# gecko-mcp [![CI](https://github.com/Frumane/gecko-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/Frumane/gecko-mcp/actions/workflows/ci.yml) [![License: MIT](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-MIT-yellow.svg)](LICENSE) > An **MCP (Model Context Protocol)** server that lets AI assistants — Claude Code, > Claude Desktop, Cursor, and any MCP client — **read pages, take screenshots and > manage tabs** in [Floorp](https://floorp.app) **and other Firefox-based browsers** > (LibreWolf, Waterfox, Zen, Mullvad, Firefox…), using your real, logged-in session. Think "Claude in Chrome", but for the whole Firefox/Gecko family. ![Claude driving Floorp via gecko-mcp — opening the GitHub repo and the npm page from a natural-language prompt](docs/demo.gif) **Get started in ~30 seconds:** ```bash npx gecko-mcp setup ``` Registers gecko-mcp with **Claude Code, Claude Desktop, Cursor, VS Code (Copilot), Windsurf, Zed, Codex** and more — per-project or global. See [Setup](#setup) for manual config and [Requirements](#requirements) for the one-time browser step. > **Cautious about installing this?** Good — you should be. It's small (2 deps, all > in [`src/`](src)), the OS keyboard/mouse is **locked by default** (browser-only > until you opt in), releases ship with **npm provenance** (verifiable against this > source), and the full threat model is in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). Read it > before you run `npx gecko-mcp`. ## How it works gecko-mcp talks to the browser through one of two backends, picked automatically: - **Floorp** ships a built-in automation HTTP API. Set `floorp.mcp.enabled = true` in `about:config` and gecko-mcp uses the fast `http://127.0.0.1:58261` API — no extension, richest feature set. - **Any other Gecko browser** — launch it with **Marionette** (the automation engine built into every Firefox fork) and gecko-mcp drives your live session over it. Same tools, same real session. ``` Claude Code / Desktop / Cursor │ MCP (stdio) ▼ gecko-mcp ──► Floorp :58261 (built-in API) ─┐ (this project) ──► Marionette :2828 (any Gecko fork) ─┴─► your real tabs ``` ## Requirements - A **Firefox-based browser** installed and running, with automation enabled: - **Floorp:** set **`floorp.mcp.enabled`** to `true` in `about:config`, restart Floorp. - **Other forks (LibreWolf / Waterfox / Zen / Mullvad / Firefox):** launch the browser with **`-marionette`** (see [Browser support](#browser-support)). - **Node.js** ≥ 18. ## Setup ### Quick start — the setup wizard ```bash npx gecko-mcp setup ``` An interactive wizard registers gecko-mcp with the AI coding tool(s) of your choice — **Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code (Copilot), Gemini CLI, Codex, Zed, Cline** (and a copy-paste snippet for **Kimi Code, Antigravity**, or any other MCP client) — and lets you install it **for the current project** or **globally (all repos)**. It merges into existing config (and backs it up first). Non-interactive / scriptable: ```bash npx gecko-mcp setup --list # show supported tools npx gecko-mcp setup --tool claude-code,cursor --scope global npx gecko-mcp setup --tool codex --scope global --print # dry run ``` ### Manual Any MCP client works with this server block (no clone/build needed — `npx` fetches it): ```json { "mcpServers": { "gecko": { "command": "npx", "args": ["-y", "gecko-mcp"] } } } ``` Or with Claude Code's CLI: `claude mcp add gecko -s user -- npx -y gecko-mcp`. > **One-time Floorp step:** set `floorp.mcp.enabled = true` in `about:config` and > restart Floorp so its automation API is available. ## Browser support gecko-mcp picks its backend automatically: if Floorp's `:58261` API is reachable it uses that; otherwise it connects to **Marionette**, the automation engine built into every Gecko browser. To use a non-Floorp browser, launch it once with Marionette enabled: | Browser | Launch with Marionette | |---|---| | **Floorp** | *(no flag — just set `floorp.mcp.enabled=true`; uses the native API)* | | **Firefox** | `firefox -marionette` | | **LibreWolf** | `librewolf -marionette` | | **Waterfox** | `waterfox -marionette` | | **Zen** | `zen -marionette` | | **Mullvad** | `mullvad-browser -marionette` | Marionette listens on TCP **2828** by default. To use another port, set the `marionette.port` pref in the profile (e.g. via `user.js`) and start gecko-mcp with a matching `MARIONETTE_PORT`. Force a backend with `GECKO_MCP_BACKEND=marionette`. > **Note:** Marionette must be enabled *at launch* to attach to your live session. > On the Marionette backend, Floorp-only extras (`snapshot` fingerprints, > `list_workspaces`/`switch_workspace`, accessibility tree) return a clear > "not supported" message — use `find` / `read_page` instead. Everything else > (tabs, navigation, click, type, forms, screenshots, cookies, real OS input…) works. ## Tools **Tabs & reading** | Tool | What it does | |------|--------------| | `list_tabs` | List all open tabs (title, URL, browserId, active, pinned). | | `open_tab` | Open a new tab at a URL; **returns the new tab's `browserId`** so you can target it. | | `get_active_tab` | Return the active tab's title, URL and browserId. | | `navigate_tab` | Navigate an existing tab to a URL. | | `close_tab` | Close a tab. | | `read_page` | Read a tab's content as clean Markdown (or HTML / accessibility tree). Output is capped (default 25 KB) to protect the context. | | `find` | **Fast element locator** — search a page server-side by visible text and/or tag; returns a compact list of ready-to-use CSS `selector`s (~1 KB) instead of the whole HTML. Use it to find a button/link/field, then act on the selector. | | `snapshot` | Structured page map: Markdown with inline `fp:` refs + an element selector map — locate elements without grepping HTML, then act via a `ref`. | | `screenshot` | Capture a screenshot of a tab (viewport or full page). | | `launch_floorp` | Ensure Floorp is running — launches it if the API isn't reachable (Windows). | | `launch` | Start any Firefox-based browser (Firefox, LibreWolf, Zen…) with Marionette enabled so gecko-mcp can drive it. | **Interaction** | Tool | What it does | |------|--------------| | `click` | Click an element by CSS selector **or a `ref` from `snapshot`**; auto-scrolls it into view first. | | `type_text` | Type into an input/textarea — or a rich/contenteditable editor (Slate, ProseMirror…) — by CSS selector. | | `fill_form` | Fill multiple fields at once. | | `press_key` | Press a keyboard key (Enter, Tab, …). | | `wait_for_element` | Wait for an element to attach / become visible / etc. | | `get_value` | **Sensitive.** Read the current value of an input/textarea/select (can read password fields). | Most tools target the **active tab** by default; pass a `browserId` (from `list_tabs`) to target a specific tab. ### OS keyboard & mouse — **locked by default** 🔒 The tools below can affect things *outside* the browser, so they are **disabled until you turn them on**. With nothing set, gecko-mcp does browser automation only. Unlock them per-session by just asking ("**enable OS input**", which calls the `enable_os_input` tool), or persistently with `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_OS_INPUT=1`. Lock again with `disable_os_input`. While locked, these tools refuse with a clear message. The **`evaluate`** tool (run arbitrary page JavaScript) is locked the same way — unlock with `enable_evaluate` or `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_EVALUATE=1`. | Tool | What it does | |------|--------------| | `enable_os_input` / `disable_os_input` | Unlock / re-lock the OS keyboard & mouse tools for this session. | | `enable_evaluate` / `disable_evaluate` | Unlock / re-lock the `evaluate` (run page JS) tool for this session. | | `evaluate` | **Locked.** Run JavaScript in the page and return its value (`return …`). | **Real OS keyboard (Windows)** — for React/rich editors and bot-guarded submits that ignore synthetic input: | Tool | What it does | |------|--------------| | `real_type` | Type into the focused element via **genuine OS key events** (`isTrusted`). | | `real_key` | Press a real key/combo, e.g. `"Enter"`, `"ctrl+a"`. | | `real_clear` | Real Ctrl+A + Delete — reliably clears a rich/contenteditable field. | These produce input a page can't distinguish from a human's, so they drive React/Slate editors and submit composers that synthetic clicks/typing can't. Workflow: `click` the field to focus it → `real_clear` / `real_type` / `real_key "Enter"`. > **Safety guard:** OS keystrokes go to the foreground window, so before sending > anything these tools bring Floorp to the foreground and **verify** it — if Floorp > isn't running or can't be focused, they **abort without typing a single key**, so > input can never leak into another app. **Real OS mouse (Windows)** — genuine `isTrusted` clicks at screen coordinates: | Tool | What it does | |------|--------------| | `window_bounds` | Floorp's window rectangle in screen pixels (to compute targets). | | `move_cursor` | Move the real OS cursor to a screen pixel inside Floorp. | | `real_click` | Real OS click (left/right, single/double) at a screen pixel inside Floorp. | > **Double guard:** the click is sent only when Floorp is verified foreground **and** > the point lies **inside Floorp's window rect** — a stray coordinate is refused, so > a click can never land in another app/window. Coordinates are screen pixels > (note display scaling/DPI when mapping from a screenshot). **More interaction & queries** | Tool | What it does | |------|--------------| | `hover` / `double_click` / `right_click` | Mouse gestures on an element (selector or `ref`). | | `select_option` | Choose an option in a `` by absolute path — restrict with `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_UPLOAD_DIRS`. | | `get_attribute` | Read an element attribute (href, value, …). | | `get_article` | Readability-extracted main article as Markdown. | | `get_cookies` | **Sensitive.** Cookies visible to the page — values redacted unless `includeValues: true`. | | `wait_for_network_idle` | Wait for network activity to settle. | | `list_workspaces` / `switch_workspace` | Floorp workspaces (where supported). | ## Security Understand the threat model before enabling this. Two risks dominate: 1. **Floorp's automation API has no authentication by default.** While `floorp.mcp.enabled` is on, **any local process** can drive your logged-in browser via `127.0.0.1:58261` — not just this server. There is also no Origin check, so hostile web pages may attempt CSRF/DNS-rebinding tricks against it. Mitigations: - Turn `floorp.mcp.enabled` **off** when you're not using automation. - Set the `GECKO_MCP_TOKEN` environment variable — this server then sends it as a `Bearer` token on every request (effective on Floorp builds that enforce a token; harmless otherwise). 2. **Prompt injection ("lethal trifecta").** The assistant reads untrusted page content *and* can act on your authenticated sessions (click, type, submit, navigate, real OS input). A malicious page could try to instruct the assistant to act against you. Treat everything read from a page as untrusted; don't run automation unattended on sites you don't trust. Hardening built into this server: - **OS keyboard/mouse is locked by default (least privilege):** the only tools that can act outside the browser refuse to run until you explicitly unlock them (`enable_os_input` tool, or `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_OS_INPUT=1`). By default gecko-mcp can only automate the browser, never your wider machine. - **Real OS input is double-guarded:** keys/clicks are sent only after verifying Floorp is the foreground window, and mouse clicks must land inside Floorp's window rectangle — otherwise it aborts *without* sending anything. PowerShell payloads are passed base64-encoded via process-private environment variables (no shell interpolation, no temp script files on disk). - **URL scheme + host allowlist:** `open_tab`/`navigate_tab` accept only `http(s)` (and `about:blank`) by default, and **refuse loopback/private hosts** (`127.0.0.1`, `localhost`, `10/8`, `172.16/12`, `192.168/16`, `169.254/16`, IPv6 ULA/link-local). This stops a prompt-injected agent from pivoting the browser onto Floorp's own API or your LAN and reading the response back. Lift with `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_PRIVILEGED_URLS=1`. Optionally pin navigation to a domain allowlist with `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_DOMAINS`. - **Cookie values are redacted by default** in `get_cookies`; raw values require an explicit `includeValues: true`. - **`get_value` can read secrets:** browsers let same-origin JS read password fields, so this tool *can* return a typed password. It's flagged SENSITIVE — use it only on fields the user asked about, never to harvest credentials. - **Upload allowlist:** set `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_UPLOAD_DIRS` (`;`-separated directories) to confine `upload_file`. Paths are canonicalised with realpath (symlinks resolved) and checked so `..`, a symlink, a same-prefix sibling directory, or a UNC path can't escape the allowed folders. - **`find` skips hidden elements** (inline `display:none`/`visibility:hidden`, `hidden`, `type=hidden`, `aria-hidden`) so a page can't lure the agent into clicking an invisible button via text search. - **Input bounds:** numeric/text tool parameters are range- and length-capped (coordinates, timeouts, `maxChars`, `find` limit, typed text, form fields) to prevent resource-exhaustion / crash inputs. - **Truncated API errors & validated port:** Floorp error bodies are truncated before reaching the model; `GECKO_MCP_PORT` is validated as 1–65535. - **Tool annotations for human-in-the-loop:** every tool carries MCP hints (`readOnlyHint`/`destructiveHint`/…) so your client can auto-run read-only tools and confirm destructive ones (`close_tab`, `navigate_tab`, `submit_form`, `upload_file`). A server can't show prompts itself — approval is the client's job — so this is how gecko-mcp tells the client what's safe vs consequential. - **No `evaluate` tool:** arbitrary page-JS execution is deliberately not exposed. What is **not** defended (inherent / Floorp-side): a malicious *local* process can still read or impersonate the unauthenticated loopback API (plaintext, no TLS), and prompt injection from a page you choose to automate can still drive legitimate actions on that page. Disable `floorp.mcp.enabled` when idle and don't automate untrusted sites unattended. | Environment variable | Effect | |---|---| | `GECKO_MCP_TOKEN` | Sent as `Authorization: Bearer …` to the Floorp API. | | `GECKO_MCP_PORT` | API port (default `58261`, validated 1–65535). | | `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_PRIVILEGED_URLS` | `1` allows non-http(s) URLs **and** loopback/private hosts in open/navigate. | | `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_DOMAINS` | Comma-separated domain allowlist for navigation (subdomains included). Unset = any public host. | | `GECKO_MCP_ALLOW_UPLOAD_DIRS` | Restrict `upload_file` to these directories (`;`-separated). | | `FLOORP_PATH` | Full path to `floorp.exe` for `launch_floorp`. | | `GECKO_MCP_BACKEND` | Force the backend: `floorp` or `marionette`. Default: auto-detect. | | `MARIONETTE_PORT` | Marionette TCP port for non-Floorp browsers (default `2828`). | | `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_OS_INPUT` | `1` unlocks the OS keyboard/mouse tools at startup (otherwise locked until the `enable_os_input` tool is called). | | `GECKO_MCP_ENABLE_EVALUATE` | `1` unlocks the `evaluate` (run page JS) tool at startup (otherwise locked until `enable_evaluate`). | | `GECKO_MCP_BROWSER_PROCESS` | Process-name regex the real OS keyboard/mouse may target (default covers the common Gecko forks). | > The legacy `FLOORP_MCP_*` variable names still work as fallbacks (from before the > rename), so existing configs keep working — prefer `GECKO_MCP_*` going forward. ## Performance - **HTTP tool calls are cheap** — a full attach → act → detach round-trip against Floorp's local API is ~5–6 ms. `find` searches the page server-side and returns ~1 KB of ready-to-use selectors instead of dumping the whole HTML, and `read_page` is capped (default 25 KB) so a page read can't flood the context. - **Real OS input uses a persistent PowerShell host.** Spawning `powershell.exe` (~700 ms) and compiling the P/Invoke helper (~600 ms) used to happen on *every* `real_*`/`move_cursor`/`window_bounds` call (~1.9 s each). Now one host is started lazily, compiles once, and runs a read-eval loop — so the first call pays ~1.6 s but every call after is **~350 ms** for a guarded key/click (~5× faster) and a few ms for a window-bounds query. The foreground/bounds safety guards still run on every command; the host is recycled if it hangs or dies. ## Notes & limitations Learned from driving real apps (incl. Google Flow): - **Rich editors:** `type_text` handles plain inputs *and* contenteditable editors (Slate, ProseMirror, Lexical) — it falls back to dispatching a real text-input event when an element has no `.value`. Reliably *clearing* such editors isn't solved yet (no `select-all`/`evaluate`). - **Submitting React composers:** many chat/prompt composers submit on a real **Enter keydown**, not on a synthetic click of the send button. Prefer `press_key` `"Enter"` over `click` for those. - **Trusted events:** you cannot forge `isTrusted=true` from page JavaScript — it is a browser security invariant. Floorp injects input at a privileged layer, so ordinary clicks/keys behave like real ones; but flows guarded by reCAPTCHA or strict bot-detection may still refuse automated submission. - **`evaluate`:** the page-JS eval endpoint returns HTTP 404 on some Floorp builds, so it is not exposed as a tool here. - **Multiple windows:** when more than one window is open, the "active tab" is ambiguous (each window has its own active tab). Prefer the `browserId` returned by `open_tab`, or one from `list_tabs`, and pass it explicitly to every tool. ## Roadmap - [x] Tab management, page reading, screenshots - [x] Interaction tools: click, type, fill forms, key presses, read field values - [x] Real OS keyboard (Windows): `real_type` / `real_key` / `real_clear`, with a foreground safety guard — drives React/Slate editors & bot-guarded submits - [x] `snapshot` (fingerprint refs + selector map) + `click` by `ref` + auto-scroll-into-view - [x] `launch_floorp` — start Floorp if not running (Windows) - [x] Extra tools: hover, double/right-click, select_option, set_checked, submit, upload_file, get_attribute, get_article, get_cookies, wait_for_network_idle, workspaces - [x] Real OS mouse (Windows): `window_bounds` / `move_cursor` / `real_click`, with a foreground + in-window-bounds double guard - [x] **Marionette backend — all Firefox-based browsers** (LibreWolf, Waterfox, Zen, Mullvad, Firefox…), auto-selected when Floorp's API isn't present - [ ] macOS / Linux native-input backends - [ ] JS `evaluate` (available in newer Floorp builds; older ones return HTTP 404) - [ ] Optional bearer-token auth - [ ] `launch` helper for non-Floorp browsers (start them with `-marionette`) ## Acknowledgements Built against the automation API exposed by Floorp. The official [`Floorp-Projects/floorp-mcp-server`](https://github.com/Floorp-Projects/floorp-mcp-server) was a useful reference for mapping the endpoint surface. This is an independent, clean-room MIT-licensed implementation. ## License [MIT](./LICENSE) © Frumane