', 'S-1-5-32-549': 'Server Operators', 'S-1-5-32-550': 'Print Operators', 'S-1-5-32-551': 'Backup Operators', 'S-1-5-32-552': 'Replicators', 'S-1-5-64-10': 'NTLM Authentication', 'S-1-5-64-14': 'SChannel Authentication', 'S-1-5-64-21': 'Digest Authority', 'S-1-5-80': 'NT Service', 'S-1-5-83-0': 'NT VIRTUAL MACHINE\\Virtual Machines', 'S-1-16-0': 'Untrusted Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-4096': 'Low Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-8192': 'Medium Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-8448': 'Medium Plus Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-12288': 'High Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-16384': 'System Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-20480': 'Protected Process Mandatory Level', 'S-1-16-28672': 'Secure Process Mandatory Level', 'S-1-5-32-554': 'BUILTIN\\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access', 'S-1-5-32-555': 'BUILTIN\\Remote Desktop Users', 'S-1-5-32-557': 'BUILTIN\\Incoming Forest Trust Builders', 'S-1-5-32-556': 'BUILTIN\\Network Configuration Operators', 'S-1-5-32-558': 'BUILTIN\\Performance Monitor Users', 'S-1-5-32-559': 'BUILTIN\\Performance Log Users', 'S-1-5-32-560': 'BUILTIN\\Windows Authorization Access Group', 'S-1-5-32-561': 'BUILTIN\\Terminal Server License Servers', 'S-1-5-32-562': 'BUILTIN\\Distributed COM Users', 'S-1-5-32-569': 'BUILTIN\\Cryptographic Operators', 'S-1-5-32-573': 'BUILTIN\\Event Log Readers', 'S-1-5-32-574': 'BUILTIN\\Certificate Service DCOM Access', 'S-1-5-32-575': 'BUILTIN\\RDS Remote Access Servers', 'S-1-5-32-576': 'BUILTIN\\RDS Endpoint Servers', 'S-1-5-32-577': 'BUILTIN\\RDS Management Servers', 'S-1-5-32-578': 'BUILTIN\\Hyper-V Administrators', 'S-1-5-32-579': 'BUILTIN\\Access Control Assistance Operators', 'S-1-5-32-580': 'BUILTIN\\Remote Management Users', } # GUID rights enum # GUID thats permits to identify extended rights in an ACE # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/adschema/a-rightsguid class RIGHTS_GUID(Enum): WriteMembers = "bf9679c0-0de6-11d0-a285-00aa003049e2" ResetPassword = "00299570-246d-11d0-a768-00aa006e0529" DS_Replication_Get_Changes = "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2" DS_Replication_Get_Changes_All = "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2" # ACE flags enum # New ACE at the end of SACL for inheritance and access return system-audit # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/securitybaseapi/nf-securitybaseapi-addauditaccessobjectace class ACE_FLAGS(Enum): CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE = ldaptypes.ACE.CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = ldaptypes.ACE.FAILED_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG INHERIT_ONLY_ACE = ldaptypes.ACE.INHERIT_ONLY_ACE INHERITED_ACE = ldaptypes.ACE.INHERITED_ACE NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE = ldaptypes.ACE.NO_PROPAGATE_INHERIT_ACE OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE = ldaptypes.ACE.OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG = ldaptypes.ACE.SUCCESSFUL_ACCESS_ACE_FLAG # ACE flags enum # For an ACE, flags that indicate if the ObjectType and the InheritedObjecType are set with a GUID # Since these two flags are the same for Allowed and Denied access, the same class will be used from 'ldaptypes' # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/winnt/ns-winnt-access_allowed_object_ace class OBJECT_ACE_FLAGS(Enum): ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_INHERITED_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT # Access Mask enum # Access mask permits to encode principal's rights to an object. This is the rights the principal behind the specified SID has # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/7a53f60e-e730-4dfe-bbe9-b21b62eb790b # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/api/iads/ne-iads-ads_rights_enum?redirectedfrom=MSDN class ACCESS_MASK(Enum): # Generic Rights GenericRead = 0x80000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_READ GenericWrite = 0x40000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_WRITE GenericExecute = 0x20000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_EXECUTE GenericAll = 0x10000000 # ADS_RIGHT_GENERIC_ALL # Maximum Allowed access type MaximumAllowed = 0x02000000 # Access System Acl access type AccessSystemSecurity = 0x01000000 # ADS_RIGHT_ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY # Standard access types Synchronize = 0x00100000 # ADS_RIGHT_SYNCHRONIZE WriteOwner = 0x00080000 # ADS_RIGHT_WRITE_OWNER WriteDACL = 0x00040000 # ADS_RIGHT_WRITE_DAC ReadControl = 0x00020000 # ADS_RIGHT_READ_CONTROL Delete = 0x00010000 # ADS_RIGHT_DELETE # Specific rights AllExtendedRights = 0x00000100 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS ListObject = 0x00000080 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_LIST_OBJECT DeleteTree = 0x00000040 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_DELETE_TREE WriteProperties = 0x00000020 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP ReadProperties = 0x00000010 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP Self = 0x00000008 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_SELF ListChildObjects = 0x00000004 # ADS_RIGHT_ACTRL_DS_LIST DeleteChild = 0x00000002 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_DELETE_CHILD CreateChild = 0x00000001 # ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD # Simple permissions enum # Simple permissions are combinaisons of extended permissions # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2003/cc783530(v=ws.10)?redirectedfrom=MSDN class SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS(Enum): FullControl = 0xf01ff Modify = 0x0301bf ReadAndExecute = 0x0200a9 ReadAndWrite = 0x02019f Read = 0x20094 Write = 0x200bc # Mask ObjectType field enum # Possible values for the Mask field in object-specific ACE (permitting to specify extended rights in the ObjectType field for example) # Since these flags are the same for Allowed and Denied access, the same class will be used from 'ldaptypes' # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/c79a383c-2b3f-4655-abe7-dcbb7ce0cfbe class ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE_MASK_FLAGS(Enum): ControlAccess = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS CreateChild = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CREATE_CHILD DeleteChild = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_DELETE_CHILD ReadProperty = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP WriteProperty = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP Self = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_SELF class DACLedit(object): """docstring for setrbcd""" def __init__(self, ldap_session, base_dn, args): super(DACLedit, self).__init__() self.ldap_session = ldap_session self.base_dn = base_dn self.target_sAMAccountName = args.target_sAMAccountName self.target_SID = args.target_SID self.target_DN = args.target_DN self.principal_sAMAccountName = args.principal_sAMAccountName self.principal_SID = args.principal_SID self.principal_DN = args.principal_DN self.ace_type = args.ace_type self.rights = args.rights self.rights_guid = args.rights_guid self.filename = args.filename self.inheritance = args.inheritance if self.inheritance: logging.info("NB: objects with adminCount=1 will no inherit ACEs from their parent container/OU") self.dacl_controls = [ldapasn1.SDFlagsControl(flags=0x04)] if args.mask is not None: if args.mask.startswith("0x"): self.force_mask = int(args.mask, 16) elif args.mask == "readwrite": self.force_mask = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP + \ ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP elif args.mask == "write": self.force_mask = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP elif args.mask == "self": self.force_mask = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_SELF elif args.mask == "allext": self.force_mask = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS else: self.force_mask = None if self.target_sAMAccountName or self.target_SID or self.target_DN: # Searching for target account with its security descriptor self.search_target_principal_security_descriptor() # Extract security descriptor data self.principal_raw_security_descriptor = ldap_value_to_bytes(get_entry_value(self.target_principal, 'nTSecurityDescriptor')) self.principal_security_descriptor = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=self.principal_raw_security_descriptor) # Searching for the principal SID if any principal argument was given and principal_SID wasn't if self.principal_SID is None and self.principal_sAMAccountName is not None or self.principal_DN is not None: _lookedup_principal = "" if self.principal_sAMAccountName is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.principal_sAMAccountName entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(_lookedup_principal), self.base_dn, attributes=['objectSid']) elif self.principal_DN is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.principal_DN entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(distinguishedName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(_lookedup_principal), self.base_dn, attributes=['objectSid']) try: self.principal_SID = as_sid_string(get_entry_value(entries[0], 'objectSid')) logging.debug("Found principal SID: %s" % self.principal_SID) except IndexError: logging.error('Principal SID not found in LDAP (%s)' % _lookedup_principal) exit(1) # Main read funtion # Prints the parsed DACL def read(self): parsed_dacl = self.parseDACL(self.principal_security_descriptor['Dacl']) self.printparsedDACL(parsed_dacl) return # Main write function # Attempts to add a new ACE to a DACL def write(self): # Creates ACEs with the specified GUIDs and the SID, or FullControl if no GUID is specified # Append the ACEs in the DACL locally if self.rights == "FullControl" and self.rights_guid is None: logging.debug("Appending ACE (%s --(FullControl)--> %s)" % (self.principal_SID, self.target_SID or self.target_sAMAccountName or self.target_DN)) self.principal_security_descriptor['Dacl'].aces.append(self.create_ace(SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS.FullControl.value, self.principal_SID, self.ace_type)) elif self.rights == "Custom" and self.force_mask is not None: logging.debug("Appending ACE (%s --(Custom)--> %s)" % (self.principal_SID, self.target_SID or self.target_sAMAccountName or self.target_DN)) self.principal_security_descriptor['Dacl'].aces.append(self.create_ace(self.force_mask, self.principal_SID, self.ace_type)) else: for rights_guid in self.build_guids_for_rights(): logging.debug("Appending ACE (%s --(%s)--> %s)" % (self.principal_SID, rights_guid, self.target_SID or self.target_sAMAccountName or self.target_DN)) self.principal_security_descriptor['Dacl'].aces.append(self.create_object_ace(rights_guid, self.principal_SID, self.ace_type, force_mask=self.force_mask)) # Backups current DACL before add the new one self.backup() # Effectively push the DACL with the new ACE self.modify_secDesc_for_dn(get_entry_dn(self.target_principal), self.principal_security_descriptor) return # Attempts to remove an ACE from the DACL # To do it, a new DACL is built locally with all the ACEs that must NOT BE removed, and this new DACL is pushed on the server def remove(self): compare_aces = [] # Creates ACEs with the specified GUIDs and the SID, or FullControl if no GUID is specified # These ACEs will be used as comparison templates if self.rights == "FullControl" and self.rights_guid is None: compare_aces.append(self.create_ace(SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS.FullControl.value, self.principal_SID, self.ace_type)) elif self.rights == "Custom" and self.force_mask is not None: compare_aces.append(self.create_ace(self.force_mask, self.principal_SID, self.ace_type)) else: for rights_guid in self.build_guids_for_rights(): compare_aces.append(self.create_object_ace(rights_guid, self.principal_SID, self.ace_type, force_mask=self.force_mask)) new_dacl = [] i = 0 dacl_must_be_replaced = False for ace in self.principal_security_descriptor['Dacl'].aces: ace_must_be_removed = False for compare_ace in compare_aces: # To be sure the good ACEs are removed, multiple fields are compared between the templates and the ACEs in the DACL # - ACE type # - ACE flags # - Access masks # - Revision # - SubAuthorityCount # - SubAuthority # - IdentifierAuthority value if ace['AceType'] == compare_ace['AceType'] \ and ace['AceFlags'] == compare_ace['AceFlags']\ and ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask'] == compare_ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask']\ and ace['Ace']['Sid']['Revision'] == compare_ace['Ace']['Sid']['Revision']\ and ace['Ace']['Sid']['SubAuthorityCount'] == compare_ace['Ace']['Sid']['SubAuthorityCount']\ and ace['Ace']['Sid']['SubAuthority'] == compare_ace['Ace']['Sid']['SubAuthority']\ and ace['Ace']['Sid']['IdentifierAuthority']['Value'] == compare_ace['Ace']['Sid']['IdentifierAuthority']['Value']: # If the ACE has an ObjectType, the GUIDs must match if 'ObjectType' in ace['Ace'].fields.keys() and 'ObjectType' in compare_ace['Ace'].fields.keys(): if ace['Ace']['ObjectType'] == compare_ace['Ace']['ObjectType']: ace_must_be_removed = True dacl_must_be_replaced = True else: ace_must_be_removed = True dacl_must_be_replaced = True # If the ACE doesn't match any ACEs from the template list, it is added to the DACL that will be pushed if not ace_must_be_removed: new_dacl.append(ace) elif logging.getLogger().level == logging.DEBUG: logging.debug("This ACE will be removed") self.printparsedACE(self.parseACE(ace)) i += 1 # If at least one ACE must been removed if dacl_must_be_replaced: self.principal_security_descriptor['Dacl'].aces = new_dacl self.backup() self.modify_secDesc_for_dn(get_entry_dn(self.target_principal), self.principal_security_descriptor) else: logging.info("Nothing to remove...") # Permits to backup a DACL before a modification # This function is called before any writing action (write, remove or restore) def backup(self): backup = {} backup["sd"] = binascii.hexlify(self.principal_raw_security_descriptor).decode('utf-8') backup["dn"] = get_entry_dn(self.target_principal) if not self.filename: self.filename = 'dacledit-%s.bak' % datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S") else: if os.path.exists(self.filename): logging.info("File %s already exists, I'm refusing to overwrite it, setting another filename" % self.filename) self.filename = 'dacledit-%s.bak' % datetime.datetime.now().strftime("%Y%m%d-%H%M%S") with codecs.open(self.filename, 'w', 'utf-8') as outfile: json.dump(backup, outfile) logging.info('DACL backed up to %s', self.filename) # Permits to restore a saved DACL def restore(self): # Opens and load the file where the DACL has been saved with codecs.open(self.filename, 'r', 'utf-8') as infile: restore = json.load(infile) assert "sd" in restore.keys() assert "dn" in restore.keys() # Extracts the Security Descriptor and converts it to the good ldaptypes format new_raw_security_descriptor = binascii.unhexlify(restore["sd"].encode('utf-8')) new_security_descriptor = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=new_raw_security_descriptor) self.target_DN = restore["dn"] # Searching for target account with its security descriptor self.search_target_principal_security_descriptor() # Extract security descriptor data self.principal_raw_security_descriptor = ldap_value_to_bytes(get_entry_value(self.target_principal, 'nTSecurityDescriptor')) self.principal_security_descriptor = ldaptypes.SR_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR(data=self.principal_raw_security_descriptor) # Do a backup of the actual DACL and push the restoration self.backup() logging.info('Restoring DACL') self.modify_secDesc_for_dn(self.target_DN, new_security_descriptor) # Attempts to retrieve the DACL in the Security Descriptor of the specified target def search_target_principal_security_descriptor(self): _lookedup_principal = "" if self.target_sAMAccountName is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.target_sAMAccountName entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(_lookedup_principal), self.base_dn, attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor'], search_controls=self.dacl_controls) elif self.target_SID is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.target_SID entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(objectSid=%s)' % _lookedup_principal, self.base_dn, attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor'], search_controls=self.dacl_controls) elif self.target_DN is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.target_DN entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(distinguishedName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(_lookedup_principal), self.base_dn, attributes=['nTSecurityDescriptor'], search_controls=self.dacl_controls) try: self.target_principal = entries[0] logging.debug('Target principal found in LDAP (%s)' % _lookedup_principal) except IndexError: logging.error('Target principal not found in LDAP (%s)' % _lookedup_principal) exit(0) # Attempts to retieve the SID and Distinguisehd Name from the sAMAccountName # Not used for the moment # - samname : a sAMAccountName def get_user_info(self, samname): entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(samname), self.base_dn, attributes=['objectSid']) try: dn = get_entry_dn(entries[0]) sid = as_sid_string(get_entry_value(entries[0], 'objectSid')) return dn, sid except (IndexError, TypeError): logging.error('User not found in LDAP: %s' % samname) return False # Attempts to resolve a SID and return the corresponding samaccountname # - sid : the SID to resolve def resolveSID(self, sid): # Tries to resolve the SID from the well known SIDs if sid in WELL_KNOWN_SIDS.keys(): return WELL_KNOWN_SIDS[sid] # Tries to resolve the SID from the LDAP domain dump else: entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(objectSid=%s)' % sid, self.base_dn, attributes=['samaccountname']) try: samname = as_string(get_entry_value(entries[0], 'samaccountname')) return samname except IndexError: logging.debug('SID not found in LDAP: %s' % sid) return "" # Parses a full DACL # - dacl : the DACL to parse, submitted in a Security Desciptor format def parseDACL(self, dacl): parsed_dacl = [] logging.info("Parsing DACL") i = 0 for ace in dacl['Data']: parsed_ace = self.parseACE(ace) parsed_dacl.append(parsed_ace) i += 1 return parsed_dacl # Parses an access mask to extract the different values from a simple permission # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/28029872/retrieving-security-descriptor-and-getting-number-for-filesystemrights # - fsr : the access mask to parse def parsePerms(self, fsr): _perms = [] for PERM in SIMPLE_PERMISSIONS: if (fsr & PERM.value) == PERM.value: _perms.append(PERM.name) fsr = fsr & (~ PERM.value) for PERM in ACCESS_MASK: if fsr & PERM.value: _perms.append(PERM.name) return _perms # Parses a specified ACE and extract the different values (Flags, Access Mask, Trustee, ObjectType, InheritedObjectType) # - ace : the ACE to parse def parseACE(self, ace): # For the moment, only the Allowed and Denied Access ACE are supported if ace['TypeName'] in [ "ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE", "ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE" ]: parsed_ace = {} parsed_ace['ACE Type'] = ace['TypeName'] # Retrieves ACE's flags _ace_flags = [] for FLAG in ACE_FLAGS: if ace.hasFlag(FLAG.value): _ace_flags.append(FLAG.name) parsed_ace['ACE flags'] = ", ".join(_ace_flags) or "None" # For standard ACE # Extracts the access mask (by parsing the simple permissions) and the principal's SID if ace['TypeName'] in [ "ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_ACE" ]: parsed_ace['Access mask'] = "%s (0x%x)" % (", ".join(self.parsePerms(ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask'])), ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask']) parsed_ace['Trustee (SID)'] = "%s (%s)" % (self.resolveSID(ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()) or "UNKNOWN", ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()) # For object-specific ACE elif ace['TypeName'] in [ "ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE", "ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE" ]: # Extracts the mask values. These values will indicate the ObjectType purpose _access_mask_flags = [] for FLAG in ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE_MASK_FLAGS: if ace['Ace']['Mask'].hasPriv(FLAG.value): _access_mask_flags.append(FLAG.name) parsed_ace['Access mask'] = "%s (0x%x)" % (", ".join(_access_mask_flags), ace['Ace']['Mask']['Mask']) # Extracts the ACE flag values and the trusted SID _object_flags = [] for FLAG in OBJECT_ACE_FLAGS: if ace['Ace'].hasFlag(FLAG.value): _object_flags.append(FLAG.name) parsed_ace['Flags'] = ", ".join(_object_flags) or "None" # Extracts the ObjectType GUID values if ace['Ace']['ObjectTypeLen'] != 0: obj_type = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['ObjectType']).lower() try: parsed_ace['Object type (GUID)'] = "%s (%s)" % (OBJECT_TYPES_GUID[obj_type], obj_type) except KeyError: parsed_ace['Object type (GUID)'] = "UNKNOWN (%s)" % obj_type # Extracts the InheritedObjectType GUID values if ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectTypeLen'] != 0: inh_obj_type = bin_to_string(ace['Ace']['InheritedObjectType']).lower() try: parsed_ace['Inherited type (GUID)'] = "%s (%s)" % (OBJECT_TYPES_GUID[inh_obj_type], inh_obj_type) except KeyError: parsed_ace['Inherited type (GUID)'] = "UNKNOWN (%s)" % inh_obj_type # Extract the Trustee SID (the object that has the right over the DACL bearer) parsed_ace['Trustee (SID)'] = "%s (%s)" % (self.resolveSID(ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()) or "UNKNOWN", ace['Ace']['Sid'].formatCanonical()) else: # If the ACE is not an access allowed logging.debug("ACE Type (%s) unsupported for parsing yet, feel free to contribute" % ace['TypeName']) parsed_ace = {} parsed_ace['ACE type'] = ace['TypeName'] _ace_flags = [] for FLAG in ACE_FLAGS: if ace.hasFlag(FLAG.value): _ace_flags.append(FLAG.name) parsed_ace['ACE flags'] = ", ".join(_ace_flags) or "None" parsed_ace['DEBUG'] = "ACE type not supported for parsing by dacleditor.py, feel free to contribute" return parsed_ace # Prints a full DACL by printing each parsed ACE # - parsed_dacl : a parsed DACL from parseDACL() def printparsedDACL(self, parsed_dacl): # Attempts to retrieve the principal's SID if it's a write action if self.principal_SID is None and self.principal_sAMAccountName or self.principal_DN: if self.principal_sAMAccountName is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.principal_sAMAccountName entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(sAMAccountName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(_lookedup_principal), self.base_dn, attributes=['objectSid']) elif self.principal_DN is not None: _lookedup_principal = self.principal_DN entries = search_entries(self.ldap_session, '(distinguishedName=%s)' % escape_filter_chars(_lookedup_principal), self.base_dn, attributes=['objectSid']) try: self.principal_SID = as_sid_string(get_entry_value(entries[0], 'objectSid')) except IndexError: logging.error('Principal not found in LDAP (%s)' % _lookedup_principal) return False logging.debug("Found principal SID to write in ACE(s): %s" % self.principal_SID) logging.info("Printing parsed DACL") i = 0 # If a principal has been specified, only the ACE where he is the trustee will be printed if self.principal_SID is not None: logging.info("Filtering results for SID (%s)" % self.principal_SID) for parsed_ace in parsed_dacl: print_ace = True if self.principal_SID is not None: try: if self.principal_SID not in parsed_ace['Trustee (SID)']: print_ace = False except Exception as e: logging.error("Error filtering ACE, probably because of ACE type unsupported for parsing yet (%s)" % e) if print_ace: logging.info(" %-28s" % "ACE[%d] info" % i) self.printparsedACE(parsed_ace) i += 1 # Prints properly a parsed ACE # - parsed_ace : a parsed ACE from parseACE() def printparsedACE(self, parsed_ace): elements_name = list(parsed_ace.keys()) for attribute in elements_name: logging.info(" %-26s: %s" % (attribute, parsed_ace[attribute])) # Retrieves the GUIDs for the specified rights def build_guids_for_rights(self): _rights_guids = [] if self.rights_guid is not None: _rights_guids = [self.rights_guid] elif self.rights == "WriteMembers": _rights_guids = [RIGHTS_GUID.WriteMembers.value] elif self.rights == "ResetPassword": _rights_guids = [RIGHTS_GUID.ResetPassword.value] elif self.rights == "DCSync": _rights_guids = [RIGHTS_GUID.DS_Replication_Get_Changes.value, RIGHTS_GUID.DS_Replication_Get_Changes_All.value] logging.debug('Built GUID: %s', _rights_guids) return _rights_guids # Attempts to push the locally built DACL to the remote server into the security descriptor of the specified principal # The target principal is specified with its Distinguished Name # - dn : the principal's Distinguished Name to modify # - secDesc : the Security Descriptor with the new DACL to push def modify_secDesc_for_dn(self, dn, secDesc): data = secDesc.getData() logging.debug('Attempts to modify the Security Descriptor.') try: self.ldap_session.modify(dn, {'nTSecurityDescriptor': [(ldap.MODIFY_REPLACE, [data])]}, controls=self.dacl_controls) logging.info('DACL modified successfully!') except ldap.LDAPSessionError as error: log_ldap_error('Could not modify object', error) # Builds a standard ACE for a specified access mask (rights) and a specified SID (the principal who obtains the right) # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/72e7c7ea-bc02-4c74-a619-818a16bf6adb # - access_mask : the allowed access mask # - sid : the principal's SID # - ace_type : the ACE type (allowed or denied) def create_ace(self, access_mask, sid, ace_type): nace = ldaptypes.ACE() if ace_type == "allowed": nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE.ACE_TYPE acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_ACE() else: nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_DENIED_ACE.ACE_TYPE acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_DENIED_ACE() if self.inheritance: nace['AceFlags'] = ldaptypes.ACE.OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE + ldaptypes.ACE.CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE else: nace['AceFlags'] = 0x00 acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK() acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = access_mask acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID() acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid) nace['Ace'] = acedata logging.debug('ACE created.') return nace # Builds an object-specific for a specified ObjectType (an extended right, a property, etc, to add) for a specified SID (the principal who obtains the right) # The Mask is "ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS" (the ObjectType GUID will identify an extended access right) # https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/c79a383c-2b3f-4655-abe7-dcbb7ce0cfbe # - privguid : the ObjectType (an Extended Right here) # - sid : the principal's SID # - ace_type : the ACE type (allowed or denied) def create_object_ace(self, privguid, sid, ace_type, force_mask=None): nace = ldaptypes.ACE() if ace_type == "allowed": nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE() else: nace['AceType'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_TYPE acedata = ldaptypes.ACCESS_DENIED_OBJECT_ACE() if self.inheritance: nace['AceFlags'] = ldaptypes.ACE.OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE + ldaptypes.ACE.CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE else: nace['AceFlags'] = 0x00 acedata['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_MASK() # WriteMembers not an extended right, we need read and write mask on the attribute (https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/openspecs/windows_protocols/ms-dtyp/c79a383c-2b3f-4655-abe7-dcbb7ce0cfbe) # force_mask in the case we give the -rights-guid option if force_mask is not None: acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = force_mask elif privguid == RIGHTS_GUID.WriteMembers.value: acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_READ_PROP + ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_WRITE_PROP # Other rights in this script are extended rights and need the DS_CONTROL_ACCESS mask else: acedata['Mask']['Mask'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ADS_RIGHT_DS_CONTROL_ACCESS acedata['ObjectType'] = string_to_bin(privguid) acedata['InheritedObjectType'] = b'' acedata['Sid'] = ldaptypes.LDAP_SID() acedata['Sid'].fromCanonical(sid) assert sid == acedata['Sid'].formatCanonical() # This ACE flag verifes if the ObjectType is valid acedata['Flags'] = ldaptypes.ACCESS_ALLOWED_OBJECT_ACE.ACE_OBJECT_TYPE_PRESENT nace['Ace'] = acedata logging.debug('Object-specific ACE created.') return nace def parse_args(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(add_help=True, description='Python editor for a principal\'s DACL.') parser.add_argument('identity', action='store', help='domain.local/username[:password]') parser.add_argument('-ldaps', '-use-ldaps', dest='ldaps', action='store_true', help='Use LDAPS instead of LDAP') parser.add_argument('-ts', action='store_true', help='Adds timestamp to every logging output') parser.add_argument('-debug', action='store_true', help='Turn DEBUG output ON') auth_con = parser.add_argument_group('authentication & connection') auth_con.add_argument('-hashes', action="store", metavar="LMHASH:NTHASH", help='NTLM hashes, format is LMHASH:NTHASH') auth_con.add_argument('-no-pass', action="store_true", help='don\'t ask for password (useful for -k)') auth_con.add_argument('-k', action="store_true", help='Use Kerberos authentication. Grabs credentials from ccache file (KRB5CCNAME) based on target parameters. If valid credentials cannot be found, it will use the ones specified in the command line') auth_con.add_argument('-aesKey', action="store", metavar="hex key", help='AES key to use for Kerberos Authentication (128 or 256 bits)') auth_con.add_argument('-dc-ip', action='store', metavar="ip address", help='IP Address of the domain controller or KDC (Key Distribution Center) for Kerberos. If omitted it will use the domain part (FQDN) specified in the identity parameter') auth_con.add_argument('-dc-host', action='store', metavar="hostname", help='Hostname of the domain controller or KDC (Key Distribution Center) for Kerberos. If omitted, -dc-ip will be used') principal_parser = parser.add_argument_group("principal", description="Object, controlled by the attacker, to reference in the ACE to create or to filter when printing a DACL") principal_parser.add_argument("-principal", dest="principal_sAMAccountName", metavar="NAME", type=str, required=False, help="sAMAccountName") principal_parser.add_argument("-principal-sid", dest="principal_SID", metavar="SID", type=str, required=False, help="Security IDentifier") principal_parser.add_argument("-principal-dn", dest="principal_DN", metavar="DN", type=str, required=False, help="Distinguished Name") target_parser = parser.add_argument_group("target", description="Principal object to read/edit the DACL of") target_parser.add_argument("-target", dest="target_sAMAccountName", metavar="NAME", type=str, required=False, help="sAMAccountName") target_parser.add_argument("-target-sid", dest="target_SID", metavar="SID", type=str, required=False, help="Security IDentifier") target_parser.add_argument("-target-dn", dest="target_DN", metavar="DN", type=str, required=False, help="Distinguished Name") dacl_parser = parser.add_argument_group("dacl editor") dacl_parser.add_argument('-action', choices=['read', 'write', 'remove', 'backup', 'restore'], nargs='?', default='read', help='Action to operate on the DACL') dacl_parser.add_argument('-file', dest="filename", type=str, help='Filename/path (optional for -action backup, required for -restore))') dacl_parser.add_argument('-ace-type', choices=['allowed', 'denied'], nargs='?', default='allowed', help='The ACE Type (access allowed or denied) that must be added or removed (default: allowed)') dacl_parser.add_argument('-rights', choices=['FullControl', 'ResetPassword', 'WriteMembers', 'DCSync', 'Custom'], nargs='?', default='FullControl', help='Rights to write/remove in the target DACL (default: FullControl)') dacl_parser.add_argument('-rights-guid', type=str, help='Manual GUID representing the right to write/remove') dacl_parser.add_argument('-mask', nargs='?', default=None, help='Force access mask, possible values: readwrite, write, self, allext, 0xXXXXX. Useful with -rights Custom or --rights-guid where the mask is different of read+write.') dacl_parser.add_argument('-inheritance', action="store_true", help='Enable the inheritance in the ACE flag with CONTAINER_INHERIT_ACE and OBJECT_INHERIT_ACE. Useful when target is a Container or an OU, ' 'ACE will be inherited by objects within the container/OU (except objects with adminCount=1)') if len(sys.argv) == 1: parser.print_help() sys.exit(1) return parser.parse_args() def main(): print(version.BANNER) args = parse_args() logger.init(args.ts, args.debug) if args.action == 'write' and args.principal_sAMAccountName is None and args.principal_SID is None and args.principal_DN is None: logging.critical('-principal, -principal-sid, or -principal-dn should be specified when using -action write') sys.exit(1) if args.action == "restore" and not args.filename: logging.critical('-file is required when using -action restore') domain, username, password, lmhash, nthash, args.k = parse_identity(args.identity, args.hashes, args.no_pass, args.aesKey, args.k) try: base_dn = ','.join('dc=%s' % part for part in domain.split('.')) target = args.dc_host if args.dc_host is not None else domain ldap_session = ldap_login(target, base_dn, args.dc_ip, args.dc_host, args.k, username, password, domain, lmhash, nthash, args.aesKey, ldaps_flag=args.ldaps) dacledit = DACLedit(ldap_session, base_dn, args) if args.action == 'read': dacledit.read() elif args.action == 'write': dacledit.write() elif args.action == 'remove': dacledit.remove() elif args.action == 'flush': dacledit.flush() elif args.action == 'backup': dacledit.backup() elif args.action == 'restore': dacledit.restore() except Exception as e: if logging.getLogger().level == logging.DEBUG: traceback.print_exc() logging.error(str(e)) if __name__ == '__main__': main()