page,line,text
1,1,U.S. Department of Justice
1,2,"AttarAe:,c\\'erlc Predtiet // Mtt; CeA1:ttiA"
1,3,Ma1:ertalPrn1:eetedUAder Fed. R. Crhtt. P. 6(e)
1,4,Report On The Investigation Into
1,5,Russian InterferenceIn The
1,6,2016 PresidentialElection
1,7,Volume I of II
1,8,"Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III"
1,9,Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c)
1,10,"Washington, D.C."
1,11,March 2019
1,12,NA
2,1,U.S. Department of Justice
2,2,Atl6rney W6rk Pr6d1:1et// May C6ntain MEtterial Pr6teeted Under Fed . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
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3,1,U.S. Department of Justice
3,2,"At:t:ef'fle)'Werle Predttet /,' Ma;· CeHtail'lMaterial Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
3,3,TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME I
3,4,INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME I ......... .......................................................            ............ .............................. 1
3,5,"EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME                 1................................................. ,............................................. 4"
3,6,"I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION .....................................................                       .. ..................    ,....... 11"
3,7,"II. RUSSIAN ""ACTIVE MEASURES"" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN ............................................                                           ... ...... 14"
3,8,A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency ...................................... ........................... 15
3,9,B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin .................................. ... ............ 16
3,10,C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections .............. ....................................................................                         19
3,11,"1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014 ............. .......... , .............. 19"
3,12,2. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts ........ ......... .... 22
3,13,3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook. .....................................................................                               24
3,14,4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter ................. ....... ............ .....................................                          26
3,15,a. Individualized Accounts ............................... ....... ................ ................ ............. 26
3,16,b. IRA Botnet Activities .................................. ......... ............... .............. .......... .... 28
3,17,5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies ............... ...... ....... ................. ........... .. 29
3,18,6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons .................. ............ .......................... .. 31
3,19,7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign ...........................................                                         33
3,20,a. Trump Campaign Promotion ofIRA Politica l Materials ........... ...................... 33
3,21,b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies ................. 35
3,22,Ill. RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS ..................................................                                 ...... .............   36
3,23,A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign ................. .......... ............... ............. 36
3,24,1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign .................. .................... ....................... 36
3,25,2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks ................... ................... ...... ......... 38
3,26,a. Initial Access .................................... ....... ......... ..... .......................... ......... ........ 3 8
3,27,b. Implantation ofMalware on DCCC and DNC Networks ................................ 38
3,28,c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks .................................... 40
3,29,B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials ................. ......... ......................... ....... ............ 41
3,30,I. DCL ea ks ........ ............................. ................................. .................. .................. ..... 41
3,31,2 . Guccifer 2.0 ............ .............. .................. ............. ..................................................         42
3,32,3. Use of WikiLeaks ......... ........... ..... ......... :......... ...................... ............................... 44
3,33,a. WikiLeaks 's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign ............... 44
3,34,b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks ........................... 45
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4,2,"MterHey Werk Pretittet // Ma,· Cel'ltail'IMaterial Preteeteti UH:tierFee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
4,3,c. The GRU ' s Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks ........... ....................... 45
4,4,d. · WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen
4,5,Materials ......................................... ................ ......................................... ...... 48
4,6,C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations .............................................................................                  49
4,7,l. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims ............ 49
4,8,2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U .S. Elections ................................... 50
4,9,D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials .................................. 51
4,10,l.                          ...................................................................................... ........ 51
4,11,a. Background ..................... .............................................. .......... ......................... 51
4,12,b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks ................................................ 52
4,13,C.  Harm to Ongoing Matter                                                                            .................... 54
4,14,"d. WikiLeaks ' s October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails ................ .... 58"
4,15,e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks ................................................ 59
4,16,2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials ............. ............ 61
4,17,a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg) ................................................ .... 61
4,18,b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails .............................. ........ 62
4,19,IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN ................ 66
4,20,"A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016) ......................................... 66"
4,21,1. Trump Tower Moscow Project .................................. ........................... ............ .... 67
4,22,a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013 -2014) ............ 67
4,23,b. Communications with LC . Expert Investment Company and Giorgi
4,24,Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015) ............................................................                       69
4,25,c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-
4,26,January 2016) ................................................................................................        70
4,27,i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization .... 70
4,28,ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia ......................................... 72
4,29,d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump
4,30,(December 2015-June 2016) ........................ .............. ............. ...................... 76
4,31,i. Sater ' s Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia ........................................ 76
4,32,ii. Candidate Trump's Opportuniti es to Travel to Russia ............................ 78
4,33,2. George Papadopoulos .......................................... ...................................... ........... 80
4,34,a. Origins of Campaign Work .............. ................................................................ 81
4,35,b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts ........ ............................... ................................. 82
4,36,c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting ......................................................... 85
4,37,ii
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5,1,U.S. Department of Justice
5,2,Wet'k Pt'etlttet /I Ma:y CeHtttiHMat:ef'ittlPreteetetl UHtler Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
5,3,At-1:effley
5,4,"d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Russia Has ""Dirt"" in the Form of"
5,5,Clinton Emails ............. ....... ............................ ........... ............ ........... ............. 86
5,6,e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign .................................... 89
5,7,"f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of ""Dirt"" ...........................................................                                93"
5,8,g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact.. .................... ......... ........................ 94
5,9,3. Carter Page ........................................ ........ ...... ................... ................................... 9 5
5,10,a. Background ......................................................................................................             96
5,11,b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work .............................................................                              97
5,12,c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow ..................................................... ... 98
5,13,d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign ............................ . 102
5,14,4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest ...................................... 103
5,15,a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign ................... ...... 103
5,16,b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
5,17,........... ..................................... ..... ............................................ ................... . 105
5,18,c. Jeff Sessions's Post -Speech Interactions with CNI ....................................... 107
5,19,d. Jared Kushner' s Continuing Contacts with Simes ......................................... 108
5,20,"5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower ........... .................... ...... ,......................... 110"
5,21,a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting .......................................................................                        110
5,22,i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr ..................................................................                          110
5,23,ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign ........................ ........... 114
5,24,"b. TheEventsofJune9                   , 2016 ............................ .................... ................. ........... 116"
5,25,i. Arrangements for the Meeting ................................................................                           116
5,26,ii. Conduct of the Meeting ............... ................................... ........................ 117
5,27,c. Post-June 9 Events ................................................................. ........................ 120
5,28,6. Events at the Republican National Convention ..................................................                                  123
5,29,a.  Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D.
5,30,Gordon the Week of the RNC .....................................................................                           123
5,31,b. Change to Republican Party Platform ............................................................                             124
5,32,7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak ................................ :.............. .............. 127
5,33,a.    Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the
5,34,Ambassador's Residence ........................... ................ ......................... ......... 127
5,35,b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak ...... 127
5,36,8. Paul Manafort .............. .................... ........................................................... ......... 129
5,37,a. Paul Manafort' s Ties to Russia and Ukraine ..................................................                               131
5,38,lll
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6,3,1.   Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work .........................................................                       131
6,4,11.  Political Consulting Work .....................................................................                132
6,5,iii. Konstantin Kilimnik ........................ ..................................................... . 132
6,6,b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign .............. 134
6,7,i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign .........................................................                       134
6,8,ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period Contacts .............................. ............ 135
6,9,iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin
6,10,Kilimnik in the United States .............................. .................................. 138
6,11,c. Post-Resignation Activities ............................................................................              141
6,12,B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts ..........................................................                       144
6,13,1. Immediate Post-Election Activity .......................................................................                  144
6,14,a. Outreach from the Russian Government.. ...................................................                        ... 145
6,15,b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels ....... 146
6,16,2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration ...... 147
6,17,a. Background .................... ................ ........................................ ........................ 147
6,18,b.  Kirill Dmitriev's            Post-Election              Contacts With the Incoming
6,19,Administration .............. ............... .......................................... .......... ............ 149
6,20,c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles ................................ 151
6,21,i.    George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with
6,22,Dmitriev ..... ............................................. ................................ ............... 151
6,23,11.  The Seychelles Meetings .............. ........................................... ............... 153
6,24,iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip .... 155
6,25,d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding
6,26,U .S.-Russia Relations ...................... ............................................................          156
6,27,3. Ambassador Kislyak's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn in
6,28,Trump Tower Following the Election .................................................................                     159
6,29,4. Jared Kushner' s Meeting with Sergey Gorkov ...................................... ............. 161
6,30,5. Petr A ven' s Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team ........................................                            163
6,31,6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich ............. 166
6,32,7. Contacts With and Through Michael T. Flynn ....... .................... ................ ........ 167
6,33,a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements .............................. ...... ............... 167
6,34,b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia ............ ....................... .................................... 168
6,35,V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS ........................................................................                      174
6,36,"A. Russian ""Active Measures"" Social Media Campaign ..................... .......................... 174"
6,37,IV
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7,1,U.S. Department of Justice
7,2,AtterAe~ \\' erk Prea1::1et// Mft) CeHtttil'l Material Preteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
7,3,1                         1
7,4,B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations ......................... ................ ..................... 175
7,5,1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy ....................................................                                                       175
7,6,a. Background .................. .......................... ......... ...............................................                                175
7,7,b. Charging Decision As to                                                                                                                   ....... 176
7,8,2. Potential Section 1030 Violation By                                                                              .............................. 179
7,9,C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts ......... ............... ..................................... 180
7,10,1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion .............. ............................... 180
7,11,2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S.C. § 951). 181
7,12,a. Governing Law ...............................................................................................                                     181
7,13,b. Application .....................................................................................................                                 182
7,14,3. Campaign Finance .................... ........................ .................................. ................ 183
7,15,a. Overview Of Governing Law ............................................. .......................... .. 184
7,16,b . Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting ....... ........ ............ ..................... 185
7,17,i. Thing-of -Value Element .......... ....................................................... ........ 186
7,18,ii. Willfuln ess .................................... ............................... ....................... ... 187
7,19,iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information .............................. ........ 188
7,20,c. Application to WikiLeaks
7,21,1.
7,22,.................... ........................... ........................ 189
7,23,ii. Willfulness ............................................. .................... ........... ................. 190
7,24,iii. Constitutional Considerations ............................................ .................... 190
7,25,iv. Analysis                                    .............................................. ................. ..... 190
7,26,4. False Statem ents and Obstruction of the Investigation .............. .............. ........... 191
7,27,a. Overview Of Governing Law ............. ......................................... ......... .......... 191
7,28,b. Application to Certain Individuals .............................................. ............... .... 192
7,29,i. George Papadopoulos ....................... .................................... ................... 192
7,30,11.                                ...........     ... ... ... ...........................................                  . .. . ......... . 194
7,31,111. Michael Flynn ..............................................................................                                   ......... 194
7,32,iv . Michael Cohen .......................... ......... .................. ................................. 195
7,33,V.                                ................... ................................... .................. ...... 196
7,34,vi. Jeff Sessions ....................... .............. ......................................................                                197
7,35,vii. Other s Interviewed During the Investigation ........................ ............... 198
7,36,V
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9,3,INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME          I
9,4,"This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which"
9,5,"states that , ""[a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel ' s work, he ... shall provide the Attorney"
9,6,General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special
9,7,"Counsel] reached."""
9,8,The Russian government interfered in the 2016 presidential election in sweeping and
9,9,systematic fashion. Evidence of Russian government operations began to surface in mid-2016. In
9,10,"June, the Democratic National Committee and its cyber response team publicly announced that"
9,11,Russian hackers had compromised its computer network. Releases of hacked materials-hacks
9,12,that public reporting soon attributed to the Russian government-began                that same month.
9,13,"Additional releases followed in July through the organization WikiLeaks, with further releases in"
9,14,October and November.
9,15,"In late July 2016, soon after WikiLeaks's first release of stolen documents, a foreign"
9,16,government contacted the FBI about a May 2016 encounter with Trump Campaign foreign policy
9,17,advisor George Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos had suggested to a representative of that foreign
9,18,government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that
9,19,it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information damaging to
9,20,Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. That information prompted the FBI on July
9,21,"31, 2016, to open an investigation into whether individuals associated with the Trump Campaign"
9,22,were coordinating with the Russian government in its interference activities.
9,23,"That fall, two federal agencies jointly announced that the Russian government ""directed"
9,24,"recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions, including US political"
9,25,"organizations,"" and , "" [t]hese thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election"
9,26,"process."" After the election, in late December 2016, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia"
9,27,"for having interfered in the election. By early 2017, several congressional committees were"
9,28,examining Russia's interference in the election.
9,29,"Within the Executive Branch, these investigatory efforts ultimately led to the May 2017"
9,30,"appointment of Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III. The order appointing the Special Counsel"
9,31,"authorized him to investigate ""the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016"
9,32,"presidential election ,"" including any links or coordination between the Russian government and"
9,33,individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
9,34,"As set forth in detail in this report, the Special Counsel's investigation established that"
9,35,"Russia interfere~ in the 2016 presidential election principally through two operations. First, a"
9,36,Russian entity carried out a social media campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J.
9,37,"Trump and disparaged presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. Second , a Russian intelligence"
9,38,"service conducted computer-intrusion operations against entities, employees, and volunteers"
9,39,working on the Clinton Campaign and then released stolen documents. The investigation also
9,40,identified numerous links between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign. Although
9,41,the investigation established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump
9,42,"presidency and worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit"
9,43,NA
10,1,U.S. Department of Justice
10,2,Atterttey Werk Predttet // Ma~· Cetttaitt Material Prnteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
10,3,"electorally from information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not"
10,4,establish that members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian
10,5,government in its election interference activities.
10,6,* * *
10,7,Below we describe the evidentiary considerations underpinning statements about the
10,8,"results of our investigation and the Special Counsel's charging decisions, and we then provide an"
10,9,overview of the two volumes of our report.
10,10,The report describes actions and events that the Special Counsel's Office found to be
10,11,"supp01ted by the evidence collected in our investigation. In some instances, the report points out"
10,12,the absence of evidence or conflicts in the evidence about a particular fact or event. In other
10,13,"instances, when substantial, credible evidence enabled the Office to reach a conclusion with"
10,14,"confidence, the report states that the investigation established that certain actions or events"
10,15,occurred. A statement that the investigation did not establish particular facts does not mean there
10,16,was no evidence of those facts.
10,17,In evaluating whether evidence about collective action of multiple individuals constituted
10,18,"a crime, we applied the framework of conspiracy law, not the concept of ""collusion."" In so doing,"
10,19,"the Office recognized that the word ""collud[ e]"" was used in communications with the Acting"
10,20,Attorney General confirming certain aspects of the investigation's scope and that the term has
10,21,frequently been invoked in public reporting about the investigation. But collusion is not a specific
10,22,"offense or theory of liability found in the United States Code, nor is it a term of art in federal"
10,23,"criminal law. For those reasons , the Office's focus in analyzing questions of joint criminal liability"
10,24,"was on conspiracy as defined in federal law. In connection with that analysis, we addressed the"
10,25,"factual question whether members of the Trump Campaign ""coordinat[ ed]""-a term that appears"
10,26,"in the appointment order-with         Russian election interference activities.       Like collusion,"
10,27,"""coordination"" does not have a settled definition in federal criminal law. We understood"
10,28,coordination to require an agreement-tacit or express - between the Trump Campaign and the
10,29,Russian government on election interference. That requires more than the two parties taking
10,30,actions that were informed by or responsive to the other's actions or interests. We applied the term
10,31,coordination in that sense when stating in the report that the investigation did not establish that the
10,32,Trump Campaign coordinated with the Russian government in its election interference activities.
10,33,* * *
10,34,The report on our investigation consists of two volumes:
10,35,Volume I describes the factual results of the Special Counsel's investigation of Russia's
10,36,interference in the 2016 presidential election and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.
10,37,Section I describes the scope of the investigation. Sections II and III describe the principal ways
10,38,Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election . Section IV describes links between the Russian ·
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11,3,government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Section V sets forth the Special
11,4,Counsel's charging decisions.
11,5,Volume II addresses the President ' s actions towards the FBI's investigation into Russia ' s
11,6,"interference in the 2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions towards the"
11,7,Special Counsel ' s investigation. Volume II separately states its framework and the considerations
11,8,that guided that investigation.
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12,3,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME           I
12,4,RUSSIAN SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN
12,5,The Internet Research Agency (IRA) carried out the earliest Russian interference
12,6,operations identified by the investigation - a social media campaign designed to provoke and
12,7,"amplify political and social discord in the United States. The IRA was based in St. Petersburg,"
12,8,"Russia, and received funding from Russian oligarch Y evgeniy Prigozhin and companies he"
12,9,controlled. Pri ozhin is widel re orted to have ties to Russian President Vladimir Putin
12,10,"In mid-2014, the IRA sent em lo"
12,11,mission with instructions
12,12,The IRA later used social media accounts and interest groups to sow discord in the U.S.
12,13,"political system through what it termed ""information warfare."" The campaign evolved from a"
12,14,"generalized program designed in 2014 and 2015 to undermine the U.S . electoral system, to a"
12,15,targeted operation that by early 2016 favored candidate Trump and disparaged candidate Clinton.
12,16,The IRA' s operation also included the purchase of political advertisements on social media in the
12,17,"names of U.S. persons and entities, as well as the staging of political rallies inside the United"
12,18,"States. To organize those rallies, IRA employees posed as U.S. grassroots entities and persons and"
12,19,made contact with Trump supporters and Trump Campaign officials in the United States. The
12,20,investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons conspired or coordinated with the
12,21,IRA. Section II of this report details the Office's investigation of the Russian social media
12,22,campaign.
12,23,RUSSIAN HACKING OPERATIONS
12,24,At the same time that the IRA operation began to focus ·on supporting candidate Trump in
12,25,"early 2016, the Russian government employed a second form of interference: cyber intrusions"
12,26,(hacking) and releases of hacked materials damaging to the Clinton Campaign. The Russian
12,27,intelligence service known as the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian
12,28,Army (GRU) carried out these operations.
12,29,"In March 2016, the GRU began hacking the email accounts of Clinton Campaign"
12,30,"volunteers and employees, including campaign chairman John Podesta. In April 2016, the GRU"
12,31,hacked into the computer networks of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
12,32,(DCCC) and the Democratic National Committee (DNC). The GRU stole hundreds of thousands
12,33,of documents from the compromised email accounts and networks. Around the time that the DNC
12,34,"announced in mid-June 2016 the Russian government's role in hacking its network, the GRU"
12,35,"began disseminating stolen materials through the fictitious online personas ""DCLeaks"" and"
12,36,"""Guccifer 2.0."" The GRU later released additional materials through the organization WikiLeaks."
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13,1,U.S. Department of Justice
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13,3,"The presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump (""Trump Campaign"" or ""Campaign"")"
13,4,showed interest in WikiLeaks ' s releases of documents and welcomed their otential to damage
13,5,"candidate Clinton . Beginning in June 2016, llfilllillliliilfll~llliillllllilllilli           forecast to"
13,6,senior Campaign officials that WikiLeaks would release information damaging to candidate
13,7,"Clinton. WikiLeaks ' s first release came in July 2016. Around the same time , candidate Trump"
13,8,announced that he hoped Russia would recover emails described as missing from a private server
13,9,used b Clinton when she was Secreta of State he later said that he was s · eakin sarcasticall .
13,10,WikiLeaks began releasing
13,11,"Podesta ' s stolen emails on October 7, 2016, less than one hour after a U.S. media outlet released"
13,12,video considered damaging to candidate Trump. Section lII of this Report details the Office's
13,13,"investigation into the Russian hacking operations, as well as other efforts by Trump Campaign"
13,14,supporters to obtain Clinton-related emails.
13,15,RUSSIAN CONTACTS WITH THE CAMPAIGN
13,16,The social media campaign and the GRU hacking operations coincided with a series of
13,17,contacts between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government.
13,18,The Office investigated whether those contacts reflected or resulted in the Campaign conspiring
13,19,or coordinating with Russia in its election-interference activities. Although the investigation
13,20,established that the Russian government perceived it would benefit from a Trump presidency and
13,21,"worked to secure that outcome, and that the Campaign expected it would benefit electorally from"
13,22,"information stolen and released through Russian efforts, the investigation did not establish that"
13,23,members of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with the Russian government in its
13,24,election interference activities .
13,25,"The Russian contacts consisted of business connections, offers of assistance to the"
13,26,"Campaign, invitations for candidate Trump and Putin to meet in person , invitations for Campaign"
13,27,"officials and representatives of the Russian government to meet, and policy positions seeking"
13,28,improved U.S.-Russian relations. Section IV of this Report details the contacts between Russia
13,29,"and the Trump Campaign during the campaign and transition periods , the most salient of which"
13,30,are summarized below in chronological order.
13,31,2015. Some of the earliest contacts were made in connection with a Trump Organization
13,32,real-estate project in Russia known as Trump Tower Moscow. Candidate Trump signed a Letter
13,33,"oflntent for Trump Tower Moscow by November 2015, and in January 2016 Trump Organization"
13,34,executive Michael Cohen emailed and spoke about the project with the office of Russian
13,35,government press secretary Dmitry Peskov. The Trump Organization pursued the project through
13,36,"at least June 2016 , including by considering travel to Russia by Cohen and candidate Trump."
13,37,Spring 2016. Campaign foreign policy advisor George Papadopoulos made early contact
13,38,"with Joseph Mifsud, a London-based professor who had connections to Russia and traveled to"
13,39,"Moscow in April 2016. Immediately upon his return to London from that trip , Mifsud told"
13,40,"Papadopoulos that the Russian government had ""dirt"" on Hillary Clinton in the form of thousands"
13,41,5
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14,4,"of emails. One week later, in the first week of May 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a"
14,5,representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from
14,6,the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of
14,7,information damaging to candidate Clinton. Throughout that period of time and for several months
14,8,"thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals to arrange a meeting"
14,9,between the Campaign and the Russian government. No meeting took place.
14,10,Summer 2016. Russian outreach to the Trump Campaign continued into the summer of
14,11,"2016, as candidate Trump was becoming the presumptive Republican nominee for President. On"
14,12,"June 9, 2016, for example, a Russian lawyer met with senior Trump Campaign officials Donald"
14,13,"Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and campaign chairman Paul Manafort to deliver what the email"
14,14,"proposing the meeting had described as ""official documents and information that would"
14,15,"incriminate Hillary."" The materials were offered to Trump Jr. as ""part of Russia and its"
14,16,"government's support for Mr. Trump."" The written communications setting up the meeting"
14,17,showed that the Campaign anticipated receiving information from Russia that could assist
14,18,"candidate Trump's electoral prospects, but the Russian lawyer ' s presentation did not provide such"
14,19,information.
14,20,"Days after the June 9 meeting, on June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm and the DNC"
14,21,announced that Russian government hackers had infiltrated the DNC and obtained access to
14,22,"opposition research on candidate Trump, among other documents."
14,23,"In July 2016 , Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page traveled in his personal capacity"
14,24,to Moscow and gave the keynote address at the New Economic School. Page had lived and worked
14,25,"in Russia between 2003 and 2007 . After returning to the United States, Page became acquainted"
14,26,"with at least two Russian intelligence officers, one of whom was later charged in 2015 with"
14,27,conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of Russia . Page ' s July 2016 trip to Moscow and his
14,28,advocacy for pro-Russian foreign policy drew media attention . The Campaign then distanced itself
14,29,"from Page and, by late September 2016, removed him from the Campaign."
14,30,July 2016 was also the month WikiLeaks first released emails stolen by the GRU from the
14,31,"DNC. On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks posted thousands of internal DNC documents revealing"
14,32,"information about the Clinton Campaign. Within days, there was public reporting that U.S."
14,33,"intelligence agencies had ""high confidence"" that the Russian government was .behind the theft of"
14,34,"emails and documents from the DNC. And within a week of the release, a foreign government"
14,35,informed the FBI about its May 2016 interaction with Papadopoulos and his statement that the
14,36,"Russian government could assist the Trump Campaign. On July 31, 2016 , based on the foreign"
14,37,"government rep01ting, the FBI opened an investigation into potential coordination between the"
14,38,Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign.
14,39,"Separately, on August 2, 2016 , Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort met in New York"
14,40,"City with his long-time business associate Konstantin Kilimnik, who the FBI assesses to have ties"
14,41,to Russian intelligence. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a peace plan for
14,42,"Ukraine that Manafort acknowledged to the Special Counsel's Office was a ""backdoor"" way for"
14,43,Russia to control part of eastern Ukraine; both men believed the plan would require candidate
14,44,Trump 's assent to succeed (were he to be elected President). They also discussed the status of the
14,45,6
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15,4,Trump Campaign and Manafort's strategy for winning Democratic votes in Midwestern states.
15,5,"Months before that meeting, Manafort had caused internal polling data to be shared with Kilimnik,"
15,6,and the sharing continued for some period of time after their August meeting.
15,7,"Fall 2016. On October 7, 2016, the media released video of candidate Trump speaking in"
15,8,"graphic terms about women years earlier, which was considered damaging to his candidacy. Less"
15,9,"than an hour later, WikiLeaks made its second release: thousands of John Podesta ' s emails that"
15,10,had been stolen by the GRU in late March 2016. The FBI and other U.S. government institutions
15,11,were at the time continuing their investigation of suspected Russian government efforts to interfere
15,12,"in the presidential election. That same day, October 7, the Department of Homeland Security and"
15,13,"the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a joint public statement ""that the Russian"
15,14,"Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails from US persons and institutions,"
15,15,"including from US political organizations ."" Those ""thefts"" and the ""disclosures "" of the hacked"
15,16,"materials through online platforms such as WikiLeaks, the statement continued, ""are intended to"
15,17,"interfere with the US election process."""
15,18,"Post-2016 Election. Immediately after the November 8 election , Russian government"
15,19,officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
15,20,administration. The most senior levels of the Russian government encouraged these efforts. The
15,21,Russian Embassy made contact hours after the election to congratulate the President-Elect and to
15,22,arrange a call with President Putin. Several Russian businessmen picked up the effort from there.
15,23,"Kirill Dmitriev, the chief executive officer of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, was among"
15,24,"the Russians who tried to make contact with the incoming administration. In early December , a"
15,25,"business associate steered Dmitriev to Erik Prince, a supporter of the Trump Campaign and an"
15,26,associate of senior Trump advisor Steve Bannon. Dmitriev and Prince later met face-to-face in
15,27,"January 2017 in the Seychelles and discussed U.S.-Russia relations. During the same period ,"
15,28,another business associate introduced Dmitriev to a friend of Jared Kushner who had not served
15,29,on the Campaign or the Transition Team. Dmitriev and Kushner's friend collaborated on a short
15,30,"written reconciliation plan for the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied had been"
15,31,"cleared through Putin. The friend gave that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration , and"
15,32,Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.
15,33,"On December 29, 2016, then-President Obama imposed sanctions on Russia for having"
15,34,interfered in the election. Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn called Russian
15,35,Ambassador Sergey Kislyak and asked Russia not to escalate the situation in response to the
15,36,"sanctions. The following day, Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in"
15,37,"response to the sanctions at that time. Hours later , President-Elect Trump tweeted, ""Great move"
15,38,"on delay (by V. Putin)."" The next day, on December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him"
15,39,the request had been receiv ed at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate as a result
15,40,of Flynn's request.
15,41,***
15,42,"On January 6, 2017 , members of the intelligence community briefed President-Elect Trump"
15,43,"on a joint assessment-drafted and coordinated among the Central Intellig ence Agency, FBI, and"
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16,3,National Security Agency-that concluded with high confidence that Russia had intervened in the
16,4,election through a variety of means to assist Trump's candidacy and harm Clinton ' s. A
16,5,declassified version of the assessment was publicly released that same day.
16,6,"Between mid-January 2017 and early February 2017, three congressional committees -the"
16,7,"House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), the Senate Select Committee on"
16,8,"Intelligence (SSCI), and the Senate Judiciary Committee (SJC)-announced              that they would"
16,9,"conduct inquiries, or had already been conducting inquiries, into Russian interference in the"
16,10,election. Then-FBI Director James Comey later confirmed to Congress the existence of the FBI's
16,11,"investigation into Russian interference that had begun before the election. On March 20, 2017, in"
16,12,"open-session testimony before HPSCI, Comey stated:"
16,13,"I have been authorized by the Department of Justice to confirm that the FBI, as part"
16,14,"of our counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian government's efforts"
16,15,"to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, and that includes investigating the"
16,16,nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and
16,17,the Russian government and whether there was any coordination between the
16,18,"campaign and Russia ' s efforts ....    As with any counterintelligence investigation,"
16,19,this will also include an assessment of whether any crimes were committed.
16,20,"The investigation continued under then-Director Comey for the next seven weeks until May 9,"
16,21,"2017, when President Trump fired Comey as FBI Director-an action which is analyzed in"
16,22,Volume II of the rep01t.
16,23,"On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein appointed the Special Counsel"
16,24,and authorized him to conduct the investigation that Comey had confirmed in his congressional
16,25,"testimony, as well as matters arising directly from the investigation , and any other matters within"
16,26,"the scope of 28 C.F .R. § 600.4(a), which generally covers efforts to interfere with or obstruct the"
16,27,investigation.
16,28,President Trump reacted negatively to the Specia l Counsel's appointment. He told advisors
16,29,"that it was the end of his presidency, sought to have Attorney General Jefferson (Jeff) Sessions"
16,30,"unrecuse from the Russia investigation and to have the Special Counse l removed, and engaged in"
16,31,"efforts to curtail the Specia l Counsel's investigation and prevent the disclosure of evidence to it,"
16,32,including through public and private contacts with potential witnesses. Those and related actions
16,33,are described and ana lyzed in Volume II of the report.
16,34,***
16,35,THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S CHARGING DECISIONS
16,36,"In reaching the charging decisions described in Volume 1 of the report, the Office"
16,37,determined whether the conduct it found amounted to a violation of federal criminal law
16,38,chargeable under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual § 9-27.000 et seq.
16,39,(2018). The standard set forth in the Justice Manual is whether the conduct constitutes a crime ; if
16,40,"so, whether admissib le evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction;"
16,41,8
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17,3,and whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest that could not be adequately
17,4,served by prosecution elsewhere or through non-criminal alternatives. See Justice Manual § 9-
17,5,27 .220.
17,6,"Section V of the report provides detailed explanations of the Office's charging decisions,"
17,7,which contain three main components.
17,8,"First, the Office determined that Russia's two principal interference operations in the 2016"
17,9,U.S. presidential election-the social media campaign and the hacking-and-dumping operations-
17,10,violated U.S. criminal law. Many of the individuals and entities involved in the social media
17,11,campaign have been charged with participating in a conspiracy to defraud the United States by
17,12,undermining through deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign
17,13,"influence in U.S. elections , as well as related counts of identity theft . See United States v. Internet"
17,14,"Research Agency, et al., No. 18-cr-32 (D.D.C.) . Separately, Russian intelligence officers who"
17,15,carried out the hacking into Democratic Party computers and the personal email accounts of
17,16,"individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign conspired to violate , among other federal laws,"
17,17,"the federal computer-intrusion statute, and the have been so char ed. See United States v."
17,18,"Ne ksho, et al., No. 18-cr-215 D.D.C .."
17,19,"Second, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals with ties to"
17,20,"the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence was"
17,21,"not sufficient to support criminal charges. Among other things, the evidence was not sufficient to"
17,22,charge any Campaign official as an unregistered agent of the Russian government or other Russian
17,23,"principal. And our evidence about the June 9, 2016 meeting and WikiLeaks ' s releases of hacked"
17,24,"materials was not sufficient to charge a criminal campaign-finance violation. Further, the evidence"
17,25,was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired with
17,26,representatives of the Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.
17,27,"Third, the investigation established that several individuals affiliated with the Trump"
17,28,"Campaign lied to the Office, and to Congress, about their interactions with Russian-affiliated"
17,29,individuals and related matters. Those lies materially impaired the investigation of Russian
17,30,election interference. The Office charged some of those lies as violations of the federal false-
17,31,statements statute. Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn pleaded guilty to lying about
17,32,his interactions with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the transition period. George
17,33,"Papadopoulos, a foreign policy advisor during the campaign period , pleaded guilty to lying to"
17,34,"investigators about, inter alia, the nature and timing of his interactions with Joseph Mifsud, the"
17,35,professor who told Papadopoulos that the Russians had dirt on candidate Clinton .in the form of
17,36,thousands of emails. Former Trump Organization attorney Michael Cohen leaded uilt to
17,37,makin false statements to Con ress about the Trum Moscow ro ·ect.
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18,3,Manafort lied to the Office and the grand jury concerning his interactions and communications
18,4,with Konstantin Kilimnik about Trump Campaign polling data and a peace plan for Ukraine.
18,5,***
18,6,The Office investigated several other events that have been publicly repot1ed to involve
18,7,"potential Russia-related contacts. For example, the investigation established that interactions"
18,8,between Russian Ambassador Kislyak and Trump Campaign officials both at the candidate's April
18,9,"2016 foreign policy speech in Washington, D.C., and during the week of the Republican National"
18,10,"Convention were brief, public, and non-substantive. And the investigation did not establish that"
18,11,one Campaign official's efforts to dilute a portion of the Republican Party platform on providing
18,12,assistance to Ukraine were undertaken at the behest of candidate Trump or Russia. The
18,13,investigation also did not establish that a meeting between Kislyak and Sessions in September
18,14,2016 at Sessions's Senate office included any more than a passing mention of the presidential
18,15,campaign.
18,16,"The investigation did not always yield admissible information or testimony, or a complete"
18,17,picture of the activities undertaken by subjects of the investigation. Some individuals invoked
18,18,"their Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination and were not, in the Office ' s"
18,19,"judgment, appropriate candidates for grants of immunity. The Office limited its pursuit of other"
18,20,witnesses and information-such as information known to attorneys or individuals claiming to be
18,21,"members of the media-in light of internal Depa11ment of Justice policies. See, e.g., Justice"
18,22,"Manual§§ 9-13.400, 13.410. Some of the information obtained via court process, moreover, was"
18,23,presumptively covered by legal privilege and was screened from investigators by a filter ( or
18,24,"""taint"") team. Even when individuals testified or agreed to be interviewed, they sometimes"
18,25,"provided information that was false or incomplete, leading to some of the false-statements charges"
18,26,described above. And the Office faced practical limits on its ability to access relevant evidence as
18,27,"well-numerous witnesses and subjects lived abroad, and documents were held outside the United"
18,28,States.
18,29,"Further, the Office learned that some of the individuals we interviewed or whose conduct"
18,30,we investigated-including        some associated with the Trump Campaign---deleted relevant
18,31,communications or communicated during the relevant period using applications that feature
18,32,encryption or that do not provide for long-term retention of data or communications records. In
18,33,"such cases , the Office was not able to corroborate witness statements through comparison to"
18,34,contemporaneous communications or fully question witnesses about statements that appeared
18,35,inconsistent with other known facts.
18,36,"Accordingly, while this report embodies factual and legal determinations that the Office"
18,37,"believes to be accurate and complete to the greatest extent possible, given these identified gaps,"
18,38,the Office cannot rule out the possibility that the unavailable information would shed additional
18,39,light on (or cast in a new light) the events described in the report.
18,40,10
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19,3,I. THE SPECIAL COUNSEL'S INVESTIGATION
19,4,"On May 17, 2017, Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein -t hen serving as Acting"
19,5,Attorney General for the Russia investigation following the recusal of former Attorney General
19,6,"Jeff Sessions on March 2, 2016-appointed              the Special Counsel ""to investigate Russian"
19,7,"interference with the 2016 presidential election and related matters. "" Office of the Deputy Att'y"
19,8,"Gen., Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian Interference"
19,9,"with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters, May 17, 2017) (""Appointment Order"") ."
19,10,"Relying on ""the authority vested"" in the Acting Attorney General, ""including 28 U.S.C. §§ 509,"
19,11,"510, and 515,"" the Acting Attorney General ordered the appointment of a Special Counsel ""in"
19,12,order to discharge [the Acting Attorney General ' s] responsibility to provide supervision and
19,13,"management of the Department of Justice , and to ensure a full and thorough investigation of the"
19,14,"Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election."" Appointment Order"
19,15,"(introduction). ""The Special Counsel,"" the Order stated, ""is authorized to conduct the investigation"
19,16,confirmed by then-FBI Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select
19,17,"Committee on Intelligence on March 20, 2017,"" including:                  '"
19,18,(i) any links and/or coordination between the Russian government and individuals
19,19,associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
19,20,(ii) any matters that arose or may arise directly from the investigation; and
19,21,(iii) any other matters within the scope of 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).
19,22,"Appointment Order ,r(b). Section 600.4 affords the Special Counsel ""the authority to investigate"
19,23,"and prosecute federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the"
19,24,"Special Counsel's investigation, such as perjury , obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence,"
19,25,"and intimidation of witnesses ."" 28 C.F.R . § 600.4(a). The authority to investigate ""any matters"
19,26,"that arose . .. directly from the investigation ,"" Appointment Order ,r(b)(ii), covers similar crimes"
19,27,that may have occurred during the course of the FBI's confirmed investigation before the Special
19,28,"Counsel's appointment. ""If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate, "" the"
19,29,"Order further provided, ""the Special Counsel is authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from"
19,30,"the investigation of these matters. "" Id. ,r(c). Finally, the Acting Attorney General made applicable"
19,31,"""Sections 600.4 throu gh 600.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations. "" Id. ,r(d)."
19,32,The Acting Attorney General further clarified the scope of the Special Counsel's
19,33,"investigatory authority in two subsequent memoranda . A memorandum dated August 2, 2017,"
19,34,"explained that the Appointment Order had been ""worded categorically in order to permit its public"
19,35,"release without confirming specific investigations involving specific individuals."" It then"
19,36,confirmed that the Special Counsel had been authorized since his appointment to investiga te
19,37,"allegations that three Trump campaign officials-Carter Page, Paul Manafort, and George"
19,38,"Papadopoulos - ""comm itted a crime or crimes by colluding with Russian government officials"
19,39,"with respect to the Russian government's efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election."""
19,40,The memorandum also confirmed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate certain other
19,41,"matters , including two additional sets of allegations involving Manafort (crimes arising from"
19,42,payments he received from the Ukrainian government and crimes arising from his receipt of loans
19,43,11
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20,3,from a bank whose CEO was then seeking a position in the Trump Administration); allegations
20,4,that Papadopoulos committed a crime or crimes by acting as an unregistered agent of the Israeli
20,5,"government; and four sets of allegations involving Michael Flynn , the former National Security"
20,6,Advisor to President Trump.
20,7,"On October 20, 2017 , the Acting Attorney General confirmed in a memorandum the"
20,8,"Special Counsel's investigative authority as to several individuals and entities . First , ""as part of a"
20,9,full and thorough investigation of the Russian government's efforts to interfere in the 2016
20,10,"presidential election,"" the Special Counsel was authorized to investigate ""the pertinent activities"
20,11,"of Michael Cohen , Richard Gates ,                               , Roger Stone, and"
20,12,"I""     ""Confirmation of the authorization to investigate such individuals, "" the memorandum"
20,13,"stressed , ""does not suggest that the Special Counsel has made a determination that any of them has"
20,14,"committed a crime ."" Second, with respect to Michael Cohen, the memorandum recognized the"
20,15,"Special Counsel ' s authority to investigate "" leads relate[d] to Cohen ' s establishment and use of"
20,16,"Essential Consultants LLC to, inter alia, receive funds from Russian-backed entities."" Third , the"
20,17,memorandum memoriali zed the Special Counsel's authority to investigate individuals and entities
20,18,"who were possibly engaged in ""jointly undertaken activity"" with existing subjects of the"
20,19,"investigation , including Paul Manafort. Finally, the memorandum described an FBI investigation"
20,20,"opened befor e the Special Counsel's appointment into ""allegations that [then-Attorne y General"
20,21,"Jeff Sessions] made false statements to the United States Senate[,]"" and confirmed the Special"
20,22,Counsel's authority to investigate that matter.
20,23,"The Special Counsel structured the investigation in view of his power and authorit y ""to"
20,24,"exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States Attorney."" 28 C.F.R:"
20,25,"§ 600 .6. Like a U.S. Attorney 's Office, the Special Counsel's Office considered a range of"
20,26,classified and unclassified information available to the FBI in the course of the Office's Russia
20,27,"investigation , and the Office structured that work around evidence for possible use in prosecutions"
20,28,of federal crimes (assuming that one or more crimes were identified that warranted prosecution).
20,29,There was substantial evidence immediately available to the Special Counsel at the inception of
20,30,"the investigation in May 2017 because the FBI had, by that time , already investigated Russian"
20,31,election interference for nearly 10 months. The Special Counsel's Office exercised its jud gment
20,32,"regarding what to investigate and did not , for instance, investigate every public report of a contact"
20,33,between the Trump Campaign and Russian -affiliated individuals and entities .
20,34,The Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination between the Russian
20,35,government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain proceedings associated
20,36,with the Office's work remain ongoing. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney
20,37,"General, the Office has transferred responsibility for those remaining issues to other components"
20,38,of the Department of Justice and FBI. Appendix D lists those transfers.
20,39,Two district courts confirmed the breadth of the Special Counsel's authority to investigate
20,40,Russia election interference and links and/or coordination with the Trump Campaign. See United
20,41,"States v. Manafort , 312 F. Supp . 3d 60, 79-83 (D.D .C. 2018); United States v. Manafort, 321 F."
20,42,"Supp. 3d 640, 650-655 (E.D . Va . 2018). In the course of conducting that investigation, the Office"
20,43,periodically identified evidence of potential criminal activity that was outside the scope of the
20,44,Special Counsel's authority established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with
20,45,12
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21,3,"the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law"
21,4,"enforcement authorities, principally other components of the Department of Justice and to the FBI."
21,5,Appendix D summarizes those referrals.
21,6,** *
21,7,"To carry out the investigation and prosecution of the matters assigned to him, the Special"
21,8,Counsel assembled a team that at its high point included 19 attorneys-five of whom joined the
21,9,Office from private practice and 14 on detail or assigned from other Department of Justice
21,10,components. These attorneys were assisted by a filter team of Department lawyers and FBI
21,11,personnel who screened materials obtained via court process for privileged information before
21,12,turning those materials over to investigators; a support staff of three paralegals on detail from the
21,13,"Department 's Antitrust Division; and an administrative staff of nine responsible for budget,"
21,14,"finance, purchasing, human resources , records, facilities, security, information technology , and"
21,15,administrative support. The Special Counsel attorneys and support staff were co-located with and
21,16,"worked alongside approximatel y 40 FBI agents, intelligence analysts, forensic accountants, a"
21,17,"paralegal, and professional staff assigned by the FBI to assist the Special Counsel's investigation."
21,18,"Those ""assigned"" FBI employees remained under FBI supervision at all times; the matters on"
21,19,which they assisted were supervised by the Special Counsel. 1
21,20,"During its investigation the Office issued more than 2,800 subpoenas under the auspices of"
21,21,a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia; executed nearly 500 search-and-seizure warrants;
21,22,obtained more than 230 orders for communications records under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); obtained
21,23,almost 50 orders authorizing use of pen registers; made 13 requests to foreign governments
21,24,"pursuant to Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties; and interviewed approximately 500 witnesses,"
21,25,including almost 80 before a grand jury.
21,26,***
21,27,"From its inception, the Office recognized that its investigation could identify foreign"
21,28,intelligence and counterintelligence information relevant to the FBI's broader national security
21,29,mission. FBI personnel who assisted the Office established procedures to identify and convey
21,30,such information to the FBI. The FBI's Counterintelligence Division met with the Office regularly
21,31,"for that purpose for most of the Office's tenure. For more than the past year, the FBI also"
21,32,"embedded personnel at the Office who did not work on the Special Counsel's investigation, but"
21,33,whose purpose was to review the results of the investigation and to send-in writing-summaries
21,34,of foreign intellig ence and counterintelligence information to FBIHQ and FBI Field Offices.
21,35,Those communications and other correspondence between the Office and the FBI contain
21,36,"information derived from the investigation, not all of which is contained in this Volume. This"
21,37,"Volume is a summary. It contains, in the Office's judgment, that information necessary to account"
21,38,for the Special Counsel's prosecution and declination decisions and to describe the investigation 's
21,39,main factual results.
21,40,1 FBI  personnel assigned to the Special Counsel's Office were required to adhere to all applicable
21,41,"federal law and all Department and FBI regulations, guidelines , and policies. An FBI attorney worked on"
21,42,"FBI-related matters for the Office, such as FBI compliance with all FBI policies and procedures, including"
21,43,the FBI's Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG). That FBI attorney worked under FBI
21,44,"legal superv ision, not the Special Counsel's supervision."
21,45,13
21,46,NA
22,1,U.S. Department of Justice
22,2,AUorttey Work Proattet // Mtt'.)CotttttittMttterittlPrnteetea Uttaer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
22,3,1
22,4,"II.  RUSSIAN ""ACTIVE MEASURES"" SOCIAL MEDIA CAMPAIGN"
22,5,The first form of Russian election influence came principally from the Internet Research
22,6,"Agency, LLC (IRA), a Russian organization funded by Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and"
22,7,"companies he controlled, including Concord Management and Consulting LLC and Concord"
22,8,"Catering (collectively ""Concord""). 2 The IRA conducted social media operations targeted at large"
22,9,U.S. audiences with the goal of sowing discord in the U.S. political system. 3 These operations
22,10,"constituted ""active measures"" (aKTMBHbie          Meporrprumu1),a term that typically refers to operations"
22,11,conducted by Russian security services aimed at influencing the course of international affairs. 4
22,12,The IRA and its employees began operations targeting the United States as early as 2014.
22,13,"Using fictitious U.S. personas, IRA employees operated social media accounts and group pages"
22,14,"designed to attract U.S. audiences. These groups and accounts, which addressed divisive U.S."
22,15,"political and social issues, falsely claimed to be controlled by U.S. activists. Over time, these"
22,16,social media accounts became a means to reach large U.S. audiences. IRA employees travelled to
22,17,the United States in mid-2014 on an intelligence-gathering mission to obtain information and
22,18,photographs for use in their social media posts.
22,19,IRA employees posted derogatory information about a number of candidates in the 2016
22,20,"U.S. presidential election. By early to mid-2016, IRA operations included supporting the Trump"
22,21,Campaign and disparaging candidate Hillary Clinton. The IRA made various expenditures to carry
22,22,"out those activities , including buying political advertisements on social media in the names of U.S."
22,23,"persons and entities. Some IRA employees, posing as U.S. persons and without revealing their"
22,24,"Russian association, communicated electronically with individuals associated with the Trump"
22,25,"Campaign and with other political activists to seek to coordinate political activities , including the"
22,26,staging of political rallies. 5 The investigation did not identify evidence that any U.S. persons
22,27,knowingly or intentionally coordinated with the IRA's interference operation.
22,28,"By the end of the 2016 U.S. election , the IRA had the ability to reach millions of U.S ."
22,29,persons through their social media accounts . Multiple IRA-controlled Facebook groups and
22,30,2
22,31,The Offic e is aware of reports that other Russian entities engaged in similar active measw-es
22,32,"operations targeting the United States. Some evidence collected by the Office corroborates those rep01ts,"
22,33,and the Office has shared that evidence with other offices in the Department of Justice and FBI.
22,34,3 Harm to Ongoing Matter
22,35,"see also SM-2230634 , serial 44 (analysis). The FBI case number cited here, and other FBI case numb ers"
22,36,"identified in the report, should be treated as law enforcement sensitive given the context. The report contains"
22,37,additional law enforcement sensitive information.
22,38,"4 As discussed in Part V below, the active measures investigation has resulted in criminal charges"
22,39,"against 13 individual Russian nationals and three Russian entities, principall y for conspiracy to defraud the"
22,40,"United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. See Volume I, Section V.A, infra; Indictment, United States"
22,41,"v. Internet Research Agency, et al., 1:18-cr-32 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), Doc. I (""Int ernet R esearch Agency"
22,42,"Indictment"")."
22,43,14
22,44,NA
23,1,U.S. Department of Justice
23,2,Att:srAe~·Wark Prsdttet // Mtty CsAta.iAMttterittl Prsteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
23,3,Instagram accounts had hundreds of thousands of U.S. participants. IRA-controlled Twitter
23,4,"accounts separately had tens of thousands of followers , including multiple U.S. political figures"
23,5,"who retweeted IRA-created content. In November 2017, a Facebook representative testified that"
23,6,"Facebook had identified 470 IRA-controlled Facebook accounts that collectively made 80,000"
23,7,posts between January 2015 and August 2017. Facebook estimated the IRA reached as many as
23,8,"126 million persons through its Face book accounts. 6 In January 2018, Twitter announced that it"
23,9,"had identified 3,814 IRA-controlled Twitter accounts and notified approximately 1.4 million"
23,10,people Twitter believed may have been in contact with an iRA-controlled account. 7
23,11,A. Structure of the Internet Research Agency
23,12,Harm to Ongoing Matter                                                  Harm to Ongoing
23,13,Matter
23,14,Harm to Ongoing Matter
23,15,"I  !""   ""  I    I"
23,16,Harm to Ongoing Matter
23,17,Harm to Ongoing Matter
23,18,anization also led to a more detailed or anizational structure.
23,19,6
23,20,"Social Media Influence in the 2016 US. Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee"
23,21,"on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel ofFacebook) (""We"
23,22,estimate that roughly 29 million people were served content in their News Feeds directly from the IRA's
23,23,"80,000 posts over the two years. Posts from these Pages were also shared, liked, and followed by people on"
23,24,"Facebook, and, as a result, three times more people may have been exposed to a story that originated from"
23,25,the Russian operation. Our best estimate is that approximately 126 million people may have been served
23,26,"content from a Page associated with the IRA at some point during the two-year period.""). The Facebook"
23,27,representative also testified that Facebook had identified 170 Instagram accounts that posted approximately
23,28,"120,000 pieces of content during that time. Facebook did not offer an estimate of the audience reached via"
23,29,Instagram.
23,30,7
23,31,"Twitter, Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election (Jan. 31, 2018)."
23,32,8
23,33,"See SM-2230634, serial 92."
23,34,-            Harm to Ongoing Matter
23,35,9
23,36,10 Harm to Ongoing Matter
23,37,11
23,38,"See SM-2230634, serial 86 Harm to Ongoing Matter"
23,39,15
23,40,NA
24,1,U.S. Department of Justice
24,2,"A«:eme:,·Wefk Pfedttet // Ma:,·Cefl:taifl:     Matefial Pfeteeted Ufl:defFee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
24,3,". , I . I                   ."
24,4,.. .. .. ..    . - .. ..
24,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,6,. .
24,7,.
24,8,aHarm          to Ongoing Matter
24,9,"of 2014, the IRA be an to hide its fundin and activities ."
24,10,I I.    •   I   • . I•   I                            ! I I.. • I
24,11,Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,12,■Harm    to Ongoing Matter
24,13,B. Funding and Oversight from Concord and Prigozhin
24,14,"Until at least February 2018, Yevgeniy Viktorovich Prigozhin and two Concord companies"
24,15,funded the IRA. Prigozhin is a wealthy Russian businessman who served as the head of Concord.
24,16,13  Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,17,"-·         See, e.g., SM-2230634 , serials 9, 113 & 180 Harm to Ongoing Matter"
24,18,14
24,19,15
24,20,Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,21,Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,22,131 & 204.
24,23,17
24,24,Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,25,18 Harm to Ongoing Matter
24,26,16
24,27,NA
25,1,U.S. Department of Justice
25,2,"AUeni:ey 1Nerk Predt1et // May Cetttatt, Matet·ial Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P . 6Ee)"
25,3,"sources have reported on Prigozhin's ties to Putin, and the two have appeared together in public"
25,4,photographs. 22
25,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,6,1t1Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,7,Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,8,11Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,9,11Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,10,Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,11,19
25,12,"U.S. Treasury Deprutment, ""Treasury Sanctions Individuals and Entities in Connection with"
25,13,"Russia 's Occupation of Crimea and the Conflict in Ukraine"" (Dec. 20, 2016)."
25,14,Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,15,22
25,16,"See, e.g., Neil MacFarquhar , Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian Oligarch Indicted by US., Is Known"
25,17,"as ""Putin's Cook"", New York Times (Feb. 16, 2018)."
25,18,24 Harm to Ongoing Matter
25,19,see also SM-
25,20,17
25,21,NA
26,1,U.S. Department of Justice
26,2,"Attertte, Werk Pred1:1et// Mtty Cetttttifl Mttterittl Prnteeted Under Fed. R..Crim:. P. 6(e)"
26,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
26,4,aHarm        to Ongoing Matter
26,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
26,6,Harm to Ongoing Matter
26,7,Harm to Ongoing Matter
26,8,26 Harm to Ongoing Matter
26,9,27
26,10,Harm to Ongoing Matter
26,11,28
26,12,"The term ""tro 11"
26,13,""" refers to internet users- in this context, paid operatives-who post inflammatory"
26,14,or otherwise disruptive content on social media or other websites.
26,15,18
26,16,NA
27,1,U.S. Department of Justice
27,2,",<W:ertteyWer:lcPreettet // Moy Cetttoifl Moteriol Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
27,3,•   :6_  a • •  a a
27,4,I I. • I
27,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
27,6,Harm to Ongoing Matter
27,7,In May
27,8,"2016, IRA employees , claiming to be U.S. social activists and administrators ofFacebook groups,"
27,9,"recruited U.S. persons to hold signs (including one in front of the White House) that read ""H appy"
27,10,"55th Birthda Dear Boss,"" as an homa e to Pri ozhin whose 55th birthda was on June 1, 2016 .31"
27,11,"Harr,, ,v '-'' ll::jVI I 'l::I 1v1a,u:;r"
27,12,Harm to Ongoing Matter
27,13,C. The IRA Targets U.S. Elections
27,14,1. The IRA Ramps Up U.S. Operations As Early As 2014
27,15,I I. • I
27,16,"! ...• ...    • .... ""             •                                   "" I"" : I I"
27,17,Harm to Ongoing Matter
27,18,subdivided the Translator Department into differ ent
27,19,"responsibilities, ranging from operations on different social media platforms to analytics to"
27,20,29
27,21,"Investigative Technique                                                  See SM-2230634 ,"
27,22,serials 131 & 204.
27,23,30
27,24,"See SM-2230634, serial 156."
27,25,31
27,26,"Internet Research Agency Indictment ,r 12 b; see also 5/26/16 Facebook Messages,      ID"
27,27,1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America) &
27,28,19
27,29,NA
28,1,U.S. Department of Justice
28,2,Attorttey Work Prodttet // May Cotttaitt Material Proteetet:1 Under Feel. R . Criffl. P. 6Ee)
28,3,graphics and IT.
28,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
28,5,■Harm        to
28,6,Ongoing Matter
28,7,Harm to Ongoing Matter
28,8,"I,  •  ·  .   I"
28,9,34
28,10,"See SM-2230634, serial 204 Harm to Ongoing Matter"
28,11,20
28,12,NA
29,1,U.S. Department of Justice
29,2,Atterney Werk Predttet // Ma:y CentttiH Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
29,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
29,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
29,5,37
29,6,IRA employees also traveled to the United States on intelligence-gathering missions. In
29,7,"June 2014, four IRA employees applied to the U.S. Department of State to enter the United States,"
29,8,while lying about the purpose of their trip and claiming to be four friends who had met at a party. 38
29,9,"Ultimately, two IRA employees-Anna Bogacheva and Aleksandra Krylova-received visas and"
29,10,"entered the United States on June 4, 2014."
29,11,"•••      ""."
29,12,Harm to Ongoing Matter
29,13,".      • ,,. ,:,!,,     . "" .....         - .-.     ."
29,14,· Harm to Ongoing Matter
29,15,35
29,16,Harm to Ongoing Matter
29,17,37 Harm to Ongoing Matter
29,18,38
29,19,"See SM-2230634, serials 150 & 172 Harm to Ongoing Matter"
29,20,21
29,21,NA
30,1,U.S. Department of Justice
30,2,Atten1e; · 'Nerk Predttet // Ma;· Cel'lttl:il'IMaterial Prnteeted Under Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
30,3,2.. U.S. Operations Through IRA-Controlled Social Media Accounts
30,4,Dozens of IRA employees were responsible for operating accounts and personas on
30,5,different U.S. social media platforms. The IRA referred to employees assigned to operate the
30,6,"social media account s as ""specialists. ""42 Starting as early as 2014, the IRA' s U.S. operations"
30,7,"included social media specialists focusing on Facebook , YouTube, and Twitter. 43 The IRA later"
30,8,added specialists who operated on Tumblr and Instagram accounts. 44
30,9,"Initially , the IRA created social media accounts that pretended to be the personal accounts"
30,10,"of U.S. persons.45 By early 2015 , the IRA began to create larger social media groups or public"
30,11,social media pages that claimed (falsely) to be affiliated with U.S. political and grassroots
30,12,"organizations. In certain cases, the IRA created accounts that mimicked real U.S. organizations."
30,13,"For example, one IRA-controlled Twitter account, @TEN_ GOP , purported to be connected to the"
30,14,"Tennessee Republican Party .46 More commonly , the IRA created accounts in the names of"
30,15,fictitious U.S . organizations and grassroots groups and used these accounts to pose as anti-
30,16,"immigration groups, Tea Party activists, Black Lives Matter protestors, and other U.S. social and"
30,17,political activists.
30,18,Harm to Ongoing Matter
30,19,Harm to Ongoing Matter
30,20,Harm to Ongoing Matter
30,21,45
30,22,"See, e.g., Facebook ID 100011390466802 (Alex Anderson) ; Facebook ID 100009626173204"
30,23,(Andrea Hansen); Facebook ID 100009728618427 (Gary Williams) ; Facebook ID 100013640043337
30,24,(Lakisha Richardson).
30,25,46
30,26,"The account claimed to be the ""Unofficial Twitter of Tennessee Republican s"" and made posts"
30,27,"that appeared to be endorsements of the state political party . See, e.g., @TEN_GOP, 4/3/16 Tweet"
30,28,"(""Tennessee GOP backs @rea!DonaldTrump period #makeAmerica greatagain #tngop #tennessee #gop"")."
30,29,22
30,30,NA
31,1,U.S. Department of Justice
31,2,"A:tterHe~·'Net""lcPreettet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea Unaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
31,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
31,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
31,5,The focus on the U.S. presidential campaign continued throughout 2016.          Inifll     2016
31,6,"internal                    reviewing the IRA-controlled Facebook group ""Se cured Borders, "" the"
31,7,47 Harm to Ongoing Matter
31,8,48
31,9,"See, e.g., SM-2230634 serial 131"
31,10,49
31,11,The IRA posted content about the Clinton candidacy before Clinton officially announced her
31,12,presidential campaign . IRA-controlled social media accounts criticized Clinton's record as Secretar of
31,13,State and romoted various criti ues of her candidac . The IRA also used other techni
31,14,50 Harm    to Ongoing Matter
31,15,23
31,16,NA
32,1,U.S. Department of Justice
32,2,Attorl'ley \llork Prodttet // May Col'ltail'lMatet·ial Proteeted Ul'lder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
32,3,"author criticized the ""lower number of posts dedicated to criticizing Hillary Clinton"" and reminded"
32,4,"the Facebook specialist "" it is imperative to intensify criticizing Hillary Clinton."" 51"
32,5,3. U.S. Operations Through Facebook
32,6,Harm to Ongoing Matter
32,7,I
32,8,I
32,9,Harm to Ongoing Matter
32,10,during th e 2016 campaign covered a range of political issues and included purported conservative
32,11,52 Harm to Ongoing Matter
32,12,53 Harm to Ongoing Matter
32,13,54 Harm to Ongoing Matter
32,14,24
32,15,NA
33,1,U.S. Department of Justice
33,2,At:t:ertteyWerk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Cfiffl. P. 6(e)
33,3,"groups (with names such as ""Being Patriotic ,"" ""Stop All Immigrants,"" ""Secured Borders,"" and"
33,4,"""Tea Party News"") , purported Black social justice groups (""Black Matters ,"" ""Blacktivist, "" and"
33,5,"""Don't Shoot Us""), LGBTQ groups (""LGBT United""), and religious groups (""United Muslims of"
33,6,"America"")."
33,7,"Throughout 2016 , IRA accounts published an increasing number of materials supporting"
33,8,"the Trump Campaign and opposing the Clinton Campaign. For example, on May 31, 2016 , the"
33,9,"operational account ""Matt Skiber"" began to privately message dozens of pro-Trump Facebook"
33,10,"groups asking them to help plan a ""pro-Trump rally near Trump Tower."" 55"
33,11,"To reach larger U.S. audiences , the IRA purchased advertisements from Facebook that"
33,12,"promoted the IRA groups on the newsfeeds of U.S. audience members. According to Facebook ,"
33,13,"the IRA purchased over 3,500 advertisements , and the expenditures totaled approximately"
33,14,"$100,000. 56"
33,15,"During the U.S. presidential campaign , many IRA-purchased advertisements explicitly"
33,16,supported or opposed a presidential candidate or promoted U.S. rallies organized by the IRA
33,17,"(discussed below) . As early as March 2016, the IRA purchased advertisements that overtly"
33,18,"opposed the Clinton Campaign. For example , on March 18, 2016, the IRA purchased an"
33,19,"advertisement depicting candidate Clinton and a caption that read in part, "" If one day God lets"
33,20,"this liar enter the White House as a president - that day would be a real national tragedy."" 57"
33,21,"Similarly, on April 6, 2016 , the IRA purchased advertisements for its account ""Black Matters"""
33,22,"calling for a ""flashmob"" of U.S. persons to ""take a photo with #HillaryClintonForPrison2016 or"
33,23,"#nohillary2016."" 58 IRA-purchased advertisements featuring Clinton were, with very few"
33,24,"exceptions , negative. 59"
33,25,IRA-purchased advertisements referencing candidate Trump largely supported his
33,26,campaign. The first known IRA advertisement explicitly endorsing the Trump Campaign was
33,27,"purchased on April 19, 2016. The IRA bought an advertisement for its Instagram account ""Tea"
33,28,"Party News"" asking U.S. persons to help them ""make a patriotic team of young Trump supporters """
33,29,"by uploading photos with the hashtag ""#KIDS4TRUMP."" 60 In subsequ ent months, the IRA"
33,30,"purchased dozens of advertisements supporting the Trump Campaign , predominantly through the"
33,31,"Facebook groups ""Being Patriotic ,"" ""Stop All Invaders ,"" and ""Secured Borders."""
33,32,55
33,33,"5/31/16 Facebook Message , ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID"
33,34,"5/31/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID"
33,35,"56 Social Media Influen ce in the 2016 US . Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee"
33,36,"on Intellig ence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel of Facebook) ."
33,37,57
33,38,3/18/16 Facebook Adverti sement ID 6045505152575.
33,39,58
33,40,4/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6043740225319.
33,41,59
33,42,"See SM-2230634 , serial 213 (documenting politically-oriented advertisements from the larger"
33,43,set provided by Facebook).
33,44,60
33,45,4/19/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045151094235.
33,46,25
33,47,NA
34,1,U.S. Department of Justice
34,2,"A.tt:on1e'.Y"""
34,3,Work Prodttet // May CoA.taiflMaterial Proteeted Uflder Fecl. R. Ct'iffl.P. 6(e)
34,4,"Collectively , the IRA's social media accounts reached tens of millions of U.S. persons."
34,5,"Individual IRA social media accounts attracted hundreds of thousands of followers. For example,"
34,6,"at the time they were deactivated by Facebook in mid-2017, the IRA's ""United Muslims of"
34,7,"America"" Facebook group had over 300,000 followers , the ""Don't Shoot Us"" Facebook group had"
34,8,"over 250,000 followers, the ""Being Patriotic"" Facebook group had over 200,000 followers , and"
34,9,"the ""Secured Borders"" Facebook group had over 130,000 followers.61 According to Facebook , in"
34,10,"total the IRA-controlled accounts made over 80,000 posts before their deactivation in August 2017,"
34,11,"and these posts reached at least 29 million U.S persons and ""may have reached an estimated 126"
34,12,"million people."" 62"
34,13,4. U.S. Operations Through Twitter
34,14,.-  .. .. ....
34,15,", -"
34,16,Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,17,-- '                         • • ••••
34,18,"ti       •.••          •""!""               ••  •.         ••·•·•"
34,19,", .        ,. • .     Harm to Ongoing Matter"
34,20,"Separately, the IRA operated a network of automated Twitter accounts"
34,21,(commonly referred to as a bot network) that enabled the IRA to amplify existing content
34,22,on Twitter.
34,23,a. Individualized Accounts
34,24,Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,25,•   Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,26,61
34,27,See Facebook ID 1479936895656747 (United Muslims of America); Facebook ID
34,28,l 157233400960126 (Don't Shoot); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 Bein Patriotic; Facebook ID
34,29,757183957716200 Secured Borders).
34,30,Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,31,62
34,32,"Social Media Influence in the 2016 US Election, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee"
34,33,"on Intelligence, 115th Cong. 13 (11/1/ 17) (testimony of Colin Stretch, General Counsel ofFacebook) ."
34,34,63
34,35,Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,36,64 Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,37,65
34,38,Harm to Ongoing Matter
34,39,26
34,40,NA
35,1,U.S. Department of Justice
35,2,A-Ftat=Ae~· Werk Predttet// Mtty CoruttiflMttterittlProteet:edUAder Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
35,3,66
35,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
35,5,The IRA operated individualized Twitter accounts similar to the operation of its Facebook
35,6,"accounts, by continuously posting original content to the accounts while also communicating with"
35,7,U.S. Twitter users directly (through public tweeting or Twitter's private messaging).
35,8,The IRA used many of these accounts to attempt to influence U.S. audiences on the
35,9,election . Individualized accounts used to influence the U.S. presidential election included
35,10,@TEN_ GOP (described above) ; @jenn_ abrams (claiming to be a Virginian Trump supporter with
35,11,"70,000 followers); @Pamela_Moore13 (claiming to be a Texan Trump supporter with 70,000"
35,12,"followers); and @America:__Ist_(an anti-immigration persona with 24,000 followers) .67 In May"
35,13,"2016, the IRA created the Twitter account @march_for_trump , which promoted IRA-organized"
35,14,rallies in support of the Trump Campaign (described below) .68
35,15,"Using these accounts and others, the IRA provoked reactions from users and the media . Multiple"
35,16,IRA-posted tweets gained popularity. 70 U.S. media outlets also quoted tweets from IRA-controlled
35,17,"accounts and attributed them to the reactions of real U.S. persons. 71 Similarly, numerous high-"
35,18,66 Harm to Ongoing Matter
35,19,67
35,20,"Other individualized accounts included @MissouriNewsUS (an account with 3,800 followers"
35,21,that posted pro-Sanders and anti-Clinton material).
35,22,68
35,23,"See @march_for_trump, 5/30/16 Tweet (first post from account)."
35,24,7
35,25,"° For example, one IRA account tweeted, ""T o those people, who hate the Confederate flag. Did"
35,26,"you know that the flag and the war wasn't about slavery , it was all about money."" The tweet received over"
35,27,"40,000 responses. @Jenn_Abrams 4/24/17 (2 :37 p.m.) Tweet."
35,28,71
35,29,"Josephine Lukito & Chris Wells , Most Major Outlets Have Used Russian Tweets as Sources for"
35,30,"Partisan Opinion: Study, Columbia Journalism Review (Mar. 8, 2018); see also Twitter Steps Up to Explain"
35,31,"#NewYorkValues to Ted Cruz, Washington Post (Jan. 15, 2016) (citing IRA tweet); People Are Slamming"
35,32,"the CIA/or Claiming Russia Tried to Help Donald Trump, U.S. News & World Report (Dec. 12, 2016)."
35,33,27
35,34,NA
36,1,U.S. Department of Justice
36,2,AU:erHe'.Y'
36,3,Werk Prea1:1et// Moy CeHtoiHMaterial Pretcctea UHaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(c)
36,4,"profile U.S. persons, including former Ambassador Michael McFaul ,72 Roger Stone, 73 Sean"
36,5,"Hannity, 74 and Michael Flynn Jr.,75 retweetcd or responded to tweets posted to these IRA-"
36,6,controlled accounts . Multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign also promoted IRA
36,7,tweets (discussed below).
36,8,b. IRA Botnet Activities
36,9,"In January 2018 , Twitter publicly identified 3,814 Twitter accounts associated with the"
36,10,"IRA. 79 According to Twitter, in the ten weeks before the 2016 U.S. presidential election , these"
36,11,"accounts posted approximately 175,993 tweets, ""approximately 8.4% of which were election- ·"
36,12,72
36,13,@Mcfaul 4/30/16 Tweet (responding to tweet by @Jenn_Abrams).
36,14,73
36,15,@RogerJStoneJr 5/30/16 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_Moorel3) ; @RogerJStoneJr 4/26/ 16
36,16,Tweet (same).
36,17,74
36,18,@seanhannity 6/21/17 Tweet (retweeting @Pamela_ Moore 13).
36,19,75
36,20,"@mflynnJR 6/22/17 Tweet (""RT@Jenn_Abrams: This is what happens when you add the voice"
36,21,"over of an old documentary about mental illness onto video of SJWs ... "")."
36,22,76
36,23,A botnet refers to a network of private computers or accounts controlled as a group to send
36,24,"specific automated messages. On the Twitter network, botnets can be used to promote and republish"
36,25,"(""retweet"") specific tweets or hashtags in order for them to gain larger audiences."
36,26,77 Harm to Ongoing Matter
36,27,78 Harm to Ongoing Matter
36,28,79
36,29,"Eli Rosenberg , Twitter to Tell 677,000 Users they Were Had by the Russians . Some Signs Show"
36,30,"the Problem Continues, Washington Post (Jan. 19, 2019)."
36,31,28
36,32,NA
37,1,U.S. Department of Justice
37,2,A4teffle)' \llel'k Pt'edttet // May Cetttail'l Matet'ial Pt'eteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Ct'im. P. 6(e)
37,3,"related."" 80 Twitter also announced that it had notified approximately 1.4 million people who"
37,4,Twitter believed may have been in contact with an IRA-controlled account. 81
37,5,5. U.S. Operations Involving Political Rallies
37,6,The IRA organized and promoted political rallies inside the United States while posing as
37,7,"U.S . grassroots activists. First, the IRA used one of its preexisting social media personas"
37,8,"(Facebook groups and Twitter accounts, for example) to announce and promote the event. The"
37,9,IRA then sent a large number of direct messages to followers of its social media account asking
37,10,"them to attend the event. From those who responded with interest in attending , the IRA then sought"
37,11,"a U.S. person to serve as the event's coordinator. In most cases, the IRA account operator would"
37,12,tell the U.S . person that they personally could not attend the event due to some preex isting conflict
37,13,or because they were somewhere else in the United States. 82 The IRA then further promoted the
37,14,event by contacting U.S. media about the event and directing them to speak with the coordinator. 83
37,15,"After the event, the IRA posted videos and photographs of the event to the IRA 's social media"
37,16,accounts. 84
37,17,The Office ident ified dozens of U.S. rallies organized by the IRA. The earliest evidence of
37,18,"a rally was a ""confedera te rally"" in November 2015. 85 The IRA continued to organize rallies even"
37,19,after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The attendance at rallies varied. Some rallies appear to
37,20,hav e drawn few (if any) pa1tici2ants while others drew hundreds The reach and success of these
37,21,Harm to Ongoing Matter
37,22,80
37,23,"Twitter, ""Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election"" (updated Jan. 31, 2018). Twitter"
37,24,"also reported identifying 50,258 automated accounts connected to the Russian government, which tweeted"
37,25,more than a million times in the ten weeks before the election.
37,26,...
37,27,81
37,28,"Twitter, ""Update on Twitter's Review of the 2016 US Election"" (updated Jan. 31, 2018)."
37,29,82
37,30,"8/20/16 Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID"
37,31,83
37,32,"See, e.g., 7/21/16~gmail.com                                 to                 ; 7/21/16 Email,"
37,33,joshmilton024@gmail.com to-
37,34,84 @march_for_trump 6/25/16 Tweet (posting photos from rally outside Trump Tower).
37,35,85
37,36,"Instagram ID 2228012168 (Stand For Freedom) 11/3/15 Post (""Good evening buds! Well I am"
37,37,planning to organize a confederate rally[ . . .] in Houston on the 14 of November and I want more people
37,38,"to attend."")."
37,39,29
37,40,NA
38,1,U.S. Department of Justice
38,2,Attefl'ley Werk Predttet // May Cel'ltttil'lMaterial Pfeteeted Umler Fed. R. Cfiffl. P. 6(e)
38,3,30
38,4,NA
39,1,U.S. Department of Justice
39,2,Atleiffle) Werk Preidttet// May Cmttail'lMaterial Preiteeted UF1derFed. R. Cril'l'l:.P. 6Ee)
39,3,1
39,4,"From June 2016 until the end of the presidential campaign,"
39,5,almost all of the U.S. rallies organized by the IRA focused on the
39,6,"U.S. election, often promoting the Trump Campaign and opposing"
39,7,the Clinton Campaign. Pro-Trump rallies included three in New
39,8,MINERS
39,9,\~
39,10,"..,  - ..."
39,11,FOR
39,12,\.
39,13,TRUMP
39,14,York; a series of pro-Trump rallies in Florida in August 2016; and a
39,15,series of pro-Trump rallies in October 2016 in Pennsylvania. The
39,16,"Florida rallies drew the attention of the Trump Campaign, which"
39,17,posted about the Miami rally on candidate Trump's Facebook
39,18,BRING      BACK            OUR           JOBSaccount (as discussed below). 86
39,19,WHEN
39,20,HELP   MR.    TRUMP              FIXIT!
39,21,IIC!llelli: Iii :Tf.1
39,22,. . .. . .
39,23,"t I    ,"
39,24,..
39,25,","
39,26,•
39,27,t ·
39,28,• ••      • •  • •• • ••
39,29,"WH ERE          : 11111· 11/1,,·111:,11      111,1;H Harm to Ongoing Matter"
39,30,\ l1\l:l:llfl\' l'I ;\/A 1'11111·/
39,31,"/IIHll~\l'l'I N!:I: 1111  ,"
39,32,IRA Poster for Pennsylvania
39,33,Rallies organized by the IRA
39,34,6. Targeting and Recruitment of U.S. Persons
39,35,"IRA employees frequently used Investigative Technique                                      Twitter , Facebook, and"
39,36,lnstagram to contact and recruit U.S. persons who followed the group. The IRA recruited U.S.
39,37,"ersons from across the olitical s ectrum. For example, the IRA targeted the family of-"
39,38,and a number of black social ju stice activists
39,39,86
39,40,"The pro-Trump rallies were organized through multiple Facebook, Twitter, and email accounts."
39,41,"See, e.g., Facebook ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber); Facebook ID 1601685693432389 (Being"
39,42,Patriotic); Twitter Account @march_for_trump ; beingpatriotic@gmail.com. (Rallies were organized in
39,43,"New York on June 25, 2016; Florida on August 20, 2016; and Pennsylvania on October 2, 2016.)"
39,44,87
39,45,Harm to Ongoing Matter
39,46,88
39,47,Harm to Ongoing Matter
39,48,31
39,49,NA
40,1,U.S . Department of Justice
40,2,At1:aft'le~·Wafk Pfadttet // May CaAtaiA Material Prateetetl Under Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
40,3,"while posing as a grassroots group called ""Black Matters US."" 89 In February 2017, the persona"
40,4,"""Black Fist"" (purporting to want to teach African-Americans to protect themselves when contacted"
40,5,by law enforcement) hired a self-defense instructor in New York to offer classes sponsored by
40,6,Black Fist. The IRA also recruited moderators of conservative social media groups to promote
40,7,"IRA-generated content, 90 as well as recruited individuals to perform political acts (such as walking"
40,8,around New York City dressed up as Santa Claus with a Trump mask). 91
40,9,Harm to Ongoing Matter
40,10,aHarm      to Ongoing Matter
40,11,aHarm to Ongoing
40,12,Matter
40,13,"as the IRA's online audience became larger, the IRA tracked U.S."
40,14,persons with whom they communicated and had successfully tasked with tasks ran in from
40,15,or anizin rallies to takin ictures with certain olitical messa es .
40,16,89
40,17,"3/11/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6045078289928, 5/6/16 Facebook Advertisement ID"
40,18,"6051652423528, 10/26/16 Facebook Advertisement ID 6055238604687; 10/27/16 Facebook Message, ID"
40,19,& ID 100011698576461(Taylor Brooks).
40,20,90
40,21,"8/19/16 Face book Message , ID 10000992 2908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID"
40,22,91
40,23,"12/8/ 16 Email, robot@craigslist.org  to beingpatriotic @gma il.com (confirming     Craigslist"
40,24,advertisement).
40,25,92
40,26,"8/18-19/16 Twitter DMs , @marc h_for_trump &"
40,27,ID 100011698576461 (Taylor Brooks) &
40,28,(arranging to pay for plane tickets and for a
40,29,"Facebook Message, ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skibe r) &"
40,30,"(discussing payment for rally supplies); 8/18/16 Twitter DM,"
40,31,(discussing payment for construction materials).
40,32,32
40,33,NA
41,1,U.S. Department of Justice
41,2,"Atterfle)"" Werk Predttet // Mfl-)1 Cefltftit'I.Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct·im. P. 6(e)"
41,3,7. Interactions and Contacts with the Trump Campaign
41,4,The investigation identified two different forms of connections between the IRA and
41,5,. members of the Trump Campaign. (The investigation identified no similar connections between
41,6,"the IRA and the Clinton Campaign .) First, on multiple occasions, members and surrogates of the"
41,7,"Trump Campaign promoted-typically          by linking, retweeting , or similar methods of reposting -"
41,8,pro-Trump or anti-Clinton content published by the IRA through IRA-controlled social media
41,9,"accounts. Additionally, in a few instances, IRA employees represented thems elves as U.S. persons"
41,10,to communicate with members of the Trump Campaign in an effort to seek assistance and
41,11,coordination on IRA-organized political rallies inside the United States.
41,12,a. Trump Campaign Promotion of IRA Political Materials
41,13,"Among the U.S. ""leaders of public opinion"" targeted by the IRA were various members"
41,14,"and surrogates of the Trump Campaign. In total, Trump Campaign affiliates promoted dozens of"
41,15,"tweets, posts , and other political content created by the IRA ."
41,16,Posts from the IRA-controlled Twitter account @TE N_GOP we re cited or retweeted by
41,17,"multiple Trump Campaign officials and surrogates, including Donald J. Trump Jr.,96 Eric"
41,18,96
41,19,"See, e.g , @DonaldJTrumpJr 10/26/16 Tweet (""RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Thousands of"
41,20,"names changed on voter rolls in Indiana. Police investigating #Voterfraud . #DrainTheSwamp."");"
41,21,"@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/2/ 16 Tweet (""RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING: #VoterFraud by counting tens of"
41,22,"thousands of ineligible mail in Hillary votes being reported in Broward County, Florida."");"
41,23,"@DonaldJTrumpJr 11/8/16 Tweet (""RT @TEN_GOP: This vet passed away last month before he could"
41,24,"vote for Trump. Here he is in his #MAGA hat. #voted #ElectionDay.""). Trump Jr. retweeted additional"
41,25,@TEN_ GOP content subsequent to the election.
41,26,33
41,27,NA
42,1,U.S. Department of Justice
42,2,AtterHe'.')'·'Nerlc PFOtittet// Mey CeHtaiHMaterial Preteeteti UHtier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
42,3,"Trump, 97 Kellyanne Conway,9 8 Brad Parscale, 99 and Michael T. Flynn. 100 These posts included"
42,4,"allegations of voter fraud, 101 as well as allegations that Secretary Clinton had mishandled"
42,5,classified information. 102
42,6,"-   A November 7, 2016 post from the IRA-controlled"
42,7,Twitter account @Pame la_ Moore 13 was retweeted by             THANKYOUforyoursuppo rt Miami!Mylearnjusl sha1ed   pholos lromYQU1
42,8,TRUMP SIGN WAVING DAY.yes1e1da.
42,9,y! I bve you - and lhereis no question
42,10,"Donald J. Trump Jr. 103                                         • TOGETHER, WE WILL MAKEAMEAICAGREATAGAIN!"
42,11,"On September 19, 2017, President Trump's personal               .."
42,12,account @realDonaldTrump responded to a tweet from
42,13,the IRA-controlled account @ l0_gop (the backup
42,14,"account of @TEN _ GOP, which had already been"
42,15,"deactivated by Twitter). The tweet read: ""We love you,"
42,16,"Mr. President!"" 104"
42,17,IRA employees monitored the reaction of the Trump
42,18,"Campaign and , later, Trump Administration officials to their"
42,19,"tweets. For example, on August 23 , 2016, the IRA-"
42,20,"controlled persona ""Matt Skiber"" Facebook account sent a"
42,21,"message to a U.S. Tea Party activist, writin.g that ""Mr."
42,22,"Trump posted about our event in Miami! This is great!"" 105"
42,23,The IRA employee included a screenshot of candidate
42,24,"Trump ' s Facebook account, which included a post about the                Screenshot of Trump Facebook"
42,25,"August 20, 2016 political rallies organized by the IRA.                      Account (from Matt Skibe,)"
42,26,97
42,27,"@Er icTrump 10/20/16 Tweet (""RT @TEN_GOP: BREAKING Hillary shuts down press"
42,28,"conference when asked about DNC Operatives corruption & #VoterFraud #debatenight #TrumpB"")."
42,29,98
42,30,"@Ke llyannePo lls 11/6/16 Tweet (""RT @TEN_ GOP: Mother of jailed sailor: ' Hold Hillary to"
42,31,"same standards as my son on Classified info' #hillarysemail #WeinerGa te."")."
42,32,99
42,33,"@parsca le 10/15/16 Tweet (""Thousands of deplorables chant ing to the media: ' Tell The Truth!'"
42,34,"RT if you are also done w/ biased Media! #Friday Feeling"")."
42,35,100
42,36,"@GenF lynn 11/7/16 (retweeting @TEN_GOP post that included in part "" @rea!Dona ldTrum p"
42,37,"& @m ike_pence will be our next POTUS & VPOTUS."")."
42,38,101
42,39,"@TEN_ GOP 10/11/ 16 Tweet (""North Carolina finds 2,214 voters over the age of 110!!"")."
42,40,102
42,41,"@TEN_ GOP 11/6/ 16 Tweet (""Mother of jailed sailor: ' Hold Hillary to same standa rds as my"
42,42,"son on classified info #hillaryemail #WeinerGate.""')."
42,43,103
42,44,"@Dona ldJTrumpJr 11/7/16 Tweet (""RT @Pamela _M oore 13: Detroit resid ents speak out against"
42,45,"the failed policies of Obama, Hillary & democrats .... "")."
42,46,104
42,47,"@rea!Dona ldTrump 9/19/17 (7 :33 p.m.) Tweet (""THANK YOU for your support Miami! My"
42,48,"team just shared photos from your TRUMP SIGN WA YING DAY , yesterday! I lov e you- and there is no"
42,49,"question - TOGETHER , WE WILL MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN! "")."
42,50,105
42,51,"8/23/16 Facebook Message , ID 100009922908461 (Matt Skiber) to ID"
42,52,34
42,53,NA
43,1,U.S. Department of Justice
43,2,"Atten1.e,· Werk Prea1:1et// May CeHtttiHMaterial Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
43,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
43,4,I•
43,5,b. Contact with Trump Campaign Officials in Connection to Rallies
43,6,"Starting in June 2016, the IRA contacted different U.S. persons affiliated with the Trump"
43,7,Campaign in an effort to coordinate pro-Trump IRA-organized rallies inside the United States. In
43,8,"all cases, the IRA contacted the Campaign while claiming to be U.S. political activists working on"
43,9,behalf of a conservative grassroots organization. The IRA's contacts included requests for signs
43,10,"and other materials to use at rallies, 107 as well as requests to promote the rallies and help coordinate"
43,11,Iogistics. 108 While certain campaign volunteers agreed to provide the requested support (for
43,12,"example, agreeing to set aside a number of signs), the investigation has not identified evidence"
43,13,that any Trump Campaign official understood the requests were coming from foreign nationals.
43,14,***
43,15,"In sum, the investigation established that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election"
43,16,"through the ""active measures"" social media campaign carried out by the IRA, an organization"
43,17,"funded by Prigozhin and companies that he controlled . As explained further in Volume I, Section"
43,18,"V.A, infra, the Office concluded (and a grand jury has alleged) that Prigozhin, his companies , and"
43,19,"IRA employees violated U.S. law through these operations, principally by undermining through"
43,20,deceptive acts the work of federal agencies charged with regulating foreign influence in U.S.
43,21,elections .
43,22,107
43,23,"See, e.g., 8/16/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com to -@donaldtrump.com            (asking for"
43,24,"~Pence             signs for Florida rally);           8/18/16 Email, joshmilton024@gmail.com             to"
43,25,"-@donaldtrump.com               (a-kin for Trump/Pence signs for Florida rally); 8/12/16 Email,"
43,26,"joshmilton024@gmail.com to              @donaldtrump.com (asking for ""contact phone numbers for Trump"
43,27,"Campaign affiliates"" in various Florida cities and signs)."
43,28,108
43,29,"8/15/16 Email,                                 to joshmilton024"
43,30,"locations to the ""Florida Goes Trump,"" list); 8/16/16 Email,                                             to"
43,31,joshmi1ton024@gmail.com (volunteering to send an email blast to followers).
43,32,35
43,33,NA
44,1,U.S. Department of Justice
44,2,"Attem1:eyWork Prod1:1et/,' M1tyCot1t1tit1      Mftteri1tlProteeted Ut1derFed. R. Crifl'I.P. 6(e)"
44,3,III.  RUSSIAN HACKING AND DUMPING OPERATIONS
44,4,"Beginning in March 2016, units of the Russian Federation ' s Main Intelligence Directorate"
44,5,"of the General Staff (GRU) hacked the computers and email accounts of organizations , e·mployees ,"
44,6,"and volunteers supporting the Clinton Campaign, including the email account of campaign"
44,7,"chairman John Podesta. Starting in April 2016, the GRU hacked into the computer networks of the"
44,8,Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) and the Democratic National
44,9,Committee (DNC). The GRU targeted hundreds of email accounts used by Clinton Campaign
44,10,"employees , advisors , and volunteers. In total, the GRU stole hundreds of thousands of documents"
44,11,from the compromised email accounts and networks. 109 The GRU later released stolen Clinton
44,12,"Campaign and DNC documents through online personas , ""DCLeaks"" and ""G uccifer 2.0,"" and later"
44,13,through the organization WikiLeaks. The release of the documents was designed and timed to
44,14,interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election and undermine the Clinton Campaign.
44,15,", the Trump Campaign"
44,16,about WikiLeaks 's activities. The investigation was unable to resolve
44,17,"WikiLeaks's release of the stolen Podesta emails on October 7,"
44,18,"2016, the same day a video from years earlier was published of Trump using graphic language"
44,19,about women.
44,20,A. GRU Hacking Directed at the Clinton Campaign
44,21,1. GRU Units Target the Clinton Campaign
44,22,Two military units of the GRU carried out the computer intrusions into the Clinton
44,23,"Campaign, DNC, and DCCC: Military Units 26165 and 74455. 110 Military Unit 26165 is a GRU"
44,24,"cyber unit dedicated to targeting military , political , governmental , and non-governmental"
44,25,"organizations outside of Russia, including in the United States. 111 The unit was sub-divided into"
44,26,"departments with different specialties. One department, for example, developed specialized"
44,27,"malicious software ""malware"" , while another de artment conducted large-scale spearphishing"
44,28,campaigns. 112 jfllllililliliilllilli lilillllll~                              a bitcoin mining operation to
44,29,109
44,30,"As discussed in Section V below, our Office charged 12 GRU officers for crimes arising from"
44,31,"the hacking of these computers, principally with conspiring to commit computer intrusion s, in violation of"
44,32,"18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371. See Volume I, Section V.B, infra; Indictment , United States v. Netyksho , No."
44,33,"I :18-cr-215 (D.D.C. July 13, 2018), Doc. 1 (""Netyksho Indictment"") ."
44,34,110
44,35,"Netyksho Indictment  ,r1."
44,36,111
44,37,"Separate from this Office 's indictment of GRU officers , in October 2018 a grand jury sitting in"
44,38,the Western District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging certain members of Unit 26165 with
44,39,"hacking the U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, the World Anti-Doping Agency, and other international sport"
44,40,"associations. United States v. Aleksei Sergeyevich Morenets, No. 18-263 (W.D. Pa.)."
44,41,112
44,42,"A spearphishing ema il is designed to appear as though it originates from a trusted source, and"
44,43,"solicits information to enable the sender to gain access to an account or network, or causes the recipient to"
44,44,36
44,45,NA
45,1,U.S. Department of Justice
45,2,"MorAey Work Prodttet // Ma:,· CoAiait\ Material Protected UAder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
45,3,113
45,4,secure bitcoins used to purchase computer infrastructure used in hacking operations.
45,5,Military Unit 74455 is a related GRU unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber
45,6,"operations. Unit 74455 assisted in the release of documents stolen by Unit 26165, the promotion"
45,7,"of those releases, and the publication of anti-Clinton content on social media accounts operated by"
45,8,the GRU. Officers from Unit 74455 separately hacked computers belonging to state boards of
45,9,"elections, secretaries of state, and U.S. companies that supplied software and other technology"
45,10,related to the administration of U.S. elections. 114
45,11,"Beginning in mid-March 2016, Unit 26165 had primary responsibility for hacking the"
45,12,"DCCC and DNC , as well as email accounts of individuals affiliated with the Clinton Campaign: 115"
45,13,Unit 26165 used                                                    Investigative Technique
45,14,began before the GRU had obtained any credentials or gained access
45,15,"to these networks , indicating that the later DCCC and DNC intrusions were not crimes of"
45,16,opportunity but rather the result of targeting. 116
45,17,GRU officers also sent hundreds of spearphishing emails to the work and personal email
45,18,"accounts of Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers. Between March 10, 2016 and March"
45,19,"15, 2016 , Unit 26165 appears to have sent approximately 90 spearphishing emails to email"
45,20,"accounts at hillaryclinton.com. Starting on March 15, 2016, the GRU began targeting Google"
45,21,"email accounts used by Clinton Campaign employees, along with a smaller number of dnc.org"
45,22,email accounts. 117
45,23,The GRU spearphishing operation enabled it to gain access to numerous email accounts of
45,24,"Clinton Campaign employees and volunteers, including campaign chairman John Podesta , junior"
45,25,"volunteers assigned to the Clinton Campaign's advance team, informal Clinton Campaign"
45,26,"advisors, and a DNC employee. 118 GRU officers stole tens of thousands of emails from"
45,27,"spearphishing victims, including various Clinton Campaign-related communications."
45,28,download malware that enables the sender to gain access to an account or network. Netyksho Indictment
45,29,~ 10.
45,30,113
45,31,Bitcoin mining consists of unlocking new bitcoins by solving computational problems.  Ill
45,32,1111    kept its newly mined coins in an account on the bitcoin exchange platform CEX.io.     To make
45,33,"purchases, the GRU routed funds into other accounts through transactions designed to obscure the source"
45,34,of funds. Netyksho Indictment~ 62.
45,35,114
45,36,Netyksho Indictment~ 69.
45,37,115
45,38,Netyksho Indictment~ 9.
45,39,116
45,40,"See SM-2589105, serials 144 & 495."
45,41,118 Investigative Technique
45,42,37
45,43,NA
46,1,U.S. Department of Justice
46,2,Attert1ey Werk P12ed1:1et  // :Mt:tyCmttaitt Materit:tlPreteeted Ut1derFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
46,3,2. Intrusions into the DCCC and DNC Networks
46,4,a. Initial Access
46,5,"By no later than April 12, 2016, the GRU had gained access to the DCCC computer"
46,6,network using the credentials stolen from a DCCC employee who had been successfully
46,7,"spearphished the week before. Over the ensuing weeks, the GRU traversed the network,"
46,8,identifying different computers connected to the DCCC network. By stealing network access
46,9,credentials along the way (including those of IT administrators with unrestricted access to the
46,10,"system), the GRU compromised approximately 29 different computers on the DCCC network. 119"
46,11,"Approximately six days after first hacking into the DCCC network, on April 18, 2016,"
46,12,GRU officers gained access to the DNC network via a virtual private network (VPN) connection 120
46,13,"between the DCCC and DNC networks. 121 Between April 18, 2016 and June 8, 2016, Unit 26165"
46,14,"compromised more than 30 computers on the DNC network, including the DNC mail server and"
46,15,shared file server. 122
46,16,b. Implantation of Ma/ware on DCCC and DNC Networks
46,17,Unit 26165 implanted on the DCCC and DNC networks two types of customized
46,18,"malware, 123 known as ""X-Agent"" and ""X-Tunnel ""; Mimikatz, a credential-harvesting tool ; and"
46,19,"rar.exe , a tool used in these intrusions to compile and compress materials for exfiltration. X-Agent"
46,20,"was a multi -function hacking tool that allowed Unit 26165 to log keystrokes , take screenshots, and"
46,21,"gather other data about the infected computers (e.g., file directories , operating systems). 124 X-"
46,22,Tunnel was a hacking tool that created an encrypted connection between the victim DCCC/DNC
46,23,computers and GRU-controlled computers outside the DCCC and DNC networks that was capable
46,24,of large -scale data transfers. 125 GRU officers then used X-Tunnel to exfiltrate stolen data from the
46,25,victim computers.
46,26,120
46,27,"A VPN extends a private network, allowing users to send and receive data across public"
46,28,networks (such as the internet) as if the connecting computer was directly connected to the private network.
46,29,The VPN in this case had been created to give a small number of DCCC employees access to certain
46,30,"databases housed on the DNC network. Therefore, while the DCCC employees were outside the DNC's"
46,31,"private network , they could access parts of the DNC network from their DCCC computers."
46,32,Investigative Technique
46,33,Investigative Technique
46,34,123
46,35,"""Malware"" is short for malicious software, and here refers to software designed to allow a third"
46,36,party to infiltrate a computer without the consent or knowledge of the computer's user or operator.
46,37,124
46,38,Investigative Technique
46,39,125
46,40,Investigative Technique
46,41,38
46,42,NA
47,1,U.S. Department of Justice
47,2,Att:on1eyWork Proattet // Mtty Col'l:tttil'I:MttterittlProteetea Unser Fea. R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
47,3,"To operate X-Agent and X-Tunnel on the DCCC and DNC networks, Unit 26165 officers"
47,4,set up a group of computers outside those networks to communicate with the implanted
47,5,"malware. 126 The first set of GRU-controlled computers, known by the GRU as ""middle servers,"""
47,6,sent and received messages to and from malware on the DNC/DCCC networks. The middle
47,7,"servers, in turn, relayed messages to a second set of GRU-controlled com;§'ters, labeled internally"
47,8,"by the GRU as an ""AMS Panel."" The AMS Panel               jjjff  11'•§\1flffl       1•j'1·-     served as a"
47,9,nerve center through which GRU officers monitored and directed the malware's operations on the
47,10,DNC/DCCC networks. 127
47,11,!   . •       . • •            •
47,12,: Investigative Technique
47,13,Investigative Technique
47,14,Investigative Technique
47,15,126
47,16,"In connection with these intrusions, the GRU used computers (virtua l private networks,"
47,17,"alia,  -~-~-Ii"
47,18,"dedicated servers operated by hosting companies, etc.) that it leased from third-party providers located all"
47,19,"over the world. The investi ation identified rental a reements and payments for computers located in, inter"
47,20,targeting the U.S. election.
47,21,127
47,22,IIMliilili
47,23,"Netyksho Indictment ,r25."
47,24,all of which were used in the operations
47,25,128
47,26,"Netyksho Indictment ,r24( c)."
47,27,129
47,28,"Netyksho Indictment ,r24(b )."
47,29,39
47,30,NA
48,1,U.S. Department of Justice
48,2,Atlorttey Work Prodttet // May Cotttaifl Material Proteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee)
48,3,The Arizona-based AMS Panel also stored thousands of files containing keylogging
48,4,sessions captured through X-Agent. These sessions were captured as GRU officers monitored
48,5,DCCC and DNC employees' work on infected computers regularly between April 2016 and June
48,6,"2016. Data captured in these key logging sessions included passwords, internal communications"
48,7,"between employees, banking information , and sensitive personal information."
48,8,c. Theft of Documents from DNC and DCCC Networks
48,9,Officers from Unit 26165 stole thousands of documents from the DCCC and DNC
48,10,"networks, including significant amounts of data pertaining to the 2016 U.S. federal election s."
48,11,"Stolen documents included internal strategy documents , fundraising data , opposition research , and"
48,12,emails from the work inboxes of DNC employeesY 0
48,13,The GRU began stealing DCCC data shortly after it gained access to the network. On Ap ril
48,14,"14, 2016 (approximately three days after the initial intrusion) GRU officers downloaded rar .exe"
48,15,"onto the DCCC's document server. The following day , the GRU searched one compromised"
48,16,"DCCC computer for files containing search terms that included ""Hillary ,"" ""DNC, "" ""Cruz ,"" and"
48,17,"""Trump."" 131 On April 25, 2016 , the GRU collected and compressed PDF and Microsoft documents"
48,18,from folders on the DCCC ' s shared file server that pertained to the 2016 election. 132 The GRU
48,19,appears to have compressed and exfiltrated over 70 gigabytes of data from thi s file server. 133
48,20,The GRU also stole documents from the DNC network shortly after gaining access . On
48,21,"April 22 , 2016, the GRU copied files from the DNC network to GRU-controlled computers. Stolen"
48,22,documents included the DNC' s opposition research into candidate Trump .134 Betwe en
48,23,"approximately May 25, 2016 and June 1, 2016 , GRU officers accessed the DNC's mail server"
48,24,"from a GRU-controlled computer leased inside the United States. 135 During these connection s,"
48,25,130
48,26,"Netyksho Indictment ,i,i 27-29 ; Investigative Technique"
48,27,131
48,28,Investigative Technique
48,29,Investigative Technique
48,30,Investigative Technique
48,31,· Investigative Technique
48,32,"SM-2589105-HACK, serial 5. Investigative Technique"
48,33,135 Investigative Technique
48,34,"-      See SM-2589105-GJ, serial 649 . As part of its investigation, the FBI later received images ofDNC"
48,35,"servers and copies of relevant traffi c logs. Netyksho Indictment ,i,i 28-29."
48,36,40
48,37,NA
49,1,U.S. Department of Justice
49,2,Attarl'ley Werk Predttet // Mey Cel'ltail'l Material Preteeted Unaer Fed. R. Cril'l'I.P. 6(e)
49,3,"Unit 26165 officers appear to have stolen thousands of emails and attachments , which were later"
49,4,released by WikiLeaks in July 2016. 136
49,5,B. Dissemination of the Hacked Materials
49,6,"The GRU ' s operations extended beyond stealing materials , and included releasing"
49,7,documents stolen from the Clinton Campaign and its supporters. The GRU carried out the
49,8,anonymous release through two fictitious online personas that it created-DCLeaks             and Guccifer
49,9,2.0-and later through the organization WikiLeaks.
49,10,1. DCLeaks
49,11,"The GRU began planning the releases at least as early as April 19, 2016, when Unit 26165"
49,12,registered the domain dcleaks.com through a service that anonymized the registrant. 137 Unit 26165
49,13,paid for the registration using a pool of bitcoin that it had mined. 138 The dcleaks.com landing page
49,14,"pointed to different tranches of stolen documents , arranged by victim or subject matter. Other"
49,15,dcleaks.com pages contained indexes of the stolen emails that were being released (bearing the
49,16,"sender , recipient, and date of the email). To control access and the timing of releas es, pages were"
49,17,sometimes password-protected for a period of time and later made unrestricted to the public.
49,18,"Starting in June 2016 , the GRU posted stolen documents onto the website dcleaks.com ,"
49,19,including documents stolen from a number of individuals associated with the Clinton Campaign.
49,20,"These documents appeared to have originated from personal email accounts (in particular , Google"
49,21,"and Microsoft accounts) , rather than the DNC and DCCC computer networks. DCLeaks victims"
49,22,"included an advisor to the Clinton Campaign , a former DNC employee and Clinton Campaign"
49,23,"employee, and four other campaign volunte ers. 139 The GRU released through dcleaks.com"
49,24,"thousands of documents , including personal identifying and financial information , internal"
49,25,"correspondence related to the Clinton Campaign and prior political jobs, and fundraising files and"
49,26,information. 140
49,27,136
49,28,"Netyksho Indictment ,i 29. The last-in-time DNC email released by WikiLeaks was dated May"
49,29,"25, 2016, the same period of time during which the GRU gained access to the DNC's email server."
49,30,"Netyksho Indictment ,i 45."
49,31,137
49,32,"Netyksho Indictment ,i 35. Approximately a week before the registration of dcleaks.com, the"
49,33,same actors attem ted to re ister the website electionleaks.com using the same domain registration service.
49,34,138
49,35,"See SM-2589105, serial 181; Netyksho Indictment ,i 2l(a)."
49,36,140
49,37,"See, e.g., Internet Archive, ""htt s://dcleaks.com/"" archive date Nov. 10, 2016). Additionally,"
49,38,"DCLeaks released documents relating to                                                   , emails belonging"
49,39,"to_,               and emails from 2015 relating to Republican Party employees (under the portfolio name"
49,40,"""The United States Republican Party""). ""The United States Republican Party"" portfolio contained"
49,41,"approximately 300 emails from a variety of GOP members, PACs, campaigns, state parties, and businesses"
49,42,"dated between May and October 2015. According to open-source reporting, these victims shared the same"
49,43,41
49,44,NA
50,1,U.S. Department of Justice
50,2,AM:6rt~eyW6rk Prndttet // Mtty CetttttiH Mttterittl Pr6teeted Umler Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
50,3,"GRU officers operated a Facebook page under the DCLeaks moniker, which they primarily"
50,4,used to promote releases of materials. 141 The Facebook page was administered through a small
50,5,number of preexisting GRU-controlled Facebook accounts. 142
50,6,"GRU officers also used the DCLeaks Facebook account, the Twitter account @dcleaks_,"
50,7,and the email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com to communicate privately with reporters and
50,8,· other U.S. persons. GRU officers using the DCLeaks persona gave certain reporters early access
50,9,to archives of leaked files by sending them links and passwords to pages on the dcleaks.com
50,10,"website that had not yet become public. For example , on July 14, 2016, GRU officers operating"
50,11,under the DCLeaks persona sent a link and password for a non-public DCLeaks webpage to a U.S.
50,12,"reporter via the Facebook account. 143 Similarly, on September 14, 2016, GRU officers sent"
50,13,"reporters Twitter direct messages from @dcleaks_, with a password to another non-public part of"
50,14,the dcleaks.com website. 144
50,15,The DCLeaks.com website remained operational and public until March 2017.
50,16,2. Guccifer 2.0
50,17,"On June 14, 2016, the DNC and its cyber-response team announced the breach of the DNC"
50,18,"network and suspected theft of DNC documents. In the statements, the cyber-response team"
50,19,"alleged that Russian state-sponsored actors (which they referred to as ""Fancy Bear"") were"
50,20,"responsible for the breach. 145 Apparently in response to that announcement, on June 15, 2016,"
50,21,GRU officers using the persona Guccifer 2.0 created a WordPress blog. In the hours leading up
50,22,"to the launch of that WordPress blog, GRU officers logged into a Moscow-based server used and"
50,23,"managed by Unit 74455 and searched for a number of specific words and phrases in English,"
50,24,"including ""some hundred sheets,"" ""illuminati, "" and ""worldwide known."" Approximatel y two"
50,25,"hours after the last of those searches, Guccifer 2.0 published its first post, attributing the DNC"
50,26,server hack to a lone Romanian hacker and using several of the unique English words and phra ses
50,27,that the GRU officers had searched for that day. 146
50,28,"Tennessee-based web-hosting company, called Smartech Corporation. William Bastone , RNC E-Mail Was,"
50,29,"In Fact, Ha cked By Russians, The Smoking Gun (Dec. 13, 2016)."
50,30,141
50,31,"Netyksho Indictment   ,r38."
50,32,142
50,33,"See, e.g., Facebook Account 100008825623541 (Alice Donovan)."
50,34,143
50,35,"7/14/ 16 Facebook Message, ID 793058100795341 (DC Leaks) to ID"
50,36,144
50,37,"See, e. ., 9/14/ 16 Twitte r DM,                                          ; 9/14/16 Twitter OM,"
50,38,"@dcleak s_ to                                      . The messages read: "" Hi https://t.co/QTvKUjQc Ox pass :"
50,39,"KvFsgo/o*14@gPgu&amp; enjo y;)."""
50,40,145
50,41,"Dmitri Alperovitch, Bears in the Mids t: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee,"
50,42,"CrowdStrike Blog (June 14, 2016). Crow dStrike upd ated its post after the June 15, 2016 post by Guccifer"
50,43,2 .0 claiming responsibility for the intrusion.
50,44,146
50,45,"Netyksho Indictment   ,r,r41-4 2."
50,46,42
50,47,NA
51,1,U.S. Department of Justice
51,2,AtterHey '1¥ei-lcPfed1:1et// May CeHtaiHMaterial Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
51,3,"That same day, June 15, 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 WordPress blog to begin"
51,4,releasing to the public documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC computer networks. The
51,5,Guccifer 2.0 persona ultimately released thousands of documents stolen from the DNC and DCCC
51,6,"in a series of blog posts between June 15, 2016 and October 18, 2016. 147 Released documents"
51,7,included opposition research performed by the DNC (including a memorandum analyzing
51,8,"potential criticisms of candidate Trump) , internal policy documents (such as recommendations on"
51,9,"how to address politically sensitive issues), analyses of specific congressional races , and"
51,10,"fundraising documents. Releases were organized around thematic issues, such as specific states"
51,11,"(e.g., Florida and Pennsylvania) that were perceived as competitive in the 2016 U.S. presidential"
51,12,election.
51,13,"Beginning in late June 2016, the GRU also used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to release"
51,14,"documents directly to reporters and other interested individuals. Specifically, on June 27, 2016,"
51,15,"Guccifer 2.0 sent an email to the news outlet The Smoking Gun offering to provide ""exclusive"
51,16,"access to some leaked emails linked [to] Hillary Clinton's staff."" 148 The GRU later sent the"
51,17,reporter a password and link to a locked portion of the dcleaks.com website that contained an
51,18,archive of emails stolen by Unit 26165 from a Clinton Campaign volunteer in March 2016. 149 That
51,19,the Guccifer 2.0 persona provided reporters access to a restricted portion of the DCLeaks website
51,20,tends to indicate that both personas were operated by the same or a closely-related group of
51,21,people. 1so
51,22,The GRU continued its release efforts through Guccifer 2.0 into August 2016. For
51,23,"example, on August 15, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a candidate for the U.S. Congress"
51,24,"documents related to the candidate's opponent. 1st On August 22, 2016, the Guccifer 2.0 persona"
51,25,transferred approximately 2.5 gigabytes of Florida-related data stolen from the DCCC to a U.S .
51,26,"blogger covering Florida politics. 1s2 On August 22, 2016 , the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent a U.S ."
51,27,reporter documents stolen from the DCCC pertaining to the Black Lives Matter movement. 1s3
51,28,147
51,29,"Releases of documents on the Guccifer 2.0 blog occurred on June 15, 2016; June 20, 2016; June"
51,30,"21, 2016; July 6, 2016; July 14, 2016; August 12, 2016; August 15, 2016; August 21, 2016; August 31,"
51,31,"2016; September 15, 2016; September 23, 2016; October 4, 2016; and October 18, 2016."
51,32,"~~ccifer20@aol.fr                               to                            (subject ""leaked emails""); ■"
51,33,149
51,34,"6/27/16 Email, uccifer20 @aol.fr to                              (sub' ect ""leaked emails"" ;"
51,35,; see also 6127/16          uccifer20@aol.fr to
51,36,"(subject ""leaked emails"");                                      ( claiming DCLeaks was a ""Wikileaks sub"
51,37,"project"")."
51,38,150
51,39,"Before sending the reporter the link and password to the closed DCLeaks website, and in an"
51,40,apparent effort to deflect attention from the fact that DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0 were operated by the same
51,41,"organization, the Guccifer 2.0 persona sent the repm1er an email stating that DCLea ks was a ""W ikileaks"
51,42,"sub project"" and that Guccifer 2.0 had asked DCLeaks to release the leaked emails with ""closed access"" to"
51,43,give reporters a preview of them .
51,44,151
51,45,"Netyksho Indictment   ,r43(a)."
51,46,152
51,47,"Netyksho Indictment ,r43(b )."
51,48,153
51,49,"Netyksho Indictment ,r43(c)."
51,50,43
51,51,NA
52,1,U.S. Department of Justice
52,2,AtierHey Werk Predttet // Moy CeHtttiHMaterial Preteeted UHeer Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
52,3,"In early August 2016 ,                                 Twitter's suspension of the"
52,4,"Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account. After it was reinstated, GRU officers posing as Guccifer 2.0 wrote"
52,5,"1;c•)Wp     ,,ia private message, ""thank u for writing back ... do u find anyt[h]ing interesting in the"
52,6,"docs i posted? "" On August 17, 2016, the GRU added, ""please tell me if i can help u anyhow . .."
52,7,"it would be a great pleasure to me."" On September 9, 2016 , the"
52,8,Guccifer 2.0-referred to a stolen DCCC docum ent posted online and asked •
52,9,GRUi;(T);f       posing as
52,10,"""what do u"
52,11,"think of the info on the turnout model for the democrats entire presidential campaign. "" -"
52,12,"responded , ""pretty standard. "" 155         The investigation did not identify evidence of other"
52,13,communications between-                and Guccifer 2.0.
52,14,3. Use of WikiLeaks
52,15,"In order to expand its interference in the 20 I 6 U.S. presidential election, the GRU units"
52,16,transferred many of the documents they stole from the DNC and the chairman of the Clinton
52,17,Campaign to WikiLeaks. GRU officers used both the DCLeaks and Guccifer 2 .0 personas to
52,18,"communicate with WikiLeaks through Twitter private messaging and through encrypted channels ,"
52,19,including possibly through WikiLeaks ' s private communication system .
52,20,. a. WikiLeaks's Expressed Opposition Toward the Clinton Campaign
52,21,"WikiLeaks , and particularly its founder Julian Assange, privat ely expressed opposition to"
52,22,"candidate Clinton well before the first release of stolen documents . In November 2015 , Assange"
52,23,"wrote to other member s and associates of WikiLeaks that ""[w]e believe it would be much better"
52,24,for GOP to win ... Dems +Media + liberals woudl [sic] then form a block to reign in their worst
52,25,"qualities. . . . With Hillary in charge, GOP will be pushing for her worst qualities. ,"
52,26,"dems+media+neoliberals will be mute . ... She' s a bright , well connected, sadisitic sociopath ."" 156"
52,27,"In March 2016, WikiLeaks released a searchable archive of approx imately 30 ,000 Clinton"
52,28,"emails that had been obtained through FOIA litigation. 157 While designing the archive , one"
52,29,WikiLeaks member explained the reason for building the archive to another associate:
52,30,154
52,31,155  Harm to Ongoing Matter
52,32,156
52,33,"1l/1 9/ 15 Twitter Group Chat , Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLea ks et al. Assange"
52,34,"also wrote that, ""GOP will generate a lot oposition [sic], includin g through dumb moves. Hillary will do"
52,35,"the same thing , but co-opt the liberal opposition and the GOP opposition . Hence biliary has greater freedom"
52,36,"to statt war s than the GOP and has the will to do so."" Id."
52,37,157
52,38,"WikiLeaks, ""Hillary Clinton Email Archive,"" availabl e at https://wikileaks.org/clinton-emai ls/."
52,39,44
52,40,NA
53,1,U.S. Department of Justice
53,2,AttorHey Work Prodttet // Mtty Cofl:tttifl:Mttterittl Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
53,3,"[W]e want this repository to become ""the place"" to search for background on hillary's"
53,4,plotting at the state department during 2009-2013. . . . Firstly because its useful and will
53,5,"annoy Hillary, but secondly because we want to be seen to be a resource/player in the US"
53,6,"election, because eit [sic] may en[]courage people to send us even more important leaks. 158"
53,7,b. WikiLeaks's First Contact with Guccifer 2.0 and DCLeaks
53,8,Shortly after the GRU's first release of stolen documents through dcleaks.com in June
53,9,"2016, GRU officers also used the DCLeaks persona to contact WikiLeaks about possible"
53,10,"coordination in the future release of stolen emails. On June 14, 2016, @dcleaks _ sent a direct"
53,11,"message to @WikiLeaks, noting, ""You announced your organization was preparing to publish"
53,12,"more Hillary's emails. We are ready to support you. We have some sensitive information too, in"
53,13,"particular, her financial documents. Let 's do it to ether. What do ou think about ublishin our"
53,14,"info at the same moment? Thank ou."" 159"
53,15,"Around the same time , WikiLeaks initiated communications with the GRU persona"
53,16,"Guccifer 2.0 shortly after it was used to release documents stolen from the DNC. On June 22,"
53,17,"2016, seven days after Guccifer 2.0 's first releases of stolen DNC documents, WikiLeaks used"
53,18,Twitter's direct message function to contact the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter account and suggest that
53,19,"Guccifer 2.0 ""[s]end any new material [stolen from the DNC] here for us to review and it will have"
53,20,"a much higher impact than what you are doing."" 160"
53,21,"On July 6, 2016, WikiLeaks again contacted Guccifer 2.0 through Twitter's private"
53,22,"messaging function , writing, ""if you have anything hillary related we want it in the next tweo [sic]"
53,23,days prefab le [sic] because the DNC is approaching and she will solidify bernie supporters behind
53,24,"her after."" The Guccifer 2.0 persona responded , ""ok ... i see."" WikiLeaks also explained, ""we"
53,25,think trump has only a 25% chance of winning against hillary ... so conflict between bernie and
53,26,"hillary is interesting."" 161"
53,27,c. The GRU's Transfer of Stolen Materials to WikiLeaks
53,28,"Both the GRU and WikiLeaks sought to hide their communications, which has limited the"
53,29,"Office's ability to collect all of the communications between them. Thus, although it is clear that"
53,30,"the stolen DNC and Podesta documents were transferred from the GRU to WikiLeaks , -"
53,31,Investigative Technique
53,32,158
53,33,"3/14/16 Twitter DM, @W ikiLeaks to                      Less than two weeks earlier, the same"
53,34,"account had been used to send a private message opposing the idea of Clinton "" in whitehouse with her"
53,35,"bloodlutt and amitions [sic] of empire with hawkish liberal-interventionist appointees."" 11/19/ 15 Twitter"
53,36,"Group Chat, Group ID 594242937858486276, @WikiLeaks et al."
53,37,159
53,38,"6/14/16 Twitter DM, @dcleaks_ to @WikiLeaks."
53,39,160
53,40,"Netyksho Indictm ent ,r47(a)."
53,41,161
53,42,"7/6/16 Twitter DMs , @WikiLeaks & @g uccifer_2."
53,43,45
53,44,NA
54,1,U.S. Department of Justice
54,2,Atterttey Werk Predttet // Ma:y Cettta:itt Mttteria:l Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
54,3,The Office was able to identify when the GRU (operating through its personas Guccifer 2.0
54,4,and DCLeaks) transferred some of the stolen documents to WikiLeaks through online archives set
54,5,"up by the GRU. Assan e had access to the internet from the Ecuadorian Embass in London,"
54,6,En land.
54,7,"On July 14, 2016, GRU officers used a Guccifer 2.0 email account to send WikiLeaks an"
54,8,"email bearing the subject ""big archive"" and the message ""a new attempt."" 163 The email contained"
54,9,"an encrypted attachment with the name ""wk dnc link I .txt.gpg."" 164 Using the Guccifer 2.0 Twitter"
54,10,"account, GRU officers sent WikiLeaks an encrypted file and instructions on how to open it. 165 On"
54,11,"July 18, 2016, WikiLeaks confirmed in a direct message to the Gucci fer 2.0 account that it had"
54,12,"""the 1Gb or so archive"" and would make a release of the stolen documents ""this week."" 166 On"
54,13,"July 22 , 2016, WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents stolen from the DNC"
54,14,computer networks. 167 The Democratic National Convention began three days later.
54,15,Similar communications occurred between WikiLeaks and the GRU-operated persona
54,16,"DCLeaks. On September 15, 2016, @dcleaks wrote to @WikiLeaks, ""hi there! I'm from DC"
54,17,Leaks. How could we discuss some submission-related issues? Am trying to reach out to you via
54,18,your secured chat but getting no response. I've got something that might interest you. You won't
54,19,"be disappointed, I promise. "" 168 The WikiLeaks account responded, ""Hi there ,"" without further"
54,20,elaboration. The @dcleaks_ account did not respond immediately.
54,21,"The same day, the Twitter account@guccifer _2 sent @dcleaks_ a direct message, which"
54,22,"is the first known contact between the personas. 169 During subsequent communications, the"
54,23,163
54,24,"This was not the GRU's first attempt at transferring data to WikiLeaks. On June 29 , 2016, the"
54,25,GRU used a Guccifer 2.0 email accou~ted                                  file to a WikiLeak s email account.
54,26,"6/29/16 Email, guccifer2@mail.com ~ (The email appears to have been"
54,27,undelivered.)
54,28,164
54,29,"See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS, serial 28 (analysis)."
54,30,165
54,31,"6/27/16 Twitt er DM, @Guccifer_2 to @WikiLeaks."
54,32,166
54,33,"7/18/16 Twitter OM, @G uccifer _2 & @WikiLeaks."
54,34,167
54,35,"""DNC Email Archive,"" WikiLeaks (Jul. 22, 2016), available at https: // wikileaks.org /dnc-em ails."
54,36,168
54,37,"9/15/16 Twitter DM , @dcleak s_ to @WikiLeaks."
54,38,169
54,39,"9/15/16 Twitter DM, @guccifer _ 2 to @d cleak s_."
54,40,46
54,41,NA
55,1,U.S. Department of Justice
55,2,AtterRe;· Werk Predttet // Mtt;· CeRtail'l Mftferial Preteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
55,3,Guccifer 2.0 persona informed DCLeaks that WikiLeaks was trying to contact DCLeaks and
55,4,arrange for a way to speak through encrypted emails. 170
55,5,An analysis of the metadata collected from the WikiLeaks site revealed that the stolen
55,6,"Podesta emails show a creation date of September 19, 2016. 171 Based on information about"
55,7,"Assange's computer and its possible operating system, this date may be when the GRU staged the"
55,8,stolen Podesta emails for transfer to WikiLeaks (as the GRU had previously done in July 2016 for
55,9,the DNC emails). 172 The WikiLeaks site also released PDFs and other documents taken from
55,10,Podesta that were attachments to emails in his account; these documents had a creation date of
55,11,"October 2, 2016, which appears to be the date the attachments were separately staged by"
55,12,WikiLeaks on its site. 173
55,13,"Beginning on September 20, 2016, WikiLeaks and DCLeaks resumed communications in"
55,14,"a brief exchange. On September 22, 2016, a DCLeaks email account dcleaksproject@gmail.com"
55,15,"sent an email to a WikiLeaks account with the subject ""S ubmission "" and the message ""Hi from"
55,16,"DCLeaks.""        The email contained a PGP-encr ted                               with the filename"
55,17,lllliliiliiiiil.■lliiljiillllllilili
55,18,174
55,19,"""wiki_mail.txt.gpg.""                                                      The email, however, bears a"
55,20,"number of similarities to the July 14, 2016 email in which GRU officers used the Guccifer 2.0"
55,21,"persona to give WikiLeaks access to the archive of DNC files. On September 22, 2016 (the same"
55,22,"day of DCLeaks' email to WikiLeaks), the Twitter account dcleaks sent a sin le messa e to"
55,23,WikiLeaks with the strin of characters
55,24,The Office cannot rule out that stolen documents were transferred to WikiLeaks through
55,25,"intermediaries who visited during the summer of 2016. For example, public reporting identified"
55,26,"A d       M ""'ll M       h       w·kiL k             . t h       h        . t d ""th th t     fi   fth"
55,27,Investigative Technique
55,28,170
55,29,"See SM-2589105-DCLEAKS,serial 28; 9/15/16 Twitter DM, @Guccifer_2 & @WikiLeaks."
55,30,171
55,31,"See SM-2284941, serials 63 & 64 Investigative Technique"
55,32,"At the time, certain Apple operating systems used a setting that left a"
55,33,downloaded file's creation date the same as the creation date shown on the host computer. This would
55,34,"explain why the creation date on WikiLeaks's version of the files was still September 19, 2016. See SM-"
55,35,"2284941, serial 62 Investigative Technique"
55,36,173
55,37,"When WikiLeaks saved attachments separately from the stolen emails, its computer system"
55,38,"appears to have treated each attachment as a new file and given it a new creation date. See SM-2284941,"
55,39,serials 63 & 64.
55,40,174
55,41,"See 9/22/16 Email, dcleaksproject@gmail.com"
55,42,175
55,43,"Ellen Nakashima et al., A German Hacker Offers a Rare Look Inside the Secretive World of"
55,44,"Julian Assange and WikiLeaks, Washington Post (Jan. 17, 2018)."
55,45,47
55,46,NA
56,1,U.S. Department of Justice
56,2,Atton=ieyWork Protl1:1et   // Mtl:yCottt:tl:ifl
56,3,Mtl:teritl:l
56,4,Proteetetl UAtierFetl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
56,5,Investigative Technique
56,6,.
56,7,"On October 7, 2016 , WikiLeaks released the first emails stolen from the Podesta email"
56,8,"account. In total, WikiLeaks released 33 tranches of stolen emails between October 7, 2016 and"
56,9,"November 7, 2016. The releases included private speeches given by Clinton; 177 internal"
56,10,communications between Podesta and other high-ranking members of the Clinton Campaign ; 178
56,11,"and correspondence related to the Clinton Foundation. 179 In total , WikiLeaks released over 50,000"
56,12,documents stolen from Podesta ' s personal email account. The last-in-time email released from
56,13,"Podesta' s account was dated Mar ch 21, 2016, two days after Podesta received a spearphishing"
56,14,email sent by the GRU.
56,15,d. WikiLeaks Statements Dissembling About the Source of Stolen Materials
56,16,"As reports attributing the DNC and DCCC hacks to the Russian government emerged ,"
56,17,WikiLeaks and Assange made several public statement s apparentl y designed to obscure the source
56,18,of the materials that WikiLeaks wa s releasing. The file-transfer evidence described abov e and
56,19,other information uncovered during the investigation discredit WikiLeaks's claims about the
56,20,source of material that it posted.
56,21,"Beginning in the summer of 2016 , Assange and WikiLeaks made a number of statements"
56,22,"about Seth Rich , a former DNC staff member who was killed in July 2016. The statements about"
56,23,"Rich implied falsely that he had been the source of the stolen DNC emails . On August 9, 2016,"
56,24,"the @WikiLeaks Twitt er account posted: ""ANNOUNCE: WikiLeaks has decided to issue a"
56,25,"US$20k reward for information leading to conviction for the murder ofDNC staffer Seth Rich. "" 180"
56,26,"Likewise, on August 25, 2016, Assange was asked in an interview, ""Why are you so interested in"
56,27,"Seth Rich's killer?"" and responded , ""We 're very interested in anythin g that might be a threat to"
56,28,"alleged Wikileaks sources. "" The interviewer responded to Assange ' s statement by commenting ,"
56,29,""" I know you don ' t want to reveal your source, but it certainly sounds like you 're suggesting a man"
56,30,"who leaked information to WikiLeaks wa s then murdered."" Assange replied , ""If there ' s someone"
56,31,"who's potentially connected to our publication , and that person has been murder ed in suspicious"
56,32,t
56,33,79
56,34,"Netyksho Indictment ,r43."
56,35,180
56,36,@WikiLeaks 8/9/ 16 Tweet.
56,37,48
56,38,NA
57,1,U.S. Department of Justice
57,2,"Attort1eyWork Prndttet ,'/ May Cot1:tait1:    Material Proteeted Ut1:derFed. R. Cri1fl.P. 6(e)"
57,3,"circumstances, it doesn't necessarily mean that the two are connected. But it is a very serious"
57,4,"matter ... that type of allegation is very serious, as it's taken very seriously by us."" 181"
57,5,After the U.S. intelligence community publicly announced its assessment that Russia was
57,6,"behind the hacking operation , Assange continued to deny that the Clinton materials released by"
57,7,"WikiLeaks had come from Russian hacking. According to media reports , Assange told a U.S."
57,8,"congressman that the DNC hack was an ""inside job,"" and purported to have ""physical proof ' that"
57,9,Russians did not give materials to Assange. 182
57,10,C. Additional GRU Cyber Operations
57,11,"While releasing the stolen emails and documents through DCLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, and"
57,12,"WikiLeaks, GRU officers continued to target and hack victims linked to the Democratic campaign"
57,13,"and, eventually, to target entities responsible for election administration in several states."
57,14,1. Summer and Fall 2016 Operations Targeting Democrat-Linked Victims
57,15,"On July 27 2016 , Unit 26165 targeted email accounts connected to candidate Clinton's"
57,16,"personal office                       . Earlier that day, candidate Trump made public statements that"
57,17,"included the following: ""Russia , if you're listening, I hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails"
57,18,"that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded mightily by our press."" 183 The ""30,000"
57,19,"emails"" were apparently a reference to emails described in media accounts as having been stored"
57,20,on a personal server that candidate Clinton had used while serving as Secretary of State.
57,21,"Within approximately five hours of Trump's statement, GRU officers targeted for the first"
57,22,"time Clinton's personal office. After candidate Trump's remarks , Unit 26165 created and sent"
57,23,malicious links targeting 15 email accounts at the domain                              including an email
57,24,account belonging to Clinton aide                        The investigation did not find evidence of earlier
57,25,GRU attempts to compromise accounts hosted on this domain. It is unclear how the GRU was
57,26,"able to identify these email accounts, which were not public. 184"
57,27,Unit 26165 officers also hacked into a DNC account hosted on a cloud-computing service
57,28,"On September 20, 2016, the GRU began to generate"
57,29,copies of the DNC da                             function designed to allow users to produce backups of
57,30,"databases (referred to                 as ""snapshots ""). The GRU then stole those snapshots by moving"
57,31,181
57,32,"See Assange: ""Murdered DNC Staffer Was 'Potential' WikiLeaks Source, "" Fox News (Aug. 25,"
57,33,2016)(containing video of Assange interview by Megyn Kelly).
57,34,182
57,35,"M. Raju & Z. Cohen, A GOP Congressman's Lonely Quest Defending Julian Assange, CNN"
57,36,"(May 23, 2018)."
57,37,183
57,38,"""Donald Trump on Russian & Missing Hillary Clinton Emails ,"" YouTube Channel C-SPAN,"
57,39,"Posted 7/27/ 16, available at https ://www.youtube.com /watch?v=3kxG8uJUsWU (starting at 0:41)."
57,40,49
57,41,NA
58,1,U.S. Department of Justice
58,2,Atteme;· :werk PFeauet // Moy Cef!ta.if!Material Preteetea Uflaef Fee. R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
58,3,"them to -              account that they controlled; from there, the copies were moved to GRU-"
58,4,controlled computers. The GRU stole approximately 300 gigabytes of data from the DNC cloud-
58,5,based account. 185
58,6,2. Intrusions Targeting the Administration of U.S. Elections
58,7,"In addition to targeting individuals involved in the Clinton Campaign, GRU officers also"
58,8,targeted individuals and entities involved in the administration of the elections. Victims included
58,9,"U.S. state and local entities, such as state boards of elections (SBOEs), secretaries of state, and"
58,10,"county governments, as well as individuals who worked for those entities. 186 The GRU also"
58,11,targeted private technology firms responsible for manufacturing and administering election-related
58,12,"software and hardware, such as voter registration software and electronic polling stations. 187 The"
58,13,GRU continued to target these victims through the elections in November 2016. While the
58,14,"investigation identified evidence that the GRU targeted these individuals and entities, the Office"
58,15,"did not investigate further. The Office did not, for instance, obtain or examine servers or other"
58,16,"relevant items belonging to these victims. The Office understands that the FBI, the U.S."
58,17,"Department of Homeland Security, and the states have separately investigated that activity."
58,18,"By at least the summer of 2016, GRU officers sought access to state and local computer"
58,19,networks by exploiting known software vulnerabilities on websites of state and local governmental
58,20,"entities. GRU officers, for example, targeted state and local databases of registered voters using a"
58,21,"technique known as ""SQL injection,"" by which malicious code was sent to the state or local"
58,22,website in order to run commands (such as exfiltrating the database contents). 188 In one instance
58,23,"in approximately June 2016, the GRU compromised the computer network of the Illinois State"
58,24,Board of Elections by exploiting a vulnerability in the SBOE's website. The GRU then gained
58,25,"access to a database containing information on millions of registered Illinois voters, 189 and"
58,26,extracted data related to thousands of U.S. voters before the malicious activity was identified. 190
58,27,GRU officers Investigative Technique                      scanned state and local websites for
58,28,"eriod in July 2016, GRU officers -"
58,29,for vulnerabilities on websites of more than
58,30,"-·            Netyksho Indictment ,i 34; see also SM-2589105-HACK , serial 29 Investigative Technique"
58,31,185
58,32,186
58,33,"Netyksho Indictment ,i 69."
58,34,-             Investigative Technique
58,35,188
58,36,50
58,37,NA
59,1,U.S. Department of Justice
59,2,AttorHey Werle Proattet // Moy CoHtoiHMoteriol Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e)
59,3,for vulnerabilities continued through the election.
59,4,Unit 74455 also sent spearphishing emails to public officials involved in election
59,5,"administration and personnel a~               involved in voting technology. In August 2016, GRU"
59,6,"officers targeted employees of .....         , a voting technology company that developed software"
59,7,"used by numerous U.S. counties to manage voter rolls, and installed malware on the company"
59,8,"network. Similarly, in November 2016 , the GRU sent spearphishing emails to over 120 email"
59,9,accounts used by Florida county officials responsible for administering the 2016 U .S. election. 191
59,10,The spearphishing emails contained an attached Word document coded with malicious software
59,11,(commonly referred to as a Trojan) that permitted the GRU to access the infected computer. 192
59,12,The FBI was separately responsible for this investigation. We understand the FBI believes that this
59,13,operation enabled the GRU to gain access to the network of at least one Florida county
59,14,"government. The Office did not independently verify that belief and, as explained above , did not"
59,15,undertake the investigative steps that would have been necessary to do so.
59,16,D. Trump Campaign and the Dissemination of Hacked Materials
59,17,The Trump Campaign showed interest in WikiLeaks's releases
59,18,hout the summer and fall of 2016.
59,19,1.
59,20,a. Background
59,21,"I , Investigative Technique"
59,22,Investigative Technique
59,23,51
59,24,NA
60,1,U.S. Department of Justice
60,2,"Attertte,· Werk Proclttet// Mtt'' CettttttftMttterittl ProteeteclUHclerFecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
60,3,b. Contacts with the Campaign about WikiLeaks
60,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
60,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
60,6,"On June 12, 2016, Assange claimed in a televised interview to ""have emails relating"
60,7,"to Hillary Clinton which are pending publication,"" 194 but provided no additional context."
60,8,•••    •
60,9,Harm to Ongoing.Matter
60,10,•          • •        . ....
60,11,Harm to Ongoing Matter
60,12,Gates recalled candidate
60,13,Trump being generally frustrated that the Clinton emails had not been found. 196
60,14,",   !              Harm to Ongoing Matter"
60,15,Harm to Ongoing Matter
60,16,•;
60,17,194
60,18,"See Mahita Gajanan, Julian Assange Timed DNC Email Release for Democ ratic Convention,"
60,19,"Time (July 27, 2016) (qu.oting the June 12, 2016 television interview)."
60,20,195
60,21,"In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to a superseding criminal"
60,22,"information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit multiple offenses (i.e., tax fraud, failure"
60,23,"to report foreign bank accounts, and acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign principal) against the"
60,24,"United States, as well as making false statem ents to our Office. Superseding Criminal Information , United"
60,25,"States v. Richard W Gates III, l: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 195 (""Gates Superseding Criminal"
60,26,"Information""); Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W Gates III, 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018),"
60,27,"Doc. 205 (""Gat es Plea Agreement""). Gates has provided information and in-comt testimony that the Office"
60,28,has deemed to be reliable.
60,29,196
60,30,"Gates I 0/25/18 302, at 1-2."
60,31,197
60,32,"As explained further in Volume I, Section IV.A.8, irifra, Manafort entered into a plea agreement"
60,33,with our Office. We determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and
60,34,before the grand jury. We have generally recounted his version of events in this report only when his
60,35,statements are sufficiently corroborated to be trustworthy ; to identify issues on which Manafort's untruthful
60,36,"responses may themselves be of evidentiary value; or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events,"
60,37,even when we were unable to determine whether that explanation was credible. His account appears here
60,38,principally because it aligns with those of other witnesses.
60,39,198
60,40,52
60,41,NA
61,1,U.S. Department of Justice
61,2,Att:erttey '+\'erk Prnt=lttet// May Cetttaitt Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
61,3,"Michael Cohen, former executive vice president of the Trump Organization and special"
61,4,"counsel to Donald J. Trump, 199 told the Office that he recalled an incident in which he was in"
61,5,candidate Trum 's office in Trum Tower
61,6,"Cohen further told the Office that, after WikiLeaks's subsequent release of stolen"
61,7,"mails in July 2016, candidate Trump said to Cohen something to the effect of 1;c•m■"
61,8,202
61,9,199
61,10,"In November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count"
61,11,"information charging him with making false statements to Congress, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § l00l(a) &"
61,12,(c). He had previously pleaded guilty to several other criminal charges brought by the U.S. Attorney ' s
61,13,"Office in the Southern District of New York, after a referral from this Office . In the months leading up to"
61,14,"his false-statements guilty plea , Cohen met with our Office on multiple occasions for interviews and"
61,15,provided information that the Office has generally assessed to be reliable and that is included in this report.
61,16,202
61,17,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at I 0. Harm to Ongoing Matter"
61,18,Harm to Ongoing Matter
61,19,20 3
61,20,"Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4."
61,21,204
61,22,20S
61,23,53
61,24,NA
62,1,U.S. Department of Justice
62,2,"Att:erHey Werle Predttet ,',' May CeHtttiH Mttterittl Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee)"
62,3,developments with WikiLeaks and separately told Gates to keep in touch--                         about future
62,4,WikiLeaks releases. 206
62,5,"According to Gates, by the late summer of 2016, the Trump Campaign was planning a"
62,6,"press strategy, a communications cam                          and messa in based on the ossible release of"
62,7,Clinton emails b WikiLeaks.          207 I IQI 111  LV '-'ll~VII   I~ HIQLL r
62,8,",:"
62,9,208  Harm to Ongoing Matter
62,10,to LaGuardia Airport.
62,11,"Harm to ungomg Matter                                                                , shortly after the call"
62,12,candidate Trump told Gates that more releases of damaging information would be coming. 209
62,13,c. Harm to Ongoing Matter
62,14,Harm to Ongoing Matter
62,15,• • • •• • •
62,16,•
62,17,Harm to Ongoing Matter
62,18,• u •  . - • •
62,19,207
62,20,"Gates 4/10/18 302, at 3; Gates 4/11/18 302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2."
62,21,208
62,22,209
62,23,"Gates 10/25/18 302 (serial 241), at 4."
62,24,210
62,25,",HOM"
62,26,211
62,27,2 12
62,28,Corsi first rose to public prominence in August 2004 when he published his book Unfit for
62,29,"Command: Swift Boat Veterans Speak Out Against John Kerry. In the 2008 election cycle, Corsi gained"
62,30,prominence for being a leading proponent of the allegation that Barack Obama was not born in the United
62,31,"States. Corsi told the Office that Donald Trump expressed interest in his writings, and that he spoke with"
62,32,"Trump on the phone on at least six occasions. Corsi 9/6/18 302, at 3."
62,33,213
62,34,"Corsi 10/31/18 302, at 2;                                                       Corsi was first"
62,35,"interviewed on September 6, 2018 at the Special Counsel's offices in Washington, D.C. He was"
62,36,"accompanied by counsel throughout the interview. Corsi was subsequently interviewed on September 17,"
62,37,"2018; September 21, 2018; October 31, 2018; November I, 2018; and November 2, 2018. Counsel was"
62,38,54
62,39,NA
63,1,U.S. Department of Justice
63,2,Attemey Werk Preclttet // Miey·Cefltttifl Material Preteetecl Uflcler Fecl. R. Critfl. P. 6(e)
63,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
63,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
63,5,111i1Harmto Ongoing Matter
63,6,"According to Malloch , Corsi asked him to put Corsi in touch with Assange, whom Corsi"
63,7,"wished to interview. Malloch recalled that Corsi also suggested that individuals in the ""orbit"" of"
63,8,U.K. politician Nigel Farage might be able to contact Assange and asked if Malloch knew them.
63,9,Malloch told Corsi that he would think about the request but made no actual attempt to connect
63,10,Corsi with Assange. 218
63,11,Harm to Ongoing Matter
63,12,Harm to Ongoing Matter
63,13,"present for all interviews , and the interviews beginning on September 21, 2018 were conducted pursuant to"
63,14,a proffer agreement that precluded affirmative use of his statements against him in limited circumstances.
63,15,214
63,16,2 15
63,17,"Corsi 10/3 1/ 18 302, at 4."
63,18,Malloch denied ever communicating with Assange
63,19,est to contact Assange because he believed he had no
63,20,55
63,21,NA
64,1,U.S. Department of Justice
64,2,Att:arttey Wat1kPt1adttet// Mtty Catttttitt Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Ct1iffl.P. 6(e)
64,3,"Malloch stated to investigators that beginnin in or about Au ust 2016, he and Corsi had"
64,4,multiple Face Time discussions about WikiLeaks ·
64,5,had made a connection to Assange and that the hacked emails of John Podesta would be released
64,6,prior to Election Day and would be helpful to the Trump Campaign. In one conversation in or
64,7,"around August or September 2016, Corsi told Malloch that the release of the Podesta emails was"
64,8,"coming, after which ""we"" were going to be in the driver's seat. 22 1"
64,9,Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,10,1if11Harmto Ongoing Matter
64,11,1i1Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,12,111Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,13,Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,14,111Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,15,-Harm       to Ongoing Matter
64,16,Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,17,· Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,18,223 Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,19,224 Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,20,225 Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,21,226 Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,22,227 Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,23,228
64,24,Harm to Ongoing Matter
64,25,56
64,26,NA
65,1,U.S. Department of Justice
65,2,"Att:ame:,· Wark Pl'06ttet // Mey C0HttliHMatel'ial Pl'ateetea UHaer rea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
65,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,5,aHarm to Ongoing
65,6,Matter
65,7,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,8,111Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,9,aHarm        to Ongoing Matter
65,10,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,11,aHarm
65,12,-
65,13,to Ongoing Matter
65,14,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,15,230
65,16,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,17,231
65,18,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,19,234 Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,20,235
65,21,Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,22,236 Harm to Ongoing Matter
65,23,57
65,24,NA
66,1,U.S. Department of Justice
66,2,AM:ertteyWer:k Predttet // Mtty Cetttaitt Mttterial Preteeted Uttder FeE:I.R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
66,3,"d. WikiLeaks's October 7, 2016 Release of Stolen Podesta Emails"
66,4,On October 7 2016 four days after the Assange press conference
66,5,", the Washington Post published an Access Hollywood video that"
66,6,captured comments by candidate Trump some years earlier and that was expected to adversely
66,7,"affect the Campaign. 239 Less than an hour after the video's publication , WikiLeaks released the"
66,8,first set of emails stolen by the GRU from the account of Clinton Campaign chairman
66,9,John Podesta.
66,10,Harm to Ongoing Matter
66,11,111Harm to Ongoing Matter
66,12,-Harm       to Ongoing Matter
66,13,Harm to Ongoing Matter
66,14,1111Harm to Ongoing Matter
66,15,"Corsi said that, because he had no direct means o communicating with"
66,16,"WikiLeaks, he told members of the news site WNO-who were participating on a conference call"
66,17,with him that day-to reach Assange immediately. 244 Corsi claimed that the pressure was
66,18,239
66,19,Candidate Trump can be heard off camera making graphic statements about women.
66,20,240
66,21,241
66,22,242
66,23,243
66,24,244
66,25,"In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated Harm to Ongoing Matter"
66,26,that he believed Malloch was on the call but then focused
66,27,"on other individuals who were on the call-invitation, which Malloch was not. (Separate travel records show"
66,28,"that at the time of the call, Malloch was aboard a transatlantic flight). Corsi at one point stated that after"
66,29,"WikiLeaks's release of stolen emails on October 7, 2016, he concluded Malloch had gotten in contact with"
66,30,"Assange. Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6."
66,31,58
66,32,NA
67,1,U.S. Department of Justice
67,2,Attet'He~·Werk Prnfitiet // Mft)· CemaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
67,3,enormous and recalled telling the conference call the Access Hollywood tape was coming. 245 Corsi
67,4,stated that he was convinced that his efforts had caused WikiLeaks to release the emails when they
67,5,"did. 246 In a later November 2018 interview, Corsi stated that he thought that he had told people"
67,6,on a WND conference call about the forthcoming tape and had sent out a tweet asking whether
67,7,"anyone could contact Assange, but then said that maybe he had done nothing. 247"
67,8,The Office investigated Corsi' s allegations about the events of October 7
67,9,little corroboration for his alle ations about the da .248
67,10,"However , the phone records"
67,11,themselves do not indicate that the conversation was with any of the reporters who broke the
67,12,"Access Hollywood sto , and the Office has not otherwise been able to identif the substance of"
67,13,the conversation.
67,14,"However , the Office"
67,15,"has not identified any conference call participant, or anyone who spoke to Corsi that day , who says"
67,16,that they received non-public information about the tape from Corsi or acknowledged having
67,17,"contacted a member of WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016 after a conversation with Corsi."
67,18,e. Donald Trump Jr. Interaction with WikiLeaks
67,19,Donald Trump Jr. had direct electronic communications with WikiLeaks during the
67,20,"campaign period. On September 20, 2016, an individual named Jason Fishbein sent WikiLeaks"
67,21,"the password for an unlaunched website focused on Trump's ""unprecedented and dangerous "" ties"
67,22,245
67,23,"During the same interview , Corsi also suggested that he may have sent out public tweet s because"
67,24,he knew Assange was reading his tweets. Our Office was unable to find evidence of any such tweets.
67,25,246
67,26,"_Corsi 9/21/18 302, at 6-7."
67,27,247
67,28,"Corsi 11/1/18 302, at 6."
67,29,Harm to Ongoing Matter
67,30,··Harm to Ongoing Matter
67,31,Harm to Ongoing Matter
67,32,59
67,33,NA
68,1,U.S. Department of Justice
68,2,"At:tarHey'ille,rkPratittet // Ma;· Ce,AtttiH Material Pre,teeteti UHtierFeti. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
68,3,"to Russia, PutinTrump .org.252 WikiLeaks publicly tweeted: '""Let's bomb Iraq' Progress for"
68,4,"America PAC to launch ""PutinTrump.org' at 9:30am. Oops pw is 'putintrump' putintrump.org."""
68,5,"Several hours later, WikiLeaks sent a Twitter direct message to Donald Trump Jr., ""A PAC run"
68,6,anti-Trump site putintrump.org is about to launch. The PAC is a recycled pro-Iraq war PAC. We
68,7,have guessed the password. It is 'putintrump.' See 'About' for who is behind it. Any
68,8,"comments ?""253"
68,9,"Several hours later, Trump Jr. emailed a variety of senior campaign staff:"
68,10,Guys I got a weird Twitter DM from wikileaks. See below. I tried the password and it
68,11,works and the about section they reference contains the next pie in terms of who is behind
68,12,it. Not sure if this is anything but it seems like it's really wikileaks asking me as I follow
68,13,them and it is a DM. Do you know the people mentioned and what the conspiracy they are
68,14,looking for could be? These are just screen shots but it' s a fully built out page claiming to
68,15,be a PAC let me know your thoughts and ifwe want to look into it.254
68,16,"Trump Jr. attached a screenshot of the ""About"" page for the unlaunched site PutinTrump.org. The"
68,17,"next day (after the website had launched publicly) , Trump Jr . sent a direct message to WikiLeaks:"
68,18,"""Off the record, l don 't know who that is but I'll ask around. Thanks. "" 255"
68,19,"On October 3, 2016, WikiLeaks sent another direct message to Trump Jr., asking ""you"
68,20,"guys"" to help disseminate a link alleging candidate Clinton had advocated using a drone to target"
68,21,"Julian Assange. Trump Jr. responded that he already ""had done so,"" and asked , ""what's behind"
68,22,"this Wednesday leak I keep reading about?"" 256 WikiLeaks did not respond."
68,23,"On October 12, 2016, WikiLeaks wrote again that it was ""great to see you and your dad"
68,24,talking about our publications. Strongly suggest your dad tweets this link if he mentions us
68,25,"wlsearch.tk."" 257 WikiLeaks wrote that the link would help Trump in ""digging through "" leaked"
68,26,"emails and stated, ""we just released Podesta emails Part 4."" 258 Two days later, Trump Jr. publicly"
68,27,tweeted the wlsearch.tk link.259                '
68,28,252
68,29,"9/20/16 Twitter DM~hbein                  to @WikiLeaks; see JF0058 7 (9/2 1/16 Messag es,"
68,30,"-@jabber.cryptoparty.is            ~@jabber.cryptoparty.is);               Fishbein 9/5/18 302, at 4. When"
68,31,"interviewed by our Office, Fishbein produced what he claimed to be logs from a chatroom in which the"
68,32,participants discussed U.S. politics; one of the other participants had posted the website and password that
68,33,Fishbein sent to WikiLeaks .
68,34,253
68,35,"9/20/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr."
68,36,254
68,37,"TRUMPORG _ 28_ 000629-33 (9/21/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Conway et al. (subject"
68,38,"""Wikileaks""))."
68,39,255
68,40,"9/21/16 Twitter DM, @DonaldJTrumpJr to @W ikiLeaks."
68,41,256
68,42,"10/3/ 16 Twitter DMs , @Dona ldJTrumpJr & @Wik iLeaks."
68,43,257
68,44,"At the time, the link took users to a WikiLeaks archive of stolen Clinton Campaign documents."
68,45,258
68,46,"10/12/16 Twitter DM, @WikiLeaks to @DonaldJTrumpJr."
68,47,259
68,48,@DonaldJTrumpJr 10/14/ 16 (6:34 a.m.) Tweet.
68,49,60
68,50,NA
69,1,U.S. Department of Justice
69,2,Attefl'le)' \liCefkPredttet // Mey Cefltail'l Matet·ial Preteetee:I Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
69,3,2. Other Potential Campaign Interest in Russian Hacked Materials
69,4,"Throughout 2016, the Trump Campaign expressed interest in Hillary Clinton's private"
69,5,"email server and whether approximately 30,000 emails from that server had in fact been"
69,6,"permanently destroyed, as reported by the media . Several individuals associated with the"
69,7,Campaign were contacted in 2016 about various efforts to obtain the missing Clinton emails and
69,8,other stolen material in support of the Trump Campaign. Some of these contacts were met with
69,9,"sk~pticism, and nothing came of them; others were pursued to some degree. The investigation did"
69,10,"not find evidence that the Trump Campaign recovered any s~ch Clinton emails, or that these"
69,11,contacts were part of a coordinated effort between Russia and the Trump Campaign.
69,12,a. Henry Oknyansky (a/k/a Henry Greenberg)
69,13,"In the spring of 2016, Trump Campaign advisor Michael Caputo learned through a Florida-"
69,14,"based Russian business partner that another Florida-based Russian, Henry Oknyansky (who also"
69,15,"went by the name Henry Greenberg), claimed to have information pertaining to Hillary Clinton ."
69,16,Caputo notified Roger Stone and brokered communication between Stone and Oknyansky.
69,17,Oknyansky and Stone set up a May 2016 in-person meeting. 260
69,18,"Oknyansky was accompanied to the meeting by Alexei Rasin, a Ukrainian associate"
69,19,"involved in Florida real estate. At the meeting, Rasin offered to sell Stone derogatory information"
69,20,on Clinton that Rasin claimed to have obtained while working for Clinton. Rasin claimed to
69,21,possess financial statements demonstrating Clinton's involvement in money laundering with
69,22,"Rasin's companies. According to Oknyansky, Stone asked if the amounts in question totaled"
69,23,"millions of dollars but was told it was closer to hundreds of thousands. Stone refused the offer,"
69,24,stating that Trump would not pay for opposition research. 261
69,25,Oknyansky claimed to the Office that Rasin's motivation was financial. According to
69,26,"Oknyansky, Rasin had tried unsuccessfully to shop the Clinton information around to other"
69,27,"interested parties, and Oknyansky would receive a cut if the information was sold .262 Rasin is"
69,28,noted in public source documents as the director and/or registered agent for a number of Florida
69,29,"companies, none of which appears to be connected to Clinton . The Office found no other evidence"
69,30,that Rasin worked for Clinton or any Clinton-related entities.
69,31,"In their statements to investigators, Oknyansky and Caputo had contradictory recollections"
69,32,about the meeting. Oknyansky claimed that Caputo accompanied Stone to the meeting and
69,33,"provided an introduction, whereas Caputo did not tell us that he had attended and claimed that he"
69,34,was never told what information Oknyansky offered. Caputo also stated that he was unaware
69,35,Oknyansky sought to be paid for the information until Stone informed him after the fact.263
69,36,26
69,37,"°Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at l."
69,38,261
69,39,"Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 1-2."
69,40,262
69,41,"Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at 2."
69,42,263
69,43,"Caputo 5/2/18 302, at 4; Oknyansky 7/13/18 302, at l."
69,44,61
69,45,NA
70,1,U.S. Department of Justice
70,2,Atlet'Ae;· \¥erk Pr0a1:1et// May CeAtttiA Mttterittl Preteetea UAaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
70,3,"The Office did not locate Rasin in the United States, although the Office confirmed Rasin"
70,4,had been issued a Florida driver's license. The Office otherwise was unable to determine the
70,5,"content and origin of the information he purportedly offered to Stone. Finally , the investigation"
70,6,did not identify evidence of a connection between the outreach or the meeting and Russian
70,7,interference efforts.
70,8,b. Campaign Efforts to Obtain Deleted Clinton Emails
70,9,"After candidate Trump stated on July 27, 2016, that he hoped Russia would ""find the"
70,10,"30,000 emails that are missing,"" Trump asked individuals affiliated with his Campaign to find the"
70,11,deleted Clinton emails.264 Michael Flynn-who would later serve as National Security Advisor in
70,12,"the Trump Administration - recalled that Trump made this request repeatedly , and Flynn"
70,13,subsequently contacted multiple people in an effort to obtain the emails. 265
70,14,"Barbara Ledeen and Peter Smith were among the people contacted by Flynn. Ledeen, a"
70,15,"long-time Senate staffer who had previously sought the Clinton emails, provided updates to Flynn"
70,16,"about her efforts throughout the summer of 2016.266 Smith, an investment advisor who was active"
70,17,"in Republican politics, also attempted to locate and obtain the deleted Clinton emails. 267"
70,18,"Ledeen began her efforts to obtain the Clinton emails before Flynn's request , as early as"
70,19,"December 2015. 268 On December 3, 2015, she emailed Smith a proposal to obtain the emails,"
70,20,"stating, ""Here is the proposal I briefly mentioned to you. The person I described to you would be"
70,21,happy to talk with you either in person or over the phone. The person can get the emails which 1.
70,22,Were classified and 2. Were purloined by our enemies. That would demonstrate what needs to be
70,23,"demonstrated. ""269"
70,24,"Attached to the email was a 25-page proposal stating that the ""Clinton email server was, in"
70,25,"all likelihood , breached long ago,"" and that the Chinese, Russian, and Iranian intelligence services"
70,26,"could ""re-assemble the server's email content."" 270 The proposal called for a three-phase approach."
70,27,The first two phases consisted of open-source analysis. The third phase consisted of checking with
70,28,"certain intelligence sources ""that have access through liaison work with various foreign services"""
70,29,"to determine if any of those services had gotten to the server. The proposal noted , ""Even if a"
70,30,"single email was recovered and the providence [sic] of that email was a foreign service, it would"
70,31,"be catastrophic to the Clinton campaign[.]"" Smith forwarded the email to two colleagues and"
70,32,264
70,33,"Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302, at 1-3."
70,34,265
70,35,"Flynn 5/1/18 302, at l -3."
70,36,266
70,37,"Flynn 4/25/18 302, at 7; Flynn 5/4/18 302, at 1-2; Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8."
70,38,267
70,39,"Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7."
70,40,268
70,41,"Szobocsan 3/29/17 302, at 1."
70,42,269
70,43,"12/3/ 15 Email, Ledeen to Smith."
70,44,270
70,45,"12/3/15 Email, Ledeen to Smith (attachment)."
70,46,62
70,47,NA
71,1,U.S. Department of Justice
71,2,Atlertte~• \\'erk Predttet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteetet:I Uttt:ler Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
71,3,"wrote, ""we can discuss to whom it should be referred. ""27 1 On December 16, 2015, Smith informed"
71,4,"Ledeen that he declined to participate in her ""initiative."" According to one of Smith's business"
71,5,"associates , Smith believed Ledeen's initiative was not viable at that time. 272"
71,6,"Just weeks after Trump's July 2016 request to find the Clinton emails , however , Smith"
71,7,"tried to locate and obtain the emails himself. He created a company, raised tens of thousands of"
71,8,"dollars, and recruited security experts and business associates. Smith made claims to others"
71,9,involved in the effort (and those from whom he sought funding) that he was in contact with hackers
71,10,"with ""ties and affiliations to Russia"" who had access to the emails , and that his efforts were"
71,11,coordinated with the Trump Campaign. 273
71,12,"On August 28, 2016, Smith sent an email from an encrypted account with the subject ""Sec ."
71,13,"Clinton's unsecured private email server"" to an undisclosed list ofrecipients , including Campaign"
71,14,"co-chairman Sam Clovis. The email stated that Smith was ""u]ust finishing two days of sensitive"
71,15,meetings here in DC with involved groups to poke and probe on the above. It is clear that the
71,16,"Clinton 's home -based, unprotected server was hacked with ease by both State-related players , and"
71,17,"private mercenaries. Parties with varying interests , are circling to release ahead of the election. ""274"
71,18,"On September 2, 2016, Smith directed a business associate to establish KLS Research LLC"
71,19,in furtherance of his search for the deleted Clinton emails. 275 One of the purposes ofKLS Research
71,20,was to manage the funds Smith raised in support of his initiative. 276 KLS Research received over
71,21,"$30,000 during the presidential campaign , although Smith represented that he raised even more"
71,22,money. 277
71,23,"Smith recruited multiple people for his initiative, including security experts to search for"
71,24,"and authenticate the emails .278 In early September 2016, as pait of his recruitment and fundraising"
71,25,"effort, Smith circulated a document stating that his initiative was ""in coordination"" with the Trump"
71,26,"Campaign, ""to the extent permitted as an independent expenditure organization."" 279 The document"
71,27,"listed multiple individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign, including Flynn , Clovis, Bannon,"
71,28,271
71,29,"12/3/15 Email, Smith to Szobocsan & Safron."
71,30,272
71,31,"Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 1."
71,32,27 3
71,33,"8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith."
71,34,274
71,35,"8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith."
71,36,275
71,37,"Incorporation papers ofKLS Research LLC , 7/26/17"
71,38,"Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 2."
71,39,276
71,40,"Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 3."
71,41,277
71,42,"Financial Institution Record of Peter Smith and KLS Research LLC , 10/31/ 17 -"
71,43,"10/11/16 Email, Smith to"
71,44,278
71,45,"Tait 8/22/17 302, at 3; York 7/12/17 302, at 1-2; York 11/22/ 17 302, at 1."
71,46,279
71,47,"York 7/13/17 302 (attachment KLS Research , LLC, ""Clinton Email Reconnaissance Initiati ve,"""
71,48,"Sept. 9, 2016)."
71,49,63
71,50,NA
72,1,U.S. Department of Justice
72,2,AM:at't=tey Wark Pra<:ittet// Moy CaHtoiHMaterial Prnteete<:iUl'l:<:ier    Fee. R. Crifl'I:.P. 6(e)
72,3,and Kellyanne Conway. 280 The investigation established that Smith communicated with at least
72,4,"Flynn and Clovis about his search for the deleted Clinton emails ,281 but the Office did not identify"
72,5,evidence that any of the listed individuals initiated or directed Smith's efforts.
72,6,"In September 2016, Smith and Ledeen got back in touch with each other about their"
72,7,"respective efforts. Ledeen wrote to Smith, ""wondering if you had some more detailed reports or"
72,8,memos or other data you could share because we have come a long way in our efforts since we
72,9,last visited ... . We would need as much technical discussion as possible so we could marry it
72,10,"against the new data we have found and then could share it back to you 'your eyes only.' "" 282"
72,11,"Ledeen claimed to have obtained a trove of emails (from what she described as the ""dark"
72,12,"web"") that purpo1ted to be the deleted Clinton emails. Ledeen wanted to authenticate the emails"
72,13,and solicited contributions to fund that effort . Erik Prince provided funding to hire a tech advisor
72,14,"to ascertain the authenticity of the emails. According to Prince, the tech advisor determined that"
72,15,the emails were not authentic. 283
72,16,A backup of Smith's computer contained two files that had been downloaded from
72,17,WikiLeaks and that were originally attached to emails received by John Podesta. The files on
72,18,"Smith's computer had creation dates of October 2, 2016, which was prior to the date of their release"
72,19,"by WikiLeaks. Forensic examination, however, established that the creation date did not reflect"
72,20,when the files were downloaded to Smith ' s computer. (It appears the creation date was when
72,21,"WikiLeaks staged the document for release, as discussed in Volume I, Section III.B.3.c , supra. 284)"
72,22,The investigation did not otherwise identify evidence that Smith obtained the files before their
72,23,release by WikiLeaks.
72,24,Smith continued to send emails to an undisclosed recipient list about Clinton ' s deleted
72,25,"emails until shortly before the election. For example , on October 28, 2016, Smith wrote that there"
72,26,"was a ""tug -of-war going on within WikiLeaks over its planned releases in the next few days,"" and"
72,27,"that WikiLeaks ""has maintained that it will save its best revelations for last, under the theory this"
72,28,"allows little time for response prior to the U.S. election November 8.""285 An attachment to the"
72,29,280
72,30,"The same recruitment document             listed Jerome Corsi under ""Independent"
72,31,"Groups/Organizations/Individuals,"" and described him as an ""established author and writer from the right"
72,32,"on President Obama and Sec. Clinton."""
72,33,281
72,34,"Flynn 11/29/17 302, at 7-8; 10/15/16 Email, Smith to Flynn et al.; 8/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith"
72,35,(bee: Clovis et al.).
72,36,282
72,37,"9/16/16 Email , Ledeen to Smith."
72,38,283
72,39,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 4-5."
72,40,284
72,41,The forensic analysis of Smith' s computer devices found that Smith used an older Appl e
72,42,"operating system that would have preserved that October 2, 2016 creation date when it was downloaded"
72,43,"(no matter what day it was in fact downloaded by Smith). See Volume I, Section 111.B.3.c,supra. The"
72,44,Office tested this theory in March 2019 by downloading the two files found on Smith ' s computer from
72,45,WikiLeaks's site using the same Apple operating system on Smith's computer ; both files were successfully
72,46,"downloaded and retained the October 2, 2016 creation date. See SM-2284941, serial 62."
72,47,2 85
72,48,"10/28/16 Email, Smith to Smith."
72,49,64
72,50,NA
73,1,U.S. Department of Justice
73,2,Att6rHey W6rle:Pr6dttet // May C6HtaiH Material Pr6teeted Una er Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
73,3,"email claimed that WikiLeaks would release ""All 33k deleted Emails"" by ""November 1st."" No"
73,4,emails obtained from Clinton's server were subsequently released.
73,5,Smith drafted multiple emails stating or intimating that he was in contact with Russian
73,6,"hackers. For example , in one such email, Smith claimed that, in August 2016 , KLS Research had"
73,7,"organized meetings with parties who had access to the deleted Clinton emails, including parties"
73,8,"with ""ties and affiliations to Russia."" 286 The investigation did not identify evidence that any such"
73,9,meetings occurred. Associates and security experts who worked with Smith on the initiative did
73,10,not believe that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers and were aware of no such
73,11,connection. 287 The investigation did not establish that Smith was in contact with Russian hackers
73,12,"or that Smith, Ledeen, or other individuals in touch with the Trump Campaign ultimately obtained"
73,13,the deleted Clinton emails .
73,14,***
73,15,"In sum, the investigation established that the GRU hacked into email accounts of persons"
73,16,"affiliated with the Clinton Campaign , as well as the computers of the DNC and DCCC. The GRU"
73,17,"then exfiltrated data related to the 2016 election from these accounts and computers, and"
73,18,disseminated that data through fictitious online personas (DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0) and later
73,19,through WikiLeaks. The investigation also established that the Trum Cam ai n dis la ed
73,20,"interest in the WikiLeaks releases, and that"
73,21,"explained in Volume I, Section V.B, infra, the evidence was sufficient to support computer-"
73,22,intrusion and other char es a ainst GRU officers for their role in election-related hackin .
73,23,286
73,24,"8/31/16 Email, Smith to Smith."
73,25,287
73,26,"Safron 3/20/18 302, at 3; Szobocsan 3/29/18 302, at 6."
73,27,65
73,28,NA
74,1,U.S. Department of Justice
74,2,Atlef'l'le;·Wef'k Pf'et.ittet// Mo; Cel'ltttiftMttteriol Preteeted Uftt.ierFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
74,3,IV. RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT LINKS To AND CONTACTS WITH THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN
74,4,"The Office identified multiple contacts- ""links ,"" in the words of the Appointment Order-"
74,5,between Trump Campaign officials and individuals with ties to the Russian government. The
74,6,Office investigated whether those contacts constituted a third avenue of attempted Russian
74,7,"interference with or influence on the 2016 presidential election. In particular, the investigation"
74,8,examined whether these contacts involved or resulted in coordination or a conspiracy with the
74,9,"Trump Campaign and Russia, including with respect to Russia providing assistance to the"
74,10,Campaign in exchange for any sort of favorable treatment in the future. Based on the available
74,11,"information, the investigation did not establish such coordination ."
74,12,This Section describes the principal links between the Trump Campaign and individuals
74,13,"with ties to the Russian government , including some contacts with Campaign officials or associates"
74,14,that have been publicly reported to involve Russian contacts. Each subsection begins with an
74,15,"overview of the Russian contact at issue and then describes in detail the relevant facts, which are"
74,16,"generally presented in chronological order, beginning with the early months of the Campaign and"
74,17,"extending through the post-election, transition period."
74,18,"A. Campaign Period (September 2015 - November 8, 2016)"
74,19,Russian-government -connected individuals and media entities began showing interest in
74,20,Trump ' s campaign in the months after he announced his candidacy in June 2015. 288 Because
74,21,Trump's status as a public figure at the time was attributable in large part to his prior business and
74,22,"entertainment dealings, this Office investigated whether a busin ess contact with Russia-linked"
74,23,"individuals and entities during the campaign period-the Trump Tower Moscow project , see"
74,24,"Volume l, Section IV.A. I, infra-led to or involved coordination of election assistance."
74,25,"Outreach from individuals with ties to Russia continued in the spring and summer of 2016,"
74,26,when Trump was moving toward- and eventually becoming -t he Republican nominee for
74,27,"President. As set forth below, the Office also evaluated a series of links during this period:"
74,28,"outreach to two of Trump 's then-recently named foreign policy advisors, including a"
74,29,"representation that Russia had ""dirt"" on Clinton in the form of thousands of emails (Volume I,"
74,30,Sections IV.A.2 & IV.A.3); dealings with a D.C.-based think tank that specializes in Russia and
74,31,"has connections with its government (Volume I, Section IV.A.4); a meeting at Trump Tower"
74,32,"between the Campaign and a Russian lawyer promising dirt on candidate Clinton that was ""part of"
74,33,"Russia and its government's support for [Trump]"" (Volume I, Section IV.A.5); events at the"
74,34,"Republican National Convention (Volume I, Section IV.A.6); post- Convention contacts betwe en"
74,35,"Trump Campaign officials and Russia's ambassador to the United States (Volume I, Section"
74,36,"IV .A.7) ; and contacts through campaign chairman Paul Manafort, who had previously worked for"
74,37,"a Russian oligarch and a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine (Volume I, Section IV.A.8)."
74,38,288
74,39,"For example, on August 18, 2015, on behalf of the editor-in-chief of the internet newspaper"
74,40,"Vzglyad, Georgi Asatryan emailed campaign press secretary Hope Hicks asking for a phone or in-person"
74,41,"candidate interview. 8/18/15 Email, Asatryan to Hicks. One day earlier, the publication's founder (and"
74,42,former Russian parliamentarian) Konstantin Rykov had registered two Russian websites-Trump2016.ru
74,43,and DonaldTrump2016.ru. No interview took place.
74,44,66
74,45,NA
75,1,U.S. Department of Justice
75,2,Att:ot>Re~· Work Prodttet // Ma-yCoRtttiRMotet>ialPt>oteetedUttdet>Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
75,3,1. Trump Tower Moscow Project
75,4,The Trump Organization has pursued and completed projects outside the United States as
75,5,part of its real estate portfolio.       Some projects have involved the acquisition and ownership
75,6,"(through subsidiary corporate structures) of property. In other cases , the Trump Organization has"
75,7,"executed licensing deals with real estate developer s and management companies, often local to the"
75,8,country where the project was located. 289
75,9,"Between at least 2013 and 2016, the Trump Organization explored a similar licensing deal"
75,10,"in Russia involving the construction of a Trump-branded property in Moscow. The project,"
75,11,"commonly referred to as a ""Trump Tower Moscow"" or ""Trump Moscow"" project , anticipated a"
75,12,"combination of commercial , hotel , and residential properties all within the same building."
75,13,"Between 2013 and June 2016, several employees of the Trump Organization, including then-"
75,14,"president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Moscow deal with several Russian"
75,15,"counterparties. From the fall of 2015 until the middle of 2016, Michael Cohen spearheaded the"
75,16,"Trump Organization's pursuit of a Trump Tower Moscow project, including by reporting on the"
75,17,project's status to candidate Trump and other executives in the Trump Organization. 290
75,18,a. Trump Tower Moscow Venture with the Crocus Group (2013-2014)
75,19,"The Trump Organization and the Crocus Group , a Russian real estate conglomerate owned"
75,20,"and controlled by Aras Agalarov, began discussing a Russia-based real estate project shortly after"
75,21,the conclusion of the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow. 291 Donald J. Trump Jr. served as
75,22,_the primary negotiator on behalf of the Trump Organization; Emin Agalarov (son of Aras
75,23,"Agalarov) and Irakli ""Ike"" Kaveladze represented the Crocus Group during negotiations, 292 with"
75,24,the occasional assistance of Robe1t Goldstone. 293
75,25,"In December 2013, Kaveladze and Trump Jr. negotiated and signed preliminary terms of"
75,26,289
75,27,"See, e.g., Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committe e, 115th Cong. 151-52"
75,28,"(Sept. 7, 2017) ( discussing licensing deals of specific projects)."
75,29,290
75,30,"As noted in Volume I, Section III.D.l , supra, in November 20 18, Cohen pleaded guilty to"
75,31,"making false statements to Congress concerning, among other things, the duration of the Trump Tower"
75,32,"Moscow project. See Information ,r7(a), United States v. Michael Cohen, 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N .Y. Nov. 29,"
75,33,"2018) , Doc. 2 (""Cohen Information "")."
75,34,291
75,35,"See Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 13 (Sept. 7,"
75,36,"2017) (""Following the pageant the Trump Organization and Mr. Agalarov' s company, Crocus Group, began"
75,37,"preliminarily discussion [sic] potential real estate projects in Moscow."") . As has been widely reported, the"
75,38,Miss Universe pageant-which Trump co-owned _at the time-was held at the Agalarov-owned Crocus
75,39,"City Hall in Moscow in November 2013. Both groups were involved in organizing the pageant, and Aras"
75,40,"Agalarov's son Emin was a musical performer at the event, which Trump attended."
75,41,292
75,42,"Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 2, 4-6;                                                       OSC-"
75,43,"KA V_00385 (12/6/13 Emai l, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov)."
75,44,67
75,45,NA
76,1,U.S. Department of Justice
76,2,Attet'Aey Werk Preauet // May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fee. R. Crifl'I. P. 6(e)
76,3,"an agreement for the Trump Tower Moscow project. 294 On December 23, 2013, after discussions"
76,4,"with Donald J. Trump , the Trump Organization agreed to accept an arrangement whereby the"
76,5,"organization received a flat 3.5% commission on all sales, with no licensing fees or incentives. 295"
76,6,The parties negotiated a letter of intent during Januar y and February 2014. 296
76,7,"From January 2014 through November 2014, the Trump Organization and Crocus Group"
76,8,"discussed development plans for the Moscow project. Some time before January 24, 2014, the"
76,9,"Crocus Group sent the Trump Organization a propo sal for a 800-unit, 194-me ter building to be ·"
76,10,"constructed at an Agalarov-owned site in Moscow called ""Crocus City,"" which had also been the"
76,11,"site of the Miss Universe pageant. 297 In February 2014, Ivanka Trump met with Emin Agalarov"
76,12,"and toured the Crocus City site during a visit to Moscow. 298 From March 2014 through July 2014,"
76,13,"the groups discussed ""design standards"" and other architectural elements. 299 For example, in July"
76,14,"2014, members of the Trump Organization sent Crocus Group counterparties questions about the"
76,15,"""de mographics of these prospective buyers "" in the Crocus City area, the development of"
76,16,"neighboring parcels in Crocus City, and concepts for redesigning portions of the building. 300 In"
76,17,"August 2014, the Trump Organization requested specifications for a competing Marriott-branded"
76,18,tower being built in Crocus City. 301
76,19,"Beginning in September 2014, the Trump Organization stopped responding in a timely"
76,20,fashion to correspondence and proposals from the Crocus Group. 302 Communications between the
76,21,two groups continued through November 2014 with decreasing frequency; what appears to be the
76,22,"last communication is dated November 24, 2014. 303 The project appears not to have developed"
76,23,"past the planning stage, and no construction occurred."
76,24,294
76,25,295
76,26,"OSC-KA V_00452 (12/23/13 Email, Trmnp Jr. to Kaveladze & E. Agalarov)."
76,27,296
76,28,"See, e.g., OSC-KAV _011 58 (Letter agreement signed by Trump Jr. & E . Agalarov); OSC-"
76,29,"KAV _01147 (1/20/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.) ."
76,30,297
76,31,"See, e.g., OSC-KA V_00972 ( 10/14/ 14 Email, McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group"
76,32,"contractor about specifications); OSC-KA V_00540 (1/24/14 Email, McGee to Trump Jr. et al.)."
76,33,298
76,34,"See OSC-KA V 00631 (2/5/14 Email, E. A~alarov to Ivanka Tn~ump              Jr. & Kaveladze );"
76,35,"Goldstone Facebook post, 2/4/14 (8:01   a.m.)jjjijfiU(\h'llffi@[lm        •--"
76,36,"299 See, e.g., OSC-KAV_00791 (6/3/14 Email, Kaveladze to Trump Jr. et al.; OSC-KAV_00799"
76,37,"(6/ 10/ 14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze et al.); OSC-KA V_0081 7 (6/16/14 Email, Trump Jr. to Kaveladze"
76,38,et al.).
76,39,300
76,40,"OSC-KAV 00870 (7/17/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.)."
76,41,301
76,42,"OSC-KA V_00855 (8/4/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.)."
76,43,302
76,44,"OSC-KA V_ 00903 (9/29/ 14 Email, Tropea to McGee & Kaveladze (not ing last response was on"
76,45,"August 26, 2014)); OSC-KAV _00906 (9/29/14 Email, Kaveladze to Tropea & McGee (suggesting silenc e"
76,46,"""proves my fear that those guys are bailing out of the project"")); OSC-KA V_00972 (10/14/14 Email,"
76,47,McGee to Khoo et al.) (email from Crocus Group contractor about development specifications)).
76,48,303
76,49,"OSC-KA V_ 01140 ( 11/24/14 Email, Khoo to McGee et al.)."
76,50,68
76,51,NA
77,1,U.S. Department of Justice
77,2,Att erney Werk Pfedtte t // Ma-y CmttaiA Material Preteeted U11:eer         Fed. R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
77,3,b. Communications with J.C. Expert Investment Company and Giorgi
77,4,Rtskhiladze (Summer and Fall 2015)
77,5,"In the late summer of 2015 , the Trump Organization received a new inquiry about pursuing"
77,6,"a Trump Tower project in Moscow. In approximatel y September 2015 , Felix Sater , a New York-"
77,7,"based real estate advisor , contacted Michael Cohen, then-executive vice president of the Trump"
77,8,Organization and special counsel to Donald J. Trump. 304 Sater had previously worked with the
77,9,Trump Organization and advised it on a number of domestic and international projects. Sater had
77,10,explored the possibility of a Trump Tower project in Moscow while working with the Trump
77,11,Organi zation and therefore knew of the organization's general inter est in completing a deal
77,12,there .305 Sater had also served as an informal agent of the Trump Organization in Moscow
77,13,previousl y and had accompanied lvanka Trump and Donald Trump Jr. to Moscow in the mid-
77,14,2000s. 306
77,15,"Sater contacted Cohen on behalf of I.C. Expert Investment Company (LC. Expert) , a"
77,16,Russian real-estate development corporation controlled by Andrei Vladimirovich Rozov .307 Sater
77,17,"had known Ro zov since approximately 2007 and, in 2014 , had served as an agent on behalf of"
77,18,Rozov during Rozov's purchase of a building in New York City. 308 Sater later contacted Rozov
77,19,and proposed that I.C. Expert pursue a Trump Tower Moscow project in which l.C. Expert would
77,20,license the name and brand from the Trump Organization but construct the building on its own.
77,21,Sater worked on the deal with Rozov and another .emplo y ee of l.C. Expert .309
77,22,Cohen was the only Trump Organization representative to negotiate directly with l.C.
77,23,"Exp ert or its agents . In approximately September 2015 , Cohen obtained approval to negotiate with"
77,24,"I.C. Expert from candidat e Trump, who was then president of the Trump Organization. Cohen"
77,25,"provid ed updat es directly to Trump about the project throughout 2015 and into 2016 , assuring him"
77,26,°
77,27,the project was continuing .31 Coh en also discussed the Trump Moscow project with Ivanka
77,28,Trump as to design elements (such as possible architects to use for the proje ct311) and Donald J.
77,29,Trump Jr. (about his experience in Moscow and po ssible involvement in the project 312) during the
77,30,fall of 2015.                    .
77,31,rovided information to our Office in two 2017 interview s condu cted under a proffer
77,32,agreement
77,33,306
77,34,"Sater9/19/1 7 302, at 1-2, 5."
77,35,307
77,36,"Sater 9/19/17 302, at 3."
77,37,308
77,38,"Rozov 1/25/18 3 02, at 1."
77,39,309
77,40,"Rozov 1/25/18 302, at I ; see also 11/2/ 15 Email , Cohen to Rozov et al. (sending letter of intent) ."
77,41,31
77,42,"°Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-2, 4-6."
77,43,31 1
77,44,"Cohen 9/12/ 18 302, at 5."
77,45,312
77,46,"Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 4-5."
77,47,69
77,48,NA
78,1,U.S. Department of Justice
78,2,Att:erftey Werk Preattet // Mlt) Cefttttift Material Preteetea UH:aerFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
78,3,1
78,4,"Also during the fall of 2015, Cohen communicated about the Trump Moscow proposal with"
78,5,"Giorgi Rtskhiladze, a business executive who previously had been involved in a development deal"
78,6,"with the Trump Organization in Batumi, Georgia. 313 Cohen stated that he spoke to Rtskhiladze in"
78,7,"part because Rtskhiladze had pursued business ventures in Moscow, including a licensing deal with"
78,8,"the Agalarov-owned Crocus Group. 314 On September 22, 2015 , Cohen forwarded a preliminary"
78,9,"design study for the Trump Moscow project to Rtskhiladze, adding ""I look forward to your reply"
78,10,"about this spectacular project in Moscow ."" Rtskhiladze forwarded Cohen 's email to an associate"
78,11,"and wrote, ""[i]f we could organize the meeting in New York at the highest level of the Russian"
78,12,"Government and Mr. Trump this project would definitely receive the worldwide attention ."" 315"
78,13,"On September 24, 2015, Rtskhiladze sent Cohen an attachment that he described as a"
78,14,"proposed ""[!Jetter to the Mayor of Moscow from Trump org,"" explaining that ""[ w ]e need to send"
78,15,this letter to the Mayor of Moscow (second guy in Russia) he is aware of the potential project and
78,16,"will pledge his support ."" 316 In a second email to Cohen sent the same day, Rtskhiladze provided a"
78,17,"translation of the letter , which described the Trump Moscow project as a ""symbol of stronger"
78,18,"economic, business and cultural relationships between New York and Moscow and therefore"
78,19,"United States and the Russian Federation ."" 317 On September 27, 2015 , Rtskhiladze sent another"
78,20,"email to Cohen , proposing that the Trump Organization partner on the Trump Moscow project with"
78,21,"""Global Development Group LLC,"" which he described as being controlled by Michail Posikhin, a"
78,22,"Russian architect, and Simon Nizharadze. 318 Cohen told the Office that he ultimately declined the"
78,23,"proposal and instead continued to work with LC. Expert, the company represented by Felix Sater. 319"
78,24,c. Letter of Intent and Contacts to Russian Government (October 2015-January
78,25,2016)
78,26,i. Trump Signs the Letter of Intent on behalf of the Trump Organization
78,27,"Between approximately October 13, 2015 and November 2, 2015 , the Trump Organization"
78,28,"(through its subsidiary Trump Acquisition, LLC) and I.C. Expert completed a letter of intent (LOI)"
78,29,"for a Trump Moscow property. The LOI, signed by Trump for the Trump Organization and Rozov"
78,30,"on behalf of I.C. Expert, was ""intended to facilitate further discussions"" in order to ""attempt to"
78,31,313
78,32,Rtskhiladze was a U.S.-based executive of the Georgian company Silk Road Group. In
78,33,"approximately 2011, Silk Road Group and the Trump Organization entered into a licensing agreement to"
78,34,"build a Trump-branded property in Batumi, Georgia. Rtskhiladze was also involved in discussions for a"
78,35,"Trum -branded ro'ect in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office twice interviewed Rtskhiladze, -"
78,36,3 14
78,37,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12; see also Rtskhiladze 5/10/18 302, at 1."
78,38,315
78,39,"9/22/1 5 Email, Rtskhilad ze to Nizharadze."
78,40,316
78,41,"9/24/15 Email, Rtskhilad ze to Cohen."
78,42,317
78,43,"9/24/1 5 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen ."
78,44,3 18
78,45,"9/27/15 Email, Rtskhiladze to Cohen."
78,46,3 19
78,47,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 12."
78,48,70
78,49,NA
79,1,U.S. Department of Justice
79,2,Atterfl:eyWerk Predttet // Mfr)·Cefl:tail'lMaterial Preteeted Ufl:derFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
79,3,"enter into a mutually acceptable agreement"" related to the Trump-branded project in Moscow. 320"
79,4,"The LOI contemplated a development with residential, hotel, commercial, and office components,"
79,5,"and called for""[ a]pproximately 250 first class, luxury residential condominiums ,"" as well as""[ o]ne"
79,6,"first class, luxury hotel consisting of approximately 15 floors and containing not fewer than 150"
79,7,"hotel rooms."" 321 For the residential and commercial portions of the project , the Trump"
79,8,"Organization would receive between 1% and 5% of all condominium sales, 322 plus 3% of all rental"
79,9,"and other revenue. 323 For the project's hotel portion, the Trump Organization would receive a base"
79,10,"fee of 3% of gross operating revenues for the first five years and 4% thereafter , plus a separate"
79,11,"incentive fee of 20% of operating profit. 324 Under the LOI, the Trump Organization also would"
79,12,"receive a $4 million ""up-front fee"" prior to groundbreaking. 325 Under these terms, the Trump"
79,13,"Organization stood to earn substantial sums over the lifetime of the project, without assuming"
79,14,significant liabilities or financing commitments. 326
79,15,"On November 3, 2015, the day after the Trump Organization transmitted the LOI, Sater"
79,16,emailed Cohen suggesting that the Trump Moscow project could be used to increase candidate
79,17,"Trump's chances at being elected, writing:"
79,18,Buddy our boy can become President of the USA and we can engineer it. I will get all of
79,19,"Putins team to buy in on this, I will manage this process .... Michael, Putin gets on stage"
79,20,"with Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump Moscow , and Donald owns the republican"
79,21,nomination. And possibly beats Hillary and our boy is in .. . . We will manage this process
79,22,better than anyone. You and I will get Donald and Vladimir on a stage together very
79,23,shortly. That the game changer .327
79,24,"Later that day, Sater followed up:"
79,25,"Donald doesn't stare down, he negotiates and understands the economic issues and Putin"
79,26,"only want to deal with a pragmatic leader, and a successful business man is a good"
79,27,"candidate for someone who knows how to negotiate. ""Business, politics, whatever it all is"
79,28,"the same for someone who knows how to deal"""
79,29,320
79,30,"11/2/15 Email, Cohen to Rozov et al. (attachment) (hereinafter ""LOI""); see also I 0/13/ 15 Email,"
79,31,Sater to Cohen & Davis (attaching proposed letter of intent).
79,32,"321 LOI, p. 2."
79,33,322
79,34,The LOI called for the Trump Organization to receive 5% of all gross sales up to $100 million ;
79,35,4% of all gross sales from $100 million to $250 million ; 3% of all gross sales from $250 million to $500
79,36,million; 2% of all gross sales from $500 million to $1 billion; and 1% of all gross sales over $1 billion.
79,37,"LOI, Schedule 2."
79,38,323
79,39,"LOI, Schedule 2."
79,40,324
79,41,"LOI, Schedule 1."
79,42,325
79,43,"LOI, Schedule 2."
79,44,326
79,45,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 3."
79,46,327
79,47,"11/3/ 15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:14 p.m.) ."
79,48,71
79,49,NA
80,1,U.S. Department of Justice
80,2,Attertte;· 'i1l6rk Predttet // Mtt; CetttttiA Mttterittl Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
80,3,I think I can get Putin to say that at the Trump Moscow press conference.
80,4,If he says it we own this election . Americas most difficult adversary agreeing that Donald
80,5,is a good guy to negotiate ....
80,6,We can own this election.
80,7,"Michael my next steps are very sensitive with Putins very very close people , we can pull"
80,8,this off.
80,9,Michael lets go. 2 boys from Brooklyn getting a USA president elect ed. This is good really
80,10,good.328
80,11,"According to Cohen , he did not consider the political import of the Trump Moscow project"
80,12,to the 2016 U.S. presidential election at the time. Cohen also did not recall candidate Trump or
80,13,anyone affiliated with the Trump Campaign discussing the political implications of the Trump
80,14,"Moscow project with him. However, Cohen recalled conversations with Trump in which the"
80,15,"candidat e suggested that his campaign would be a significant ""infomercial "" for Trump-branded"
80,16,prope1ties .329
80,17,ii. Post-LOI Contacts with Individuals in Russia
80,18,"Given the size of the Trump Moscow project, Sater and Cohen believed the project required"
80,19,"approval (whether express or implicit) from the Russian national government , including from the"
80,20,Presidential Administration of Russia. 330 Sater stated that he therefore began to contact the
80,21,Presidential Administration through another Russian business contact. 331 In early negotiations
80,22,"with the Trump Organization , Sater had alluded to the need for government approval and his"
80,23,"attempts to set up meetings with Russian officials . On October 12, 2015 , for example , Sater wrote"
80,24,"to Cohen that ""all we need is Putin on board and we are golden ,"" and that a ""meeting with Putin"
80,25,"and top deputy is tentatively set for the 14th [of October]. "" 332                               this meeting"
80,26,was being coordinated by associates in Russia and that he had no direct interaction with the Russian
80,27,government. 333
80,28,"Approximately a month later, after the LOI had been signed, Lana Erchova emailed lvank a"
80,29,"Trump on behalf of Erchova's then-husband Dmitr y Klokov , to offer Klokov ' s assistance to the"
80,30,Trump Campaign. 334 Klokov was at that time Director of External Communicati ons for PJSC
80,31,"Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System, a large Russian electricity transmission"
80,32,328
80,33,"11/3/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12 :40 p.m.) ."
80,34,329
80,35,"Coh en 9/12/ 18 302, at 3-4; Cohen 8/7/ 18 302, at 15."
80,36,330
80,37,"Sater 12/15/17 302 , at 2."
80,38,331
80,39,"Sater 12/15/ 17 302 , at 3-4."
80,40,332
80,41,"10/ 12/15 Email , Sat er to Cohen (8:07 a.m.)."
80,42,333
80,43,334
80,44,"Ivanka Trump received an email from a wom an who identified herself as ""Lan a E. Alexander,"""
80,45,"which said in part , ""If you ask anyone who knows Russian to google my husband Dmitry Klokov , you' ll"
80,46,"see who he is close to and that he has done Putin' s political campaign s."" 11/ 16/ 15 Email , Erchova to"
80,47,I. Trump.
80,48,72
80,49,NA
81,1,U.S. Department of Justice
81,2,Atl:erfl:eyWerk Predttet // May Cetttaitt Material PreteeteEIUttEierFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
81,3,"company , and had been previously employed as an aide and press secretary to Russia's energy"
81,4,"minister. Ivanka Trump forwarded the email to Cohen. 335 He told the Office that , after receiving"
81,5,"this inquiry, he had conducted an internet search for Klokov's name and concluded (incorrectly)"
81,6,that Klokov was a former Olympic weightlifter. 336
81,7,"Between November 18 and 19, 2015,-Klokov and Cohen had at least one telephone call"
81,8,"and exchanged several emails. Describing himself in emails to Cohen as a ""trusted person "" who"
81,9,"could offer the Campaign ""political synergy"" and ""synergy on a government level,"" Klokov"
81,10,recommended that Cohen travel to Russia to speak with him and an unidentified intermediary .
81,11,Klokov said that those conversations could facilitate a later meeting in Russia between the
81,12,"candidate and an individual Klokov described as ""our person of interest."" 337 In an email to the"
81,13,"Office, Erchova later identified the ""person of interest"" as Russian President Vladimir Putin. 338"
81,14,"In the telephone call and follow-on emails with Klokov, Cohen discussed his desire to use"
81,15,a near-term trip to Russia to do site surveys and talk over the Trump Moscow project with local
81,16,developers. Cohen registered his willingness also to meet with Klokov and the unidentified
81,17,"intermediary, but was emphatic that all meetings in Russia involving him or candidate Trump--"
81,18,"including a possible meeting between candidate Trump and Putin-would                      need to be ""in"
81,19,"conjunction with the development and an official visit"" with the Trump Organization receiving a"
81,20,"formal invitation to visit. 339 (Klokov had written previously that ""the visit [by candidate Trump"
81,21,"to Russia] has to be informal. "") 340"
81,22,Klokov had also previously recommended to Cohen that he separate their negotiations over
81,23,"a possible meeting between Trump and ""the person of interest "" from any existing business track. 341"
81,24,"Re-emphasizing that his outreach was not done on behalf of any business, Klokov added in second"
81,25,"email to Cohen that, if publicized well, such a meeting could have ""phen omenal "" impact ""in a"
81,26,"business dimension"" and that the ""pe rson of interest['s]"" ""most important support"" could have"
81,27,"significant ramifications for the ""level of projects and their capacity."" Klokov concluded by telling"
81,28,335
81,29,"11/16/15 Email, I. Trump to Cohen."
81,30,336
81,31,"Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 17. During his interviews with the Office, Cohen still appeared to believe"
81,32,"that the Klokov he spoke with was that Olympian. The investigation, however, established that the email"
81,33,"address used to communicate with Cohen belongs to a different Dmitry Klokov, as described above."
81,34,337
81,35,"11/18/ 15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.)."
81,36,338
81,37,"In July 2018, the Office received an unsolicited email purporting to be from Erchova, in which"
81,38,"she wrote that ""[a]t the end of2015 and beginning of2016 I was asked by my ex-husband to contact lvanka"
81,39,"Trump . .. and offer cooperation to Trump's team on behalf of the Russian officials."" 7/27/18 Email,"
81,40,Erchova to Special Counsel's Office. The email claimed that the officials wanted to offer candidate Trump
81,41,"""land in Crimea among other things and unofficial meeting with Putin."" Id. In order to vet the email's"
81,42,"claims, the Office responded requesting more details. The Office did not receive any reply."
81,43,339
81,44,"11/18/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (7:15 a.m.)."
81,45,340
81,46,"11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.)."
81,47,341
81,48,"11/18/15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (6:51 a.m.) (""I would suggest separating your negotiations"
81,49,"and our proposal to meet. I assure you, after the meeting level of projects and their capacity can be"
81,50,"completely different, having the most important support."")."
81,51,73
81,52,NA
82,1,U.S. Department of Justice
82,2,"Attorfle)' \Vork Prod1:1et// Ma,· Cofl:htil'I:"
82,3,Material Proteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
82,4,"Cohen that there was ""no bigger warranty in any project than [the] consent of the person of"
82,5,"interest."" 342 Cohen rejected the proposal, saying that ""[c]urrently our LOI developer is in talks"
82,6,"with VP's Chief of Staff and arranging a formal invite for the two to meet."" 343 This email appears"
82,7,"to be their final exchange, and the investigation did not identify evidence that Cohen brought"
82,8,Klokov ' s initial offer of assistance to the Campaign's attention or that anyone associated with the
82,9,Trump Organization or the Campaign dealt with Klokov at a later date. Cohen explained that he
82,10,did not pursue the proposed meeting because he was already working on the Moscow Project with
82,11,"Sater, who Cohen understood to have his own connections to the Russian government. 344"
82,12,"By late December 2015, however, Cohen was complaining that Sater had not been able to"
82,13,use those connections to set up the promised meeting with Russian government officials. Cohen
82,14,"told Sater that he was ""setting up the meeting myself. "" 345 On January 11, 2016, Cohen emailed"
82,15,"the office of Dmitry Peskov , the Russian government's press secretary, indicating that he desired"
82,16,"contact with Sergei Ivanov , Putin's chief of staff. Cohen erroneously used the email address"
82,17,"""Pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru"" instead of ""Pr_peskova@prpress.gov .ru,"" so the email apparently"
82,18,"did not go through. 346 On January 14, 2016, Cohen emailed a different address"
82,19,(info@prpress .gov.ru) with the following message:
82,20,"Dear Mr. Peskov,"
82,21,"Over the past few months, I have been working with a company based in Russia regarding"
82,22,the development of a Trump Tower-Moscow project in Moscow City.
82,23,"Without getting into lengthy specifics, the communication between our two sides has"
82,24,"stalled. As this project is too important , I am hereby requesting your assistance."
82,25,"I respectfully request someone, preferably you; contact me so that I might discuss the"
82,26,specifics as well as arranging meetings with the appropriate individuals.
82,27,I thank you in advance for your assistance and look forward to hearing from you soon. 347
82,28,"Two days later, Cohen sent an email to Pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru, repeating his request to speak"
82,29,with Sergei Ivanov. 348
82,30,"Cohen testified to Congress, and initially told the Office, that he did not recall receiving a"
82,31,response to this email inquiry and that he decided to terminate any further work on the Trump
82,32,Moscow project as of January 2016. Cohen later admitted that these statements were false . In
82,33,342
82,34,"11/19/ 15 Email, Klokov to Cohen (7:40 a.m.)."
82,35,343
82,36,"11/19/15 Email, Cohen to Klokov (12:56 p.m.)."
82,37,344
82,38,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 12."
82,39,345
82,40,"FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (6:17 p.m.))."
82,41,346
82,42,"1/ 11/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gof.ru (9: 12 a.m.)."
82,43,347
82,44,"1/14/16 Email, Cohen to info@prpress.gov.ru (9:21 a.m.)."
82,45,348
82,46,"1/16/16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova@prpress.gov.ru (10:28 a.m.)."
82,47,74
82,48,NA
83,1,U.S. Department of Justice
83,2,"AUarney Wede Predttet /,' Mey Cett1:aittMl:\1:erial     Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)"
83,3,"fact, Cohen had received (and recalled receiving) a response to his inquiry, and he continued to"
83,4,work on and update candidate Trump on the project through as late as June 2016. 349
83,5,"On January 20, 2016, Cohen received an email from Elena Poliakova , Peskov's personal"
83,6,"assistant. Writing from her personal email account , Poliakova stated that she had been trying to"
83,7,reach Cohen and asked that he call her on the personal number that she provided. 350 Shortly after
83,8,"receiving Poliakova's email , Cohen called and spoke to her for 20 minutes. 351 Cohen described to"
83,9,Poliakova his position at the Trump Organization and outlined the proposed Trump Moscow
83,10,"project, including information about the Russian counterparty with which the Trump Organization"
83,11,"had partnered. Cohen requested assistance in moving the project forward, both in securing land to"
83,12,"build the project and with financing. According to Cohen, Poliakova asked detailed questions and"
83,13,"took notes , stating that she would need to follow up with others in Russia. 352"
83,14,Cohen could not recall any direct follow -up from Poliakova or from any other
83,15,"representative of the Russian government, nor did the Office identify any evidence of direct"
83,16,"follow-up. However, the day after Cohen ' s call with Poliakova , Sater texted Cohen, asking him"
83,17,"to ""[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat .. . It ' s about Putin they called today."" 353 Sater"
83,18,"then sent a draft invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow to discuss the Trump Moscow project, 354"
83,19,"along with a note to ""[t]ell me if the letter is good as amended by me or make whatever changes"
83,20,"you want and send it back to me."" 355 After a further round of edits, on January 25, 2016 , Sater"
83,21,sent Cohen an invitation - signed by Andrey Ryabinskiy of the company MHJ-to travel to
83,22,"""Moscow for a working visit"" about the ""prospects of development and the construction business"
83,23,"in Russia,"" ""the various land plots available suited for construction of this enormous Tower,"" and"
83,24,"""the oppo1tunity to co-ordinate a follow up visit to Moscow by Mr. Donald Trump."" 356 According"
83,25,349
83,26,"Cohen Information ,i,i 4, 7. Cohen ' s interactions with President Trump and the Presiden t's"
83,27,"lawyers when preparing his congressional testimony are discussed further in Volume II. See Vol. II, Section"
83,28,"11.K.3,infra."
83,29,350
83,30,"1/20/16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen (5 :57 a.m.) (""Mr. Cohen[,] I can 't get through to both your"
83,31,"phones. Pis, call me."")."
83,32,35 1
83,33,"Telephone records show a 20-m inute call on January 20, 2016 between Cohen and the number"
83,34,Poliakova provided in her email. Call Records of Michael Cohen                                          After
83,35,"the call, Cohen saved Poliakova's contact information in his Trump Organi zation Outlook contact list."
83,36,1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
83,37,352
83,38,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2-3."
83,39,353
83,40,"FS000l 1 (1/21/16 Text Messages , Sater to Cohen)."
83,41,354
83,42,"The invitation purported to be from Genbank , a Russian bank that was, according to Sater,"
83,43,"working at the behest of a larger bank, VTB, and would consider providing financing. FS00008 (12/31/ 15"
83,44,"Text Messages, Sater & Cohen). Additional information about Genbank can be found infra."
83,45,355
83,46,"FS000l I (1/21/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:44 p.m.)) ; 1/21/ 16 Email, Sater to Cohen"
83,47,(6:49 p.m.).
83,48,356
83,49,"1/25/16 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:01 p.m.) (attachment)."
83,50,75
83,51,NA
84,1,U.S. Department of Justice
84,2,Attort1ey Work Prndttet // Mtty Cot1tttil'IMttterittl Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. e(e)
84,3,"to Cohen , he elected not to travel at the time because of concerns about the lack of concrete"
84,4,proposals about land plots that could be considered as options for the project. 357
84,5,d. Discussions about Russia Travel by Michael Cohen or Candidate Trump
84,6,(December 2015-June 2016)
84,7,i. Sater 's Overtures to Cohen to Travel to Russia
84,8,The late January communication was neither the first nor the last time that Cohen
84,9,"contemplated visiting Russia in pursuit of the Trump Moscow project. Beginning in late 2015 ,"
84,10,"Sater repeatedly tried to arrange for Cohen and candidate Trump, as representatives of the Trump"
84,11,"Organization, to travel to Russia to meet with Russian governm ent officials and possible financing"
84,12,"partners. In December 2015, Sater sent Cohen a number of emails about logistics for traveling to"
84,13,"Russia for meetings. 358 On December 19, 2015, Sater wrote:"
84,14,Please call me I have Evgeney [Dvoskin] on the other line. [359] He needs a copy of your
84,15,and Donald's passports they need a scan of every page of the passports. Invitations &
84,16,Visas will be issued this week by VTB Bank to discuss financing for Trump Tower
84,17,Moscow. Politically neither Putins office nor Ministry of Foreign Affairs cannot issue
84,18,"invite, so they are inviting commercially/ business. VTB is Russia's 2 biggest bank and"
84,19,"VTB Bank CEO Andrey Kostin, will be at all meetings with Putin so that it is a business"
84,20,meeting not political. We will be invited to Russian consulate this week to receive invite
84,21,& have visa issued. 360
84,22,"In response , Cohen texted Sater an image of his own passport. 361 Cohen told the Office that at one"
84,23,"point he requested a copy of candidate Trump's passport from Rhona Graff, Trump's executive"
84,24,"assistant at the Trump Organization, and that Graff later brought Trump ' s passport to Cohen's"
84,25,357
84,26,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6-7."
84,27,358
84,28,"See, e.g., 12/1/15 Email, Sater to Cohen (12:41 p.m.) (""Please scan and send me a copy of your"
84,29,"passport for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs."")."
84,30,359
84,31,Toll records show that Sater was speaking to Evgeny Dvoskin. Call Records of Felix Sater
84,32,"Dvoskin is an executive of Genbank, a large bank with lending focused"
84,33,"in Crimea, Ukraine . At the time that Sater provided this financing letter to Cohen, Genbank was subject to"
84,34,"U.S. government sanctions, see Russia/Ukraine -related Sanctions and Identifi cations, Office of Foreign"
84,35,"Assets Control (Dec. 22, 2015), available at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center /sanctions/OF AC-"
84,36,"Enforcement/Pages/20151222.aspx. Dvoskin , who had been deported from the United States in 2000 for"
84,37,"criminal activity , was under indictment in the United States for stock fraud under the aliases Eugene Slusker"
84,38,"and Gene Shustar. See United States v. Rizzo, et al., 2:03-cr-63 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2003)."
84,39,360
84,40,"12/ 19/15 Email , Sater to Cohen (10:50 a.m.); FS00002 (12/ 19/15 Text Mes sages, Sater to"
84,41,"Cohen, (10:53 a.m.)."
84,42,36 1
84,43,"FS00004 (12/19/15 Text Message , Cohen to Sater); ERT_0198-256 (12/ 19/15 Text Messages,"
84,44,Cohen & Sater).
84,45,76
84,46,NA
85,1,U.S. Department of Justice
85,2,Att:ort1eyWork PfOdttet// Mtty CotttttiHMttterittlProteeted UHderFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
85,3,"office. 362 The investigation did not, however , establish that the passport was forwarded to Sater. 363"
85,4,"Into the spring of 2016, Sater and Cohen continued to discuss a trip to Moscow in"
85,5,"connection with the Trump Moscow project. On April 20, 2016, Sater wrote Cohen, "" [t]he People"
85,6,". wanted to know when you are coming?"" 364 On May 4, 2016, Sater followed up:"
85,7,I had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is before or after
85,8,"the convention. I said I believe, but don't know for sure, that ' s it's probably after the"
85,9,convention. Obviously the pre-meeting trip (you only) can happen anytime you want but
85,10,the 2 big guys where [sic] the question. I said I would confirm and revert. . . . Let me
85,11,know about If I was right by saying I believe after Cleveland and also when you want to
85,12,speak to them and possibly fly over. 365
85,13,"Cohen responded, ""My trip before Cleveland. Trump once he becomes the nominee after the"
85,14,"convention."" 366"
85,15,"The day after this exchange , Sater tied Cohen ' s travel to Russia to the St. Petersburg"
85,16,"International Economic Forum (""Forum""), an annual event attended by prominent Russian"
85,17,politicians and businessmen. Sater told the Office that he was informed by a business associate
85,18,"that Peskov wanted to invite Cohen to the Forum. 367 On May 5, 2016, Sater wrote to Cohen:"
85,19,Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is Russia's
85,20,Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly introduce you to
85,21,"either Putin or Medvedev , as they are not sure if 1 or both will be there."
85,22,This is perfect. The entire business class of Russia wiU be there as well.
85,23,He said anything you want to discuss including dates and subjects are on the table to
85,24,discuss[. ]368
85,25,"The following day, Sater asked Cohen to confirm those dates would work for him to travel ; Cohen"
85,26,"wrote back, ""[w]orks for me."" 369"
85,27,362
85,28,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5."
85,29,363
85,30,"On December 21 , 2015, Sater sent Cohen a text message that read, ""They need a copy of DJT"
85,31,"passport ,"" to which Cohen responded , ""After I return from Moscow with you with a date for him."" FS00004"
85,32,"(12/21/15 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater)."
85,33,364
85,34,"FS00014 (4/20/16 Text Message , Sater to Cohen (9:06 p.m.)) ."
85,35,365
85,36,"FS000l 5 (5/4/16 Text Message, Sater to Cohen (7:38 p.m.))."
85,37,3 66
85,38,"FS00015 (5/4/16 Text Message, Cohen to Sater (8:03 p.m.))."
85,39,367
85,40,"Sater 12/15/17 302 , at 4."
85,41,368
85,42,"FS00016 (5/5/ 16 Text Messages , Sater to Coh en (6:26 & 6:27 a.m.))."
85,43,369
85,44,"FS00016 (5/6/ 16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater) ."
85,45,77
85,46,NA
86,1,U.S. Department of Justice
86,2,AttertteyWerk Predttet// Ma;· Cmi.tftiH MatertalPreteeted UttderFed. R. Crtm.P. 6(e)
86,3,"On June 9, 2016, Sater sent Cohen a notice that he (Sater) was completing the badges for"
86,4,"the Forum, adding, ""Putin is there on the 17th very strong chance you will meet him as well."" 370"
86,5,"On June 13, 2016 , Sater forwarded Cohen an invitation to the Forum signed by the Director of the"
86,6,"Roscongress Foundation, the Russian entity organizing the Forum. 371 Sater also sent Cohen a"
86,7,"Russian visa application and asked him to send two passport photos. 372 According to Cohen, the"
86,8,invitation gave no indication that Peskov had been involved in inviting him. Cohen was concerned
86,9,that Russian officials were not actually involved or were not interested in meeting with him (as
86,10,"Sater had alleged) , and so he decided not to go to the Forum. 373 On June 14, 2016 , Cohen met"
86,11,Sater in the lobby of the Trump Tower in New York and informed him that he would not be
86,12,traveling at that time. 374
86,13,ii. Candidate Trump's Opportunities to Travel to Russia
86,14,"The investigation identified evidence that , during the period the Trump Moscow project"
86,15,"was under consideration, the possibility of candidate Trump visiting Russia arose in two contexts."
86,16,"First, in interviews with the Office, Cohen stated that he discussed the subject of traveling"
86,17,"to Russia with Trump twice: once in late 2015; and again in spring 2016. 375 According to Cohen,"
86,18,"Trump indicated a willingness to travel if it would assist the project significantly. On one occasion,"
86,19,Trump told Cohen to speak with then-campaign manager Corey Lewandowski to coordinate the
86,20,"candidate's schedule. Cohen recalled that he spoke with Lewandowski , who suggested that they"
86,21,"speak again when Cohen had actual dates to evaluate. Cohen indicated , however , that he knew"
86,22,that travel prior to the Republican National Convention would be impossible given the candidate 's
86,23,preexisting commitments to the Campaign. 376
86,24,"Second, like Cohen, Trump received and turned down an invitation to the St. Petersburg"
86,25,"International Economic Forum. In late December 2015, Mira Duma-a contact oflvanka Trump ' s"
86,26,from the fashion industry-first passed along invitations for Ivanka Trump and candidate Trump
86,27,"from Sergei Prikhodko, a Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. 377 On January 14,"
86,28,"2016, Rhona Graff sent an email to Duma stating that Trump was ""honored to be asked to"
86,29,"participate in the highly prestigious"" Forum event, but that he would ""have to decline"" the"
86,30,"invitation given his ""very grueling and full travel schedule"" as a presidential candidate. 378 Graff"
86,31,37
86,32,"°FS000 18 (6/9/16 Text Messages,   Sater & Cohen)."
86,33,371
86,34,"6/13/16 Email , Sater to Cohen (2:10 p.m.)."
86,35,372
86,36,"FS00018 (6/13/16 Text Message , Sater to Cohen (2:20 p.m.)); 6/13/16 Email, Sater to Cohen."
86,37,373
86,38,"Cohen 9/12/18 302 , at 6-8."
86,39,374
86,40,"FS00019 (6/14/16 Text Messages, Cohen & Sater (12:06 and 2:50 p.m.))."
86,41,375
86,42,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2."
86,43,376
86,44,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7."
86,45,377
86,46,"12/21/15 Email, Mira to Ivanka Trump (6:57 a.m.) (attachments); TRUMPORG_16_000057"
86,47,"(1/7/16 Email, I. Trump to Graff(9:18 a.m.))."
86,48,378
86,49,"1/14/16 Email, Graff to Mira."
86,50,78
86,51,NA
87,1,U.S. Department of Justice
87,2,Attorttey Work Prodt1et /! Mtty Cotttaitt Material Proteeted Uttder Fed . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
87,3,"asked Duma whether she recommended that Graff ""send a formal note to the Deputy Prime"
87,4,"Minister"" declining his invitation; Duma replied that a formal note would be ""great."" 379"
87,5,It does not appear that Graff prepared that note immediately. According to written answers
87,6,"from President Trump, 380 Graff received an email from Deputy Prime Minister Prikhodko on"
87,7,"March 17, 2016, again inviting Trump to participate in the 2016 Forum in St. Petersburg. 381 Two"
87,8,"weeks later, on March 31, 2016, Graff prepared for Trump 's signature a two-paragraph letter"
87,9,"declining the invitation. 382 The letter stated that Trump's ""schedule has become extremely"
87,10,"demanding"" because of the presidential campaign, that he ""already ha[ d] several commitments in"
87,11,"the United States"" for the time of the Forum, but that he otherwise ""would have gladly given every"
87,12,"consideration to attending such an important event. ""383 Graff forwarded the letter to another"
87,13,executive assistant at the Trump Organization with instructions to print the document on letterhead
87,14,for Trump to sign. 384
87,15,"At approximately the same time that the letter was being prepared, Robert Foresman-a"
87,16,New York-based investment banker- began reaching out to Graff to secure an in-person meeting
87,17,"with candidate Trump. According to Foresman , he had been asked by Anton Kobyakov, a Russian"
87,18,"presidential aide involved with the Roscongress Foundation, to see if Trump could speak at the"
87,19,"Forum. 385 Foresman first emailed Graff on March 31, 2016, following a phone introduction"
87,20,brokered through Trump business associate Mark Burnett (who produced the televis ion show The
87,21,"Apprentice). In his email , Foresman referenc ed his long-standing personal and professional"
87,22,"expertise in Russia and Ukraine , his work setting up an early ""private channel "" between Vladimir"
87,23,"Putin and former U.S. President George W. Bush, and an ""approac h"" he had received from ""senior"
87,24,"Kremlin officials"" about the candidate. Foresman asked Graff for a meeting with the candidate,"
87,25,"Corey Lewandowski , or ""another relevant person"" to discuss this and other ""concrete thin gs"""
87,26,"Foresman felt uncomfortabl e discussing over ""unsecure email. "" 386 On April 4, 2016, Graff"
87,27,"forwarded Foresman ' s meeting request to Jessica Macchia, another execut ive assistant"
87,28,to Trump. 387
87,29,379
87,30,"1/15/16 Email, Mira to Graff."
87,31,"380  As explained in Volume II and Appendix C, on September 17, 2018, the Office sent written"
87,32,"questions to the President's counsel. On November 20 , 20 18, the Presid ent provided written answers to"
87,33,those questions through counsel.
87,34,381
87,35,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov . 20 , 2018) , at 17 (Response to Question IV,"
87,36,"Pait (e)) ("" [D]ocuments show that Ms. Graff prepared for my signature a brief response declining the"
87,37,"invitation."")."
87,38,382
87,39,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018) , at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part"
87,40,"(e)); see also TRUMPORG_l 6_000134 (unsigned letter dated March 31, 2016)."
87,41,383
87,42,TRUMPORG_16_000134        (unsigned letter) .
87,43,384
87,44,"TRUMPORG_l6 _ 000133 (3/31/16 Email, Graffto Macchia) ."
87,45,38 5
87,46,"Foresman 10/17/ 18 302, at 3-4."
87,47,386
87,48,"See TRUMPORG_16_00136         (3/31/16 Ema il, For esman to Graff) ; see also Fore sman 10/17/18"
87,49,"302, at 3-4 ."
87,50,387
87,51,"See TRUMPORG _ l6 _00136 (4/4/16 Email, Graff to Macchia) ."
87,52,79
87,53,NA
88,1,U.S. Department of Justice
88,2,MterHey Wet'k Pred1:1et// Ma-yCeHtail'lMaterial Preteeted Ul'!derFed. R. C1·iffl.P. 6(e)
88,3,"With no response forthcoming , Foresman twice sent reminders to Graff-first on April 26"
88,4,"and again on April 30, 2016. 388 Graff sent an apology to Foresman and forwarded his April 26"
88,5,"email ( as well as his initial March 2016 email) to Lewandowski. 389 On May 2, 2016 , Graff"
88,6,forwarded Foresman ' s April 30 email-which            suggested an alternative meeting with Donald
88,7,"Trump Jr. or Eric Trump so that Foresman could convey to them information that ""should be"
88,8,"conveyed to [the candidate] personally or [to] someone [the candidate] absolutely trusts ""-to"
88,9,policy advisor Stephen Miller. 390
88,10,No communications or other evidence obtained by the Office indicate that the Trump
88,11,Campaign learned that Foresman was reaching out to invite the candidate to the Forum or that the
88,12,"Campaign otherwise followed up with Foresman until after the election, when he interacted with"
88,13,the Transition Team as he pursued a possible position in the incoming Administration. 391 When
88,14,"interviewed by the Office , Foresman denied that the specific ""approach "" from ""se nior Kremlin"
88,15,"officials"" noted in his March 31, 2016 email was anything other than Kobyakov's invitation to"
88,16,"Roscongress. According to Foresman, the ""concrete things"" he referenced in the same email were"
88,17,"a combination of the invitation itself , Foresman's personal perspectives on the invitation and"
88,18,"Russia policy in general, and details of a Ukraine plan supported by a U.S. think tank (EastWest"
88,19,Institute). For esman told the Office that Kobyakov had extended similar invitations through him
88,20,to another Republican presidential candidate and one other politician. Foresman also said that
88,21,Kobyakov had asked Foresman to invite Trump to speak after that other presidential candidate
88,22,"withdrew from the race and the other politician's participation did not work out. 392 Finally ,"
88,23,"Foresman claimed to have no plans to establish a back channel involving Trump, stating the"
88,24,reference to his involvement in the Bush-Putin back channel was meant to burnish his credentials
88,25,to the Campaign. Foresman commented that he had not recogni zed any of the experts announced
88,26,"as Trump's foreign policy team in March 2016, and wanted to secure an in-person meeting with"
88,27,"the candidate to share his professional background and policy views , including that Trump should"
88,28,decline Kobyakov 's invitation to speak at the Forum .393
88,29,2. George Papadopoulos
88,30,George Papadopoulo s was a foreign polic y advisor to the Trump Campaign from March
88,31,388
88,32,"See TRUMPORG_16_00137 (4/26/16 Email, Foresman to Graff); TRUMPORG_ 16_00141"
88,33,"(4/30/16 Email, Foresman to Graff)."
88,34,389
88,35,"See TRUMPORG_ 16_00139 (4/27/16 Email, Graff to Foresman); TRUMPORG_16_00137"
88,36,"(4/27/16 Email, Graff to Lewandowski)."
88,37,390
88,38,"TRUMPORG_16_00142 (5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller); see also TRUMPORG_16_00143"
88,39,"(5/2/16 Email, Graff to S. Miller) (forwarding March 2016 email from Foresman)."
88,40,391
88,41,"Foresman' s contacts during the transition period are discussed further in Volume I, Section"
88,42,"IV.B.3, infra."
88,43,392
88,44,"Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 4."
88,45,393
88,46,"Foresman 10/ 17/18 302, at 8-9."
88,47,80
88,48,NA
89,1,U.S. Department of Justice
89,2,Atief'Hey \l/erk Pretittet // Ma;· CeHtaiH Material Preteeteti UHtier Fed. R. CFiffl. P. 6(e)
89,3,"2016 to early October 2016. 394 In late April 2016, Papadopoulos was told by London-based"
89,4,"professor Joseph Mifsud, immediately after Mifsud ' s return from a trip to Moscow, that the"
89,5,"Russian government had obtained ""dirt"" on candidate Clinton in the form of thousands of emails."
89,6,"One week later, on May 6, 2016, Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign"
89,7,government that the Trump Campaign had received indications from the Russian government that
89,8,it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous release of information that would be
89,9,damaging to candidate Clinton.
89,10,"Papadopoulos shared information about Russian ""dirt "" with people outside of the"
89,11,"Campaign, and the Office investigated whether he also provided it to a Campaign official."
89,12,Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials with whom he interacted told the Office that they did
89,13,· not recall that Papadopoulos passed them the information. Throughout the relevant period of time
89,14,"and for several months thereafter, Papadopoulos worked with Mifsud and two Russian nationals"
89,15,to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government. That meeting never
89,16,came to pass.
89,17,a. Origins of Campaign Work
89,18,395
89,19,"In March 2016, Papadopoulos became a foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign."
89,20,"As early as the summer of 2015, he had sought a role as a policy advisor to the Campaign but, in"
89,21,"a September 30, 2015 email , he was told that the Campaign was not hiring policy advisors. 396 In"
89,22,"late 2015, Papadopoulos obtained a paid position on the campaign of Republican presidential"
89,23,candidate Ben Carson. 397
89,24,"Although Carson remained in the presidential race until early March 20 I 6, Papadopoulos"
89,25,"had stopped actively working for his campaign by early February 2016. 398 At that time,"
89,26,Papadopoulos reached out to a contact at the London Centre of International Law Practice
89,27,"(LCILP) , which billed itself as a ""unique institution . . . comprising high-level professional"
89,28,"international law practitioners, dedicated to the advancement of global legal knowledge and the"
89,29,"practice of international law."" 399 Papadopoulos said that he had finished his role with the Carson"
89,30,394
89,31,Papadopoulos met with our Office for debriefings on several occasions in the summer and fall
89,32,"of 2017, after he was arrested and charged in a sealed criminal complaint with making false statements in"
89,33,"a January 2017 FBI interview about, inter alia, the timing, extent, and nature of his interactions and"
89,34,communications with Joseph Mifsud and two Russian nationals: Olga Polonskaya and Ivan Timofeev.
89,35,"Papadopoulos later pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to an information charging him with"
89,36,"making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § lO0l(a)."
89,37,395
89,38,"A Transcript of Donald Trump's Meeting with the Washington Post Editorial Board,"
89,39,"Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016)."
89,40,396
89,41,"7/15/15 Linkedln Message, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (6:57 a.m.); 9/30/15 Email, Glassner"
89,42,to Papadopoulos (7:42:21 a.m.).
89,43,397
89,44,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2."
89,45,398
89,46,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2; 2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris."
89,47,399
89,48,"London Centre oflnternational Law Practice, at https://www.lcilp.org/ (via web.archive.org)."
89,49,81
89,50,NA
90,1,U.S. Department of Justice
90,2,AttorHe;· Work Prodttet // May CotttaiH Material Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
90,3,"campaign and asked if LCILP was hiring. 400 In early February, Papadopoulos agreed to join"
90,4,LCILP and arrived in London to begin work. 401
90,5,"As he was taking his position at LCILP , Papadopoulos contacted Trump campaign manager"
90,6,Corey Lewandowski via Linkedln and emailed campaign official Michael Glassner about his
90,7,"interest in joining the Trump Campaign. 402 On March 2, 2016, Papadopoulos sent Glassner"
90,8,another message reiterating his interest. 403 Glassner passed along word of Papadopoulos's interest
90,9,"to another campaign official, Joy Lutes, who notified Papadopoulos by email that she had been"
90,10,"told by Glassner to introduce Papadopoulos to Sam Clovis, the Trump Campaign's national co-"
90,11,chair and chief policy advisor .404
90,12,"At the time of Papadopoulos's March 2 email , the media was criticizing the Trump"
90,13,Campaign for lack of experienced foreign policy or national security advisors within its ranks. 405
90,14,"To address that issue, senior Campaign officials asked Clovis to put a foreign policy team together"
90,15,"on short notice. 406 After receiving Papadopoulos's name from Lutes, Clovis performed a Google"
90,16,"search on Papadopoulos, learned that he had worked at the Hudson Institute , and believed that he"
90,17,"had credibility on energy issues. 407 On March 3, 2016 , Clovis arranged to speak with"
90,18,"Papadopoulos by phone to discuss Papadopoulos joining the Campaign as a foreign policy advisor,"
90,19,"and on March 6, 2016, the two spoke. 408 Papadopoulos recalled that Russia was mention ed as a"
90,20,"topic, and he understood from the conversation that Russia would be an important aspect of the"
90,21,"Campaign's foreign policy. 409 At the end of the conversation , Clovis offered Papadopoulos a role"
90,22,"as a foreign policy advisor to the Campaign, and Papadopoulos accepted the offer. 410"
90,23,b. Initial Russia-Related Contacts
90,24,"Approximately a week after signing on as a foreign policy advisor , Papadopoulos traveled"
90,25,400
90,26,"2/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Idris."
90,27,401
90,28,"2/5/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos (6:11:25 p.m.); 2/6/16 Email, Idris to Papadopoulos"
90,29,(5:34:15 p.m.) .
90,30,402
90,31,"2/4/16 Linkedln Message , Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1 :28 p.m.); 2/4/ 16 Email ,"
90,32,Papadopoulos to Glassner (2:10:36 p.m.).
90,33,403
90,34,"3/2/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Glassner (11: 17:23 a.m.)."
90,35,404
90,36,"3/2/16 Email, Lutes to Papadopoulos (10:08:15 p.m.)."
90,37,405
90,38,"Clovis 10/3/17 302 (1 of2), at 4."
90,39,406
90,40,"Clovis 10/3/ 17 302 (1 of2), at 4."
90,41,407
90,42,"; 3/3/16 Email, Lutes to Clovis & Papadopoulos"
90,43,(6:05:47 p.m.).
90,44,40 8
90,45,"3/6/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (4:24:21 p.m.)."
90,46,409
90,47,"Statement of Offense ,i 4, United States v. George Papadopoulos, 1:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5,"
90,48,"2017), Doc. 19 (""Papadopoulos Statement of Offense"")."
90,49,4 10
90,50,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2."
90,51,82
90,52,NA
91,1,U.S. Department of Justice
91,2,Mterttey '.\'erk Preeittet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteeteel Ul'l:elerFeel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
91,3,"to Rome, Italy, as part of his duties with LCILP. 41 1 The purpose of the trip was to meet officials"
91,4,"affiliated with Link Campus University, a for-profit institution headed by a former Italian"
91,5,"government official. 412 During the visit , Papadopoulos was introduced to Joseph Mifsud."
91,6,Mifsud is a Maltese national who worked as a professor at the London Academy of
91,7,"Diplomacy in London, England. 4 13 Although Mifsud worked out of London and was also affiliated"
91,8,"with LCILP, the encounter in Rome was the first time that Papadopoulos met him. 414 Mifsud"
91,9,"maintained various Russian contacts while living in London, as described further below. Among"
91,10,"his contacts was                        ,415 a one-time employee of the IRA , the entity that carried out"
91,11,"the Russian social media campaign (see Volume I Section II, supra). In January and February"
91,12,"2016 , Mifsud and -                 discussed                        possibly meeting in Russia. The"
91,13,"investigation did not~                                  meeting. Later , in the spring of 2016, -"
91,14,was also in contact -                                   that was linked to an employee of the Russian
91,15,"Ministry of Defense, and that account had overlapping contacts with a group of Russian military-"
91,16,controlled Facebook accounts that included accounts used to promote the DCLeaks releases in the
91,17,"course of the GRU ' s hack-and-release operations (see Volume I, Section III.B.1, supra)."
91,18,"According to Papadopoulos , Mifsud at first seemed uninterested in Papadopoulos when"
91,19,"they met in Rome .416 After Papadopoulos informed Mifsud about his role in the Trump Campaign,"
91,20,"however, Mifsud appeared to take greater interest in Papadopoulos. 417 The two discussed Mifsud ' s"
91,21,European and Russian contacts and had a general discussion about Russia; Mifsud also offered to
91,22,introduce Papadopoulos to European leaders and others with contacts to the Russian
91,23,government. 418 Papadopoulos told the Office that Mifsud ' s claim of substantial connections with
91,24,"Russian government officials interested Papadopoulos, who thought that such connections could"
91,25,increase his importance as a policy advisor to the Trump Campaign. 419
91,26,"411 Papadopoulos  8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Papadop oulos Statement of Offense   ,r5."
91,27,412
91,28,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2-3; Stephanie Kirchgaessner et al., Joseph Mifsud: more"
91,29,"questions than answers about mystery professor linked to Russia, The Guardian (Oct. 31, 2017) (""Link"
91,30,"Campus University ... is headed by a former Italian interior minister named Vincenzo Scotti."")."
91,31,413
91,32,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense    ,r5."
91,33,414
91,34,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3."
91,35,",,  ,•   Investigative Technique"
91,36,1Harm to Ongoing Matter
91,37,416
91,38,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense    ,r5."
91,39,4 17
91,40,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offens e ,r5."
91,41,418
91,42,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 2."
91,43,419
91,44,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r5."
91,45,83
91,46,NA
92,1,U.S. Department of Justice
92,2,Atterttey Werle Prnat:tet// May Cef!taifl Material Prnteetea URaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
92,3,°
92,4,"On March 17, 2016, Papadopoulos returned to London. 42 Four days later, candidate"
92,5,Trump publicly named him as a member of the foreign policy and national security advisory team
92,6,"chaired by Senator Jeff Sessions, describing Papadopoulos as ""an oil and energy consultant"" and"
92,7,"an ""[e]xcellent guy."" 421"
92,8,"On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos met with Mifsud in London. 422 Mifsud was"
92,9,accompanied by a Russian female named Olga Polonskaya. Mifsud introduced Polonskaya as a
92,10,former student of his who had connections to Vladimir Putin. 423 Papadopoulos understood at the
92,11,time that Polonskaya may have been Putin ' s niece but later learned that this was not true .424 During
92,12,"the meeting, Polonskaya offered to help Papadopoulos establish contacts in Russia and stated that"
92,13,"the Russian ambassador in London was a friend of hers .425 Based on this interaction, Papadopoulos"
92,14,"expected Mifsud and Polonskaya to introduce him to the Russian ambassador in London, but that"
92,15,did not occur. 426
92,16,"Following his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos sent an email to members of the Trump"
92,17,"Campaign ' s foreign policy advisory team. The subject line of the message was ""Meeting with"
92,18,"Russian leadership--including Putin."" 427 The message stated in pertinent part:"
92,19,"I just finished a very productive lunch with a good friend of mine, Joseph Mifsud, the"
92,20,director of the London Academy of Diplomacy--who introduced me to both Putin's niece
92,21,and the Russian Ambassador in London--who also acts as the Deputy Foreign Minister. 428
92,22,The topic of the lunch was to arrange a meeting between us and the Russian leadership to
92,23,"discuss U.S.-Russia ties under President Trump. They are keen to host us in a ""neutral"""
92,24,"city, or directly in Moscow. They said the leadership, including Putin, is ready to meet with"
92,25,us and Mr. Trump should there be interest. Waiting for everyone's thoughts on moving
92,26,forward with this very important issue. 429
92,27,420
92,28,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 2."
92,29,421
92,30,"Phillip Rucker & Robert Costa, Trump Questions Need for NATO, Outlines Noninterventionist"
92,31,"Foreign Policy, Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016)."
92,32,422
92,33,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; 3/24/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos."
92,34,423
92,35,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3."
92,36,424
92,37,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 2/10/17 302, at 2-3 ; Papadopoulos Internet"
92,38,"Search History (3/24/16) (revealing late-morning and early-afternoon searches on March 24, 2016 for"
92,39,"""putin's niece, "" ""olga putin,"" and ""russian president niece olga,"" among other terms)."
92,40,425
92,41,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 3."
92,42,426
92,43,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense     ,r8 n. l."
92,44,427
92,45,"3/24/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.)."
92,46,428
92,47,"Papadopoulos's statements to the Campaign were false. As noted above , the woman he met was"
92,48,"not Putin's niece, he had not met the Russian Amba ssador in London, and the Ambassador did not also"
92,49,serve as Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister.
92,50,429
92,51,"3/24/16 Email , Papadopoulos to Page et al. (8:48:21 a.m.)."
92,52,84
92,53,NA
93,1,U.S. Department of Justice
93,2,A:tterttey Werk Pred1:1et// May Cet1taitt Material Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Critt1. P. 6(e)
93,3,Papadopoulos's message came at a time when Clovis perceived a shift in the Campaign ' s approach
93,4,toward Russia-from       one of engaging with Russia throu h the NA TO framework and takin a
93,5,"stron stance on Russian a ression in Ukraine,"
93,6,"Clovis ' s response to Papadopoulos , however, did not reflect that shift. Replying to"
93,7,Papadopoulos and the other members of the foreign policy advisory team copied on the initial
93,8,"email, Clovis wrote :"
93,9,This is most informative. Let me work it through the campaign. No commitments until we
93,10,see how this plays out. My thought is that we probably should not go forward with any
93,11,"meetings with the Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies,"
93,12,"especially France, Germany and Great Britain. We need to reassure our allies that we are"
93,13,not going to advance anything with Russia until we have everyone on the same page.
93,14,More thoughts later today. Great work. 431
93,15,c. March 31 Foreign Policy Team Meeting
93,16,The Campaign held a meeting of the foreign policy advisory team with Senator Sessions
93,17,"and candidate Trump approximately one week later, on March 31, 2016, in Washington, D.C. 432"
93,18,The meeting-which was intended to generate press coverage for the Campaign 433 -took place at
93,19,"the Trump International Hotel. 434 Papadopoulos flew to Washington for the event. At the meeting ,"
93,20,"Senator Sessions sat at one end of an oval table , while Trump sat at the other. As reflected in the"
93,21,"photograph below (which was posted to Trump's Instagram account), Papadopoulos sat between"
93,22,"the two, two seats to Sessions's left:"
93,23,430
93,24,431
93,25,"3/24/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos et al. (8:55:04 a.m.)."
93,26,432
93,27,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3."
93,28,433
93,29,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 16-17."
93,30,434
93,31,"Papadopoulos 8/ 10/17 302, at 4."
93,32,85
93,33,NA
94,1,U.S. Department of Justice
94,2,"AttertteyWerk Predtiet// Ma:, Cel'l:tail'I:"
94,3,1
94,4,MaterialPreteeted 01'1:der       Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
94,5,"March 31, 2016 Meeting of Foreign Poli cy Team, with Papadopoulos (Four th from Right of Candida te Trump)"
94,6,"During the meeting, each of the newly announced foreign policy advisors introduced"
94,7,themselves and briefly described their areas of experience or expertise. 435 Papadopoulos spoke
94,8,about his previous work in the energy sector and then brought up a potential meeting with Russian
94,9,"officials. 436 Specifically , Papadopoulos told the group that he had learned through his contacts in"
94,10,London that Putin wanted to meet with candidate Trump and that these connections could help
94,11,arrange that meeting. 437
94,12,Trump and Sessions both reacted to Papadopoulos's statement. Papadopoulos and
94,13,"Campaign advisor J.D. Gordon- who told investigators in an interview that he had a ""crystal"
94,14,"clear"" recollection of the meeting-have stated that Trump was interested in and receptive to the"
94,15,idea of a meeting with Putin. 438 Papadopoulos understood Sessions to be similarly supportive of
94,16,"his efforts to arrange a meeting. 439 Gordon and two other attendees, however, recall that Sessions"
94,17,"generally opposed the propo sal, though they differ in their accounts of the concerns he voiced or"
94,18,the strength of the opposition he expressed. 440
94,19,"d. George Papadopoulos Learns That Rus sia Has ""Dirt"" in the Form of Clinton"
94,20,Emails
94,21,"Whatever Sessions's precise words at the March 31 meeting , Papadopoulos did not"
94,22,understand Sessions or anyone else in the Trump Campaign to have directed that he refrain from
94,23,435
94,24,"Papadopoulos 8/10/ 17 302 , at 4."
94,25,436
94,26,"Papadopoulo s 8/ 10/17 302 , at 4 ."
94,27,437
94,28,"P apad opoulos Statement of Offense ,i 9; see Gordon 8/29/ 17 302, at 14; Carafan o 9/12/ 17 302,"
94,29,"at 2; Hoskins 9/14/17 302, at 1."
94,30,438
94,31,"Papadopoulos 8/10/ 17 302 , at 4-5 ; Gordon 9/7 / 17 302 , at 4-5."
94,32,439
94,33,"Papadopoulo s 8/ 10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3."
94,34,440
94,35,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 17; Gordon 9/7/ 17 302 , at 5; Hoskins 9/ 14/ 17 302, at l ; Carafano"
94,36,"9/12/17 302, at 2."
94,37,86
94,38,NA
95,1,U.S. Department of Justice
95,2,Att:orttey 'ili'ork Prodttet /I May CoHtaiH Material Proteeted Uttaer Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
95,3,making further efforts to arrange a meeting between the Campaign and the Russian government.
95,4,"To the contrary, Papadopoulos told the Office that he understood the Campaign to be supportive"
95,5,"of his efforts to arrange such a meeting. 441 Accordingly , when he returned to London,"
95,6,Papadopoulos resumed those efforts. 442
95,7,"Throughout April 2016, Papadopoulos continued to correspond with , meet with, and seek"
95,8,"Russia contacts through Mifsud and , at times , Polonskaya. 443 For example, within a week of her"
95,9,"initial March 24 meeting with him, Polonskaya attempted to send Papadopoulos a text message-"
95,10,which email exchanges show to have been drafted or edited by Mifsud-addressing
95,11,"Papadopoulos ' s ""wish to engage with the Russian Federation."" 444 When Papadopoulos learned"
95,12,"from Mifsud that Polonskaya had tried to message him , he sent her an email seeking another"
95,13,"meeting. 445 Polonskaya responded the next day that she was ""back in St. Petersburg "" but ""would"
95,14,"be very pleased to support [Papadopoulos's] initiatives between our two countries "" and ""to meet"
95,15,"[him] again."" 446 Papadopoulos stated in reply that he thought ""a good step"" would be to introduce"
95,16,"him to ""the Russian Ambassador in London,"" and that he would like to talk to the ambassador , ""or"
95,17,"anyone else you recommend , about a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. "" 447"
95,18,"Mifsud , who had been copied on the email exchanges, replied on the morning of April 11,"
95,19,"2016. He wrote, ""This is already been agreed. I am flying to Moscow on the 18th for a Valdai"
95,20,"meeting, plus other meetings at the Duma. We will talk tomorrow."" 448 The two bodies referenced"
95,21,by Mifsud are part of or associated with the Russian government: the Duma is a Russian legislative
95,22,"assembly, 449 while ""Valdai"" refers to the Valdai Discussion Club, a Moscow-based group that ""is"
95,23,"close to Russia's foreign-policy establishment."" 450 Papadopoulos thanked Mifsud and said that he"
95,24,"would see him ""tomorrow."" 451 For her part, Polonskaya responded that she had ""already alerted"
95,25,"my personal links to our conversation and your request,"" that ""w e are all very excited the"
95,26,"possibility of a good relationship with Mr. Trump,"" and that "" [t]he Russian Federation would love"
95,27,"to welcome him once his candidature would be officially announced."" 452"
95,28,441
95,29,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 4-5; Papadopoulos 8/11/17 302, at 3; Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302,"
95,30,at 2.
95,31,442
95,32,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i 10."
95,33,443
95,34,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i,i 10-15."
95,35,444
95,36,"3/29/16 Emails, Mifsud to Polonskaya (3 :39 a.m. and 5 :36 a.m.)."
95,37,445
95,38,"4/10/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (2:45:59 p.m.)."
95,39,446
95,40,"4/11/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (3: 11 :24 a.m.)."
95,41,447
95,42,"4/11 /l 6 Email, Papadopoulos to Polonskaya (9:21 :56 a.m.)."
95,43,448
95,44,"4/11/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (11 :43 :53)."
95,45,449
95,46,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,i 10(c)."
95,47,450
95,48,"Anton Troianovski, Putin Ally Warns of Arms Race as Russia Considers Response to US."
95,49,"Nuclear Stance, Washington Post (Feb. 10, 2018)."
95,50,451
95,51,"4/11/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (11:51 :53 a.m.)."
95,52,452
95,53,"4/12/16 Email, Polonskaya to Papadopoulos (4:47:06 a.m.)."
95,54,87
95,55,NA
96,1,U.S. Department of Justice
96,2,AtteFHey Werk Preettet // Mtt~· Cetttttitt Mttterittl Preteetea Uttaer Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
96,3,"Papadopoulos's and Mifsud's mentions of seeing each other ""tomorrow"" referenced a"
96,4,"meeting that the two had scheduled for the next morning , April 12, 2016, at the Andaz Hotel in"
96,5,"London. Papadopoulos acknowledged the meeting during interviews with the Office ,453 and"
96,6,records from Papadopoulos ' s UK cellphone and his internet-search history all indicate that the
96,7,meeting took place. 454
96,8,"Following the meeting , Mifsud traveled as planned to Moscow. 455 On April 18, 2016,"
96,9,"while in Russia, Mifsud introduced Papadopoulos over email to Ivan Timofeev, a member of the"
96,10,Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC). 456 Mifsud had described Timofeev as having
96,11,"connections with the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 457 the executive entity in Russia"
96,12,"responsible for Russian foreign relations. 458 Over the next several weeks, Papadopoulos and"
96,13,"Timofeev had multiple conversations over Skype and email about setting ""the groundwork "" for a"
96,14,"""potential"" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials. 459 Papadopoulos"
96,15,"told the Office that, on one Skype call, he believed that his conversation with Timofeev was being"
96,16,"monitored or supervised by an unknown third party, because Timofeev spoke in an official manner"
96,17,and Papadopoulos heard odd noises on the line.460 Timofeev also told Papadopoulos in an April
96,18,"25, 2016 email that he had just spoken ""to Igor Ivanov[,] the President ofRIAC and former Foreign"
96,19,"Minister of Russia,"" and conveyed Ivanov ' s advice about how best to arrange a ""Moscow visit."" 46 1"
96,20,"After a stop in Rome, Mifsud returned to England on April 25, 2016. 462 The next day,"
96,21,Papadopoulos met Mifsud for breakfast at the Andaz Hotel (the same location as their last
96,22,453
96,23,"Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 7."
96,24,454
96,25,"4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (5:44:39 a.m.) (forwarding Libya-related document);"
96,26,"4/12/16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos & Obaid (10:28:20 a.m.); Papadopoulos Internet Search History"
96,27,"(Apr. 11, 2016 10:56:49 p.m.) (search for ""andaz hotel liverpool street""); 4/12/16 Text Messages, Mifsud"
96,28,& Papadopoulos.
96,29,455
96,30,"See, e.g., 4/18/16 Email, Mifsud t~ Papadopoulos (8:04:54 a.m.)."
96,31,456
96,32,"Papadopoulos 8/ l 0/17 302, at 5."
96,33,457
96,34,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense    ,r 11."
96,35,"458   During the campaign period , Papadopoulos connected over Linkedln with several MF A-"
96,36,"affiliated individuals in addition to Timofeev. On April 25, 2016, he connected with Dmitry Andreyko ,"
96,37,"publicly identified as a First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in Ireland. In July 2016, he connected with"
96,38,"Yuriy Melnik, the spokesperson for the Russian Embassy in Washington and with Alexey Krasilnikov ,"
96,39,"publicly identified as a counselor with the MFA. And on September 16, 2016, he con~"
96,40,"Nalobin, also identified as an MFA official. See Papadopoulos Linkedln Connections~"
96,41,459
96,42,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense    ,r11."
96,43,460
96,44,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/19/ 17 302, at 10."
96,45,46 1
96,46,"4/25/16 Email, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (8:16 :35 a.m.)."
96,47,462
96,48,"4/22/ 16 Email, Mifsud to Papadopoulos (12:41:01 a.m.)."
96,49,88
96,50,NA
97,1,U.S. Department ofJustice
97,2,AtteFHe~·Werk PF0eh:1et      // Mtt)' CeHtttiflMateFial Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. CFil'l'l.
97,3,. P. 6(e)
97,4,"meeting). 463 During that meeting, Mifsud told Papadopoulos that he had met with high-level"
97,5,"Russian government officials during his recent trip to Moscow . Mifsud also said that, on the trip,"
97,6,"he learned that the Russians had obtained ""dirt"" on candidate Hillary Clinton. As Papadopoulos"
97,7,"later stated to the FBI, Mifsud said that the ""dirt"" was in the form of "" emails of Clinton,"" and that"
97,8,"they ""have thousands of emails."" 464 On May 6, 2016, 10 days after that meeting with Mifsud,"
97,9,Papadopoulos suggested to a representative of a foreign government that the Trump Campaign had
97,10,received indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the
97,11,anonymous release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton .465
97,12,e. Russia-Related Communications With The Campaign
97,13,While he was discussing with his foreign contacts a potential meeting of campaign officials
97,14,"with Russian government officials, Papadopoulos kept campaign officials apprised of his efforts."
97,15,"On April 25 , 2016 , the day before Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the emails, Papadopoulos wrote"
97,16,"to senior policy advisor Stephen Miller that ""[t]he Russian government has an open invitation by"
97,17,"Putin for Mr. Trump to meet him when he is ready ,"" and that ""[t]he advantage of being in London"
97,18,"is that these governments tend to speak a bit more openly in 'neutral' cities .""466 On April 27, 2016,"
97,19,"after his meeting with Mifsud, Papadopoulos wrote a second message to Miller stating that ""s ome"
97,20,467
97,21,"interesting messages [were] coming in from Moscow about a trip when the time is right. ""                The"
97,22,"same day , Papadopoulos sent a similar email to campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, telling"
97,23,"Lewandowski that Papadopoulos had ""been receiving a lot of calls over the last month about Putin"
97,24,"wanting to host [Trump] and the team when the time is right. ""468"
97,25,Papadopoulos' s Russia-related communications with Campaign officials continued
97,26,"throughout the spring and summer of 2016. On May 4, 2016, he forwarded to Lewandowski an"
97,27,"email from Timofeev raising the possibility of a meeting in Moscow , asking Lewandowski"
97,28,"whether that was "" something we want to move forward with. "" 469 The next day, Papadopoulos"
97,29,"forwarded the same Timofeev email to Sam Clovis, adding to the top of the email ""Russia"
97,30,"update."" 470 He included the same email in a May 21, 2016 message to senior Campaign official"
97,31,"Paul Manafort, under the subject line ""Request from Russia to meet Mr. Trump, "" stating that"
97,32,"""Russia has been eager to meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and have been reaching out to me"
97,33,463
97,34,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ~ 14; 4/25/16 Text Messages, Mifsud & Papadopoulos."
97,35,464
97,36,Papadopoulo s Statement of Offense~ 14.
97,37,465
97,38,This information is contained in the FBI case-opening document and related materials. ~
97,39,"iHferfflatiat1.is lu 11 eHfareefflefl.tseHsitive (LES) sHs f!'lttst be trestes ueeersiHgly iH uHy e,cten1al"
97,40,1
97,41,"sisseffliHstiatt. The foreign government conveyed this information to the U.S. government on July 26 ,"
97,42,"2016, a few days after WikiLeaks's release of Clinton-related emails. The FBI opened its investigation of"
97,43,potential coordination between Russia and the Trump Campaign a few days later based on the information.
97,44,466
97,45,"4/25/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (8: 12:44 p.m.)."
97,46,467
97,47,"4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to S. Miller (6:55 :58 p.m.)."
97,48,468
97,49,"4/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (7:15:14 p.m.)."
97,50,469
97,51,"5/4/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (8:14:49 a.m.)."
97,52,470
97,53,"5/5/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (7:15:21 p.m.)."
97,54,89
97,55,NA
98,1,U.S. Department of Justice
98,2,Atlei-fle~·Werk Predttet // Mtty CetttaiR Material Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
98,3,"to discuss."" 471 Manafort forwarded the message to another Campaign official, without including"
98,4,"Papadopoulos, and stated: ""Let[']s discuss. We need someone to communicate that [Trump] is ·"
98,5,not doing these trips. It should be someone low level in the Campaign so as not to send
98,6,"any signal. "" 472"
98,7,"On June 1, 2016, Papadopoulos replied to an earlier email chain with Lewandowski about"
98,8,"a Russia visit, asking if Lewandowski ""want[ ed] to have a call about this topic "" and whether ""w e"
98,9,"were following up with it."" 473 After Lewandowski told Papadopoulos to "" connect with"" Clov is"
98,10,"because he was ""running point,"" Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that ""the Russian MF A"" was asking"
98,11,"him ""if Mr. Trump is interested in visiting Russia at some point."" 474 Papadopoulos wrote in an"
98,12,"email that he ""[w]anted to pass this info along to you for you to decide what's best to do with it"
98,13,"and what message I should send (or to ignore)."" 475"
98,14,"After several email and Skype exchanges with Timofeev, 476 Papadopoulos sent one more"
98,15,"email to Lewandowski on June 19, 2016, Lewandowski's last day as campaign manager. 477 The"
98,16,"email stated that ""[t]he Russian ministry of foreign affairs"" had contacted him and asked whether ,"
98,17,"if Mr. Trump could not travel to Russia , a campaign representative such as Papadopoulos could"
98,18,"attend meetings. 478 Papadopoulos told Lewandowski that he was ""w illing to make the trip off the"
98,19,"record if it's in the interest of Mr. Trump and the campaign to meet specific people. "" 479"
98,20,"Following Lewandowski's departure from the Campaign, Papadopoulos communicated"
98,21,"with Clovis and Walid Phares , another member of the foreign policy advisory team, about an off-"
98,22,the-record meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials or with
98,23,"Papadopoulos's other Russia connections , Mifsud and Timofeev .480 Papadopoulos also interacted"
98,24,471
98,25,"5/21/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Manafort (2:30: 14 p.m.)."
98,26,472
98,27,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r 19 n.2."
98,28,473
98,29,"6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (3:08:18 p.m.)."
98,30,474
98,31,"6/1/16 Email, Lewandowski to Papadopoulos (3:20:03 p.m.); 6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to"
98,32,Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.).
98,33,475
98,34,"6/1/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (3:29:14 p.m.). Papadopoulos ' s emai l coincided in time"
98,35,"with another message to Clovis suggesting a Trump-Putin meeting. First , on May 15, 2016, David Klein-"
98,36,a distant relative of then-Trump Organization lawyer Jason Greenblatt-emailed Clovis about a potential
98,37,"Campaign meeting with Berel Lazar, the Chief Rabbi of Russia. The email stated that Klein had contacted"
98,38,"Lazar in February about a possible Trump-Putin meeting and that Lazar was ""a very close confidante of"
98,39,"Putin."" DJTFP00011547 (5/15/16 Email, Klein to Clovis (5:45:24 p.m.)). The investigation did not find"
98,40,evidence that Clovis responded to Klein 's email or that any further contacts of significance came out of
98,41,"Klein's subsequent meeting with Greenb latt and Rabbi Lazar at Trump Tower. Klein 8/30/18 302, at 2."
98,42,476
98,43,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense  ,r21(a)."
98,44,477
98,45,478
98,46,"6/19/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1 :11 :11 p.m.)."
98,47,479
98,48,"6/19/ 16 Email, Papadopoulos to Lewandowski (1: 11: 11 p.m.)."
98,49,480
98,50,"Papadop oulos Statement of Offense ,r21; 7/14/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Timofeev (11:57:24"
98,51,"p.m.); 7/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud; 7/27/16 Email , Papadopoulos to Mifsud (2:14:18 p.m.) ."
98,52,90
98,53,NA
99,1,U.S. Department of Justice
99,2,AtterHey 'Nerk Preattet // Mfr)' CeHta.iHMa.terial Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
99,3,directly with Clovis and Phares in connection with the summit of the Transatlantic Parliamentary
99,4,"Group on Counterterrorism (TAG), a group for which Phares was co-secretary general. 481 On July"
99,5,"16, 2016, Papadopoulos attended the TAG summit in Washington, D.C., where he sat next to"
99,6,Clovis (as reflected in the photograph below). 482
99,7,George Papad opoulos (far right) and Sam Clovis (second from right)
99,8,"Although Clovis claimed to have no recollection of attending the TAG summit, 483"
99,9,Papadopoulos remembered discussing Russia and a foreign policy trip with Clovis and Phares
99,10,during th e event. 484 Papadopoulos's recollection is consistent with ema ils sent before and after
99,11,"the TAG summit. The pre-summit messages included a July 11, 2016 email in which Phares"
99,12,"suggested meeting Papadopoulos the day after the summit to chat, 485 and a July 12 message in the"
99,13,"same chain in which Phares advised Papadopoulos that other summit attendees ""are very nervous"
99,14,"about Russia . So be aware .""486 Ten days after the summit, Papadopoulos sent an email to Mifsud"
99,15,"listing Phares and Clovis as other ""participants"" in a potential meeting at the London Academy of"
99,16,Diplomacy. 487
99,17,"Finally, Papadopoulos 's recollection is also consistent with handwritten notes from a"
99,18,481
99,19,"Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17; 9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic"
99,20,Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism.
99,21,482
99,22,"9th TAG Summit in Washington DC, Transatlantic Parliament Group on Counter Terrorism."
99,23,483
99,24,484
99,25,"Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 16-17."
99,26,485
99,27,"7/11/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos."
99,28,486
99,29,"7/12/16 Email, Phares to Papadopoulos (14:52:29)."
99,30,487
99,31,"7/27/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Mifsud (14:14:18)."
99,32,91
99,33,NA
100,1,U.S. Department of Justice
100,2,AtterRe~·Werle Pretitiet // MieyCeRtttit1Material Preteeteti Ut1tierFeti. R. Cri1=tt.                P. 6(e)
100,3,"journal that he kept at the time. 488 Those notes, which are reprinted in part below , appear to refer"
100,4,"to potential September 2016 meetings in London with representatives of the ""office of Putin,"" and"
100,5,"suggest that Phares , Clovis , and Papadopoulos (""Walid/Sam me"") would attend without the official"
100,6,"backing of the Campaign (""no official letter/no message from Trump""). 489"
100,7,September:                               \ ;efft~tN :            i         (#.-/
100,8,"Have an exploratory meeting              ,H-. ~ -tl{t--J-, /A-l<1-0                    # ~"
100,9,te or lose. In September - if allowed
100,10,"they will blast Mr. Trump.                           {o ~. ffl - fe{'J,""""W-~ T(. ""' J,,,..,._/"
100,11,We want         the   meeting  in
100,12,"} 1 i-.:r1 !l4c,f t4'1r.          1r.:>1·"
100,13,London/England
100,14,"• 1.w tv➔- f<-~                            w...'~/ ~""'-'V"
100,15,Walid/Sam me
100,16,"(""'- l,./JJ- / ~J                        ,;vv,e"
100,17,No official lett er/no message
100,18,"from Trump                                                 ~ d.({;r,7.1 t~r,_,,              /       fl   \"
100,19,They are talking to us.
100,20,". htt        ~t;~          ti~     ,~    ,, \"
100,21,-It is a lot of risk.
100,22,-Office of Putin.
100,23,", tlj,       &;;l_    ~{~.~         lo u4'"
100,24,"..__, Jj,, :o/ t / ..f- -.I- r. t:j-,,"
100,25,"-Explore: we are a campaign.                 ~ c_pif.l  ~ of' fJl,l,/1 ."
100,26,"_ .rcr,~. i-t                 ""It.   ~ r1f""'·5~."
100,27,e~~~
100,28,offlsrael!    EGYPT
100,29,Willingness to meet the FM sp
100,30,with Walid/Sam
100,31,-FM coming
100,32,t-.;llr-.')~
100,33,~
100,34,~
100,35,"-re ,r"
100,36,¢         5rw:h          t1H t;J/
100,37,"5,,.,."
100,38,"-Useful to have a session with           -.. f M          (c)llv-~           Cf  ~g;_,,-,"
100,39,"him.                                                 --:v. ;~i,}      />'1~    Lrt."
100,40,Later communications indicate that Clovis determined that he (Clovis) could not travel.
100,41,"On August 15, 2016, Papadopoulos emailed Clovis that he had received requests from multiple"
100,42,"foreign governments, ""even Russia[], "" for ""closed door workshops/consultations abroad, "" and"
100,43,"asked whether there was still interest for Clovis, Phares, and Papadopoulos ""to go on that trip. "" 490"
100,44,"Clovis copied Phares on his response, which said that he could not ""t ravel before the election"" but"
100,45,"that he ""would encourage [Papadopoulos] and Walid to make the trips, if it is feasible. ""491"
100,46,488
100,47,"Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 3."
100,48,489
100,49,"Papadopoulos declined to assist in deciphering his notes , telling investigators that he could not"
100,50,"read his own handwriting from the journal. Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302 , at 21. The notes , however , app ear"
100,51,to read as listed in the column to the left of the imag e above.
100,52,490
100,53,"8/15/16 Email, Papadopoulos to Clovis (11 :59:07 a.m.)."
100,54,49 1
100,55,"8/ 15/16 Email, Clovis to Papadopoulos (12:01 :45 p.m .)."
100,56,92
100,57,NA
101,1,U .S. Department of Justice
101,2,Atlerl'le~· Werk Pree1:1et// May Ce!'ltaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
101,3,"Papadopoulos was dismissed from the Trump Campaign in early October 2016, after an"
101,4,interview he gave to the Russian news agency Inter/ax generated adverse publicity. 492
101,5,"f. Trump Campaign Knowledge of ""Dirt"""
101,6,Papadopoulos admitted telling at least one individual outside of the Campaign-
101,7,"specifically, the then-Greek foreign minister-about Russia's obtaining Clinton -related emails. 493"
101,8,"In addition, a different foreign government informed the FBI that, 10 days after meeting with"
101,9,"Mifsud in late April 2016 , Papadopoulos suggested that the Trump Campaign had received"
101,10,indications from the Russian government that it could assist the Campaign through the anonymous
101,11,release of information that would be damaging to Hillary Clinton. 494 (This conversation occurred
101,12,"after the GRU spearphished Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta and stole his emails, and"
101,13,"the GRU hacked into the DCCC and DNC, see Volume l, Sections III.A & III.B , supra.) Such"
101,14,disclosures raised questions about whether Papadopoulos informed any Trump Campaign official
101,15,about the emails.
101,16,"When interviewed, Papadopoulos and the Campaign officials who interacted with him told"
101,17,the Office that they could not recall Papadopoulos ' s sharing the information that Russia had
101,18,"obtained ""dirt"" on candidate Clinton in the form of emails or that Russia could assist the Campaign"
101,19,through the anonymous release of information about Clinton. Papadopoulos stated that he could
101,20,not clearly recall having told anyone on the Campaign and wavered about whether he accurately
101,21,remembered an incident in which Clovis had been upset after hearing Papadopoulos tell Clovis
101,22,"that Papadopoulos thought ""they have her emails. ""495 The Campaign officials who interacted or"
101,23,"corresponded with Papadopoulos have similarly stated, with varying degrees of certainty , that he"
101,24,"did not tell them. Senior policy advisor Stephen Miller, for example, did not remember hearing"
101,25,anything from Papadopoulos or Clovis about Russia having emails of or dirt on candidate
101,26,"Clinton. 496 Clovis stated that he did not recall anyone , including Papadopoulos , having given him"
101,27,non -public information that a forei n overnm ent mi ht be in ossession of material dama in to
101,28,Hillar Clinton .497
101,29,49 2
101,30,"George Papadopoulos: Sanctions Have Done Little More Than to Turn Russia Towards China ,"
101,31,"Interfax (Sept. 30, 2016)."
101,32,493
101,33,"Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 14-15; Def. Sent. Mem., United States v. George Papad opoulos,"
101,34,"I :17-cr-182 (D.D.C . Aug. 31, 2018), Doc. 45."
101,35,494
101,36,"See footnote 465 of Volume I, Section IV.A.2.d, supra."
101,37,495
101,38,"Papadopoulos 8/10/17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 8/11/ 17 302, at 5; Papadopoulos 9/20/1 7 302,"
101,39,at 2.
101,40,496
101,41,"S. Miller 12/14/17 302, at 10."
101,42,497
101,43,498
101,44,93
101,45,NA
102,1,U.S. Department of Justice
102,2,"Attet'Hey Werk Predttet /,' May CetttaiH Material PFeteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
102,3,"No documentary evidence, and nothing in the email accounts or other"
102,4,"communications facilities reviewed by the Office, shows that Papadopoulos shared this"
102,5,information with the Campaign .
102,6,g. Additional George Papadopoulos Contact
102,7,The Office investigated another Russia-related contact with Papadopoulos. The Office was
102,8,not fully able to explore the contact because the individual at issue-Sergei Millian-remained
102,9,out of the country since the inception of our investigation and declined to meet with members of
102,10,the Office despite our repeated efforts to obtain an interview.
102,11,"Papadopoulos first connected with Millian via Linkedln on July 15, 2016, shmtly after"
102,12,"Papadopoulos had attended the TAG Summit with Clov is.500 Millian , an American citizen who is"
102,13,"a native of Belarus , introduced himself ""as president of [the] New York-based Russian American"
102,14,"Chamber of Commerce ,"" and claimed that through that position he had "" insider knowledge and"
102,15,"direct access to the top hierarchy in Russian politics .""501 Papadopoulos asked Timofeev whether"
102,16,"he had heard of Millian. 502 Although Timofeev said no, 503 Papadopoulos met Millian in New York"
102,17,"City. 504 The meetings took place on July 30 and August 1, 2016. 505 Afterwards, Millian invited"
102,18,"Papadopoulos to attend-and            potentially speak at-two        international energy conferenc es,"
102,19,including one that was to be held in Moscow in September 2016. 506 Papadopoulos ultimately did
102,20,not attend either conference.
102,21,"On July 31, 2016, following his first in-person meeting wit h Millian , Papadopoulos"
102,22,"emailed Trump Campa ign official Bo Denysyk to say that he had been contacted ""by some leader s"
102,23,"of Russian-American voters here in the US about their interest in voting for Mr . Trump ,"" and to"
102,24,"ask whether he should ""put you in touch with their group (US-Russia chamber of commerce). "" 507"
102,25,"Denysyk thanked Papadopoulos ""for taking the initiative ,"" but asked him to ""hold off with"
102,26,499
102,27,500
102,28,"7/15/16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos."
102,29,50 1
102,30,"7/15/ 16 Linkedln Message, Millian to Papadopoulos."
102,31,502
102,32,"7/22/ 16 Facebook Message, Papadopou los to Timofeev (7:40:23 p.m.) ; 7/26/ 16 Facebook"
102,33,"Message, Papadopoulos to Timofe ev (3:08:57 p.m.)."
102,34,503
102,35,"7/23/ 16 Facebook Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (4 :31:37 a.m .); 7/26/16 Facebook"
102,36,"Message, Timofeev to Papadopoulos (3:37: 16 p.m.)."
102,37,504
102,38,"7/16/16 Text Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (7:55:43 p.m.)."
102,39,505
102,40,"7/30/16 Text Messages , Papadopoulos & Millian (5:38 & 6:05 p.m .); 7/31/ 16 Text Messages,"
102,41,"Millian & Papadopoulo s (3 :48 & 4:18 p.m.); 8/ 1/16 Text Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (8:19 p.m .)."
102,42,506
102,43,"8/2/16 Text Messages, Milli an & Papadopou los (3 :04 & 3 :05 p.m.); 8/3/16 Facebook Messages ,"
102,44,Papadopoulos & Millian (4:07:37 a.m. & 1:11:58 p.m.) .
102,45,507
102,46,"7/31/16 Email, Papadopoulo s to Denysyk (12:29:59 p.m.)."
102,47,94
102,48,NA
103,1,U.S. Department of Justice
103,2,"Atteme,· 'i\'erk Prefittet // May Cefl.taifl Material Preteetefi Unfier Fee. R. Criffl:.P. 6(e)"
103,3,"outreach to Russian-Americans "" because ""too many articles "" had already portrayed the Campaign ,"
103,4,508
103,5,"then-campaign chairman Paul Manafort, and candidate Trump as "" being pro-Russian."""
103,6,"On August 23, 2016, Millian sent a Facebook message to Papadopoulos promising that he"
103,7,"would "" share with you a disruptive technology that might be instrumental in your political work"
103,8,"for the campaign."" 509 Papadopoulos claimed to have no recollection of this matter. 510"
103,9,"On November 9, 2016, shortly after the election, Papadopoulos arranged to meet Millian"
103,10,"in Chicago to discuss business opportunities, including potential work with Russian ""billionaires"
103,11,"who are not under sanctions."" 511 The meeting took place on November 14, 2016 , at the Trump"
103,12,"Hotel and Tower in Chicago. 512 According to Papadopoulos, the two men discussed partnering on"
103,13,"business deals, but Papadopoulos perceived that Millian's attitude toward him changed when"
103,14,Papadopoulos stated that he was only pursuing privat e-sector opportunities and was not interested
103,15,"in a job in the Administration. 5 13 The two remained in contact , however , and had extended online"
103,16,discussions about possible business opportunities in Russia. 514 The two also arranged to meet at a
103,17,"Washington, D.C. bar when both attended Trump's inauguration in late Januar y 2017. 515"
103,18,3. Carter Page
103,19,Carter Page worked for the Trump Campaign from January 2016 to September 2016. He
103,20,was formally and publicly announced as a foreign policy advisor by the candidate in March
103,21,"2016. 516 Page had lived and worked in Russia, and he had been approached by Russian intelligence"
103,22,officers several years before he volunteered for the Trump Campaign. During his time with the
103,23,"Campaign, Page advocated pro-Russia foreign policy positions and traveled to Moscow in his"
103,24,personal capacity. Russian intelligence officials had formed relationships with Page in 2008 and
103,25,2013 and Russian officials may have focused on Page in 2016 because of his affiliation with the
103,26,"Campaign. However, the investigation did not establish that Page coordinated with the Russian"
103,27,government in its efforts to interfere with the 2016 presidential election.
103,28,508
103,29,"7/31/16 Email, Denysyk to Papadopoulos (21 :54:52)."
103,30,509
103,31,"8/23/16 Facebook Message , Millian to Papadopoulos (2:55:36 a.m.)."
103,32,5 10
103,33,"Papadopoulos 9/20/17 302, at 2."
103,34,511
103,35,"11/10/16 Facebook Message , Millian to Papadopoulos (9:35:05 p.m .)."
103,36,5 12
103,37,"11/14/16 Facebook Message, Millian to Papadopoulos (1 :32: 11 a.m.)."
103,38,513
103,39,"Papadopoulos 9/19/17 302, at 19."
103,40,514
103,41,"E.g., 11/29/ 16 Facebook Messages, Papadopoulos & Millian (5:09 - 5:11 p.m.); 12/7/16"
103,42,"Facebook Message , Millian to Papadopoulos (5:10:54 p.m.)."
103,43,5 15
103,44,"1/20/ 17 Facebook Messages , Papadopoulos & Millian (4:37-4:39 a.m.)."
103,45,516
103,46,Page was interviewed b
103,47,Counsel 's appointm ent.
103,48,95
103,49,NA
104,1,U.S. Department of Justice
104,2,"Attorfte)"" Work Proc:ittet// May Cofttatfl Material Proteetee Umier Feel. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e)"
104,3,a. Background
104,4,"Before he began working for the Campaign in January 2016, Page had substantial prior"
104,5,"experience studying Russian policy issues and living and working in Moscow. From 2004 to 2007,"
104,6,"Page was the deputy branch manager of Merrill Lynch's Moscow office. 517 There, he worked on"
104,7,transactions involving the Russian energy company Gazprom and came to know Gazprom ' s
104,8,"deputy chief financial officer , Sergey Yatsenko. 518"
104,9,"In 2008, Page founded Global Energy Capital LLC (GEC), an in~"
104,10,advisor firm focused on the ener sector in emerging markets .519 -----
104,11,"520 The company otherwise had no sources of income , and"
104,12,Page was forced to draw down his life savings to support himself and pursue his business
104,13,venture. 521 Pa e asked Yatsenko to work with him at GEC as a senior advisor on a contin
104,14,"In 2008, Page met Alexander Bulatov, a Russian government official who worked at the"
104,15,Russian Consulate in New York. 523 Pa e later learned that Bulatov was a Russian intelli ence
104,16,524
104,17,"officer,"
104,18,"In 2013 , Victor Podobnyy, another Russian intelligence officer working covertly in the"
104,19,"United States under diplomatic cover, formed a relationship with Page. 525 Podobnyy met Page at"
104,20,an energy symposium in New York City and began exchanging emails with him. 526 Podobnyy
104,21,"and Page also met in person on multiple occasions, during which Page offered his outlook on the"
104,22,future of the energy industry and provided documents to Podobnyy about the energy business. 527
104,23,"In a recorded conversation on April 8, 2013, Podobnyy told another intelligence officer that Page"
104,24,"was interested in business opportunities in Russia. 528 In Podobny y's words, Page ""got hooked on"
104,25,517
104,26,"Testimony of Carter Page, Hearing Before the U.S. House of Representatives, Permanent Select"
104,27,"Committee on Intellig ence, 115th Cong. 40 (Nov. 2, 2017) (exhibit)."
104,28,518
104,29,"Page 3/30/17 302, at 10."
104,30,519
104,31,520
104,32,521
104,33,523
104,34,524
104,35,525
104,36,"Complaint ,r,r22, 24, 32, United States v. Buryakov , 1: 15-"
104,37,"mj-215 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 20 I 5), Doc. 1 (""Buryakov Complaint"")."
104,38,526
104,39,"Buryakov Complaint   ,r34."
104,40,527
104,41,"Buryak ov Complaint ,r34."
104,42,528
104,43,"Buryakov Comp laint ,r32."
104,44,96
104,45,NA
105,1,U.S. Department of Justice
105,2,Att:et1Ae;·Wet1kPt1et!ttet// Mft) CeAtttiAMtttet1ittlPt1eteeteaUAaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
105,3,"Gazprom thinking that if they have a project, he could ... rise up. Maybe he can .... [I]t' s obvious"
105,4,"that he wants to earn lots of money."" 529 Podobnyy said that he had led Page on by ""feed[ing] him"
105,5,"empty promises "" that Podobnyy would use his Russian business connections to help Page. 530"
105,6,Podobnyy told the other intelligence officer that his method of recruiting foreign sources was to
105,7,promise them favors and then discard them once he obtained relevant information from them. 531
105,8,"In 2015, Podobnyy and two other Russian intelligence officers were charged with"
105,9,conspiracy to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. 532 The criminal complaint
105,10,"detailed Podobnyy's interactions with and conversations about Page, who was identified only as"
105,11,"""Male-1."" 533 Based on the criminal complaint ' s description of the interactions, Page was aware"
105,12,"that he was the individual described as ""Male-l. "" 534 Page later spoke with a Russian government"
105,13,official at the United Nations General Assembly and identified himself so that the official would
105,14,"understand he was ""Male- I"" from the Podobn                   laint. 535 Pa e told the official that he ""didn't"
105,15,536
105,16,"do anything"""
105,17,"In interviews with the FBI before the Office's opening, Page acknowledged that he"
105,18,understood that the individuals he had associated with were members of the Russian intelligence
105,19,"services, but he stated that he had only provided immaterial non-public information to them and"
105,20,"that he did not view this relationship as a backchannel. 537 Page told investigatin g agents that ""the"
105,21,"more immaterial non-public information I give them, the better for this country. "" 538"
105,22,b. Origins of and Early Campaign Work
105,23,"In January 2016, Page began volunteering on an informal, unpaid basis for the Trump"
105,24,"Campaign after Ed Cox, a state Republican Party official, introduced Page to Trump Campaign"
105,25,officials. 539 Page told the Office that his goal in working on the Campaign was to help candidate
105,26,"Trump improve relations with Russia. 540 To that end, Page emailed Campaign officials offering"
105,27,"his thoughts on U.S.-Russia relations, prepared talking points and briefing memos on Russia, and"
105,28,529
105,29,Buryakov Complaint.
105,30,530
105,31,Buryakov Complaint.
105,32,531
105,33,Buryakov Complaint.
105,34,532
105,35,"See Buryakov Com laint; see also Indictment United States v. Buryakov, 1: 15-cr-73 (S.D.N. Y."
105,36,"Feb. 9, 2015), Doc. 10;"
105,37,536
105,38,"Page 3/16/17 302, at 4;"
105,39,537
105,40,"Page 3/30/17 302, at 6; Page 3/31/17 302, at 1."
105,41,538
105,42,"Page 3/31/17 302, at 1."
105,43,539
105,44,"Page 3/16/17 302, at 1;"
105,45,540
105,46,"Page 3/ 10/17 302, at 2."
105,47,97
105,48,NA
106,1,U.S. Department of Justice
106,2,At-teri'l:ey'.Verk Pree1::1et// May CeHtail'l:Material Preteetee Ul'l:eerFee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
106,3,proposed that candidate Trump meet with President Vladimir Putin in Moscow. 541
106,4,"In communications with Campaign officials, Page also repeatedly touted his high-level"
106,5,contacts in Russia and his ability to forge connections between candidate Trump and senior
106,6,"Russian governmental officials. For example, on January 30, 2016, Page sent an email to senior"
106,7,"Campaign officials stating that he had ""spent the past week in Europe and ha[ d] been in discussions"
106,8,"with some individuals with close ties to the Kremlin"" who recognized that Trump could have a"
106,9,"""ga me-changing effect ... in bringing the end of the new Cold War."" 542 The email stated that"
106,10,""" [t]hrough [his] discussions with these high level contacts ,"" Page believed that ""a direct meeting"
106,11,"in Moscow between Mr[.] Trump and Putin could be arran ed."" 543 Pa e closed the email b"
106,12,criticizin U.S. sanctions on Russia. 544
106,13,"On March 21, 2016, candida te Trump formally and publicly identified Page as a member"
106,14,of his foreign policy team to advise on Russia and the energy sector. 546 Over the next several
106,15,"months , Page continued providing policy -related work produc t to Campaign officials . For"
106,16,"example, in April 2016, Page provided feedback on an outline for a foreign policy speech that the"
106,17,"candidate gave at the Mayflower Hotel, 547 see Volume I, Section IV.A.4 , infra. In May 2016, Page"
106,18,"prepared an outline of an energy policy speech for the Campaign and then traveled to Bismarck,"
106,19,"North Dakota, to watch the candidate deliver the speech. 548 Chief policy advisor Sam Clovis"
106,20,expressed appreciation for Page's work and praised his work to other Campaign officials. 549
106,21,c. Carter Page's July 2016 Trip To Moscow
106,22,Page's affiliation with the Trump Campaign took on a higher profile and drew the attention
106,23,"of Russian officials after the candidate named him a foreign policy advisor. As a result, in late"
106,24,"April 2016, Page was invited to give a speech at the July 20 16 commencement ceremony at the"
106,25,541
106,26,"See, e.g., 1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al.; 3/17/16 Email, Page to Clovis (attaching a"
106,27,"""President 's Daily Brief' prepared by Page that discussed the ""severe de radation ofU.S.-Russia relations"
106,28,"following Washington's meddling"" in Ukraine);"
106,29,542
106,30,"1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al."
106,31,543
106,32,"1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al."
106,33,544
106,34,"1/30/16 Email, Page to Glassner et al."
106,35,545
106,36,546
106,37,"A Transcript of Donald                        with the Washington Post Editorial Board,"
106,38,"Washington Post (Mar. 21, 2016);"
106,39,547
106,40,548
106,41,"549 See, e.g., 3/28/16 Email, Clovis to Lewandowski et al. (forwarding notes .prepared by Page and"
106,42,"stating , ""I wanted to let you know the type of work some of our advisors are capable of."")."
106,43,98
106,44,NA
107,1,U.S. Department of Justice
107,2,t'W:emey 'illerk Pfea1:1et// Ma)' Cetttaifl Matefial Preteetea Unaer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
107,3,New Economic School (NES) in Moscow. 550 The NES commencement ceremony generally
107,4,"featured high-profile speakers; for example , President Barack Obama delivered a commencement"
107,5,address at the school in 2009. 551 NES officials told the Office that the interest in inviting Page to
107,6,speak at NES was' based entirely on his status as a Trump Campaign advisor who served as the
107,7,"candidate 's Russia expert .552 Andrej Krickovic, an associate of Page' s and assistant professor at"
107,8,"the Higher School of Economics in Russia, recommended that NES rector Shlomo Weber invite"
107,9,Page to give the commencement address based on his connection to the Trump Campaign. 553
107,10,"Denis Klimentov, an employee ofNES, said that when Russians learned of Page's involvement in"
107,11,"the Trump Campaign in March 2016, the excitement was palpable. 554 Weber recalled that in"
107,12,"summer 2016 there was substantial interest in the Trump Campaign in Moscow , and he felt that"
107,13,bringing a member of the Campaign to the school would be beneficial. 555
107,14,"Page was eager to accept the invitation to speak at NES, and he sought approval from"
107,15,"Trump Campaign officials to make the trip to Russia. 556 On May 16, 2016, while that request was"
107,16,"still under consideration, Page emailed Clovis, J.D. Gordon, and Walid Phares and suggested that"
107,17,candidate Trump take his place speaking at the commencement ceremony in Moscow. 557 On June
107,18,"19, 2016 , Page followed up again to request approval to speak at the NES event and to reiterate"
107,19,"that NES ""would love to have Mr. Trump speak at this annual celebration"" in Page's place .558"
107,20,"Campaign manager Corey Lewandowski responded the same day, saying, "" If you want to do this,"
107,21,it would be out side [sic] of your role with the DJT for President campaign. I am certain Mr.
107,22,"Trump will not be able to attend."" 559"
107,23,"In early July 2016, Page traveled to Russia for the NES events. On July 5, 2016, Denis"
107,24,"Klimentov , copying his brother, Dmitri Klimentov, 560 emailed Maria Zakharova, the Director of"
107,25,"the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Information and Press Department , about Page's visit and"
107,26,his connection to the Trump Campaign. 56 1 Denis Klimentov said in the email that he wanted to
107,27,draw the Russian government's attention to Page' s visit in Moscow. 562 His message to Zakharova
107,28,550
107,29,"Page 3/16/ 17 302, at 2-3; Page 3/10/ 17 302, at 3."
107,30,551
107,31,"S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3."
107,32,552
107,33,"Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4-5; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3."
107,34,553
107,35,"See Y. Weber 6/1/17 302, at 4; S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3."
107,36,554
107,37,"De. Klimentov 6/9/17 302, at 2."
107,38,555
107,39,"S. Weber 7/28/17 302, at 3."
107,40,"556 See 5/16/16 Ema il, Page to Phares et al. (referring to submission of a ""campaign advisor request"
107,41,"form"")."
107,42,557
107,43,"; 5/16/16 Email, Page to Phares et al."
107,44,558
107,45,"6/19/16 Email, Page to Gordon et al."
107,46,559
107,47,"6/19/16 Email, Lewandowski to Page et al."
107,48,560
107,49,Dmitri Klimentov is a New York-based public relations consultant.
107,50,561
107,51,"7/5/16 Email , Klimentov to Zakharova (translated)."
107,52,562
107,53,"7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated)."
107,54,99
107,55,NA
108,1,U.S. Department of Justice
108,2,"Atterne::, Werle Prea1:1et// Miey Centain Material Preteetea Unaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
108,3,"continued: ""Page is Trump's adviser on foreign policy . He is a known businessman; he used to"
108,4,"work in Russia ...       . If you have any questions, I will be happy to help contact him."" 563 Dmitri"
108,5,Klimentov then contacted Russian Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov about Page's visit to see if
108,6,"Peskov wanted to introduce Page to any Russian government officials. 564 The following day,"
108,7,Peskov responded to what appears to have been the same Denis Klimentov -Zakharova email
108,8,"thread. Peskov wrote, ""I have read about [Page]. Specialists say that he is far from being the main"
108,9,"one. So I better not initiate a meeting in the Kremlin."" 565"
108,10,"On July 7, 2016, Page delivered the first of his two speeches in Moscow at NES. 566 In the"
108,11,"speech, Page criticized the U.S. government's foreign policy toward Russia, stating that"
108,12,"""Washington and other Western capitals have impeded potential progress through their often"
108,13,"hypocritical focus on ideas such as democratization , inequality, corruption and regime change."" 567"
108,14,"On July 8, 2016, Page delivered a speech during the NES commencement. 568 After Page delivered"
108,15,"his commencement address, Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES board member Arkady"
108,16,Dvorkovich spoke at the ceremony and stated that the sanctions the United States had imposed on
108,17,"Russia had hurt the NES. 569 Page and Dvorkovich shook hands at the commencement ceremony,"
108,18,and Weber recalled that Dvorkovich made statements to Pa e about workin to ether in the
108,19,future. 570
108,20,"Page said that, during his time in Moscow, he met with friends and associates he knew"
108,21,"from when he lived in Russia, including Andrey Baranov, a former Gazprom employee who had"
108,22,"become the head of investor relations at Rosneft, a Russian energy company. 572 Page stated that"
108,23,"he and Baranov talked about ""immaterial non-public "" information. 573 Page believed he and"
108,24,"Baranov discussed Rosneft president Igor Sechin, and he thought Baranov might have mentioned"
108,25,563
108,26,"7/5/16 Email, Klimentov to Zakharova (translated)."
108,27,564
108,28,"Dm. Klimentov 11/27/18 302, at 1-2."
108,29,565
108,30,"7/6/16 Email, Peskov to Klimentov (translated)."
108,31,566
108,32,"Page 3/10/17 302, at 3."
108,33,567
108,34,"See Carter W. Page, The Lecture of Trump's Advisor Carter Page in Moscow, YouTube"
108,35,"Channel Katehon Think Tank, Posted July 7, 2016, available at https://www.youtube.com /watch?"
108,36,time_continue =28&v= lCYF29saA9w . Page also provided the FBI with a copy of his speech and slides
108,37,"from the speech. See Carter Page, ""The Evolution of the World Economy: Trends and Potential,"" Speech"
108,38,"at National Economic Speech (July 7, 2016)."
108,39,568
108,40,"Page 3/10/17 302, at 3."
108,41,569
108,42,"Page 3/ 16/ 17 302 , at 3."
108,43,570
108,44,"S. Weber 7/28/ 17 302, at 4."
108,45,571
108,46,572
108,47,"Page 3/10/17 302 , at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 3; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2."
108,48,573
108,49,"Page 3/30/17 302, at 3."
108,50,100
108,51,NA
109,1,U.S. Department of Justice
109,2,Artemey Werle Pmtl1:1etII May Cet'ltail'I Material Preteetetl Ut'ltler Fetl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
109,3,the possibility of a sale of a stake in Rosneft in passing. 574 Page recalled mentioning his
109,4,"involvement in the Trump Campaign with Baranov, although he did not remember details of the"
109,5,"conversation. 575 Page also met with individuals from Tatneft, a Russian energy company, to"
109,6,"discuss possible business deals, including having Page work as a consultant. 576"
109,7,"On July 8, 2016 , while he was in Moscow , Page emailed several Campaign officials and"
109,8,"stated he would send ""a readout soon regarding some incredible insights and outreach I've received"
109,9,"from a few Russian legislators and senior members of the Presidential Administration here. "" 577"
109,10,"On July 9, 2016, Page emailed Clovis, writing in pertinent part:"
109,11,Russian Deputy Prime minister and NES board member Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke
109,12,"before the event. In a private conversation, Dvorkovich expressed strong support for Mr."
109,13,Trump and a desire to work together toward devising better solutions in response to the
109,14,vast range of current international problems. Based on feedback from a diverse array of
109,15,"other sources close to the Presidential Administration, it was readily apparent that this"
109,16,sentiment is widely held at all levels of government. 578
109,17,The Office was unable to obtain additional evidence or testimony about who Page
109,18,"may have met or communicated with in Moscow; thus, Page's activities in Russia-as described"
109,19,in his emails with the Campaign-were not fully explained.
109,20,576
109,21,"Page 3/10/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 7; Page 3/31/17 302, at 2."
109,22,577
109,23,"7/8/ 16 Email, Page to Dahl & Gordon."
109,24,578
109,25,579
109,26,580
109,27,58 1
109,28,582
109,29,101
109,30,NA
110,1,U.S. Department of Justice
110,2,Attonaiey \l/ork Prodttet // May Cottt:attt Material Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
110,3,d. Later Campaign Work and Removal from the Campaign
110,4,"In July 2016, after returning from Russia, Page traveled to the Republican National"
110,5,"Convention in Cleveland. 583 While there, Page met Russian Ambassador to the United States"
110,6,"Sergey Kislyak ; that interaction is described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6.a , infra. 584 Page later"
110,7,emailed Campaign officials with feedback he said he received from ambassadors he had met at the
110,8,"Convention, and he wrote that Ambassador Kisl ak was ver worried about candidate Clinton's"
110,9,world views. 585
110,10,"Following the Convention, Page's trip to Moscow and his advocacy for pro-Russia foreign"
110,11,policy drew the media's attention and began to generate substantial press coverage. The Campaign
110,12,"responded by distancing itself from Page, describing him as an ""informal foreign policy advisor"""
110,13,"who did ""not speak for Mr. Trump or the campaign."" 587 On September 23, 2016, Yahoo! News"
110,14,reported that U.S. intelligence officials were investigating whether Page had opened private
110,15,communications with senior Russian officials to discuss U.S. sanctions policy under a possible
110,16,"Trump Administration. 588 A Campaign spokesman told Yahoo! News that Page had ""no role"" in"
110,17,"the Campaign and that the Campaign was ""not aware of any of his activities , past or present. "" 589"
110,18,"On September 24, 2016, Page was formally removed from the Campaign. 590"
110,19,"Although Page had been removed from the Campaign, after the election he sought a"
110,20,"position in the Trump Administration. 59 1 On November 14, 2016, he submitted an application to"
110,21,"the Transition Team that inflated his credentials and experiences, stating that in his capacity as a"
110,22,"Trump Campaign foreign policy advisor he had met with ""top world leaders"" and ""effect ively"
110,23,5 3
110,24,"&  Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/ 16/ 17 302, at 3."
110,25,5 4
110,26,"&  Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3."
110,27,5&5
110,28,"; 7/23/16 Email, Page to Clovis; 7/25/16 Email,"
110,29,Page to Gordon & Schmitz.
110,30,586
110,31,587
110,32,"See, e.g., Steven Mufson & Tom Hamburger , Trump Advisor's Public Comments, Ties to"
110,33,"Moscow Stir Unease in Both Parties , Washington Post (Aug. 5, 2016)."
110,34,58
110,35,"& Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin , Yahoo!"
110,36,"News (Sept. 23, 2016)."
110,37,5 9
110,38,"&  Michael Isikoff, US. Intel Officials Probe Ties Between Trump Adviser and Kremlin , Yahoo!"
110,39,"News (Sept. 23, 2016); see also 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon (instructing that inquirie s about"
110,40,"Page should be answered with ""[h]e was announced as an informal adviser in March. Since then he has"
110,41,had no role or official contact with the campaign. We have no knowledge of activities past or present and
110,42,"he now officially has been removed from all lists etc."")."
110,43,"590 Page 3/16/17 302, at 2; see, e.g., 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon & S. Miller (discussing"
110,44,plans to remove Page from the campaign).
110,45,", ""Transition Online Form,"" 11/14/ 16 -"
110,46,102
110,47,NA
111,1,U.S. Department of Justice
111,2,AUerfl:ey \\'erk Pretittet // May Cerua.ifl Material Preteeteti Ufl:tierFee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
111,3,"responded to diplomatic outreach efforts from senior government officials in Asia, Europe, the"
111,4,"Middle East, Africa, [and] the Americas."" 592 Page received no response from the Transition Team."
111,5,"When Page took a personal trip to Moscow in December 2016, he met again with at least one"
111,6,Russian government official. That interaction and a discussion of the December trip are set forth
111,7,"in Volume I, Section IV.B .6, infra."
111,8,4. Dimitri Simes and the Center for the National Interest
111,9,Members of the Trump Campaign interacted on several occasions with the Center for the
111,10,"National Interest (CNI), principally through its President and Chief Executive Officer, Dimitri"
111,11,Simes. CNI is a think tank with expertise in and connections to the Russian government. Simes
111,12,was born in the former Soviet Union and immigrated to the United States in the 1970s. In April
111,13,"2016, candidate Trump delivered his first speech on foreign policy and national security at an event"
111,14,"hosted by the National Interest, a publication affiliated with CNI. Then-Senator Jeff Sessions and"
111,15,"Russian Ambassador Kislyak both attended the event and, as a result, it gained some attention in"
111,16,relation to Sessions's confirmation hearings to become Attorney General. Sessions had various
111,17,"other contacts with CNI during the campaign period on foreign-policy matters, including Russia."
111,18,Jared Kushner also interacted with Simes about Russian issues during the campaign. The
111,19,investigation did not identify evidence that the Campaign passed or received any messages to or
111,20,from the Russian government through CNI or Simes.
111,21,a. CNI and Dimitri Simes Connect with the Trump Campaign
111,22,CNI is a Washington-based non-profit organization that grew out of a center founded by
111,23,"former President Richard Nixon. 593 CNI describes itself ""as a voice for strategic realism in U.S ."
111,24,594
111,25,"foreign policy,"" and publishes a bi-monthly foreign policy magazine, the National Interest.          CNI"
111,26,is overseen by a board of directors and an advisory council that is largely honorary and whose
111,27,"members at the relevant time included Sessions, who served as an advisor to candidate Trump on"
111,28,national security and foreign policy issues. 595
111,29,Dimitri Simes is president and CEO of CNI and the publisher and CEO of the National
111,30,"Jnterest.596 Simes was born in the former Soviet Union, emigrated to the United States in the early"
111,31,"1970s, and joined CNI' s predecessor after working at the Carnegie Endowment for International"
111,32,593
111,33,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2."
111,34,594
111,35,"About the Center, CNI, available at https://cftni.org/about/."
111,36,595
111,37,"Advisory Counsel, CNl, available at https://web.archive.org/web /20161030025331 /"
111,38,"http://cftni.org/about/advisory-council/ ; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 3-4; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 4; Sessions"
111,39,"1/17/18 302, at 16."
111,40,596
111,41,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 2."
111,42,103
111,43,NA
112,1,U.S. Department of Justice
112,2,Atterttey Werk Preflttet // Moy CeRtttift Material PrnteeteEI Uttfler Fee. R:.Criffl. P. 6(e)
112,3,Peace. 597 Simes personally has many contacts with current and former Russian government
112,4,"officials, 598 as does CNI collectively. As CNI stated when seeking a grant from the Carnegie"
112,5,"Corporation in 2015, CNI has ""unparalleled access to Russian officials and politicians among"
112,6,"Washington think tanks, "" 599 in part because CNI has arranged for U.S. delegations to visit Russia"
112,7,"and for Russian delegations to visit the United States as patt of so-called ""Track 11"" diplomatic"
112,8,·efforts.600
112,9,"On March 14, 2016, CNI board member Richard Plepler organized a luncheon for CNI and"
112,10,"its honorary chairman, Henry Kissinger, at the Time Warner Building in New York. 601 The idea"
112,11,behind the event was to generate interest in CNI's work and recruit new board members for CNI. 602
112,12,"Along with Simes, attendees at the event included Jared Kushner , son-in-law of candidate"
112,13,Trump. 603 Kushner told the Office that the event came at a time when the Trump Campaign was
112,14,"having trouble securing support from experienced foreign policy professionals and that, as a result ,"
112,15,he decided to seek Simes's assistance during the March 14 event. 604
112,16,"Simes and Kushner spoke again on a March 24, 2016 telephone call,605 three days after"
112,17,Trump had publicly named the team of foreign policy advisors that had been put together on short
112,18,"notice. 606 On March 31, 2016, Simes and Kushner had an in-person , one-on-one meeting in"
112,19,"Kushner's New York office. 607 During that meeting, Simes told Kushner that the best way to"
112,20,handle foreign-policy issues for the Trump Campaign would be to organize an advisory group of
112,21,experts to meet with candidate Trump and develop a foreign policy approach that was consistent
112,22,with Trump's voice. 608 Simes believed that Kushner was receptive to that suggestion. 609
112,23,Simes also had contact with other individuals associated with the Trump Campaign
112,24,"regarding the Campaign's foreign policy positions. For example, on June 17, 2016, Simes sent"
112,25,"J.D. Gordon an email with a ""memo to Senator Sessions that we discussed at our recent meeting """
112,26,597
112,27,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; Simes 3/27/ 18 302, at 19."
112,28,598
112,29,"Simes 3/27 /18 302, at 10-15."
112,30,599
112,31,"C000l 1656 (Rethinking US-Russia Relati ons, CNI (Apr. 18, 2015))."
112,32,600
112,33,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 29-30; Zakheim 1/25/ 18 302, at 3."
112,34,601
112,35,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; C00006784 (3/11/16 Email , Gilbride to Saunders (3:43:12 p.m.); cf"
112,36,"Zakheim 1/25/18 302, at 1 (Kissinger was CNI's ""Honorary Chairman of the Board""); Boyd 1/24/1 8 302,"
112,37,"at 2; P. Sanders 2/15/18 302, at 5."
112,38,602
112,39,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 5-6; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 2."
112,40,603
112,41,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302 at 2."
112,42,604
112,43,"Kushner 4/ 11/ 18 302 , at 2."
112,44,605
112,45,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 6-7."
112,46,606
112,47,"see Volume I, Section IV.A.2, supra."
112,48,607
112,49,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-9."
112,50,608
112,51,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 7-8."
112,52,609
112,53,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8; see also Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 2."
112,54,104
112,55,NA
113,1,U.S. Department of Justice
113,2,"At:1:ertte,·'Nerk Predttet // Ma,· Cetttaitt Material Preteeted Utteler Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
113,3,and asked Gordon to both read it and share it with Sessions. The memorandum proposed building
113,4,"a ""small and carefully selected group of experts"" to assist Sessions with the Campaign, operating"
113,5,"under the assumption ""that Hillary Clinton is very vulnerable on national security and foreign"
113,6,"policy issues."" The memorandum outlined key issues for the Campaign , including a ""new"
113,7,"beginning with Russia."" 610"
113,8,b. National Interest Hosts a Foreign Policy Speech at the Mayflower Hotel
113,9,"During both their March 24 phone call and their March 31 in-person meeting, Simes and"
113,10,6 11
113,11,Kushner discussed the possibility of CNI hosting a foreign policy speech by candidate Trump.
113,12,"Following those conversations, Simes agreed that he and others associated with CNI would"
113,13,provide behind-the-scenes input on the substance of the foreign-policy speech and that CNI
113,14,"officials would coordinate the logistics of the speech with Sessions and his staff, including"
113,15,"Sessions's chief of staff, Rick Dearborn. 612"
113,16,"In mid-April 2016, Kushner put Simes in contact with senior policy advisor Stephen Miller"
113,17,and forward ed to Simes an outline of the foreign -policy speech that Miller had prepared .613 Simes
113,18,sent back to the Campaign bullet points with ideas for the speech that he had drafted with CNI
113,19,Executive Director Paul Saunders and board member Richard Burt. 6 14 Simes received subsequent
113,20,"draft outlines from Miller , and he and Saunders spoke to Miller by phone about substantive"
113,21,"changes to the speech. 615 It is not clear , however, whether CNI officials received an actual draft"
113,22,"of the speech for comment; while Saunders recalled having received an actual draft, Simes did not,"
113,23,and the emails that CNI produced to this Office do not contain such a draft. 616
113,24,After board members expressed concern to Simes that CNl's hosting the speech could be
113,25,"perceived as an endorsement of a particular candidate, CNI decided to have its publication , the"
113,26,"National Interest, serve as the host and to have the event at the National Press Club. 617 Kushner"
113,27,"later requested that the event be moved to the Mayflower Hotel, which was another venue that"
113,28,"Simes had mentioned during initial discussions with the Campaign, in order to address concerns"
113,29,about security and capacity. 618
113,30,61
113,31,"°C00008187    (6/17/16 Email, Simes to Gordon (3:35:45 p.m.))."
113,32,611
113,33,"Simes 3/8/18 302 , at 7."
113,34,"612  Simes 3/8/18 302, at 8-11; C00008923 (4/6/16 Email, Simes to Burt (2:22:28 p.m.)) ; Burt 2/9/18"
113,35,"302, at 7."
113,36,6 13
113,37,"C00008551 (4/17/16 Email , Kushner to Simes (2:44:25 p.m.)); C00006759 (4/14/16 Email"
113,38,Kushner to Simes & S. Miller (12:30 p.m.)).
113,39,6 14
113,40,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 7; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8."
113,41,615
113,42,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8."
113,43,616
113,44,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 13; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 7-8."
113,45,6 17
113,46,"Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 8; Simes 3/8/18 302, at 12; C00003834-43 (4/22/16 Ema il, Simes to"
113,47,Boyd et al. (8 :47 a.m.)).
113,48,618
113,49,"Simes 3/8/ 18 302 , at 12, 18; Saunders 2/ 15/ 18 302, at 11."
113,50,105
113,51,NA
114,1,U.S. Department of Justice
114,2,"A.tlerRe:,,·Werk Pretlttet // May CeRtai:RMaterial Preteetetl Untler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
114,3,"On April 25, 2016, Saunders booked event rooms at the Mayflower to host both the speech"
114,4,and a VIP reception that was to be held beforehand .6 19 Saunders understood that the reception -
114,5,at which invitees would have the chance to meet ·candidate Trump--would be a small event. 620
114,6,Saunders decided who would attend by looking at the list of CNI' s invitees to the speech itself and
114,7,then choosing a subset for the reception. 62 1 CNI's invitees to the reception included Sessions and
114,8,Kislyak. 622 The week before the speech Simes had informed Kislyak that he would be invited to
114,9,"the speech, and that he would have the opportunity to meet Trump. 623"
114,10,"When the pre -speech reception began on April 27, a receiving line was quickly organized"
114,11,so that attendees could meet Trump. 624 Sessions first stood next to Trump to introduce him to the
114,12,"members of Congress who were in attendance. 625 After those members had been introduced ,"
114,13,"Simes stood next to Trump and introduced him to the CNI invitees in attendance , including"
114,14,"Kislyak. 626 Simes perceived the introduction to be positive and friendly, but thought it clear that"
114,15,Kislyak and Trump had just met for the first time. 627 Kislyak also met Kushner during the pre-
114,16,"speech reception. The two shook hands and chatted for a minute or two, during which Kushner"
114,17,"recalled Kislyak saying , ""we like what your candidate is saying ... it's refreshing. "" 628"
114,18,"Several public reports state that, in addition to speaking to Kushner at the pre-speech"
114,19,"reception, Kislyak also met or conversed with Sessions at that time. 629 Sessions stated to"
114,20,"investigators, however, that he did not remember any such conversation. 630 Nor did anyone else"
114,21,affiliated with CNI or the National Interest specifically recall a conversation or meeting between
114,22,"Sessions and Kislyak at the pre-speech reception. 631 It appears that , if a conversation occurred at"
114,23,"the pre-speech reception, it was a brief one conducted in public view , similar to the exchange"
114,24,between Kushner and Kislyak.
114,25,6 19
114,26,"Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 11-12; C00006651-57 (Mayflower Group Sales Agreement)."
114,27,620
114,28,"Saunders 2/15/18 302 , at 12-13."
114,29,621
114,30,"Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 12."
114,31,622
114,32,"C00002575 (Attendee List); C00008536 (4/25/ 16 Email, Simes to Kushner (4:53:45 p.m.))."
114,33,623
114,34,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 19-20."
114,35,624
114,36,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21."
114,37,625
114,38,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21."
114,39,626
114,40,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21."
114,41,627
114,42,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 2 1."
114,43,628
114,44,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 4."
114,45,629
114,46,"See, e.g., Ken Dilanian, Did Trump, Kushner, Sessions Have an Undisclosed Meeting With"
114,47,"Russian? , NBC News (June 1, 2016); Julia Ioffe, Why Did Jeff Sessions Really Meet With Sergey Kislyak ,"
114,48,"The Atlantic (June 13, 2017) ."
114,49,630
114,50,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22 ."
114,51,63 1
114,52,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 21; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 14, 21; Boyd 1/24/ 18 302, at 3-4; Heilbrunn"
114,53,"2/1/18 302, at 6; Statement Regarding President Trump's April 27, 2016 Foreign Policy Speech at the"
114,54,"Center for the National Interest, CNI (Mar. 8, 2017)."
114,55,106
114,56,NA
115,1,U.S. Department of Justice
115,2,Atteffle~· Werk Pfeattet // Mtty Cefltttifl Mt1terittl Preteetea Umler Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
115,3,The Office found no evidence that Kislyak conversed with either Trump or Sessions after
115,4,"the speech, or would have had the opportunity to do so. Simes, for example, did not recall seeing"
115,5,"Kislyak at the post -speech luncheon, 632 and the only witness who accounted for Sessions's"
115,6,whereabouts stated that Sessions may have spoken to the press after the event but then departed
115,7,"for Capitol Hill. 633 Saunders recalled, based in part on a food-related request he received from a"
115,8,"Campaign staff member, that Trump left the hotel a few minutes after the speech to go to the"
115,9,airport. 634
115,10,c. Jeff Sessions's Post-Speech Interactions with CNI
115,11,"In the wake of Sessions' s confirmation hearings as Attorney General, questions arose about"
115,12,whether Sessions's campaign-period interactions with CNI apart from the Mayflower speech
115,13,included any additional meetings with Ambassador Kislyak or involved Russian -related matters.
115,14,"With respect to Kislyak contacts , on May 23, 2016, Sessions attended CNI 's Distinguished Service"
115,15,"Award dinner at the Four Seasons Hotel in Washington, D.C. 635 Sessions attended a pre-dinner"
115,16,reception and was seated at one of two head tables for the event.636 A seating chart prepared by
115,17,"Saunders indicates that Sessions was scheduled to be seated next to Kislyak, who appears to have"
115,18,"responded to the invitation by indicating he would attend the event. 637 Sessions, however , did not"
115,19,"remember seeing, speaking with, or sitting next to Kislyak at the dinner. 638 Although CNI board"
115,20,"member Charles Boyd said he may have seen Kislyak at the dinner, 639 Simes, Saunders, and Jacob"
115,21,Heilbrunn--editor of the National Interest-all had no recollection of seeing Kislyak at the May
115,22,°
115,23,23 event. 64 Kislyak also does not appear in any of the photos from the event that the Office
115,24,obtained.
115,25,"In the summer of 20 16, CNI organized at least two dinner s in Washington , D.C. for"
115,26,Sessions to meet with experienced foreign policy professionals. 641 The dinners included CNI-
115,27,"affiliated individuals, such as Richard Burt and Zalmay Khalilzad, a former U.S. ambassador to"
115,28,"Afghanistan and Iraq and the person who had introduced Trump before the April 27, 2016 foreign-"
115,29,632
115,30,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 22; Heilbrunn 2/1/ 18 302, at 7."
115,31,633
115,32,"Luff 1/30/18 302, at 4."
115,33,634
115,34,"Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 15."
115,35,635
115,36,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22 ; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 17."
115,37,"636 Saunders 2/15/18 302 , at 17; C00004779-80 (5/23/16 Email , Cante lmo to Saunders & Hagberg"
115,38,"(9:30: 12 a.m.); C00004362 (5/23/16 Email, Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.)."
115,39,637
115,40,C00004362 (5/23/16 Email Bauman to Cantelmo et al. (2:02:32 a.m.).
115,41,638
115,42,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22."
115,43,639
115,44,"Boyd 1/24/18 302, at 4."
115,45,640
115,46,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 23; Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 18; Heilbrunn 2/1/18 302, at 7."
115,47,"641 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 31; Saunders 2/15/ 18 302, at 19; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 9-1 0; Khalil zad 1/9/ 18"
115,48,"302, at 5."
115,49,107
115,50,NA
116,1,U.S. Department of Justice
116,2,Atterl'l:ey'Nerk Precluet // Mtt:>'Cel'l:tail'I:
116,3,Material Preteetecl UflclerFecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
116,4,"policy speech. 642 Khalilzad also met with Sessions one-on -one separately from the ,dinners. 643 At"
116,5,"the dinners and in the meetings , the participants addressed U.S. relations with Russia, including"
116,6,how U.S. relations with NATO and European countries affected U.S. policy toward Russia. 644 But
116,7,"the discussions were not exclusively focused on Russia. 645 Khalilzad, for example, recalled"
116,8,"discussing ""nation-building"" and violent extremism with Sessions. 646 In addition , Sessions asked"
116,9,Saunders (of CNI) to draft two memoranda not specific to Russia: one on Hillary Clinton ' s foreign
116,10,policy shortcomings and another on Egypt. 647
116,11,d. Jared Kushner's -Continuing Contacts with Simes
116,12,"Between the April 2016 speech at the Mayflower Hotel and the presidential election , Jared"
116,13,Kushner had periodic contacts with Simes. 648 Those contacts consisted of both in-person meetings
116,14,"and phone conversations , which concerned how to address issues relating to Russia in the"
116,15,Campaign and how to move forward with the advisory group of foreign policy experts that Simes
116,16,"had proposed. 649 Simes recalled that he, not Kushner, initiated all conversations about Russia, and"
116,17,that Kushner never asked him to set up back-channel conversations with Russians. 650 According
116,18,"to Simes, after the Mayflower speech in late April, Simes raised the issue of Russian contacts with"
116,19,"Kushner , advised that it was bad optics for the Campaign to develop hidden Russian contacts, and"
116,20,told Kushner both that the Campaign should not highlight Russia as an issue and should handle
116,21,any contacts with Russians with care. 651 Kushner generally provided a similar account of his
116,22,interactions with Simes. 652
116,23,"Among the Kushner-Simes meetings was one held on August 17, 2016 , at Simes' s request,"
116,24,in Kushner's New York office. The meeting was to address foreign policy advice that CNI was
116,25,providing and how to respond to the Clinton Campaign's Russia-relat ed attacks on candidate
116,26,642
116,27,"Butt 2/9/18 302, at 9-10; Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 1-2, 5."
116,28,643
116,29,"Khalilzad 1/9/ 18 302, at 5-6."
116,30,644
116,31,"Simes 3/8/ 18 302, at 31; Burt 2/9/ 18 302, at 9-1 O;Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 5."
116,32,645
116,33,"Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 20."
116,34,646
116,35,"Khalilzad 1/9/18 302, at 6."
116,36,647
116,37,"Saunders 2/15/18 302, at 19-20."
116,38,648
116,39,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27."
116,40,649
116,41,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27."
116,42,650
116,43,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27."
116,44,651
116,45,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 27. During this period of time, the Campaign received a request for a high-"
116,46,"level Campaign official to meet with an officer at a Russian state-owned bank ""to discuss an offer [that"
116,47,"officer] claims to be canying from Presid ent Putin to meet with"" candidate Trump. NOSC00005653"
116,48,"(5/17/16 Email, Dearborn to Kushner (8: 12 a.m.)). Copying Manafort and Gates, Kushner respond ed, ""Pass"
116,49,on this . A lot of people come claiming to carry messages. Very few are able to verify. For now I th ink we
116,50,decline such meetings. Most likely these people go back home and claim they have special access to gain
116,51,"importance for themselves. Be careful."" NOSC00005653 (5/ 17/16 Email, Kushner to Dearborn)."
116,52,652
116,53,"Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 11-13."
116,54,108
116,55,NA
117,1,U.S. Department of Justice
117,2,Att:ert1:ey'.¥erk Predt:tet// Mtty CeHtttiflMttterittl Preteeted UAder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
117,3,"Trump. 653 In advance of the meeting , Simes sent Kushner a ""Russia Policy Memo"" laying out"
117,4,"""what Mr. Trump may want to say about Russia."" 654 In a cover email transmitting that memo and"
117,5,"a phone call to set up the meeting , Simes mentioned ""a well-documented story of highly"
117,6,"questionable connections between Bill Clinton"" and the Russian government, ""parts of [which]"""
117,7,"(according to Simes) had even been ""discussed with the CIA and the FBI in the late 1990s and"
117,8,"shared with the [Independent Counsel] at the end of the Clinton presidency. "" 655 Kushner"
117,9,"forwarded the email to senior Trump Campaign officials Stephen Miller, Paul Manafort, and Rick"
117,10,"Gates , with the note ""sugges tion only."" 656 Manafort subsequently forwarded the email to his"
117,11,assistant and scheduled a meeting with Simes. 657 (Manafort was on the verge of leaving the
117,12,"Campaign by the time of the scheduled meeting with Simes, and Simes ended up meeting only"
117,13,with Kushner).
117,14,"During the August 17 meeting , Simes provided Kushner the Clinton-related information"
117,15,"that he had romised. 658 Simes told Kushner that ,"
117,16,Simes claimed that he had received this information from former
117,17,"CIA and Reagan White House official Fritz Ermarth, who claimed to have learned it from U.S."
117,18,"intelligence sources, not from Russians. 660"
117,19,Simes perceived that Kushner did not find the information to be of interest or use to the
117,20,"Campaign because it was, in Simes's words, ""old news."" 661 When interviewed by the Office ,"
117,21,Kushner stated that he believed that there was little chance of something new being revealed about
117,22,"the Clintons given their long career as public figures, and that he never received from Simes"
117,23,"information that could be ""operationalized"" for the Trump Campaign. 662 Despite Kushner's"
117,24,653
117,25,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27 /18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12; C00007269"
117,26,"(8/10/16 Meeting Invitation, Vargas to Simes et al.); DJTFP00023484 (8/11/16 Emai l, Hagan to Manafmt"
117,27,(5:57:15 p.m.)).
117,28,654
117,29,"C00007981-84 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.)). The memorandum"
117,30,"recommend ed ""down playing Russia as a U.S. foreign policy priority at this time"" and suggested that ""some"
117,31,"tend to exaggerate Putin's flaws."" The memorandum also recommended approaching general Russian-"
117,32,"related questions in the framework of ""how to work with Russia to advance important U.S . national"
117,33,"interests"" and that a Trump Administration ""not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy."" The"
117,34,"memorandum did not discuss sanctions but did address how to handle Ukraine-related questions , including"
117,35,questions about Russia's invasion and annexation of Crimea.
117,36,655
117,37,"C00007981 (8/9/16 Email, Simes to Kushner (6:09:21 p.m.))."
117,38,656
117,39,"DJTFP00023459 (8/10/16 Email, Kushner to S. Miller et al. (11 :30: 13 a.m.))."
117,40,657
117,41,"DJTFP00023484 (8/1 1/16 Email, Hagan to Manafort (5:57:15 p.m.))."
117,42,"658 Simes 3/8/18 302, at 29-30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12."
117,43,659
117,44,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27 /l 8 302, at 6."
117,45,660
117,46,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30."
117,47,661
117,48,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 6."
117,49,662
117,50,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 12."
117,51,109
117,52,NA
118,1,U.S. Department of Justice
118,2,Attoraey Work Prodttet // Mtt; Coatttifl Mttterittl Proteeted Uader Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
118,3,"reaction , Simes believed that he provided the same information at a small group meeting of foreign"
118,4,policy experts that CNI organized for Sessions. 663
118,5,"5. June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower"
118,6,"On June 9, 2016, senior representatives of the Trump Campaign met in Trump Tower with"
118,7,a Russian attorney expecting to receive derogatory information about Hillary Clinton from the
118,8,Russian government. The meeting was proposed to Donald Trump Jr. in an email from Robert
118,9,"Goldstone, at the request of his then-client Emin Agalarov, the son of Russian real-estate developer"
118,10,"Aras Agalarov . Goldstone relayed to Trump Jr. that the ""Crown prosecutor of Russia ... offered"
118,11,to provide the Trump Campaign with some official documents and information that would
118,12,"incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia "" as ""part of Russia and its government 's support"
118,13,"for Mr. Trump."" Trump Jr. immediately responded that ""if it ' s what you say I love it,"" and arranged"
118,14,the meeting through a series of emails and telephone calls.
118,15,Trump Jr. invited campaign chairman Paul Manafort and senior advisor Jared Kushner to
118,16,"attend the meeting, and both attended. Members of the Campaign discussed the meeting before it"
118,17,"occurred, and Michael Cohen recalled that Trump Jr. may have told candidate Trump about an"
118,18,"upcoming meeting to receive adverse information about Clinton , without linking the meeting to"
118,19,"Russia. According to written answers submitted by President Trump, he has no recollection of"
118,20,"learning of the meeting at the time, and the Office found no documentary evidence showing that he"
118,21,was made aware of the meeting--or its Russian connection-before it occurred.
118,22,"The Russian attorney who spoke at the meeting, Natalia Veselnitskaya, had previously"
118,23,worked for the Russian government and maintained a relationship with that government throughout
118,24,this period of time. She claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided
118,25,"to Hillary Clinton and other Democrats. Trump Jr . requested evidence to support those claims, but"
118,26,Veselnitskaya did not provide such information. She and her associates then turned to a critique of
118,27,"the origins of the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 statute that imposed financial and travel sanctions on"
118,28,Russian officials and that resulted in a retaliatory ban on adoptions of Russian children. Trump Jr.
118,29,suggested that the issue could be revisited when and if candidate Trump was elected . After the
118,30,"election , Veselnitskaya made additional efforts to follow up on the meeting, but the Trump"
118,31,Transition Team did not engage.
118,32,a. Setting Up the June 9 Meeting
118,33,i. Outreach to Donald Trump Jr.
118,34,Aras Agalarov is a Russian real-estate develop er with ties to Putin and other members of
118,35,"the Russian government, including Russia ' s Prosecutor General, Yuri Chaika. 664 Aras Agalarov"
118,36,"is the president of the Crocus Group , a Russian enterprise that holds substantial Russian"
118,37,"government construction contracts and that- as discussed above , Volume I, Section IV.A.I, supra"
118,38,663
118,39,"Simes 3/8/18 302, at 30."
118,40,664
118,41,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302,"
118,42,at 4.
118,43,110
118,44,NA
119,1,U.S. Department of Justice
119,2,"AtterHe'.1'""Werk Pt'eelttet// Mfr'.1'"
119,3,1
119,4,CeHtaiHMaterial Preteeteel UHelerFeel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
119,5,-worked with Trump in connection with the 2013 Miss Universe pageant in Moscow and a
119,6,"potential Trump Moscow real-estate project. 665 The relationship continued over time, as the parties"
119,7,pursued the Trump Moscow project in 2013-2014 and exchanged gifts and letters in 2016 .666 For
119,8,"example, in April 2016 , Trump responded to a letter from Aras Agalarov with a handwritten"
119,9,"note. 667 Aras Agalarov expressed interest in Trump's campaign , passed on ""congratulations"" for"
119,10,"winning in the primary and-according to one email drafted by Goldstone-an ""offer"" of his"
119,11,"""support and that of many of his important Russian friends and colleagues[,] espec ially with"
119,12,"reference to U.S./Russian relations."" 668"
119,13,"On June 3, 2016, Emin Agalarov called Goldstone, Emin ' s then-publicist. 669 Goldstone is"
119,14,·a music and events promoter who represented Emin Agalarov from approximately late 2012 until
119,15,"late 2016. 670 While representing Emin Agalarov, Goldstone facilitated the ongoing contact"
119,16,between the Trumps and the Agalarovs-includin           an invitation that Trum sent to Putin to attend
119,17,the 2013 Miss Universe Pa eant in Moscow. 67 1
119,18,Goldstone understood                                                                 a
119,19,"Russian political connection, and Emin Agalarov indicated that the attorney was a prosecutor. 73"
119,20,Goldstone recalled that the information that mi ht interest the Trum s involved Hillar Clinton
119,21,674
119,22,Kaveladze
119,23,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 10; -"
119,24,"Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 5-6; 4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone."
119,25,667
119,26,"RG000033-34 (4/25/16 Email, Graff to Goldstone (attachment))."
119,27,669
119,28,Call Records of Robert Goldstone
119,29,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 6."
119,30,670
119,31,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-2;                                        Beniaminov 1/6/18 302,"
119,32,at 3.
119,33,67 1
119,34,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 1-5;                                                   DJTJR00008"
119,35,"(2/29/19 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3; Shugart 9/25/17 302, at 2;"
119,36,"TRUMPORG_ 18_001325 (6/21/13 Email, Goldstone to Graft); TRUMPORG_ 18_001013 (6/24/13 Email,"
119,37,"Goldstone to Graff); TRUMPORG 18 001014 (6/24/13 Email, Graff to Shugart);"
119,38,"TRUMPORG_l8_001018 (6/26/13 Email, Graffto Goldstone); TRUMPORG_ l8_001022 (6/27/13 Email,"
119,39,"Graff to L. Kelly); TRUMPORG_18_001333 (9/12/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart);"
119,40,"MUO00004289 (7/27/13 Email, Goldstone to Graff, Shugart)."
119,41,672
119,42,"see Goldstone 2/,8/ 18 302, at 6-7."
119,43,673
119,44,674
119,45,111
119,46,NA
120,1,U.S. Department of Justice
120,2,Atter1:1e~·Werk Pred1:1et// Mtt~·Ce1:1ttttfl
120,3,Mttterittl Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crtm. P. 6(e)
120,4,675
120,5,The                                             mentioned by Emin Agalarov was Natalia
120,6,"Veselnitskaya.       From approximately 1998 until 2001, Veselnitskaya worked as a prosecutor for"
120,7,"the Central Administrative District of the Russian Prosecutor's Office, 677 and she continued to"
120,8,perform government-related work and maintain ties to the Russian government following her
120,9,"departure. 678 She lobbied and testified about the Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial"
120,10,sanctions and travel restrictions on Russian officials and which was named for a Russian tax
120,11,"specialist who exposed a fraud and later died in a Russian prison. 679 Putin called the statute ""a"
120,12,"purely political , unfriendly act,"" and Russia responded by barring a list of current and former U.S."
120,13,officials from entering Russia and by halting the adoption of Russian children by U.S. citizens. 680
120,14,"Veselnitskaya performed legal work for Denis Katsyv, 681 the son of Russian businessman Peter"
120,15,"Katsyv, and for his company Prevezon Holdings Ltd., which was a defendant in a civil-forfeiture"
120,16,action alleging the laundering of proceeds from the fraud exposed by Magnitsky. 682 She also
120,17,675
120,18,676
120,19,"In December 2018, a grand jury in the Southern District of New York returned an indictment"
120,20,"charging Veselnitskaya with obstructing the Prevezon litigation discussed in the text above. See Indictment ,"
120,21,"United States v. Natalia Vladimirovna Veselnitskaya, No. 18-cr-904 (S.D.N.Y.). The indictment alleges,"
120,22,"among other things, that Veselnitskaya lied to the district court about her relationship to the Russian"
120,23,Prosecutor General's Office and her involvement in responding to a U.S. document request sent to the
120,24,Russian government.
120,25,677
120,26,"Veselnitska a 11/20/17 Statement to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 2;-"
120,27,678
120,28,"Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20 , 2017)"
120,29,"at 33; Keir Simmons & Rachel Elbaum , Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr."
120,30,"Info on Clinton, NBC News (July 11, 2017); Maria Tsvetkova & Jack Stubbs, Moscow Lawyer Who Met"
120,31,"Trump Jr. Had Russian Spy Agency As Client, Reuters (July 21, 2017); Andrew E. Kramer & Sharon"
120,32,"LaFraniere , Lawyer Who Was Said to Have Dirt on Clinton Had Closer Ties to Kremlin than She Let On,"
120,33,"New York Times (Apr. 27, 2018).                                                          ·"
120,34,679
120,35,"See Pub. L. No. 112-208 §§ 402, 404(a)(l), 126 Stat. 1502, 1502-1506. Sergei Magnitsky was"
120,36,"a Russian tax specialist who worked for William Browder, a former investment fund manager in Russia."
120,37,"Browder hired Magnitsky to investigate tax fraud by Russian officials, and Magnitsky was charged with"
120,38,"helping Browder embezzle money. After Magnitsky died in a Russian prison, Browder lobbied Congress"
120,39,"to pass the Magnitsky Act. See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Turning Tables in Magnitsky Case, Russia"
120,40,"Accuses Nemesis of Murder , New York Times (Oct. 22, 2017) ; Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before"
120,41,"the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017), Exhibits at 1-4; Rosie Gray, Bill Browd er 's Testimony"
120,42,"to the Senate Judiciary Committee, The Atlantic (July 25, 2017)."
120,43,680
120,44,"Ellen Barry, Russia Bars 18 Americans After Sanctions by US, New York Times (Apr. 13, 2013);"
120,45,"Tom Porter, Supporters of the Magnitsky Act Claim They 've Been Targets of Russian Assassination and"
120,46,"Kidnapping Bids, Newsweek (July 16, 2017)."
120,47,681
120,48,"Testimony ofNatalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017),"
120,49,at 21.
120,50,682
120,51,"See Veselnitskaya Deel., United States v. Prevezon Holdings, Ltd., No. 13-cv-6326 (S.D.N.Y.);"
120,52,"see Prevezon Holdings, Second Amended Complaint; Prevezon Holdings , Mem. and Order ; Prev ezon"
120,53,"Holdings, Deposition of Oleg Lurie."
120,54,112
120,55,NA
121,1,U.S. Department of Justice
121,2,Atterttey Werk Preeittet// Mo~·Ce)fttoiRMoteriol Preteetee Utteier Fee . R. Crim. P. 6Ee)
121,3,appears to have been involved in an April 2016 approach to a U.S. congressional delegation in
121,4,"Moscow offering ""confidential information "" from ""the Prosecutor General of Russia "" about"
121,5,"""interactions between certain political forces in our two countries. "" 683"
121,6,I
121,7,"Shortly after his June 3 call with Emin Agalarov, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. 684 The"
121,8,email stated:
121,9,Goodmorning
121,10,Emlnjustcalled-andaskedmetocontact   youwithsomething    veryInteresting.
121,11,TheCrown   prosecutor
121,12,ofRussia metwithhisfatherArasthismorning                      offered
121,13,andintheirmeeting     lo providetheTrump  campaignwith
121,14,someofficialdocuments andinformationthatwouldincriminate         andherdealings
121,15,HIiiary             withRussiaandwouldbe veryusefultoyourfather.
121,16,Thisisobviouslyveryhighlevelandsensitive information butispartofRussia  andItsgovernment's
121,17,supportforMr.Trump  - helped
121,18,alongby
121,19,ArasandEmin.
121,20,Whatdoyouthinkisthebestwaytohandle     thisinformation andwouldyoubeabletospeak    to Eminaboutit directly?
121,21,"I canalsosendthisInfotoyourfathervia Rhona , butit Isultrasensitive"
121,22,sowanted tosendtoyoufirst.
121,23,Best
121,24,RobGoldstone
121,25,"Within minutes of this email, Trump Jr . responded , emailing back: ""Thanks Rob I appreciate that."
121,26,I am on the road at the moment but perhaps I j ust speak to Emin first. Seems we have some time
121,27,and if it's what you say I love it especially later in the summer. Could we do a call first thing next
121,28,"week when I am back?"" 685 Goldstone conveyed Trump Jr.'s interest to Emin Agalarov, emailing"
121,29,"that Trump Jr. ""wants to speak personally on the issue ."" 686"
121,30,"On June 6, 2016, Emin Agalarov asked Goldstone ifther e was ""[a]ny news, "" and Go ldstone"
121,31,"explained that Trump Jr. was likely still traveling for the ""final elections ... where [T]rurnp will"
121,32,"be 'crowned' the official nominee."" 687 On the same day, Goldstone again emailed Trump Jr. and"
121,33,"asked when Trump Jr. was ""free to talk with Emin about this Hillary info."" 688 Trump Jr. asked if"
121,34,683
121,35,"See Gribbin 8/31/17 302, at 1-2 & lA (undat ed one-page document given to congressional"
121,36,delegation). The Russian Prosecutor General is an official with broad national responsibilities in the
121,37,"Russian legal system. See Federal Law on the Prosecutor' s Office of the Russian Federation ( 1992,"
121,38,amended 2004).
121,39,684
121,40,"RG000061 (6/3/ 16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Goldstone to"
121,41,Donald Trump Jr.); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/17 (11 :00) Tweet.
121,42,685
121,43,"DJTJR00446 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/1 7 (11 :00)"
121,44,"Tweet; RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone)."
121,45,686
121,46,"RG000062 (6/3/ 16 Email, Goldstone & Trump Jr.)."
121,47,687
121,48,"RG000063 (6/6/16 Email, A. Agalarov to Goldstone); RG000064 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to"
121,49,A. Agalarov).
121,50,688
121,51,"RG000065 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.); DJTJR00446 (6/6/16 Email, Goldstone to"
121,52,Trump Jr.).
121,53,113
121,54,NA
122,1,U.S. Department of Justice
122,2,"Att6mey W6rk Pl'6dttet ,','May CmttttiR Mfttet1ittlPt16teetedURdet1Fed. R. Ct1im.P. 6(e)"
122,3,"they could ""speak now,"" and Goldstone arranged a call between Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov. 689"
122,4,"On June 6 and June 7, Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had multiple brief calls. 690"
122,5,"Also on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov called Ike Kaveladze and asked him to attend a"
122,6,"meeting in New York with the Trump Organization. 691 Kaveladze is a Georgia-born, naturalized"
122,7,U.S. citizen who worked in the United States for the Crocus Group and reported to Aras
122,8,"Agalarov. 692 Kaveladze told the Office that, in a second phone call on June 6, 2016, Aras Agalarov"
122,9,"asked Kaveladze ifhe knew anything about the Magnitsky Act, and Aras sent him a short synopsis"
122,10,"for the meeting and Veselnitskaya's business card. According to Kaveladze, Aras Agalarov said"
122,11,"the purpose of the meeting was to discuss the Magnitsky Act, and he asked Kaveladze to"
122,12,translate. 693
122,13,ii. Awareness of the Meeting Within the Campaign
122,14,"On June 7, Goldstone emailed Trump Jr. and said that ""Emin asked that I schedule a"
122,15,"meeting with you and [t]he Russian government attorney who is flying over from Moscow."" 694"
122,16,"Trump Jr. replied that Manafort (identified as the ""campaign boss"") , Jared Kushner , and Trump"
122,17,"Jr. would likely attend. 695 Go~d                     to learn that Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner"
122,18,696
122,19,"would attend.        Kaveladze ---                    ""puzzled"" by the list of attendees and that he"
122,20,"checked with one of Emin Agalarov's assistants , Roman Beniaminov , who said that the purpose"
122,21,"of the meeting was for Veselnitskaya to convey ""negative information on Hillary Clinton."" 697"
122,22,"Beniaminov, however, stated that he did not recall having known or said that. 698"
122,23,"Early on June 8, 2016 Kushner emailed his assistant, asking her to discuss a 3 :00 p.m ."
122,24,689
122,25,DJTJR00445
122,26,and Trump Jr.);
122,27,690
122,28,DJTJR00499                                                                 ); Call Records
122,29,693
122,30,"Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 6."
122,31,694
122,32,"DJTJR00467 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trum"
122,33,"Tweet; RG000068 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.);"
122,34,695
122,35,"DJTJR00469 (6/7/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJr 07/11/1 7 (11 :00)"
122,36,"Tweet; RG000071 6/7/16 Email, Trum Jr. to Goldstone); OSC-KAV _00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to"
122,37,Kaveladze);
122,38,696
122,39,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 7;"
122,40,697
122,41,"KA V_00048 (6/7/16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze)."
122,42,698
122,43,"Beniaminov 1/6/18 302, at 3."
122,44,114
122,45,NA
123,1,U.S. Department of Justice
123,2,Atist1neyWst1kPred1:1et// Ma:y Csnta:in Ma:teria:lPt1steeted Undet1Fed. R. Crim..P. 6(e)
123,3,"meeting the following day with Trump Jr. 699 Later that day , Trump Jr. forwarded the entirety of"
123,4,"his email correspondence regarding the meeting with Goldstone to Manafort and Kushner, under"
123,5,"the subject line ""FW: Russia - Clinton - private and confidential, "" adding a note that the ""[m]eeting"
123,6,°
123,7,"got moved to 4 tomorrow at my offices."" 70 Kushner then sent his assistant a second email ,"
123,8,"informing her that the ""[m]eeting with don jr is 4pm now .""70 1 Manafort responded , ""See you"
123,9,"then. P. "" 702"
123,10,"Rick Gates , who was the deputy campaign chairman, stated during interviews with the"
123,11,"Office that in the days before June 9, 2016 Trump Jr. announced at a regular morning meeting of"
123,12,senior campaign staff and Trump family members that he had a lead on negative information about
123,13,the Clinton Foundation. 703 Gates believed that Trump Jr. said the information was coming from a
123,14,group in Kyrgy zstan and that he was introduced to the group by a friend. 704 Gates recalled that
123,15,"the meeting was attended by Trump Jr., Eric Trump , Paul Manafort, Hope Hicks, and, joining late,"
123,16,"Ivanka Trump and Jared Kushner . According to Gates, Manafort warned the group that the"
123,17,meeting likely would not yield vital information and they should be careful. 705 Hicks denied any
123,18,"knowledge of the June 9 meeting before 2017, 706 and Kushner did not recall if the planned June 9"
123,19,meeting came up at all earlier that week. 707
123,20,Michael Cohen recalled being in Donald J. Trump ' s office on June 6 or 7 when Trump Jr.
123,21,told his father that a meeting to obtain adverse information about Clinton was going forward. 708
123,22,Cohen did not recall Trump Jr. stating that the meeting was connected to Russia. 709 From the tenor
123,23,"of the conversation, Cohen believed that Trump Jr. had previou sly discussed the meeting with his"
123,24,"father, although Cohen was not involved in any such conversation. 710 In an interview with the"
123,25,"Senate Judiciary Committee , however , Trump Jr . stated that he did not inform his father about the"
123,26,699
123,27,"NOSC0000007-08 (6/8/18 Email, Kushner to Vargas)."
123,28,700
123,29,"NOSC00000039 -42 (6/8/16 Email , Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort) ; DJTJR00485 (6/8/16"
123,30,"Email, Trump Jr. to Kushner & Manafort)."
123,31,701
123,32,"NOSC0000004 (6/8/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas)."
123,33,702
123,34,"6/8/16 Email , Manafo1t to Trump Jr."
123,35,703
123,36,"Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7; Gates 3/ 1/18 302 , at 3-4. Although the March l 302 refers to ""June"
123,37,"19,"" that is likely a typographical error; external emails indicate that a meeting with those participants"
123,38,"occurred on June 6. See NOSC00023603 (6/6/16 Email, Gates to Trump Jr. et al.)."
123,39,704
123,40,"Gates 1/30/18 302, at 7. Aras Agalarov is originally from Azerbaijan, and public reporting"
123,41,"indicates that his company, the Crocus Group, has done substantial work in Kyrgyzstan. See Neil"
123,42,"MacFarquhar, A Russian Developer Helps Out the Kremlin on Occasion. Was He a Conduit to Trump?,"
123,43,"New York T imes (July 16, 2017)."
123,44,705
123,45,"Gates 3/1/18 302 , at 3-4."
123,46,706
123,47,"Hicks 12/7117 302 , at 6."
123,48,707
123,49,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 8."
123,50,708
123,51,"Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 4-6."
123,52,709
123,53,"Cohen 8/7 / 18 302, at 4-5."
123,54,71
123,55,"°Cohen 9/12/18 302 , at 15-16 ."
123,56,115
123,57,NA
124,1,U.S. Department of Justice
124,2,"AMorAeyWork Prod1:1et,',' May CofttaiHMatet'ial Protected Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
124,3,"emails or the upcoming meeting. 7 11 Similarly , neither Manafort nor Kushner recalled anyone"
124,4,"informing candidate Trump of the meeting , including Trump Jr. 712 President Trump has stated to"
124,5,"this Office, in written answers to questions, that he has ""no recollection of learning at the time """
124,6,"that his son, Manafort, or "" Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016"
124,7,"concerning potentially negative information about Hillary Clinton."" 713"
124,8,"b. The Events of June 9, 2016"
124,9,i. Arrangements   for the Meeting
124,10,"Veselnitskaya was in New York on June 9, 2016, for appellate proceedings in the Prevezon"
124,11,"civil forfeiture liti ation. 714 That da , Veselnitskaya called Rinat Akhmetshin , a Soviet -born U.S ."
124,12,"lobbyist,                                    and when she learned that he was in New York , invited him"
124,13,to lunch.          Akhmetshin told the Office that he had worked on issues relating to the Magnitsky
124,14,"Act and had worked on the Prevezon litigation .716 Kaveladze and Anatoli Samochornov, a"
124,15,7 11
124,16,"Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 28-29, 84, 94-95"
124,17,"(Sept. 7, 2017). The Senate Judiciary Committee interview was not under oath, but Trump Jr. was advised"
124,18,that it is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to make materially false statements in a congressional investigation.
124,19,Id. at 10-11.
124,20,712
124,21,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 3-4; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 10."
124,22,713
124,23,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018) , at 8 (Response to Question I, Patts (a)-"
124,24,(c)). We considered whether one sequence of events suggested that candidate Trump had contemporaneous
124,25,"knowledge of the June 9 meeting . On June 7, 2016 Trump announced his intention to give ""a major speech"""
124,26,"""probably Monday of next week""-which would have been June 13-about ""all of the things that have"
124,27,"taken place with the Clintons."" See, e.g., Phillip Bump, What we know about the Trump Tower meeting,"
124,28,"Washington Post (Aug. 7, 2018). Following the June 9 meeting , Trump changed the subject of his planned"
124,29,speech to national security. But the Office did not find evidence that the original idea for the speech was
124,30,connected to the anticipated June 9 meeting or that the change of topic was attributable to the failure of that
124,31,"meeting to produce concrete evidence about Clinton. Other events, such as the Pulse nightclub shooting"
124,32,"on June 12, could well have caused the change. The President 's written answers to our questions state that"
124,33,"the speech's focus was altered ''[i]n light of ' the Pulse nightclub shooting. See Written Responses , supra."
124,34,"As for the original topic of the June 13 speech, Trump has said that ""he expected to give a speech referencing"
124,35,"the publicly available , negative inf01mation about the Clintons,"" and that the draft of the speech prepared"
124,36,"by Campaign staff""was based on publicly available material, including, in particular, information from the"
124,37,"book Clinton Cash by Peter Schweizer."" Written Responses, supra. In a later June 22 speech, Trump did"
124,38,"speak extensively about allegations that Clinton was corrupt , drawing from the Clinton Cash book. See"
124,39,"Full Transcript: Donald Trump NYC Speech on Stakes of the Ele ction, politico.com (June 22, 2016)."
124,40,7 14
124,41,"Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary (Nov. 20, 2017)"
124,42,"at 41, 42; Alison Frankel, How Did Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Get into US. for Trump Tower Meeting?"
124,43,"Reuters , (Nov. 6, 2017); Michael Kranish et al., Russian Lawyer who Met with Trump Jr. Has Long History"
124,44,"Fighting Sanctions, Washington Post (July 11, 2017); see OSC-KA VOOl13 (6/8/ 16 Email, Goldstone to"
124,45,"Kaveladze); RG000073 (6/8/16 Email, Goldstone to Trump Jr.) ; Lieberman 12/13/17 302, at 5; see also"
124,46,"Prevezon Holdings Order (Oct. 17, 2016)."
124,47,715
124,48,116
124,49,NA
125,1,U.S. Department of Justice
125,2,Attorttey 'Nork Proattet // Mtty Cotttttitt Mttterittl Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
125,3,Russian-born translator who had assisted Veselnitska
125,4,"Prevezon case, also attended the lunch. 717"
125,5,meeting
125,6,"asked Akhmetshin what she should tell him.              According to several participants in the lunch,"
125,7,Veselnitskaya showed Akhmetshin a document alleging financial misconduct by Bill Browder and
125,8,"the Ziff brothers (Americans with business in Russia , and those individuals subse uentl makin"
125,9,olitical donations to the DNC. 719
125,10,The group then went to Trump Tower for the meeting. 721
125,11,ii. Conduct of the Meeting
125,12,"Trump Jr., Manafort, and Kushner participated on the Trump side, while Kaveladze,"
125,13,"Samochomov, Akhmetshin, and Goldstone attended with Veselnitskaya. 722 The Office spoke to"
125,14,"every participant except Veselnitska a and Trum Jr., the latter of whom declined to be voluntaril"
125,15,interviewed b the Office
125,16,Goldstone recalled that Trump Jr. invited Veselnitskaya to begin but did not
125,17,say anything about the subject of the meeting. 725 Participants agreed that Veselnitskaya stated that
125,18,the Ziff brothers had broken Russian laws and had donated their profits to the DNC or the Clinton
125,19,Campaign .726 She asserted that the Ziff brothers had engaged in tax evasion and money laundering
125,20,717
125,21,"Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 7;                                          Samochornov 7/13/17"
125,22,"302 , at 2, 4;"
125,23,r
125,24,subject matter of the Trump Tower meeting coming up at lunch.
125,25,"■ Samochomov 7/12/17 302, at 4. In her later Senate statement and interactions with the press,"
125,26,Veselnitskaya produced what she claimed were the talking points that she brought to the June 9 meeting.
125,27,720
125,28,721
125,29,"E.g ., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4."
125,30,722
125,31,"E.g., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4."
125,32,723
125,33,"E.g ., Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4; Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 9."
125,34,724
125,35,725
125,36,726
125,37,117
125,38,NA
126,1,U.S. Department of Justice
126,2,"A:tterfle)'WerlePred1:1et   // Ma, Ce,~taiRMaterial Preteeted Ui,der Fed. R. Criffl.P. 6(e)"
126,3,"in both the United States and Russia,727"
126,4,728
126,5,"According to Akhmetshin, Trump Jr. asked follow-up"
126,6,"questions about how the alleged payments could be tied specifically to the Clinton Campaign, but"
126,7,Veselnitskaya indicated that she could not trace the money once it entered the United States. 729
126,8,"Kaveladze similarly recalled that Trump Jr. asked what they have on Clinton, and Kushner became"
126,9,"aggravated and asked "" [w]hat are we doing here?"" 730"
126,10,Akhmetshin then spoke about U.S. sanctions imposed under the Magnitsky Act and
126,11,Russia's response prohibiting U.S. adoption of Russian children .731 Several participants recalled
126,12,"that Trump Jr. commented that Trump is a private citizen, and there was nothing they could do at"
126,13,that time. 732 Trump Jr. also said that they could revisit the issue if and when they were in
126,14,"government. 733 Notes that Manafort took on his phone reflect the general flow of the conversation,"
126,15,although not all of its details. 734
126,16,"At some point in the meeting , Kushner sent an iMessage to Manafort stating ""waste of time,"""
126,17,followed immediately by two separate emails to assistants at Kushner Companies with requests that
126,18,732
126,19,"E.g., Akhmetshin 11/14/ l 7 302, at 12-13;"
126,20,733
126,21,"Akhmetshin 11/14/17 302, at 12-13;                                           Samochornov"
126,22,"7/13/17 302, at 3. Trump Jr. confirmed this in a statement he made in July 2017 after news of the June"
126,23,"20 16 meeting broke. Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee US. Senate"
126,24,"Washington DC, 115th Cong. 57 (Sept. 7, 2017)."
126,25,734
126,26,Manafort's notes state:
126,27,Bill browder
126,28,Offshore - Cyprus
126,29,133m shares
126,30,Companies
126,31,Not invest - loan
126,32,Value in Cyprus as inter
126,33,Illici
126,34,Active sponsors ofRNC
126,35,Browder hired Joanna Glover
126,36,Tied into Cheney
126,37,Russian adoption by American families
126,38,PJM-SJC-00000001-02 (Notes Produced to Senate Judiciary Committee).
126,39,118
126,40,NA
127,1,U .S. Department of Justice
127,2,Atl:erfle)· Werk Predttet // Ma)' CefltatH Matet·ial Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crhfl. P. 6(e)
127,3,they call him to give him an excuse to leave .735 Samochornov recalled that Kushner departed the
127,4,meeting before it concluded; Veselnitskaya recalled the same when interviewed by the press in
127,5,July 2017. 736
127,6,Veselnitskaya ' s press interviews and written statements to Congress differ materially from
127,7,"other accounts. In a July 2017 press interview, Veselnitskaya claimed that she has no connection"
127,8,to the Russian government and had not referred to any derogatory information concerning the
127,9,Clinton Campaign when she met with Trump Campaign officials. 737 Veselnitskaya's November
127,10,2017 written submission to the Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the purpose of the June 9
127,11,"meeting was not to connect with ""the Trump Campaign"" but rather to have ""a private meeting with"
127,12,Donald Trump Jr.-a friend of my good acquaintance's son on the matter of assisting me or my
127,13,colleagues in informing the Congress members as to the criminal nature of manipulation and
127,14,"interference with the legislative activities of the US Congress."" 738 In other words, Veselnitskaya"
127,15,"claimed her focus was on Congress and not the Campaign. No witness , however , recalled any"
127,16,"reference to Congress during the meeting. Veselnitskaya also maintained that she ""a ttended the"
127,17,"meeting as a lawyer of Denis Katsyv,"" the pr,eviously mentioned owner of Prevezon Holdings, but"
127,18,"she did not ""introduce [her]self in this capacity. "" 739"
127,19,"In a July 2017 television interview, Trump Jr. stated that while he had no way to gauge the"
127,20,"reliability, credibility , or accuracy of what Goldstone had stated was the purpose of the meeting ,"
127,21,"if ""someone has information on our opponent ... maybe this is something. I should hear them"
127,22,"out. ""740 Trump Jr. fu1ther stated in September 2017 congressional testimony that he thought he"
127,23,"should ""listen to what Rob and his colleagues had to say."" 741 Depending on what, if any,"
127,24,"information was provided , Trump Jr. stated he could then ""consult with counsel to make an"
127,25,"informed decision as to whether to give it any further consideration ."" 742"
127,26,735
127,27,"NOSC00003992 (6/9/16 Text Message , Kushner to Manafort); Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 9;"
127,28,"Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 7; NOSC00000044 (6/9/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas); NOSC00000045 (6/9/16"
127,29,"Email, Kushner to Cain)."
127,30,736
127,31,"Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4;                                               Kushner 4/11/18"
127,32,"302, at 9-10; see also Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr., Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 48-49"
127,33,"(Sept. 7, 2017).                                                               ."
127,34,737
127,35,"Russian Lawyer Veselnitskaya Says She Didn't Give Trump Jr. Info on Clinton, NBC News"
127,36,"(July 11, 2017)."
127,37,738
127,38,"Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,"
127,39,th
127,40,"115 Cong. }O(Nov 20, 2017)."
127,41,739
127,42,"Testimony of Natalia Veselnitskaya before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary,"
127,43,th
127,44,"115 Cong. 21 (Nov. 20, 2017) ."
127,45,740
127,46,"Sean Hannity, Transcript-Donald Trump Jr, Fox News (July 11, 2017)."
127,47,741
127,48,"Intervi ew of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. 16 (Sept. 7, 2017)."
127,49,742
127,50,"Interview of Donald J Trump, Jr, Senate Judiciar y Committee, 115th Cong. 16-17 (Sept. 7,"
127,51,2017).
127,52,119
127,53,NA
128,1,U.S. Department of Justice
128,2,Atlerftey Werk Predttet // May Cefttaifl. Mttterial Preteetea Ufl.aer Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
128,3,After the June 9 meetin                                                      Jr. 743 According to
128,4,"Goldstone, he told Trump Jr.                                                                         744 and"
128,5,told Emin A alarov
128,6,745
128,7,Aras Agalaro v asked Kaveladze to
128,8,"report in after the meeting , but before Kaveladze could call , Aras Agalarov called him .747 With"
128,9,"Veselnitskaya next to him , Kaveladze reported that the meeting had gone well, but he later told"
128,10,Aras Agalarov that the meeting about the Magnitsky Act had been a waste of time because it was
128,11,"not with lawyers and they were ""preaching to the wrong crowd."" 748"
128,12,c. Post-June 9 Events
128,13,Veselnitskaya and Aras Agalarov made at least two unsuccessful attempts after the election
128,14,to meet with Trump representatives to convey similar information about Browder and the
128,15,"Magnitsky Act. 749 On Novem ber 23, 2016, Kaveladze emailed Goldstone about setti ng up another"
128,16,"meeting ""with T people"" and sent a document bearing allegations similar to those conveyed on"
128,17,°
128,18,"June 9. 75 Kaveladze followed up with Goldstone, stating that ""Mr. A ,"" which Goldstone"
128,19,"understood to mean Aras Agalarov , called to ask about the meeting. 751 Goldstone emailed the"
128,20,"document to Rhona Graff, saying that ""Aras Agalarov has asked me to pass on this document in"
128,21,"the hope it can be passed on to the appropriate team. If needed, a lawyer representing the case is"
128,22,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302,"
128,23,"(and one text message shows) that, shortly after the DNC"
128,24,e ts co   ecting the DNC hacking announcement to the June 9
128,25,"OSC-KAV_00029 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E."
128,26,Agalarov & Kaveladze (10:09 a.m.)). The investigation did not identify evidence connecting the events of
128,27,"June 9 to the GRU's hack-and-dump operation. OSC-KAV_00029-30 (6/14/16 Email, Goldstone to E."
128,28,Agalarov).
128,29,746
128,30,747
128,31,"Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records ofike . Kaveladze"
128,32,748
128,33,"Kaveladze 11/16/17 302, at 8; Call Records of Ike Kaveladze"
128,34,"On June 14, 2016 Kaveladze's teenage daughter emailed asking how the June 9 meeting had gone, and"
128,35,"Kaveladze responded, ""meeting was boring. The Russians did not have an bad info on Hilar "" OSC-"
128,36,"KA V_00257 (6/14/16 Email, I. Kaveladze to A. Kaveladze;"
128,37,749
128,38,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11;"
128,39,750
128,40,"OSC-KAV 00138 11/23/ 16 Email, Goldstone to Kaveladze);"
128,41,751
128,42,"RG000196 (11/26-29/16 Text Messages, Goldstone & Kaveladze);"
128,43,120
128,44,NA
129,1,U.S. Department of Justice
129,2,"Atte,me, We,rk Pre,dttet // M1ty Cmttttifl Mttterial Pre,teeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
129,3,"in New York currently and happy to meet with any member of his transition team."" 752 According"
129,4,"to Goldstone, around January 2017, Kaveladze contacted him again to set up another meeting, but"
129,5,Goldstone did not make the request. 753 The investigation did not identify evidence of the transition
129,6,team following up.
129,7,"Participants in the June 9, 2016 meeting began rece1vmg inqumes from attorneys"
129,8,representing the Trump Organization starting in approximately June 2017. 754 On approximately
129,9,"June 2, 2017, Goldstone spoke with Alan Garten, general counsel of the Trump Organization,"
129,10,"about his participation in the June 9 meeting .755 The same day , Goldstone emailed Veselnitskaya ' s"
129,11,"name to Garten, identifying her as the ""woman who was the attorney who spok e at the meeting"
129,12,"from Moscow. "" 756 Later in June 2017 , Goldstone participated in a lengthier call with Garten and"
129,13,"Alan Futerfas, outside counsel for the Trump Organization (and , subsequently, personal counsel"
129,14,"for Trump Jr.). 757 On June 27, 2017 , Goldstone emailed Emin Agalarov with the subject ""Trump"
129,15,"attorneys"" and stated that he was ""interviewed by attorneys "" about the June 9 meeting who were"
129,16,"""concerned because it links Don Jr. to officials from Russia-which              he has always denied"
129,17,"meeting."" 758 Goldstone stressed that he ""did say at the time this was an awful idea and a terrible"
129,18,"meeting ."" 759 Emin Agalarov sent a screenshot of the message to Kav eladze. 760"
129,19,"The June 9 meeting became public in July 2017. In a July 9, 2017 text message to Emin"
129,20,"Agalarov, Goldstone wrote ""I made sure I kept you and your father out of [t]his story,"" 76 1 and "" [i]f"
129,21,"contacted I can do a dance and keep you out of it."" 762 Goldstone added , ""FBI now investigating ,"""
129,22,"and ""I hope this favor was worth for your dad-it could blow up. "" 763 On July 12, 2017 Emin"
129,23,"Agalarov complained to Kaveladze that his father , Aras , ""never listens"" to him and that their"
129,24,752
129,25,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 11;                                        DJTJR00l 18 (11/28/16"
129,26,"Email, Goldstone to Graff)."
129,27,753
129,28,754
129,29,755
129,30,756
129,31,"RG000256 (6/2/17 Email, Goldstone to Garten)."
129,32,7 57
129,33,758
129,34,"RG000092 (6/27/ 17 Email, Goldstone to E. Agalarov)."
129,35,760
129,36,"OSC-KA V_01190 (6/27/ 17 Text Message , E. Agalarov to Kaveladz e)."
129,37,761
129,38,"RG000286-87 (7/9/17 Text Messages, E. Agalarov & Goldstone) ;"
129,39,121
129,40,NA
130,1,U.S. Department of Justice
130,2,"At-torRe)""Work Proch::1et  // Mtt)""CorttttiHMttterittl Proteeteci UHcierFeci. R. Ct·im. P. 6(e)"
130,3,"relationship with ""mr T has been thrown down the drain .""764 The next month, Goldstone"
130,4,"commented to Emin Agalarov about the volume of publicity the June 9 meeting had generated,"
130,5,"stating that his ""reputation [was] basically destroyed by this dumb meeting which your father"
130,6,"insisted on even though Ike and Me told him would be bad news and not to do .""765 Goldstone"
130,7,"added, ""I am not able to respond out of courtesy to you and your father . So am painted as some"
130,8,"mysterious link to Putin ."" 766"
130,9,"After public reporting on the June 9 meeting began, representatives from the Trump"
130,10,"Organization again reached out to participants. On July 10, 2017, Futerfas sent Goldstone an email"
130,11,"with a proposed statement for Goldstone to issue , which read:"
130,12,"As the person who arranged the meeting , I can definitively state that th~ statements I have"
130,13,read by Donald Trump Jr. are 100% accurate. The meeting was a complete waste of time
130,14,and Don was never told Ms. Veselnitskaya ' s name prior to the meeting. Ms. Veselnitskaya
130,15,mostly talked about the Magnitsky Act and Russian adoption laws and the meeting lasted
130,16,20 to 30 minutes at most. There was never any follow up and nothing ever came of the
130,17,meeting. 767
130,18,the statement drafted by Trump Organization representatives was
130,19,768
130,20,"He proposed a different statement, asserting that he had been"
130,21,"asked ""by [his] client in Moscow - Emin Agalarov - to facilitate a meeting between a Russian"
130,22,attorney (Natalia Veselnitzkaya [sic]) and Donald Trump Jr. The lawyer had apparently stated
130,23,"that she had some information regarding funding to the DNC from Russia , which she believed Mr."
130,24,"Trump Jr. might find interesting."" 769 Goldstone never released either statement. 770"
130,25,"On the Russian end, there were also communications about what participants should say"
130,26,"about the June 9 meeting. Specifically, the organization that hired Samochornov - an anti-"
130,27,Magnitsky Act group controlled by Veselnitskaya and the owner of Prevezon-offered                   to pay
130,28,"$90,000 of Samochornov ' s legal fees. 771 At Veselnitskaya's request, the organization sent"
130,29,"Samochornov a transcript of a Veselnitskaya press interview, and Samochornov understood that"
130,30,the organization would pay his legal fees only if ·he made statements consistent with
130,31,"Veselnitskaya's. 772 Samochornov declined , telling the Office that he did not want to perjure"
130,32,764
130,33,"OSC-KAV 01197 (7/11-12/17 Text Messages, Kaveladze & E. Agalarov);"
130,34,765 Investigative Technique
130,35,766
130,36,Investigative Technique
130,37,767
130,38,"7/10/ 17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten."
130,39,768
130,40,769
130,41,"7/10/ 17 Email, Goldstone to Futerfas & Garten."
130,42,770
130,43,772
130,44,122
130,45,NA
131,1,U.S. Department of Justice
131,2,AUem.ey Wet·lc Pt'edt1et // May Centain Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
131,3,himself. 773 The individual who conveyed Veselnitskaya ' s request to Samochornov stated that he
131,4,"did not expressly condition payment on following Veselnitskaya ' s answers but, in hindsight,"
131,5,"recognized that by sending the transcript, Samochornov could have interpreted the offer of"
131,6,774
131,7,assistance to be conditioned on his not contradicting Veselnitskaya's account.
131,8,"Volume II, Section 11.G, infra, discusses interactions between President Trump, Trump Jr.,"
131,9,and others in June and July 2017 regarding the June 9 meeting.
131,10,6. Events at the Republican National Convention
131,11,Trump Campaign officials met with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak during the week
131,12,of the Republican National Convention . The evidence indicates that those interactions were brief
131,13,"and non-substantive. During platform committee meetings immediately before the Convention,"
131,14,"J.D. Gordon, a senior Campaign advisor on policy and national security, diluted a proposed"
131,15,"amendment to the Republican Party platform expressing support for providing ""lethal"" assistance"
131,16,to Ukraine in response to Russian aggression. Gordon requested that platform committee
131,17,"personnel revise the proposed amendment to state that only ""appropriate"" assistance be provided"
131,18,"to Ukraine. The original sponsor of the ""lethal"" assistance amendment stated that Gordon told her"
131,19,(the sponsor) that he was on the phone with candidate Trump in connection with his request to
131,20,"dilute the language.        Gordon denied making that statement to the sponsor, although he"
131,21,acknowledged it was possible he mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the
131,22,subject matter. The investigation did not establish that Gordon spoke to or was directed by the
131,23,candidate to make that proposal. Gordon said that he sought the change because he believed the
131,24,proposed language was inconsistent with Trump ' s position on Ukraine.
131,25,a. Ambassador Kislyak's Encounters with Senator Sessions and J.D. Gordon the
131,26,Week of the RNC
131,27,"In July 2016, Senator Sessions and Gordon spoke at the Global Partners in Diplomacy"
131,28,"event , a conference co-sponsored by the State Department and the Heritage Foundation held in"
131,29,"Cleveland , Ohio the same week as the Republican National Convention (RNC or"
131,30,"""Convention""). 775 Approximately 80 foreign ambassadors to the United States , including Kislyak,"
131,31,were invited to the conference. 776
131,32,"On July 20, 2016, Gordon and Sessions delivered their speeches at the conference. 777 In"
131,33,"his speech, Gordon stated in pertinent part that the United States should have better relations with"
131,34,773
131,35,"Samochornov 7/13/17 302, at 1."
131,36,774
131,37,775
131,38,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Allan Smith, We Now Know Mor e About"
131,39,"why Jeff Sessions and a Russian Ambassador Crossed Paths at the Republican Convention, Business Insider"
131,40,"(Mar. 2, 2017)."
131,41,776
131,42,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Laura DeMarco, Global Cleveland and Sen. Bob Corker Welcome"
131,43,"International Republican National Convention Guests, Cleveland Plain Dealer (July 20, 2016)."
131,44,777
131,45,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22."
131,46,123
131,47,NA
132,1,U.S. Department of Justice
132,2,"Attemey Vierk Preattet ,'/ Mt1j CeHtttiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
132,3,1
132,4,"Russia. 778 During Sessions's speech, he took questions from the audience, one of which may have"
132,5,"been asked by Kislyak. 779 • When the speeches concluded , several ambassadors lined up to greet"
132,6,the speakers. 780 Gordon shook hands with Kislyak and reiterated that he had meant what he said
132,7,in the speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations. 781 Sessions separately spoke with between
132,8,"six and 12 ambassadors, including Kislyak. 782 Although Sessions stated during interviews with"
132,9,"the Office that he had no specific recollection of what he discussed with Kislyak, he believed that"
132,10,the two spoke for only a few minutes and that they would have exchanged pleasantries and said
132,11,some things about U.S.-Russia relations. 783
132,12,"Later that evening, Gordon attended a reception as part of the conference. 784 Gordon ran"
132,13,"into Kislyak as the two prepared plates of food, and they decided to sit at the same table to eat. 785"
132,14,"They were joined at that table by the ambassadors from Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and by Trump"
132,15,"Campaign advisor Carter Page. 786 As they ate, Gordon and Kislyak talked for what Gordon"
132,16,"estimated to have been three to five minutes , during which Gordon again mentioned that he meant"
132,17,what he said in his speech about improving U.S.-Russia relations. 787
132,18,b. Change to Republican Party Platform
132,19,"In preparation for the 2016 Convention, foreign policy advisors to the Trump Campaign,"
132,20,"working with the Republican National Committee, reviewed the 2012 Convention's foreign policy"
132,21,platform to identify divergence between the earlier platform and candidate Trump ' s positions. 788
132,22,The Campaign team discussed toning down language from the 2012 platform that identified Russia
132,23,"as the country 's number one threat, given the candidate's belief that there needed to be better U .S."
132,24,relations with Russia. 789 The RNC Platform Committee sent the 2016 draft platform to the
132,25,"National Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee on July 10, 2016, the evening before its"
132,26,778
132,27,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9."
132,28,779
132,29,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3."
132,30,780
132,31,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3."
132,32,781
132,33,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9."
132,34,782
132,35,"Sessions 1/ 17/18 302, at 22; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 3; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.4.b, supra"
132,36,(explaining that Sessions and Kislyak may have met three months before this encounter during a reception
132,37,"held on April 26, 2016, at the Mayflower Hotel)."
132,38,783
132,39,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 22."
132,40,784
132,41,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10."
132,42,785
132,43,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 9-10."
132,44,786
132,45,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; see also Volume I, Section IV.A.3.d, supra (explaining that Page"
132,46,acknowledged meeting Kislyak at this event).
132,47,787
132,48,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10."
132,49,788
132,50,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10."
132,51,789
132,52,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10."
132,53,124
132,54,NA
133,1,U.S. Department of Justice
133,2,A:ttemey 'Nerk Pretittet // May Cetttaifl Material Prnteeteti UHtier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
133,3,7 0
133,4,first meeting to propose amendments.        ~
133,5,"Although only delegates could participate in formal discussions and vote on the platform,"
133,6,"the Trump Campaign could request changes, and members of the Trump Campaign attended"
133,7,"committee meetings. 791 John Mashburn , the Campaign's policy director, helped oversee the"
133,8,Campaign's involvement in the platform committee meetings. 792 He told the Office that he
133,9,"directed Campaign staff at the Convention, including J.D. Gordon, to take a hands-off approach"
133,10,793
133,11,and only to challenge platform planks if they directly contradicted Trump 's wishes .
133,12,"On July 11, 2016, delegate Diana Denman submitted a proposed platform amendment that"
133,13,"included provision of armed support for Ukraine. 794 The amendment described Russia's ""ongoing"
133,14,"military aggression"" in Ukraine and announced ""supp01t"" for ""maintaining (and, if warranted ,"
133,15,increasing) sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity are fully
133,16,"restored"" and for ""providing lethal defensive weapons to Ukraine ' s armed forces and greater"
133,17,"coordination with NA TO on defense planning."" 795 Gordon reviewed the proposed platform"
133,18,"changes, including Denman 's .796 Gordon stated that he flagged this amendment because of"
133,19,"Trump's stated position on Ukraine, which Gordon personally heard the candidate say at the March"
133,20,"31 foreign policy meeting-namely, that the Europeans should take primary responsibility for any"
133,21,"assistance to Ukraine, that there should be improved U.S.-Russia relations, and that he did not"
133,22,want to start World War III over that region. 797 Gordon told the Office that Trump's statements
133,23,on the campaign trail following the March meeting underscored those positions to the point where
133,24,Gordon felt obliged to object to the proposed platform change and seek its dilution. 798
133,25,"On July 11, 2016, at a meeting of the National Security and Defense Platform"
133,26,"Subcommittee , Denman offered her amendment. 799 Gordon and another Campaign staffer, Matt"
133,27,"Miller, approached a committee co-chair and asked him to table the amendment to permit further"
133,28,"discussion. 800 Gordon's concern with the amendment was the language about providing ""lethal"
133,29,790
133,30,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10; Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1-2."
133,31,79 1
133,32,"Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 1; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 10."
133,33,792
133,34,"Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 7-8."
133,35,793
133,36,"Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4; Gordon 8/29/ 17 302, at 10."
133,37,794
133,38,"DENMAN 000001-02, DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22; Denman 12/4/ 17 302, at 1;"
133,39,"Denman 6/7 /17 302, at 2."
133,40,795
133,41,"DENMAN 000001-02 , DENMAN 000012, DENMAN 000021-22 ."
133,42,796
133,43,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 10-11."
133,44,797
133,45,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11; Gordon 2/14/19 302 , at 1-2, 5-6."
133,46,798
133,47,"Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 5-6."
133,48,799
133,49,"Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; see DENMAN 000014."
133,50,800
133,51,"Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2; Denman 12/4/ 17 302, at 2; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Hoff"
133,52,"5/26/17 302, at 2."
133,53,125
133,54,NA
134,1,U.S. Department of Justice
134,2,Attomey \Vork Prodttet // May Cofltaifl: Material Proteeted Uflcler Fecl. R. Griff!. P. 6(e)
134,3,"defensive weapons to Ukraine."" 801 Miller did not have any independent basis to believe that this"
134,4,language contradicted Trump's views and relied on Gordon's recollection of the candidate ' s
134,5,views. 802
134,6,"According to Denman, she spoke with Gordon and Matt Miller, and they told her that they"
134,7,"had to clear the language and that Gordon was ""talking to New York."" 803 Denman told others that"
134,8,"she was asked by the two Trump Campaign staffers to strike ""lethal defense weapons "" from the"
134,9,proposal but that she refused. 804 Demnan recalled Gordon saying that he was on the phone with
134,10,"candidate Trump, but she was skeptical whether that was true. 805 Gordon denied having told"
134,11,"Denman that he was on the phone with Trump, although he acknowledged it was possible that he"
134,12,mentioned having previously spoken to the candidate about the subject matter. 806 Gordon's phone
134,13,"records reveal a call to Sessions's office in Washington that afternoon, but do not include calls"
134,14,directly to a number associated with Trump. 807 And according to the President's written answers
134,15,"to the Office's questions, he does not recall being involved in the change in language of the"
134,16,platform amendment. 808
134,17,"Gordon stated that he tried to reach Rick Dearborn , a senior foreign policy advisor, and"
134,18,"Mashburn, the Campaign policy director. Gordon stated that he connected with both of them (he"
134,19,could not recall if by phone or in person) and apprised them of the language he took issue with in
134,20,the proposed amendment. Gordon recalled no objection by either Dearborn or Mashburn and that
134,21,"all three Campaign advisors supported the alternative formulation (""appropriate assistance ""). 809"
134,22,"Dearborn recalled Gordon warning them about the amendment, but not weighing in because"
134,23,Gordon was more familiar with the Campaign's foreign policy stance. 810 Mashburn stated that
134,24,"Gordon reached him, and he told Gordon that Trump had not taken a stance on the issue and that"
134,25,the Campaign should not intervene .811
134,26,"When the amendment came up again in the committee 's proceedings , the subcommittee"
134,27,"changed the amendment by striking the ""lethal defense weapons"" language and replacing it with"
134,28,80 1
134,29,"Denman 6/7/17 302, at 3."
134,30,802
134,31,M. Miller 10/25/ 17 302 at 3.
134,32,803
134,33,"Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2; Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2."
134,34,804
134,35,"Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2."
134,36,805
134,37,"Denman 6/7/17 302, at 2-3, 3-4; Denman 12/4/17 302, at 2."
134,38,806
134,39,"Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7."
134,40,807 Call Records of J.D. Gordon                                 . Gordon stated to the Office that
134,41,"his calls with Sessions were unrelated to the platform change. Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 7."
134,42,808
134,43,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV,"
134,44,Part (f)).
134,45,809
134,46,"Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6-7; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 11-12; see Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11."
134,47,810
134,48,"Dearborn 11/28/17 302, at 7-8."
134,49,811
134,50,"Mashburn 6/25/18 302, at 4."
134,51,126
134,52,NA
135,1,U.S. Department of Justice
135,2,Attomey 'Nork Prodttet // Ma-y Corttail'l.Material Prnteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
135,3,"""appropriate assistance."" 812 Gordon stated that he and the subcommittee co-chair ultimately"
135,4,"agreed to replace the language about armed assistance with ""appropriate assistance."" 8 13 The"
135,5,"subcommittee accordingly approved Denman's amendment but with the term ""appropriate"
135,6,"assistance."" 814 Gordon stated that, to his recollection, this was the only change sought by the"
135,7,"Campaign. 815 Sam Clovis, the Campaign's national co-chair and chief policy advisor , stated he"
135,8,was surprised by the change and did not believe it was in line with Trump's stance. 816 Mashburn
135,9,"stated that when he saw the word ""appropriate assistance, "" he believed that Gordon had violated"
135,10,Mashburn's directive not to intervene. 8 17
135,11,7. Post-Convention Contacts with Kislyak
135,12,Ambassador Kislyak continued his efforts to interact with Campaign officials with
135,13,responsibility for the foreign-policy portfolio-among them Sessions and Gordon-in the weeks
135,14,after the Convention. The Office did not identify evidence in those interactions of coordination
135,15,between the Campaign and the Russian government.
135,16,a. Ambassador Kislyak Invites J.D. Gordon to Breakfast at the Ambassador's
135,17,Residence
135,18,"On August 3, 2016, an official from the Embassy of the Russian Federation in the United"
135,19,"States wrote to Gordon "" [o]n behalf of' Ambassador Kislyak inviting Gordon ""to have"
135,20,"breakfast/tea with the Ambassador at his residence"" in Washington , D.C. the following week. 818"
135,21,"Gordon responded five days later to decline the invitation. He wrote, ""[t]hese days are not optimal"
135,22,"for us, as we are busily knocking down a constant stream of false media stories while also preparing"
135,23,for the first debate with HRC. Hope to take a raincheck for another time when things quiet down
135,24,"a bit. Please pass along my regards to the Ambassador ."" 819 The investigation did not identify"
135,25,evidence that Gordon made any other arrangements to meet (or met) with Kislyak after this email.
135,26,b. Senator Sessions's September 2016 Meeting with Ambassador Kislyak
135,27,"Also in August 2016, a representative of the Russian Embassy contacted Sessions' s Senate"
135,28,"office about setting up a meeting with Kislyak. 820 At the time, Sessions was a member of the"
135,29,812
135,30,"Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3; see Denman 12/4/ 17 302, at 2-3; Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11."
135,31,8 13
135,32,"Gordon 8/29/17 302, at 11; Gordon 9/7/17 302, at 12."
135,33,814
135,34,"Hoff 5/26/17 302, at 2-3."
135,35,81 5
135,36,"· Gordon 2/14/19 302, at 6."
135,37,816
135,38,"Clovis 10/3/17 302, at 10-11."
135,39,817
135,40,"Mashbu rn 6/25/18 302, at 4."
135,41,818
135,42,"DJTFP00004828 (8/3/16 Email, Pchelyakov [embassy @russianembassy.org] to Gordon)."
135,43,819
135,44,"DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to embassy@russianembassy.org)."
135,45,820
135,46,"Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5."
135,47,127
135,48,NA
136,1,U.S. Department of Justice
136,2,AMerttey Werk Predttet // May Cetttaitt MU-1:erial      Preteetea Uttaer Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
136,3,Senate Foreign Relations Committee and would meet with foreign officials in that capacity. 82 1 But
136,4,"Sessions's staff reported , and Sessions himself acknowledged , that meeting requests from"
136,5,"ambassadors increased substantially in 2016, as Sessions assumed a prominent role in the Trump"
136,6,Campaign and his name was mentioned for potential cabinet-level positions in a future
136,7,Trump Administration. 822
136,8,"On September 8, 2016 , Sessions met with Kislyak in his Senate office. 823 Sessions said"
136,9,"that he believed he was doing the Campaign a service by meeting with foreign ambassadors,"
136,10,including Kislyak. 824 He was accompanied in the meeting by at least two of his Senate staff:
136,11,"Sandra Luff , his legislative director; and Pete Landrum, who handled military affairs. 825 The"
136,12,meeting lasted less than 30 minutes. 826 Sessions voiced concerns about Russia's sale of a missile-
136,13,"defense system to Iran , Russian planes buzzing U.S. military assets in the Middle East, and Russian"
136,14,aggression in emerging democracies such as Ukraine and Moldova. 827 Kislyak offered
136,15,explanations on these issues and complained about NA TO land forces in former Soviet-bloc
136,16,countries that border Russia. 828 Landrum recalled that Kislyak referr ed to the presidential
136,17,"campaign as ""an interesting campaign,"" 829 and Sessions also recalled Kislyak saying that the"
136,18,Russian government was receptive to the overtures Trump had laid out during his campaign. 830
136,19,"None of the attendees, though, remembered any discussion of Russian election interference or any"
136,20,request that Sessions convey information from the Russian government to the Trump Campaign. 831
136,21,"During the meeting , Kislyak invited Sessions to further discuss U.S.-Russia relations with"
136,22,him over a meal at the ambassador's residence. 832 Sessions was non-committal when Kislyak
136,23,"extended the invitation. After the meeting ended , Luff advised Sessions again st accepting the one-"
136,24,"on-one meeting with Kislyak, whom she assessed to be an ""old school KGB guy."" 833 Neither Luff"
136,25,nor Landrum recalled that Sessions followed up on the invitation or mad e any further effort to dine
136,26,821
136,27,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5."
136,28,822
136,29,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23-24; Luff 1/30/ 18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 3-5."
136,30,823
136,31,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23."
136,32,824
136,33,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23."
136,34,825
136,35,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5-6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5 (stating he"
136,36,could not remember if election was discus sed).
136,37,826
136,38,"Luff 1/30/18 302 , at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5."
136,39,827
136,40,"Luff 1/30/ 18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5."
136,41,828
136,42,"Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302 at 4-5."
136,43,829
136,44,"Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 5."
136,45,830
136,46,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23. Sessions also noted that ambassadors came to him for information"
136,47,"about Trump and hoped he would pass along information to Trump. Sessions 1/17118 302, at 23-24."
136,48,831
136,49,"Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at 23; Luff 1/30/18 302 , at 6; Landrum 2/27 / l 8 302, at 5."
136,50,832
136,51,"Luff 1/30/ 18 302, at 5; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4."
136,52,833
136,53,"Luff 1/30/18 302, at 5."
136,54,128
136,55,NA
137,1,U.S. Department of Justice
137,2,Atterftey '+¥erk Prndttet // Miey Cefttttift Material Preteeted Uftder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
137,3,"or meet with Kislyak before the November 2016 election. 834 Sessions and Landrum recalled that ,"
137,4,"after the election , some efforts were made to arrange a meeting between Sessions and Kislyak. 835"
137,5,"According to Sessions, the request came through CNI and would have involved a meeting between"
137,6,"Sessions and Kislyak , two other ambassadors, and the Governor of Alabama. 836 Sessions,"
137,7,"however, was in New York on the day of the anticipated meeting and was unable to attend. 837 The"
137,8,investigation did not identify evidence that the two men met at any point after their September 8
137,9,meeting.
137,10,8. Paul Manafort
137,11,"Paul Manafort served on the Trump Campaign, including a period as campaign chairman,"
137,12,from March to August 2016. 838 Manafort had connections to Russia through his prior work for
137,13,Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska and later through his work for a pro-Russian regime in Ukraine.
137,14,Manafort stayed in touch with these contacts during the campaign period through Konstantin
137,15,"Kilimnik, a longtime Manafort employee who prev iously ran Manafort 's office in Kiev and who"
137,16,the FBI assesses to have ties to Russian intelligence.
137,17,"Manafort instructed Rick Gates, his deputy on the Campaign and a longtime employee ,839"
137,18,"to provide Kilimnik with updates on the Trump Campaign-including                       internal polling data ,"
137,19,although Manafort claims not to recall that specific instruction. Manafort expected Kilimnik to
137,20,share that information with others in Ukraine and with Deripaska . Gates periodically sent such
137,21,polling data to Kilimnik during the campaign.
137,22,834
137,23,"Luff 1/30/18 302, at 6; Landrum 2/27/18 302, at 4-5."
137,24,835
137,25,"Sessions 1/17/l 8 302, at 23."
137,26,836
137,27,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 23."
137,28,837
137,29,"Sessions 1/ 17/18 302, at 23."
137,30,838
137,31,"On August 21, 2018, Manafo1t was convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on eight tax,"
137,32,"Foreign Bank Account Registration (FBAR), and bank fraud charges. On September 14, 2018, Manafort"
137,33,pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and conspiracy to
137,34,"commit offenses against the United States (money laundering , tax fraud, FBAR, Foreign Agents"
137,35,"Registration Act (FARA), and FARA false statements), and (2) conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness"
137,36,tampering). Manafort also admitted criminal conduct with which he had been charged in the Eastern
137,37,"District of Virginia, but as to which the jury hung. The conduct at issue in both cases involved Manafort 's"
137,38,"work in Ukraine and the money he earned for that work , as well as crimes after the Ukraine work ended."
137,39,"On March 7, 2019, Manafort was sentenced to 47 months of imprisonment in the Virginia prosecution. On"
137,40,"March 13, the district court in D.C. sentenced Manafo1t to a total term of 73 months: 60 months on the"
137,41,"Count 1 conspiracy (with 30 of those months to run concurrent to the Virginia sentence), and 13 months on"
137,42,"the Count 1 conspiracy, to be served consecutive to the other two sentences. The two sentences resulted in"
137,43,a total term of 90 months.
137,44,839
137,45,"As noted in Volume I, Section III.D. l .b, supra, Gates pleaded guilty to two criminal charges in"
137,46,"the District of Columbia, including making a false statement to the FBI, pursuant to a plea agreement. He"
137,47,has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be reliable. See also
137,48,"Transcript at 16, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., l :17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 514"
137,49,"(""Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript"") (court 's explanation of reasons to credit Oates's statements in one"
137,50,instance).
137,51,129
137,52,NA
138,1,U.S. Department of Justice
138,2,"Atttm1ey Wark Pradttet /,' May Cal'l:taiflMatertal Prateetee Ul'l:eerFee. R. Crim. P . 6(e)"
138,3,Manafort also twice met Kilimnik in the United States during the campaign period and
138,4,"conveyed campaign information. The second meeting took place on August 2, 2016 , in New York"
138,5,City. Kilimnik requested the meeting to deliver in person a message from former Ukrainian
138,6,"President Viktor Y anukovych, who was then living in Russia. The message was about a peace"
138,7,"plan for Ukraine that Manafort has since acknowledged was a ""backdoor "" means for Russia to"
138,8,"control eastern Ukraine. Several months later, after the presidential election, Kilimnik wrote an"
138,9,email to Manafort expressing the view-which Manafort later said he shared-that the plan ' s
138,10,"success would require U.S. support to succeed: ""all that is required to start the process is a very"
138,11,"minor ' wink' (or slight push) from [Donald Trump ]."" 840 The email also stated that if Manafort"
138,12,"were designated as the U.S. representative and started the process, Yanukovych would ensure his"
138,13,"reception in Russia ""at the very top level."""
138,14,Manafort communicated with Kilimnik about peace plans for Ukraine on at least four
138,15,occasions after their first discussion of the topic on August 2: December 2016 (the Kilimnik email
138,16,described above); January 2017; February 2017; and again in the spring of 2018. The Office
138,17,"reviewed numerous Manafort email and text communications, and asked President Trump about"
138,18,the plan in written questions. 841 The investigation did not uncover evidence ofManafort's passing
138,19,along information about Ukrainian peace plans to the candidate or anyone else in the Campaign or
138,20,"the Administration. The Office was not , however, able to gain access to all of Manafort ' s"
138,21,"electronic communications (in some instances , messages were sent using encryption applications)."
138,22,And while Manafort denied that he spoke to members of the Trump Campaign or the new
138,23,"Administration about the peace plan, he lied to the Office and the grand jury about the peace plan"
138,24,"and his meetings with Kilimnik, and his unreliability on this subject was among the reasons that"
138,25,the district judge found that he breached his cooperation agreement. 842
138,26,The Office could not reliably determine Manafort's ur ose in sharin
138,27,with Kilimnik during the campaign period. Manafort                                                  did not see
138,28,"a downside to sharing campaign information , and told Gates that his role in the Campaign would"
138,29,Investigative Technique
138,30,.  .. . ..                 I   I' · .  .   •
138,31,841
138,32,"According to the President's written answers, he does not remember Manafort communicating"
138,33,to him any particular positions that Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to support. Written
138,34,"Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 16-17 (Response to Question IV, Part (d))."
138,35,842
138,36,"Manafort made several false statements during debriefings. Based on that conduct , the Office"
138,37,determined that Manafort had breached his plea agreement and could not be a cooperating witness. The
138,38,judge presiding in Manafort ' s D.C. criminal case found by a preponderance of the evidence that Manafort
138,39,"intentionally made multiple false statements to the FBI, the Office, and the grand jury concerning his"
138,40,interactions and communications with Kilimnik (and concerning two other issues). Although the report
138,41,"refers at times to Manafort' s statements , it does so only when those statements are sufficiently corroborated"
138,42,"to be trustworthy, to identify issues on which Manafort 's untruthful responses may themselves be of"
138,43,"evidentiary value, or to provide Manafort's explanations for certain events, even when we were unable to"
138,44,determine whether that explanation was credible.
138,45,130
138,46,NA
139,1,U.S. Department of Justice
139,2,"AtterHey Werk Predttet // Mtt:,·CeAtttiHMttterittl Prnteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
139,3,"be ""good for business "" and potentially a way to be made whole for work he previously completed"
139,4,"in the Ukraine. As to Deripaska, Manafort claimed that by sharing campaign information with"
139,5,"him, Deripaska might see value in their relationship and resolve a ""disagreement""-a reference to"
139,6,one or more outstanding lawsuits. Because of questions about Manafort ' s credibility and our
139,7,"limited ability to gather evidence on what happened to the polling data after it was sent to Kilimnik,"
139,8,the Office could not assess what Kilimnik (or others he may have given it to) did with it. The
139,9,Office did not identify evidence of a connection between Manafort ' s sharing polling data and
139,10,"Russia's interference in the election, which had already been reported by U.S. media outlets at the"
139,11,time of the August 2 meeting. The investigation did not establish that Manafort otherwise
139,12,coordinated with the Russian government on its election-interference efforts.
139,13,a. Paul Manafort's Ties to Russia and Ukraine
139,14,Manafort' s Russian contacts during the campaign and transition periods stem from his
139,15,consulting work for Deripaska from approximately 2005 to 2009 and his separate political
139,16,"consulting work in Ukraine from 2005 to 2015, including through his company Dl\1P International"
139,17,LLC (DMI). Kilimnik worked for Manafort in Kiev during this entire period and continued to
139,18,"communicate with Manafort through at least June 2018. Kilimnik, who speaks and writes"
139,19,"Ukrain ian and Russian, facilitated many of Manafort's communications with Deripaska and"
139,20,Ukrainian oligarchs.
139,21,i.    Oleg Deripaska Consulting Work
139,22,"In approximately 2005, Manafort began working for Deripaska, a Russian oligarch who"
139,23,has a global empire involving aluminum and power companies and who is closely aligned with
139,24,Vladimir Putin. 843 A memorandum describing work that Manafort performed for Deripaska in
139,25,2005 regarding the post-Soviet republics referenced the need to brief the Kremlin and the benefits
139,26,"that the work could confer on ""the Putin Government."" 844 Gates described the work Manafort did"
139,27,"for Deripaska as ""political risk insurance ,"" and explained that Deripaska used Manafort to install"
139,28,friendly political officials in countries where Deripaska had business interests. 845 Manafort's
139,29,company earned tens of millions of dollars from its work for Deripaska and was loaned millions
139,30,of dollars by Deripaska as well. 846
139,31,"In 2007, Deripaska invested through another entity in Pericles Emerging Market Partners"
139,32,"L.P. (""Pericles""), an investment fund created by Manafort and former Manafort business partner"
139,33,Richard Davis. The Pericles fund was estab lished to pursue investments in Eastern Europe. 847
139,34,Deripaska was the sole investor. 848 Gates stated in interviews with the Office that the venture led
139,35,843
139,36,"Pinchuk et al., Russian Tycoon Deripask a in Putin Delegation to China, Reuters (June 8, 2018)."
139,37,844
139,38,"6/23/05 Memo, Manafort & Davis to Deripaska & Rothchild."
139,39,845
139,40,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 7."
139,41,846
139,42,"Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2-5; Manafort Income by Year , 2005 - 2015; Manafort Loans from"
139,43,"Wire Transfers, 2005 - 2015."
139,44,847
139,45,"Gates 3/12/18 302, at 5."
139,46,848
139,47,"Manafort 12/16/15 Dep., at 157:8-11."
139,48,131
139,49,NA
140,1,U.S. Department of Justice
140,2,Att6mey W6rk Prndttet // Miey Cmitaitt Material Preteeted Umier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
140,3,"to a deterioration of the relationship between Manafort and Deripaska. 849 In pa1ticular, when the"
140,4,"fund failed, litigation between Manafort and Deripaska ensued. Gates stated that, by 2009,"
140,5,"Manafort's business relationship with Deripaska had ""dried up ."" 850 According to Gates , various"
140,6,interactions with Deripaska and his intermediaries over the past few years have involved trying to
140,7,"resolve the legal dispute. 851 As described below, in 2016, Manafort, Gates, Kilimnik, and others"
140,8,engaged in efforts to revive the Deripaska relationship and resolve the litigation.
140,9,ii.   Political Consulting Work
140,10,"Through Deripaska, Manafort was introduced to Rinat Akhmetov , a Ukrainian oligarch"
140,11,"who hired Manafort as a political consultant. 852 In 2005, Akhmetov hired Manafort to engage in"
140,12,"political work supporting the Party of Regions, 853 a political party in Ukraine that was generally"
140,13,"understood to align with Russia. Manafort assisted the Party of Regions in regaining power , and"
140,14,"its candidate , Viktor Yanukovych , won the presidency in 2010. Manafort became a close and"
140,15,trusted political advisor to Y anukovych during his time as President of Ukraine. Yanukovych
140,16,"served in that role until 2014, when he fled to Russia amidst popular protests. 854"
140,17,iii.   Konstantin Kilimnik
140,18,Kilimnik is a Russian national who has lived in both Russia and Ukraine and was a
140,19,longtime Manafort employee. 855 Kilimnik had direct and close access to Yanukovych and his
140,20,"senior entourage, and he facilitated communications between Manafort and his clients, including"
140,21,Yanukovych and multiple Ukrainian oligarchs. 856 Kilimnik also maintained a relationship with
140,22,"Deripaska's deputy, Viktor Boyarkin, 857 a Russian national who previously served in the defense"
140,23,attache office of the Russian Embassy to the United States .858
140,24,849
140,25,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9."
140,26,850
140,27,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 6."
140,28,851
140,29,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 9-10."
140,30,852
140,31,"Manafort 7 /30/14 302, at 1; Manafort 9/20/18 302, at 2."
140,32,853
140,33,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5-6."
140,34,854
140,35,"Gates 3/16/18 302 , at 1; Davis 2/8/18 302, at 9; Devine 7/6/18 302, at 2-3."
140,36,855
140,37,"Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; 10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record , U.S."
140,38,Department of State.
140,39,856
140,40,"Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18-19; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8; Gates 1/3 1/18 302, at 4-5; Gates 1/30/18"
140,41,"302, at 2; Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11."
140,42,857
140,43,"Gates 1/29/18 302, at 18; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 8."
140,44,858
140,45,"Boyarkin Visa Record, U.S. Department of State."
140,46,132
140,47,NA
141,1,U.S. Department of Justice
141,2,Atlerney Werlt Predttet // Mtty Centttin Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
141,3,Manafort told the Office that he did not believe Kilimnik was working as a Russian
141,4,"""spy .""859 The FBI, however, assesses that Kilimnik has ties to Russian intelligence. 860 Several"
141,5,pieces of the Office ' s evidence-including witness interviews and emails obtained through court-
141,6,authorized search warrants-support that assessment:
141,7,"•   Kilimnik was born on April 27, 1970, in Dnipropetrovsk Ob last, then of the Soviet Union ,"
141,8,and attended the Military Institute of the Ministry of Defense from 1987 until 1992 .861 Sam
141,9,"Patten, a business partner to Kilimnik, 862 stated that Kilimnik told him that he was a"
141,10,translator in the Russian army for seven years and that he later worked in the Russian
141,11,armament industry selling arms and military equipment. 863
141,12,•   U.S. government visa records reveal that Kilimnik obtained a visa to travel to the United
141,13,States with a Russian diplomatic passport in 1997. 864
141,14,"•   Kilimnik worked for the International Republican Institute' s (IRI) Moscow office , where"
141,15,he did translation work and general office management from 1998 to 2005. 865 While
141,16,"another official recalled the incident differently ,866 one former associate of Kilimnik's at"
141,17,TRI told the FBI that Kilimnik was fired from his post because his links to Russian
141,18,intelligence were too strong. The same individual stated that it was well known at IRI that
141,19,Kilimnik had links to the Russian government. 867
141,20,"•   Jonathan Hawker, a British national who was a public relations consultant at FTI"
141,21,"Consulting , worked with DMI on a public relations campaign for Yanukovych. After"
141,22,"Hawker ' s work for DMI ended, Kilimnik contacted Hawker about working for a Russian"
141,23,859
141,24,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5."
141,25,860
141,26,The Office has noted Kilimnik's assessed ties to Russian intelligence in public court filings.
141,27,"E.g. , Gov't Opp . to Mot. to Modify, United States v. Paul J Manafort , Jr ., 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C . Dec. 4,"
141,28,"2017), Doc. 73, at 2 (""Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify"")."
141,29,861
141,30,"12/17/16 Kilimnik Visa Record, U.S. Department of State."
141,31,862
141,32,"In August 2018, Patten pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating the Foreign"
141,33,"Agents Registration Act, and admitted in his Statement of Offense that he also misled and withheld"
141,34,documents from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the course of its investigation of Russian
141,35,"election interference. Plea Agreement, United States v. W. Samu el Patten , 1: 18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,"
141,36,"2018) , Doc. 6; Statement of Offense, United States v. W. Samuel Patten, 1:18-cr-260 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,"
141,37,"2018), Doc. 7."
141,38,863
141,39,"Patten 5/22/18 302, at 5-6."
141,40,864
141,41,"10/28/97 Kilimnik Visa Record , U.S. Department of State."
141,42,865
141,43,"Nix 3/30/18 302, at 1-2."
141,44,866
141,45,"Nix 3/30/18 302, at 2."
141,46,867
141,47,"Lenzi 1/30/18 302, at 2."
141,48,133
141,49,NA
142,1,U.S. Department of Justice
142,2,"Attet'tle)' Werk Predttet /,' Mtty Cefl:tttil'lMttterittl Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e)"
142,3,"government entity on a public -relations project that would promote, in Western and"
142,4,"Ukrainian media, Russia's position on its 2014 invasion of Crimea. 868"
142,5,"•   Gates suspected that Kilimnik was a ""spy ,"" a view that he shared with Manafort , Hawker,"
142,6,"and Alexander van der Zwaan, 869 an attorney who had worked with DMI on a report for"
142,7,the Ukrainian Ministry of ForeignAffairs. 870
142,8,Investigative Technique
142,9,b. Contacts during Paul Manafort's Time with the Trump Campaign
142,10,i. Paul Manafort Joins the Campaign
142,11,"Manafort served on the Trump Campaign from late March to August 19, 2016. On March"
142,12,"29, 2016, the Campaign announced that Manafort would serve as the Campaign's ""C onvention"
142,13,"Manager."" 871 On May 19, 2016 , Manafort was promoted to campaign chairman and chief"
142,14,"strategist, and Gates, who had been assisting Manafort on the Campaign, was appointed deputy"
142,15,campaign chairman. 872
142,16,Thomas Barrack and Roger Stone both recommended Manafort to candidate Trump. 873 In
142,17,"early 2016 , at Manafort ' s request, Barrack suggested to Trump that Mana fort join the Campaign"
142,18,to manage the Republican Convention. 874 Stone had worked with Manafort from approximately
142,19,1980 until the mid- l 990s through various consulting and lobbying firms. Manafort met Trump in
142,20,"1982 when Trump hired the Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly lobbying firm. 875 Over the years,"
142,21,"Manafort saw Trump at political and social events in New York City and at Stone's wedding, and"
142,22,Trump requested VIP status at the 1988 and 1996 Republican conventions worked by Manafort. 876
142,23,868
142,24,"Hawker 1/9/18 302, at 13; 3/18/14 Email, Hawker & Tulukbaev."
142,25,869
142,26,van der Zwaan pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to making
142,27,"false statements to the Special Counsel's Office. Plea Agreement, United States v. Alex van der Zwaan,"
142,28,"1:18-cr-31 (D.D.C. Feb. 20, 2018), Doc. 8."
142,29,870
142,30,"Hawker 6/9/18 302, at 4; van der Zwaan 11/3/17 302, at 22. Manafort said in an interview that"
142,31,Gates had joked with Kilimnik about Kilimnik's going to meet with his KGB handler. Manafort 10/16/18
142,32,"302, at 7."
142,33,871
142,34,"Press Release-DonaldJ. Trump Announces Campaign Convention Manager PaulJ. Manafort ,"
142,35,"The American Presidency Project - U.C. Santa Barbara (Mar. 29, 2016)."
142,36,872
142,37,"Gates 1/29/18 302, at 8; Meghan Keneally, Timeline of Manafo rt 's role in the Trump Campaign,"
142,38,"ABC News (Oct. 20, 2017)."
142,39,873
142,40,"Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8; Manafort 9/1 1/18 302, at 1-2; Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3."
142,41,874
142,42,"Barrack 12/12/17 302, at 3; Gates 1/29/18 302, at 7-8."
142,43,875
142,44,"Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6."
142,45,876
142,46,"Manafort 10/16/18 302, at 6."
142,47,134
142,48,NA
143,1,U.S. Department of Justice
143,2,MterHe5\Vefk Preclttet// P..4ey    CetttoiH~4ftteria:l  ProteeteclUttelerFet1.R. Crim.P. 6(e)
143,3,"According to Gates, in March 2016, Manafort traveled to Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate in"
143,4,Florida to meet with Trump. Trump hired him at that time. 877 Manafort agreed to work on the
143,5,"Campaign without pay. Manafort had no meaningful income at this point in time, but resuscitating"
143,6,his domestic political campaign career could be financially beneficial in the future. Gates reported
143,7,"that Manafort intended, if Trump won the Presidency, to remain outside the Administration and"
143,8,monetize his relationship with the Administration. 878
143,9,ii. Paul Manafort's Campaign-Period         Contacts
143,10,"Immediately upon joining the Campaign, Manafort directed Gates to prepare for his review"
143,11,"separate memoranda addressed to Deripaska, Akhmetov, Serhiy Lyovochkin, and Boris"
143,12,"Kolesnikov, 879 the last three being Ukrainian oligarchs who were senior Opposition Bloc"
143,13,officials. 880 The memoranda described Manafort' s appointment to the Trump Campaign and
143,14,"indicated his willingness to consult on Ukrainian politics in the future. On March 30, 2016, Gates"
143,15,emailed the memoranda and a press release announcing Manafort' s appointment to Kilimnik for
143,16,translation and dissemination. 881 Manafort later followed up with Kilimnik to ensure his messages
143,17,"had been delivered, emailing on April 11, 2016 to ask whether Kilimnik had shown ""our friends"""
143,18,"the media coverage of his new role. 882 Kilimnik replied, ""Absolutely. Every article."" Manafort"
143,19,"further asked: ""How do we use to get whole. Has Ovd [Oleg Vladimirovich Deripaska] operation"
143,20,"seen?"" Kilimnik wrote back the same day, ""Yes, I have been sending everything to Victor"
143,21,"[Boyarkin, Deripaska's deputy], who has been forwarding the coverage directly to OVD."" 883"
143,22,"Gates reported that Manafort said that being hired on the Campaign would be ""good for"
143,23,"business"" and increase the likelihood that Manafort would be paid the approximately $2 million"
143,24,he was owed for previous political consulting work in Ukraine. 884 Gates also explained to the
143,25,"Office that Manafort thought his role on the Campaign could help ""confirm"" that Deripaska had"
143,26,"dropped the Pericles lawsuit, and that Gates believed Manafort sent polling data to Deripaska ( as"
143,27,877
143,28,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at IO."
143,29,878
143,30,"Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4."
143,31,879
143,32,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11."
143,33,0
143,34,"""   See Sharon LaFraniere, Manafort's Trial Isn't About Russia, but It Will Be in the Air, New York"
143,35,"Times (July 30, 2018); Tierney Sneed, Prosecutors Believe Manafort Made $60 Million Consulting in"
143,36,"Ukraine, Talking Points Memo (July 30, 2018); Mykola Vorobiov, How Pro-Russian Forces_ Will Take"
143,37,"Revenge on Ukraine, Atlantic Council (Sept. 23, 2018); Sergii Leshchenko, Ukraine's Oligarchs Are Still"
143,38,"Calling the Shots, Foreign Policy (Aug. 14, 2014); Interfax-Ukraine, Kolesnikov: Inevitability of"
143,39,"Punishment Needed for Real Fight Against Smuggling in Ukraine, Kyiv Post (June 23, 2018); Igor Kossov,"
143,40,"Kyiv Hotel Industry Makes Room for New Entrants, Kyiv Post (Mar. 7, 2019); Markian Kuzmowycz, How"
143,41,"the Kremlin Can Win Ukraine's Elections, Atlantic Council (Nov. 19, 2018). The Opposition Bloc is a"
143,42,Ukraine political party that largely reconstituted the Party of Regions.
143,43,881
143,44,"3/30/16 Email, Gates to Kilimnik."
143,45,882
143,46,"4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik."
143,47,883
143,48,"4/11/16 Email, Manafort & Kilimnik."
143,49,884
143,50,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 10."
143,51,135
143,52,NA
144,1,U.S. Department of Justice
144,2,Attort'ley 'Nork Prodttet // Mf:l-)CoFttatFtMaterial Proteeted UFtderFee. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e)
144,3,1
144,4,discussed further below) so that Deripaska would not move forward with his lawsuit against
144,5,"Manafort .885 Gates further stated that Deripaska wanted a visa to the United States, that Deripaska"
144,6,could believe that having Manafort in a position inside the Campaign or Administration might be
144,7,"helpful to Deripaska, and that Manafort's relationship with Trump could help Deripaska in other"
144,8,"ways as well. 886 Gates stated, however, that Manafort never told him anything specific about what,"
144,9,"if anything, Manafort might be offering Deripaska. 887"
144,10,Gates also reported that Manafort instructed him in April 2016 or early May 2016 to send
144,11,"Kilimnik Campaign internal polling data and other updates so that Kilimnik, in turn , could share"
144,12,it with Ukrainian oli archs. 888 Gates understood that the information would also be shared with
144,13,Deripaska                                                                 .889 Gates reported to the Office
144,14,"that he did not know why Manafort wanted him to send polling information , but Gates thought it"
144,15,"was a way to showcase Manafort 's work, and Manafort wanted to open doors to jobs after the"
144,16,Trump Campaign ended. 890 Gates said that Manafort 's instruction included sending internal
144,17,polling data prepared for the Trump Campaign by pollster Tony Fabrizio. 891 Fabrizio had worked
144,18,"with Manafort for years and was brought into the Campaign by Manafort . Gates stated that , in"
144,19,"accordance with Manafort's instruction , he periodically sent Kilimnik polling data via WhatsApp ;"
144,20,"Gates then deleted the communications on a daily basis. 892 Gates further told the Office that , after"
144,21,"Manafort left the Campaign in mid-August , Gates sent Kilimnik polling data less frequently and"
144,22,that the data he sent was more publicly available information and less internal data. 893
144,23,with multiple emails that
144,24,Kilimnik sent to U.S. associates and press contacts between late July and mid-August of 2016.
144,25,"Those emails referenced ""internal polling, "" described the status of the Trump Campaign and"
144,26,885
144,27,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 11; Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2."
144,28,886
144,29,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12."
144,30,887
144,31,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 12."
144,32,"888 Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17; Gates 9/27 / 18 302 (serial 740), at 2. In a later interview with the"
144,33,"Office, Gates stated that Manafmt directed him to send polling data to Kilimnik after a May 7, 2016 meeting"
144,34,"between Manafmt and Kilimnik in New York, discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.8.b.iii , infra. Gates"
144,35,"11/7/18 302, at 3."
144,36,889
144,37,"Gates 9/27/18 302, Part II, at 2;"
144,38,890
144,39,"Gates 2/12/18 302, at 10; Gates 1/3 1/18 302 , at 17."
144,40,891
144,41,"Gates 9/27/18 302 (serial 740), at 2; Gates 2/7/18 302, at 15."
144,42,892
144,43,"Gates 1/31/18 302, at 17."
144,44,893
144,45,"Gates 2/12/18 302, at 11-12. According to Gates, his access to internal polling data was more"
144,46,limited because Fabrizio was himself distanced from the Campaign at that point.
144,47,894
144,48,136
144,49,NA
145,1,U.S. Department of Justice
145,2,AttofHey Wofk Pfotlttet // Mtty CoHtttiHMttterittlProteetetl UHtler Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
145,3,and assessed Trump ' s prospects for
145,4,"Gates to send Kilimnik internal data,"
145,5,The Office also obtained contemporaneous emails that shed light on the purpose of the
145,6,"communications with Deripaska and that are consistent with Gates ' s account. For example , in"
145,7,"response to a July 7, 20 I 6, email from a Ukrainian reporter about Manafort ' s failed Deripaska-"
145,8,"backed investment, Manafort asked Kilimnik whether there had been any movement on ""this issue"
145,9,"with our friend. "" 897 Gates stated that ""our friend"" likely referred to Deripaska ,898 and Manafort"
145,10,"told the Office that the ""issue"" (and ""our biggest interest ,"" as stated below) was a solution to the"
145,11,Deripaska-Pericles issue. 899 Kilimnik replied:
145,12,I am carefully optimistic on the question of our biggest interest.
145,13,Our friend [Boyarkin] said there is lately significantly more attention to the campaign in
145,14,"his boss' [Deripaska ' s] mind, and he will be most likely looking for ways to reach out to"
145,15,"you pretty soon, understanding all the time sensitivity. I am more than sure that it will be"
145,16,resolved and we will get back to the original relationship with V. 's boss [Deripaska]. 900
145,17,"Eight minutes later, Manafort replied that Kilimnik should tell Boyarkin's ""boss ,"" a reference to"
145,18,"Deripaska , ""that if he needs private briefings we can accommodate. "" 901 Manafort has alleged to"
145,19,the Office that he was willing to brief Deripaska only on public campaign matters and gave an
145,20,example: why Trump selected Mike Pence as the Vice-Presidential running mate. 902 Manafort
145,21,"said he never gave Deripaska a briefing. 903 Manafort noted that if Trump won , Deripaska would"
145,22,want to use Manafort to advance whate ver interests Deripaska had in the United States and
145,23,elsewhere. 904
145,24,895
145,25,"8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Dirkse; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Schultz; 8/18/ 16 Email, Kilimnik"
145,26,"to Marson; 7/27/ 16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Ash; 8/ 18/ 16 Email, Kilimnik to"
145,27,"Jackson; 8/18/16 Email, Kilimnik to Mendoza-Wilson; 8/19/ 16 Email, Kilimnik to Patten."
145,28,896
145,29,897
145,30,"7/7/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik."
145,31,898
145,32,"Gates 2/2/18 302, at 13."
145,33,899
145,34,"Manafort 9/ 11/18 302, at 6."
145,35,900
145,36,"7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort."
145,37,901
145,38,"7/8/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort; Gates 2/2/18 302 , at 13."
145,39,902
145,40,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6."
145,41,903
145,42,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6."
145,43,904
145,44,"Manafort 9/ 11/ 18 302, at 6."
145,45,137
145,46,NA
146,1,U.S. Department of Justice
146,2,AtierHe;· 'Nerk Pretittet // May CeHtaifl Material Preteeteti UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
146,3,iii. Paul Manafort's Two Campaign-Period Meetings with Konstantin Kilimnik
146,4,in the United States
146,5,Manafort twice met with Kilimnik in person during the campaign period-once in May
146,6,"and again in August 2016. The first meeting took place on May 7, 2016, in New York City. 905 In"
146,7,"the days leading to the meeting, Kilimnik had been working to gather information about the"
146,8,political situation in Ukraine. That included information gleaned from a trip that former Party of
146,9,Regions official Yuriy Boyko had recently taken to Moscow-a trip that likely included meetings
146,10,"between Boyko and high-ranking Russian officials. 906 Kilimnik then traveled to Washington, D.C."
146,11,"on or about May 5, 2016; while in Washington , Kilimnik had pre-arranged meetings with State"
146,12,Department employees. 907
146,13,"Late on the evening of May 6, Gates arranged for Kilimnik to take a 3:00 a.m. train to meet"
146,14,"Mana fort in New York for breakfast on May 7.908 According to Manafort, during the meeting , he"
146,15,"and Kilimnik talked about events in Ukraine, and Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the Trump"
146,16,"Campaign, expecting Kilimnik to pass the information back to individuals in Ukraine and"
146,17,elsewhere. 909 Manafort stated that Opposition Bloc members recognized Manafort ' s position on
146,18,°
146,19,"the Campaign was an opportunity, but Kilimnik did not ask for anything. 91 Kilimnik spoke about"
146,20,"a plan of Boyko to boost election participation in the eastern zone of Ukraine, which was the base"
146,21,"for the Opposition Bloc. 911 Kilimnik returned to Washington, D.C. right after the meeting with"
146,22,Manafort.
146,23,Manafort met with Kilimnik a second time at the Grand Havana Club in New York City
146,24,"on the evening of August 2, 2016 . The events leading to the meeting are as follows. On July 28,"
146,25,"2016, Kilimnik flew from Kiev to Moscow .912 The next day, Kilimnik wrote to Manafort"
146,26,"requesting that they meet, using coded language about a conversation he had that day. 913 In an"
146,27,"email with a subject line ""Black Caviar,"" Kilimnik wrote:"
146,28,I met today with the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar several years ago. We
146,29,"spent about 5 hours talking about his story , and I have several important messages from"
146,30,him to you. He asked me to go and brief you on our conversation. I said I have to run it
146,31,"by you first, but in principle I am prepared to do it. ... It has to do about the future of his"
146,32,905  Investigative Technique
146,33,906
146,34,"4/26/16 Email, Kilimnik to Purcell , at 2; Gates 2/2/ 18 302, at 12; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 6-7;"
146,35,"Gates 11/7/18 302, at 3."
146,36,"907  5/7/16 Email, Kilimnik to Charap & Kimmage; 5/7/16 Email, Kasanofto Kilimnik."
146,37,908
146,38,"5/6/16 Email, Manafort to Gates; 5/6/16 Email , Gates to Kilimnik ."
146,39,909
146,40,"Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1."
146,41,910
146,42,"Manafort 10/ 11/18 302, at 1."
146,43,91 1
146,44,"Manafort 10/11/18 302, at 1."
146,45,912
146,46,"7/25/16 Email, Kilimnik to katrin@yana.kiev.ua (2: 17:34 a.m.)."
146,47,913
146,48,"7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.111.)."
146,49,138
146,50,NA
147,1,U.S. Department of Justice
147,2,"Attorttey Work Prodttet // Mtt, CoHtttiHMttterittl Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
147,3,"country , and is quite interesting. 914"
147,4,"Manafort identified ""the guy who gave you your biggest black caviar jar"" as Yanukovych. He"
147,5,"explained that, in 2010 , he and Yanukovych had lunch to celebrate the recent presidential election."
147,6,"Yanukovych gave Manafort a large jar of black caviar that was worth approximately $30,000 to"
147,7,"$40,000. 915 Manafort's identification ofYanukovych as ""the guy who gave you your biggest black"
147,8,"caviar jar"" is consistent with Kilimnik being in Moscow-where Yanukovych resided-when"
147,9,"Kilimnik wrote ""I met today with~                                a December 2016 email in which Kilimnik"
147,10,916
147,11,"referred to Yanukovych as ""BG,""-                                     Manafort replied to Kilimnik's July 29"
147,12,"email, ""Tuesday [August 2] is best . .. Tues or weds in NYC."" 9 17"
147,13,"Three days later, on July 31, 2016, Kilimnik flew back to Kiev from Moscow, and on that"
147,14,"same day, wrote to Manafort that he needed ""about 2 hours"" for their meeting ""because it is a long"
147,15,"caviar story to tell."" 918 Kilimnik wrote that he would arrive at JFK on August 2 at 7:30 p.m., and"
147,16,"he and Manafort agreed to a late dinner that night. 919 Documentary evidence- including flight,"
147,17,"phone, and hotel records, and the timing of text messages exchanged 920-confirms the dinner took"
147,18,place as planned on August 2.921
147,19,"As to the contents of the meeting itself, the accounts of Manafort and Gates-who arrived"
147,20,"late to the dinner-differ in certain respects. But their versions of events, when assessed alongside"
147,21,"available documentary evidence and what Kilimnik told business associate Sam Patten, indicate"
147,22,that at least three principal topics were discussed.
147,23,"First, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed a plan to resolve the ongoing political problems in"
147,24,"Ukraine by creating an autonomous republic in its more industrialized eastern region ofDonbas, 922"
147,25,914
147,26,"7/29/16 Email, Kilimnik to Manafort (10:51 a.m.)."
147,27,915
147,28,"Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 3."
147,29,916
147,30,"7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik; Investigative Technique"
147,31,917
147,32,"7/29/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik."
147,33,918
147,34,"7/31/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik."
147,35,919
147,36,"7/3 1/16 Email, Manafort to Kilimnik."
147,37,92
147,38,° Kilimnik 8/2/16 CBP Record; Call Records of Konstantin Kilimnik
147,39,"-     ; Call Records of Rick Gates                                         ; 8/2-3/ 16, Kilimnik Park Lane Hotel"
147,40,Receipt.
147,41,921
147,42,Deripaska ' s private plane also flew to Teterboro Airport in New Jersey on the evening of August
147,43,"2, 2016. According to Customs and Border Protection records , the only passengers on the plane were"
147,44,"Deripaska's wife, daughter , mother, and father-in-law, and separate records obtained by our Office confirm"
147,45,that Kilimnik flew on a commercial flight to New York.
147,46,922
147,47,"The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics , which are located in the Donbas region of"
147,48,"Ukraine, declared themselves independent in response to the popular unrest in 2014 that removed President"
147,49,"Yanukovych from power. Pro-Russian Ukrainian militia forces, with backing from the Russian military ,"
147,50,"have occupied the region since 2014. Under the Yanukovych-backed plan, Russia would assist in"
147,51,"withdrawing the military, and Donbas would become an autonomous region within Ukraine with its own"
147,52,139
147,53,NA
148,1,U.S. Department of Justice
148,2,Attomey Work Pt1oduet// Mtty Cottt:tttttMttt:erittlPfet:eet:edUttdet' Fed. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e)
148,3,"and having Yanukovych, the Ukrainian President ousted in 2014 , elected to head that republic. 923"
148,4,"That plan, Manafort later acknowledged, constituted a ""backdoor"" means for Russia to control"
148,5,"eastern Ukraine. 924 Manafort initially said that, if he had not cut off the discussion, Kilimnik would"
148,6,have asked Manafort in the August 2 meeting to convince Trump to come out in favor of the peace
148,7,"plan, and Yanukovych would have expected Manafort to use his connections in Europe and"
148,8,Ukraine to support the plan. 925 Manafort also initially told the Office that he had said to Kilimnik
148,9,"that the plan was crazy, that the discussion ended, and that he did not recall Kilimnik askin"
148,10,Manafort to reconsider the Ian after their Au ust 2 meetin .926 Manafort said
148,11,"that he reacted negatively to Yanukovych sending-years later-an ""urgent"""
148,12,request when Yanukovych needed him. 927 When confronted with an email written by Kilimnik on
148,13,"or about December 8, 2016, however, Manafort acknowledged Kilimnik raised the peace plan"
148,14,again in that email. 928 Manafort ultimately acknowled ed Kilimnik also raised the eace Ian in
148,15,~ary                           2017 meetings with Manafort
148,16,..........                929
148,17,"Second, Manafort briefed Kilimnik on the state of the Trump Campaign and Manafort's"
148,18,plan to win the election. 930 That briefing encompassed the Campaign's messaging and its internal
148,19,"polling data . According to Gates, it also included discussion of ""battleground"" states , which"
148,20,"Manafort identified as Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota. 931 Manafort did not"
148,21,"refer ex licit! to ""battle round "" states in his tellin of the Au ust 2 discussion,"
148,22,prime minister. The plan emphasized that Yanukovych would be an ideal candidate to bring peace to the
148,23,"region as prime minister of the republic, and facilitate the reintegration of the re~aine             with the"
148,24,"support of the U.S. and Russian presidents. As noted above, according to ~ the written"
148,25,"documentation describin the Ian, for the lan to work, both U.S. and Russian support were necessary."
148,26,"2/21/18 Email, Manafort, Ward, & Fabrizio, at 3-5."
148,27,925
148,28,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 4."
148,29,926
148,30,"Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4."
148,31,927
148,32,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/12/18"
148,33,"302, at 4."
148,34,928
148,35,"Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 4; Investigative Technique"
148,36,929
148,37,Documentary
148,38,"evidence confirms the peace-plan discus~ionsin 2018. 2/19/18 Email, Fabrizio to Ward (forwarding email"
148,39,"from Manafort); 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio."
148,40,930
148,41,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5."
148,42,931
148,43,"Gates 1/30/18 302 , at 3, 5."
148,44,932
148,45,140
148,46,NA
149,1,U.S. Department of Justice
149,2,"Attoft'le'.y"""
149,3,Wofk Prodttet // Mfl') Cotttaitt Material Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
149,4,1
149,5,"Third , according to Gates and what Kilimnik told Patten, Manafort and Kilimnik discussed"
149,6,two sets of financial disputes related to Mana fort's previous work in the region. Those consisted
149,7,of the unresolved Deripaska lawsuit and the funds that the Opposition Bloc owed to Manafort for
149,8,his political consulting work and how Manafort might be able to obtain payment. 933
149,9,"After the meeting, Gates and Manafort both. stated that they left separately from Kilimnik"
149,10,because they knew the media was tracking Manafort and wanted to avoid media reporting on his
149,11,connections to Kilimnik. 934
149,12,c. Post-Resignation Activities
149,13,"Manafort resigned from the Trump Campaign in mid-August 2016, approximately two"
149,14,"weeks after his second meeting with Kilimnik, amidst negative media reporting about his political"
149,15,"consulting work for the pro-Russian Party of Regions in Ukraine. Despite his resignation,"
149,16,Manafort continued to offer advice to various Campaign officials through the November election.
149,17,"Manafort told Gates that he still spoke with Kushner, Bannon, and candidate Trump, 935 and some"
149,18,"of those post-resignation contacts are documented in emails. For example, on October 21, 2016,"
149,19,Manafort sent Kushner an email and attached a strategy memorandum proposing that the
149,20,"Campaign make the case against Clinton ""as the failed and corrupt champion of the establishment """
149,21,"and that ""Wikileaks provides the Trump campaign the ability to make the case in a very credible"
149,22,"way - by using the words of Clinton, its campaign officials and DNC members .""936 Later, in a"
149,23,"November 5, 2016 email to Kushner entitled ""Securing the Victory,"" Manafort stated that he was"
149,24,"""really feeling good about our prospects on Tuesday and focusing on preserving the victory,"" and"
149,25,"that he was concerned the Clinton Campaign would respond to a loss by ""mov[ing] immediately"
149,26,"to discredit the [Trump] victory and claim voter fraud and cyber-fraud, including the claim that"
149,27,"the Russians have hacked into the voting machines and tampered with the results.""937"
149,28,"Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Manafort told the Office that, in the"
149,29,"wake of Trump's victory, he was not interested in an Administration job. Manafort instead"
149,30,"preferred to stay on the ""outside,"" and monetize his campaign position to generate business given"
149,31,his familiarity and relationship with Trump and the incoming Administration. 938 Manafort
149,32,"appeared to follow that plan, as he traveled to the Middle East, Cuba, South Korea, Japan, and"
149,33,China and was paid to explain what a Trump presidency would entaii. 939
149,34,Manafort' s activities in early 20 17 included meetings relating to Ukraine and Russia. The
149,35,9 33
149,36,"Gates 1/30/ 18 302, at 2-4; Patten 5/22/18 302, at 7."
149,37,934
149,38,"Gates 1/30/18 302, at 5; Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 5."
149,39,935
149,40,"Gates 2/ 12/18 302, at 12."
149,41,936
149,42,"NOSC000215 l 7-20 (10/21/16 Ema il, Manafo11 to Kushner)."
149,43,937
149,44,"NOSC00021573- 75 (11/5/16 Email , Manafort to Kushner)."
149,45,938
149,46,"Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 1, 4-5; Gates 1/30/18 302, at 4."
149,47,939
149,48,"Manafo119/12/18 302, at 1."
149,49,141
149,50,NA
150,1,U.S. Department of Justice
150,2,Atterney Werk Predttet // May Centain Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
150,3,"first meeting, which took place in Madrid, Spain in January 2017, was with Georgiy Oganov."
150,4,"Oganov , who had previously worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States, was a senior"
150,5,executive at a Deripaska company and was believed to report directly to Deripaska. 940 Manafort
150,6,"initially denied attending the meeting. When he later acknowledged it, he claimed that the meeting"
150,7,"had been arranged by his lawyers and concerned only the Pericles lawsuit. 941 Other evidence,"
150,8,"however, provides reason to doubt Manafort's statement that the sole topic of the meeting was the"
150,9,"Pericles lawsuit. In particular , text messages to Manafort from a number associated with Kilimnik"
150,10,suggest that Kilimnik and Boyarkin-not Manafort's counsel-had arranged the meeting between
150,11,"Manafort and Oganov. 942 Kilimnik's message states that the meeting was supposed to be ""not"
150,12,"about money or Pericles"" but instead ""about recreating [the] old friendship""-ostensibly between"
150,13,"Manafort and Deripaska- ""and talking about global politics. "" 943 Manafort also replied by text that"
150,14,"he ""n eed[s] this finished before Jan. 20,"" 944 which appears to be a reference to resolving Pericles"
150,15,before the inauguration.
150,16,"On January 15, 2017, three days after his return from Madrid , Manafort emailed K.T."
150,17,"McFarland, who was at that time designated to be Deputy National Security Advisor and was"
150,18,"formally appointed to that position on January 20, 2017. 945 Manafort ' s January 15 email to"
150,19,"McFarland stated: ""I have some important information I want to share that I picked up on my"
150,20,"travels over the last month."" 946 Manafort told the Office that the email referred to an issue"
150,21,"regarding Cuba, not Russia or Ukraine, and Manafort had traveled to Cuba in the past month. 947"
150,22,"Either way, McFarland - who was advised by Flynn not to respond to the Manafort inquiry-"
150,23,appears not to have responded to Manafort. 948
150,24,"Manafort told the Office that around the time of the Presid ential Inauguration in January,"
150,25,he met with Kilimnik and Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Lyovochkin at the Westin Hote l in
150,26,"Alexandria, Virginia. 949 During this meeting , Kilimnik again discussed the Yanukovych peace"
150,27,"plan that he had broached at the August 2 meeting and in a detailed December 8, 2016 message"
150,28,"found in Kilimnik' s DMP email account. 950 In that December 8 email , which Manafort"
150,29,94
150,30,"° Kalashnikova 5/17/18 302, at 4; Gary Lee, Soviet Embassy's Identity Crisis, Washington Post"
150,31,"(Dec. 20, 1991); Georgy S. Oganov Executive Profil e & Biography , Bloomberg (Mar. 12, 2019)."
150,32,941
150,33,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7."
150,34,942
150,35,"Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik."
150,36,943
150,37,"Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik; Manafort 9/12/18 302, at 5."
150,38,944
150,39,"Text Message, Manafort & Kilimnik."
150,40,945
150,41,"1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn."
150,42,946
150,43,"1/15/17 Email , Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn."
150,44,947
150,45,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 7."
150,46,948
150,47,"1/15/17 Email, Manafort, McFarland, & Flynn ; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18-19."
150,48,949
150,49,"Manafort 9/ 11/18 302, at 7; Manafort 9/21/18"
150,50,"302, at 3; 1/19/17 & 1/22/17 Kilimnik CBP Records , Jan. 19 and 22, 2017; 20 16-17 Text Messages ,"
150,51,"Kilimnik & Patten, at 1-2."
150,52,950
150,53,Investigative Technique
150,54,142
150,55,NA
151,1,U.S. Department of Justice
151,2,At:1:1.'lrttey
151,3,"',l/1.'lrkPrl.'ldttet/,' Ma;· C8tttaitt Material Prl.'lteetedUttder Fed. R. Ct·iffl.P. 6(e)"
151,4,"acknowledged having read, 951 Kilimnik wrote, ""[a]ll that is required to stait the process is a very"
151,5,"minor 'wink' (or slight push) from DT""-an apparent reference to President-elect Trump-""and"
151,6,"a decision to authorize you to be a 'special representative' and manage this process. "" Kilimnik"
151,7,"assured Manafort, with that authority, he ""could start the process and within 10 days visit Russia"
151,8,"[Y anukovych] guarantees your reception at the very top level,"" and that ""DT could have peace in"
151,9,"Ukraine basically within a few months after inauguration."" 952"
151,10,"On February 26, 2017, Manafort met Kilimnik in Madrid, where Kilimnik had flown from"
151,11,"Moscow. 956 In his first two interviews with the Office, Manafort denied meeting with Kilimnik"
151,12,on his Madrid trip and then-after being confronted with documentary evidence that Kilimnik was
151,13,in Madrid at the same time as him-recognized that he met him in Madrid . Manafort said that
151,14,"Kilimnik had updated him on a criminal investigation into so-called ""black ledger"" payments to"
151,15,Manafort that was bein conducted b Ukraine's National Anti-Corru tion Bureau. 957
151,16,Manafort remained in contact with Kilimnik throughout 2017 and into the spring of 2018.
151,17,951
151,18,"Manafort 9/11/18 302, at 6;"
151,19,952 Investigative Technique
151,20,956
151,21,"2/21 /17 Email, Zatynaiko to Kilimnik."
151,22,957
151,23,"Manafort 9/13/18 302, at I."
151,24,958                                                              In resolving whether Manafort breached
151,25,"his cooperation plea agreement by lying to the Office, the district court found that Manafort lied about,"
151,26,"among other things, his contacts with Kilimnik regarding the peace plan, including the meeting in Madrid."
151,27,"Manafort 2/13/19 Transcript, at 29-31, 40."
151,28,143
151,29,NA
152,1,U.S. Department of Justice
152,2,Att:ortteyWork Prot:l:ttet// May CoHtaiflMaterial Proteetet:l:UAt:l:er  Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
152,3,959
152,4,"Those contacts included matters pertaining to the criminal charges brought by the Office , and"
152,5,"the Ukraine peace plan. In early 2018 , Manafort retained his longtime polling firm to craft a draft"
152,6,"poll in Ukraine, sent the pollsters a three-page primer on the plan sent by Kilimnik , and worked"
152,7,with Kilimnik to formulate the polling questions. 960 The primer sent to the pollsters specifically
152,8,called for the United States and President Trump to support the Autonomous Republic of Donbas
152,9,"with Yanukovych as Prime Minister, 961 and a series of questions in the draft poll asked for opinions"
152,10,on Yanukovych ' s role in resolving the conflict in Donbas. 962 (The poll was not solely about
152,11,Donbas; it also sought participants' views on leaders apart from Yanukovych as they pertained to
152,12,the 2019 Ukraine presidential election.)
152,13,The Office has not uncovered evidence that Manafort brought the Ukraine peace plan to
152,14,the attention of the Trump Campaign or the Trump Administration. Kilimnik continued his efforts
152,15,"to promote the peace plan to the Executive Branch (e.g., U.S. Department of State) into the summer"
152,16,of 2018. 963
152,17,B. Post-Election and Transition-Period Contacts
152,18,"Trump was elected President on November 8, 2016. Beginning immediately after the"
152,19,"election , individuals connected to the Russian government started contacting officials on the"
152,20,Trump Campaign and Transition Team through multiple channels-sometimes                   through Russian
152,21,Ambassador Kislyak and at other times through individuals who sought reliable contacts through
152,22,U.S. persons not formally tied to the Campaign or Transition Team. The most senior levels of the
152,23,Russian government encouraged these efforts. The investigation did not establish that these efforts
152,24,reflected or constituted coordination between the Trump Campaign and Russia in its election-
152,25,interference activities.
152,26,1. Immediate Post -Election Activity
152,27,"As soon as news broke that Trump had been elected President, Russian government"
152,28,officials and prominent Russian businessmen began trying to make inroads into the new
152,29,Administration. They appeared not to have preexisting contacts and struggled to connect with
152,30,"senior officials around the President- Elect. As explained below , those efforts entailed both official"
152,31,contact through the Russian Embassy in the United States and outreaches-sanctioned                  at high
152,32,levels of the Russian government-through          business rather than political contacts.
152,33,"959   Manafort (D.D.C.) Gov't Opp. to Mot. to Modify, at 2; Superseding Indictment       ,r,r48-51,"
152,34,"United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., 1: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C. June 8, 2018), Doc. 318."
152,35,"960  2/12/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort & Ward; 2/16/18 Email, Fabrizio to Manafort; 2/ 19/18"
152,36,"Email, Fabrizio to Ward; 2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio."
152,37,96 1
152,38,"2/21/18 Email, Manafort to Ward & Fabrizio (7:16:49 a.m.) (attachment)."
152,39,"962  3/9/18 Email, Ward to Manafort & Fabrizio (attachment)."
152,40,144
152,41,NA
153,1,U.S. Department of Justice
153,2,Attaffte~· 'i/:erk Produet // Ma~· Cotrtaift Material Proteeted Under Fed . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
153,3,a. Outreach from the Russian Government
153,4,"At approximately 3 a.m. on election night, Trump Campaign press secretary Hope Hicks"
153,5,received a telephone call on her personal cell phone from a person who sounded foreign but was
153,6,calling from a number with a DC area code. 964 Although Hicks had a hard time understanding the
153,7,"person, she could make out the words ""Putin call."" 965 Hicks told the caller to send her an email. 966"
153,8,"The following morning, on November 9, 2016, Sergey Kuznetsov, an official at the Russian"
153,9,"Embassy to the United States, emailed Hicks from his Gmail address with the subject line,"
153,10,"""Message from Putin."" 967 Attached to the email was a message from Putin, in both English and"
153,11,"Russian, which Kuznetsov asked Hicks to convey to the President-Elect. 968 In the message, Putin"
153,12,"offered his congratulations to Trump for his electoral victory, stating he ""look[ ed] forward to"
153,13,"working with [Trump] on leading Russian-American relations out of crisis."" 969"
153,14,"Hicks forwarded the email to Kushner, asking, ""Can you look into this? Don't want to get"
153,15,°
153,16,"duped but don't want to blow off Putin!"" 97 Kushner stated in Congressional testimony that he"
153,17,believed that it would be possible to verify the authenticity of the forwarded email through the
153,18,"Russian Ambassador, whom Kushner had previously met in April 2016. 971 Unable to recall the"
153,19,"Russian Ambassador's name, Kushner emailed Dimitri Simes of CNI, whom he had consulted"
153,20,"previously about Russia, see Volume I, Section IV.A.4, supra, and asked, ""What is the name of"
153,21,"Russian ambassador? ""972 Kushner forwarded Simes 's response-which                 identified Kislyak by"
153,22,"name-to Hicks. 973 After checking with Kushner to see what he had learned , Hicks conveyed"
153,23,"Putin's letter to transition officials. 974 Five days later, on November 14, 2016, Trump and Putin"
153,24,"spoke by phone in the presence of Transition Team members, including incoming National"
153,25,Security Advisor Michael Flynn. 975
153,26,964
153,27,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3."
153,28,965
153,29,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3."
153,30,966
153,31,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3."
153,32,967
153,33,"NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.))."
153,34,968
153,35,"NOSC00044381-82 (11/9/16 Email, Kuznetsov to Hicks (5:27 a.m.))."
153,36,969
153,37,"NOSC00044382 (11/9/16 Letter from Putin to President-Elect Trump (Nov. 9, 2016)"
153,38,(translation)).
153,39,970
153,40,"NOSC00044381 (11/9/16 Email, Hicks to Kushner (10:26 a.m.))."
153,41,971
153,42,"Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017)."
153,43,972
153,44,"NOSC00000058(11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Simes (10:28 a.m.)); Statement of Jared Kushner"
153,45,"to Congressional Committees, at 4 (Jul. 24, 2017)."
153,46,973
153,47,"NOSC00000058 (11/9/16 Email, Kushner to Hicks (11 :05:44 a.m.))."
153,48,974
153,49,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 3-4."
153,50,975
153,51,"Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-10; see Doug G. Ware, Trump, Russia 's Putin Talk about Syria, Icy"
153,52,"Relations in Phone Call, UPI (Nov. 14, 2016)."
153,53,145
153,54,NA
154,1,U.S. Department of Justice
154,2,"At1:et1Hey  \lh,t1kPt1edt1et// May CeHtttiHMatet1ittlPt1eteetedUHdet1Fed. R. Ct'iffl. P. 6(e)"
154,3,b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels
154,4,"As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a"
154,5,number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make
154,6,"contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia 's largest commercial bank,"
154,7,described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the
154,8,tlurry of Russian activity .976                      ·
154,9,Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who
154,10,"regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as ""oligarchs."" 977"
154,11,"Aven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter"
154,12,"(Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election. 978 Aven said that he took these meetings"
154,13,seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings
154,14,"were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow"
154,15,"through. 979 As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting"
154,16,"with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vaino. 980"
154,17,"According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,981 Putin raised the"
154,18,"prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including"
154,19,sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank. 982 Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to
154,20,protect himself and Alfa-Bank. 983 Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by
154,21,the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration. 984
154,22,"According to Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and"
154,23,generally did not know the people around the President-Elect. 985
154,24,976
154,25,"A ven rovided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer , Ill"
154,26,977
154,27,"Aven 8/2/18 3 02, at 7."
154,28,978
154,29,979
154,30,"Aven 8/2/18 302, at2-3."
154,31,980
154,32,"and interview with the Offic e,"
154,33,"A ven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (e.g. , Official 1, Official 2)."
154,34,Aven separately confirmed th.rough an attorne y proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's
154,35,"chiefofstaff, Vaino. See Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug. 2, 2018) (hard copy on file)."
154,36,981
154,37,"At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, A ven was generally aware of the press coverage"
154,38,"about Russian interference in the U.S. election. According to Aven , he did not discuss that topic with Putin"
154,39,"at any point, and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions. Aven 8/2/18 302,"
154,40,at 5-7.
154,41,982
154,42,983
154,43,984
154,44,985
154,45,146
154,46,NA
155,1,U.S. Department of Justice
155,2,"AUerHey Werk Preti1:1et,','MieyCeHtttiHMaterial Preteetea UHtierFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
155,3,Aven                    told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank
155,4,"shareholders from potential sanctions , and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the"
155,5,incoming Administration to establish a line of communication. 986 A ven described Putin
155,6,"responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success. 987 According to Aven, although"
155,7,"Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team , Aven understood"
155,8,that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised. 988 A ven' s efforts are
155,9,"described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, infra."
155,10,2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration
155,11,Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill
155,12,"Dmitriev , a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected"
155,13,to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in
155,14,the months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United
155,15,"Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials,"
155,16,"and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a"
155,17,"Trump Campaign supporter and an assoc iate of Steve Bannon. 989 In addition, the UAE national"
155,18,"security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick"
155,19,"Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson"
155,20,"worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev"
155,21,implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the
155,22,"inauguration , and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson."
155,23,a. Background
155,24,"Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia 's sovereign wealth fund ,"
155,25,"the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011. 990 Dmitriev reported"
155,26,"directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his ""boss."" 99 1"
155,27,RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds. 992 Dmitriev
155,28,"regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed"
155,29,989
155,30,"Nader provided information to the Office in multi le interviews, all but one of which were"
155,31,conducted under a proffer agreement                                                                  . The
155,32,"investi ators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. Bannon was interviewed by the Office,"
155,33,under a proffer agreement.
155,34,99
155,35,"° Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available at"
155,36,"https://rdif.ru/Eng_person_ dmitriev_kiriII/. See also Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, available"
155,37,at https://rdif.ru/Eng_About/.
155,38,99 1
155,39,"Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. See also, e.g., 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17"
155,40,"Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson."
155,41,992
155,42,147
155,43,NA
156,1,U.S. Department of Justice
156,2,"AUem:e)''.Verk Prnd1:1et,','Mtty CeHtttiHMttterittl Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e)"
156,3,"(Crown Prince Mohammed), in connection with RDIF's dealings with the UAE. 993 Putin wanted"
156,4,Dmitriev to be in charge of both the financial and the political relationship between Russia and the
156,5,"Gulf states, in part because Dmitriev had been educated in the West and spoke English fluently. 994"
156,6,"Nader considered Dmitriev to be Putin's interlocutor in the Gulf region, and would relay"
156,7,Dmitriev's views directly to Crown Prince Mohammed. 995
156,8,"Nader developed contacts with both U.S. presidential campaigns during the 2016 election,"
156,9,"and kept Dmitriev abreast of his efforts to do so.996 According to Nader, Dmitriev said that his"
156,10,and the government of Russia's preference was for candidate Trum to win and asked Nader to
156,11,assist him in meetin members of the Trum Cam ai n.997
156,12,Nader did not
156,13,introduce Dmitriev to anyone associated with the Trump Campaign before the election. 999
156,14,Erik Prince is a businessman who had relationships with various individuals associated
156,15,"with the Trump Campaign, including Steve Bannon, Donald Trump Jr., and Roger Stone.1005"
156,16,"Prince did not have a formal role in the Campaign, although he offered to host a fundraiser for"
156,17,993
156,18,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2; Nader 1/23/18 302, at 2-3; 5/3/16 Email, Nader to Phares; .."
156,19,994
156,20,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 1-2."
156,21,995
156,22,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3."
156,23,996
156,24,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3;"
156,25,998
156,26,999
156,27,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3."
156,28,1000
156,29,1001
156,30,1002
156,31,1003
156,32,1004
156,33,1005
156,34,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 1-5; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 21."
156,35,148
156,36,NA
157,1,U.S. Department of Justice
157,2,"Atten1e:,,·Werk Predttet // May CetttttiH Mttterittl Preteetecl Under Fed. R Criffl. P. 6(e)"
157,3,"Trump and sent unsolicited policy papers on issues such as foreign policy, trade, and Russian"
157,4,election interference to Bannon. 1006
157,5,"After the election, Prince frequently visited transition offices at Trump Tower, primarily"
157,6,to meet with Bannon but on occasion to meet Michael Flynn and others. 1007 Prince and Bannon
157,7,"would discuss, inter alia, foreign policy issues and Prince's recommendations regarding who"
157,8,1008
157,9,should be appointed to fill key natio~sitions.                           Although~
157,10,"affiliated with the transition , Nader---                   received assurances -"
157,11,that the incoming Administration considered Prince a trusted associate. 10
157,12,b. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contacts With the Incoming Administration
157,13,",! A I  Investigative Technique"
157,14,• n• •
157,15,Investigative Technique
157,16,Investigative Technique
157,17,. .. ..                                               I •             . ••
157,18,• Investigative Technique
157,19,• .•        .  ... .
157,20,• ' Investigative Technique
157,21,1006
157,22,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at l, 3-4; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 19-20; 10/ 18/ 16"
157,23,"Email, Prince to Bannon."
157,24,1007
157,25,"Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 6; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 5; Flynn 1/24/18 302, at 5-6; Flynn 5/1/18 302,"
157,26,"at 11; Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5, 8; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 20-21; 11/12/16 Email, Prince to Corallo ."
157,27,1008
157,28,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 5; Bannon 2/ 14/18 302, at 21."
157,29,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6; 1111"
157,30,1011  Investigative Technique
157,31,l0 12 Investigative Technique
157,32,Investigative Technique
157,33,10 14 Investigative Technique
157,34,10 15
157,35,Investigative Technique
157,36,149
157,37,NA
158,1,U.S. Department of Justice
158,2,"AUorAeyWork Prod1:1et// Ms,y CeHt8'iHM8'teris,IPretectcd Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
158,3,"Later that morning, Dmitriev contacted Nader, who was in New York , to request a meeting"
158,4,"with the ""key people "" in the incoming Administration as soon as possible in light of the ""[g]reat"
158,5,"results."" 1016 He asked Nader to convey to the incoming Administration that ""we want to start"
158,6,rebuilding the relationship in whatever is a comfortable pace for them. We understand all of the
158,7,"sensitivities and are not in a rush."" 1017 Dmitriev and Nader had previously discussed Nader"
158,8,introducing him to the contacts Nader had made within the Trump Campaign. 1018 Dmitriev also
158,9,"told Nader that he would ask Putin for permission to travel to the United States , where he would"
158,10,be able to speak to media outlets about the positive impact of Trump's election and the need for
158,11,reconciliation between the United States and Russia . 1019
158,12,"Later that day, Dmitriev flew to New York, where Peskov was separately traveling to"
158,13,attend the chess tournament. 1020 Dmitri ev invited Nader to the opening of the tournament and
158,14,"noted that, if there was ""a chance to see anyone key from Trump camp,"" he ""would love to start"
158,15,building for the future.'' 1021 Dmitriev also asked Nader to invite Kushner to the event so that he
158,16,(Dmitriev) could meet him. 1022 Nader did not pass along Dmitriev 's invitation to anyone
158,17,connected with the incoming Administration. 1023 Although one World Chess Federation official
158,18,"recalled hearing from an attendee that President-Elect Trump had stopped by the tournament, the"
158,19,investigation did not establish that Trump or any Campaign or Transition Team official attended
158,20,the event. 1024 And the President's written answers denied that he had. 1025
158,21,Nader stated that Dmitriev continued to press him to set up a meeting with transition
158,22,"officials, and was particularly focused on Kushner and Trump Jr. 1026 Dmitriev told Nader that"
158,23,-.                                     .
158,24,-
158,25,1016
158,26,"11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (9:34 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 4."
158,27,1017
158,28,"11/9/16 Text Message , Dmitriev to Nader (11 :58 p.m.)."
158,29,1018
158,30,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 3."
158,31,1019
158,32,"11/9/16 Text Messa e, Dmitriev to Nader 10:06 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to"
158,33,Nader (10:10 a.m.);
158,34,1020
158,35,"11/9/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:08 a.m.); 11/9/16 Text Message , Dmitriev to"
158,36,"Nader (3:40 p.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5."
158,37,1021
158,38,"11/9/16 Text Message , Dmitriev to Nader (7: 10 p.m.)."
158,39,1022
158,40,"11/10/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (5:20 a.m.)."
158,41,1023
158,42,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-6."
158,43,1024
158,44,"Marinello 5/31/18 302, at 2-3; Nader 1/22/ 18 302, at 5-6."
158,45,1025
158,46,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 17-18 (Response to Question V,"
158,47,Part (a).
158,48,1026
158,49,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6;"
158,50,1111       1027
158,51,"Nader 1/22/ 18 302, at 6;"
158,52,150
158,53,NA
159,1,U.S. Department of Justice
159,2,:PrHemey Werk Predttet // May Cmttttil'I:Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
159,3,"According to Nader , Dmitriev was very"
159,4,anxious to connect with the incoming Administration and told Nader that he would try other routes
159,5,to do so besides Nader himself. 1030 Nader did not ultimately introduce Dmitriev to anyone
159,6,103 1
159,7,associated with the incoming Administration during Dmitriev ' s post-election trip to New York.
159,8,"In early December 2016, Dmitriev again broached the topic of meeting incoming"
159,9,Administration officials with Nader in Januar y or February. 1032 Dmitriev sent Nader a list of
159,10,"publicly available quotes of Dmitriev speaking positively about Donald Trump ""in case they"
159,11,"[were] helpful."" 1033"
159,12,c. Erik Prince and Kirill Dmitriev Meet in the Seychelles
159,13,i. George Nader and Erik Prince Arrange Seychelles Meeting with Dmitriev
159,14,Nader traveled to New York in early January 2017 and had lunchtime and dinner meetings
159,15,"with Erik Prince ·on January 3, 2017. 1034 Nader and Prince discussed Dmitriev . 1035 Nader"
159,16,informed Prince that the Russians were looking to build a link with the incoming Trump
159,17,Administration. 1036                          he told Prince that Dmitriev had been ushin Nader to
159,18,e · omin Administration
159,19,1037
159,20,".      Nader suggested, in light of Prince's"
159,21,and Dmitriev meet to discuss issues of
159,22,mutual concern. 1038                                                                   Prince told Nader
159,23,that he needed to think further about it and to check with Transition Team officials. 1039
159,24,"After his dinner with Prince, Nader sent Prince a link to a Wikipedia entry about Dmitriev ,"
159,25,"and sent Dmitriev a message stating that he had just met ""with some key peopl e within the family"
159,26,"and inner circle"" - a reference to Prince-and that he had spoken at length and positively about"
159,27,1028
159,28,1029
159,29,1030
159,30,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 6."
159,31,1031
159,32,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 5-7."
159,33,1032
159,34,"12/8/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (12: 10:31 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 11."
159,35,1033
159,36,"12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (12: 10:31 a.m .); 12/8/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to"
159,37,Nader (12:10:57 a.m.).
159,38,1034
159,39,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 8."
159,40,151
159,41,NA
160,1,U.S. Department of Justice
160,2,Atterttey \¥erk Predttet // May Cetttaitt .Mttterial Preteeted Uttder Fed . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
160,3,"Dmitriev. 1040 Nader told Dmitriev that the people he met had asked for Dmitriev's bio, and"
160,4,Dmitriev replied that he would update and send it. 1041 Nader later received from Dmitriev two
160,5,"files concerning Dmitriev: one was a two-page biography , and the other was a list of Dmitriev's"
160,6,positive quotes about Donald Trump. 1042
160,7,"The next morning, Nader forwarded the message and attachments Dmitriev had sent him"
160,8,"to Prince. 1043 Nader wrote to Prince that these documents were the versions ""to be used with some"
160,9,"additional details for them"" (with ""them"" referring to members of the incoming"
160,10,Administration). 1044 Prince opened the attachments at Trump Tower within an hour of receiving
160,11,"them. 1045 Prince stated that, while he was at Trump Tower that day, he spoke with Kellyanne"
160,12,"Conway, Wilbur Ross, Steve Mnuchin, and others while waiting to see Bannon. 1046 Cell-site"
160,13,location data for Prince's mobile phone indicates that Prince remained at Trump Tower for
160,14,"approximately three hours . 1047 Prince said that he could not recall whether , durin those three"
160,15,"hours , he met with Bannon and discussed Dmitriev with him. 1048"
160,16,"Prince booked a ticket to the Seychelles on January 7, 2017. 1050 The following day, Nader"
160,17,"wrote to Dmitriev that he had a ""pleasant surprise"" for him, namely that he had arranged for"
160,18,"Dmitriev to meet ""a Special Guest"" from ""the New Team ,"" referring to Prince. 1051 Nader asked"
160,19,"Dmitriev if he could come to the Seychelles for the meeting on January 12, 2017, and Dmitriev"
160,20,agreed. 1052
160,21,"The f9llowing day ,~                            urance from Nader that the Seychelles meeting"
160,22,would be worthwhile. 1053 ---Dmitriev                              was not enthusiastic about the idea of
160,23,"meeting with Prince, and that Nader assured him that Prince wielded influence with the incoming"
160,24,1040
160,25,"1/4/17 Text Message, Nader to Prince; 1/4/17 Text Messa es, Nader to Dmitriev (5:24 a.m. -"
160,26,"5:26 a.m.); Nader 1/22/18 302, at 8-9;"
160,27,1041
160,28,"1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (7:24:27 a.m.)."
160,29,1042
160,30,"1/4/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Nader (7:25-7:29 a.m.)"
160,31,1043
160,32,"1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince."
160,33,1044
160,34,"1/4/17 Text Messages, Nader to Prince;"
160,35,1045
160,36,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 1-3."
160,37,1046
160,38,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 2-3."
160,39,1047
160,40,Cell-site location data for Prince's mobile phone Investigative Technique
160,41,1048
160,42,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 3."
160,43,1049
160,44,1050
160,45,"1/5/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince."
160,46,10 51
160,47,"1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader to Dmitriev (6:05 - 6: 10 p.m.)."
160,48,1052
160,49,"1/8/17 Text Messages, Nader & Dmitriev (6: 10 - 7:27 p.m.)."
160,50,1053
160,51,"1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader."
160,52,152
160,53,NA
161,1,U.S. Department of Justice
161,2,"Atterttey Wetlc Predtiet // Ma:, Cetttaitt Material Prnteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee)"
161,3,1
161,4,"Administration. 1054 Nader wrote to Dmitriev , ""This guy [Prince] is designate ·d by Steve [Bannon]"
161,5,to meet you! I know him and he is very very well connected and trusted by the New Team. His
161,6,"sister is now a Minister of Education."" 1055 According to Nader , Prince had led him to believe that"
161,7,"Bannon was aware of Prince's upcoming meeting with Dmitriev , and Prince acknowledged that it"
161,8,was fair for Nader to think that Prince would pass information on to the Transition Team. 1056
161,9,"Bannon, however, told the Office that Prince did not tell him in advance about his meeting"
161,10,with Dmitriev. 1057
161,11,ii. The Seychelles Meetings
161,12,"Dmitriev arrived with his wife in the Seychelles on January 11, 2017 , and checked into the"
161,13,Four Seasons Resort where Crown Prince Mohammed and Nader were staying. 1058 Prince arrived
161,14,"that same day. 1059 Prince and Dmitriev met for the first time that afternoon in Nader's villa, with"
161,15,Nader present. 1060 The initial meeting lasted approximately 30-45 minutes. 1061
161,16,Prince described the eight
161,17,"years of the Obama Administration in negative terms , and stated that he was looking forward to a"
161,18,"new era of cooperation and conflict resolution. 1063 According to Prince, he told Dmitriev that"
161,19,"Bannon was effective if not conventional , and that Prince provided policy papers to Bannon. 1064"
161,20,1054
161,21,1055
161,22,"1/9/17 Text Message , Nader to Dmitriev (2:12:56 p.m.); Nader 1/ 19/ 18 302, at 13;  Ill"
161,23,1056
161,24,"Nader 1/19/18 302, at 13;                                  Prince 5/3/18 302 , at 3."
161,25,1057
161,26,"Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 25-26."
161,27,1058
161,28,"1/10/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (2:05:54 - 3:30:25 p.m.); 1/1 1/17 Text Messages ,"
161,29,Dmitriev & Nader (2: 16: 16 - 5:17:59 p.m.).
161,30,1059
161,31,"1/7/17 Email, Kasbo to Prince."
161,32,1060
161,33,"1/11/17 Text Messages , Nader & Dmitriev (5:18:24 - 5:37:14 p.m.);"
161,34,1062
161,35,1063
161,36,1064
161,37,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4."
161,38,1065
161,39,153
161,40,NA
162,1,U.S. Department of Justice
162,2,"Atteme'.)'""Werk Predt1et ,',' May CeHtttiH Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim . P. 6(e)"
162,3,topic of Russian interference in the 2016 election did not come up.
162,4,"Prince added that he would inform Bannon about his meeting with Dmitriev, and that if there was"
162,5,"interest in continuin the discussion, Bannon or someone else on the Transition Team would do"
162,6,so.1011
162,7,"Afterwards, Prince returned to his room, where he learned that a Russian aircraft carrier"
162,8,"had sailed to Libya, which led him to call Nader and ask him to set up another meeting with"
162,9,"Dmitriev. 1073According to Nader, Prince called and said he had checked with his associates back"
162,10,"home and needed to convey to Dmitriev that Libya was ""off the table."" 1074 Nader wrote to"
162,11,"Dmitriev that Prince had ""received an urgent message that he needs to convey to you immediately,"""
162,12,"and arranged for himself, Dmitriev, and Prince to meet at a restaurant on the Four Seasons"
162,13,property. 101s
162,14,"At the second meeting, Prince told Dmitriev that the United States could not acce"
162,15,Russian involvement in Lib a because it would make the situation there much worse. 1076
162,16,1066
162,17,1067
162,18,1068
162,19,1069
162,20,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4-5."
162,21,1070
162,22,1072
162,23,1073
162,24,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;"
162,25,1075
162,26,"1/11/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Nader (9: 13 :54 -"
162,27,10:24:25 p.m.).
162,28,"Prince ,"
162,29,"however , denied that and recalled that he was making these remarks to Dmitri ev not in an official capacity"
162,30,"for the tran sition but based on his experience as a former naval officer. Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4."
162,31,154
162,32,NA
163,1,U.S. Department of Justice
163,2,Aft6mey 'Nm·kPr6tit1et// Mfr) CetttttiAMaterial Pretecteci UAE:icr
163,3,1
163,4,Feti. R. Cri1tt. P. 6(e)
163,5,1077
163,6,"After the brief second meeting concluded, Nader and Dmitriev discussed what had"
163,7,transpired. 1078 Dmitriev told Nader that he was disappointed in his meetings with Prince for two
163,8,"reasons: first, he believed the Russians needed to be communicating with someone who had more"
163,9,"authority within the incoming Administration than Prince had. 1079 Second, he had hoped to have"
163,10,"a discussion of greater substance, such as outlin in a strate ic roadmap for both countries to"
163,11,follow. 1080 Dmitriev told Nader that                                  Prince's comments -
163,12,1
163,13,were insulting                        081
163,14,"Hours after the second meeting , Prince sent two text messages to Bannon from the"
163,15,"Seychelles. 1082 As described further below , investigators were unable to obtain the content of these"
163,16,"or other messages between Prince and Bannon, and the investigation also did not identify evidence"
163,17,of any further communication between Prince and Dmitriev after their meetings in the Seychelles.
163,18,iii. Erik Prince's Meeting with Steve Bannon after the Seychelles Trip
163,19,"After the Seychelles meetings , Prince told Nader that he would inform Bannon about his"
163,20,discussion with Dmit riev and would convey that someone within the Russian power structure was
163,21,"interested in seeking better relations with the incoming Administration. 1083 On January 12, 2017,"
163,22,1084
163,23,Prince contacted Bannon's personal assistant to set up a meeting for the following week.
163,24,1085
163,25,"Several days later, Prince messa ged her again asking about Bannon ' s schedule."
163,26,Prince said that he met Bannon at Bannon's home after returning to the United States in
163,27,"mid-January and briefed him about several topics, includin g his meeting with Dmitriev .1086 Prince"
163,28,told the Office that he explained to Bannon that Dmitriev was the head of a Russian sovereign
163,29,1087
163,30,wealth fund and was interested in improving relations between the United States and Russia.
163,31,"Prince had on his cellphone a screenshot ofDmitriev's Wikipedia pag e dated January 16, 2017,"
163,32,-
163,33,1079
163,34,"Nader 1/22/1 8 302, at 9, 15;"
163,35,1080
163,36,"Nader 1/22/18 302, at 15."
163,37,1081
163,38,1083
163,39,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 10; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 4;"
163,40,1084
163,41,"1/ 12/17 Text Messages, Prince to Preate."
163,42,1085
163,43,"1/15/17 Text Message, Prince to Preate."
163,44,1086
163,45,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302 , at 5."
163,46,1087
163,47,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 11; Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5."
163,48,155
163,49,NA
164,1,U.S. Department of Justice
164,2,"Atlerney ·werk Predt:1et/,' May Cm'ttaitt Material Preteeted Under Fed . R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
164,3,and Prince told the Office that he likely showed that image to Bannon. 1088 Prince also believed he
164,4,"provided Bannon with Dmitriev's contact information. 1089 According to Prince , Bannon instructed"
164,5,"Prince not to follow up with Dmitriev , and Prince had the impression that the issue was not a"
164,6,"priority for Bannon . 1090 Prince related that Bannon did not appear angry, just relatively"
164,7,uninterested. 1091
164,8,"Bannon, by contrast , told the Office that he never discussed with Prince anything regarding"
164,9,"Dmitriev, RDIF , or any meetings with Russian individuals or people associated with Putin. 1092"
164,10,"Bannon also stated that had Prince mentioned such a meeting, Bannon would have remembered it,"
164,11,and Bannon would have objected to such a meeting having taken place. 1093
164,12,The conflicting accounts provided by Bannon and Prince could not be independently
164,13,"clarified by reviewing their communications , because neither one was able to produc e any of the"
164,14,messages they exchanged in the time period surrounding the Seychelles meeting. Prince's phone
164,15,"contained no text messages prior to March 2017, though provider records indicate that he and"
164,16,Bannon exchanged dozens of messages. 1094 Prince denied deleting any messages but claimed he
164,17,did not know why there were no messages on his device before March 2017. 1095 Bannon's devices
164,18,"similarly contained no messages in the relevant time period, and Bannon also stated he did not"
164,19,"know why messages did not appear on his device. 1096 Bannon told the Office that, during both the"
164,20,"months before and after the Seychelles meeting , he regularly used his personal Blackberry and"
164,21,"personal email for work-related communications (including those with Prince), and he took no"
164,22,steps to preserve these work communications. 1097
164,23,d. Kirill Dmitriev's Post-Election Contact with Rick Gerson Regarding U.S.-
164,24,Russia Relations
164,25,Dmitriev's contacts during the transition period were not limited to those facilitated by
164,26,"Nader. In approximately late November 2016, the UAE national security advisor introduced"
164,27,"Dmitriev to Rick Gerson, a friend of Jared Kushner who runs a hedge fund in New York. 1098"
164,28,Gerson stated he had no formal role in the transition and had no involvement in the Trump
164,29,1088
164,30,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5; 1/16/17 Image on Prince Phone (on file with the Office)."
164,31,1089
164,32,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5."
164,33,1090
164,34,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5."
164,35,1091
164,36,"Prince 5/3/18 302, at 5."
164,37,1092
164,38,"Bannon 10/26/ 18 302, at 10-11."
164,39,1093
164,40,"Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 10-11."
164,41,1094
164,42,Call Records of Erik Prince
164,43,1095
164,44,"Prince 4/4/18 302, at 6."
164,45,1096
164,46,"Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 36."
164,47,1097
164,48,"Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 11."
164,49,1098
164,50,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1, 3; 11/26/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/25/17 Text Message,"
164,51,Dmitriev to Nader.
164,52,156
164,53,NA
165,1,U.S. Department of Justice
165,2,Atterfl:ey Werle Pred1:1et// Mey Cefl:tttifl:   Material Prnteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
165,3,Campaign other than occasional casual discussions about the Campaign with Kushner. 1099 After
165,4,"the election, Gerson assisted the transition by arranging meetings for transition officials with"
165,5,former UK prime minister Tony Blair and a UAE delegation led by Crown Prince Mohammed. 1100
165,6,"When Dmitriev and Gerson met, they principally discussed potential joint ventures"
165,7,between Gerson's hedge fund and RDIF. 1101 Dmitriev was interested in improved economic
165,8,cooperation between the United States and Russia and asked Gerson who he should meet with in
165,9,the incoming Administration who would be helpful towards this goal. 1102 Gerson replied that he
165,10,"would try to figure out the best way to arrange appropriate introductions, but noted that"
165,11,confidentiality would be required because of the sensitivity of holding such meetings before the
165,12,"new Administration took power, and before Cabinet nominees had been confirmed by the"
165,13,"Senate. 1103 Gerson said he would ask Kushner and Michael Flynn who the ""key person or people"""
165,14,"were on the topics of reconciliation with Russia, joint security concerns, and economic matters. 1104"
165,15,Dmitriev told Gerson that he had been tasked by Putin to develop and execute a
165,16,reconciliation plan between the United States and Russia. He noted in a text message to Gerson
165,17,"that if Russia was ""approached with respect and willingness to understand our position, we can"
165,18,"have Major Breakthroughs quickly."" 1105 Gerson and Dmitriev exchanged ideas in December 2016"
165,19,about what such a reconciliation plan would include. 1106 Gerson told the Office that the Transition
165,20,"Team had not asked him to engage in these discussions with Dmitriev, and that he did so on his"
165,21,own initiative and as a private citizen. 1107
165,22,"On January 9, 2017, the same day he asked Nader whether meeting Prince would be"
165,23,"worthwhile , Dmitriev sent his biography to Gerson and asked him if he could ""share it with Jared"
165,24,(or somebody else very senior in the team) - so that they know that we are focused from our side
165,25,"on improving the relationship and my boss asked me to play a key role in that."" 1108 Dmitriev also"
165,26,"asked Gerson if he knew Prince, and if Prince was somebody important or worth spending time"
165,27,1099
165,28,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 1."
165,29,1100
165,30,"Gerson 6/5/ 18 302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 21."
165,31,1101
165,32,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3-4 ; see, e.g., 12/2/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 12/14/ 16 Text"
165,33,"Mes sages, Dmitriev & Gerson; 1/3/17 Text Message , Gerson to Dmitriev; 12/2/16 Email, Tolokonnikov to"
165,34,Gerson.
165,35,1102
165,36,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson."
165,37,1103
165,38,"12/14/16 Text Message , Gerson to Dmitriev."
165,39,1104
165,40,"12/14/16 Text Message , Gerson to Dmitriev ."
165,41,1105
165,42,"12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1."
165,43,1106
165,44,"12/14/16 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson."
165,45,1107
165,46,"Gerson 6/15/18 302, at I."
165,47,1108
165,48,"1/9/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/ 17 Text Message, Dm itriev to Nad er."
165,49,157
165,50,NA
166,1,U.S. Department of Justice
166,2,"Att:erney ',l.ZerkPredttet II Mtty Centttin Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
166,3,"with. 1109 After his trip to the Seychelles, Dmitriev told Gerson that Bannon had asked Prince to"
166,4,meet with Dmitriev and that the two had had a positive meeting. 1110
166,5,"On January 16, 2017, Dmitriev consolidated the ideas for U.S.-Russia reconciliation that"
166,6,he and Gerson had been discussing into a two-page document that listed five main points: (1)
166,7,jointly fighting terrorism; (2) jointly engaging in anti-weapons of mass destruction efforts; (3)
166,8,"developing ""win-win"" economic and investment initiatives; (4) maintaining an honest , open, and"
166,9,continual dialogue regarding issues of disagreement ; and (5) ensuring proper communication and
166,10,"trust by ""key people "" from each country. 1111 On January 18, 2017, Gerson gave a copy of the"
166,11,document to Kushner. 1112 Kushner had not heard of Dmitriev at that time. 1113 Gerson explained
166,12,"that Dmitriev was the head of RDIF, and Gerson may have alluded to Dmitriev ' s being well"
166,13,connected. 1114 Kushner placed the document in a file and said he would get it to the right
166,14,people. 1115 Kushner ultimately gave one copy of the document to Bannon and another to Rex
166,15,"Tillerson; according to Kushner , neither of them followed up with Kushner about it. 1116 On"
166,16,"January 19, 2017 , Dmitriev sent Nader a copy of the two -page document, telling him that this was"
166,17,"""a view from our side that I discussed in my meeting on the islands and with you and with our"
166,18,"friends. Please share with them - we believe this is a good foundation to start from."" 1117"
166,19,Gerson informed Dmitriev that he had given the document to Kushner soon after delivering
166,20,"it. 1118 On January 26, 2017, Dmitriev wrote to Gerson that his ""boss""-an apparent reference to"
166,21,"Putin-was asking if there had been any feedback on the proposal. 1119 Dmitriev said, "" [w]e do"
166,22,"not want to rush things and move at a comfortable speed. At the same time , my boss asked me to"
166,23,"try to have the key US meetings in the next two weeks if possible."" 1120 He informed Gerson that"
166,24,"Putin and President Trump would speak by phone that Saturday, and noted that that information"
166,25,"was ""very confidential."" 1121"
166,26,"The same day, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that he had seen his ""boss "" again yesterday who"
166,27,"had ""emphasized that this is a great priority for us and that we need to build this communication"
166,28,1109
166,29,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 4."
166,30,1110
166,31,"1/18/17 Text Messages, Dmitriev & Gerson ."
166,32,1111
166,33,1/16/17 Text Messages; Dmitriev & Gerson.
166,34,1112
166,35,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2."
166,36,1113
166,37,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3."
166,38,11 14
166,39,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3; Gerson 6/15/18.302, at 1-2; Kushner 4/ 11/ 18 30 2, at 22."
166,40,1115
166,41,"Gerson 6/5/18 302, at 3."
166,42,1116
166,43,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 32."
166,44,1117
166,45,"1/19/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (11: 11 :56 a.m.)."
166,46,1118
166,47,"1/18/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 2."
166,48,1119
166,49,"1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson."
166,50,1120
166,51,"1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson."
166,52,1121
166,53,"1/26/17 Text Message , Dmitriev to Gerson."
166,54,158
166,55,NA
167,1,U.S . Department of Justice
167,2,"Att6rHey W6rk Pr6dttet /,' May Cmi:taiflMaterial Prnteeted Umier Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)"
167,3,"channel to avoid bureaucracy ."" 1122 On January 28, 2017, Dmitriev texted Nader that he wanted"
167,4,"""to see if I can confirm to my boss that your friends may use some of the ideas from the 2 pager I"
167,5,"sent you in the telephone call that will happen at 12 EST,"" 1123 an apparent reference to the call"
167,6,"scheduled between President Trump and Putin. Nader replied, ""Definitely paper was so submitted"
167,7,"to Team by Rick and me. They took it seriously!"" 1124 After the call between President Trump and"
167,8,"Putin occurred, Dmitriev wrote to Nader that ""the call went very well. My boss wants me to"
167,9,continue making some public statements that us [sic] Russia cooperation is good and
167,10,"important. "" 1125 Gerson also wrote to Dmitriev to say that the call had gone well, and Dmitriev"
167,11,"replied that the document they had drafted together ""played an important role. "" 1126"
167,12,Gerson and Dmitriev appeared to stop communicating with one another in approximately
167,13,"March 2017, when the investment deal they had been working on together showed no signs of"
167,14,progressing . 1127
167,15,3. Ambassador Kislyak 's Meeting with Jared Kushner and Michael Flynn m
167,16,Trump Tower Following the Election
167,17,"On November 16, 2016, Catherine Vargas, an executive assistant to Kushner, received a"
167,18,"request for a meeting with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak. 1128 That same day, Vargas sent"
167,19,"Kushner an email with the subject, ""MISSED CALL: Russian Ambassador to the US, Sergey"
167,20,"Ivanovich Kislyak .... "" 1129 The text of the email read , ""RE : setting up a time to meet w/you on"
167,21,"12/1. LMK how to proceed ."" Kushner responded in relevant part , ""I think I do this one -- confirm"
167,22,"with Dimitri [Simes of CNI] that this is the right guy ."" 1130 After reaching out to a colleague of"
167,23,"Simes at CNI, Vargas reported back to Kushner that Kislyak was ""the best go-to guy for routine"
167,24,"matters in the US,"" while Yuri Ushakov, a Russian foreign policy advisor, was the contact for"
167,25,"""more direct/substantial matters. "" 1131"
167,26,"Bob Foresman , the UBS investment bank executive who had previously tried to transmit"
167,27,"to candidate Trump an invitation to speak at an economic forum in Russia , see Volume I, Section"
167,28,"IV.A.l.d.ii, supra, may have provided similar information to the Transition Team. According to"
167,29,1122
167,30,"1/26/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (10:04:41 p.m.)."
167,31,1123
167,32,"1/28/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Nader (I'l :05:39 a.m.)."
167,33,1124
167,34,"1/28/17 Text Message, Nader to Dmitriev (11: 11:33 a.m.)."
167,35,1125
167,36,"1/29/17 Text Message , Dmitriev to Nader (11 :06:35 a.m.)."
167,37,1126
167,38,"1/28/17 Text Message, Gerson to Dmitriev; 1/29/ 17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson."
167,39,1127
167,40,"Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 4; 3/21/17 Text Message , Gerson to Dmitriev."
167,41,1128
167,42,"Statement of Jared C. Kushner to Congressional Committees (""Kushner Stmt. ""), at 6 (7/24/17)"
167,43,(written statement by Kushner to the Senate Judiciary Committee).
167,44,1129
167,45,"NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (6:44 p .m.)) ."
167,46,1130
167,47,"NOSC00004356 (11/16/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (9:54 p.m.))."
167,48,1131
167,49,"11/ 17/ 16 Email, Brown to Simes (10:41 a.m.); Brown 10/13/ 17 302, at 4; 11/17/ 16 Email,"
167,50,Vargas to Kushner (12:3 1:18).
167,51,159
167,52,NA
168,1,U.S. Department of Justice
168,2,"Attemey Werk Pfedttet // Mlt) CtJHtttiflMaterial Pfeteeted Ur,der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
168,3,1
168,4,"Foresman, at the end of an early December 2016 meeting with incoming National Security Advisor"
168,5,"Michael Flynn and his designated deputy (K.T. McFarland) in New York, Flynn asked Foresman"
168,6,"for his thoughts on Kislyak. Foresman had not met Kislyak but told Flynn that , while Kislyak was"
168,7,"an important person, Kislyak did not have a direct line to Putin. 1132 Foresman subsequently"
168,8,"traveled to Moscow, inquired of a source he believed to be close to Putin, and heard back from"
168,9,that source that Ushakov would be the official channel for the incoming U.S. national security
168,10,advisor. 1133 Foresman acknowledged that Flynn had not asked him to undertake that inquiry in
168,11,"Russia but told the Office that he nonetheless felt obligated to report the information back to Flynn,"
168,12,and that he worked to get a face-to-face meeting with Flynn in January 2017 so that he could do
168,13,"so. 1134 Email correspondence suggests that the meeting ultimately went forward, 1135 but Flynn has"
168,14,no recollection of it or of the earlier December meeting. 1136 (The investigation did not identify
168,15,evidence of Flynn or Kushner meeting with Ushakov after being given his name. 1137)
168,16,"In the meantime , although he had already formed the impression that Kislyak was not"
168,17,"necessarily the right point of contact , 1138 Kushner went forward with the meeting that Kislyak had"
168,18,"requested on November 16. It took place at Trump Tower on November 30, 2016. 1139 At"
168,19,"Kushner' s invitation , Flynn also attended; Bannon was invited but did not attend .1140 During the"
168,20,"meeting, which lasted approximately 30 minutes , Kushner expressed a desire on the part of the"
168,21,incoming Administration to start afresh with U.S.-Russian relations. 1141 Kushner also asked
168,22,Kislyak to identify the best person (whether Kislyak or someone else) with whom to direct future
168,23,discussions-someone         who had contact with Putin and the ability to speak for him. 1142
168,24,"The three men also discussed U.S. policy toward Syria , and Kislyak floated the idea of"
168,25,having Russian generals brief the Transition Team on the topic using a secure communications
168,26,"line. 1143 After Flynn explained that there was no secure line in the Transition Team offices,"
168,27,1132
168,28,"Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17."
168,29,1133
168,30,"Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 17-18."
168,31,1134
168,32,"Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 18."
168,33,1135
168,34,"RMF-SCO-00000015 (1/5/17 Email, Foresman to Atencio & Flaherty); RMF-SCO-00000015"
168,35,"(1/5/17 Email, Flaherty to Foresman & Atencio)."
168,36,1136
168,37,9/26/18 Attorney Proffer from Covington & Burling LLP (reflected in email on file with the
168,38,Office).
168,39,1137
168,40,"Vargas 4/4/18 302, at 5."
168,41,1138
168,42,"Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 4."
168,43,1139
168,44,"AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_0000016-019 (11/29/16 Email, Vargas to Kuznetsov)."
168,45,114
168,46,"°Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2; NOS00004240 (Calendar Invite, Vargas to Kushner & Flynn)."
168,47,1141
168,48,Kushner Strut. at 6.
168,49,1142
168,50,"Kushner Strut. at 6; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18."
168,51,1143
168,52,"Kushner Stmt. at 7; Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18; Flynn 1/11/18 302, at 2."
168,53,160
168,54,NA
169,1,U.S. Department of Justice
169,2,A1:l:tm·1ey '.VsrkProdttet// Mey CmttttiflMMerielProteetedUnder Fed. R. Cri1'l'I.P. 6(e)
169,3,Kushner asked Kislyak if they could communicate using secure facilities at the Russian
169,4,Embassy. 1144 Kislyak quickly rejected that idea. 1145
169,5,4. Jared Kushner's Meeting with Sergey Gorkov
169,6,"On December 6, 2016, the Russian Embassy reached out to Kushner's assistant to set up a"
169,7,second meeting between Kislyak and Kushner. 1146 Kushner declined several proposed meeting
169,8,"dates, but Kushner's assistant indicated that Kislyak was very insistent about securing a second"
169,9,meeting. 1147 Kushner told the Office that he did not want to take another meeting because he had
169,10,"already decided Kislyak was not the right channel for him to communicate with Russia, so he"
169,11,"arranged to have one of his assistants, Avi Berkowitz, meet with Kislyak in his stead. 1148 Although"
169,12,"embassy official Sergey Kuznetsov wrote to Berkowitz that Kislyak thought it ""importa nt"" to"
169,13,"""continue the conversation with Mr. Kushner in person,"" 1149 Kislyak nonetheless agreed to meet"
169,14,·instead with Berkowitz once it became apparent that Kushner was unlikely to take a meeting.
169,15,"Berkowitz met with Kislyak on December 12, 2016, at Trump Tower. 1150 The meeting"
169,16,"lasted only a few minutes, during which Kislyak indicated that he wanted Kushner to meet"
169,17,"someone who had a direct line to Putin: Sergey Gorkov, the head of the Russian-government-"
169,18,owned bank Vnesheconombank (VEB).
169,19,"Kushner agreed to meet with Gorkov. 1151 The one-on-one meeting took place the next day,"
169,20,"December 13, 2016, at the Colony Capital building in Manhattan , where Kushner had previously"
169,21,scheduled meetings. 1152 VEB was (and is) the subject of Department of Treasury econom ic
169,22,"sanctions imposed in response to Russia ' s annexation of Crimea. 1153 Kushner did not, however ,"
169,23,recall any discussion during his meeting with Gorkov about the sanctions against VEB or sanctions
169,24,more generally. 1154 Kushner stated in an interview that he did not engage in any preparation for
169,25,1144
169,26,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18."
169,27,1145
169,28,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 18."
169,29,1146
169,30,"Kushner Strut. at 7; NOSC00000123 (12/6/16 Email, Vargas to Kushner (12 : 11:40 p.m.))."
169,31,1147
169,32,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Vargas (10:41"
169,33,p.m.)).
169,34,1148
169,35,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; Kushner Stmt. at 7; DJTFP_SCO_01442290 (12/6/ 16 Email ,"
169,36,Berkowitz to
169,37,1149
169,38,DJTFP - SCO- 01442290 (12/7/16 Email                      to Berkowitz (12:31 :39 p.m.)).
169,39,1150
169,40,"Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 7; AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ _O0000l-04 (12/12/ 16 Text"
169,41,"Messages, Berkowitz & 202-701-8532)."
169,42,1151
169,43,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email, Kushner to Berkowitz)."
169,44,1152
169,45,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19; NOSC00000130-135 (12/12/16 Email , Kushner to Berkowitz)."
169,46,1153
169,47,Announcement of Treasury Sanctions on Entities Within the Financial Services and Energy
169,48,"Sectors of Russia, Against Arms or Related Materiel Entities, and those Undermining Ukraine's"
169,49,"Sovereignty, United States Department of the Treasury (Jul. 16, 2014)."
169,50,1154
169,51,"Kushner 4/11 /18 302, at 20."
169,52,161
169,53,NA
170,1,U.S. Department of Justice
170,2,"At:tefl'le:,\1/efk Predttet // Mo:,·CeHta:il'IMa:teria:lPreteetecl Ul'laer Fee. R. CPim.P. 6Ee)"
170,3,1
170,4,the meeting and that no one on the Transition                   Team even did a Google search for
170,5,Gorkov's name. 1155
170,6,"At the start of the meeting, Gorkov presented Kushner with two gifts: a painting and a bag"
170,7,of soil from the town in Belarus where Kushner's family originated. 1156
170,8,The accounts from Kushner and Gorkov differ as to whether the meeting was diplomatic
170,9,"or business in nature. Kushner told the Office that the meeting was diplomatic , with Gorkov"
170,10,expressing disappointment with U.S.-Russia relations under President Obama and hopes for
170,11,"improved relatio ns with the incoming Administration. 1157 According to Kushner, although Gorkov"
170,12,"told Kushner a little bit about his bank and made some statements about the Russian economy, the"
170,13,two did not discuss Kushner's companies or private business dealings of any kind. 1158 (At the time
170,14,"of the meeting, Kushner Companies had a debt obligation coming due on the building it owned at"
170,15,"666 Fifth Avenue, and there had been public reporting both about efforts to secure lending on the"
170,16,property and possible conflicts of interest for Kushner arising out of his company's borrowing
170,17,from foreign lenders. 1159)
170,18,"In contrast, in a 2017 public statement, VEB suggested Gorkov met with Kushner in"
170,19,"Kushner' s capacity as CEO of Kushner Companies for the purpose of discussing business, rather"
170,20,"than as part of a diplomatic effort. In particular, VEB characterized Gorkov's meeting with"
170,21,"Kushner as part of a series of ""roads how meetings"" with ""representatives of major US banks and"
170,22,"business circles,"" which included ""negotiatio ns "" and discussion of the ""most promising business"
170,23,"lines and sectors."" 1160"
170,24,"Foresman, the investment bank executive mentioned in Volume l, Sections IV.A. I and"
170,25,"IV.B.3 , supra , told the Office that he met with Gorkov and VEB deput y chairman Nikolay"
170,26,Tsekhomsky in Moscow just before Gorkov left for New York to meet Kushner. 1161 According to
170,27,"Foresman, Gorkov and Tsekhomsky told him that they were travelin g to New York to discuss post-"
170,28,"election issues with U.S. financial institutions, that their trip was sanctioned by Putin, and that they"
170,29,would be reporting back to Putin upon their return. 1162
170,30,1155
170,31,"Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 19. Berkowitz, by contrast, stated to the Office that he had googled"
170,32,"Gorkov' s name and told Kushner that Gorkov appeared to be a banker. Berkowitz 1/12/18 302, at 8."
170,33,1156
170,34,"Kushner 4/ 11/18 302, at 19-20."
170,35,1157
170,36,Kushner Stmt. at 8.
170,37,1158
170,38,Kushner Stmt. at 8.
170,39,"1159 See, e.g., Peter Grant, Donald Trump Son-in-Law Jared Kushner Could Face His Own Conflict-"
170,40,"of-Interest Questions, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 29, 2016)."
170,41,1160
170,42,"Patrick Reevell & Matthew Mosk, Russian Banker Sergey Gorkov Brushes off Questions About"
170,43,"Meeting with Jared Kushner, ABC News (June 1, 2017)."
170,44,1161
170,45,"Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 14-15."
170,46,1162
170,47,"Foresman 10/17/18 302, at 15-16."
170,48,162
170,49,NA
171,1,U.S. Department of Justice
171,2,"Atlorfte'.',''illerk Preduet // Miey·Ce:mtatftMatef'ittl Preteeted UH:derFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
171,3,The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and
171,4,"Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated) , focused"
171,5,"on business (as VEB ' s public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of"
171,6,"those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner"
171,7,and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting.
171,8,"Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner ' s assistant, ""Hi,"
171,9,"please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!""' 163"
171,10,"Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts. 1164"
171,11,"On February 8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner ' s assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up"
171,12,"another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed. 1165 According"
171,13,"to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding"
171,14,"the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request. 1166"
171,15,5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team
171,16,"In December 2016, weeks after the one-on -one meeting with Putin described in Volume I,"
171,17,"Section IV.B.1.b, supra, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate ""all-hands "" oligarch"
171,18,meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen. 1167 As in Aven's one-on-one
171,19,"meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of"
171,20,forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions. 1168
171,21,"After the December 2016 all-hands meeting , A ven tried to establish a conn ection to the"
171,22,Trump team . A ven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump
171,23,"Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L 1), another company headed"
171,24,"by Aven, and had done work for Alfa -Bank. 1169 Burt had previously served as U .S. ambassador"
171,25,"to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his"
171,26,primary roles with Alfa-Bank and Ll was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the
171,27,United States and other Western countries. 1170
171,28,"While at a Ll board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016 , Aven pulled Burt"
171,29,aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed
171,30,1163
171,31,"AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000ll (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz"
171,32,(9:56 a.m.)).
171,33,1164
171,34,"AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000ll-15 (12/19/16 - 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko"
171,35,& Berkowitz).
171,36,1165
171,37,"AKIN_GUMP_BERKOWITZ_00000lS (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz"
171,38,(10:41 a.m.)).
171,39,1166
171,40,"Berkowitz 3/22/ 18 302, at 4-5."
171,41,1168
171,42,1169
171,43,1170
171,44,"Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/ 18 302, at 2."
171,45,163
171,46,NA
172,1,U.S. Department of Justice
172,2,"AtterHe)"" '.¥erk Predttet // May CeHtttiHMttterittl Preteeted UHeer Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
172,3,interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition
172,4,Team. 1171 Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Transition Team. 1172 Although
172,5,"Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past , Burt viewed Aven's"
172,6,request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven. 1173
172,7,"Burt , who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume I, Section IV.A.4,"
172,8,"supra), 1174   decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven' s request,"
172,9,"recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner. 1175 At the time, Simes was lobbying the"
172,10,"Trump Transition Team, on Burt's behalf, to appoint Burt U.S. ambassador to Russia. 1176"
172,11,Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner
172,12,to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming
172,13,Administration. 1177 Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such
172,14,a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the
172,15,"U.S. presidential election. 1178 According to Simes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret"
172,16,"channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian"
172,17,"government and the incoming Administration. 1179 Based on what Simes had read in the media, he"
172,18,stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by
172,19,"Russia, and Simes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement"
172,20,in facilitating any connection. 1180
172,21,"In an email dated December 22 , 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with"
172,22,Simes:
172,23,"Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned"
172,24,in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the
172,25,"need to establish such a channel. But the individual emphasized that at this moment, with"
172,26,so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking
172,27,"(and who ordered what) , Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to"
172,28,discuss it again after the New Year. I trust the individual 's instincts on this.
172,29,1173
172,30,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 4."
172,31,1174
172,32,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 5."
172,33,1175
172,34,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3."
172,35,1176
172,36,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3."
172,37,1177
172,38,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4."
172,39,1178
172,40,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4."
172,41,1179
172,42,"Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5."
172,43,1180
172,44,"Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5."
172,45,164
172,46,NA
173,1,U.S. Department of Justice
173,2,/\tterl'l.e~·Werlt Prea1:1et// May Cel'l.tail'l.Material Preteetea Ul'l.Eier
173,3,Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
173,4,"If this is unclear or you would like to discuss, don't hesitate to call. 1181"
173,5,"According to Burt, the ""very influential person"" referenced in his email was Simes , and the"
173,6,"reference to a ""t rusted third party"" was a fabrication , as no such third party existed. ""Project A"""
173,7,was a term that Bmt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between
173,8,"Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what A ven was"
173,9,"requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia ' s influence in the U.S. presidential"
173,10,"election. 1182 According to Burt , his repo rt that there was "" interest "" in a communications channel"
173,11,"reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event , Burt"
173,12,"acknowledged that he added some ""hype"" to that sentence to make it sound like there was more"
173,13,interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed. 1183
173,14,1184
173,15,"Aven replied to Burt ' s email on the same day, saying ""Than k you. All clear. """
173,16,"According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue. 1185 Burt"
173,17,"spoke to A ven some time thereafter about his attempt to mak e contact with the Trum team,"
173,18,"~hat                            the current environment made it impossible ,"
173,19,"____                         1186 Burt did not recall discussing Aven's request with Simes again, nor did"
173,20,he recall speaking to anyone else about the request. 1187
173,21,"In the first quarter of 2017, A ven met again with Putin and other Russian officials. 1188 At"
173,22,"that meeting , Putin asked about Aven ' s attem t to build relations with the Trum Administration"
173,23,and Aven recounted his lack of success. 1189
173,24,1190
173,25,-                    Putin continued to inquire about Aven's efforts to connect to the Trump
173,26,Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings. 1191
173,27,Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI. 1192 As part
173,28,"of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked"
173,29,to create a back channel betwee n the Russian government and the Trump Administration. 1193
173,30,1181
173,31,"12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23 p.m.)."
173,32,1182
173,33,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3."
173,34,1183
173,35,"Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4."
173,36,1184
173,37,"12/22/16 Email, Aven to Butt (4:58:22 p.m.)."
173,38,1185
173,39,"Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7."
173,40,1186
173,41,1187
173,42,"Burt 2/9/18 302 , at 3-4."
173,43,1188
173,44,I 189
173,45,I 190
173,46,1191
173,47,1192
173,48,"Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8."
173,49,1193
173,50,"Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8;"
173,51,165
173,52,NA
174,1,U.S. Department of Justice
174,2,Attorney 1Nork Prodttet // May Contain Material Proteeted Unael' Fea. R. Cri:ffl. P. 6(e)
174,3,"According to A ven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear"
174,4,to care .1I94
174,5,6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich
174,6,"In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump"
174,7,"Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Pa e a ain visited Moscow in an"
174,8,attem t to ursue business o ortunities. II9 5
174,9,"According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort' s"
174,10,"associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his"
174,11,"connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort ,"
174,12,"Kilimnik wrote, ""Carter Page is in Moscow today , sending messages he is authorized to talk to"
174,13,"Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine. "" 1197"
174,14,"On December 9, 2016 , Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and"
174,15,Andrej Krickovic. I 198 Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town
174,16,"and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant"
174,17,for a few minutes to meet with Page. 1I99 Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump's election and
174,18,expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia. 1200 Dvorkovich
174,19,asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition
174,20,to be in a discussion of future coo eration. 1201
174,21,1194
174,22,"Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8;"
174,23,1195
174,24,"Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3;                                Among"
174,25,"other meetings, Page contacted Andrey Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, ~"
174,26,the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. ----
174,27,1197
174,28,Investigative Technique
174,29,1198
174,30,"Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8."
174,31,1199
174,32,"Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3;"
174,33,1200
174,34,"Page 3/ 16/17 302, at 3;"
174,35,1202
174,36,1203
174,37,166
174,38,NA
175,1,U.S. Department of Justice
175,2,At-t:erneyWerkPred1:1et// May Cefl:taifl:Material Preteeted Ufl:derFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
175,3,7. Contacts With and Through Michael T . Flynn
175,4,Incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn was the Transition Team ' s primary
175,5,conduit for communications with the Russian Ambassador and dealt with Russia on two sensitive
175,6,matters during the transition period: a United Nations Security Council vote and the Russian
175,7,government ' s reaction to the United States ' s imposition of sanctions for Russian interference in
175,8,the 2016 election. 1207 Despite Kushner ' s conclusion that Kislyak did not wield influence inside
175,9,"the Russian government, the Transition Team turn ed to Flynn's relationship with Kislyak on"
175,10,"both issues. As to the sanctions, Flynn spoke by phone to K.T. McFarland , his incoming deputy ,"
175,11,to prepare for his call to Kislyak; McFarland was with the President-Elect and other senior
175,12,members of the Transition Team at Mar-a-Lago at the time. Although transition officials at Mar-
175,13,"a-Lago had some concern about possible Russian reactions to the sanctions, the investigation did"
175,14,not identify evidence that the President-Elect asked Flynn to make any request to Kislyak. Flynn
175,15,"asked Kislyak not to escalate the situation in response to U.S. sanctions imposed on December 29,"
175,16,"2016 , and Kislyak later reported to Flynn that Russia acceded to that request."
175,17,a. United Nations Vote on Israeli Settlements
175,18,"On December 21, 2016 , Egypt submitted a resolution to the United Nations Security"
175,19,Council calling on Israel to cease settlement activities in Palestinian territory '.1208 The Security
175,20,"Council, which includes Russia, was scheduled to vote on the resolution th e following day .1209"
175,21,There was speculation in the media that the Obama Administration would not oppose the
175,22,resolution. 1210
175,23,1204
175,24,1205
175,25,1206
175,26,1207
175,27,"As discussed further in Volume I, Section V.C.4, infra, Flynn pleaded guilty to making false"
175,28,"statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, about these communications with Ambassador"
175,29,"Kislyak. Plea Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc."
175,30,"3. Flynn's plea agreement required that he cooperate with this Office, and the statements from Flynn in"
175,31,this report reflect his cooperation over the course of multiple debriefings in 2017 and 2018.
175,32,1208
175,33,"Karen DeYoung, How the US. Came to Abstain on a UN. Resolution Condemning Israeli"
175,34,"Settle'!1ents, Washjngfon Post (Dec. 28, 2016)."
175,35,1209
175,36,"Karen DeYoung, How the US. Came to Abstain on a UN. Resolution Condemning Israeli"
175,37,"Settlements, Washington Post (Dec. 28, 2016)."
175,38,12 10
175,39,"Michelle Nichols & Lesley Wroughton, US. Intended to Allow Passage of UN. Draft Critical"
175,40,"of Israel, Reuters (Dec. 21, 2016)."
175,41,167
175,42,NA
176,1,U.S. Department of Justice
176,2,"Atterney      \ 1/erk Predttet /,' Ma'.)'""Centain Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
176,3,"According to Flynn, the Transition Team regarded the vote as a significant issue and"
176,4,"wanted to support Israel by opposing the resolution. 1211 On December 22, 2016, multiple members"
176,5,"of the Transition Team, as well as President-Elect Trump, communicated with foreign government"
176,6,officials to determine their views on the resolution and to rally support to delay the vote or defeat
176,7,the resolution. 1212 Kushner led the effort for the Transition Team; Flynn was responsible for the
176,8,Russian government. 1213 Minutes after an early morning phone call with Kushner on December
176,9,"22, Flynn called Kislyak. 1214 According to Flynn, he informed Kislyak about the vote and the"
176,10,"Transition Team's opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the"
176,11,"resolution. 1215 Later that day, President-Elect Trump spoke with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah"
176,12,"al-Sisi about the vote. 1216 Ultimately , Egypt postponed the vote. 1217"
176,13,"On December 23, 2016, Malaysia, New Zealand, Senegal, and Venezuela resubmitted the"
176,14,"resolution. 1218 Throughout the day, members of the Transitio n Team continued to talk with foreign"
176,15,"leaders about the resolution, w ith Flynn continuing to lead the outreach with the Russian"
176,16,"government through Kislyak. 1219 When Flynn again spoke with Kislyak , Kislyak informed Flynn"
176,17,"that if the resolution came to a vote, Russia would not vote against it. 1220 The resolution later"
176,18,"passed 14-0, with the United States abstaining. 1221"
176,19,b. U.S. Sanctions Against Russia
176,20,Flynn was also the Transition Team member who spoke with the Russian government when
176,21,the Obama Administration imposed sanctions and other measures against Russia in response to
176,22,"Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election. On December 28, 2016, then-Pres ident"
176,23,"Obama signed Executive Order 13757, which took effect at 12:01 a.m. the following day and"
176,24,1211
176,25,"Flynn 11/16/ 17 302, at 12; Flynn 11/17117 302, at 2."
176,26,1212
176,27,"Flym1 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2."
176,28,1213
176,29,"Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 12-14; Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 2; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/22/16"
176,30,"Email, Kushner to Flynn; 12/22/16 Email , McFarland to                                             et al."
176,31,1214
176,32,"Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn"
176,33,1215
176,34,"Statement of Offense 13( d), United States v. Michael T. Flynn, No . 1: l 7-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec."
176,35,"1, 2017), Doc. 4 (""Flynn Stateme nt of Offense""); Flynn 11/16/ 17 302, at 12-13."
176,36,1216
176,37,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2; Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 13."
176,38,1217
176,39,"UN Vote on Israeli Settlement Postponed, ""Potentially Indefinitely"", Reuters (Dec. 22, 2016) ."
176,40,1218
176,41,"Somini Sengupta & Rick Gladstone, Rebuffing Israel, U.S. Allows Censure Over Settlem ents,"
176,42,"New York Times (Dec. 23, 2016)."
176,43,1219
176,44,"Flynn 11/16/ 17 302, at 12-14; Kushner 11/1/17 302, at 3; 12/23/16 Email , Flynn to Kushner et"
176,45,al.
176,46,122
176,47,°Flynn Statement of Offense 13(g) .
176,48,122 1
176,49,"Israel's Settlements Have No Legal Validity, Constitute Flagrant Violation of International"
176,50,"Law, Security Council Reaffirms, 7853rd Meeting (PM), United Nations Security Council (Dec. 23 , 2016)."
176,51,168
176,52,NA
177,1,U.S. Department of Justice
177,2,"A:ttort1eyWork Prodt:1et,','Mtt~'CoHtttiHMttterittl Proteeted Ut1derFed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
177,3,1222
177,4,"imposed sanctions on nine Russian individuals and entities.            On December 29, 2016, the Obama"
177,5,Administration also expelled 35 Russian government                  officials and closed two Russian
177,6,government-owned compounds in the United States. 1223
177,7,"During the rollout of the sanctions, President-Elect Trump and multiple Transition Team"
177,8,"senior officials, including McFarland, Steve Bannon, and Reince Priebus , were staying at the Mar-"
177,9,"a-Lago club in Palm Beach, Florida. Flynn was on vacation in the Dominican Republic, 1224 but"
177,10,was in daily contact with McFarland. 1225
177,11,The Transition Team and President-Elect Trump were concerned that these sanctions
177,12,would harm the United States's relationship with Russia. 1226 Although the details and timing of
177,13,"sanctions were unknown on December 28, 2016 , the media began reporting that retaliatory"
177,14,measures from the Obama Administration against Russia were forthcoming. 1227 When asked about
177,15,"imposing sanctions on Russia for its alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election,"
177,16,"President-Elect Trump told the media, ""I think we ought to get on with our lives."" 1228"
177,17,"Russia initiated the outreach to the Transition Team. On the evening of December 28,"
177,18,"2016, Kislyak texted Flynn, ""can you kindly call me back at your convenience."" 1229 Flynn did not"
177,19,respond to the text message that evening. Someone from the Russian Embassy also called Flynn
177,20,"the next morning, at 10:38 a.m., but they did not talk. 1230"
177,21,"The sanctions were announced publicly on December 29, 2016. 1231 At 1 :53 p.m. that day ,"
177,22,McFarland began exchanging emails with multiple Transition Team members and advisors about
177,23,"the impact the sanctions would have on the incoming Administration. 1232 At 2:07 p.m. , a Transition"
177,24,Team member texted Flynn a link to a New York Times article about the sanctions. 1233 At 2:29
177,25,1222
177,26,Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to Significant
177,27,"Malicious Cyber-EnabledActivities , The White House, Office ofthe Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016)."
177,28,1223
177,29,Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
177,30,"Harassment , The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016)."
177,31,1224
177,32,"Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 14; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 3-8; Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 5."
177,33,1225
177,34,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5; Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 1; McFarland 11/22/17 302, at 3-9."
177,35,1226
177,36,"Flynn 11/17/l 7 302, at 3."
177,37,1227
177,38,"Christine Wang, US to announce new sanctions against Russia in response to election hacking,"
177,39,"CNBC (Dec. 28, 2016)."
177,40,1228
177,41,"John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interference by Russia: ""Get on with our lives"" ,"
177,42,"Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016)."
177,43,1229
177,44,"SF000006 (12/28/16 Text Message, Kislyak to Flynn)."
177,45,123
177,46,°Call Records of Michael T. Flynn
177,47,123 1
177,48,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 2-3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 4-5."
177,49,1232
177,50,"12/29/16 Email, McFarland to O'Brien et al.; 12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al."
177,51,1233
177,52,"SF00000t (12/29/16 Text Message, Flaherty to Flynn)."
177,53,169
177,54,NA
178,1,U.S. Department of Justice
178,2,Atloffle)' Wofk Prodttet II May CoAtail'lMittertal Proteeted U!'lder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
178,3,"p.m., McFarland called Flynn , but they did not talk. 1234 Shortly thereafter, McFarland and Bannon"
178,4,"discussed the sanctions. 1235 According to McFarland, Bannon remarked that the sanctions would"
178,5,"hurt their ability to have good relations with Russia, and that Russian escalation would make things"
178,6,more difficult. 1236 McFarland believed she told Bannon that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak
178,7,"later that night. 1237 McFarland also believed she may have discussed the sanctions with Priebus ,"
178,8,"and likewise told him that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak that night. 1238 At 3: 14 p.m. ,"
178,9,"Flynn texted a Transition Team member who was assisting McFarland, ""Time for a call???"" 1239"
178,10,"The Transition Team member responded that McFarland was on the phone with Tom Bossert, a"
178,11,"Transition Team senior official, to which Flynn responded , ""Tit for tat w Russia not good. Russian"
178,12,"AMBO reaching out to me today. "" 1240"
178,13,Flynn recalled that he chose not to communicate with Kislyak about the sanctions until he
178,14,"had heard from the team at Mar-a-Lago. 1241 He first spoke with Michael Ledeen, 1242 a Transition"
178,15,"Team member who advised on foreign policy and national security matters, for 20 minutes. 1243"
178,16,"Flynn then spoke with McFarland for almost 20 minutes to discuss what, if anything, to"
178,17,"communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions. 1244 On that call, McFarland and Flynn discussed the"
178,18,"sanctions, including their potential impact on the incoming Trump Administration's foreign polic y"
178,19,goals. 1245 McFarland and Flynn also discussed that Transition Team members in Mar-a-Lago did
178,20,not want Russia to escalate the situation. 1246 They both understood that Flynn would relay a
178,21,message to Kislyak in hopes of making sure the situation would not get out of hand . 1247
178,22,1234
178,23,Call Records of K.T. McFarland
178,24,1235
178,25,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6."
178,26,1236
178,27,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 5-6."
178,28,1237
178,29,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6."
178,30,1238
178,31,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6."
178,32,1239
178,33,"SF00000l (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty)."
178,34,1240
178,35,"SF00000l (12/29/16 Text Me ssa ge, Flynn to Flaherty)."
178,36,124 1
178,37,"Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3."
178,38,1242
178,39,"Michael Ledeen is married to Barbara Led een, the Senate staffer whose 2016 efforts to locate"
178,40,"Hillary Clinton ' s missing emails are described in Volume I, Section III.D.2, supra."
178,41,1243
178,42,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3; Call Record s of Michael Ledeen"
178,43,1244
178,44,"Fl nn 11/17 /17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense"
178,45,; Call Records of Michael T. Flynn
178,46,1245
178,47,"Flynn 11/17117 302, at 3-4"
178,48,1246
178,49,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense  ,r3( c); McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 6-"
178,50,7.
178,51,1247
178,52,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 6-7."
178,53,170
178,54,NA
179,1,U.S. Department of Justice
179,2,"/\tleffle)"" Werk Pred1:1et// Mity Cml:taiHMaterial Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
179,3,"Immediately after speaking with McFarland , Flynn called and spoke with Kislyak. 1248"
179,4,"Flynn discussed multiple topics with Kislyak, including the sanctions, scheduling a video"
179,5,"teleconference between President-Elect Trump and Putin , an upcoming terrorism conference , and"
179,6,"Russia's views about the Middle East. 1249 With respect to the sanctions, Flynn requested that"
179,7,"Russia not escalate the situation, not get into a ""tit for tat,"" and only respond to the sanctions in a"
179,8,reciprocal manner. 1250
179,9,Multiple Transition Team members were aware that Flynn was speaking with Kislyak that
179,10,"day. In addition to her conversations with Bannon and Reince Priebus , at 4:43 p.m., McFarland"
179,11,"sent an email to Transition Team members about the sanctions, informing the group that ""Gen"
179,12,"[F]lynn is talking to russian ambassador this evening."" 1251 Less than an hour later , McFarland"
179,13,"briefed President-Elect Trump. Bannon, Priebus, Sean Spicer, and other Transition Team members"
179,14,"were present. 1252 During the briefing , President -E lect Trump asked McFarland if the Russians did"
179,15,"""it,"" meaning the intrusions intended to influence the presidential election. 1253 McFarland said"
179,16,"yes, and President-Elect Trump expressed doubt that it was the Russians. 1254 McFarland also"
179,17,"discussed potential Russian responses to the sanctions, and said Russia's response would be an"
179,18,indicator of what the Russians wanted going forward. 1255 President-Elect Trump opined that the
179,19,sanctions provided him with leverage to use with the Russians. 1256 McFarland recalled that at the
179,20,"end of the meeting, someone may have mentioned to President-Elect Trump that Flynn was"
179,21,speaking to the Russian ambassador that evening. 1257
179,22,"After the briefing , Flynn and McFarland spoke over the phone. 1258 Flynn reported on the"
179,23,"substance of his call with Kislyak, including their discussion of the sanctions. 1259 According to"
179,24,"McFarland, Flynn mentioned that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be"
179,25,escalatory because they wanted a good relationship with the incoming Administration . 1260
179,26,McFarland also gave Flynn a summary of her recent briefing with President-Elect Trump. 1261
179,27,1248
179,28,"Flynn Statement of Offense  ,r3(d)."
179,29,1249
179,30,"Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 3-4; Flynn Statement of Offense    ,r 3(c); 12/30/16 Email, Flynn to"
179,31,McFarland.
179,32,125
179,33,"°Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 1; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r3(d)."
179,34,1251
179,35,"12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al."
179,36,1252
179,37,"12/29/16 Email, Westerhoutto Flaherty; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
179,38,1253
179,39,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
179,40,1254
179,41,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
179,42,1255
179,43,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
179,44,1256
179,45,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 7."
179,46,1257
179,47,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 7."
179,48,1258
179,49,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
179,50,1259
179,51,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4; Flynn Statement of Offense ,r3(e)."
179,52,1260
179,53,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8."
179,54,1261
179,55,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 8."
179,56,171
179,57,NA
180,1,U.S. Department of Justice
180,2,Attet·Hey\l/erk Predttet// Mtty CeHtttiH    MttterittlPreteeted UHderFed. R. Criffl.P. 6(e)
180,3,"The next day, December 30, 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov remarked that"
180,4,"Russia would respond in kind to the sanctions. 1262 Putin superseded that comment two hours later,"
180,5,releasing a statement that Russia would not take retaliatory measures in response to the sanctions
180,6,"at that time. 1263 Hours later President-Elect Trump tweeted, ""Great move on delay (by V."
180,7,"Putin)."" 1264 Shortly thereafter, Flynn sent a text message to McFarland summarizing his call with"
180,8,"Kislyak from the day before, which she emailed to Kushner, Bannon, Priebus, and other Transition"
180,9,Team members. 1265 The text message and email did not include sanctions as one of the topics
180,10,discussed with Kislyak. 1266 Flynn told the Office that he did not document his discussion of
180,11,sanctions because it could be perceived as getting in the way of the Obama Administration's
180,12,foreign policy .1267
180,13,"On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him the request had been received"
180,14,at the highest levels and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate to the sanctions in response to the
180,15,"request. 1268 Two hours later , Flynn spoke with McFarland and relayed his conversation with"
180,16,"Kislyak. 1269 According to McFarland, Flynn remarked that the Russians wanted a better"
180,17,°
180,18,relationship and that the relationship was back on track. 127 Flynn also told McFarland that he
180,19,believed his phone call had made a difference. 1271 McFarland recalled congratulating Flynn in
180,20,"response. 1272 Flynn spoke with other Transition Team members that day, but does not recall"
180,21,whether they discussed the sanctions. 1273 Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions with Bannon the
180,22,"next day and that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's conversation with Kislyak. 1274 Bannon,"
180,23,1262
180,24,Comment by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on recent US sanctions and the expulsion of
180,25,"Russian diplomats, Moscow, December 20, 2016, The Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Russian Federation"
180,26,"(Dec. 30, 2016 (5:32 a.m.))."
180,27,1263
180,28,"Statement of the President of the Russian Federation, Kremlin, Office of the President (Dec."
180,29,"30, 2016 (7:15 a.m.))."
180,30,1264
180,31,@realDonaldTrump 12/30/16 (11:41 a.m.) Tweet.
180,32,1265
180,33,"12/30/16 Email, Flynn to McFarland; 12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al."
180,34,1266
180,35,"12/30/16 Email, McFarland to Kushner et al."
180,36,1267
180,37,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 4."
180,38,1268
180,39,"Call Records of Michael T. Flynn                                  ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at l ;"
180,40,"Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense iJ3(g)."
180,41,1269
180,42,"Call Records of Michael T. Flynn                                  ; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 5;"
180,43,"Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10."
180,44,1270
180,45,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10."
180,46,1271
180,47,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10."
180,48,1272
180,49,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10."
180,50,1273
180,51,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, !1t5-6."
180,52,1274
180,53,"Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 1; Flynn 11/20/17 302, at 3; Flynn 1/19/17 302, at 5; Flynn Statement"
180,54,"of Offense ,r3(h)."
180,55,172
180,56,NA
181,1,U.S. Department of Justice
181,2,"Atterttey Werk Predttet /,' Ma, · Cetttaitt Material Preteeted Uttder Fed . R. Criffl. P . 6(e)"
181,3,"for his part, recalled meeting with Flynn that day , but said that he did not remember discussing"
181,4,sanctions with him. 1275
181,5,"Additional information about Flynn's sanctions -related discussions with Kislyak, and the"
181,6,"handling of those discussions by the Transition Team and the Trump Administration , is provided"
181,7,in Volume II of this report.
181,8,***
181,9,"In sum, the investigation established multiple links between Trump Campaign officials and"
181,10,individuals tied to the Russian government. Those links included Russian offers of assistance to
181,11,"the Campaign. In some instances , the Campaign was receptive to the offer , while in other instances"
181,12,"the Campaign officials shied away. Ultimately , the investigation did not establish that the"
181,13,Campaign coordinated or conspired with the Russian government in its election-interferenc e
181,14,activities.
181,15,1275
181,16,"Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9."
181,17,173
181,18,NA
182,1,U.S. Department of Justice
182,2,Atlerl'le)' '.¥erk Predttet // May CmttaiH .Material Preteeted UHElerFeel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
182,3,V. PROSECUTION AND DECLINATION DECISIONS
182,4,"The Appointment Order authorized the Special Counsel's Office ""to prosecute federal"
182,5,"crimes arising from [its] investigation"" of the matters assigned to it. In deciding whether to"
182,6,"exercise this prosecutorial authority , the Office has been guided by the Principles of Federal"
182,7,"Prosecution set forth in the Justice (formerly U.S. Attorney's) Manual. In particular, the Office"
182,8,has evaluated whether the conduct of the individuals considered for prosecution constituted a
182,9,federal offense and whether admissible evidence would probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain
182,10,a conviction for such an offense. Justice Manual § 9-27.220 (2018). Where the answer to those
182,11,"questions was yes, the Office further considered whether the prosecution would serve a substantial"
182,12,"federal interest, the individuals were subject to effective prosecution in another jurisdiction , and"
182,13,there existed an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. Id.
182,14,"As explained below, those considerations led the Office to seek charges against two sets of"
182,15,Russian nationals for their roles in er etratin the active-measures social media cam ai n and
182,16,similarly determined that the contacts between Campaign officials and Russia-linked individuals
182,17,"either did not involve the commission of a federal crime or, in the case of campaign-finance"
182,18,"offenses, that our evidence was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a criminal conviction. At the"
182,19,"same time, the Office concluded that the Principles of Federal Prosecution supported charging"
182,20,certain individuals connected to the Campaign with making false statements or otherwise
182,21,obstructing this investigation or parallel congressional investigations .
182,22,"A. Russian ""Active Measures"" Social Media Campaign"
182,23,"On February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an"
182,24,indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian entities-including the Internet
182,25,Research Agency (IRA) and Concord Management and Consulting LLC (Concord)- with
182,26,violating U.S. criminal laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes. 1276
182,27,The indictment charges all of the defendants with conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count
182,28,"One), three defendants with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and •bank fraud (Count Two) , and"
182,29,five defendants with aggravated identity theft (Counts Three through Eight). Internet Research
182,30,"Agency Indictment. Concord, which is one of the entities charged in the Count One conspiracy,"
182,31,entered an appearance through U.S. counsel and moved to dismiss the charge on multiple grounds .
182,32,"In orders and memorandum opinions issued on August 13 and November 15, 2018, the district"
182,33,court denied Concord's motions to dismiss. United States v. Concord Management & Consulting
182,34,"LLC, 347 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. 2018). United States v. Concord Management & Consulting"
182,35,"LLC, 317 F. Supp. 3d 598 (D.D.C . 2018). As of this writing, the prosecution of Concord remains"
182,36,ongoing before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The other defendants remain
182,37,at large.
182,38,12 76
182,39,A more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case is set forth in a separate
182,40,memorandum provided to the Acting Attorney General before the indictment.
182,41,174
182,42,NA
183,1,U.S. Department of Justice
183,2,Atterfl:ey Werk Preettet // Moy Cefltoifl Material Preteetee Ufl:eef Pee. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
183,3,Although members of the IRA had contact with individuals affiliated with the Trump
183,4,"Campaign, the indictment does not charge any Trump Campaign official or any other U.S. person"
183,5,with participating in the conspiracy. That is because the investigation did not identify evidence
183,6,that any U.S. person who coordinated or communicated with the IRA knew that he or she was
183,7,speaking with Russian nationals engaged in the criminal conspiracy. The Office therefore
183,8,determined that such persons did not have the knowledge or criminal purpose required to charge
183,9,them in the conspiracy to defraud the United States (Count One) or in the separate count alleging
183,10,a wire- and bank-fraud conspiracy involving the IRA and two individual Rus sian nationals (Count
183,11,Two).
183,12,"The Office did , however , charge one U.S . national for his role in supplying false or stolen"
183,13,bank account numbers that allowed the IRA conspirators to access U.S. online payment systems
183,14,"by circumventing those systems ' security features. On February 12, 2018, Richard Pinedo pleaded"
183,15,"guilty, pursuant to a single-count information , to identity fraud , in violation of 18 U .S.C."
183,16,"§ 1028(a)(7) and (b)(l)(D) . Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24"
183,17,"(D.D.C . Feb. 12, 2018) , Doc. 10. The investigation did not establish that Pinedo was aware of the"
183,18,identity of the IRA members who purchased bank account numbers from him. Pinedo's sales of
183,19,account numbers enabled the IRA members to anonymously access a financial network through
183,20,"which they transacted with U .S. persons and companies . See Gov't Sent. Mem. at 3, United States"
183,21,"v. Richard Pinedo, No. 1:18-cr-24 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2018), Doc. 24 . On October 10, 2018, Pinedo"
183,22,"was sentenced to six months of imprisonment, to be followed by six months of home confinement ,"
183,23,and was ordered to complete 100 hours of community service.
183,24,B. Russian Hacking and Dumping Operations
183,25,1. Section 1030 Computer-Intrusion Conspiracy
183,26,a. Background
183,27,"On July 13, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia returned an indictment"
183,28,charging Russian military intelligence officers from the GRU with conspiring to hack into various
183,29,"U.S. computers used by the Clinton Campaign, DNC, DCCC, and other U.S. persons , in violation"
183,30,of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 371 (Count One); committing identity theft and conspiring to commit
183,31,"money laundering in furtherance of that hacking conspiracy, in violation of 18 U.S .C. §§ I 028A"
183,32,and l 956(h) (Counts Two through Ten); and a separate conspiracy to hack into the computers of
183,33,"U.S. persons and entities responsible for the administration of the 2016 U.S. election, in violation"
183,34,"of18U .S.C. §§ 1030and371 (CountEleven). Netyksholndictment. 1277 Asofthiswriting,all                12"
183,35,defendants remain at large.
183,36,The Netyksho indictment alleges that the defendants conspired with one another and with
183,37,others to hack into the computers of U.S. persons and entities involved in the 2016 U.S. presidential
183,38,"election , steal documents from those computers, and stage releases of the stolen documents to"
183,39,"interfere in the election . Netyksho Indictment ,r2. The indictment also describes how , in staging"
183,40,1277
183,41,The Office provided a more detailed explanation of the charging decision in this case in
183,42,meetings with the Office of the Acting Attorney General before the indictment.
183,43,175
183,44,NA
184,1,U.S. Department of Justice
184,2,"Atterfte)' Werk Predt1et ,',' Ma:>·Cefltaifl Material Preteeted Uflder Fed . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
184,3,"the releases, the defendants used the Guccifer 2.0 persona to disseminate documents through"
184,4,"WikiLeaks. On July 22, 2016 , WikiLeaks released over 20,000 emails and other documents that"
184,5,"the hacking conspirators had stolen from the DNC. Netyksho Indictment ,i 48. In addition, on"
184,6,"October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks began releasing emails that some conspirators had stolen from Clinton"
184,7,Campaign chairman John Podesta after a successful spearphishing operation. Netyksho
184,8,"Indictment ,i 49."
184,9,Harm to Ongoing Matter
184,10,Harm to Ongoing Matter
184,11,b. Charging Decision As to Harm to Ongoing Matter
184,12,Harm to Ongoing Matter
184,13,-Harm        to Ongoing Matter
184,14,1278
184,15,"The Office also considered , but ruled out, charges on the theory that the post-hacking sharing"
184,16,and dissemination of emails could constitute trafficking in or receipt of stolen property under the National
184,17,"Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 and 2315. The statutes comprising the NSPA cover"
184,18,"""goods, wares , or merchandise,"" and lower coutts have largely understood that phrase to be limited to"
184,19,"tangible items since the Supreme Court's decision in Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207 (1985). See"
184,20,"United States v. Yijia Zhang , 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 344-48 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (collecting cases). One of those"
184,21,"post-Dowling decisions-United States v. Brown, 925 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1991)-specifically held that"
184,22,"the NSPA does not reach ""a computer program in source code form,"" even though that code was stored in"
184,23,"tangible items (i.e., a hard disk and in a three-ring notebook). Id. at 1302-03. Congress, in turn, cited the"
184,24,"Brown opinion in explaining the need for amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) that ""would ensure that"
184,25,the theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft
184,26,"of physical items [is] protected."" S. Rep. 104-357, at 7 (1996). That sequenc e of events would make it"
184,27,"difficult to argue that hacked emails in electronic form, which are the relevant stolen items here, const itute"
184,28,"""goods, wares, or merchandise"" within the meaning of the NSPA."
184,29,176
184,30,NA
185,1,U.S. Department of Justice
185,2,Attemey 'Nerk Pr0d1:1et// Ma-y C0t1tait1Material Preteetea Ut1der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
185,3,177
185,4,NA
186,1,U.S. Department of Justice
186,2,"AttorRey Work Prodttet ,',' Mtty Cofltttifl Mttterittl Proteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
186,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
186,4,-Harm     to Ongoing Matter
186,5,178
186,6,NA
187,1,U.S. Department of Justice
187,2,"Atterne:,· Werk Predttet // May Centain Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim . P. 6(e)"
187,3,2. Potential Section 1030 Violation B
187,4,See United States v.
187,5,"Willis, 4 76 F .3d 1121, 1125 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the 1986 amendments to Section"
187,6,"1030 reflect Congress's desire to reach ""' intentional acts of unauthorized access-rather than"
187,7,"mistaken, inadvertent or careless ones""') (quoting S. Rep. 99-432, at 5 (1986)). In addition, the"
187,8,"computer                                likely qualifies as a ""protected"" one under the statute, which"
187,9,"reaches ""effectively all comp       s ith Internet access."" United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854,"
187,10,859 9th Cir . 2012 en bane .
187,11,"Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution, however, the Office determined that"
187,12,prosecution of this potential violation was not warranted. Those Principles instruct prosecutors to
187,13,"consider, among other things, the nature and seriousness of the offense, the person's culpability in"
187,14,"connection with the offense, and the probable sentence to be im osed if the rosecution is"
187,15,successful. Justice Manual 9-27.230.
187,16,179
187,17,NA
188,1,U.S. Department of Justice
188,2,Atterney Werk Predttet // May CeHtain Material Preteeted Under Fee. R:. Criffl. P. 6(e)
188,3,C. Russian Government Outreach and Contacts
188,4,"As explained in Section IV above, the Office's investigation uncovered evidence of"
188,5,"numerous links (i.e., contacts) between Trump Campaign officials and individuals having or"
188,6,claiming to have ties to the Russian government. The Office evaluated the contacts under several
188,7,"sets of federal laws, including conspiracy laws and statutes governing foreign agents who operate"
188,8,"in the United States. After considering the available evidence, the Office did not pursue charges"
188,9,under these statutes against any of the individuals discussed in Section IV above-with the
188,10,exception of FARA charges against Paul Manafort and Richard Gates based on their activities on
188,11,behalf of Ukraine.
188,12,One of the interactions between the Trump Campaign and Russian -affiliated individuals-
188,13,"the June 9, 2016 meeting between high-ranking campaign officials and Russians promising"
188,14,derogatory information on Hillary Clinton-implicates         an additional body of law: campaign -
188,15,finance statutes. Schemes involving the solicitation or receipt of assistance from foreign sources
188,16,"raise difficult statutory and constitutional questions. As ex lained below, the Office evaluated"
188,17,those questions in connection with the June 9 meeting
188,18,"The Office ultimately concluded that, even if the principal legal questions were resolved favorably"
188,19,"to the government , a prosecution would encounter difficulties proving that Campaign officials or"
188,20,individuals connected to the Campaign willfully violated the law.
188,21,"Finally, although the evidence of contacts between Campaign officials and Russia -"
188,22,"affiliated individuals may not have been sufficient to establish or sustain criminal charges , several"
188,23,U.S. persons connected to the Campaign made false statements about those contacts and took other
188,24,steps to obstruct the Office's investigation and those of Congress. This Office has therefore
188,25,charged some of those individuals with making false statements and obstructing justice.
188,26,1. Potential Coordination: Conspiracy and Collusion
188,27,"As an initial matter , this Office evaluated potentially criminal conduct that involved the"
188,28,"collective action of multiple individuals not under the rubric of ""collusion,"" but through the lens"
188,29,"of conspiracy law. In so doing, the Office recognized that the word ""collud[ e]"" appears in the"
188,30,"Acting Attorney General's August 2, 2017 memorandum; it has frequently been invoked in public"
188,31,"reporting; and it is sometimes referenced in antitrust law, see, e.g., Brooke Group v. Brown &"
188,32,"Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993). But collusion is not a specific offense or"
188,33,theory of liability found in the U .S. Code; nor is it a term of art in federal criminal law. To the
188,34,"contrary, even as defined in legal dictionaries, collusion is largely synonymous with conspiracy as"
188,35,"that crime is set forth in the general federal conspiracy statute , 18 U .S.C. § 371. See Black 's Law"
188,36,"Dictionary 321 (10th ed. 2014) (collusion is ""[a]n agreement to defraud another or to do or obtain"
188,37,"something forbidden by law""); 1 Alexander Burrill , A Law Dictionary and Glossary 311 (1871)"
188,38,"(""An agreement between two or more persons to defraud another by the forms of law, or to employ"
188,39,"such forms as means of accomplishing some unlawful object.""); 1 Bouvier 's Law Dictionary 352"
188,40,180
188,41,NA
189,1,U.S . Department of Justice
189,2,A:t:1:ertteyWerk Predttet // Mtt;s CetttttiH Mttterittl Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
189,3,"(1897) (""An agreement between two or more persons to defraud a person of his rights by the forms"
189,4,"of law, or to obtain an object forbidden by law."")."
189,5,"For that reason, this Office ' s focus in resolving the question of joint criminal liability was"
189,6,"on conspiracy as defined in federal law, not the commonly discussed term ""collusion."" The Office"
189,7,considered in particular whether contacts between Trump Campaign officials and Russia-linked
189,8,individuals could trigger liability for the crime of conspiracy-either under statutes that have their
189,9,"own conspiracy language (e.g. , 18 U .S.C. §§ 1349, 195l(a)) , or under the general conspiracy"
189,10,statute (18 U.S .C. § 371). The investigation did not establish that the contacts described in Volume
189,11,"I, Section IV, supra , amounted to an agreement to commit any substantive violation of federal"
189,12,"criminal law- including foreign-fnfluence and campaign-finance laws , both of which are"
189,13,discussed further below. The Office therefore did not charge any individual associated with the
189,14,"Trump Campaign with conspiracy to commit a federal offense arising from Russia contacts, either"
189,15,under a specific statute or under Section 371 's offenses clause.
189,16,The Office also did not charge any campaign official or associate with a conspiracy under
189,17,Section 371 's defraud clause. That clause criminalizes participating in an agreement to obstruct a
189,18,lawful function of the U.S. government or its agencies through deceitful or dishon est means. See
189,19,"Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 861 (1966); Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S ."
189,20,"182, 188 (1924); see also United States v. Concord Mgmt. & Consulting LLC, 34 7 F. Supp. 3d 38,"
189,21,46 (D.D .C.2018). The investigation did not establish any agreement among Campaign officials-
189,22,or between such officials and Russia-linked individuals-to interfere with or obstruct a lawful
189,23,"function of a government agency during the campaign or transition period. And , as discussed in"
189,24,"Volume I, Section V.A , supra , the investigation did not identify evidence that any Campaign"
189,25,official or associate knowingly and intentionally participated in the conspiracy to defraud that the
189,26,"Office charged , namely, the active-measures conspiracy described in Volume I, Section II, supra ."
189,27,"Accordingly, the Office did not charge any Campaign associate or other U.S. person with"
189,28,conspiracy to defraud the United States based on the Russia-relat ed contact s described in Section
189,29,IV above.
189,30,2. Potential Coordination: Foreign Agent Statutes (FARA and 18 U.S .C. § 951)
189,31,The Office next assessed the potential liability of Campaign-affiliated individuals under
189,32,"federal statutes regulating actions on behalf of, or work done for, a foreign government."
189,33,a. Governing Law
189,34,"Under 18 U.S.C . § 951, it is generally illegal to act in the United States as an agent of a"
189,35,foreign government without providing notice to the Attorney General. Although the defendant
189,36,"must act on behalf of a foreign government (as oppos ed to other kinds of foreign entities) , the acts"
189,37,"need not involve espionage ; rather, acts of any typ e suffice for liability. See United States v."
189,38,"Duran, 596 F.3d 1283, 1293-94 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Latchin, 554 F.3d 709 , 715 (7th"
189,39,"Cir. 2009) ; United States v. Dumeisi, 424 F.3d 566 , 581 (7th Cir. 2005) . An ""agent of a foreign"
189,40,"government"" is an "" individual"" who ""agrees to operate "" in the United States ""subject to the"
189,41,"direction or control of a foreign government or official. "" 18 U.S .C. § 951 (d) ."
189,42,181
189,43,NA
190,1,U.S . Department of Justice
190,2,Aft:emey Werk Predt1et // Mity Cetttaitt Material Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
190,3,The crime defined by Section 951 is complete upon knowingly acting in the United States
190,4,as an unregistered foreign-government agent. 18 U.S.C. § 95l(a). The statute does not require
190,5,"willfulness, and knowledge of the notification requirement is not an element of the offense. United"
190,6,"States v. Campa, 529 F.3d 980, 998-99 (11th Cir. 2008); Duran, 596 F.3d at 1291-94 ; Dumeisi ,"
190,7,424 F.3d at 581.
190,8,The Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) generally makes it illegal to act as an agent
190,9,of a foreign principal by engaging in certain (largely political) activities in the United States
190,10,without registering with the Attorney General. 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621. The triggering agency
190,11,"relationship must be with a foreign principal or ""a person any of whose activities are directly or"
190,12,"indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in major part by a"
190,13,"foreign principal. "" 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(l). That includes a foreign government or political party"
190,14,and various foreign individuals and entities. 22 U.S.C. § 611(6). A covered relationship exists if
190,15,"a person ""acts as an agent , representative , employee, or servant"" or ""in any other capacity at the"
190,16,"order, request, or under the [foreign principal's] direction or control. "" 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(l) . It"
190,17,"is sufficient if the person ""agrees, consents, assumes or purports to act as, or who is or holds"
190,18,"himself out to be , whether or not pursuant to contractual relationship , an agent of a foreign"
190,19,"principal."" 22 U.S.C. § 61 l(c)(2)."
190,20,"The triggering activity is that the agent ""directly or through any other person "" in the United"
190,21,"States (1) engages in ""political activities for or in the interests of [the] foreign principal ,"" which"
190,22,"include s attempts to influence federal officials or the public; (2) acts as ""public relations counsel,"
190,23,"publicity agent, information-service employee or political consultant for or in the interests of such"
190,24,"foreign principal ""; (3) "" solicits, collects, disburses , or dispenses contributions , loans, money , or"
190,25,"other things of value for or in the interest of such foreign principal"" ; or (4) ""re presents the interests"
190,26,"of such foreign principal"" before any federal agency or official. 22 U .S.C. § 611 (c)(1 )."
190,27,"It is a crime to engage in a "" [w ]illful violation of any provision of the Act or any regulation"
190,28,"thereunder. "" 22 U.S .C. § 618(a)(l). It is also a crime willfully to make false statements or"
190,29,omissions of material facts in FARA registration statements or supplements.                         22 U.S.C.
190,30,"§ 618(a)(2). Most violations have a maximum penalty of five years of imprisonment and a $10,000"
190,31,fine. 22 U.S.C. § 618.
190,32,b. Application
190,33,The investigation uncovered extensive evidence that Paul Manafort's and Richard Oates's
190,34,pre -campaign work for the government of Ukraine violated FARA. Manafort and Gates were
190,35,charg ed for that conduct and admitted to it when they pleaded guilty to superseding criminal
190,36,informations in the District of Columbia prosecution .1280 The evidence und erlying those charges
190,37,is not addressed in this report because it was discussed in public court documents and in a separate
190,38,1280
190,39,"Gates Superseding Criminal Information ; Waiver of Indictment, United States v. Richard W"
190,40,"Gates III, 1:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 203; Waiver of Trial by Jury, United States v. Richard"
190,41,"W Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 204; Gates Plea Agr eement; Statement of Offense ,"
190,42,"United States v. Richard W Gates III, l:17-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2018), Doc. 206; Plea Agreement ,"
190,43,"United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1 :17-cr-2 01 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), Doc. 422 ; Statement of Offense ,"
190,44,"United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr., 1: l 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018) , Doc. 423."
190,45,182
190,46,NA
191,1,U.S. Department of Justice
191,2,"AtterRe:,· Werk Predttet // Mtt:,•CeRtttiR Mttterittl Preteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. e(e)"
191,3,prosecution memorandum submitted to the Acting Attorney General before the original indictment
191,4,in that case.
191,5,"In addition, the investigation produced evidence of FARA violations involving Michael"
191,6,"Flynn. Those potential violations, however, concerned a country other than Russia (i.e., Turkey)"
191,7,and were resolved when Flynn admitted to the underlying facts in the Statement of Offense that
191,8,"accompanied his guilty plea to a false-statements charge . Statement of Offense, United States v."
191,9,"Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 4 (""Flynn Statement of"
191,10,"Offense""). 1281"
191,11,"The investigation did not, however, yield evidence sufficient to sustain any charge that any"
191,12,individual affiliated with the Trump Campaign acted as an agent of a foreign principal within the
191,13,"meaning of FARA or, in terms of Section 951, subject to the direction or control of the government"
191,14,"of Russia, or any official thereof. In particular, the Office did not find evidence likely to prove"
191,15,"beyond a reasonable doubt that Campaign officials such as Paul Manafort, George Papadopoulos ,"
191,16,"and Carter Page acted as agents of the Russian overnrnent-or at its direction control, or"
191,17,re uest-durin       the relevant time eriod. 1282
191,18,"As a result, the Office did not charge                 any other Trump Campaign official with violating"
191,19,"FARA or Section 951, or attempting or conspiring to do so, based on contacts with the Russian"
191,20,government or a Russian principal.
191,21,"Finally , the Office investigated whether one of the above campaign advisors-George"
191,22,"Papadopoulos-acted as an agent of, or at the direction and control of, the government of Israel."
191,23,While the investigation revealed significant ties between Papadopoulos and Israel (and search
191,24,"warrants were obtained in part on that basis), the Office ultimately determined that the evidence"
191,25,was not sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction under FARA or Section 951.
191,26,3. Campaign Finance
191,27,Several areas of the Office's investigation involved efforts or offers by foreign nationals to
191,28,provide negative information about candidate Clinton to the Trump Campaign or to distribute that
191,29,"information to the public, to the anticipated benefit of the Campaign. As explained below , the"
191,30,"Office considered whether two of those efforts in particular - the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump"
191,31,1282
191,32,"On four occasions, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) issued warrants based"
191,33,"on a finding of probable cause to believe that Page was an agent of a foreign power. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b ),"
191,34,1805(a)(2)(A). The FISC 's probable-cause finding was based on a different (and lower) standard than the
191,35,"one governing the Office's decision whether to bring charges against Page, which is whether admissible"
191,36,evidence would likely be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Page acted as an agent of the
191,37,"Russian Federation during the period at issue. Cf United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir."
191,38,"2013) ( explaining that probable cause requires only ""a fair probability ,"" and not ""certainty, or proof beyond"
191,39,"a reasonable doubt, or proof by a preponderance of the evidence"")."
191,40,183
191,41,NA
192,1,U.S. Department of Justice
192,2,:At:l:erHey\¥erk Predttet // Ma)· CaHtaiH Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
192,3,Tower Harm to Ongoing Matter                                     ---:-eonstitutedprosecutable violations of
192,4,the campaign-finance laws. The Office determined that the evidence was not sufficient to charge
192,5,either incident as a criminal violation.
192,6,a. Overview Of Governing Law
192,7,"""[T]he United States has a compelling interest ... in limiting the participation of foreign"
192,8,"citizens in activities of democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign influence"
192,9,"over the U.S. political process."" Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288 (D.D.C. 2011)"
192,10,"(Kavanaugh, J., for three-judge court), ajf'd, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). To that end, federal campaign-"
192,11,"finance law broadly prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions, donations,"
192,12,"expenditures, or other disbursements in connection with federal, state, or local candidate elections,"
192,13,"and prohibits anyone from soliciting, accepting, or receiving such contributions or donations. As"
192,14,"relevant here, foreign nationals may not make- and no one may ""solicit,' accept, or receive"" from"
192,15,"them-""a contribution or donation of money or other thing of value"" or ""an express or implied"
192,16,"promise to make a contribution or donation, in connection with a Federal, State, or local election."""
192,17,"52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(l)(A), (a)(2). 1283 The term ""contr ibution,"" which is used throughout the"
192,18,"campaign-finance law, ""includes"" ""any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or"
192,19,anything of value made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal
192,20,"office."" 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i). It excludes , among other things, ""the value of [volunteer]"
192,21,"services."" 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(B)(i)."
192,22,"Foreign nationals are also barred from making ""an expenditure, independent expenditure ,"
192,23,"or disbursement for an electioneering communication."" 52 U.S.C. § 30121(a)(l)(C). The term"
192,24,"""expenditure "" ""includes"" ""any purchase , payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit , or gift of"
192,25,"money or anything of value, made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for"
192,26,"Federal office."" 52 U.S.C. §,30101(9)(A)(i). It excludes, among other things, news stories and"
192,27,"non-partisan get-out-the-vote activities. 52 U.S.C . § 3010 I (9)(B)(i)-(ii). An "" independent"
192,28,"expenditure"" is an expenditure ""expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified"
192,29,"candidate"" and made independently of the campaign. 52 U.S.C. § 30101(17). An ""electioneering"
192,30,"communication"" is a broadcast communication that ""refers to a clearly identified candidate for"
192,31,"Federal office"" and is made within specified time periods and targeted at the relevant electorate."
192,32,52 u.s.c.§ 30104(f)(3).
192,33,"The statute defines ""foreign national "" by reference to FARA and the Immigration and"
192,34,"Nationality Act, with minor modification. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b) (cross-referencing 22 U.S.C."
192,35,"§ 61 l(b)(l)-(3) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(20), (22)). That definition yields five, sometimes-"
192,36,"overlapping categories of foreign nationals, which include all of the individuals and entities"
192,37,"relevant for present purposes-namely, foreign governments and political parties, individuals"
192,38,1283
192,39,"Campaign-finance law also places financial limits on contributions, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) , and"
192,40,"prohibits contributions from corporations, banks, and labor union s, 52 U.S.C. § 3011 S(a); see Citizens"
192,41,"United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). Because the conduct that the Office investigated involved"
192,42,"possible electoral activity by foreign nationals, the foreign-contributions ban is the most readily app licable"
192,43,provision.
192,44,184
192,45,NA
193,1,U.S. Department of Justice
193,2,"JMeme)· Werk Predttet ,',' May Cefltatfl Material Preteeted Uflcler Fecl. R. Crtffl. P. 6(e)"
193,3,"outside of the U.S. who are not legal permanent residents, and certain non-U.S. entities located"
193,4,outside of the U.S.                                      ·
193,5,"A ""knowing □ and willful[]"" violation involving an aggregate of $25,000 or more in a"
193,6,"calendar year is a felony. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i); see Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292"
193,7,"(noting that a willful violation will require some ""proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law"");"
193,8,"United States v. Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d 573, 577 (E.D. Va. 2013) (applying willfulness"
193,9,"standard drawn from Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1998)); see also Wagner v."
193,10,"FEC, 793 F.3d 1, 19 n.23 (D.C. Cir . 2015) (en bane) (same). A ""knowing[] and willful[]"" violation"
193,11,"involving an aggregate of $2,000 or more in a calendar year, but less than $25,000, is a"
193,12,misdemeanor. 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(ii).
193,13,b. Application to June 9 Trump Tower Meeting
193,14,The Office considered whether to charge Trump Campaign officials with crimes in
193,15,"connection with the June 9 meeting described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra. The Office"
193,16,"concluded that, in light of the government's substantial burden of proof on issues of intent"
193,17,"(""knowing"" and ""willful"") , and the difficulty of establishing the value of the offered information,"
193,18,"criminal charges would not meet the Justice Manual standard that ""the admissible evidence will"
193,19,"probably be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction. "" Justice Manual§ 9-27.220."
193,20,"In brief, the key facts are that, on June 3, 2016, Robert Goldstone emailed Donald Trump"
193,21,"Jr., to pass along from Emin and Aras Agalarov an ""offer"" from Russia's ""Crown prosecutor"" to"
193,22,"""the Trump campaign"" of ""official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and"
193,23,"her dealings with Russia and would be very useful to [Trump Jr. ' s] father."" The email described"
193,24,"this as ""very high level and sensitive information"" that is ""part of Russia and its government's"
193,25,"support to Mr. Trump-helped along by Aras and Emin."" Trump Jr. responded: ""if it's what you"
193,26,"say I love it especially later in the summer."" Trump Jr. and Emin Agalarov had follow-up"
193,27,"conversations and, within days, scheduled a meeting with Russian representatives that was"
193,28,"attended by Trump Jr ., Manafort , and Kushner. The communications setting up the meeting and"
193,29,the attendance by high-level Campaign representatives support an inference that the Campaign
193,30,anticipated receiving derogatory documents and information from official Russian sources that
193,31,could assist candidate Trump's electoral prospects.
193,32,This series of events could implicate the federal election-law ban on contributions and
193,33,"donations by foreign nationals , 52 U .S.C. § 3012 l(a)(l )(A). Specifically, Goldstone passed along"
193,34,"an offer purportedly from a Russian government official to provide ""official documents and"
193,35,"information"" to the Trump Campaign for the purposes of influenc ing the presidential election."
193,36,Trump Jr. appears to have accepted that offer and to have arranged a meeting to receive those
193,37,materials. Documentary evidence in the form of email chains supports the inference that Kushner
193,38,and Mana fort were aware of that purpose and attended the June 9 meeting anticipating the receipt
193,39,of helpful information to the Campaign from Russian sources.
193,40,The Office considered whether this evidence would establish a conspiracy to violate the
193,41,"foreign contributions ban, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 ; the solicitation of an illegal foreign -"
193,42,"source contribution; or the acceptance or receipt of ""an express or implied promise to make a"
193,43,185
193,44,NA
194,1,U.S. Department of Justice
194,2,Attomey Work Produet // Mtty CoHtttiHMttterittl Proteetea Under Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
194,3,"[foreign-source] contribution, "" both in violation of 52 U.S.C. § 3012l(a)(l)(A), (a)(2). There are"
194,4,"reasonable arguments that the offered information would constitute a ""thing of value"" within the"
194,5,"meaning of these provisions, but the Office determined that the government would not be likely to"
194,6,"obtain and sustain a conviction for two other reasons: first, the Office did not obtain admissible"
194,7,evidence likely to meet the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that these
194,8,"individuals acted ""willfully,"" i.e., with general knowledge of the illegality of their conduct; and,"
194,9,"second, the government would likely encounter difficulty in proving beyond a reasonable doubt"
194,10,"that the value of the promised information exceeded the threshold for a criminal violation, see 52"
194,11,U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i).
194,12,i. Thing-of Value Element
194,13,"A threshold legal question is whether providing to a campaign ""documents and"
194,14,"information"" of the type involved here would constitute a prohibited campaign contribution. The"
194,15,"foreign contribution ban is not limited to contributions of money. It expressly prohibits ""a"
194,16,"contribution or donation of money or other thing of value."" 52 U.S.C. § 3012l(a)(l)(A), (a)(2)"
194,17,"(emphasis added). And the term ""contribution"" is defined throughout the campaign-finance laws"
194,18,"to ""include[]"" ""any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value."""
194,19,52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i) (emphasis added).
194,20,"The phrases ""thing of value"" and ""anything of value "" are broad and inclusive enough to"
194,21,"encompass at least some forms of valuable information. Throughout the United States Code, these"
194,22,"phrases serve as ""term[ s] of art"" that are construed ""broad[ly]."" United States v. Nilsen , 967 F .2d"
194,23,"539, 542 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (""thing of value"" includes ""both tangibles and intangibles "");"
194,24,"see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 20l(b)(l), 666(a)(2) (bribery statutes) ; id. § 641 (theft of government"
194,25,"property). For example, the term ""thing of value"" encompasses law enforcement reports that"
194,26,"would reveal the identity of informants, United States v. Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1979);"
194,27,"classified materials, United States v. Fowler, 932 F.2d 306 , 310 (4th Cir . 1991); confidential"
194,28,"information about a competitive bid, United States v. Matzkin, 14 F .3d 1014, I 020 (4th Cir. 1994);"
194,29,"secret grand jury information, United States v. Jeter, 775 F.2d 670, 680 (6th Cir . 1985); and"
194,30,"information about a witness's whereabouts, United States v. Sheker , 618 F.2d 607 , 609 (9th Cir."
194,31,"1980) (per curiam). And in the public corruption context , "" ' thing of value' is defined broadly to"
194,32,"include the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items received."" United States"
194,33,"v. Renzi, 769 F.3d 731,744 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted)."
194,34,Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations recognize the value to a campaign of at
194,35,"least some forms of information, stating that the term ""anything of value "" includes ""the provision"
194,36,"of any goods or services without charge,"" such as ""membership lists"" and ""mailing lists. "" 11"
194,37,C.F.R. § 100.52(d)(l) . The FEC has concluded that the phrase includes a state-by-state list of
194,38,"activists. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. FEC, 475 F.3d 337, 338"
194,39,"(D.C. Cir. 2007) (describing the FEC 's findings) . Likewise , polling data provided to a campaign"
194,40,"constitutes a ""contribution. "" FEC Advisory Opinion 1990-12 (Strub) , 1990 WL 153454 (citing 11"
194,41,"C.F.R. § 106.4(6)). And in the specific context of the foreign-contributions ban, the FEC has"
194,42,"concluded that ""election materials used in previous Canadian campaigns ,"" including ""flyers,"
194,43,"advertisements, door hangers , tri-folds, signs, and other printed material ,"" constitute ""anything of"
194,44,186
194,45,NA
195,1,U.S. Department of Justice
195,2,Ati6rHe; W6t1't Pr6dttet // Ma-;· C6HtaiH Ma-terial Pr6teeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
195,3,"value,"" even though ""the value of these materials may be nominal or difficult to ascertain ."" FEC"
195,4,"Advisory Opinion 2007-22 (Hurysz), 2007 WL 5172375, at *5."
195,5,These authorities would support the view that candidate-related opposition research given
195,6,to a campaign for the purpose of influencing an election could constitute a contribution to which
195,7,"the foreign-source ban could apply. A campaign can be assisted not only by the provision offunds,"
195,8,but also by the provision of derogatory information about an opponent. Political campaigns
195,9,frequently conduct and pay for opposition research. A foreign entity that engaged in such research
195,10,"and provided resulting information to a campaign could exert a greater effect on an election, and"
195,11,"a greater tendency to ingratiate the donor to the candidate, than a gift of money or tangible things"
195,12,"of value. At the same time , no judicial decision has treated the voluntary provision of"
195,13,uncompensated opposition research or similar information as a thing of value that could amount
195,14,to a contribution under campaign -finance law. Such an interpretation could have implications
195,15,"beyond the foreign-source ban , see 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a) (imposing monetary limits on campaign"
195,16,"contributions), and raise First Amendment questions. Those questions could be especially difficult"
195,17,where the information consisted simply of the recounting of historically accurate facts. It is
195,18,uncertain how courts would resolve those issues.
195,19,ii. Willfulness
195,20,"Even assuming that the promised ""documents and information that would incriminate"
195,21,"Hillary"" constitute a ""thing of value"" under campaign-finance law, the government would"
195,22,"encounter other challenges in seeking to obtain and sustain a conviction. Most significantly, the"
195,23,government has not obtained admissible evidence that is likely to establish the scienter requirement
195,24,"beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove that a defendant acted ""knowingly and willfully, "" the"
195,25,government would have to show that the defendant had general knowledge that his conduct was
195,26,"unlawful. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Election Offenses 123 (8th ed. Dec."
195,27,"2017) (""Election Offenses""); see Bluman , 800 F. Supp. 2d at 292 (noting that a willful violation"
195,28,"requires ""proof of the defendant's knowledge of the law""); Danielczyk, 917 F. Supp. 2d at 577"
195,29,"(""knowledge of general unlawfulness ""). ""This standard creates an elevated scienter element"
195,30,"requiring , at the very least, that application of the law to the facts in question be fairly clear. When"
195,31,"there is substantial doubt concerning whether the law applies to the facts of a particular matter, the"
195,32,"offender is more likely to have an intent defense."" Election Offenses 123.               ·"
195,33,"On the facts here, the government would unlikely be able to prove beyond a reasonable"
195,34,doubt that the June 9 meeting participants had general knowledge that their conduct was unlawful.
195,35,The investigation has not developed evidence that the participants in the meeting were familiar
195,36,with the foreign-contribution ban or the application of federal law to the relevant factual context.
195,37,The government does not have strong evidence of surreptitious behavior or effo11sat concealment
195,38,at the time of the June 9 meeting. While the government has evidence of later efforts to prevent
195,39,disclosure of the nature of the June 9 meeting that could circumstantially provide support for a
195,40,"showing of scienter, see Volume II, Section II.G, infra, that concealment occurred more than a"
195,41,"year later, involved individuals who did not attend the June 9 meeting , and may reflect an intention"
195,42,"to avoid political consequences rather than any prior knowledge of illegality. Additionally, in light"
195,43,"of the unresolv ed legal questions about whether giving ""documents and information"" of the sort"
195,44,"offered here constitutes a campaign contribution, Trump Jr. could mount a factual defense that he"
195,45,187
195,46,NA
196,1,U.S. Department of Justice
196,2,"Attorney Work Prod1:1et// Ma,· Cmnain Material Proteeted Under Fed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)"
196,3,did not believe his response to the offer and the June 9 meeting itself violated the law. Given his
196,4,"less direct involvement in arranging the June 9 meeting, Kushner could likely mount a similar"
196,5,"defense. And, while Manafort is experienced with political campaigns, the Office has not"
196,6,developed evidence showing that he had relevant knowledge of these legal issues.
196,7,iii. Difficulties in Valuing Promised Information
196,8,The Office would also encounter difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
196,9,"value of the promised documents and information exceeds the $2,000 threshold for a criminal"
196,10,"violation, as well as the $25,000 threshold for felony punishment. See 52 U.S.C. § 30109(d)(l)."
196,11,The type of evidence commonly used to establish the value of non-monetary contributions-such
196,12,as pricing the contribution on a commercial market or determining the upstream acquisition cost
196,13,or the cost of distribution-would         likely be unavailable or ineffective in this factual setting.
196,14,"Although damaging opposition research is surely valuable to a campaign , it appears that the"
196,15,information ultimately delivered in the meeting was not valuable. And while value in a conspiracy
196,16,"may well be measured by what the participants expected to receive at the time of the agreement,"
196,17,"see, e.g., United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485 , 489 (11th Cir. 1982), Goldstone's description"
196,18,"of the offered material here was quite general. His suggestion of the information's value-i.e.,"
196,19,"that it would ""incriminate Hillary "" and ""would be very useful to [Trump Jr.'s] father ""-was non-"
196,20,"specific and may have been understood as being of uncertain worth or reliability, given"
196,21,Goldstone's lack of direct access to the original source. The uncertainty over what would be
196,22,"delivered could be reflected in Trump Jr. ' s response (""if it's what you say I love it"") (emphasis"
196,23,added).
196,24,"Accordingly , taking into account the high burden to establish a culpable mental state in a"
196,25,"campaign-finance prosecution and the difficulty in establishing the required valuation, the Office"
196,26,decided not to pursue criminal campaign-finance charges against Trump Jr. or other campaign
196,27,officials for the events culminating in the June 9 meeting .
196,28,c. Application to Harm to Ongoing Matter
196,29,Harm to Ongoing Matter
196,30,188
196,31,NA
197,1,U.S . Depart ment of Justice
197,2,At1:erttey Werk Predttet // Mey CetttftiH MB.teria:lPreteeted Uttder Fed . R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
197,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
197,4,189
197,5,NA
198,1,U.S. Department of Justice
198,2,AtlEH'fley· \VoFkPFodttet // May CoHtttit'IMatefittl PFoteeteciUmleF Fetl. R. Cfiffl. P. 6(e)
198,3,ii. Willfulness
198,4,"As discussed , to establish a criminal campaign -finance violation, the government must"
198,5,"prove that the defendant acted ""knowingly and willfully."" 52 U.S.C . § 30109(d)(l)(A)(i). That"
198,6,standard requires proof that the defendant knew generally that his conduct was unlawful. Election
198,7,"Offenses 123. Given the uncertainties noted above, the ""willfulness"" requirement would pose a"
198,8,substantial barrier to prosecution.
198,9,iii. Constitutional Considerations
198,10,", the First Amendment could ose constraints on a"
198,11,iv. Analysis as to  mllllll
198,12,190
198,13,NA
199,1,U.S. Department of Justice
199,2,Attomey 'Nork Pt10attet// Mtt'.)Cotnttit1Mtttet1ittlProteetea Ut1aer Fee. R..Ct1iffi.P. 6(e)
199,3,1
199,4,4. False Statements and Obstruction of the Investigation
199,5,The Office determined that certain individuals associated with the Campaign lied to
199,6,investigators about Campaign contacts with Russia and have taken other actions to interfere with
199,7,"the investigation. As explained below, the Office therefore charged some U.S. persons connected"
199,8,to the Campaign with false statements and obstruction offenses.
199,9,a. Overview Of Governing Law
199,10,False Statements. The principal federal statute criminalizing false statements to
199,11,"government investigators is 18 U.S.C. § 1001. As relevant here , under Section 1001(a)(2), it is a"
199,12,"crime to knowingly and willfully ""make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement"
199,13,"or representation"" ""in any matter within the jurisdiction of th e executive ... branch of the"
199,14,"Government."" An FBI investigation is a matter within the Executive Branch's jurisdiction. United"
199,15,"States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479 (1984). The statute also applies to a subset of legislative"
199,16,"branch actions-viz., administrative matters and ""investiga tion[s] or review[ s ]"" conducted by a"
199,17,congressional committee or subcommittee. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(c)(l) and (2); see United States v.
199,18,"Pickett, 353 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2004)."
199,19,"Whether the statement was made to law enforcement or congressional investigators , the"
199,20,government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the same basic non -jurisdictional elements :
199,21,"the stat ement was false, fictitious, or fraudulent ; the defendant knew both that it was false and that"
199,22,"it was unlawful to make a false statement; and the false stateme nt was material. See, e.g., United"
199,23,"States v. Smith , 831 F.3d 1207, 1222 n.27 (9th Cir. 2017) (listing elements); see also Ninth Circu it"
199,24,Pattern Instruction 8.73 & cmt. (explaining that the Section 1001 jury instruction was modified in
199,25,"light of the Department of Justice's position that the phrase ""knowingly and willfully "" in th e statute"
199,26,"require s the defendant's knowledge that his or her conduct was unlawful). In the D.C. Circuit , the"
199,27,government must prove that the statement was actually false; a statement that is misleading but
199,28,"""litera lly true"" does not satisfy Section 1001 (a)(2). See United States v. Milton, 8 F .3d 39 , 45"
199,29,191
199,30,NA
200,1,U.S. Department of Justice
200,2,"A·tlerney Werk Predttet /,' Mfty Cm~tftil'lMftteriftl Preteeted Ul'lder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6Ee)"
200,3,"(D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819, 832-33 & n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1993). For that"
200,4,"false statement to qualify as ""materia l,"" it must have a natural tendency to influence, or be capable"
200,5,"of influencing , a discrete decision or any other function of the agency to which it is addressed. See"
200,6,"United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995) ; United States v. Moore, 612 F .3d 698 , 70 1"
200,7,(D.C. Cir. 2010).
200,8,"Perjury. Under the federal perjury statutes, it is a crime for a witness testifying under oath"
200,9,before a grand jury to knowingly make any false material declaration. See 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The
200,10,government must prove four elements beyond a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction under
200,11,Section 1623(a): the defendant testified under oath before a federal grand jury; the defendant's
200,12,testimony was false in one or more respects; the false testimony concerned matters that were
200,13,material to the grand jury investigation; and the false testimony was knowingly given. United
200,14,"States v. Bridges, 717 F.2d 1444, 1449 n.30 (D .C. Cir. 1983). The general perjury statute , 18"
200,15,"U.S.C. § 1621, also applies to grand jury testimony and has sim ilar elements, except that it requires"
200,16,"that the witness have acted willfully and that the government satisfy ""strict common-law"
200,17,"requirements for establishing falsity."" See Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 & n.6 (1979)"
200,18,"(explaining ""the two-witness rule"" and the corroboration that it demands)."
200,19,Obstruction of Just ice. Three basic elements are common to the obstruction stat utes
200,20,pertinent to this Office's charging decisions: an obstructive act; some form of nexus between the
200,21,"obstructive act and an official proceeding; and criminal (i.e., corrupt) int ent. A detailed discussion"
200,22,"of those elements, and the law governing obstruction of justice more generally, is included in"
200,23,Volume II of the report.
200,24,b. Application to Certain Individuals
200,25,i. George Papadopoulos
200,26,Investigators approached Papadopoulos for an interview based on his role as a foreign
200,27,policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and hi s suggestion to a foreign government representative
200,28,that Russia had indicat ed that it could assist the Campaign thr ough the anonymous release of
200,29,"information damaging to candidate Clinton. On January 27 , 2017 , Papadopoulos agreed to be"
200,30,"interviewed by FBI agents, who informed him that the interview was part of the inve stigation into"
200,31,potential Russian government interference in the 2016 presidential election.
200,32,"During the interview, Papadopoulos lied about the timing, extent , and nature of his"
200,33,"communications with Joseph Mifsud, Olga Polonskaya , and Ivan Timofeev. With respect to"
200,34,"timing, Papadopoulos acknowledged that he had met Mifsud and that Mifsud told him the Russians"
200,35,"had ""dirt"" on Clinton in the form of ""thousand s of emails."" But Papadopoulos stated multiple"
200,36,times that those communications occurred before he joined the Trump Campa ign and that it was a
200,37,"""very strange coincidence "" to be to ld of the ""dirt"" before he started working for the Campaign ."
200,38,"This accou nt was false. Papadopoulos met Mifsu d for the first time on approximately March 14,"
200,39,"2016 , after Papadopoulos had already learned he would be a foreign policy advisor for the"
200,40,Campaign. Mifsud showed interest in Papadopoulos on ly after learn ing of his ro le on the
200,41,"Campaign. And Mifsud told Papadopoulos about the Russians possessing ""dirt"" on candidate"
200,42,"Clinton in late April 2016, more than a month after Papadopoulos had joined the Campaign and"
200,43,192
200,44,NA
201,1,U.S . Department of Justice
201,2,Attorney \¥erk Prodttet // Mey Cot1teit1Materiel Proteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
201,3,"been publicly announced by candidate Trump. Statement of Offense ,r,r       25-26, United States v."
201,4,"George Papadopoulos, No. 1: 17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 5, 2017), Doc. 19 (""Papadopoulos Statement"
201,5,"of Offense"")."
201,6,Papadopoulos also made false statements in an effort to mmumze the extent and
201,7,"importance of his communications with Mifsud. For example, Papadopoulos stated that"
201,8,""" [Mifsud]'s a nothing ,"" that he thought Mifsud was ""just a guy talk[ing] up connections or"
201,9,"something,"" and that he believed Mifsud was ""BS'ing to be completely honest with you ."" In fact,"
201,10,"however , Papadopoulos understood Mifsud to have substantial connections to high -level Russian"
201,11,government officials and that Mifsud spoke with some of those officials in Moscow before telling
201,12,"Papadopoulos about the ""dirt ."" Papadopoulos also engaged in extensive communications over a"
201,13,"period of months with Mifsud about foreign policy issues for the Campaign, including efforts to"
201,14,"arrange a ""history making "" meeting between the Campaign and Russian government officials. In"
201,15,"addition, Papadopoulos failed to inform investigators that Mifsud had introduced him to Timofeev ,"
201,16,the Russian national who Papadopoulos understood to be connected to the Russian Ministry of
201,17,"Foreign Affairs , despite being asked if he had met with Russian nationals or "" [a]nyone with a"
201,18,"Russian accent"" during the campaign. Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r,r       27-29."
201,19,"Papadopoulos also falsely claimed that he met Polonskaya before he joined the Campa ign,"
201,20,"and falsely told the FBI that he had ""no"" relationship at all with her . He stated that the extent of"
201,21,"their communications was her sending emails-""Just,         'Hi , how are you?' That's it."" In truth ,"
201,22,"however , Papadopoulos met Polonskaya on March 24, 2016, after he had joined the Campaign; he"
201,23,believed that she had connections to high-level Russian government officials and could help him
201,24,arrange a potential foreign policy trip to Russia. During the campaign he emailed and spoke with
201,25,her over Skype on numerous occasions about the potential foreign policy trip to Russia.
201,26,"Papadopoulos Statement of Offense ,r,r     30-31."
201,27,Papadopoulos 's false statements in January 2017 impeded the FBI's investigation into
201,28,"Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Most immediatel y, those statements"
201,29,hindered investigators' ability to effectively question Mifsud when he was interviewed in the lobby
201,30,"of a Washington, D.C. hotel on February 10, 2017. See Gov't Sent. Mem . at 6, United States v."
201,31,"George Papadopoulos, No. 1 :17-cr-182 (D .D.C. Aug. 18, 2017), Doc. 44. During that interview ,"
201,32,Mifsud admitted to knowing Papadopoulos and to having introduced him to Polonskaya and
201,33,Timofeev. But Mifsud denied that he had advance knowledge that Russia was in possession of
201,34,"emails damaging to candidate Clinton, stating that he and Papadopoulos had discussed"
201,35,cybersecurity and hacking as a larger issue and that Papadopoulos must have misunderstood their
201,36,conversation. Mifsud also falsely stated that he had not seen Papadopoulos since the meetin g at
201,37,"which Mifsud introduced him to Polonskaya, even though emails, text messages, and other"
201,38,information show that Mifsud met with Papadopoulos on at least two other occasions-April           12
201,39,"and April 26, 2016. In addition, Mifsud omitted that he had drafted (or edited) the follow-up"
201,40,"message that Polonskaya sent to Papadopoulos following the initial meetin g and that, as reflected"
201,41,"in the language of that email chain (""Baby, thank you!""), Mifsud may have been involved in a"
201,42,personal relationship with Polonskaya at the time. The false information and omissions in
201,43,Papadopoulos ' s January 20 17 interview undermined investi gators ' ability to challenge Mifsud
201,44,when he made these inaccurate statements.
201,45,193
201,46,NA
202,1,U.S. Department of Justice
202,2,Atlort1ey Work PFodttet// Miey CoHtttiHMaterial Prnteeted Ut1det1Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
202,3,"Given the seriousness of the lies and omissions and their effect on the FBI's investigation,"
202,4,"the Office charged Papadopoulos with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U.S.C."
202,5,"§ 1001. Information, United States v. George Papadopoulos, No. l:17-cr-182 (D.D.C. Oct. 3,"
202,6,"2017), Doc. 8. On October 7, 2017, Papadopoulos pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea"
202,7,"agreement. On September 7, 2018 , he was sentenced to 14 days of imprisonment, a $9,500 fine,"
202,8,and 200 hours of community service.
202,9,ii. -
202,10,iii. Michael Flynn
202,11,"Michael Flynn agreed to be interviewed by the FBI on January 24, 2017, four days after he"
202,12,had officially assumed his duties as National Security Advisor to the President. During the
202,13,"interview , Flynn made several false statements pertaining to his communications with the Russian"
202,14,ambassador.
202,15,"First , Flynn made two false statements about his conversations with Russian Ambassador"
202,16,"Kislyak in late December 20 16, at a time when the United States had imposed sanctions on Russia"
202,17,for interfering with the 2016 presidential election and Russia was considering its response. See
202,18,Flynn Statement of Offense. Flynn told the agents that he did not ask Kislyak to refrain from
202,19,escalating the situation in response to the United States's imposition of sanctions. That statement
202,20,"was false . On December 29, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak to requ est Russian restraint. Flynn mad e"
202,21,the call immediately after speaking to a senior Transition Team official (K.T. McFarland) about
202,22,what to communicate to Kislyak. Flynn then spoke with McFarland again after the Kislyak call to
202,23,report on the substance of that conversation. Flynn also falsely told the FBI that he did not
202,24,remember a follow-up conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate
202,25,"its response to the U.S. sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. On December 31, 2016, Flynn in"
202,26,"fact had such a conversation with Kislyak, and he again spoke with McFarland within hours of the"
202,27,"call to relay the substance of his conversation with Kislyak. See Flynn Statement of Offense ,r3."
202,28,194
202,29,NA
203,1,U.S. Department of Justice
203,2,Attorney 1Nork Prodttet II :May Contain Ma:teria:lPreteeted Under Fed . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
203,3,"Second, Flynn made false statements about calls he had previously made to representatives"
203,4,of Russia and other countries regardin g a resolution submitted by Egypt to the United Nations
203,5,"Security Council on December 21, 2016. Specifically, Flynn stated that he only asked the"
203,6,countries' positions on how they would vote on the resolution and that he did not request that any
203,7,of the countries take any particular action on the resolution. That statement was false. On
203,8,"December 22, 2016, Flynn called Kislyak , informed him of the incoming Trump Administration's"
203,9,"opposition to the resolution, and requested that Russia vote against or delay the resolution. Flynn"
203,10,also falsely stated that Kislyak never described Russia's response to his December 22 request
203,11,"regarding the resolution. Kislyak in fact told Flynn in a conversation on December 23 , 2016, that"
203,12,Russia would not vote against the resolution if it came to a vote. See Flynn Statement of Offense
203,13,",r4."
203,14,Flynn made these false statements to the FBI at a time when he was serving as National
203,15,Security Advisor and when the FBI had an open investigation into Russian interference in the 2016
203,16,"presidential election, including the nature of any links between the Trump Campaign and Russia."
203,17,Flynn's false statements and omissions impeded and otherwise had a material impact on that
203,18,"ongoing investigation. Flynn Statement of Offense ,r,r1-2. They also came shortly before Flynn"
203,19,"made separate submissions to the Depa1tment of Justice , pursuant to FARA , that also contained"
203,20,"materially false statements and omissions. Id. ,r5. Based on the totality of that conduct, the Office"
203,21,"decided to charge Flynn with making false statements to the FBI, in violation of 18 U .S.C."
203,22,"§ l00l(a). On December 1, 2017, and pursuant to a plea agreement, Flynn pleaded guilty to that"
203,23,charge and also admitted his false statements to the Department in his FARA filing. See id.; Plea
203,24,"Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, No. l:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017), Doc. 3."
203,25,Flynn is awaiting sentencing .
203,26,iv. Michael Cohen
203,27,Michael Cohen was the executive vice president and special counsel to the Trump
203,28,"Organization when Trump was president of the Trump Organi zation. Information ,r1, United"
203,29,"States v. Cohen, No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (""Cohen Information ""). From"
203,30,"the fall of 2015 through approximately June 2016, Cohen was involved in a project to build a"
203,31,Trump-branded tower and adjoining development in Moscow. The project was known as Trump
203,32,Tower Moscow.
203,33,"In 2017, Cohen was called to testify before the House Permanent Select Committee on"
203,34,"Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), both of which were"
203,35,investigating Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election and possible links between
203,36,"Russia and the presidential campaigns. In late August 2017, in advance of his testimony , Cohen"
203,37,caused a two-page statement to be sent to SSCI and HPSCI addressing Trump Tower Moscow.
203,38,"Cohen Information ,r,r  2-3. The letter contained three representations relevant here. First , Cohen"
203,39,stated that the Trump Moscow project had ended in January 2016 and that he had briefed candidate
203,40,Trump on the project only three times before making the unilateral decision to terminate it.
203,41,"Second, Cohen represented that he never agreed to travel to Russia in connection with the proj ect"
203,42,"and never considered asking Trump to travel for the project. Third , Cohen stated that he did not"
203,43,"recall any Russian government contact about the project , including any response to an email that"
203,44,195
203,45,NA
204,1,U.S. Department of Justice
204,2,/I Mey Cefl:taiflMaterial Pl'eteeted Uflder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
204,3,Att:effle)' Werk Pl'ed1:1et
204,4,"he had sent to a Russian government email account. Cohen Information ,i 4. Cohen later asked"
204,5,"that his two-page statement be incorporated into his testimony's transcript before SSCI , and he"
204,6,"ultimately gave testimony to SSCI that was consistent with that statement. Cohen Information ,i 5."
204,7,Each of the foregoing representations in Cohen's two-page statement was false and
204,8,misleading. Consideration of the project had extended through approximately June 2016 and
204,9,included more than three progress reports from Cohen to Trump. Cohen had discussed with Felix
204,10,"Sater his own travel to Russia as part of the project , and he had inquired about the possibility of"
204,11,Trump traveling there- both with the candidate himself and with senior campaign official Corey
204,12,Lewandowski. Cohen did recall that he had received a response to the email that he sent to Russian
204,13,"government spokesman Dmitry Peskov-in particular, that he received an email reply and had a"
204,14,follow-up phone conversation with an English-speaking assistant to Peskov in mid-January 2016.
204,15,"Cohen Information ,i 7. Cohen knew the statements in the letter to be false at the time, and"
204,16,admitted that he made them in an effort (1) to minimize the links between the project and Trump
204,17,"(who by this time was President), and (2) to give the false impression that the project had ended"
204,18,"before the first vote in the Republican Party primary process , in the hopes of limiting the ongoing"
204,19,Russia investigations. Id.
204,20,Given the nature of the false statements and the fact that he repeated them during his initial
204,21,"interview with the Office, we charged Cohen with violating Section 1001. On November 29, 2018 ,"
204,22,Cohen pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to a single-count information charging him
204,23,"with making false statements in a matter within the jurisdiction of the legislative branch , in"
204,24,violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100l(a)(2) and (c). Cohen Information. The case was transferred to the
204,25,district judge presiding over the separate prosecution of Cohen pursued by the Southern District
204,26,"of New York (after a referral from our Office). On December 7, 2018 , this Office submitted a"
204,27,letter to that judge recommending that Cohen's cooperation with our investigation be taken into
204,28,account in sentencing Cohen on both the false-statements charge and the offenses in the Southern
204,29,"District prosecution. On December 12, 2018, the judge sentenced Cohen to two months of"
204,30,"imprisonment on the false-statements count, to run concurrently with a 36-month sentence"
204,31,imposed on the other counts.
204,32,v. litialllll
204,33,196
204,34,NA
205,1,U.S. Department of Justice
205,2,Atterney Werk Pl'ed1:1et// May Cetttaifl Material Preteeted Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
205,3,vi. Jeff Sessions
205,4,"As set forth in Volume I, Section IV.A.6, supra, the investigation established that, while a"
205,5,"U.S. Senator and a Trump Campaign advisor , former Attorney General Jeff Sessions interacted"
205,6,with Russian Ambassador Kislyak during the week of the Republican National Convention in July
205,7,2016 and again at a meeting in Sessions' s Senate office in September 2016. The investigation also
205,8,established that Sessions and Kislyak both attended a reception held before candidate Trump's
205,9,197
205,10,NA
206,1,U.S. Department of Justice
206,2,Atlot1ney'Nork Pt1odttet// Mft)' Contain Matet1ialPt10teetedUndet' Fed . R. Ct1im.P. 6(e)
206,3,"foreign policy speech at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C. , in April 2016, and that it is"
206,4,possible that they met briefly at that reception .
206,5,"The Office considered whether , in light of these interactions, Sessions committed perjury"
206,6,"before, or made false statements to, Congress in connection with his confirmation as Attorney"
206,7,"General. In January 2017 testimony during his confirmation hearing, Sessions stated in response"
206,8,to a question about Trump Campaign communications with the Russian government that he had
206,9,"""been called a surrogate at a time or two in that campaign and I didn't have - did not have"
206,10,"communications with the Russians."" In written responses submitted on January 17, 2017, Sessions"
206,11,"answered ""[n]o"" to a question asking whether he had ""been in contact with anyone connected to"
206,12,"any part of the Russian government about the 2016 election, either before or after election day."""
206,13,"And, in a March 2017 supplement to his testimony , Sessions identified two of the campaign-period"
206,14,"contacts with Ambassador Kislyak noted above , which had been reported in the media following"
206,15,the January 2017 confirmation hearing. Sessions stated in the supplemental response that he did
206,16,"""not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador , or any other representatives of the"
206,17,"Russian government , regarding the political campaign on these occasions or any other occasion."""
206,18,Although the investigation established that Sessions interacted with Kislyak on the
206,19,occasions described above and that Kislyak mentioned the presidential campaign on at least one
206,20,"occasion, the evidence is not sufficient to prove that Sessions gave knowingly false answers to"
206,21,Russia-related questions in light of the wording and conte xt of those questions. With respect to
206,22,"Sessions ' s statements that he did ""not recall any discussions with the Russian Ambassador . .."
206,23,"regarding the political campaign"" and he had not been in contact with any Russian official ""about"
206,24,"the 2016 election, "" the evidence concerning the nature of Sessions's interactions with Kislyak"
206,25,makes it plausible that Sessions did not recall discussing the campaign with Kislyak at the time of
206,26,"his statements. Similarly, while Sessions stated in his January 2017 oral testimony that he ""did"
206,27,"not have communications with Russians,"" he did so in response to a question that had linked such"
206,28,"communications to an alleged ""continuing exchange of information "" between the Trump"
206,29,Campaign and Russian government intermediaries . Sessions later explained to the Senate and to
206,30,the Office that he understood the question as narrowly calling for disclosure of interactions with
206,31,"Russians that involved the exchange of campaign information, as distinguished from more routine"
206,32,"contacts with Russian nationals. Given the context in which the question was asked, that"
206,33,understanding is plausible.
206,34,"Accordingly, the Office concluded that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Session s"
206,35,was willfully untruthful in his answers and thus insufficient to obtain or sustain a conviction for
206,36,"perjury or false statements. Consistent with the Principles of Federal Prosecution , the Office"
206,37,therefore determined not to pursue charges against Sessions and informed his counsel of that
206,38,decision in March 2018.
206,39,vii. Others Interviewed During the Investigation
206,40,"The Office considered whether , during the course of the investigation , other individuals"
206,41,interviewed either omitted material information or provided information determin ed to be false.
206,42,"Applying the Principles of Federal Prosecution , the Office did not seek criminal charges again st"
206,43,"any individuals other than those listed above. In some instances , that decision was due to"
206,44,198
206,45,NA
207,1,U.S. Department of Justice
207,2,Attorney Work Prod1:1et  // M~· Cot1tB:it1Mttterittl Proteeted Ut1derFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
207,3,"evidentiary hurdles to proving falsity. In others , the Office determined that the witness ultimately"
207,4,"provided truthful information and that considerations of culpability , deterrence, and resource-"
207,5,reservation wei hed a ainst rosecution. See Justice Manual           9-27.220 9-27 .230.
207,6,-
207,7,199
207,8,NA
208,1,U.S . Department of Justice
208,2,Attentey \llerk Preattet // May Cefltaifl Material Preteetea UAaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6te)
208,3,Report On The Investigation Into
208,4,Russian InterferenceIn The
208,5,2016 PresidentialElection
208,6,Volume II of II
208,7,"Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III"
208,8,Submitted Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.B(c)
208,9,"Washington , D.C."
208,10,March 2019
208,11,NA
209,1,U.S. Department of Justice
209,2,"At:1:6me,· W6rk Pr6tlttet// Ma,· C6HtaiflMaterialPr6teetetlUHtlerFetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
209,3,TABLE OF CONTENTS - VOLUME II
209,4,INTROD UCTION TO VOLUME            IT.............................................................     ............................................ 1
209,5,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUM E TI ............................................................................................. 3
209,6,I. BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDE NTIARY PRINCIPLES . ... .. ...... ... . .... ............ . ..... .. .. .. .............. . .... . 9
209,7,A . Legal Framework of Obstruction _of Justice ................ ... ................ ............ .................... 9
209,8,B. Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations .................... ....................... ................... 12
209,9,II. FACTUAL    RES ULTS OF     THEOBSTRUCTION                 INVESTIGATIO N .........................................                ............. 15
209,10,A. The Campaign 's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump ................. 15
209,11,1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia ............. . 16
209,12,2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks ' s Release of Hacked Emails ........... 17
209,13,3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to
209,14,Aid Candidat e Trump .............................................................................. ............. 18
209,15,"4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or"
209,16,Connections with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election ................................ 21
209,17,B. The President ' s Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn ................ .. 24
209,18,1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia
209,19,with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak ..................... ............................ .......... 24
209,20,2. President-El ect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's
209,21,Assessment of Russian Interference in the Election and Congress Opens
209,22,E lection-Interference Investigations ................. ............... .......... ................ ........... 27
209,23,3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications with Kislyak to
209,24,"Incoming Administration Officials , the Media, and the FBI .......... ............. ......... 29"
209,25,4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Concerns About Flynn ............. 31
209,26,5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President
209,27,Trump has Dinner with FBI Director Comey ............................ ..................... ...... 32
209,28,6. Flynn's Resignation ................ ................... ... .......... ........... ..... ..................... ...... ... 36
209,29,7. The Pres ident Discusses Flynn with FBI Dir ector Co rney .................... ............. .. 38
209,30,8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating
209,31,Flynn ........ ................................... ...... ............... ........ ....... ......................... ............. 41
209,32,9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witn ess
209,33,Statement Denying that he Directed Flynn' s Discussions with Kislyak .............. 42
209,34,C. The President ' s Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBl's Ru ssia
209,35,Investigation ........................... ...................... ..................................................... ........... 48
209,36,I. Attorney General Sessions Recu ses From the Rus sia Inve stigation ........ ............. 48
209,37,NA
210,1,U.S. Department of Justice
210,2,AUeme~· Werk Pt'etittet // Mey CeHtttifl Meteriel Preteeteti UHtier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
210,3,2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms the Existence of the Russia
210,4,Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI ...... .. ...................................................                                    52
210,5,3. The President Asks Intelligence Community Leaders to Make Public
210,6,Statements that he had No Connection to Russia ....................... .......... ...... .......... 55
210,7,"4. The President Asks Comey to ""Li ft the Cloud"" Created by the Rus sia"
210,8,Investigation .. ..................................................        ......................................................        57
210,9,D . Events Leading Up To and Surrounding the Termination of FBI Director
210,10,Comey .................................... ....... ............................. ...... ............................................         62
210,11,1. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Declines to
210,12,Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation ............. 62
210,13,2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey ......................................                                               64
210,14,E. The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel.. ..........................................                                          . 77
210,15,1. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President's Reaction .............. 78
210,16,2. The President Asserts that the Special Counsel has Conflicts ofinterest... .......... 80
210,17,3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigat ed for Obstruction
210,18,of Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the
210,19,Special Counsel Removed ............................................ .................. ..................... . 84
210,20,F. The President's        Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation ................ .......... 90
210,21,1. The President Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions
210,22,to Curtail the Spec ial Counsel Investigation ............................................                                .......... ... 90
210,23,2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski .................................................                                          .... 92
210,24,3. The President Publicly Cr itici zes Sess ions in a New York Times Interview ....... 93
210,25,4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Res igna tion .................. ..... 94
210,26,"G. The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9,"
210,27,2016 Meeting Between Russians and Senior Campaign Officials ...............................                                                   98
210,28,1. The President Learns About the Existence of E mail s Concerning the June
210,29,"9, 2016 Trump Tower Meeting ........................................................                            .. ................... 98"
210,30,2. The President Directs Communications                              Staff Not to Publicly Disclose
210,31,Information About the June 9 Meeting .... ..... .......... ............................................                                100
210,32,3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the
210,33,June 9 Meeting ......... .... ..... ..................................................................................                 101
210,34,"4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting ....... ............................. ......... .. 103"
210,35,H. The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over
210,36,the Investigation .............................................        ........................ ..... ...... ..... .................. .. 107
210,37,1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessio ns Reverse his Recusal. ............. .... .. 107
210,38,2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Inve st igati ons
210,39,Covered by hi s Recusal. ....... ..................... ..... .................. ..... ................. ..... ........ 109
210,40,ii
210,41,NA
211,1,U.S . Department of Justice
211,2,At:t:ol'tte~·
211,3,Wol'k Pl'oe:lttet// May Cotttaitt Material Pl'oteeteti Utte:le!'Fee:I.R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
211,4,I. The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the
211,5,Special Counsel ................. ....... ................... ....................... .................. ................ ...... 113
211,6,1. .The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel... ......... . 113
211,7,2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports ..................... 114
211,8,"J. The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort,litlllll                                                         ····· .......... ................. 120"
211,9,1. Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn .................... ........ ...................................... .. 120
211,10,2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort ..................... ........... ..................................... 122
211,11,3. Harm to Ongoing Matter                                          ···················· ············ ···· ..... ........................ ...... 128
211,12,K. The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen ......................... .......... ............. .. 134
211,13,l.  Candidate Trump ' s Awareness of and Involvement in the Trump Tower
211,14,Moscow Project ............. .............. ....................... ............................... .............. ... 134
211,15,"2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a ""Party Line"" Distancing Candidate"
211,16,Trump From Russia ................................ ........ ...................... ......... ............... ...... 138
211,17,3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump
211,18,Tower Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line ................... ............ 139
211,19,4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen ................. .................. ....... 144
211,20,5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the
211,21,Government. ................. .............................................................. ......................... 148
211,22,L. Overarching Factual Issues .............................................. ......... ......... ................. ....... 156
211,23,III. LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE STATUTES To THE
211,24,PR ESIDENT ........ .. ....... .. .... .......... .......................................     ....... . .... ..... ... ... ... ...... ..... .... ....... .. .. 159
211,25,A. Statutory Defenses to the Applicat ion of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions
211,26,to the Conduct Under Investigation .......................................... ............................ ..... 160
211,27,1. The Text of Section 1512(c)(2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive
211,28,Acts ..... .. ....................... .............. ....................... ..................... ............. ............. 160
211,29,2 . Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 1512( c )(2) .................. 162
211,30,3. The Legislative History of Section 1512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing
211,31,Its Text. .................... ..... ................ ..................................... ................................ 164
211,32,4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section
211,33,1512( c)(2) is Inapplicabl e to the Conduct in this Investigation .......................... 165
211,34,5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this
211,35,Investigation ............................. ............. ......... ..................................................... 167
211,36,B. Constitutional Defenses to App lying Obstruction-Of-Justice Statutes to
211,37,Presidential Conduct ............. ........................ ..................................... ....... ................. 168
211,38,1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential
211,39,Cond uct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes ................................. ............ 169
211,40,iii
211,41,NA
212,1,U.S. Department of Justice
212,2,Att0rfl:e~•\ll0rk Pr0tlttet // Mey C0tttttiH Meterie ·I Pr0teetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
212,3,2. Separation-of -Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress
212,4,May Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the
212,5,President's Official Powers .......................................................... ..................... .. 171
212,6,a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies In
212,7,This Context ...... ......... ....................................................... .................... ....... .. 172
212,8,b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's
212,9,Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited ................... .. 173
212,10,"c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and Judicial"
212,11,Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source ...... ............................ .. 176
212,12,3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes
212,13,Would Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties ...... ...................... ..... 178
212,14,IV. CONCLUSION ......... ···························   ·· ····· ···· ················· ··········· ···· · ········· .......... .... ........... ....... 182
212,15,iv
212,16,NA
213,1,U.S. Department of Justice
213,2,"Atten1e::,·Werk Proclttet// Mu::,CoHtCtiH    Muteriul Preteetecl UHclerFecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
213,3,INTRODUCTION TO VOLUME         II
213,4,"This report is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c), which"
213,5,"states that, "" [a]t the conclusion of the Special Counsel's work, he ... shall provide the Attorney"
213,6,General a confidential report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions [the Special
213,7,"Counsel] reached ."""
213,8,"Beginning in 2017, the President of the United States took a variety of actions towards the"
213,9,ongoing FBI investigation into Russia's interference in the 2016 presidential election and related
213,10,matters that raised questions about whether he had obstructed justice. The Order appointing the
213,11,Special Counsel gave this Office jurisdiction to investigate matters that arose directly from the
213,12,"FBI's Russia inve stigation , including whether the President had obstructed justice in connection"
213,13,with Russia-related investigations. The Special Counsel's jurisdiction also covered potentially
213,14,obstructive acts related to the Special Counsel's investigation itself. This Volume of our report
213,15,summarizes our obstruction-of-justice investigation of the President.
213,16,"We first describe the considerations that guided our obstruction-of-justice       investigation,"
213,17,and then provide an overview of this Volume:
213,18,"First, a traditional prosecution or declination decision entails a binary determination to"
213,19,"initiate or declin e a prosecution, but we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial"
213,20,"judgment. The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) has issued an opinion finding that ""t he indictment"
213,21,or criminal prosecution of a sitting President would impermissibly undermine the capacity of the
213,22,"executive branch to perform its constitutionally assigned functions"" in violation of ""the"
213,23,"constitutional separation of powers."" 1 Given the role of the Special Counsel as an attorney in the"
213,24,"Department of Justice and the framework of the Special Counsel regulations , see 28 U.S.C. § 515;"
213,25,"28 C.F .R. § 600.7(a), this Office accepted OLC's legal conclusion for the purpose of exerc ising"
213,26,"prosecutorial jurisdiction. And apart from OLC's constitutional view, we recognized that a federal"
213,27,criminal accusation against a sitting President would place burdens on the President's capacity to
213,28,govern and potentially preempt constitutional processes for addressing presidential misconduct. 2
213,29,"Second, while the OLC opinion concludes that a sitting President may not be prosecuted,"
213,30,it recognizes that a cr iminal investigation during the President's term is permissible .3 The OLC
213,31,opinion also recognizes that a President does not have immunity after he leaves office. 4 And if
213,32,"individuals other than the President committed an obstruction offense, they may be prosecuted at"
213,33,"this time. Given tho se considerations, the facts known to us, and the strong public intere st in"
213,34,1
213,35,"A Sitting President 's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222,"
213,36,"222, 260 (2000) (OLC Op.)."
213,37,2
213,38,"See U .S. CONST. Art. I § 2, cl. 5; § 3, cl. 6; cf OLC Op. at 257-258 (discussin g relationship"
213,39,between impeachment and criminal prosecution of a sitting President).
213,40,3
213,41,"OLC Op. at 257 n.36 (""A grand jury could continue to gather evidence throughout the period of"
213,42,"immunity"")."
213,43,"4 OLC Op. at 255 (""Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not"
213,44,preclude suc h prosecution once the President's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by
213,45,"resignation or impea chment"")."
213,46,NA
214,1,U.S. Department of Justice
214,2,Aftt'lffle~·Wt'lrlcPrt'lettet // May C6fltaifl Material Pr6teetee Ufleer Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
214,3,"safeguarding the integrity of the criminal justice system , we conducted a thorough factual"
214,4,investigation in order to preserve the evidence when memories were fresh and documentary
214,5,materials were available.
214,6,"Third, we considered whether to evaluate the conduct we investigated under the Justice"
214,7,"Manual standards governing prosecution and declination decisions, but we determined not to apply"
214,8,an approach that could potentially result in a judgment that the President committed crimes. The
214,9,threshold step under the Justice Manual standards is to assess whether a person's conduct
214,10,"""constitutes a federal offense."" U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Manual§ 9-27.220 (2018) (Justice"
214,11,Manual). Fairness concerns counseled against potentially reaching that judgment when no charges
214,12,can be brought. The ordinary means for an individual to respond to an accusation is through a
214,13,"speedy and public trial, with all the procedural protections that surround a criminal case. An"
214,14,individual who believes he was wrongly accused can use that process to seek to clear his name. In
214,15,"contrast , a prosecutor's judgment that crimes were committed, but that no charges will be brought ,"
214,16,affords no such adversarial opportunity for public name-clearing before an impartial adjudicator .5
214,17,The concerns about the fairness of such a determination would be heightened in the case
214,18,"of a sitting President, where a federal prosecutor's accusation of a crime, even in an internal report ,"
214,19,could carry consequences that extend beyond the realm of criminal justice. OLC noted similar
214,20,"concerns about sealed indictments. Even if an indictment were sealed during the President's term ,"
214,21,"OLC reasoned, ""it would be very difficult to preserve [an indictment 's] secrecy, "" and if an"
214,22,"indictment became public, ""[t]he stigma and opprobrium"" could imperil the President's ability to"
214,23,"govern."" 6 Although a prosecutor's internal report would not represent a formal public accusation"
214,24,"akin to an indictment, the possibility of the report 's public disclosure and the absence of a neutral"
214,25,"adjudicatory forum to review its findings counseled against potentially determining ""that the"
214,26,"person's conduct constitutes a federal offense ."" Justice Manual § 9-27.220."
214,27,"Fourth, if we had confidence after a thorough investigation of the facts that the President"
214,28,"clearly did not commit obstruction of justice , we would so state. Based on the facts and the"
214,29,"applicable legal standards , however , we are unable to reach that judgment. The evidence we"
214,30,obtained about the President ' s actions and intent presents difficult issues that prevent us from
214,31,"conclusively determining that no criminal conduct occurred. Accordingly, while this report does"
214,32,"not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does not exonerate him."
214,33,*       *       *
214,34,This report on our investigation consists of four parts . Section I provides an overview of
214,35,obstruction-of-justice      principles and summarizes certain investigatory and evidentiary
214,36,considerations. Section II sets forth the factual results of our obstruction investigation and
214,37,analy zes the evidence. Section III addresses statutory and co nstitutional defenses. Section IV
214,38,states our conclusion.
214,39,5
214,40,"For that reason, criticisms have been lodged against the practice of naming unindicted co-"
214,41,"conspirators in an indictment. See United States v.Briggs,514 F.2d 794,802 (5th Cir. 1975) (""The courts"
214,42,have struck down with strong language efforts by grand juries to accuse persons of crime while affording
214,43,"them no forum in which to vindicate themselves.""); see also Justice Manual § 9-11.130."
214,44,6
214,45,OLC Op. at 259 & n.38 (citation omitted).
214,46,2
214,47,NA
215,1,U.S. Department of Justice
215,2,"Attef'Ae:,·WElf'kPt1Eltittet"
215,3,// Moy CElAtoiA  Motet1iolPt1eteetetiUAtier Feti. R. Ct1im.P. 6(e)
215,4,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO VOLUME           II
215,5,Our obstruction -of-justice inquiry focused on a series of actions by the President that
215,6,"related to the Russian -interference investigations , including the President's conduct towards the"
215,7,law enforcement officials overseeing the investigations and the witnesses to relevant events.
215,8,FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
215,9,The key issues and events we examined include the following:
215,10,The Campaign's response to reports about Russian support for Trump. During the 2016
215,11,"presidential campaign , questions arose about the Russian government's apparent support for"
215,12,candidate Trump. After WikiLeaks released politically damaging Democratic Party emails that
215,13,"were reported to have been hacked by Russia, Trump publicly expressed skepticism that Russia"
215,14,was responsible for the hacks at the same time that he and other Campaign officials privately
215,15,sought information                                            about any further planned WikiLeaks
215,16,"releases. Trump also denied having any business in or connections to Russia, even though as late"
215,17,as June 2016 the Trump Organization had been pursuing a licensing deal for a skyscraper to be
215,18,"built in Russia called Trump Tower Moscow. After the election , the President expressed concerns"
215,19,to advisors that reports of Russia's election interference might lead the public to question the
215,20,legitimacy of his election .
215,21,"Conduct involving FBI Director Comey and Michael Flynn. In mid-January 2017,"
215,22,"incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn falsely denied to the Vice President, other"
215,23,"administration officials, and FBI agents that he had talked to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak"
215,24,"about Russia ' s response to U.S. sanctions on Russia for its election interference. On January 27,"
215,25,the day after the President was told that Flynn had lied to the Vice President and had made similar
215,26,"statements to the FBI, the President invited FBI Director Comey to a private dinner at the White"
215,27,"House and told Comey that he needed loyalty. On February 14, the day after the President"
215,28,"requested Flynn's resignation, the President told an outside advisor, ""Now that we fired Flynn , the"
215,29,"Russia thing is over."" The advisor disagreed and said the investigations would continue."
215,30,"Later that afternoon, the President cleared the Oval Office to have a one-on-one meeting"
215,31,"with Comey. Referring to the FBI's investigation of Flynn, the President said , ""I hope you can"
215,32,"see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go. He is a good guy . T hope you can let this"
215,33,"go."" Shortly after requesting Flynn's resignation and speaking privately to Comey, the President"
215,34,sought to have Deputy National Security Advisor K.T. McFarland draft an internal letter stating
215,35,that the President had not directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. McFarland declined
215,36,"because she did not know whether that was true, and a White House Counsel's Office attorney"
215,37,thought that the request would look like a quid pro quo for an ambassadorship she had been offered.
215,38,"The President's reaction to the continuing Russia investigation. Tn February 2017,"
215,39,Attorney General Jeff Sessions began to assess whether he had to recuse himself from campaign-
215,40,"related investigations because of his role in the Trump Campaign . Tn early March, the President"
215,41,told White House Counsel Donald McGahn to stop Sessions from recusing. And after Sessions
215,42,"announced his recusal on March 2, the President expressed anger at the decision and told advisors"
215,43,"that he should have an Attorney General who would protect him. That weekend, the President"
215,44,"took Sessions aside at an event and urged him to ""unrecuse."" Later in March, Comey publicly"
215,45,3
215,46,NA
216,1,U.S. Department of Justice
216,2,Aftefl'1e~·Werk Preettet// May CetttaittMaterialPreteetea UttderFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
216,3,"disclosed at a congressional hearing that the FBI was investigating ""the Russian government's"
216,4,"efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,"" including any links or coordination between"
216,5,"the Russian government and the Trump Campaign . In the following days , the President reached"
216,6,out to the Director of National Intelligence and the leaders of the Central Intelligence Agency
216,7,(CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to ask them what they could do to publicly dispel
216,8,the suggestion that the President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort.
216,9,"The President also twice called Comey directly, notwithstanding guidance from McGahn to avoid"
216,10,direct contacts with the Department of Justice. Comey had previously assured the President that
216,11,"the FBI was not investigating him personally, and the President asked Comey to "" lift the cloud """
216,12,of the Russia investigation by saying that publicly.
216,13,"The President's termination of Comey. On May 3, 2017, Comey testified in a"
216,14,"congressional hearing, but declined to answer questions about whether the President was"
216,15,"personally under investigation. Within days, the President decided to terminate Comey. The"
216,16,"President insisted that the termination letter, which was written for public release , state that Comey"
216,17,"had informed the President that he was not under investigation. The day of the firing, the White"
216,18,House maintained that Comey's termination resulted from independent recommendations from the
216,19,Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General that Comey should be discharged for mishandling
216,20,the Hillary Clinton email investigation. But the President had decided to fire Comey before
216,21,"hearing from the Department of Justice. The day after firing Comey , the President told Russian"
216,22,"officials that he had ""faced great pressure because of Russia, "" which had been ""taken off' by"
216,23,"Comey's firing. The next day , the President acknowledged in a television interview that he was"
216,24,going to fire Comey regardless of the Department of Justice's recommendation and that when he
216,25,"""decided to just do it,"" he was thinking that ""this thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story."""
216,26,"In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia investigation,"
216,27,"the President said, ""As far as I'm concerned , I want that thing to be absolutely done properly ,"""
216,28,"adding that firing Comey ""might even lengthen out the investigation."""
216,29,"The appointment of a Special Counsel and efforts to remove him. On May 17, 2017 , the"
216,30,Acting Attorney General for the Russia investigation appointed a Special Counsel to conduct the
216,31,investigation and related matter s. The President reacted to news that a Special Counsel had been
216,32,"appointed by telling advisors that it was ""the end of his presidency"" and demanding that Sessions"
216,33,"resign. Sessions submitted his resignation , but the President ultimately did not accept it. The"
216,34,President told aides that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and suggested that the Special
216,35,Counsel therefore could not serve. The President's advisors told him the asserted conflicts were
216,36,meritless and had already been considered by the Department of Justice.
216,37,"On June 14, 2017, the media report ed that the Special Counsel's Office was investigating"
216,38,"whether the President had obstructed justice. Press reports called this ""a major turning point "" in"
216,39,"the investigation: while Comey had told the President he was not under investigation , following"
216,40,"Comey's firing , the President now was under investigation. The President reacted to this news"
216,41,with a series of tweets criticizing the Department of Justice and the Special Counsel's
216,42,"investigation. On June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn at home and directed him to call"
216,43,the Acting Attorney General and say that the Special Counsel had conflicts of interest and must be
216,44,"removed. McGahn did not carry out the direction , however, deciding that he would resign rather"
216,45,than trigger what he regarded as a potential Saturday Night Massacre.
216,46,4
216,47,NA
217,1,U.S. Department of Justice
217,2,AtterHe:) Werle Preattet // May CeHtaiH Mitteria:1Preteetea UHder Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
217,3,Efforts to curtail the Special Counsel's investigation. Two days after directing McGahn
217,4,"to have the Special Counsel removed, the President made another attempt to affect the course of"
217,5,"the Russia investigation. On June 19, 2017 , the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with"
217,6,"his former campaign manager Corey Lewandowski, a trusted advisor outside the government, and"
217,7,dictated a message for Lewandowski to deliver to Sessions. The message said that Sessions should
217,8,"publicly announce that, notwithstanding his recusal from the Russia investigation , the investigation"
217,9,"was ""very unfair "" to the President, the President had done nothing wrong , and Sessions planned to"
217,10,"meet with the Special Counsel and ""let [him] move forward with investigating election meddling"
217,11,"for future elections."" Lewandowski said he understood what the Presid ent wanted Sessions to do."
217,12,"One month later, in another private meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017 , the"
217,13,President asked about the status of his message for Sessions to limit the Special Counsel
217,14,investigation to future election interference. Lewandowski told the President that the message
217,15,"would be delivered soon. Hours after that meeting, the President publicly criticized Sessions in an"
217,16,"interview with the New York Times, and then issued a series of tweets making it clear that"
217,17,Sessions's job was in jeopardy. Lewandowski did not want to deliver the President's message
217,18,"personally , so he asked senior White House official Rick Dearborn to deliver it to Sessions."
217,19,Dearborn was uncomforta ble with the task and did not follow through.
217,20,"Efforts to prevent public disclosure of evidence. In the summer of 2017 , the President"
217,21,"learned that media outlets were asking questions about the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower"
217,22,"between senior campaign officials, including Donald Trump Jr., and a Russian lawyer who was"
217,23,"said to be offering damaging information about Hillary Clinton as ""part of Russia and its"
217,24,"government's support for Mr. Trump."" On several occasions, the President directed aides not to"
217,25,"publicly disclose the emails setting up the June 9 meeting, suggesting that the emails would not"
217,26,leak and that the number of lawyers with access to them should be limited. Before the emails
217,27,"became public, the President edited a press statement for Trump Jr. by deleting a line that"
217,28,"acknowledged that the meeting was with ""an individual who [Trump Jr.] was told might have"
217,29,"information helpful to the campaign"" and instead said only that the meeting was about adoptions"
217,30,of Russian children. When the press asked questions about the President ' s involvement in Trump
217,31,"Jr.' s statement, the President's personal lawyer repeatedly denied the President had played any"
217,32,role.
217,33,Further efforts to have the Attorney General take control of the investigation. In early
217,34,"summer 2017 , the President called Sessions at home and again asked him to reverse his recusal"
217,35,"from the Russia investigation. Sessions did not reverse his recusal. In October 2017 , the President"
217,36,"met privately with Sess ions in the Oval Office and asked him to ""take [a] look"" at investigating"
217,37,"Clinton. In December 2017 , shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation"
217,38,"agreement, the President met with Sessions in the Oval Office and sugges ted, according to notes"
217,39,"taken by a senior advisor, that if Sessio ns unrecused and took back supervision of the Russia"
217,40,"inve stigation, he would be a ""hero."" The President told Sess ions, ""I'm not going to do anything"
217,41,"or direct you to do anything. I just want to be treated fairly."" In response , Sessions volunteered"
217,42,"that he had never seen anything ""improper "" on the campaign and told the President there was a"
217,43,"""w hole new leadership team"" in place. He did not unrecuse."
217,44,Efforts to have McGahn deny that the President had ordered him to have the Special
217,45,"Counsel removed. In early 2018, the press reported that the President had directed McGahn to"
217,46,5
217,47,NA
218,1,U.S. Department of Justice
218,2,Attot1AeyWot1kProtittet // Muy CoHtuiAMuteriul Proteeteti UAtiet'Fed . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
218,3,have the Special Counsel removed in June 2017 and that McGahn had threatened to resign rather
218,4,than carry out the order. The President reacted to the news stories by directing White House
218,5,officials to tell McGahn to dispute the story and create a record stating he had not been ordered to
218,6,have the Special Counsel removed. McGahn told those officials that the media reports were
218,7,accurate in stating that the President had directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed.
218,8,The President then met with McGahn in the Oval Office and again pressured him to deny the
218,9,"reports. In the same meeting , the President also asked McGahn why he had told the Special"
218,10,Counsel about the President ' s effort to remove the Special Counsel and why McGahn took notes
218,11,of his conversations with the President. McGahn refused to back away from what he remembered
218,12,happening and perceived the President to be testing his mettle.
218,13,"Conduct towards Flynn, Manafort,~.                 After Flynn withdrew from a joint defen se"
218,14,"agreement with the President and began coop erating with the government, the President ' s personal"
218,15,counsel left a message for Flynn ' s attorneys reminding them of the President 's warm feelings
218,16,"towards Flynn, which he said ""still remains,"" and asking for a ""heads up"" if Flynn knew"
218,17,"""information that implicates the President."" When Flynn ' s counsel reiterated that Flynn could no"
218,18,"longer share information pursuant to a joint defense agreement, the President's personal counsel"
218,19,"said he would make sure that the President knew that Flynn 's actions reflected ""hostility"" towards"
218,20,the President. During Manafort ' s prosecution and when the jury in his criminal. trial was
218,21,"deliberating , the President praised Manafort in public, said that Manafort was being treated"
218,22,"unfairly, and declined to rule out a pardon. After Manafort was convicted, the President called"
218,23,"Manafort ""a brave man"" for refusin to ""break"" and said that ""fli in "" ""almost ou ht to be"
218,24,"Conduct involving Michael Cohen. The President ' s conduct towards Michael Cohen , a"
218,25,"former Trump Organization executive, changed from praise for Cohen when he falsely minimized"
218,26,"the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project , to castigation of Cohen when"
218,27,"he became a cooperating witness. From September 2015 to June 2016, Cohen had pursued the"
218,28,Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf of the Trump Organization and had briefed candidate
218,29,"Trump on the project numerous times , including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia"
218,30,"to advance the deal. In 2017 , Cohen provided false testimony to Congress about the project,"
218,31,including stating that he had only briefed Trump on the project three times and never discussed
218,32,"travel to Russia with him, in an effort to adhere to a ""party line"" that Cohen said was developed to"
218,33,"minimize the President's connections to Russia. While preparing for his congressional testimony ,"
218,34,"Cohen had extensive discussions with the President 's personal counsel, who , according to Cohen ,"
218,35,"said that Cohen should ""stay on message"" and not contradict the President. After the FBI searched"
218,36,"Cohen's home and office in April 2018 , the President publicly asserted that Cohen would not"
218,37,"""flip,"" contacted him directly to tell him to ""stay strong,"" and privately passed messages of support"
218,38,to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if
218,39,he stayed on message he would be taken care of. But after Cohen began cooperating with the
218,40,"government in the summer of 2018, the President publicly criticized him, called him a ""rat ,"" and"
218,41,suggested that his family memb ers had committed crimes.
218,42,6
218,43,NA
219,1,U.S. Department of Justice
219,2,"Attein1ey Werk Pre,1foet// Mtt)' Cm,taiH Material Preiteetea Ut1aer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
219,3,Overarching factual issues. We did not make a traditional prosecution decision about
219,4,"these facts, but the evidence we obtained supports several general statements about the President ' s"
219,5,conduct.
219,6,Several features of the conduct we investigated distinguish it from typical obstruction-of-
219,7,"justice cases. First, the investigation concerned the President , and some of his actions , such as"
219,8,"firing the FBI director , involved facially lawful acts within his Article II authority, which raises"
219,9,"constitutional issues discussed below. At the same time , the President's position as the head of"
219,10,the Executive Branch provided him with unique and powerful mean s of influencing official
219,11,"proceedings, subordinate officers , and potential witnesses-all       of which is relevant to a potential"
219,12,"obstruction-of-justice analysis. Second , unlike cases in which a subject engages in obstruction of"
219,13,"justice to cover up a crime , the evidence we obtained did not establish that the Pre sident was"
219,14,involved in an underlying crime related to Russian election interference. Although the obstruction
219,15,"statutes do not require proof of such a crime, the absence of that evidence affects the analysis of"
219,16,"the President's intent and requires consideration of other possible motives for his conduct. Th ird ,"
219,17,"many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of cooperation with"
219,18,"the government and suggestions of possible future pardons , took place in public view. That"
219,19,"circumstance is unusual, but no principle of law excludes public acts from the reach of the"
219,20,"obstruction laws. If the likely effect of public acts is to influ ence witnesses or alter their testimony,"
219,21,the harm to the justice system's integrity is the same.
219,22,"Although the series of events we investigated involved discrete acts , the overall patt ern of"
219,23,the President's conduct towards the investigations can shed light on the nature of the President ' s
219,24,"acts and the inferences that can be drawn about his intent. In particular, the actions we investigated"
219,25,"can be divided into two phases , reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. The first"
219,26,phase covered the period from the President ' s first interactions with Comey through the President 's
219,27,"firing of Comey. During that time , the President had been repeatedly told he was not personally"
219,28,"under investigation. Soon after the firing of Comey and the appointment of the Special Counsel,"
219,29,"however, the President became aware that his own conduct was being investigat ed in an"
219,30,"obstruction-of-justice inquiry. At that point , the Presid ent engaged in a second phase of conduct,"
219,31,"involving public attacks on the inve~tigation , non-public efforts to control it, and efforts in both"
219,32,public and private to encourage witne sses not to cooperate with the investigation. Judgments about
219,33,the nature of the President 's motives during each phase would be informed by the totality of the
219,34,evidence.
219,35,STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFENSES
219,36,The President's coun se l raised statutory and constitutional defenses to a possible
219,37,obstruction-of-justice analysis of the conduct we investigated. We concluded that none of those
219,38,legal defenses provided a basis for declining to investigate the facts.
219,39,Statutory defenses. Consistent with precedent and the Department of Justice's general
219,40,"approach to interpreting obstruction statutes , we concluded that several statutes could apply here."
219,41,"See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 , 1505 , 1512(b)(3) , 1512(c)(2). Section 1512(c)(2) is an omnibus"
219,42,obstruction-of-justice provision that covers a range of obstructive acts directed at pending or
219,43,contemplated official proceedings . No principle of statutory construction justifies narrowing the
219,44,provision to cover only conduct that impair s the integrity or availability of evidence. Sections
219,45,"1503 and 1505 also offer broad protection against obstructive acts directed at pending grand jury ,"
219,46,7
219,47,NA
220,1,U.S. Department of Justice
220,2,Attemey Werle Predttet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UH.tierFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
220,3,"judicial, administrative, and congressional proceedings , and they are supplemented by a provision"
220,4,in Section 1512(6) aimed specifically at conduct intended to prevent or hinder the communication
220,5,to law enforcement of information related to a federal crime.
220,6,Constitutional defenses. As for constitutional defenses arising from the President's status
220,7,"as the head of the Executive Branch, we recognized that the Department of Justice and the courts"
220,8,have not . definitively resolved these issues. We therefore examined those issues through the
220,9,framework established by Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues. The
220,10,Department of Justice and the President's personal counsel have recognized that the President is
220,11,subject to statutes that prohibit obstruction of justice by bribing a witness or suborning perjury
220,12,because that conduct does not implicate his constitutional authority. With respect to whether the
220,13,"President ca,n be found to have obstructed justice by exercising his powers under Article II of the"
220,14,"Constitution, we concluded that Congress has authority to prohibit a President's corrupt use of his"
220,15,authority in order to protect the integrity of the administration of justice .
220,16,"Under applicable Supreme Court precedent, the Constitution does not categorically and"
220,17,permanently immunize a President for obstructing justice through the use of his Article II powers .
220,18,"The separation-of-powers doctrine authorizes Congress to protect official proceedings, including"
220,19,"those of courts and grand juries, from corrupt, obstructive acts regard less of their source. We also"
220,20,concluded that any inroad on presidential authority that would occur from prohibiting corrupt acts
220,21,does not undermine the President's ability to fulfill his constitutional mission. The term
220,22,"""corruptly "" sets a demanding standard. It requires a concrete showing that a person acted with an"
220,23,"intent to obtain an improper advantage for himself or someone else, inconsistent with official duty"
220,24,"and the rights ofothers. A preclusion of""corrupt"" official action does not diminish the President's"
220,25,"ability to exercise Article II powers. For example , the proper supervision of criminal law does not"
220,26,demand freedom for the President to act with a corrupt intention of shielding himself from criminal
220,27,"punishment , avoiding financial liability, or preventing personal embarrassment. To the contrary ,"
220,28,"a statute that prohibits official action undertaken for such corrupt purposes furthers, rather than"
220,29,"hinders, the impartial and evenhanded administration of the law. It also aligns with the President's"
220,30,"constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws. Finally, we concluded that in the rare case in"
220,31,"which a criminal investigation of the President ' s conduct is justified, inquiries to determine"
220,32,whether the President acted for a corrupt motive should not impermissibly chill his performance
220,33,of his constitutionally assigned duties . The conclusion that Congress may apply the obstruction
220,34,laws to the President ' s corrupt exercise of the powers of office accords with our constitutional
220,35,system of checks and balances and the principle that no person is above the law .
220,36,CONCLUSION
220,37,"Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment , we did not draw"
220,38,ultimate conclusions about the President ' s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the
220,39,President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were
220,40,"making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time, if we had confidence after a"
220,41,"thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice,"
220,42,"we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach"
220,43,"that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a"
220,44,"crime, it also does not exonerate him."
220,45,8
220,46,NA
221,1,U.S. Department of Justice
221,2,Atteme~· Werk Pt'eettet // Mtty CeHtttiriMtttet'ittlPrnteetee UriE:iet'
221,3,Fee. R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
221,4,I.  BACKGROUND LEGAL AND EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES
221,5,A.      Legal Framework of Obstruction of Justice
221,6,"The May 17, 2017 Appointment Order and the Special Counsel regulations provide this"
221,7,"Office with jurisdiction to investigate ""federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent"
221,8,"to interfere with, the Special Counsel's investigation , such as perjury , obstruction of justice,"
221,9,"destruction of evidence , and intimidation of witnesses."" 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a) . Because of that"
221,10,"description of our jurisdiction, we sought evidence for our obstruction-of-justice investigation with"
221,11,the elements of obstruction offenses in mind. Our evidentiary analysis is similarly focused on the
221,12,"elements of such offenses, although we do not draw conclusions on the ultimate questions that"
221,13,govern a prosecutorial decision under the Principles of Federal Prosecution. See Justice Manual
221,14,§ 9-27.000 et seq. (2018).
221,15,"Here, we summarize the law interpreting the elements of potentially relevant obstruction"
221,16,statutes in an ordinary case. This discussion does not address the unique constitutional issues that
221,17,arise in an inquiry into official acts by the Pre sident. Those issues are discussed in a later section
221,18,of this report addressing constitutional defenses that the President ' s counsel have raised. See
221,19,"Volume II, Section III.B, irifra."
221,20,Three basic elements are common to most of the relevant obstruction statutes: ( 1) an
221,21,obstructive act; (2) a nexus between the obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt
221,22,"intent. See, e.g. , 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, 1512(c)(2). We describe those elements as they have '"
221,23,"been interpreted by the courts. We then discuss a more specific statute aimed at witness tampering,"
221,24,"see 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), and describe the requirement s for attempt ed offenses and endeavors to"
221,25,"obstruct justice , see 18 U.S.C . §§ I 503, 1512(c)(2)."
221,26,"Obstructive act. Obstruction-of-justice law ""reaches all corrupt conduct capable of"
221,27,"producing an effect that prevents justice from being duly administered, regardless of the means"
221,28,"employed."" United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreting 18"
221,29,"U .S.C. § 1503). An "" effort to influence"" a proceeding can qualify as an endeavor to obstruct"
221,30,"justice even if the effort was ""subtle or circuitous"" and ""however cleverly or with whatever"
221,31,"cloaking of purpose "" it was made. United States v. Roe, 529 F.2d 629,632 (4th Cir. 1975); see"
221,32,"also United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 173 (2d Cir. 2006). The verbs '"" obstruct or impede'"
221,33,"are broad"" and ""can refer to anything that blocks, makes difficult , or hinder s ."" Marinello v. United"
221,34,"States , 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1106 (2018) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted)."
221,35,An improper motive can render an actor's conduct criminal even when the conduct would
221,36,"otherwise be lawful and within the actor's authority. See United States v. Cueto, 151 F .3d 620,"
221,37,"631 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming obstruction conviction of a criminal defense attorney for ""litigation-"
221,38,"related conduct""); United States v. Cintolo, 818 F .2d 980, 992 (1st Cir. 1987) (""any act by any"
221,39,party-whether lawful or unlawful on its face-may abridge § 1503 if performed with a corrupt
221,40,"motive"")."
221,41,Nexus to a pending or contemplated official proceeding. Obstruction-of-justice law
221,42,"generally requires a nexus, or connection, to an official proceeding. In Section 1503 , the nexus"
221,43,"must be to pending ""judicial or grand jury proceedings. "" United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593,"
221,44,9
221,45,NA
222,1,U.S. Department of Justice
222,2,"AttorHe"".Y'"
222,3,Werle Proattet // May CoHtaiHMaterial Proteetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
222,4,"599 (1995). In Section 1505, the nexus can include a connection to a ""pending"" federal agency"
222,5,"proceeding or a congressional inquiry or investigation. Under both statutes, the government must"
222,6,"demonstrate "" a relationship in time, causation , or logic "" between the obstructive act and the"
222,7,"proceeding or inquiry to be obstructed. Id. at 599; see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States,"
222,8,"544 U.S. 696 , 707- 708 (2005). Section I 5 I 2(c) prohibits obstructive efforts aimed at official"
222,9,"proceedings including judicial or grand jury proceedings. 18 U.S.C . § 15 l 5(a)(l )(A). ""For"
222,10,"purposes of' Section 1512, ""an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted"
222,11,"at the time of the offense."" 18 U.S.C . § 15 l 2(f)(l ). Although a proceeding need not already be in"
222,12,"progress to trigger liability under Section 1512(c), a nexus to a contemplated proceeding still must"
222,13,"be shown. United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368, 386 (4th Cir. 2019); United States v. Petruk, 781"
222,14,"F.3d 438 , 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips , 583 F.3d 1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009);"
222,15,"United States v. Reich, 479 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). The nexus requir ement narrows the"
222,16,"scope of obstruction statutes to ensure that individuals have ""fair warning"" of what the law"
222,17,"proscribes. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 600 (internal quotation marks omitted)."
222,18,"The nexus showing has subjective and objective components. As an objective matter, a"
222,19,"defendant must act ""in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice ,"" such that the statute ""excludes"
222,20,defendants who have an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably
222,21,"be successful. "" Aguilar, 515 U.S . at 601-602 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)."
222,22,"""[T]he endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due"
222,23,"administration of justice."" Id. at 599 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).          As a"
222,24,"subjective matter, the actor must have ""co ntemplated a particular , foreseeable proceeding ."""
222,25,"Petruk, 781 F .3d at 445-446 .. A defendant need not directl y impede the proceeding. Rather, a"
222,26,"nexus exists if ""discretionary actions of a third person would be required to obstruct the judicial"
222,27,proceeding if it was foreseeable to the defendant that the third party would act on the [defendant ' s]
222,28,"communication in such a way as to obstruct the judicial proceeding ."" United States v. Martinez,"
222,29,"862 F.3d 223, 238 (2d Cir. 2017) (brackets, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted)."
222,30,"Corruptly. The word ""corruptly"" provides the intent element for obstruction of justice and"
222,31,"means acting ""knowingly and dishonestly "" or ""with an improper motive. "" United States v."
222,32,"Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 508 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1151"
222,33,"(I 0th Cir. 2013) (to act corruptly means to ""act[] with an improper purpose and to engage in"
222,34,"conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert, impede or obstruct"" the"
222,35,"relevant proceeding) (some quotation marks omitted); see 18 U .S.C. § 1515(6) (""As used in section"
222,36,"1505, the term 'c orruptly' means acting with an improper purpose , personall y or by influencing"
222,37,"another. ""); see also Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 705-706 (interpreting ""corruptly"" to mean"
222,38,"""wro ngful, immoral , depraved, or evil"" and holding that acting ""knowingly ... corruptly "" in 18"
222,39,"U.S.C. § 1512(6) requires ""consciousness of wrongdoing""). The requisite showing is made when"
222,40,"a person acted with an intent to obtain an ""improper advantage for [him] self or someo ne else,"
222,41,"inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others."" BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d"
222,42,"ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F .3d 1122, 1132 (D .C. Cir. 2015); Aguilar, 515 U.S . at"
222,43,"616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing this definition as the"
222,44,""" longstanding and well-accepted meaning "" of ""corruptly"") ."
222,45,Witness tampering. A more spec ific provision in Section 1512 prohibits tampering with a
222,46,"witness. See 18 U.S.C . § 1512(6)(I), (3) (making it a crime to ""knowingly use[] intimidation ..."
222,47,"or corruptly persuad e[] another person,"" or ""engage[] in misleading conduct towards another"
222,48,10
222,49,NA
223,1,U.S. Department of Justice
223,2,AfteFHe~·Werk Pretlttet // May CetttaiH Material Preteetetl UHtlet'Fee . R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
223,3,"person,"" with the intent to ""influence, delay , or prevent the testimony of any person in an official"
223,4,"proceeding"" or to ""hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer . . ."
223,5,"of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense""). To"
223,6,"establish corrupt persuasion, it is sufficient that the defendant asked a potential witness to lie to"
223,7,investigators in contemplation of a likely federal investigation into his conduct. United States v.
223,8,"Ed/ind, 887 F.3d 166, 174 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Sparks , 791 F.3d 1188, 1191-1192"
223,9,"(10th Cir. 2015); United States v. Byrne, 435 F.3d 16, 23-26 (1st Cir . 2006); United States v."
223,10,"LaShay, 417 F .3d 715, 718- 719 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Burns, 298 F .3d 523, 539-540"
223,11,"(6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060, 1066 (8th Cir. 1999) . The"
223,12,"""persuasion"" need not be coercive, intimidating, or explicit; it is sufficient to ""urge,"" ""induce ,"""
223,13,""" ask[] ,"" ""argu[ e ],"" ""giv[ e] reasons ,"" Sparks, 791 F .3d at 1192, or ""coach[] or remind[] witnesses"
223,14,"by planting misleading facts ,"" Ed/ind, 887 F.3d at 174. Corrupt persuasion is shown ""where a"
223,15,"defendant tells a potential witness a false story as if the story were true , intending that the witness"
223,16,"believe the story and testify to it."" United States v. Rodolitz , 786 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1986); see"
223,17,"United States v. Gabriel, 125 F .3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997). It also covers urging a witness to recall"
223,18,"a fact that the witness did not know, even if the fact was actually true. See LaShay , 417 F .3d at"
223,19,"719. Corrupt persuasion also can be shown in certain circumstances when a person, with an"
223,20,"improper motive , urges a witness not to cooperate with law enforcement. See United States v."
223,21,"Shotts, 145 F .3d 1289, 1301 (11th Cr. 1998) (telling Secretary ""not to [say] anything [to the FBI]"
223,22,"and [she] would not be bothered"")."
223,23,"When the charge is acting with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communication"
223,24,"of information to law enforcement under Section l 512(b)(3), the ""nexus"" to a proceeding inquiry"
223,25,"articulated in Aguilar-that an individual have "" knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the"
223,26,"judicial proceeding,"" 515 U.S. at 599-does not apply because the obstructive act is aimed at the"
223,27,"communication of information to investigators, not at impeding an official proceeding."
223,28,"Acting ""knowingly ... corruptly"" requires proof that the individual was ""conscious of"
223,29,"wrongdoing."" Arthur Andersen, 544 U .S. at 705-706 (declining to explore ""[t]he outer limits of"
223,30,"this element"" but indicating that an instruction was infirm where it permitted conviction even if"
223,31,"the defendant ""honestly and sincerely believed that [the] conduct was lawful""). It is an affirmative"
223,32,"defense that ""the conduct consisted solely oflawful conduct.and that the defendant ' s sole intention"
223,33,"was to encourage , induce, or cause the other person to testify truthfully."" 18 U.S.C. § 1512(e)."
223,34,Attempts and endeavors. Section I 512( c )(2) covers both substantive obstruction offenses
223,35,"and attempts to obstruct justice. Under general principles of attempt law, a person is guilty of an"
223,36,attempt when he has the intent to commit a substantive offense and takes an overt act that
223,37,"constitutes a substantial step towards that goal. See United States v. Resendiz-Ponce , 549 U.S."
223,38,"102, 106-107 (2007). ""[T]he act [must be] substantial , in that it was strongly corroborative of the"
223,39,"defendant's criminal purpose. "" United States v. Pratt, 351 F.3d 131, 135 (4th Cir. 2003). While"
223,40,"""mere abstract talk"" does not suffice , any ""concrete and specific "" act s that corroborate the"
223,41,"defendant's intent can constitute a ""substantial step."" United States v. Irving, 665 F .3d 1184 , 1198-"
223,42,"1205 (10th Cir. 2011). Thus , "" soliciting an innocent agent to engage in conduct constituting an"
223,43,"element of the crime"" may qualify as a substantial step. Model Penal Code § 5 .01 (2)(g); see United"
223,44,"States v. Lucas, 499 F .3d 769, 781 (8th Cir. 2007)."
223,45,11
223,46,NA
224,1,U.S. Department of Justice
224,2,AMat'Ae)''ilafk Pt'adttet // Muy CaAtO:it'l
224,3,M0:teri0:IPrateeted UAder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
224,4,"The omnibus clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 prohibits an ""endeavor"" to obstruct justice , which"
224,5,"sweeps more broadly than Section 1512's attempt provision. See United States v. Sampson, 898"
224,6,"F.3d 287,302 (2d Cir. 2018); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347, 1366-1367 (8th Cir. 1988)"
224,7,"( collecting cases). ""It is well established that a[ n] [obstruction-of-justice] offense is complete"
224,8,when one corruptly endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration of justice; the
224,9,prosecution need not prove that the due administration of justice was actually obstructed or
224,10,"impeded. "" United States v. Davis , 854 F .3d 1276, 1292 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation marks"
224,11,omitted).
224,12,B.      Investigative and Evidentiary Considerations
224,13,"After the appointment of the Specia l Counsel, this Office obtained evidence about the"
224,14,following events relating to potential issues of obstruction of justice involving the President:
224,15,"(a) The President 's January 27, 2017 dinner with former FBI Director James Comey in which"
224,16,"the President reportedly asked for Comey's loyalty , one day after the White House had"
224,17,been briefed by the Department of Justice on contacts between former National Security
224,18,Advisor Michael Flynn and the Russian Ambassador;
224,19,"(b) The President's February 14, 2017 meeting with Comey in which the President reportedly"
224,20,asked Comey not to pursue an investigation of Flynn;
224,21,(c) The President's private requests to Comey to make public the fact that the President was
224,22,not the subject of an FBI investigation and to lift what the President regarded as a cloud;
224,23,(d) The President ' s outreach to the Director of National Intelligence and the Directors of the
224,24,National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency about the FBI 's Russia
224,25,investigation ;
224,26,"(e) The President's stated rationales for terminating Comey on May 9, 2017, including"
224,27,statements that could reasonably be understood as acknowledging that the FBT's Russia
224,28,investigation was a factor in Comey's termination; and
224,29,"(f) The President's reported involvement in issuing a statement about the June 9, 2016 Trump"
224,30,Tower meeting between Russians and senior Trump Campaign officials that said the
224,31,meeting was about adoption and omitted that the Russians had offered to provide the
224,32,Trump Campaign with derogatory information about Hillary Clinton.
224,33,Taking into account that information and our analysis of applicable statutory and constitutional
224,34,"principle s (discussed below in Volume II, Section III, infra), we determined that there was a"
224,35,sufficient factual and legal basis to further investigate potential obstruction-of -justice issues
224,36,involving the President.
224,37,Many of the core issues in an obstruction-of-justice investigation turn on an individual ' s
224,38,actions and intent. We therefore requested that the White House provide us with documentary
224,39,evidence in its possession on the relevant events. We also sought and obtained the White House's
224,40,concurrence in our conducting interviews of Wh ite House personnel who had relevant information.
224,41,"And we interviewed other witnesses who had pertinent knowledge , obtained documents on a"
224,42,12
224,43,NA
225,1,U.S. Department of Justice
225,2,Attorney Work Protittet // May Cmtt1:tiflMaterial Proteeteti Ut1der Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
225,3,"voluntary basis when possible, and used legal process where appropriate. These investigative steps"
225,4,allowed us to gather a substantial amount of evidence.
225,5,We also sought a voluntary interview with the President. After more
225,6,"discussion, the President declined to be interviewed."
225,7,"During the course of our discussions,"
225,8,"the President did agree to answer written questions on certain Russia-related topics , and he"
225,9,provided us with answers. He did not similarly agree to provide written answers to questions on
225,10,"obstruction topics or questions on events during the transition. Ultimately, while we believed that"
225,11,we had the authority and legal justification to issue a grand jury subpoena to obtain the President 's
225,12,"testimony, we chose not to do so. We made that decision in view of the substantial delay that such"
225,13,an investigative step wou ld likely produce at a late stage in our investigation. We also assessed
225,14,that based on the significant body of evidence we had already obtained of the President's actions
225,15,"and his public and private statements describing or explaining those actions , we had sufficient"
225,16,evidence to understand relevant events and to make certain assessments without the President's
225,17,testimony. The Office's decision-making process on this issue is described in more detail in
225,18,"Appendix C, infra, in a note that precedes the President ' s written responses."
225,19,"In assessing the evidence we obtained, we relied on common principles that apply in any"
225,20,"investigation. The issue of criminal intent is often inferred from circumstantial evidence. See,"
225,21,"e.g., United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1305 (I Ith Cir. 2016) (""[G]uilty knowledge can"
225,22,"rarely be established by direct evidence .... Therefore, mens rea elements such as knowledge or"
225,23,"intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence."") (internal quotation marks omitted); United"
225,24,"States v. Robinson , 702 F.3d 22, 36 (2d Cir. 2012) (""The government's case rested on"
225,25,"circumstantial evidence, but the mens rea elements of knowledge and intent can often be proved"
225,26,"through circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. "" ) (internal"
225,27,quotation marks omitted) . The principle that intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence
225,28,"is a necessity in criminal cases, given the right ofa subject to assert his priv ilege against compelled"
225,29,"self-incr imination under the Fifth Amendment and therefore decline to testify. Accordingly,"
225,30,determinations on intent are frequently reached without the opportunity to interview an
225,31,investigatory subject.
225,32,"Obstruction-of -justice cases are consistent with this rule. See, e.g., Ed/ind, 887 F.3d at"
225,33,"174, 176 (relying on ""s ignificant circumstantial evidence that [the defendant] wa s conscious of her"
225,34,"wrongdoing"" in an obstruction case; ""[b]ecause evidence of intent will almost always be"
225,35,"circumstantial , a defendant may be found culpab le where the reasonable and foreseeable"
225,36,"consequences of her act s are the obstruction of justice "") (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and"
225,37,"punctuation omitted) ; Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 173-174. Circumstantial evidence that illuminates"
225,38,"intent may include a patt ern of potentially obstruc tive acts. Fed. R. Evid. 404(6) (""Evidence of a"
225,39,"crime, wrong, or other act ... may be admissible . . . [to] prov[ e] motive , opportunity , intent,"
225,40,"preparation , plan, knowledge , identity , absence of mistake, or lack of accident. ""); see, e.g., United"
225,41,"States v. Frankhauser , 80 F .3d 641 , 648-650 ( I st Cir. 1996); United States v. Arnold , 773 F .2d"
225,42,"823, 832-834 (7th Cir. 1985); Cintolo, 818 F .2d at 1000."
225,43,Credibility judgments may also be made bas ed on objective facts and circumstantial
225,44,evidence. Standard jury instru ct ions highlight a variety of factors that are often relevant in
225,45,13
225,46,NA
226,1,U.S. Department of Justice
226,2,A1:teffley Werk Predttet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteeted Uttder Fed . R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
226,3,assessing credibility. These include whether a witness had a reason not to tell the truth ; whether
226,4,the witness had a good memory; whether the witness had the opportunity to observe the events
226,5,about which he testified ; whether the witness ' s testimony was corroborated by other witne sses;
226,6,"and whether anything the witness said or wrote previously contradicts his testimony. See, e.g.,"
226,7,First Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions § 1.06 (2018); Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions
226,8,(Criminal Cases) § 1.08 (2012); Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction § 3.0 l (2012).
226,9,"In addition to those general factors , we took into account more specific factors in assessing"
226,10,"the credibility of conflicting accounts of the facts. For example , contemporaneous written notes"
226,11,"can provide strong corroborating evidence. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 , 232 (1975)"
226,12,"(the fact that a ""statement appeared in the contemporaneously recorded report ... would tend"
226,13,"strongly to corroborate the investigator's version of the interview"") . Similarly , a witness's"
226,14,recitation of his account before he had any motive to fabricate also supports the witne ss ' s
226,15,"credibility. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158 (l 995) ("" A con sistent statement that"
226,16,predates the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived as a
226,17,"consequence of that motive. ""). Finally, a witness' s false description of an encounter can imply"
226,18,"consciousness of wrongdoing. See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2010)"
226,19,"(noting the ""well-settled principle that false exculpatory statements are evidence-often         strong"
226,20,"evidence-of guilt ""). We applied those settled legal principles in evaluating the factual results of"
226,21,our investigation.
226,22,14
226,23,NA
227,1,U.S. Department of Justice
227,2,"AUerney Werk Pwdttet ,',' M!t) Centain Material Preteet:ecl Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
227,3,1
227,4,II. FACTUAL RESULTS OF THE OBSTRUCTION INVESTIGATION
227,5,This section of the report details the evidence we obtained. We first provide an overview
227,6,"of how Russia became an issue in the 2016 presidential campaign , and how candidate Trump"
227,7,responded. We then tum to the key events that we investigated: the President's conduct concerning
227,8,the FBI investigation of Michael Flynn; the President's reaction to public confirmation of the FBI ' s
227,9,Russia investigation; events leading up to and surrounding the termination of FBI Director Comey;
227,10,efforts to terminate the Special Counsel; efforts to curtail the scope of the Special Counsel's
227,11,"investigation; efforts to prevent disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 Trump Tower"
227,12,meeting between Russians and senior campaign officials; efforts to have the Attorney General
227,13,"unrecuse; and conduct towards McGahn, Cohen, and other witnesses."
227,14,We summarize the evidence we found and then analyze it by reference to the three statutory
227,15,"obstruction-of-justice elements: obstructive act , nexus to a proceeding , and intent. We focus on"
227,16,"elements because , by regulation, the Special Counsel has ""jurisdiction .. . to investigate ... federal"
227,17,"crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel ' s"
227,18,"investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice , destruction of evidence, and intimidation of"
227,19,"witnesses. "" 28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a).             Consistent with our jurisdiction to investigate federal"
227,20,"obstruction crimes, we gathered evidence that is relevant to the elements of thos e crimes and"
227,21,analyzed them within an elements framework-while                     refraining from reaching ultimate
227,22,"conclusions about whether crimes were committed , for the reasons explained above. This section"
227,23,also does not address legal and constitutional defenses raised by counsel for the President; those
227,24,"defenses are analyzed in Volume II , Section III, iefra."
227,25,A.       The Campaign's Response to Reports About Russian Support for Trump
227,26,"During the 2016 campaign , the media raised questions about a possible connection between"
227,27,the Trump Campaign and Russia .7 The questions intensified after WikiLeaks released politically
227,28,damaging Democratic Party emails that were reported to have been hacked by Russia. Trump
227,29,responded to questions about possible connections to Russia by denying any business involvement
227,30,in Russia-even      though the Trump Organization had pursued a business project in Russia as late
227,31,as June 2016. Trump also expressed skepticism that Russia had hacked the emails at the same
227,32,time as he and other Campaign advisors privately sought information                                 about any
227,33,"further planned WikiLeaks releases. After the election , when questions persisted about possible"
227,34,"links between Russia and the Trump Campaign, the President-Elect continued to deny any"
227,35,connections to Russia and privately expressed concerns that reports of Russian election
227,36,interference might lead the public to question the legitimacy of his election .8
227,37,7
227,38,This section summarizes and cites various news stories not for the truth of the information
227,39,"contained in the stories, but rather to place candidate Trump' s response to those stories in context. Volume"
227,40,I of this report analyzes the underlying facts of several relevant events that were reported on by the media
227,41,during the campaign.
227,42,8
227,43,"As discussed in Volume I, while the investigation identified numerous links between individuals"
227,44,"with ties to the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign, the evidence"
227,45,was not sufficient to charge that any member of the Trump Campaign conspired or coordinated with
227,46,representatives ofthe Russian government to interfere in the 2016 election.
227,47,15
227,48,NA
228,1,U.S. Department of Justice
228,2,Attorfte~· Work Proattet // May CoHtaiH Material Pt1oteetea Uftaer Fee. R. Ct1im. P. 6(e)
228,3,1. Press Reports Allege Links Between the Trump Campaign and Russia
228,4,"On June 16, 2015, Donald J. Trump declared his intent to seek nomination as the"
228,5,"Republican candidate for President. 9 By early 2016, he distinguished himself among Republican"
228,6,"candidates by speaking of closer ties with Russia, 10 saying he would get along well with Russian"
228,7,"President Vladimir Putin, 11 questioning whether the NATO alliance was obsolete, 12 and praising"
228,8,"Putin as a ""strong leader."" 13 The press reported that Russian political analysts and commentators"
228,9,perceived Trump as favorable .to Russia. 14
228,10,"Beginning in February 2016 and continuing through the summer, the media reported that"
228,11,"several Trump campaign advisors appeared to have ties to Russia. For example , the press reported"
228,12,that campaign advisor Michael Flynn was seated next to Vladimir Putin at an RT gala in Moscow
228,13,in December 2015 and that Flynn had appeared regularly on RT as an analyst. 15 The press also
228,14,"reported that foreign policy advisor Carter Page had ties to a Russian state-run gas company, 16 and"
228,15,"that campaign chairman Paul Manafort had done work for the ""Russian-backed former Ukrainian"
228,16,"president Viktor Yanukovych."" 17 In addition, the press raised questions during the Republican"
228,17,9
228,18,@realDonaldTrump 6/16/15 (11 :57 a.m. ET) Tweet.
228,19,10
228,20,"See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (Trump: ""I think"
228,21,"it would be a positive thing if Russia and the United States actually got along""); Presidential Candidate"
228,22,"Donald Trump News Conference, Hanahan, South Carolina, C-SPAN (Feb. 15, 2016) (""You want to make"
228,23,"a good deal for the country, you want to deal with Russia."")."
228,24,11
228,25,"See, e.g., Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, CNN (July 8, 2015) (""I think I get along with [Putin]"
228,26,"fine.""); Andrew Rafferty, Trump Says He Would ""Get Along Very Well"" With Putin, NBC (July 30, 2015) ."
228,27,"(quoting Trump as saying, ""I think I would get along very well with Vladimir Putin."")."
228,28,12
228,29,"See, e.g.,@realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16 (7:47 a.m. ET); @realDonaldTrump Tweet 3/24/16"
228,30,(7:59 a.m. ET).
228,31,13
228,32,"See, e.g., Meet the Press Interview with Donald J. Trump, NBC (Dec. 20, 2015) (""[Putin] is a"
228,33,"strong leader. What am I gonna say, he's a weak leader? He's making mincemeat out of our President."");"
228,34,"Donald Trump Campaign Rally in Vandalia, Ohio, C-SPAN (Mar. 12, 2016) (""I said [Putin] was a strong"
228,35,"leader, which he is. I mean, he might be bad, he might be good. But he's a strong leader."")."
228,36,14
228,37,"See, e.g., Andrew Osborn, From Russia with love: why the Kremlin backs Trump, Reuters (Mar."
228,38,"24, 2016); Robert Zubrin, Trump: The Kremlin's Candidate , National Review (Apr. 4, 2016)."
228,39,15
228,40,"See, e.g., Mark Hosenball & Steve Holland, Trump being advised by ex-US. Lieutenant General"
228,41,"who favors closer Russia ties, Reuters (Feb. 26, 2016); Tom Hamburger et al., Inside Trump's financial ties"
228,42,"to Russia and his unusual flattery of Vladimir Putin, Washington Post (June 17, 2016). Certain matters"
228,43,"pertaining to Flynn are described in Volume I, Section TV.B.7, supra."
228,44,16
228,45,"See, e.g., Zachary Mider, Trump's New Russia Advisor Has Deep Ties to Kremlin's Gazprom ,"
228,46,"Bloomberg (Mar. 30, 2016); Julia Iofee, Who is Carter Page?, Politico (Sep. 23, 2016). Certain matters"
228,47,"pertaining to Page are described in Volume l, Section IV.A.3, supra."
228,48,"17 Tracy  Wilkinson, In a shift, Republican platform doesn't call for arming Ukraine against Russia,"
228,49,"spurring outrage, Los Angeles Times (July 21, 2016); Josh Ragin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-"
228,50,"Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post (July 18, 2016)."
228,51,16
228,52,NA
229,1,U.S . Department of Justice
229,2,Atterfle~· Werle Predttet // Muy Cefltttifl Mttterittl Preteeted Uf!eer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e)
229,3,National Convention about the Trump Campaign's involvement in changing the Republican
229,4,"platform's stance on giving ""weapons to Ukraine to fight Russian and rebel forces."" 18"
229,5,2. The Trump Campaign Reacts to WikiLeaks's Release of Hacked Emails
229,6,"On June 14, 2016, a cybersecurity firm that had conducted in-house analysis for the"
229,7,Democratic National Committee (DNC) posted an announcement that Russian government
229,8,hackers had infiltrated the DNC's computer and obtained access to documents. 19
229,9,"On July 22, 2016, the day before the Democratic National Convention, WikiLeaks posted"
229,10,"thousands of hacked DNC documents revealing sensitive internal deliberations. 20 Soon thereafter,"
229,11,Hillary Clinton's campaign manager publicly contended that Russia had hacked the DNC emails
229,12,"and arranged their release in order to help candidate Trump. 21 On July 26, 2016, the New York"
229,13,"Times reported that U.S. ""intelligence agencies ha[d] told the White House they now have 'high"
229,14,confidence' that the Russian government was behind the theft of emails and documents from the
229,15,"Democratic National Committee.',22"
229,16,"Within the Trum       Cam ai n, aides reacted with enthusiasm to reports of the hacks. 23"
229,17,discussed with Campaign officials that WikiLeaks
229,18,would release the hacked material.             Some witnesses said that Trump himself discussed the
229,19,"possibility of upcoming releases~.                  Michael Cohen, then-executive vice resident of the"
229,20,"Trum Or anization and s ecial counsel to Trum , recalled hearin"
229,21,"Cohen recalled that Trump responded, ""oh good, alright,"""
229,22,18
229,23,"Josh Rogin, Trump campaign guts GOP 's anti-Russia stance on Ukraine, Washington Post,"
229,24,"Opinions (July 18, 2016). The Republican Platform events are described in Volume I, Section IV.A.6,"
229,25,supra.
229,26,19
229,27,"Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee, CrowdStrike (June 15,"
229,28,"2016) (post originally appearing on June 14, 2016, according to records of the timing provided by"
229,29,"CrowdStrike); Ellen Nakashima, Russian government hackers penetrated DNC, stole opposition research"
229,30,"on Trump, Washington Post (June 14, 2016)."
229,31,20
229,32,"Tom Hamburger and Karen Tumulty, WikiLeaks releases thousands of documents about Clinton"
229,33,"and internal deliberations, Washington Post (July 22, 2016)."
229,34,21
229,35,"Amber Phillips, Clinton campaign manager: Russians leaked Democrats ' emails to help Donald"
229,36,"Trump, Washington Post (July 24, 2016)."
229,37,22
229,38,"David E. Sanger and Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows That Russia Hacked D.N.C. ,"
229,39,"New York Times (July 26, 2016)."
229,40,23
229,41,"Gates 4/10/18 302, at 5; Newman 8/23/18 302, at I."
229,42,24
229,43,"Gates 4/11/18 302, at 2-3 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/18 302, at 2; see also Volume I, Section"
229,44,"III.D. l, supra."
229,45,25
229,46,"Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8; see also Volume I, Section III.D. l, supra. According to Cohen, after"
229,47,"WikiLeak~tolen                              DNC emails on July 22, 2016, Trump said to Cohen words to the"
229,48,"effect of,~                              Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 10. Cohen's role in the candidate's and later"
229,49,17
229,50,NA
230,1,U.S. Department of Justice
230,2,"Attef'Re~·Wef'k Pl'etittet // May CeRtaiR Material Preteetetl UReef""Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
230,3,and Harm to Ongoing Matter                      26
230,4,"oke to Trump~;;;;~;~;~;;~;.,;~;"
230,5,; Manafort recalled that Trump responded that
230,6,Manafort should                                      keep Trump u~ty                    campaign manager
230,7,Rick Gates said that Man~ssure                                about -                 information and that
230,8,Manafort instructed Gates~                              status updates on u com in releases. 28 Around
230,9,the same time Gates was with Trump on a trip to an airport
230,10,", and shortly after the call ended, Trum2 told Gates that more releases of damaging"
230,11,information would be coming.
230,12,29
230,13,i:§jih•§l•Uf•MhflrlfDiM       -       were discussed within the
230,14,"Campaign,3° and in the summer of 2016, the Campaign was planning a communications strategy"
230,15,based on the possible release of Clinton emails by WikiLeaks. 31
230,16,3. The Trump Campaign Reacts to Allegations That Russia was Seeking to Aid
230,17,Candidate Trump
230,18,"In the days that followed WikiLeaks's July 22, 2016 release of hacked DNC emails, the"
230,19,Trump Campaign publicly rejected suggestions that Russia was seeking to aid candidate Trump.
230,20,"On July 26, 2016, Trump tweeted that it was ""[c]razy"" to suggest that Russia was ""dealing with"
230,21,"Trump"" 32 and that ""[f]or the record,"" he had ""ZERO investments in Russia. "" 33"
230,22,"In a press conference the next day, July 27, 2016, Trump characterized ""this whole thing"
230,23,"with Russia"" as ""a total deflection"" and stated that it was ""farfetched"" and ""ridiculous."" 34 Trump"
230,24,"said that the assertion that Russia had hacked the emails was unproven, but stated that it would"
230,25,"give him ""no pause"" if Russia had Clinton's emails. 35 Trump added , ""Russia , if you're listening ,"
230,26,"I hope you 're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded"
230,27,"President's activities, and his own criminal conduct, is descriped in Volume II, Section ILK, infra, and in"
230,28,"Volume I, Section IV.A. I, supra."
230,29,26
230,30,"Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 8."
230,31,27
230,32,. As explained in footnote 197 of Volume
230,33,"I, Section III.D. l.b, supra, this Office has included Manafort's account of these events because it aligns"
230,34,with those of other witnesses and is corroborated to that extent.
230,35,28
230,36,"Gates l 0/25/ 18 302, at 4."
230,37,29
230,38,"Gates I 0/25/ 18 302, at 4."
230,39,30
230,40,"Bannon 1/18/l 9 302, at 3."
230,41,31
230,42,"Gates4/11/18302, at 1-2 (SM-2180998); Gates 10/25/ 18302, at2(messa~"
230,43,"formed in June/Jul timeframe based on claims b Assan eon June 12, 2016, ----"
230,44,.                               ).
230,45,32
230,46,@rea!DonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:47 p.m. ET) Tweet.
230,47,33
230,48,@realDonaldTrump 7/26/16 (6:50 p.m. ET) Tweet.
230,49,34
230,50,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral , Florida , C-SPAN (July 27, 2016)."
230,51,35
230,52,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016)."
230,53,18
230,54,NA
231,1,U.S. Department of Justice
231,2,At:te!'He~· Wel'lcPrea1:1et// Ma~·CeHtaiHMatel'ial Pl'eteetea UHtforFee . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
231,3,"mightily by our press ."" 36 Trump also said that ""there's nothing that I can think of that I' d rather"
231,4,"do than have Russia friendly as opposed to the way they are right now,"" and in response to a"
231,5,question about whether he would recognize Crimea as Russian territory and consider lifting
231,6,"sanctions , Trump replied , ""We ' ll be looking at that. Yeah, we'll be looking ."" 37"
231,7,"During the press conference, Trump repeated ""I have nothing to do with Russia"" five"
231,8,38
231,9,"times. He stated that ""the closest [he] came to Russia"" was that Russians may have purchased a"
231,10,home or condos from him. 39 He said that after he held the Miss Universe pageant in Moscow in
231,11,"2013 he had be.en interested in working with Russian companies that ""wanted to put a lot of money"
231,12,"into developments in Russia"" but "" it never worked out."" 40 He explained , ""[t]rankly, I didn't want"
231,13,to do it for a couple of different reasons. But we had a major developer ... that wanted to develop
231,14,"property in Moscow and other places. But we decided not to do it."" 41 The Trump Organization ,"
231,15,"however, had been pursuing a building project in Moscow-the Trump Tower Moscow project-"
231,16,"from approximately September 2015 through June 2016, and the candidate was regularly updated"
231,17,"on developments , including possible trips by Michael Cohen to Moscow to promote the deal and"
231,18,by Trump himself to finalize it.42
231,19,Cohen recalled speaking with Trump after the press conference about Trump's denial of
231,20,"any business dealings in Russia, which Cohen regarded as untrue. 43 Trump told Cohen that Trump"
231,21,"Tower Moscow was not a deal yet and said, ""Why mention it if it is not a deal? "" 44 According to"
231,22,"Cohen, at around this time , in response to Trump's disavowal of connections to Russia, campaign"
231,23,36
231,24,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). Within five hours"
231,25,"of Trump's remark, a Russian intelligence service began targeting email accounts associated with Hillary"
231,26,"Clinton for possible hacks. See Volume I, Section III, supra. In written answers submitted in this"
231,27,"investigation, the President stated that he made the ""Russia, if you're listening"" statement ""in jest and"
231,28,"sarcastically, as was apparent to any objective observer."" Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20,"
231,29,"2018), at 13 (Response to Question II, Part (d))."
231,30,37
231,31,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016). In his written"
231,32,"answers submitted in this investigation, the President said that his statement that ""we'll be looking"" at"
231,33,"Crimea and sanctions ""did not communicate any position."" Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov."
231,34,"20, 2018), at 17 (Response to Question IV, Part (g))."
231,35,38
231,36,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016)."
231,37,39
231,38,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016)."
231,39,40
231,40,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 2016) ."
231,41,41
231,42,"Donald Trump News Conference, Doral, Florida, C-SPAN (July 27, 20 16)."
231,43,42
231,44,The Trump Tower Moscow project and Trump's involvement in it is discussed in detail in
231,45,"Volume I, Section TV.A. I, supra, and Volume TI,Section TT.K,infra."
231,46,43
231,47,"Cohen 9/18 / 18 302, at 4."
231,48,44
231,49,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 4-5."
231,50,19
231,51,NA
232,1,U.S. Department of Justice
232,2,"AttorHey Work Protittet // Ma,.· CotttaiH Material Proteeteti UHaer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e)"
232,3,"advisors had developed a ""party line"" that Trump had no business with Russia and no connections"
232,4,to Russia. 45
232,5,"In addition to denying any connections with Russia, the Trump Campaign reacted to reports"
232,6,of Russian election interference in aid of the Campaign by seeking to distance itself from Russian
232,7,"contacts. For example, in August 2016 , foreign policy advisor J.D . Gordon declined an invitation"
232,8,"to Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak's residence because the timing was ""not optimal"" in view"
232,9,"of media reports about Russian interference. 46 On August 19, 2016 , Manafort was asked to resign"
232,10,amid media coverage scrutinizing his ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukra ine and links to
232,11,Russian business. 47 And when the media published stories about Page's connections to Russia in
232,12,"September 2016, Trump Campaign officials terminated Page's association with the Campaign and"
232,13,"told the press that he had played ""no role"" in the Campaign .48"
232,14,"On October 7, 2016, WikiLeaks released the first set of emails stolen by a Russian"
232,15,"intelligence agency from Clinton Campaign chairman John Podesta. 49 The same day, the federal"
232,16,"government announced that ""the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails"
232,17,"from US persons and institutions, including from US political organizations ."" 50 The government"
232,18,"statement directly linked Russian hacking to the releases on WikiLeaks , with the goal of interfering"
232,19,"with the presidential election, and concluded ""that only Russia ' s senior-most officials could have"
232,20,"authorized these activities"" based on their ""s cope and sensitivity."" 51"
232,21,"On October 11, 2016, Podesta stated publicly that the FBI was investigating Russia's"
232,22,hacking and said that candidate Trump might have known in advance that the hacked emails were
232,23,going to be released. 52 Vice Presidential Candidate Mike Pence was asked whether the Trump
232,24,45
232,25,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at I; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3-5. The formation of the ""party line"" is"
232,26,"described in greater detail in Volume II, Section Il.K, infra ."
232,27,46
232,28,"DJTFP00004953 (8/8/16 Email, Gordon to Pchelyakov) (stating that ""[t]hese days are not"
232,29,"optimal for us, as we are busily knocking down a stream of false media stories""). The invitation and"
232,30,"Gordon's response are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.7.a, supra."
232,31,47
232,32,"See, e.g., Amber Phillips, Paul Manafort's complicated ties to Ukraine, explained, Washington"
232,33,"Post (Aug. 19, 2016) (""There were also a wave of fresh headlines dealing with investigations into"
232,34,"[Manafort's] ties to a pro-Russian political party in Ukraine.""); Tom Winter & Ken Dilanian, Donald Trump"
232,35,"Aide Paul Manafort Scrutiniz ed for Russian Business Ties, NBC (Aug. 18, 2016). Relevant events"
232,36,"involving Manafort are discussed in Volume 1, Section IV.A.8, supra."
232,37,48
232,38,"Michael Isikoff, U.S. intel officials prob e ties between Trump adviser and Kr emlin , Yahoo News"
232,39,"(Sep. 23, 2016); see, e.g. , 9/25/16 Email, Hicks to Conway & Bannon; 9/23/16 Email, J. Miller to Bannon"
232,40,"& S. Miller; Page 3/16/17 302, at 2."
232,41,49
232,42,@WikiLeaks 10/7/16 (4:32 p.m. ET) Tweet.
232,43,50
232,44,Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
232,45,"Nationa l Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016) ."
232,46,51
232,47,Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
232,48,"National Intelligence on Election Security, DHS (Oct. 7, 2016)."
232,49,52
232,50,"John Wagner & Anne Gearan , Clinton campaign chairman ties email hack to Russians, suggests"
232,51,"Trump had early warning, Washington Post (Oct. 11, 2016)."
232,52,20
232,53,NA
233,1,U.S. Department of Justice
233,2,Atteffl:e)' Werk Predttet // Ma:)·Cefl:ta:ifl:
233,3,Ma:teria:lPreteeted Ufl:derFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
233,4,"Campaign was ""in cahoots"" with Wik iLeaks in releasing damaging Clinton-related information"
233,5,"and responded, ""Nothing could be further from the truth."" 53"
233,6,"4. After the Election, Trump Continues to Deny Any Contacts or Connections"
233,7,with Russia or That Russia Aided his Election
233,8,"On November 8, 2016, Trump was elected President. Two days later, Russian officials"
233,9,"told the press that the Russian government had maintained contacts with Trump ' s ""immediate"
233,10,"entourage"" during the campaign .54 In response, Hope Hicks, who had been the Trump Campaign"
233,11,"spokesperson, said , ""We are not aware of any campaign representatives that were in touch with"
233,12,"any foreign entities before yesterday , when Mr. Trump spoke with many world leaders ."" 55 Hicks"
233,13,"gave an additional statement denying any contacts between the Campaign and Russia: ""It never"
233,14,happened. There was no communication between the campaign and any foreign entity during the
233,15,"campaign."" 56"
233,16,"On December 10, 2016 , the press reported that U.S. intelligence agencies had ""concluded"
233,17,that Russia interfered in last month 's presidential election to boost Donald Trump's bid for the
233,18,"White House."" 57 Reacting to the story the next day, President-Elect Trump stated, ""I think it's"
233,19,"ridiculous. I think it's just another excuse."" 58 He continued that no one really knew who was"
233,20,"responsible for the hacking , suggesting that the intelligence community had ""no idea if it's Russia"
233,21,"or China or somebody . It could be som ebody sitting in a bed some place."" 59 The President-Elect"
233,22,53
233,23,"Louis Nelson, Pence denies Trump camp in cahoots with WikiLeaks, Politico (Oct. 14, 2016)."
233,24,"54 Ivan Nechepurenko, Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Diplomat Says , New"
233,25,"York Times (Nov. 10, 2016) (quoting Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov saying, ""[t]here"
233,26,"were contacts"" and ""[ cannot say that all, but a number of them maintained contacts with Russian"
233,27,"representatives""); Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,"
233,28,"Associated Press (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Ryabkov saying, ""I don 't say that all of them, but a whole array"
233,29,"of them supported contacts with Russian representatives"")."
233,30,55
233,31,"Ivan Nechepurenko , Russian Officials Were in Contact With Trump Allies, Dip lomat Says, New"
233,32,"York Times (Nov. 11, 2016) (quoting Hicks)."
233,33,"56  Jim Heintz & Matthew Lee, Russia eyes better ties with Trump; says contacts underway,"
233,34,"Associated Press (Nov. I 0, 2016) (quoting Hicks). Hicks recalled that after she made that statement, she"
233,35,"spoke with Campaign advisors Kellyanne Conway, Stephen Miller, Jason Miller, and probably Kushner"
233,36,"and Bannon to ensure it was accurate, and there was no hesitation or pushback from any of them. Hicks"
233,37,"12/8/17 302, at 4."
233,38,57
233,39,"Damien Gayle, CIA concludes Russia interfered to help Trump win election, say reports ,"
233,40,"Guardian (Dec. 10, 2016)."
233,41,58
233,42,"Chris Wallace Hosts ""Fox News Sunday,"" Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ"
233,43,"Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016) ."
233,44,"59 Chris Wallace Hosts ""Fox News Sunday,"" Interview with Presid ent-Elect Donald Trump, CQ"
233,45,"Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. 11, 2016)."
233,46,21
233,47,NA
234,1,U.S. Department of Justice
234,2,Atteme)' Werle Pre(:lttet // Mtt)' Cetttaitt Materiel Preteetea Urtaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
234,3,"also said that Democrats were ""putting D out"" the story of Russian interference ""because they"
234,4,"suffered one of the greatest defeats in the history of politics."" 60"
234,5,"On December 18, 2016, Podesta told the press that the election was ""distorted by the"
234,6,"Russian intervention"" and questioned whether Trump Campaign officials had been ""in touch with"
234,7,"the Russians."" 61 The same day, incoming Chief of Staff Reince Priebus appeared on Fox News"
234,8,Sunday and declined to say whether the President-Elect accepted the intelligence community's
234,9,determination that Russia intervened in the election. 62 When asked about any contact or
234,10,"coordination between the Campaign and Russia, Priebus said, ""Even this question is insane. Of"
234,11,"course we didn't interface with the Russians."" 63 Priebus added that ""this whole thing is a spin job """
234,12,"and said, ""the real question is, why the Democrats ... are doing everything they can to de legitimize"
234,13,"the outcome of the election?"" 64"
234,14,"On December 29, 2016, the Obama Administration announced that in response to Russian"
234,15,"cyber operations aimed at the U.S. election, it was imposing sanctions and other measures on"
234,16,"several Russian individuals and entities. 65 When first asked about the sanctions , President-Elect"
234,17,"Trump said, ""I think we ought to get on with our lives."" 66 He then put out a statement that said"
234,18,"""It's time for our country to move on to bigger and better things, "" but indicated that he would meet"
234,19,with intelligence community leaders the following week for a briefing on Russian interference. 67
234,20,"The briefing occurred on January 6, 2017. 68 Following the briefing, the intelligence community"
234,21,"released the public version of its assessment, which concluded with high confidence that Russia"
234,22,had intervened in the election through a variety of means with the goal of harming Clinton's
234,23,6
234,24,"°Chris  Wallace Hosts ""Fox News Sunday,"" Interview with President-Elect Donald Trump, CQ"
234,25,"Newsmaker Transcripts (Dec. l l, 2016)."
234,26,61
234,27,"David Morgan, Clinton campaign: It's an 'open question' if Trump team colluded with Russia ,"
234,28,"Reuters Business Insider (Dec. 18, 2016)."
234,29,62
234,30,"Chris Wallace Hosts ""Fox News Sunday, "" Int erview with Incoming White House Chief of Staff"
234,31,"Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016)."
234,32,63
234,33,"Chris Wallace Hosts ""Fox News Sunday ,"" Interview with Incoming White Hous e Chief of Staff"
234,34,"Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016)."
234,35,"64 Chris Wallace Hosts ""Fox N ews Sunday,"" Interview with Incomi ng White House Chief of Staff"
234,36,"Reince Priebus, Fox News (Dec. 18, 2016)."
234,37,65
234,38,Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
234,39,"Harassment, White House (Dec. 29, 2016); see also Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces"
234,40,"measures to punish Russia for 2016 election interference , Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016)."
234,41,66
234,42,"John Wagner, Trump on alleged election interf erence by Russia: 'Get on with our lives,'"
234,43,"Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016)."
234,44,67
234,45,"Missy Ryan et al., Obama administration announces meas ures to punish Russia for 2016 election"
234,46,"interferen ce, Washington Post (Dec. 29, 2016)."
234,47,68
234,48,"Comey 11/15/17302,at3."
234,49,. 22
234,50,NA
235,1,U.S. Department of Justice
235,2,"AM:ome, Work Protl1:1et      // Mtty Contttin Mttterittl Proteetetl Untler Fetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
235,3,electability. 69 The assessment further concluded with high confidence that Putin and the Russian
235,4,government had developed a clear preference for Trump. 70
235,5,"Several days later , BuzzFeed published unverified allegations compiled by former British"
235,6,intelligence officer Christopher Steele during the campaign about candidate Trump 's Russia
235,7,"connections under the headline ""These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia."" 71 In a"
235,8,"press conference the next day, the President -Elect called the release ""an absolute disgrace"" and"
235,9,"said, "" I have no dealings with Russia. I have no deals that could happen in Russia, because we've"
235,10,"stayed away . . .. So I have no deals, I have no loans and I have no dealings. We could make deals"
235,11,"in Russia very easily ifwe wanted to, I just don't want to because I think that would be a conflict."" 72"
235,12,Several advisors recalled that the President-Elect viewed stories about his Russian
235,13,"connections, the Russia investigations , and the intelligence community assessment of Russian"
235,14,"interference as a threat to the legitimacy of his electoral victory. 73 Hicks , for example , said that"
235,15,"the President-Elect viewed the intelligence community assessment as his ""Achilles heel "" because ,"
235,16,"even if Russia had no impact on the election, people would think Russia helped him win, taking"
235,17,"away from what he had accomplished. 74 Sean Spicer, the first White House communications"
235,18,"director, recalled that the President thought the Russia story was developed to undermine the"
235,19,legitimacy of his election. 75 Gates said the President viewed the Russia inv estigation as an attack
235,20,on the legitimacy of his win .76 And Priebus recalled that when the intelligence assessment came
235,21,"out , the President-Elect was concerned people would question the legitimacy of his win .77"
235,22,69
235,23,"Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016"
235,24,"US Presidential Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017)."
235,25,70
235,26,"Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Russia 's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016"
235,27,"US President ial Election, at 1 (Jan. 6, 2017)."
235,28,71
235,29,"Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed (Jan. 10,"
235,30,2017).
235,31,72
235,32,"Donald Trump's News Conference: Full Transcript and Video, New York Times (Jan. 11,"
235,33,"2017), available at https://www.nytimes.com/20 17/01/ 11/us/politics/trump-press-conference-"
235,34,transcript. htm I.
235,35,73
235,36,"Priebus I0/ 13/ 17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18; Spicer 10/ 16/ I7 302, at 6; Bannon 2/14/18"
235,37,"302, at 2; Gates 4/ 18/I 8 302, at 3; see Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 2 (the President believed that the purpose of"
235,38,the Russia investigation was to delegitimize his presidency).
235,39,74
235,40,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 18."
235,41,75
235,42,"Spicer 10/ 17/ 17 302, at 6."
235,43,76
235,44,"Gates 4/18/ 18 302, at 3."
235,45,77
235,46,"Priebus I 0/13/ 17 302, at 7."
235,47,23
235,48,NA
236,1,U .S. Department of Justice
236,2,AMsfl'l:eyWark Prmittct // Mtty Csl'l:taiHMaterial Prnteetee UHec1·Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
236,3,B.       The President's Conduct Concerning the Investigation of Michael Flynn
236,4,Overview
236,5,"During the presidential transition, incoming National Security Advisor Michael Flynn had"
236,6,two phone calls with the Russian Ambassador to the United States about the Russian response to
236,7,U.S. sanctions imposed because of Russia's election interference. After the press reported on
236,8,"Flynn's contacts with the Russian Ambassador, Flynn lied to incoming Administration officials"
236,9,by saying he had not discussed sanctions on the calls . The officials publicly repeated those lies in
236,10,"press interviews.      The FBI, which previously was investigating Flynn for other matters,"
236,11,"interviewed him about the calls in the first week after the inauguration, and Flynn told similar lies"
236,12,"to the FBI. On January 26, 2017, Department of Justice (DOJ) officials notified the White House"
236,13,that Flynn and the Russian Ambassador had discussed sanctions and that Flynn had been
236,14,"interviewed by the FBT. The next night, the President had a private dinner with FBI Director James"
236,15,"Comey in which he asked for Corney's loyalty. On February 13, 2017, the President asked Flynn"
236,16,"to resign. The following day, the President had a one-on-one conversation with Comey in which"
236,17,"he said, ""I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn go."""
236,18,Evidence
236,19,1. Incoming National Security Advisor Flynn Discusses Sanctions on Russia with
236,20,Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak
236,21,"Shortly after the election, President-Elect Trump announced he would appoint Michael"
236,22,"Flynn as his National Security Advisor. 78 For the next two months, Flynn played an active role on"
236,23,the Presidential Transition Team (PTT) coordinating policy positions and communicating with
236,24,"foreign government officials, including Russian Ambassador to the United States Sergey"
236,25,Kislyak. 79
236,26,"On December 29 , 2016, as noted in Volume II, Section TT.A.4, supra, the Obama"
236,27,Administration announced that it was imposing sanctions and other measures on several Russian
236,28,"individuals and entities. 80 That day, multiple members of the PTT exchanged emails about the"
236,29,"sanctions and the impact they would have on the incoming Administration, and Flynn informed"
236,30,members of the PTT that he would be speaking to the Russian Ambassador later in the day. 81
236,31,"78 Flynn  11/16/17 302, at 7; President-Elect Donald.I Trump Selects US. Senator Jeff Sessions for"
236,32,"Attorney General, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and"
236,33,"US. Rep. Mike Pompeo as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, President-Elect Donald J. Trump"
236,34,"Press Release (Nov. 18, 2016); see also, e.g., Bryan Bender, Trump names Mike Flynn national security"
236,35,"adviser, Politico, (Nov. 17, 2016)."
236,36,79
236,37,"Flynn 11/16/17 302, at 8-14; Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 3-5."
236,38,80
236,39,Statement by the President on Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and
236,40,"Harassment, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Dec. 29, 2016)."
236,41,81
236,42,"12/29/16 Email, O'Brien to McFarland et al.; 12/29/16 Email, Bossert to Flynn et al.; 12/29/16"
236,43,"Email, McFarland to Flynn et al.; SF00000 I (12/29/16 Text Message, Flynn to Flaherty) (""Tit for tat w"
236,44,"Russia not good. Russian AMBO reaching out to me today.""); Flynn 1/19/ 18 302 , at 2."
236,45,24
236,46,NA
237,1,U .S. Department of Justice
237,2,Att6f'fle~·'.VerlcPrnEittet// May C6HtaiftMaterial Pr6teeteEIUt1EierFee. R. Crim. P. e(e)
237,3,"Flynn, who was in the Dominican Republic at the time, and K.T. McFarland, who was slated to"
237,4,become the Deputy National Security Advisor and was at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Florida with
237,5,"the President-Elect and other senior staff, talked by phone about what, if anything, Flynn should"
237,6,communicate to Kislyak about the sanctions .82                 McFarland had spoken with incoming
237,7,Administration officials about the sanctions and Russia ' s possible responses and thought she had
237,8,mentioned in those conversations that Flynn was scheduled to speak with Kislyak. 83 Based on
237,9,"those conversations, McFarland informed Flynn that incoming Administration officials at Mar-a-"
237,10,"Lago did not want Russia to escalate the situation. 84 At 4:43 p.m. that afternoon, McFarland sent"
237,11,"an email to several officials about the sanctions and informed the group that ""Gen [F]lynn is talking"
237,12,"to russian ambassador this evening."" 85"
237,13,"Approximately one hour later, McFarland met with the President-Elect and senior officials"
237,14,and briefed them on the sanctions and Russia's possible responses. 86 Incoming Chief of Staff
237,15,Reince Priebus recalled that McFarland may have mentioned at the meeting that the sanctions
237,16,"situation could be ""cooled down"" and not escalated. 87 McFarland recalled that at the end of the"
237,17,"meeting, someone may have mentioned to the President-Elect that Flynn was speaking to the"
237,18,Russian Ambassador that evening. 88 McFarland did not recall any response by the President-
237,19,Elect.89 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect viewed the sanctions as an attempt by the Obama
237,20,Administration to embarrass him by delegitimizing his election. 90
237,21,"Immediately after discussing the sanctions with McFarland on December 29, 2016, Flynn"
237,22,"called Kislyak and requested that Russia respond to the sanctions only in a reciprocal manner,"
237,23,"without escalating the situation. 91 After the call, Flynn briefed McFarland on its substance. 92"
237,24,Flynn told McFarland that the Russian response to the sanctions was not going to be escalatory
237,25,"because Russia wanted a good relationship with the Trump Administration. 93 On December 30,"
237,26,"2016 , Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would not take retaliatory measures"
237,27,82
237,28,"Statement of Offense at 2-3 , United States v. Michael T. Flynn, 1: l 7-cr-232 (0.0.C. Dec. 1,"
237,29,"2017) , Doc. 4 (Flynn Statement of Offense); Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 3-4; Flynn 11/20/ 17 302, at 3;"
237,30,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7."
237,31,83
237,32,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 4-7 (recalling discussions about this issue with Bannon and Priebus)."
237,33,"84 Flynn Statement of Offense , at 3; Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at 3-4; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 6-7."
237,34,85
237,35,"12/29/16 Email, McFarland to Flynn et al."
237,36,86
237,37,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
237,38,87
237,39,"Priebus 1/18/18 302 , at 3."
237,40,88
237,41,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 7. Priebus thought it was possible that McFarland had mentioned"
237,42,"Flynn's scheduled call with Kislyak at this meeting , although he was not certain. Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at"
237,43,3.
237,44,89
237,45,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7."
237,46,90
237,47,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 3."
237,48,91
237,49,"Flynn Statement of Offense , at 3; Flynn 11/17/17 302 , at 3-4."
237,50,92
237,51,"Flynn Statement of Offen se, at 3; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 7-8; Flynn 11/17/ 17 302 , at 4."
237,52,93
237,53,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 8."
237,54,25
237,55,NA
238,1,U.S. Department of Justice
238,2,Atteffley Werk Prec41:tet// May Cefltaifl Material Preteetee UHeer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
238,3,"in response to the sanctions at that time and would instead ""plan ... further steps to restore Russian -"
238,4,"US relations based on the policies of the Trump Administration."" 94 Following that announcement ,"
238,5,"the President-Elect tweeted, ""Great move on delay (by V. Putin) - I always knew he was very"
238,6,"smart! "" 95"
238,7,"On December 31, 2016, Kislyak called Flynn and told him that Flynn ' s request had been"
238,8,received at the highest levels and Russia had chosen not to retaliate in response to the request. 96
238,9,"Later that day, Flynn told McFarland about this follow-up conversation with Kislyak and Russia's"
238,10,decision not to escalate the sanctions situation based on Flynn ' s request. 97 McFarland recalled
238,11,that Flynn thought his phone call had made a difference. 98 Flynn spoke with other incoming
238,12,"Administration officials that day, but does not recall whether they discussed the sanctions .99"
238,13,Flynn recalled discussing the sanctions issue with incoming Administration official
238,14,°
238,15,Stephen Bannon the next day. 10 Flynn said that Bannon appeared to know about Flynn's
238,16,"conversations with Kislyak, and he and Bannon agreed that they had ""s topped the train on Russia ' s"
238,17,"response"" to the sanctions. 101 On January 3, 2017, Flynn saw the President-Elect in person and"
238,18,"thought they discussed the Russian reaction to the sanctions, but Flynn did not have a specific"
238,19,recollection of telling the President-Elect about the substance of his calls with Kislyak. 102
238,20,Members of the intelligence community were surprised by Russia's decision not to retaliate
238,21,"in response to the sanctions. 103 When analyzing Russia's response , they became aware of Flynn's"
238,22,"discussion of sa nctions with Kislyak. 104 Previously, the FBI had opened an investigation of Flynn"
238,23,based on his relationship with the Russian govemment . 105 Flynn's contacts with Kislyak became
238,24,a key component of that investigation . 106
238,25,94
238,26,"Statement by the President of Russia, President of Russia (Dec. 30, 2016) 12/30/ 16."
238,27,95
238,28,@realDonaldTrump 12/30/ I6 (2:41 p.m. ET) Tweet.
238,29,96
238,30,"Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 3; Flynn Statement of Offense, at 3."
238,31,97
238,32,"Flynn 1/ 19/ 18 302, at 3; Flynn 11/ 17/ 17 302, at 6; McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 10; Flynn"
238,33,"Statement of Offense, at 3."
238,34,98
238,35,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 1O; see Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 4."
238,36,99
238,37,"Flynn 11/17117 302, at 5-6."
238,38,10
238,39,"° Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 4-5. Bannon recalled meeting with Flynn that day, but said he did not"
238,40,"remember discuss ing sanctions with him. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 9."
238,41,101
238,42,"Flynn 11/21/17 302, at I; Flynn 1/ 19/ 18 302, at 5."
238,43,102
238,44,"Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 6; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 6."
238,45,3
238,46,"to   McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2."
238,47,4
238,48,"to   McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2."
238,49,105
238,50,"McCord 7/17/17 302, at 2-3; Comey 11/ 15/17 302, at 5."
238,51,106
238,52,"McCord 7/ 17/17 302, at2-3."
238,53,26
238,54,NA
239,1,U .S. Department  of Justice
239,2,Attel'fley Werk Pl'ea1:1et// Ma.yCeAtB.iAMaterial Preteetea UHael' Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
239,3,2. President-Elect Trump is Briefed on the Intelligence Community's Assessment
239,4,of Russian Interference         in the Election and Congress Opens Election-
239,5,Interference Investigations
239,6,"On January 6, 2017, as noted in Volume II, Section 11.A.4, supra, intelligence officials"
239,7,briefed President-Elect Trump and the incoming Administration on the intelligence community's
239,8,assessment that Russia had interfered in the 2016 presidential election. 107 When the briefing
239,9,"concluded, Comey spoke with the President-Elect privately to brief him on unverified, personally"
239,10,sensitive allegations compiled by Steele. 108 According to a memorandum                    Comey drafted
239,11,"immediately after their private discussion, the President-Elect began the meeting by telling Comey"
239,12,he had conducted himself honorably over the prior year and had a great reputation. 109 The
239,13,"President-Elect stated that he thought highly of Comey, looked forward to working with him, and"
239,14,°
239,15,hoped that he planned to stay on as FBI director . 11 Comey responded that he intended to continue
239,16,serving in that role . 111 Comey then briefed the President-Elect on the sensitive material in the
239,17,"Steele reporting. 112 Comey recalled that the President-Elect seemed defensive, so Corney decided"
239,18,107
239,19,"Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,"
239,20,"I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at"
239,21,1-2):
239,22,108
239,23,"Comey 11/15/ 17 302, at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select"
239,24,"Intelligence Committee , I I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James 8. Comey , former"
239,25,"Director of the FBI, at 1-2)."
239,26,109
239,27,"Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1. Corney began drafting the memorandum summarizing the"
239,28,"meeting immediately after it occurred. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4. He finished the memorandum that"
239,29,"evening and finalized it the following morning. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4."
239,30,11
239,31,"° Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 3. Corney identified several other"
239,32,occasions in January 2017 when the President reiterated that he hoped Comey would stay on as FBI director.
239,33,"On January 11, President-Elect Trump called Comey to discuss the Steele reports and stated that he thought"
239,34,Comey was doing great and the President-Elect hoped he would remain in his position as FBI director.
239,35,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 4; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence"
239,36,"Committee, 1I 5th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ"
239,37,"Cong. Transcripts, at 90. (""[D]uring that call, he asked me again, 'Hope you're going to stay, you're doing"
239,38,"a great job .' And I told him that I intended to.""). On January 22, at a White House reception honoring law"
239,39,"enforcement, the President greeted Comey and said he looked forward to working with him. Hearing on"
239,40,"Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 20 I 7)"
239,41,"(testimony of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI), CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 22. And as discussed"
239,42,"in greater detail in Volume II, Section 11.D, infra, on January 27, the President invited Comey to dinner at"
239,43,the White House and said he was glad Comey wanted to stay on as FBI Director.
239,44,111
239,45,"Comey 1/7117 Memorandum, at 1; Corney l l /15/ 17 302 , at 3."
239,46,112
239,47,"Comey 1/7/17 Memorandum, at 1-2; Corney I 1/15/17 302, at 3. Corney's briefing included the"
239,48,Steele reporting's unverified allegation that the Russians had compromising tapes of the President involving
239,49,conduct when he was a private citizen during a 2013 trip to Moscow for the Miss Universe Pageant. During
239,50,"the 2016 presidential campaign, a similar claim may have reached candidate Trump. On October 30, 20 I 6,"
239,51,"Michael Cohen received a text from Russian businessman Giorgi Rtskhiladze that said, ""Stopped flow of"
239,52,"tapes from Russia but not sure if there ' s anything else. Just so you know .... "" 10/30/16 Text Message ,"
239,53,"Rtskhiladze to Cohen. Rtskhiladze said ""tapes "" referred to compromising tapes of Trump rumored to be"
239,54,"held by persons associated with the Russian real estate conglomerate Crocus Group, which had helped host"
239,55,27
239,56,NA
240,1,U.S . Department of Justice
240,2,"Wefk Pfetittet // Ma)· CaAtail'tMate, ia:IPl'ateeteti Ul'ttiefFee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
240,3,Afl:Elfl'te'.\'·
240,4,to assure him that the FBI was not investigating him personally. 113 Comey recalled he did not
240,5,"want the President-Elect to think of the conversation as a ""J. Edgar Hoover move ."" 114"
240,6,"On January 10, 2017, the media reported that Comey had briefed the President-El ect on"
240,7,"the Steele reporting , 115 and BuzzFeed News published information compiled by Steele online,"
240,8,"stating that the information included ""specific, unverified, and potentially unverifiable allegations"
240,9,"of contact between Trump aides and Russian operatives. "" 116 The next day, the President-Elect"
240,10,expressed concern to intelligence community leaders about the fact that the information had leaked
240,11,and asked whether they could make public statements refuting the allegations in the Steele
240,12,reports. 117
240,13,"In the following weeks , three Congressional committees opened investigations to examine"
240,14,Russia 's interference in the election and whether the Trump Campaign had colluded with
240,15,"Russia. 118 On January 13, 2017 , the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCT) announced"
240,16,"that it would conduct a bipartisan inquiry into Russian interference in the election, including any"
240,17,"""links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns."" 119 On January 25,"
240,18,"2017 , the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSC[) announced that it had been"
240,19,conducting an investigation into Russian election interference and pos sible coordination with the
240,20,"political campaigns. 120 And on February 2, 2017 , the Senate Judiciary Committee announced that"
240,21,it too would investigate Russian efforts to intervene in the election. 121
240,22,"the 2013 Miss Universe Pageant in Russia . Rtskhilad ze 4/4/ l 8 302 , at 12. Coh en said he spoke to Trump"
240,23,"about the issue after receiving the texts from Rtskhilad ze. Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 13. Rtskhiladz e said he"
240,24,"was told the tapes were fake, but he did not communicate that to Cohen . Rtskhiladze 5/ l 0/ 18 302, at 7."
240,25,113
240,26,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3-4; H earing on Russian Election Interference Befo re the Senate Select"
240,27,"Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of Jame s B. Comey, former"
240,28,"Director of the FBI, at 2)."
240,29,114
240,30,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 3."
240,31,115
240,32,"See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to"
240,33,"compromise him, CNN (Jan. 10, 2017; updated Jan. 12, 2017)."
240,34,116
240,35,"Ken Bensinger et al., These Reports Allege Trump Has D eep Ties To Russia, BuzzFeed New s"
240,36,"(Jan. 10, 2017)."
240,37,117
240,38,"See 1/ 1l /17 Email , Clapper to Comey ("" He asked ifT could put out a statem ent. H e would prefer"
240,39,"of course that I say the document s are bogus, which, of course, I can't do .""); 1/ 12/ 17 Email , Comey to"
240,40,"Clapper (""He called me at 5 yesterday and we had a very similar conversation.""); Comey 11/15/ 17 302, at"
240,41,4-5.
240,42,118
240,43,"See 2016 Presidenti al El.ection Investigation Fast Facts, CNN (first publi shed Oct. 12, 20 17;"
240,44,"updated Mar. 1, 2019) (summ arizing sta rting dates of Russia -related inve stigat ions)."
240,45,119
240,46,"Joint Statement on Committee Inquiry into Russian Intelligence Activities, SSCI (Jan. l 3, 2017)."
240,47,"120 Joint Stat ement on Progress of Bipar tisan HP SCI Inquiry into Russian Active Measures , HP SCI"
240,48,"(Jan. 25, 2017)."
240,49,121
240,50,Joint Statement fr om Senators Graham and Whitehouse on Investigation into Russian Infl uence
240,51,"on Demo cratic Nations' Elections (Feb. 2, 2017)."
240,52,28
240,53,NA
241,1,U.S. Department of Justice
241,2,"Al:taff!e~·Work Protittet // May Cof!taifl Material Pl'oteeteti Ui,der Fed. R. Ct'im. P. 6(e)"
241,3,3. Flynn Makes False Statements About his Communications                   with Kislyak to
241,4,"Incoming Administration Officials, the Media, and the FBI"
241,5,"On January 12, 2017, a Washington Post columnist reported that Flynn and Kislyak"
241,6,communicated on the day the Obama Administration announced the Russia sanctions. 122 The
241,7,"column questioned whether Flynn had said something to ""undercut the U.S. sanctions"" and"
241,8,whether Flynn's communications had violated the letter or spirit of the Logan Act. 123
241,9,President-Elect Trump called Priebus after the story was published and expressed anger
241,10,"about it. 124 Priebus recalled that the President-Elect asked , ""What the hell is this all about?"" 125"
241,11,Priebus called Flynn and told him that the President -Elect was angry about the reporting on Flynn 's
241,12,conversations with Kislyak. 126 Flynn recalled that he felt a lot of pressure because Priebus had
241,13,"spoken to the ""boss"" and said Flynn needed to ""kill the story."" 127 Flynn directed McFarland to"
241,14,call the Washington Post columnist and inform him that no discussion of sanctions had occurred. 128
241,15,"McFarland recalled that Flynn said words to the effect of, ""I want to kill the story."" 129 McFarland"
241,16,"made the call as Flynn had requested although she knew she was providing false information, and"
241,17,"the Washington Post updated the column to reflect that a ""Trump official"" had denied that Flynn"
241,18,and Kislyak discussed sanctions. 130
241,19,When Priebus and other incoming Administration                officials questioned Flynn internally
241,20,"about the Washington Post column, Flynn maintained that                 he had not discussed sanctions with"
241,21,Kislyak. 131 Flynn repeated that claim to Vice President-Elect          Michael Pence and to incoming press
241,22,"secretary Sean Spicer. 132 In subsequent media interviews               in mid-January , Pence, Priebus, and"
241,23,122
241,24,"David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017)."
241,25,123
241,26,"David Ignatius, Why did Obama dawdle on Russia's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017)."
241,27,"The Logan Act makes it a crime for ""[a]ny citizen of the United States, wherever he may be"" to ""without"
241,28,"authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commence[] or carr[y] on any correspondence or"
241,29,"intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or"
241,30,"controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States."" 18 U.S.C. § 953."
241,31,124
241,32,"Priebus l/ 18/ 18 302, at 6."
241,33,125
241,34,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6."
241,35,126
241,36,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 6."
241,37,127
241,38,"Flynn 11/2 I / 17 302 , at I; Flynn 11/20/ 17 302, at 6."
241,39,128
241,40,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12-13."
241,41,129
241,42,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 12."
241,43,130
241,44,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 12-13; McFarland 8/29/17 302, at 8; see David Ignatius , Why did"
241,45,"Obama dawdle on Russia 's hacking?, Washington Post (Jan. 12, 2017)."
241,46,13 1
241,47,"Flynn 11117/17 302, at I, 8; Flynn 1/19/18 302 , at 7; Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 7-8; S. Miller"
241,48,"8/3 I /17 3 02, at 8-1 I."
241,49,132
241,50,"Flynn 11/17/ 17 302, at I, 8; Flynn 1/ 19/18 302, at 7; S. Miller 8/31/17 302, at 10-11."
241,51,29
241,52,NA
242,1,U.S. Department of Justice
242,2,At:tofH:eyWork Prodttct // MB) ' CoH:tttiH:  Material Proteeted UH.defFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
242,3,"Spicer denied that Flynn and Kislyak had discussed sanctions, basing those denials on their"
242,4,conversations with Flynn. 133
242,5,The public statements of incoming Administration officials denying that Flynn and Kislyak
242,6,"had discussed sanctions alarmed senior DOJ officials , who were aware that the statements were"
242,7,not true. 134 Those officials were concerned that Flynn had lied to his colleagues-who           in turn had
242,8,unwittingly misled the American public-creating           a compromise situation for Flynn because the
242,9,Department of Justice assessed that the Russian government could prove Flynn lied. 135 The FBI
242,10,investigative team also believed that Flynn's calls with Kislyak and subsequent denials about
242,11,discussing sanctions raised potential Logan Act issues and were relevant to the FBI's broader
242,12,Russia investigation. 136
242,13,"On January 20 , 2017 , President Trump was inaugurated and Flynn was sworn in as"
242,14,"National Security Advisor. On January 23, 2017, Spicer delivered his first press briefing and stated"
242,15,"that he had spoken with Flynn the night before, who confirmed that the calls with Kislyak were"
242,16,about topics unrelated to sanctions. 137 Spicer's statements added to the Department of Justice's
242,17,concerns that Russia had leverage over Flynn based on his lies and could use that derogatory
242,18,information to compromise him. 138
242,19,"On January 24, 2017 , Flynn agreed to be interviewed by agents from the FBI. 139 During"
242,20,"the interview, which took place at the White House, Flynn falsely stated that he did not ask Kislyak"
242,21,to refrain from escalating the situation in response to the sanctions on Russia imposed by the
242,22,Obama Administration. 140 Flynn also falsely stated that he did not remember a follow-up
242,23,conversation in which Kislyak stated that Russia had chosen to moderate its response to those
242,24,sanctions as a result of Flynn's request. 141
242,25,133
242,26,"Face the Nation Interview with Vice President-Elect Pence , CBS (Jan. 15, 2017); Julie"
242,27,"Hirschfield Davis et al., Trump National Security Advisor Called Russian Envoy Day Before Sanctions"
242,28,"Were Imposed, Washington Post (Jan. 13, 2017); Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Jan."
242,29,"15, 2017)."
242,30,134
242,31,"Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at2-3; McCord 7/17/17 302, at3-4; McCabe 8/ 17/ 17 302, at 5 (DOJ officials"
242,32,"were ""really freaked out about it"")."
242,33,135
242,34,"Yates 8/15/17 302, at 3; McCord 7/17/ 17 302, at 4."
242,35,136
242,36,"McCord 7/17/17 302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 5-6."
242,37,137
242,38,"Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Jan. 23, 2017)."
242,39,138
242,40,"Yates 8/ 15/17 302, at 4; Axelrod 7/20/17 302, at 5."
242,41,139
242,42,"Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2."
242,43,14
242,44,"°Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2."
242,45,141
242,46,"Flynn Statement of Offense, at 2. On December 1, 2017, Flynn admitted to making these false"
242,47,"statements and pleaded guilty to violating 18 U.S.C. § I001, which makes it a crime to knowingly and"
242,48,"willfully ""make[] any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation"" to federal law"
242,49,"enforcement officials. See Volume I, Section IV.A.7, supra."
242,50,30
242,51,NA
243,1,U.S. Department of Justice
243,2,"Atton'te,•Work P!'otittet// May CoHtttiflMatel'ittlProteetetiUHE:ier  Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
243,3,4. DOJ Officials Notify the White House of Their Conc _erns About Flynn
243,4,"On January 26, 2017, Acting Attorney General Sally Yates contacted White House Counsel"
243,5,Donald McGahn and informed him that she needed to discuss a sensitive matter with him in
243,6,"person. 142 Later that day, Yates and Mary McCord , a senior national security official at the"
243,7,"Department of Justice , met at the White House with McGahn and White House Counsel's Office"
243,8,attorney James Burnham. 143 Yates said that the public statements made by the Vice President
243,9,denying that Flynn and Kislyak discussed sanctions were not true and put Flynn in a potentially
243,10,compromised position because the Russians would know he had lied. 144 Yates disclosed that Flynn
243,11,had been interviewed by the FBI. 145 She declined to answer a specific question about how Flynn
243,12,"had performed during that interview , 146 but she indicated that Flynn ' s statements to the FBI were"
243,13,similar to the statements he had made to Pence and Spicer denying that he had discussed
243,14,sanctions. 147 McGahn came away from the meeting with the impression that the FBI had not
243,15,"pinned Flynn down in lies, 148 but he asked John Eisenberg, who served as legal advisor to the"
243,16,"National Security Council , to examine potential legal issues raised by Flynn's FBI interview and"
243,17,his contacts with Kislyak. 149
243,18,"That afternoon , McGahn notified the President that Yates had come to the White House to"
243,19,"discuss concerns about Flynn .150 McGahn described what Yates had told him , and the President"
243,20,"asked him to repeat it, so he did. 151 McGahn recalled that when he described the FBI interview of"
243,21,"F lynn , he said that Flynn did not disclose having discussed sanction s with Kislyak , but that there"
243,22,may not have been a clear violation of 18 U.S.C. § I 001. 152 The President asked about Section
243,23,"1001, and McGahn explained the law to him, and also explained the Logan Act. 153 The President"
243,24,142
243,25,"Yates 8/ 15/17 302, at 6."
243,26,143
243,27,"Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at 6; McCord 7/17/ 17 302, at 6; SCR0l5 000198 (2/15/ 17 Draft"
243,28,Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
243,29,144
243,30,"Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at 6-8; McCord 7/ 17/ 17 302, at 6-7; Burnham 11/3/ 17 302, at 4;"
243,31,SCROl 5_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
243,32,145
243,33,"McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 5; Yates 8/15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/ 17/17 302, at 7; Burnham"
243,34,"11/3/17 302, at 4."
243,35,146
243,36,"Yates 8/ 15/17 302, at 7; McCord 7/17/ 17 302, at 7."
243,37,147
243,38,SCR015_000198 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
243,39,"President); Burnham 11/3/ 17 302, at 4."
243,40,148
243,41,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 5."
243,42,149
243,43,SCR0l5_000198 (2/ 15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
243,44,"President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6, 8."
243,45,150
243,46,"McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 6; SCR0l5_000278 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum"
243,47,"re: ""Flynn Tick Tock"") (on January 26, ""McGahn IMMEDIATELY advises POTUS"") ; SCR015_000198"
243,48,(2/15/ 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the President).
243,49,151
243,50,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 6."
243,51,152
243,52,"McGahn I 1/30/17 302, at 7."
243,53,153
243,54,"McGahn I 1/30/ 17 302, at 7."
243,55,31
243,56,NA
244,1,U.S. Department of Justice
244,2,AH:erfl:e~·   \llerk PreElttet// May Cefl:taiH.Material PreteeteEIUfl:ElerFeEI.R. Crim. P. 6(e)
244,3,instructed McGahn to work with Priebus and Bannon to look into the matter further and directed
244,4,that they not discuss it with any other officials. 154 Priebus recalled that the President was angry
244,5,"with Flynn in light of what Yates had told the White House and said, ""not again , this guy, this"
244,6,"stuff. "" I 55"
244,7,"That evening, the President dined with several senior advisors and asked the group what"
244,8,they thought about FBI Director Comey. 156 According to Director of National Intelligence Dan
244,9,"Coats, who was at the dinner, no one openly advocated terminating Comey but the consensus on"
244,10,him was not positive. 157 Coats told the group that he thought Comey was a good director. 158 Coats
244,11,encouraged the President to meet Comey face-to -face and spend time with him before making a
244,12,decision about whether to retain him . 159
244,13,5. McGahn has a Follow-Up Meeting About Flynn with Yates; President Trump
244,14,has Dinner with FBI Director Comey
244,15,"The next day, January 27, 2017, McGahn and Eisenberg discussed the results of"
244,16,"Eisenberg's initial legal research into Flynn's conduct, and specifically whether Flynn may have"
244,17,"violated the Espionage Act, the Logan Act , or 18 U .S.C. § 1001. 160 Based on his prelim inary"
244,18,"research, Eisenberg informed McGahn that there was a possibility that Flynn had violated 18"
244,19,U.S.C. § 1001 and the Logan Act. 16 1 Eisenberg noted that the United States had never successfully
244,20,"prosecuted an individual under the Logan Act and that Flynn could have possible defenses , and"
244,21,"154 McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 7; SCRO15_000 I 98-99 (2/ 15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the"
244,22,Office of the Counsel to the President).
244,23,155
244,24,"Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 8. Several witnesses said that the President was unhappy with Flynn"
244,25,for other reasons at this time. Bannon said that Flynn's standing with the President was not good by
244,26,"December 2016. Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 12. The President-Elect had concerns because President Obama"
244,27,"had warned him about Flynn shortly after the election. Bannon 2/ 12/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks 12/8/ 17 302, at"
244,28,7 (President Obama ' s comment sat with President- Elect Trump more than Hicks expected). Priebus said
244,29,that the President had become unhappy with Flynn even before the story of his calls with Kislyak broke
244,30,and had become so upset with Flynn that he would not look at him during intelligence briefings. Priebus
244,31,"1/18/18 302, at 8. Hicks said that the President thought Flynn had bad judgment and was angered by tweets"
244,32,"sent by Flynn and his son, and she described Flynn as ""being on thin ice"" by early February 2017. Hicks"
244,33,"12/8/17 302, at 7, 10."
244,34,156
244,35,"Coats 6/ 14/ 17 302, at 2."
244,36,157
244,37,"Coats 6/14/ 17 302, at 2."
244,38,158
244,39,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2."
244,40,159
244,41,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 2."
244,42,160 SCR015_000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
244,43,"President); McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8."
244,44,161 SCR015_000199 (2/15/ 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
244,45,"President); Eisenberg 11/29/ 17 302, at 9."
244,46,32
244,47,NA
245,1,U.S. Department of Justice
245,2,At:tertte~·Werk Prmhtet // May CetttaiH:Material Pi=eteeteclUH:clerFecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
245,3,told McGahn that he believed it was unlikely that a prosecutor would pursue a Logan Act charge
245,4,under the circumstances. 162
245,5,"That same morning, McGahn asked Yates to return to the White House to discuss Flynn"
245,6,"again. I63 In that second meeting , McGahn expressed doubts that the Department of Justice would"
245,7,"bring a Logan Act prosecution against Flynn, but stated that the White House did not want to take"
245,8,action that would interfere with an ongoing FBI investigation of Flynn. 164 Yates responded that
245,9,Department ofJustice had notified the White House so that it could take action in response to the
245,10,infonnation provided. 165 McGahn ended the meeting by asking Yates for access to the underlying
245,11,information the Department of Justice possessed pertaining to Flynn's discussions with Kislyak. 166
245,12,"Also on January 27, the President called FBI Director Comey and invited him to dinner"
245,13,"that evening . 167 Priebus recalled that before the dinner , he told the President something like, ""don't"
245,14,"talk about Russia, whatever you do,"" and the President promised he would not talk about Russia"
245,15,at the dinner .168 McGahn had previously advised the President that he should not communicate
245,16,directly with the Department of Justice to avoid the perception or reality of political interference
245,17,"in law enforcement. 169 When Bannon learned about the President 's planned dinner with Comey,"
245,18,"he suggested that he or Priebus also attend , but the President stated that he wanted to dine with"
245,19,°
245,20,"Comey alone. 17 Corney said that when he arrived for the dinner that evening, he was surprised"
245,21,and concerned to see that no one else had been invited. 171
245,22,162
245,23,SCR0l5 _000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
245,24,"President); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302 , at 9."
245,25,163
245,26,SCR015 _000199 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
245,27,"President); McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 8; Yates 8/15/ 17 302, at 8."
245,28,164
245,29,"Yates 8/15/17 302 , at 9; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 8."
245,30,165
245,31,"Yates 8/15/17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/ 17 302, at 5; see SCR015 _00199 (2/15/17 Draft"
245,32,"Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the Presid ent) (""Yates was unwilling to confirm or"
245,33,deny that there was an ongoing investigation but did indicate that the Department of Justice would not
245,34,"object to the White House taking action against Flynn."")."
245,35,166
245,36,"Yates 9/15~17 302, at 9; Burnham 11/3/ 17 302 , at 5. In accordance with McGahn's request , the"
245,37,Department of Justice made the underlying information available and Eisenberg viewed the information in
245,38,"early February. Eisenberg 11/29/17 302 , at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at I (documenting"
245,39,2/2/17 meeting with Eisenberg).
245,40,167
245,41,"Comey 11/ 15/17 302, at 6; SCR0l2b_000O0I (President's Daily Diary , 1/27/17); Hearing on"
245,42,"Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee , 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017)"
245,43,"(Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 2-3)."
245,44,168
245,45,"Priebus I 0/ 13/17 302 , at 17."
245,46,169
245,47,"See McGahn I 1/30/1 7 302, at 9; Dhillon 11/2 1/ 17 302, at 2; Bannon 2/ 12/ 18 302, at 17."
245,48,170
245,49,"Bannon 2/ 12/1 8 302, at 17."
245,50,171
245,51,"Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligen ce Committee,"
245,52,"I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at"
245,53,"3); see Comey 11/15/17 302, at 6."
245,54,33
245,55,NA
246,1,U.S. Department of Justice
246,2,Attorney Work Proeit:iet// May CoHtaiH Material Pwteeteti UHtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
246,3,"Comey provided an account of the dinner in a contemporaneous memo, an interview with"
246,4,"this Office, and congressional testimony. According to Comey's account of the dinner, the"
246,5,"President repeatedly brought up Comey's future, asking whether he wanted to stay on as FBI"
246,6,"director. 172 Because the President had previously said he wanted Comey to stay on as FBI director,"
246,7,Comey interpreted the President's comments as an effort to create a patronage relationship by
246,8,having Comey ask for his job. 173 The President also brought up the Steele reporting that Corney
246,9,"had raised in the January 6, 2017 briefing and stated that he was thinking about ordering the FBI"
246,10,to investigate the allegations to prove they were false. 174 Comey responded that the President
246,11,should think carefully about issuing such an order because it could create a narrative that the FBI
246,12,"was investigating him personally, which was incorrect. 175 Later in the dinner, the President"
246,13,"brought up Flynn and said, ""the guy has serious judgment issues."" 176 Comey did not comment on"
246,14,Flynn and the President did not acknowledge any FBI interest in or contact with Flynn. 177
246,15,"According to Comey's account, at one point during the dinner the President stated , ""I need"
246,16,"loyalty , I expect loyalty ."" 178 Comey did not respond and the conversation moved on to other"
246,17,"topics , but the President returned to the subject of Comey ' s job at the end of the dinner and"
246,18,"repeated, ""I need loyalty."" 179 Comey responded, ""You will always get honesty from me."" 180 The"
246,19,172
246,20,"Comey I 1/15/17 302, at 7; Corney 1/28/17 Memorandum, at I, 3; Hearing on Russian Election"
246,21,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
246,22,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBT, at 3)."
246,23,173
246,24,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select"
246,25,"Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record ofJames B. Comey, former"
246,26,"Director of the FBI, at 3)."
246,27,174
246,28,"Comey 1/28/ 17 Memorandum , at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate"
246,29,"Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,"
246,30,"former Director of the FBI, at 4)."
246,31,175
246,32,"Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum , at 3; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate"
246,33,"Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,"
246,34,"former Director of the FBI, at 4)."
246,35,176
246,36,"Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum , at 4; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 7 ."
246,37,177
246,38,"Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 4; Corney I 1/ 15/17 302, at 7."
246,39,178
246,40,"Comey 1/28/18 Memorandum, at 2; Corney 11/ 15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election"
246,41,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
246,42,"the Record of James B. Comey , former Director of the FBI, at 3)."
246,43,179
246,44,"Comey 1/28/ 17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11/ 15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election"
246,45,"Interferenc e Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
246,46,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 3-4)."
246,47,18
246,48,"° Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11/ 15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election"
246,49,"Interfer ence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 20 I 7) (Statement for"
246,50,"the Record of James B. Comey, form er Director of the FBI, at 4)."
246,51,34
246,52,NA
247,1,U.S. Department of Justice
247,2,"Attel'fte'.>'1.\'e,rk Pre1:h:1et"
247,3,"// ~b,. Cet1tait1Material Preteeteti Ut1tierFet:i.R. Griff!.P. 6(e)"
247,4,"President said, ""That's         what I want, honest loyalty. "" 181 Comey said, ""Yo u will get that from"
247,5,"me. "" 1s2"
247,6,"After Comey's account of the dinner became public, the President and his advisors disputed"
247,7,that he had asked for Comey's loyalty. 183 The President also indicated that he had not invited
247,8,"Comey to dinner, telling a reporter that he thought Corney had ""asked for the dinner "" because ""he"
247,9,"wanted to stay on."" I84 But substantial evidence corroborates Comey's account of the dinner"
247,10,invitation and the request for loyalty. The President's Daily Diary confirms that the President
247,11,"""extend[ed] a dinner invitation"" to Comey on January 27. 185 With respect to th e substance of the"
247,12,"dinner conversation, Comey documented the President's request for loyalty in a memorandum he"
247,13,began drafting the night of the dinner; 186 senior FBI officials recall that Comey told them about
247,14,the loyalty request shortly after the dinner occurred; 187 and Comey described the request while
247,15,181
247,16,"Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11/ 15/17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election"
247,17,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
247,18,"the Record of James B . Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4)."
247,19,182
247,20,"Comey 1/28/17 Memorandum, at 3; Corney 11/15/ 17 302, at 7; Hearing on Russian Election"
247,21,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intellig ence Committee , I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
247,22,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4)."
247,23,183
247,24,"See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty . Comey"
247,25,"Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017) (quoting Sarah Sanders as saying, ""[The President ] would"
247,26,"never even suggest the expectation of personal loyalty"") ; Ali Vitali, Trump Never Asked for Comey's"
247,27,"Loyalty, President's Personal Lawyer Says, NBC (June 8, 2017) (quoting the President 's personal counsel"
247,28,"as saying, ""The president also never told Mr. Comey, ' I need loyalty, T expect loyalty ,' in form or"
247,29,"substance.""); Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (June 9, 2017) (""I hardly"
247,30,know the man. I' m not going to say ' I want you to pledge allegiance.' Who would do that? Who would
247,31,"ask a man to pledge allegiance under oath?"") . In a private conversation with Spicer, the President stated"
247,32,"that he had never asked for Comey's loyalty, but added that if he had asked for loyalty, ""Who cares?"""
247,33,"Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 4. The President also told McGahn that he never said what Comey said he had."
247,34,"McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 17."
247,35,184
247,36,"Interview of Donald J Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017)."
247,37,185
247,38,"SCR012b_OOOOOI(President's Daily Diary, 1/27/17) (reflecting that the President called Comey"
247,39,"in the morning on January 27 and ""[t]he purpose of the call was to extend a dinner invitation""). In addition,"
247,40,"two witnesses corroborate Comey's account that the President reached out to schedule the dinner, without"
247,41,"Comey having asked for it. Priebus l 0/13/17 302, at 17 (the President asked to sched ule the January 27"
247,42,dinner because he did not know much about Comey and intended to ask him whether he wanted to stay on
247,43,"as FBI Director); Rybicki I 1/2 1/18 302, at 3 (recalling that Comey told him about the President ' s dinner"
247,44,invitation on the day of the dinner) .
247,45,186
247,46,"Comey l l /15/17 302, at 8; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select"
247,47,"Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former"
247,48,"Director of the FBI, at 4) ."
247,49,187
247,50,"McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9-10; Rybicki 11/21/ 18 302, at 3. After leaving the White House,"
247,51,"Comey called Deputy Director of the FBI Andrew McCabe , summarized what he and the President had"
247,52,"discu ssed, including the President's request for loyalty , and expressed shock over the President's request."
247,53,"McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 9. Comey also convened a meeting with his senior leadership team to discuss what"
247,54,the President had asked of him during the dinner and whether he had handled the request for loyalty
247,55,"properly. McCabe 8/17/17 302, at IO; Rybicki 11/2 1/18 302, at 3. In addition , Comey distributed his"
247,56,35
247,57,NA
248,1,U.S. Department of Justice
248,2,AttarHey 'Nark Praettet // May CaHtaiH Material Prateet:ed Utteer Fee. R. Cri!fl. P. 6(e)
248,3,under oath in congressional proceedings and in a subsequent interview with investigators subject
248,4,"to penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C. § I 00 I. Comey's memory of the details of the dinner,"
248,5,"including that the President requested loyalty, has remained consistent throughout. 188"
248,6,6. Flynn's Resignation
248,7,"On February 2, 2017 , Eisenberg reviewed the underlying information relating to Flynn's"
248,8,calls with Kislyak. 189 Eisenberg recalled that he prepared a memorandum about criminal statutes
248,9,"that could apply to Flynn ' s conduct, but he did not believe the White House had enough"
248,10,information to make a definitive recommendation to the President. 190 Eisenberg and McGahn
248,11,discussed that Eisenberg's review of the underlying information confirmed his preliminary
248,12,conclusion that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted for violating the Logan Act. I9I Because White
248,13,"House officials were uncertain what Flynn had told the FBI, however , they could not assess his"
248,14,exposure to prosecution for violating 18 U .S.C. § 1001. 192
248,15,"The week of February 6, Flynn had a one-on-one conversation with the President in the"
248,16,Oval Office about the negative media coverage of his contacts with Kislyak. I93 Flynn recalled that
248,17,the President was upset and asked him for information on the conversations. 194 Flynn listed the
248,18,"specific dates on which he remembered speaking with Kislyak, but the President corrected one of"
248,19,the dates he listed. I95 The President asked Flynn what he and Kislyak discussed and Flynn
248,20,responded that he might have talked about sanctions . I96
248,21,"memorandum documenting the dinner to his senior leadership team, and McCabe confirmed that the"
248,22,memorandum captured what Comey said on the telephone call immediately following the dinner. McCabe
248,23,"8/17/17 302, at 9-10."
248,24,188
248,25,There also is evidence that corroborates other aspects of the memoranda Comey wrote
248,26,"documenting his interactions with the President. For example, Comey recalled, and his memoranda reflect,"
248,27,"that he told the President in his January 6, 2017 meeting, and on phone calls on March 30 and April 11,"
248,28,"2017, that the FBI was not investigating the President personally. On May 8, 2017, during White House"
248,29,"discussions about firing Comey, the President told Rosenstein and others that Corney had told him three"
248,30,"times that he was not under investigation, including once in person and twice on the phone. Gauhar-000058"
248,31,(Gauhar 5/ 16/17 Notes).
248,32,189
248,33,"Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 5; FBI 2/7/17 Electronic Communication, at 1 (documenting 2/2/17"
248,34,meeting with Eisenberg).
248,35,190
248,36,"Eisenberg 11/29/ 17 302, at 6."
248,37,191
248,38,"Eisenberg 1l /29/17 302, at 9; SCRO15_000200 (2/15/ 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the"
248,39,Office of the Counsel to the President).
248,40,192
248,41,"Eisenberg 11/29/ 17 302, at 9."
248,42,193
248,43,"Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2."
248,44,194
248,45,"Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2."
248,46,195
248,47,"Flynn 11/2 1117302, at 2."
248,48,196
248,49,"Flynn 11/21/17 302, at 2-3."
248,50,36
248,51,NA
249,1,U.S. Department of Justice
249,2,"Attst=fl:e,·\li'srk Prstittct // Mtt,· CE>fl:teitt"
249,3,Mfl:1:crittl
249,4,Pt=E>teetee
249,5,Ufl:tierFcti. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
249,6,"On February 9, 2017, the Washington Post reported that Flynn discussed sanctions with"
249,7,"Kislyak the month before the President took office. 197 After the publication of that story, Vice"
249,8,President Pence learned of the Department of Justice's notification to the White House about the
249,9,content of Flynn's calls. 198 He and other advisors then sought access to and reviewed the
249,10,underlying information about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak. 199 FBI Deputy Director Andrew
249,11,"McCabe , who provided the White House officials access to the information and was present when"
249,12,"they reviewed it, recalled the officials asking him whether Flynn's conduct violated the Logan"
249,13,"Act. 200 McCabe responded that he did not know, but the FBI was investigating the matter because"
249,14,"it was a possibility. 201 Based on the evidence of Flynn's contacts with Kislyak, McGahn and"
249,15,Priebus concluded that Flynn could not have forgotten the details of the discussions of sanctions
249,16,and had instead been lying about what he discussed with Kislyak. 202 Flynn had also told White
249,17,"House officials that the FB[ had told him that the FBI was closing out its investigation of him ,203"
249,18,"but Eisenberg did not believe him. 204 After reviewing the materials and speaking with Flynn,"
249,19,McGahn and Priebus concluded that Flynn should be term inated and recommended that course of
249,20,action to the President. 205
249,21,"That weekend , Flynn accompanied the President to Mar-a-Lago. 206 Flynn recalled that on"
249,22,"February 12, 2017, on the return flight to D.C. on Air Force One , the President asked him whether"
249,23,he had lied to the Vice President. 207 Flynn responded that he may have forgotten details of his
249,24,"calls , but he did not think he lied. 20 8 The President responded, ""Okay. That's fine. T got it."" 209"
249,25,197
249,26,"Greg Miller et al., National security adviser Flynn discussed sanctions with Russian"
249,27,"ambassador, despite denials, officials say, Washington Post (Feb. 9, 2017)."
249,28,198
249,29,SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
249,30,"President); McGahn l l /30/17 302, at 12."
249,31,199
249,32,SCR0\5_000202 (2/15/ 17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
249,33,"President); McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 11-13; Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 12."
249,34,200
249,35,"McCabe 8/17/l 7 302, at 13."
249,36,20 1
249,37,"McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13."
249,38,202
249,39,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12; Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 8; Priebus 10/ 13/ 17 302, at 10;"
249,40,SCR015_000202 (2/15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office ofthe Counsel to the President).
249,41,203
249,42,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 11; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 9; Priebus 10/13/ 17 302, at 11."
249,43,204
249,44,"Eisenberg l l /29/17 302, at 9."
249,45,205
249,46,SCRO15_000202 (2/ 15/17 Draft Memorandum to file from the Office of the Counsel to the
249,47,"President); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 10; McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 12."
249,48,206
249,49,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8."
249,50,207
249,51,"Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8."
249,52,208
249,53,"Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 8; Flynn 1/19/ l 8 302, at 9."
249,54,209
249,55,"Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9."
249,56,37
249,57,NA
250,1,U.S. Department of Justice
250,2,"Atte,mey We,rk Preiclttet// Ma)' CeiAtaiHMaterial Pre,teeteclUHclerFee . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
250,3,"On February 13, 2017 , Priebus told Flynn he had to resign ."
250,4,21
250,5,° Flynn said he wanted to say
250,6,"goodbye to the President, so Priebus brought him to the Oval Office. 21 1 Priebus recalled that the"
250,7,"President hugged Flynn, shook his hand, and said, ""We'll give you a good recommendation."
250,8,"You're a good guy ·. We'll take care ofyou."" 212"
250,9,Talking points on the resignation prepared by the White House Counsel's Office and
250,10,distributed to the White House communications                  team stated that McGahn had advised the
250,11,"President that Flynn was unlikely to be prosecuted , and the President had determined that the issue"
250,12,with Flynn was one of trust. 213 Spicer told the press the next day that Flynn was forced to resign
250,13,"""not based on a legal issue, but based on a trust issue, [where] a level of trust between the President"
250,14,214
250,15,"and General Flynn had eroded to the point where [the President] felt he had to make a change."""
250,16,7. The President Discusses Flynn with FBI Director Comey
250,17,"On February 14, 2017, the day after Flynn's resignation, the President had lunch at the"
250,18,"White House with New Jersey Governor Chris Christie. 21 5 According to Christie, at one point"
250,19,216
250,20,"during the lunch the President said , ""Now that we fired Flynn , the Russia thing is over.""           Christie"
250,21,2 17
250,22,"laughed and responded, ""No way.""                He said, ""this Russia thing is far from over"" and ""[w]e'll be"
250,23,"here on Valentine's Day 2018 talking about this."" 2 18 The President said , ""[w]hat do you mean?"
250,24,"Flynn met with the Russians . That was the problem. I fired Flynn. It's over. "" 219 Christie recalled"
250,25,responding that based on his experience both as a prosecutor and as someone who had been
250,26,"investigated , firing Flynn would not end the investigation. 220 Christie said there was no way to"
250,27,"make an investigation shorter, but a lot of ways to make it longer. 221 The President asked Christie"
250,28,"what he meant, and Christie told the President not to talk about the investigation even if he was"
250,29,2 10
250,30,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9."
250,31,211
250,32,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11/17/17 302, at 10."
250,33,212
250,34,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 11117/ 17 302 , at 10."
250,35,"213  SCR004 _00600 (2/16 / 17 Email, Burnham to Donaldson)."
250,36,214
250,37,"Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) . After Flynn pleaded guilty"
250,38,"to violating 18 U .S.C. § I 00 I in December 2017, the President tweeted, ""I had to fire General Flynn because"
250,39,"he lied to the Vice President and the FBI."" @realDonaldTrump 12/2/ 17 (12: 14 p.m. ET) Tweet. The next"
250,40,"day , the President's personal counsel told the press that he had drafted the tweet. Maegan Vazquez et al.,"
250,41,"Trump's lawyer says he was behind President's tweet about firing Flynn, CNN (Dec. 3, 2017)."
250,42,"2 15 Christie 2/13/19 302, at 2-3; SCR0l2b_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17)."
250,43,216
250,44,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3."
250,45,217
250,46,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3."
250,47,"218  Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie said he thought when the President said ""the Russia thing """
250,48,he was referring to not just the investigations but also press coverage about Russia. Christie thought the
250,49,"more important thing was that there was an investigation . Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4."
250,50,2 19
250,51,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3."
250,52,22
250,53,"°Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3."
250,54,221
250,55,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3."
250,56,38
250,57,NA
251,1,U.S. Department of Justice
251,2,Atterney \llerk Pt1eattet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Ct1im.P. 6(e)
251,3,frustrated at times. 222 Christie also told the President that he would never be able to get rid of
251,4,"Flynn, ""like gum on the bottom of your shoe."" 223"
251,5,"Towards the end of the lunch, the President brought up Comey and asked if Christie was"
251,6,sti ll friendly with him. 224 Christie said he was. 225 The President told Christie to call Comey and
251,7,"tell him that the President ""really like[s] him . Tell him he's part of the team."" 226 At the end of the"
251,8,"lunch, the President repeated his request that Christie reach out to Comey. 227 Christie had no"
251,9,intention of complying with the President ' s request that he contact Comey .228 He thought the
251,10,"President's request was ""nonsensical "" and Christie did not want to put Comey in the position of"
251,11,having to receive such a phone call. 229 Christie thought it would have been uncomfortable to pass
251,12,on that message .230
251,13,"At 4 p.m. that afternoon, the President met with Comey, Sessions, and other officials for a"
251,14,"homeland security briefing. 231 At the end of the briefing, the President dismissed the other"
251,15,attendees and stated that he wanted to speak to Comey alone. 232 Sessions and senior advisor to the
251,16,"President Jared Kushner remained in the Oval Office as other patticipants left, but the President"
251,17,222
251,18,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3-4."
251,19,223
251,20,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 3. Christie also recalled that during the lunch, Flynn called Kushner ,"
251,21,"who was at the lunch, and complained about what Spicer had said about Flynn in his press briefing that"
251,22,"day. Kushner told Flynn words to the effect of, ""You know the President respects you. The President cares"
251,23,"about you. I'll get the President to send out a positive tweet about you later."" Kushner looked at the"
251,24,"President when he mentioned the tweet, and the President nodded his assent. Christie 2/13/ 19 302, at 3."
251,25,Flynn recalled getting upset at Spicer's comments in the press conference and calling Kushner to say he did
251,26,"not appreciate the comments. Flynn 1/19/18 302, at 9."
251,27,224
251,28,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4."
251,29,225
251,30,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 4."
251,31,226
251,32,"Christie 2/ 13/19 302, at 4-5."
251,33,227
251,34,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5."
251,35,228
251,36,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5."
251,37,229
251,38,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5."
251,39,23
251,40,"°Christie 2/13/19 302, at 5."
251,41,231
251,42,"SCROI 26_000022 (President's Daily Diary, 2/14/17); Comey 11/15/17 302, at 9."
251,43,232
251,44,"Comey 11115/17302, at 10; 2/ 14/17 Corney Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election"
251,45,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
251,46,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4); Priebus I0/ 13/ 17 302, at 18 (confirming"
251,47,"that everyone was shooed out ""like Comey said"" in his June testimony)."
251,48,39
251,49,NA
252,1,U.S. Department ofJustice
252,2,AttorHe'.Y· Werle Proeh:1et// Ma:y Cottta:iHMa:teria:1Proteetee UHeer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
252,3,"excused them, repeating that he wanted to speak only with Comey. 233 At some point after others"
252,4,"had left the Oval Office, Priebus opened the door, but the President sent him away. 234"
252,5,"According to Comey's account of the meeting , once they were alone, the Pre sident began"
252,6,"the conversation by saying, ""I want to talk about Mike Flynn."" 235 The President stated that Flynn"
252,7,"had not done anything wrong in speaking with the Russians, but had to be terminated because he"
252,8,had misled the Vice President. 236 The conversation turned to the topic of leaks of classified
252,9,"information, but the President returned to Flynn, saying ""he is a good guy and has been through a"
252,10,"lot.""237 The President stated, ""I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to letting Flynn"
252,11,"go. He is a good guy. I hope you can let this go."" 238 Comey agreed that Flynn "" is a good guy, """
252,12,but did not commit to ending the investigation of Flynn. 239 Comey testified under oath that he
252,13,"took the President's statement ""as a direction "" because of the President's position and the"
252,14,circumstances of the one-on-one meeting .240
252,15,233
252,16,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Corney 2/14/17 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election"
252,17,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
252,18,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4). Sessions recalled that the President asked"
252,19,to speak to Comey alone and that Sessions was one of the last to leave the room; he described Corney's
252,20,"testimony about the events leading up to the private meeting with the President as ""pretty accurate."""
252,21,"Sessions 1/ 17/18 302, at 6. Kushner had no recollection of whether the President asked Comey to stay"
252,22,"behind. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 24."
252,23,234
252,24,"Comey 2/ 14/17 Memorandum, at 2; Priebus I 0/13/ 17 302, at 18."
252,25,235
252,26,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10; Corney 2/14/17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election"
252,27,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
252,28,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 4)."
252,29,236
252,30,"Comey 2/14/ 17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate"
252,31,"Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,"
252,32,"former Director of the FBI, at 5)."
252,33,237
252,34,"Comey 1 l / 15/ 17 302, at IO; Corney 2/14/ 17 Memorandum , at 2; Hearing on Russian Election"
252,35,"Interfer ence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
252,36,"the Record of James B. Comey , former Director of the FBI, at 5)."
252,37,238
252,38,"Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,"
252,39,"115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at"
252,40,"5); Comey 2/14 / 17 Memorandum, at 2. Corney said he was highly confident that the words in quotations"
252,41,in his Memorandum documenting this meeting were the exact words used by the President. He said he
252,42,"knew · from the outset of the me eting that he was about to have a conversation of consequence, and he"
252,43,remembered the words used by the Pre sident and wrote them down soon after the meeting. Comey 11/15/ 17
252,44,"302, at 10-11."
252,45,239
252,46,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at IO; Corney 2/ 14/ 17 Memorandum, at 2."
252,47,240
252,48,"Hearing on Russian Election Interfer ence Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,"
252,49,"115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 31) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Director"
252,50,"of the FBI). Comey further stated, ""I mean, this is the president of the United States, with me alone, saying,"
252,51,"'l hope' this. I took it as, this is what he wants me to do."" Id.; see also Comey 11/15/17 302, at 10 (Corney"
252,52,took the stateme nt as an order to shut down the Flynn investigation).
252,53,40
252,54,NA
253,1,U.S . Department of Justice
253,2,"AM:e,ri,e,\l/e,rlcPre,auet // Mtt'.'.f"
253,3,"Ce,HtttiHMttterial Preteeteti Utttier Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
253,4,"Shortly after meeting with the President, Comey began drafting a memorandum"
253,5,documenting their conversation. 24 1 Comey also met with his senior leadership team to discuss the
253,6,"President's request, and they agreed not to inform FBI officials working on the Flynn case of the"
253,7,President's statements so the officials would not be influenced by the request. 242 Comey also asked
253,8,for a meeting with Sessions and requested that Sessions not leave Comey alone with the President
253,9,again. 243
253,10,8. The Media Raises Questions About the President's Delay in Terminating Flynn
253,11,"After Flynn was forced to resign, the press raised questions about why the President waited"
253,12,more than two weeks after the DOJ notification to remove Flynn and whether the President had
253,13,known about Flynn's contacts with Kislyak before the DOJ notification. 244 The press also
253,14,continued to raise questions about connections between Rus sia and the President's campaign. 245
253,15,"On February 15, 2017, the President told reporters , ""General Flynn is a wonderful man. I think"
253,16,"he's been treated very, very unfairly by the media."" 246 On February 16, 2017, the President held"
253,17,24 1
253,18,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 11; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select"
253,19,"Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former"
253,20,"Director of the FBI, at 5)."
253,21,242
253,22,"Comey 11/ 15/17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4; Rybicki 6/22/17 302, at 1; Hearing on"
253,23,"Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017)"
253,24,"(Statement for the record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 5-6)."
253,25,243
253,26,"Comey 11/15/ 17 302, at 11; Rybicki 6/9/17 302, at 4-5; Rybicki 6/22/ 17 302, at 1-2; Sessions"
253,27,"1/17/18 302, at 6 (confirming that later in the week following Comey's one-on-one meeting with the"
253,28,"President in the Oval Office, Comey told the Attorney General that he did not want to be alone with the"
253,29,"President); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 6 (within days of the February 14 Oval Office meeting, Comey told Sessions"
253,30,he did not think it was appropriate for the FBI Director to meet alone with the President); Rybicki 11/21/18
253,31,"302, at 4 (Rybicki helped to schedule the meeting with Sessions because Comey wanted to talk about his"
253,32,concerns about meeting with the President alone); Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the
253,33,"Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the record of James B."
253,34,"Comey , former Director of the FBI, at 6)."
253,35,244
253,36,"See, e.g., Sean Spicer, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Feb. 14, 2017) (questions from"
253,37,"the press included, ""if [the President] was notified 17 days ago that Flynn had misled the Vice President ,"
253,38,"other officials here, and that he was a potential threat to blackmail by the Russians, why would he be kept"
253,39,"on for almost three weeks?"" and ""Did the President instruct [Flynn] to talk about sanctions with the [Russian"
253,40,"ambassador]? ""). Priebus recalled that the President initially equivocated on whether to fire Flynn because"
253,41,it would generate negative press to lose his National Security Advisor so early in his term . Priebus 1/18/ 18
253,42,"302, at 8."
253,43,24 5
253,44,"E.g., Sean Sullivan et al., Senators from both parties pl edge to deep en probe of Russia and the"
253,45,"2016 election, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2017); Aaron Blake , 5 times Donald Trump's team deni ed contact"
253,46,"with Russia , Washington Post (Feb. 15, 2017); Oren Darell, D onald Trump's ties to Russia g o back 30"
253,47,"years, USA Today (Feb. 15, 2017); Pamela Brown et al., Trump aides were in constant touch with senior"
253,48,"Russian officials during campaign, CNN (Feb. 15, 2017); Austin Wright, Camey briefs senators amid furor"
253,49,"over Trump-Russia ties, Politico (Feb. 17, 2017); Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back -Channel Plan for"
253,50,"Ukraine and Russia, Courtesy of Trump Associates , New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017)."
253,51,246
253,52,"Remarks by President Trump and Prime Minister Netanyahu ofisrael in Joint Press Conference,"
253,53,"White House (Feb. 15, 2017)."
253,54,41
253,55,NA
254,1,U .S. Department of Justice
254,2,AttorRey Werk Pretiuet // May CoRtaifl Material Preteeteti URtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
254,3,"a press conference and said that he removed Flynn because Flynn ""didn ' t tell the Vice President"
254,4,"of the United States the facts, and then he didn't remember. And that just wasn ' t acceptable to"
254,5,"me. "" 247 The President said he did not direct Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak , but ""it"
254,6,certainly would have been okay with me if he did. I would have directed him to do it if I thought
254,7,"he wasn't doing it. I didn't direct him, but I would have directed him because that ' s his job."" 248"
254,8,"In listing the reasons for terminating Flynn , the President did not say that Flynn had lied to him .249"
254,9,"The President also denied having any connection to Russia, stating, ""I have nothing to do with"
254,10,"Russia . I told you, I have no deals there. I have no anything."" 250 The President also said he ""had"
254,11,"nothing to do with "" WikiLeaks's publication of information hacked from the Clinton campaign .251"
254,12,9. The President Attempts to Have K.T. McFarland Create a Witness Statement
254,13,Denying that he Directed Flynn's Discussions with Kislyak
254,14,"On February 22, 2017, Priebus and Bannon told McFarland that the President wanted her"
254,15,"to resign as Deputy National Security Advisor, but they suggested to her that the Administration"
254,16,"could make her the ambassador to Singapore. 252 The next day , the President asked Priebus to have"
254,17,McFarland draft an internal email that would confirm that the President did not direct Flynn to call
254,18,the Russian Ambassador about sanctions .253 Priebus said he told the President he would only
254,19,direct McFarland to write such a letter if she were comfortable with it. 254 Priebus called McFarland
254,20,into his office to convey the President's request that she memorialize in writing that the President
254,21,did not direct Flynn to talk to Kislyak. 255 McFarland told Priebus she did not know whether the
254,22,"President had directed Flynn to talk to Kislyak about sanctions, and she declined to say yes or no"
254,23,247
254,24,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017)."
254,25,248
254,26,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017) . The President"
254,27,"also said that Flynn's conduct ""wasn't wrong - what he did in terms of the information he saw."" The"
254,28,"President said that Flynn was just ""doing the job,"" and ""if anything, he did something right."""
254,29,249
254,30,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017); Priebus"
254,31,"1/18/18 302, at 9."
254,32,250
254,33,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017)."
254,34,251
254,35,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2017)."
254,36,252
254,37,"KTMF_ 00000047 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record) ; McFarland 12/22/17 302,"
254,38,at 16-17.
254,39,253
254,40,"See Priebus 1/18/ 18 302, at 11; see also KTMF_00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum"
254,41,"for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17."
254,42,254
254,43,"Priebus 1I I 8/ 18 302, at 1 1."
254,44,255
254,45,"KTMF_ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/ 17 302,"
254,46,at 17.
254,47,42
254,48,NA
255,1,U.S. Department of Justice
255,2,AttarHe;· Werk Pwettet // Ma;· CaHtaiH :Material Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Griff!:. P. 6(e)
255,3,to the request. 256 Priebus understood that McFarland was not comfortable with the President's
255,4,257
255,5,"request, and he recommended that she talk to attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office."
255,6,McFarland then reached out to Eisenberg. 258 McFarland told him that she had been fired
255,7,from her job as Deputy National Security Advisor and offered the ambassadorship in Singapore
255,8,but that the President and Priebus wanted a letter from her denying that the President directed
255,9,Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak. 259 Eisenberg advised McFarland not to write the
255,10,"requested letter. 260 As documented by McFarland in a contemporaneous ""Memorandum for the"
255,11,"Record"" that she wrote because she was concerned by the President 's request: ""Eisenberg . .."
255,12,thought the requested email and letter would be a bad idea- from my side because the email would
255,13,be awkward. Why would T be emailing Priebus to make a statement for the record? But it would
255,14,also be a bad idea for the President because it looked as if my ambassadorial appointment was in
255,15,"some way a quid pro quo."" 261 Later that evening, Priebus stopped by McFarland ' s office and told"
255,16,her not to write the email and to forget he even mentioned it.262
255,17,"Around the same time , the President asked Priebus to reach out to Flynn and let him know"
255,18,that the President still cared about him. 263 Priebus called Flynn and said that he was checking in
255,19,and that Flynn was an American hero. 264 Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn saying
255,20,bad things about him. 265
255,21,"On March 31, 2017, following news that Flynn had offered to testify before the FBI and"
255,22,"congressional investigators in exchange for immunity, the President tweeted, ""Mike Flynn should"
255,23,"ask for immunity in that this is a witch hunt (excuse for big election loss) , by media & Dems , of"
255,24,256
255,25,"KTMF_00000047 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum_for the Record) (""I said I did not know"
255,26,"whether he did or didn't , but was in Maralago the week between Christmas and New Year's (while Flynn"
255,27,"was on vacation in Carribean) and I was not aware of any Flynn-Trump, or Trump-Russian phone calls"");"
255,28,"McFarland 12/22/ 17 302, at 17."
255,29,257
255,30,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 11."
255,31,258
255,32,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17."
255,33,259
255,34,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17."
255,35,26
255,36,"°KTMF_ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the Record); McFarland 12/22/17 302,"
255,37,at 17.
255,38,261
255,39,KTMF_ 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/ 17 Memorandum for the Record); see McFarland 12/22/ 17
255,40,"302, at 17."
255,41,262
255,42,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 17; KTMF 00000048 (McFarland 2/26/17 Memorandum for the"
255,43,Record).
255,44,263
255,45,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9."
255,46,264
255,47,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9; Flynn 1/19/ 18 302, at 9."
255,48,265
255,49,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 9-10."
255,50,43
255,51,NA
256,1,U.S. Department of Justice
256,2,"AtterHe) Werle Prea1:1et// Ma,, CeHtaiHMaterial Proteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
256,3,"historic proportion!"" 266 In late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a"
256,4,message to Flynn telling him the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong. 267
256,5,Analysis
256,6,"In analyzing the President's conduct related to the Flynn investigation,            the following"
256,7,evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
256,8,"a.      Obstructive act. According to Comey's account of his February 14, 2017 meeting"
256,9,"in the Oval Office, the President told him, ""I hope you can see your way clear to letting this go, to"
256,10,"letting Flynn go .... I hope you can let this go."" In analyzing whether these statements constitute"
256,11,"an obstructive act, a threshold question is whether Comey's account of the interaction is accurate ,"
256,12,"and, if so, whether the President 's statements had the tendency to impede the administration of"
256,13,justice by shutting down an inquiry that could result in a grand jury investigation and a criminal
256,14,charge.
256,15,"After Comey's account of the President ' s request to ""let[] Flynn go"" became public, the"
256,16,President publicly disputed several aspects of the story. The President told the New York Times
256,17,"that he did not ""s hoo other people out of the room"" when he talked to Comey and that he did not"
256,18,remember having a one-on-one conversation with Comey. 268 The President also publicly denied
256,19,"that he had asked Comey to ""let[] Flynn go"" or otherwise communicated that Corney should drop"
256,20,"the investigation ofFlynn. 269 In private, the President denied aspects of Comey's account to White"
256,21,"House advisors, but acknowledged to Priebus that he brought Flynn up in the meeting with Comey"
256,22,"and stated that Flynn was a good guy. 270 Despite those denials, substantial evidence corroborates"
256,23,Comey's account.
256,24,266
256,25,"@realDonaldTrump 3/31 /l 7 (7:04 a.m. ET) Tweet; see Shane Harris at al., Mike Flynn Offers"
256,26,"to Testify in Exchange for Immunity , Wall Street Journal (Mar. 30, 2017)."
256,27,267
256,28,"McFarland 12/22/17 302, at 18."
256,29,268
256,30,"Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July 19, 2017). Hicks"
256,31,recalled that the President told her he had never asked Comey to stay behind in his office. Hicks 12/8/17
256,32,"302, at 12."
256,33,269
256,34,"In a statement on May 16, 2017, the White House said: ""While the President has repeatedly"
256,35,"expressed his view that General Flynn is a decent man who served and protected our country, the President"
256,36,"has never asked Mr. Comey or anyone else to end any investigation, including any investigation involving"
256,37,General Flynn ....     This is not a truthful or accurate portrayal of the conversation between the President
256,38,"and Mr . Comey."" See Michael S. Schmidt, Camey Memorandum Says Trump Asked Him to End Flynn"
256,39,"Investigation, New York Times (May 16, 2017) (quoting White House statement); @realDonaldTrump"
256,40,"12/3/17 (6: 15 a.m . ET) Tweet (""I never asked Comey to stop investigating Flynn. Just more Fake News"
256,41,"covering another Comey lie!"")."
256,42,270
256,43,Priebus recalled that the President acknowledged telling Comey that Flynn was a good guy and
256,44,"he hoped ""everything worked out for him."" Priebus I 0/13/17 302, at 19. McGahn recalled that the"
256,45,"President denied saying to Comey that he hoped Corney would let Flynn go, but added that he was ""allowed"
256,46,"to hope. "" The President told McGahn he did not think he had crossed any lines. McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at"
256,47,8.
256,48,44
256,49,NA
257,1,U.S. Department of Justice
257,2,At:te!'fl:eyWel'k P!'eattct // May Cefl:taiHMatcl'ial Pl'eteetea Ufl:derFed. R. Crim. P. 6Ec)
257,3,"First, Comey wrote a detailed memorandum of his encounter with the President on the"
257,4,same day it occurred. Comey also told senior FBI officials about the meeting with the President
257,5,"that day, and their recollections of what Comey told them at the time are consistent with Corney's"
257,6,account. 271
257,7,"Second, Comey provided testimony about the President's request that he "" let[] Flynn go"""
257,8,under oath in congressional proceedings and in interviews with federal investigators subject to
257,9,penalties for lying under 18 U.S.C . § I 00 l . Comey's recollections of the encounter have remained
257,10,consistent over time.
257,11,"Third, the objective , corroborated circumstances of how the one-on-one meeting came to"
257,12,occur support Comey's description of the event. Corney recalled that the President cleared the
257,13,"room to speak with Comey alone after a homeland security briefing in the Oval Office, that"
257,14,"Kushner and Sessions lingered and had to be shooed out by the President, and that Priebus briefly"
257,15,"opened the door during the meeting, prompting the President to wave him away . While the"
257,16,"President has publicly denied those details, other Administration officials who were present have"
257,17,confirmed Comey's account of how he ended up in a one-on -one meeting with the President. 272
257,18,And the President acknowledged to Priebus and McGahn that he in fact spoke to Comey about
257,19,Flynn in their one-on-one meeting.
257,20,"Fourth, the President's decision to clear the room and, in particular , to exclude the Attorney"
257,21,"General from the meeting signals that the President wanted to be alone with Comey , which is"
257,22,"consistent with the delivery of a message of the type that Comey recalls, rather than a more"
257,23,innocuous conversation that could have occurred in the presence of the Attorney General.
257,24,"Finally, Comey's reaction to the President's statements is consistent with the President"
257,25,"having asked him to ""let[] Flynn go."" Comey met with the FBI leadership team, which agreed to"
257,26,keep the President ' s statements closely held and not to inform the team working on the Flynn
257,27,investigation so that they would not be influenced by the President ' s request. Comey also promptly
257,28,"met with the Attorney General to ask him not to be left alone with the President again, an account"
257,29,"verified by Sessions, FBI Chief of Staff James Rybicki, and Jody Hunt, who was then the Attorney"
257,30,General's chief of staff.
257,31,"A second question is whether the President's statements, which were not phrased as a direct"
257,32,"order to Comey, could impede or interfere with the FBI's investigation of Flynn . While the"
257,33,"President said he ""hope[d]"" Comey could ""let[] Flynn go,"" rather than affirmatively directing him"
257,34,"to do so, the circumstances of the conversation show that the President was asking Comey to close"
257,35,"the FBl's investigation into Flynn. First, the President arranged the meeting with Comey so that"
257,36,"they would be alone and purposely excluded the Attorney General, which suggests that the"
257,37,"President meant to make a request to Comey that he did not want anyone else to hear. Second ,"
257,38,"because the President is the head of the Executive Branch, when he says that he ""hope s"" a"
257,39,"subordinate will do something , it is reasonable to expect that the subordinate will do what the"
257,40,"President wants. Indeed, the President repeated a version of""let this go "" three times , and Comey"
257,41,271
257,42,"Rybicki 11/21/18302, at 4; McCabe 8/17/17 302, at 13-14."
257,43,272
257,44,"See Priebus I 0/13/ 17 302, at 18; Sessions I / 17/18 302, at 6."
257,45,45
257,46,NA
258,1,U.S. Department of Justice
258,2,"A1:terAe~Werk Pretittet // May CeAtaiA Material Preteeteti Ui,tier Feti. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
258,3,1
258,4,"testified that he understood the President's statements as a directive, which is corroborated by the"
258,5,way Comey reacted at the time.
258,6,"b.       Nexus to a proceeding. To establish a nexus to a proceeding, it would be necessary"
258,7,to show that the President could reasonably foresee and actually contemplated that the
258,8,investigation of Flynn was likely to lead to a grand jury investigation or prosecution.
258,9,"At the time of the President's one-on-one meeting with Comey, no grand jury subpoenas"
258,10,had been issued as part of the FBI's investi ation into Fl nn. But Fl nn's lies to the FBI violated
258,11,"federal criminal law,                                                     , and resulted in Flynn's"
258,12,prosecution for violating 18 U .S.C. § 100 I. By the time the President spoke to Comey about
258,13,"Flynn, DOJ officials had informed McGahn , who informed the President, that Flynn ' s statements"
258,14,to senior White House officials about his contacts with Kislyak were not true and that Flynn had
258,15,told the same version of events to the FBI. McGahn also informed the President that Flynn ' s
258,16,conduct could violate 18 U.S .C. § l 001. After the Vice President and senior White House officials
258,17,"reviewed the underlying information about Flynn's calls on February 10, 2017, they believed that"
258,18,Flynn could not have forgotten his conversations with Kislyak and concluded that he had been
258,19,"lying. In addition, the President's instruction to the FBI Director to ""let[] Flynn go"" suggests his"
258,20,awareness that Flynn could face criminal exposure for his conduct and was at risk of prosecution.
258,21,"c.       Intent. As part of our investigation, we examined whether the President had a"
258,22,"personal stake in the outcome of an investigation into Flynn-for example , whether the President"
258,23,"was aware of Flynn ' s communications with Kislyak close in time to when they occurred, such that"
258,24,the President knew that Flynn had lied to senior White House officials and that those lies had been
258,25,passed on to the public. Some evidence suggests that the President knew about the existence and
258,26,"content of Flynn's calls when they occurred, but the evidence is inconclusive and could not be"
258,27,"relied upon to establish the President's knowledge. In advance of Flynn's initial call with Kislyak ,"
258,28,the President attended a meeting where the sanctions were discussed and an advisor may have
258,29,mentioned that Flynn was scheduled to talk to Kislyak. Flynn told McFarland about the substance
258,30,"of his calls with Kislyak and said they may have made a difference in Russia's response, and Flynn"
258,31,"recalled talking to Bannon in early January 2017 about how they had successfully ""stopped the"
258,32,"train on Russia's response "" to the sanctions. It would have been reasonable for Flynn to have"
258,33,wanted the President to know of his communications with Kislyak because Kislyak told Flynn his
258,34,request had been received at the highest levels in Russia and that Russia had chosen not to retaliate
258,35,"in response to the request , and the President was pleased by the Ru ssian response , calling it a"
258,36,""" [g]reat move."" And the President never said publicly or internally that Flynn had lied to him"
258,37,about the calls with Kislyak.
258,38,But McFarland did not recall providing the President-Elect with Flynn's read-out of his
258,39,"calls with Kislyak , and Flynn does not have a specific recollection of telling the President-Elect"
258,40,directly about the calls. Bannon also said he did not recall hearing about the calls from Flynn.
258,41,"And in February 2017, the President asked Flynn what was discussed on th e calls and whether he"
258,42,"had lied to the Vice President, suggesting that he did not already know. Our investigation"
258,43,accordingly did not produce evidence that established that the President knew about Flynn ' s
258,44,discussions of sanctions before the Department of Justice notified the White Hous e of those
258,45,discussions in late January 2017. The evidence also does not establish that Flynn otherwise
258,46,46
258,47,NA
259,1,U.S. Department of Justice
259,2,AMerf'le)'Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e)
259,3,possessed information damaging to the President that would give the President a personal incentive
259,4,to end the FBI ' s inquiry into Flynn ' s conduct.
259,5,Evidence does establish that the President connected the Flynn investigation to the FBI's
259,6,"broader Russia investigation and that he believed, as he told Christie, that terminating Flynn would"
259,7,"end ""the whole Russia thing."" Flynn's firing occurred at a time when the media and Congress"
259,8,were raising questions about Russia's interference in the election and whether members of the
259,9,President's campaign had colluded with Russia. Multiple witnesses recalled that the President
259,10,viewed the Russia investigations as a challenge to the legitimacy of his election. The President
259,11,paid careful attention to negative coverage of Flynn and reacted with annoyance and anger when
259,12,the story broke disclosing that Flynn had discussed sanctions with Kislyak . Just hours before
259,13,"meeting one-on-one with Comey, the President told Christie that firing Flynn would put an end to"
259,14,"the Russia inquiries . And after Christie pushed back , telling the President that firing Flynn would"
259,15,"not end the Russia investigation , the President asked Christie to reach out to Comey and convey"
259,16,"that the President liked him and he was part of ""the team."" That afternoon , the President cleared"
259,17,"the room and asked Comey to ""let[] Flynn go ."""
259,18,We also sought evidence relevant to assessing whether the President ' s direction to Comey
259,19,was motivated by sympathy towards Flynn. In public statements the President repeatedly
259,20,"described Flynn as a good person who had been harmed by the Russia investigation, and the"
259,21,"President directed advisors to reach out to Flynn to tell him the President ""care[d]"""
259,22,"about him and felt bad for him. At the same time, multiple senior adv isors, including Bannon,"
259,23,"Priebus, and Hicks, said that the President had become unhappy with Flynn well before Flynn was"
259,24,forced to resign and that the President was frequently irritated with Flynn. Priebus said he believed
259,25,"the President's initial reluctance to fire Flynn stemmed not from personal regard , but from concern"
259,26,about the negative press that would be generated by firing the National Security Advisor so early
259,27,in the Administration. And Priebus indicated that the President's post-firing expressions of
259,28,support for Flynn were motivated by the President's desire to keep Flynn from saying negative
259,29,things about him.
259,30,The way in which the President communicated the request to Comey also is relevant to
259,31,understanding the President's intent. When the President first learned about the FBI investigation
259,32,"into Flynn, he told McGahn , Bannon, and Priebus not to discuss the matter with anyone else in the"
259,33,"White House. The next day, the President invited Comey for a one-on-one dinner against the"
259,34,"advice of an aide who recommended that other White Hous e officials also attend. At the dinner,"
259,35,"the President asked Comey for "" loyalty"" and, at a different point in the conversation , mentioned"
259,36,that Flynn had judgment issues. When the President met with Comey the day after Flynn's
259,37,termination - shortly after being told by Christie that firing Flynn would not end the Russia
259,38,"investigation-the    President cleared the room, even excluding the Attorney General , so that he"
259,39,could again speak to Comey alone. The President's decision to meet one-on-one with Corney
259,40,contravened the advice of the White House Counsel that the President should not communicate
259,41,directly with the Department of Justice to avoid any appearance of interfering in law enforcement
259,42,"activities. And the President later denied that he clear ed the room and asked Comey to "" let[] Flynn"
259,43,"go""- a denial that would have been unnecessary if he believed his request was a proper exercise"
259,44,of prosecutorial discretion.
259,45,47
259,46,NA
260,1,U.S. Department of Justice
260,2,"AM:eme'.', "" Wefk Pfeclttet // May Cetttaitt Matefial Pfeteetecl Uttaef Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
260,3,"Finally, the President's effort to have McFarland write an internal email denying that the"
260,4,President had directed Flynn to discuss sanctions with Kislyak highlights the President ' s concern
260,5,about being associated with Flynn's conduct. The evidence does not establish that the President
260,6,"was trying to have McFarland lie. The President's request, however, was sufficiently irregular"
260,7,that McFarland-who          did not know the full extent of Flynn ' s communications with the President
260,8,and thus could not make the representation the President wanted-felt the need to draft an internal
260,9,"memorandum documenting the President's request, and Eisenberg was concerned that the request"
260,10,would look like a quid pro quo in exchange for an ambassadorship.
260,11,C.         The President's Reaction to Public Confirmation of the FBl's Russia
260,12,Investigation
260,13,Overview
260,14,"In early March 2017 , the President learned that Sessions was considering rec using from"
260,15,the Russia investigation and tried to prevent the recusal. After Sessions announced his recusal on
260,16,"March 2, the President expressed anger at Sessions for the decision and then privately asked"
260,17,"Sessions to ""unrecuse. "" On March 20 , 2017, Comey publicly disclosed the existence of the FBI's"
260,18,"Russia investigation. In the days that followed , the President contacted Comey and other"
260,19,intelligence agency leaders and asked them to push back publicly on the suggestion that the
260,20,"President had any connection to the Russian election-interference effort in order to ""lift the cloud """
260,21,of the ongoing investigation.
260,22,Evidence
260,23,1. Attorney General Sessions Recuses From the Russia Investigation
260,24,"Tn late February 2017, the Department of Justice began an internal analysis of whether"
260,25,Sessions should recuse from the Russia investigation based on his role in the 2016 Trump
260,26,"Campaign .273 On March I, 2017, the press reported that, in his January confirmation hearing to"
260,27,"become Attorney General, Senator Sessions had not disclosed two meetings he had with Russian"
260,28,"Ambassador Kislyak before the presidential election, leading to congressional calls for Sessions"
260,29,274
260,30,to recuse or for a special counsel to investigate Russia's interference in the presidential election .
260,31,"Also on March I, the President called Comey and said he wanted to check in and            see how"
260,32,"Comey was doing .275 According to an email Corney sent to his chief of staff after the              call , the"
260,33,"President ""talked about Sessions a bit,"" said that he had heard Comey was ""doing great, ""           and said"
260,34,that he hoped Comey would come by to say hello when he was at the White House. 276                   Corney
260,35,273
260,36,"Sessions 1/17/ I 8 302, at I; Hunt 2/ l /18 302, at 3."
260,37,274
260,38,"E.g., Adam Entous et al., Sessions met with Russian envoy twice last year, encounters he later"
260,39,"did not disclose, Washington Post (Mar. 1, 2017)."
260,40,275
260,41,"3/1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; SCR0l 26_000030 (President's Daily Diary, 3/1/ 17, reflecting"
260,42,call with Comey at 11:55 am.)
260,43,"276 3/ 1/17 Email, Comey to Rybicki; see Hearing on Russ ian Election Interference Before the"
260,44,"Senate Select Intelli gence Committee, I 15th Cong . (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 86) (testimony"
260,45,48
260,46,NA
261,1,U.S. Department of Justice
261,2,AtlerHe)' '.\'erk Preeuet // Ma)' CetttaiH Material Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
261,3,"interpreted the call as an effort by the President to ""pull [him] in,"" but he did not perceive the call"
261,4,as an attempt by the President to find out what Comey was doing with the Flynn investigation. 277
261,5,"The next morning, the President called McGahn and urged him to contact Sessions to tell"
261,6,him not to recuse himse lf from the Russia investigation. 278 McGahn understood the President to
261,7,be concerned that a recusal would make Sessions look guilty for omitting details in his
261,8,confirmation hearing; leave the President unprotected from an investigation that could hobble the
261,9,presidency and derail his policy objectives; and detract from favorable press coverage of a
261,10,Presidential Address to Congress the President had delivered earlier in the week .279 McGahn
261,11,reached out to Sessions and reported that the Pres ident was not happy about the possibility of
261,12,281
261,13,recusal. 280 Sessions replied that he intended to follow the rules on recusal.           McGahn reported
261,14,"back to the President about the call with Sessions, and the President reiterated that he did not want"
261,15,"Sessions to recuse. 282 Throughout the day, McGahn continued trying on behalf of the President to"
261,16,"avert Sessions's recusal by speaking to Sessions's personal counsel, Sessions's chief of staff, and"
261,17,"Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell, and by contacting Sessions himself two more times. 283"
261,18,Sessions recalled that other White House advisors also called him that day to argue against his
261,19,recusal. 284
261,20,"That afternoon, Sessions announced his decision to recuse ""from any existing or future"
261,21,investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President of the United
261,22,"States ."" 285 Sessions believed the decision to recuse was not a close call , given the applicable"
261,23,"of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI) (""[H]e called me one day .... [H]e just called to check in"
261,24,"and tell me I was doing an awesome job, and wanted to see how I was doing."")."
261,25,277
261,26,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 17-18."
261,27,278
261,28,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16."
261,29,279
261,30,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 16-17; see SC_AD_00l23 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes) (""Just in the"
261,31,"middle of another Russia Fiasco."")."
261,32,280
261,33,"Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at 3."
261,34,281
261,35,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17."
261,36,282
261,37,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 17."
261,38,283
261,39,"McGahn 11/30/17 302, at 18- 19; Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/ 18 302, at 4; Donaldson"
261,40,"11/6/17 302, at 8-10; see Hunt-000017; SC_AD_ 00121 (Donaldson 3/2/ 17 Notes) ."
261,41,284
261,42,"Sessions l/17/18302,at3."
261,43,285
261,44,"Attorney General Sessions Statement on Recusal, Department of Justice Press Release (Mar. 2,"
261,45,"2017) (""During the course of the last several weeks, I have met with the relevant senior career Department"
261,46,officials to discuss whether I should recuse myself from any matters arising from the campaigns for
261,47,"President of the United States. Having concluded those meetings today, I have decided to recuse myself"
261,48,from any existing or future investigations of any matters related in any way to the campaigns for President
261,49,"of the United States.""). At the time ofSessions's recusal, Dana Boente, then the Acting Deputy Attorney"
261,50,"General and U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, became the Acting Attorney General for"
261,51,. campaign-related matters pursuant to an executive order specifying the order of succession at the
261,52,"Department of Justice. Id. (""Consistent with the succession order for the Department of Justice, ... Dana"
261,53,Boente shall act as and perform the functions of the Attorney General with respect to any matters from
261,54,49
261,55,NA
262,1,U.s:Department of Justice
262,2,At:terHey Werk Preettet // MB:) CeHtttin Mttterittl Preteetee Under Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
262,3,1
262,4,"language in the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) , which Sessions considered to be clear and"
262,5,"decisive .286 Sessions thought that any argument that the CFR did not apply to him was ""ve ry"
262,6,"thin."" 287 Sessions got the impression , based on calls he received from White House officials, that"
262,7,the President was very upset with him and did not think he had done his duty as Attorney
262,8,General .288
262,9,"Shortly after Sessions announced his recusal, the White House Counsel's Office directed"
262,10,that Sessions should not be contacted about the matter. 289 Internal White House Counsel's Office
262,11,"notes from March 2, 2017, state ""No contact w/Sessions"" and ""No comms / Serious concerns about"
262,12,"obstruction."" 290"
262,13,291
262,14,"On March 3, the day after Sess ions's recusal, McGahn was called into the Oval Office."
262,15,"Other advisors were there, including Priebus and Bannon. 292 The President opened the"
262,16,"conversation by saying, ""I don't have a lawyer ."" 293 The President expr esse d anger at McGahn"
262,17,294
262,18,"about the recusal and brought up Roy Cohn, stating that he wished Cohn was his attorney."
262,19,"McGahn interpreted this comment as directed at him , suggesting that Cohn would fight for the"
262,20,"which I have recused myself to the extent they exist.""); see Exec. Order No. 13775, 82 Fed. Reg. 10697"
262,21,"(Feb.14,2017)."
262,22,"286  Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at 1-2. 28 C.F.R. § 45.2 provides that ""no employee shall participate in a"
262,23,criminal investigation or prosecution ifhe has a personal or political relationship with ... [a]ny person or
262,24,"organization substantially involved in the conduct that is the subject of the investigation or prosecution,"""
262,25,"and defines ""po litical relationship"" as ""a close identification with an elected official, a candidate (whether"
262,26,"or not successful) for elective, public office, a political party, or a campaign organization, arising from"
262,27,"service as a principal adviser thereto or a principal official thereof. """
262,28,287
262,29,"Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at 2."
262,30,288
262,31,"Sessions I/17/I 8 302, at 3."
262,32,289
262,33,"Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11; SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). It is not clear whether"
262,34,the President was aware of the White House Counsel's Office direction not to contact Sessions about his
262,35,recusal.
262,36,290
262,37,"SC_AD_00123 (Donaldson 3/2/17 Notes). McGahn said he believed the note ""No comms /"
262,38,"Serious concerns about obstruction"" may have referred to concerns McGahn had about the press team"
262,39,"saying ""crazy things"" and trying to spin Sessions's recusal in a way that would raise concerns about"
262,40,"obstruction . McGahn l l/30/17 302, at 19. Donaldson recalled that ""No comms"" referred to the order that"
262,41,"no one should contact Sessions. Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 11."
262,42,29 1
262,43,"McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 2."
262,44,292
262,45,"McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 2."
262,46,293
262,47,"McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 2 ."
262,48,294
262,49,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2. Cohn had previously served as a lawyer for the President during"
262,50,"his career as a private businessman. Priebus recalled that when the President talked about Cohn, he said"
262,51,"Cohn would win cases for him that had no chance, and that Cohn had done incredible things for him."
262,52,"Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5. Bannon recalled the President describing Cohn as a winner and a fixer, someone"
262,53,"who got things done. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 6."
262,54,50
262,55,NA
263,1,U.S. Department of Justice
263,2,Attel'fl:e~·Werk Preclttet // MB:yCetttB:ittMB:teriB:I    Preteetea UttclerFeel. R. Critfl. P. 6(e)
263,3,President whereas McGahn would not. 295 The President wanted McGahn to talk to Sessions about
263,4,"the recusal, but McGahn told the President that DOJ ethics officials had weighed in on Sessions's"
263,5,decision to recuse. 296 The President then brought up former Attorneys General Robert Kennedy
263,6,and Eric Holder and said that they had protected their presidents. 297 The President also pushed
263,7,"back on the DOJ contacts policy , and said words to the effect of, ""You're telling me that Bobby"
263,8,"and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate? "" 298"
263,9,Bannon recalled that the President was as mad as Bannon had ever seen him and that he screamed
263,10,at McGahn about how weak Sessions was. 299 Bannon recalled telling the President that Sessions's
263,11,recusal was not a surprise and that before the inauguration they had discussed that Sessions would
263,12,have to recuse from campaign -related investigations because of his work on the Trump
263,13,Campaign .300
263,14,"That weekend, Sessions and McGahn flew to Mar -a-Lago to meet with the President. 30 1"
263,15,Sessions recalled that the President pulled him aside to speak to him alone and suggested that
263,16,"Sessions should ""unrecuse"" from the Russia investigation. 302 The President contrasted Sessions"
263,17,"with Attorneys General Holder and Kennedy, who had developed a strategy to help their presidents"
263,18,where Sessions had not. 303 Sessions said he had the impression that the President feared that the
263,19,"investigation could spin out of control and disrupt his ability to govern, which Sessions could have"
263,20,helped avert if he were still overseeing it.304
263,21,"On March 5, 2017, the White House Counsel 's Office was informed that the FBI was"
263,22,asking for transition-period records relating to Flynn-indicating             that the FBI was still actively
263,23,"investigating him. 305 On March 6, the President told advisors he wanted to call the Acting Attorney"
263,24,295
263,25,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2."
263,26,296
263,27,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 2."
263,28,297
263,29,"McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 3. Bannon said the President saw Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder"
263,30,as Attorneys General who protected the presidents they served. The President thought Holder always stood
263,31,"up for President Obama and even took a contempt charge for him, and Robert Kennedy always had his"
263,32,"brother's back. Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5. Priebus recalled that the President said he had been told his"
263,33,"entire life he needed to have a great lawyer, a ""bulldog,"" and added that Holder had been willing to take a"
263,34,"contempt-of-Congress charge for President Obama. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5."
263,35,298
263,36,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3."
263,37,299
263,38,"Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5."
263,39,300
263,40,"Bannon 2/14/18 302, at 5."
263,41,301
263,42,"Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 3; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 5; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 3."
263,43,302
263,44,"Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at3-4."
263,45,303
263,46,"Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at3-4"
263,47,304
263,48,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 3-4. Hicks recalled that after Sessions recused, the President was angry"
263,49,"and scolded Sessions in her presence, but she could not remember exactly when that conversation occurred."
263,50,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13."
263,51,305
263,52,"SC_AD_000 I 37 (Donaldson 3/5/17 Notes); see Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at 13."
263,53,51
263,54,NA
264,1,U.S. Department of Justice
264,2,"Attorfl:e,.·Work Protittet // Ma,.·Cofl:taifl:Material Proteetee Ufl:eerFee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
264,3,"General to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated, although it"
264,4,306
264,5,is not clear whether the President knew at that time of the FBI's recent request concerning Flynn.
264,6,2. FBI Director Comey Publicly Confirms                  the Existence     of the   Russia
264,7,Investigation in Testimony Before HPSCI
264,8,"On March 9, 2017, Comey briefed the "" Gang of Eight"" congressional leaders about the"
264,9,"FBI's investigation of Russian interference, including an identification of the principal U.S."
264,10,subjects of the investigation. 307 Although it is unclear whether the President knew of that briefing
264,11,"at the time, notes taken by Annie Donaldson , then McGahn' s chief of staff, on March 12, 2017 ,"
264,12,"state, ""POTUS in panic/chaos ... Need binders to put in front of POTUS. (1) All things related"
264,13,"to Russia."" 308 The week after Comey's briefing, the White House Counsel's Office was in contact"
264,14,with SSCI Chairman Senator Richard Burr about the Russia investigations and appears to have
264,15,309
264,16,received information about the status of the FBI investigation.
264,17,310
264,18,"On March 20, 2017, Comey was scheduled to testify before HPSCI.                      In advance of"
264,19,"Comey's testimony, congressional officials made clear that they wanted Corney to provide"
264,20,"information about the ongoing FBI investigation .311 Dana Boente, who at that time was the Acting"
264,21,"Attorney General for the Russia investigation , authorized Comey to confirm the existence of the"
264,22,Russia investigation and agreed that Comey should decline to comment on whether any particular
264,23,"individuals, including the President, were being investigated. 312"
264,24,306
264,25,"Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14; see SC_ AD_ 000168 (Donaldson 3/6/17 Notes) (""POTUS wants"
264,26,to call Dana [then the Acting Attorney General for campaign-related investigations]/ Is investigation I No/
264,27,"We know something on Flynn/ GSA got contacted by FBI/ There's something hot"")."
264,28,307
264,29,"Comey 11/15/17 302, at 13-14; SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email, Gauhar to Page et"
264,30,al.).
264,31,308
264,32,SC_AD _00188 (Donaldson 3/12/18 Notes). Donaldson said she was not part of the conversation
264,33,"that led to these notes, and must have been told about it from others . Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 13."
264,34,309
264,35,"Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 14-15. On March 16, 2017, the White House Counsel's Office was"
264,36,"briefed by Senator Burr on the existence of ""4-5 targets."" Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15. The ""targets """
264,37,"were identified in notes taken by Donaldson as ""Flynn (FBI was ~ooking                                for phone"
264,38,"records""; ""Comey~Manafort (Ukr + Russia, not campaign)"";~                                       ""Carter Page ($"
264,39,"game)""; and ""Greek Guy"" (potentially referring to George Papadopoulos , later charged with violating 18"
264,40,U.S.C. § 1001 for lying to the FBI). SC_AD_00l98 (Donaldson 3/16/17 Notes). Donaldson and McGahn
264,41,"both said they believed these were targets ofSSCI. Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at 15; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302,"
264,42,"at 4. But SSCI does not fotmally investigate individuals as ""targets""; the notes on their face reference the"
264,43,"FBI, the Department of Justice, and Comey; and the notes track the background materials prepared by the"
264,44,"FBI for Comey's briefing to the Gang of8 on March 9. See SNS-Classified-0000140-44 (3/8/17 Email ,"
264,45,"Gauhar to Page et al.); see also Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 15 (Donaldson could not rule out that Burr had"
264,46,told McGahn those individuals were the FBI's targets).
264,47,310
264,48,Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
264,49,"Committee , I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017)."
264,50,311
264,51,"Comey 11/ 15/17 302, at 16; McCabe 8/17/17, at 15; McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at I."
264,52,3 12
264,53,"Boente 1/31/18 302 , at 5; Comey I I /15/17 302, at 16-17."
264,54,52
264,55,NA
265,1,U.S. Department of Justice
265,2,Attorfl:eyWerle Prodttet // .May Cofl:taifl:Matel'ial Pfoteeteel Ufl:eleF
265,3,Feel. R. Ct1iffl.P. 6(e)
265,4,"In his opening remarks at the HPSCI hearing, which were drafted in consultation with the"
265,5,"Department of Justice, Comey stated that he had ""been authorized by the Department of Justice to"
265,6,"confirm that the FBI, as part of [its] counterintelligence mission, is investigating the Russian"
265,7,government's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election and that includes investigating
265,8,the nature of any links between individuals associated with the Trump campaign and the Russian
265,9,government and whether there was any coordination between the campaign and Russia's effot1s.
265,10,"As with any counterintelligence investigation, this will also include an assessment of whether any"
265,11,"crimes were committed."" 313 Comey added that he would not comment further on what the FBI"
265,12,"was ""doing and whose conduct [it] [was] examining"" because the investigation was ongoing and"
265,13,"classified - but he observed that he had ""taken the extraordinary step in consultation with the"
265,14,Department of Justice of briefing this Congress's leaders ... in a classified setting in detail about
265,15,"the investigation."" 314 Comey was specifically asked whether President Trump was ""under"
265,16,"investigation during the campaign"" or ""under investigation now."" 315 Comey declined to answer,"
265,17,"stating, ""Please don't over interpret what I've said as-as the chair and ranking know, we have"
265,18,"briefed him in great detail on the subjects of the investigation and what we're doing, but I'm not"
265,19,"gonna answer about anybody in this forum."" 316 Comey was also asked whether the FBI was"
265,20,317
265,21,"investigating the information contained in the Steele reporting, and he declined to answer."
265,22,"According to McGahn and Donaldson, the President had expressed frustration with Comey"
265,23,"before his March 20 testimony, and the testimony made matters worse. 318 The President had"
265,24,previously criticized Comey for too frequently making headlines and for not attending intelligence
265,25,"briefings at the White House, and the President suspected Comey of leaking certain information"
265,26,"to the media. 319 McGahn said the President thought Comey was acting like ""his own branch of"
265,27,"government."" 320"
265,28,3 13
265,29,Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
265,30,"Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James"
265,31,"B. Comey); Corney 11/15/17 302, at 17; Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5 (confirming that the Department of Justice"
265,32,authorized Comey's remarks).
265,33,314
265,34,Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
265,35,"Committee , I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 11) (testimony by FBI Director James"
265,36,B. Comey).       ·
265,37,315
265,38,Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
265,39,"Committee, 115th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (question by Rep. Swalwell)."
265,40,316
265,41,Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
265,42,"Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 130) (testimony by FBI Director James"
265,43,B. Comey).
265,44,317
265,45,Hearing on Russian Election Tampering Before the House Permanent Select Intelligence
265,46,"Committee, I 15th Cong. (Mar. 20, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 143) (testimony by FBI Director James"
265,47,B. Comey).
265,48,318
265,49,"Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7."
265,50,319
265,51,"Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 21; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 6-9."
265,52,320
265,53,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7."
265,54,53
265,55,NA
266,1,U.S . Department of Justice
266,2,At:tort1ey Work Proattet II May Cot1tait1 Material Proteetea Ut1aer Fee. R . Crim. P. 6(e)
266,3,Press reports following Comey's March 20 testimony suggested that the FBI was
266,4,"investigating the President , contrary to what Comey had told the President at the end of the January"
266,5,"6, 2017 intelligence assessment briefing. 321 McGahn, Donaldson , and senior advisor Stephen"
266,6,Miller recalled that the President was upset with Comey's testimony and the press coverage that
266,7,followed because of the suggestion that the President was under investigation. 322 Notes from the
266,8,"White House Counsel's Office dated March 21, 2017, indicate that the President was "" beside"
266,9,himself' over Comey' s testimony. 323 The President called McGahn repeatedly that day to ask him
266,10,"to intervene with the Department of Justice, and, according to the notes, the President was ""getting"
266,11,"hotter and hotter, get rid? "" 324 Officials in the White House Counsel 's Office became so concerned"
266,12,that the President would fire Comey that they began drafting a memorandum that examined
266,13,325
266,14,whether the President needed cause to terminate the FBI director.
266,15,"At the President's urging, McGahn contacted Boente several times on March 21, 2017, to"
266,16,seek Boente's assistance in having Comey or the Department of Justice correct the misperception
266,17,"that the President was under investigation. 326 Boente did not specifically recall the conversations ,"
266,18,although he did remember one conversation with McGahn around this time where McGahn asked
266,19,327
266,20,if there was a way to speed up or end the Russia investigation as quickly as possible.               Boente
266,21,328
266,22,said McGahn told him the President was under a cloud and it made it hard for him to govern.
266,23,Boente recalled telling McGahn that there was no good way to shorten the investigation and
266,24,attempting to do so could erode confidence in the investigation ' s conclusions. 329 Boente said
266,25,"McGahn agreed and dropped the issue. 330 The President also sought to speak with Boente directly ,"
266,26,but McGahn told the President that Boente did not want to talk to the President about the request
266,27,"321  E.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., F.B.I. ls Investigating Trump's Russia Ties, Comey Confirms, New"
266,28,"York Times (Mar. 20, 20 I 7); Andy Greenberg. The FBI Has Been Investigating Trump 's Russia Ties Since"
266,29,"July, Wired (Mar. 20, 2017); Julie Borger & Spencer Ackerman , Trump-Russia collusion is being"
266,30,"investigated by FBI, Comey confirms, Guardian (Mar. 20, 2017); see Corney 1/6/ 17 Memorandum, at 2."
266,31,"322  Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-17; S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 5-7."
266,32,323  SC_AD_00213 (Donaldson 3/2 1/17 Notes). The notes from that day also indicate that the
266,33,"President referred to the ""Comey bombshell"" which ""made [him] look like a fool."" SC_AD_00206"
266,34,(Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
266,35,324
266,36,SC_AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes).
266,37,325 SCR0l6 _000002-05 (White House Counsel's Office Memorandum). White House Counsel's
266,38,Office attorney Uttam Dhillon did not recall a triggering event causing the White House Counsel's Office
266,39,"to begin this research. Dhmon I 1/21/ 17 302, at 5. Metadata from the document , which was provided by"
266,40,"the White House, establishes that it was created on March 21, 2017."
266,41,326
266,42,"Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 16-21; McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 5-7."
266,43,327
266,44,"Boente 1/3 1/18 302, at 5."
266,45,328
266,46,"Boente 1/3 1/I 8 302, at 5."
266,47,329
266,48,"Boente 1/3 1/ 18 302, at 5."
266,49,330
266,50,"Boente 1/31/18 302, at 5."
266,51,54
266,52,NA
267,1,U.S. Department of Justice
267,2,Afttm'ley Werk Prnettet // May Cm1:taif'IMaterial Preteetee Uf'leer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
267,3,to intervene with Comey. 331 McGahn recalled Boente telling him in calls that day that he did not
267,4,"think it was sustainable for Comey to stay on as FBI director for the next four years, which"
267,5,McGahn said he conveyed to the President. 332 Boente did not recall discussing with McGahn or
267,6,anyone else the idea that Comey should not continue as FBI director. 333
267,7,3. The President Asks Intelligence Community           Leaders  to Make Public
267,8,Statements that he had No Connection to Russia
267,9,"In the weeks following Comey's March 20, 2017 testimony, the President repeatedly asked"
267,10,intelligence community officials to push back publicly on any suggestion that the President had a
267,11,connection to the Russian election-interference effort.
267,12,"On March 22, 2017, the President asked Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats and"
267,13,CIA Director Michael Pompeo to stay behind in the Oval Office after a Presidential Daily
267,14,"Briefing. 334 According to Coats , the President asked them whether they could say publicly that no"
267,15,link existed between him and Russia. 335 Coats responded that the Office of the Director ofNational
267,16,Intelligence (ODNJ) has nothing to do with investigations and it was not his role to make a public
267,17,statement on the Russia investigation. 336 Pompeo had no recollection of being asked to stay behind
267,18,"after the March 22 briefing, but he recalled that the President regularly urged officials to get the"
267,19,word out that he had not done anything wrong related to Russia. 337
267,20,Coats told this Office that the President never asked him to speak to Comey about the FBI
267,21,"investigation. 338 Some ODNI staffers, however, had a different recollection of how Coa ts"
267,22,described the meeting immediately after it occurred. According to senior ODNI official Michael
267,23,"Dempsey, Coats said after the meeting that the President had brought up the Russia investigation"
267,24,"and asked him to contact Comey to see if there was a way to get past the investigation , get it over"
267,25,"with , end it, or words to that effect. 339 Dempsey said that Coats described the President's"
267,26,"comments as falling ""somewhere between musing about hating the investigation"" and wanting"
267,27,"Coats to ""do something to stop it."" 340 Dempsey said Coats made it clear that he wou ld not get"
267,28,"involved with an ongoing FBI investigation. 341 Edward Gistaro, another ODNI official, recalled"
267,29,331
267,30,"SC_AD_00210 (Donaldson 3/21/17 Notes); McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 7; Donaldson 11/6/17"
267,31,"302, at 19."
267,32,332
267,33,"McGahn 12/12/1 7 302, at 7; Burnham l l/03/17 302, at 11."
267,34,333
267,35,"Boente 1/31/18 302, at 3."
267,36,334
267,37,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3; Culver 6/14/ I 7 302, at 2."
267,38,335
267,39,"Coats 6/ 14/17 3 02, at 3."
267,40,336
267,41,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3 ."
267,42,33 7
267,43,"Pompeo 6/28/17 302, at 1-3."
267,44,338
267,45,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 3."
267,46,339
267,47,"Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2."
267,48,340
267,49,"Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 2-3."
267,50,341
267,51,"Dempsey 6/14/17 302, at 3."
267,52,55
267,53,NA
268,1,U.S. Department of Justice
268,2,Atterftey Werk Pree1:1et// May CeHtttift Materittl Preteetee Ufteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
268,3,"that right after Coats's meeting with the President , on the walk from the Oval Office back to the"
268,4,"Eisenhower Executive Office Building, Coats said that the President had kept him behind to ask"
268,5,"him what he could do to ""help with the investigation."" 342 Another ODNI staffer who had been"
268,6,waiting for Coats outside the Oval Office talked to Gistaro a few minutes later and recalled Gistaro
268,7,reporting that Coats was upset because the President had asked him to contact Comey to convince
268,8,him there was nothing to the Russia investigation. 343
268,9,"On Saturday, March 25 , 2017, three days after the meeting in the Oval Office , the President"
268,10,"called Coats and again complained about the Russia investigations, saying words to the effect of,"
268,11,""" I can't do anything with Russia, there's things I'd like to do with Russia, with trade , with ISIS ,"
268,12,"they 're all over me with this."" 344 Coats told the President that the investigations were going to go"
268,13,on and the best thing to do was to let them run their course. 345 Coats later testified in a
268,14,"congressional hearing that he had ""never felt pressure to intervene or interfere in any way and"
268,15,"shape-with        shaping intelligence in a political way, or in relationship . . . to an ongoing"
268,16,"investigation ."" 346"
268,17,"On March 26, 2017 , the day after the President called Coats, the President called NSA"
268,18,Director Admiral Michael Rogers. 347 The President expressed frustration with the Russia
268,19,"investigation, saying that it made relations with the Russians difficult. 348 The President told"
268,20,349
268,21,"Rogers ""the thing with the Russians [wa]s messing up"" his ability to get things done with Russia."
268,22,The President also said that the news stories linking him with Russia were not true and asked
268,23,Rogers if he could do anything to refute the stories. 350 Deputy Director of the NSA Richard
268,24,"Ledgett , who was present for the call , said it was the most unusual thing he had experienced in 40"
268,25,"years of government service. 351 After the call concluded, Ledgett prepared a memorandum that"
268,26,he and Rogers both signed documenting the content of the conversation and the President 's
268,27,"request , and they placed the memorandum in a safe. 352 But Rogers did not perceive the President's"
268,28,"request to be an order , and the President did not ask Rogers to push back on the Russia"
268,29,342
268,30,"Gistaro 6/ 14/ 17 302, at 2."
268,31,343
268,32,"Culver 6/14 / 17 302, at 2-3."
268,33,344
268,34,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 4."
268,35,"345 Coats 6/14/17 302 , at 4; Dempsey 6/ 14/ 17 302 , at 3 (Coats relayed that the President had asked"
268,36,"several times what Coats could do to help ""get [the investigation] done,"" and Coats had repeatedly told the"
268,37,"President that fastest way to ""get it done"" was to let it run its course) ."
268,38,. 346 Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence
268,39,"Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 25) (testimony by Daniel Coats, Director"
268,40,ofNational Intelligence).
268,41,347
268,42,"Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 3-4."
268,43,348
268,44,"Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4."
268,45,349
268,46,"Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 1-2; see Rogers 6/12/ 17 302, at 4."
268,47,350
268,48,"Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4-5; Ledgett 6/ 13/ l 7 302, at 2."
268,49,351
268,50,"Ledgett 6/ 13/ 17 302, at 2."
268,51,"352 Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2-3; Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 4."
268,52,56
268,53,NA
269,1,U.S . Department of Justice
269,2,"AlterHe:,· Werle Predttet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted Ut1der Fed. R . Crim.. P. 6(e)"
269,3,investigation itself. 353 Rogers later testified in a congressional hearing that as NSA Director he
269,4,"had ""never been directed to do anything [he] believe[d] to be illegal , immoral , unethical or"
269,5,"inappropriate "" and did ""not recall ever feeling pressured to do so. "" 354"
269,6,"In addition to the specific comments made to Coats, Pompeo , and Rogers , the President"
269,7,spoke on other occasions in the presence of intelligence community officials about the Russia
269,8,investigation and stated that it interfered with his ability to conduct foreign relations. 355 On at least
269,9,"two occasions, the President began Presidential Daily Briefings by stating that there was no"
269,10,collusion with Russia and he hoped a press statement to that effect could be issued. 356 Pompeo
269,11,"recalled that the President vent ed about the investigation on multiple occasions, complaining that"
269,12,there was no evidence against him and that nobody would publicly defend him. 357 Rogers recalled
269,13,"a private conversation with the President in which he "" vent[ ed]"" about the investigation , said he"
269,14,"had done nothing wrong , and said something like the ""Russia thing has got to go away."" 358 Coats"
269,15,"recalled the President bringing up the Russia investigation several times , and Coats said he finally"
269,16,told the President that Coats's job was to_ provide intellig ence and not get involved in
269,17,investigation s.359
269,18,"4. The President Asks Comey to ""Lift               the Cloud "" Created by the Russia"
269,19,Investigation
269,20,"On the morning of March 30, 2017 , the President reached out to Comey directly about the"
269,21,"Russia investigation. 360 According to Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the"
269,22,"President said ""he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making"
269,23,353
269,24,"Rogers 6/12/17 302, at 5; Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at 2."
269,25,354
269,26,Hearing on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Before the Senate Select Intelligence
269,27,"Committee, 115th Cong . (June 7, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 20) (testimony by Admiral M ichael"
269,28,"Rogers, Director of the National Secur ity Agency)."
269,29,355
269,30,"Gistaro 6/ 14/ 17 302, at I, 3; Pompeo 6/28/ 17 302, at 2-3."
269,31,356
269,32,"Gistaro 6/ 14/ l 7 302, at I."
269,33,357
269,34,"Pompeo 6/28/ 17 302, at 2."
269,35,358
269,36,"Rogers 6/12/ 17 302, at 6."
269,37,359
269,38,"Coats 6/14/17 302 , at 3-4."
269,39,360
269,40,"SCRO l 2b_000044 (President' s Daily Diary, 3/30/17, reflecting call to Comey from 8: 14 - 8:24"
269,41,"a.m.); Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1 ("" The President called me on my CMS phone at 8: 13 am today ."
269,42,". . . The call laste d I I minutes (about IO minutes when he was connected)."" ; Hearing on Russian Election"
269,43,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligen ce Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
269,44,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6)."
269,45,57
269,46,NA
270,1,U.S . Department of Justice
270,2,"AM:orAe,·'il/ork Proe1:1et// Ma)' CoAtaiAMaterial Proteetea UAeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
270,3,"that difficult."" 361 The President asked Comey what could be done to "" lift the cloud."" 362 Corney"
270,4,"explained ""that we were running it down as quickly as possible and that there would be great"
270,5,"benefit, if we didn't find anything, to our Good Housekeeping seal of approval, but we had to do"
270,6,"our work."" 363 Comey also told the President that congressional leaders were aware that the FBI"
270,7,"was not investigating the President personally. 364 The President said several times, ""We need to"
270,8,"get that fact out."" 365 The President commented that if there was ""some satellite"" (which Comey"
270,9,"took to mean an associate of the President's or the campaign) that did something, ""it would be"
270,10,"good to find that out"" but that he himself had not done anything wrong and he hoped Comey"
270,11,"""would find a way to get out that we weren't investigating hirn."" 366 After the call ended, Comey"
270,12,"called Boente and told him about the conversation, asked for guidance on how to respond , and said"
270,13,he was uncomfortable with direct contact from the President about the investigation. 367
270,14,"On the morning of April 11, 2017, the President called Comey again. 368 According to"
270,15,"Comey's contemporaneous record of the conversation, the President said he was "" following up to"
270,16,see if[Comey] did what [the President] had asked last time-getting out that he personally is not
270,17,"under investigation."" 369 Comey responded that he had passed the request to Boente but not heard"
270,18,"back, and he informed the President that the traditional channel for such a request would be to"
270,19,361
270,20,"Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at 1. Corney subsequently testified before Congress abou t this"
270,21,conversation and described it to our Office; his recollections were consistent with his memorandum.
270,22,"Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong."
270,23,"(June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 6); Corney"
270,24,"11/15/17 302 , at 18."
270,25,362
270,26,"Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum , at 1; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 18."
270,27,363
270,28,"Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum , at I; Corney 11/15/17 302, at 18."
270,29,364
270,30,"Comey 3/30/ 17 Memorandum, at 1; Hearing on Russian Election Interfer ence Before the Senate"
270,31,"Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,"
270,32,"former Director of the FBI, at 6)."
270,33,365
270,34,"Comey 3/30/ I 7 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate"
270,35,"Select Intelligen ce Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,"
270,36,"former Director of the FBT, at 6)."
270,37,366
270,38,"Comey 3/30/17 Memorandum, at I; Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate"
270,39,"Select Intelligence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey,"
270,40,"former Director of the FBI, at 6-7)."
270,41,367
270,42,"Comey 3/30/ 17 Memorandum , at 2; Boente I /3 1/ 18 302, at 6-7; Hearing on Russian Election"
270,43,"Interferenc e Before the Senat e Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Sta tement for"
270,44,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI , at 7)."
270,45,368
270,46,"SCR012b _ 0000 53 (President's Daily Diary , 4/1 I /17 , reflecting call to Comey from 8:27 - 8:3 1"
270,47,"a.m.); Comey 4/ 11/17 M emorandum, at I (""I returned the president's call this morning at 8:26 am EDT."
270,48,"We spoke for about four minutes. "") ."
270,49,369
270,50,"Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum , at I. Corney subsequently testified before Congress about this"
270,51,conver sat ion and his recollections were consistent with his memo. H earing on Russian Election
270,52,"Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for"
270,53,"the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at 7)."
270,54,58
270,55,NA
271,1,U.S. Department of Justice
271,2,Attet'Hey Werle Preattet // May CeHtaifl Material Prnteetea UHElerFee. R. Ct1i1t1         . P. 6(e)
271,3,have the White House Counsel contact DOJ leadership. 37 0 The President said he would take that
271,4,"step. 371 The President then ~dded, ""Because I have been very loyal to you, very loyal , we had that"
271,5,"thing, you know ."" 372 In a televised interview that was taped early that afternoon , the President was"
271,6,"asked if it was too late for him to ask Comey to step down; the President responded, ""No, it's not"
271,7,"too late, but you know, I have confidence in him. We ' ll see what happens. You know , it's going"
271,8,"to be interesting."" 373 After the interview, Hicks told the President she thought the President's"
271,9,"comment about Comey should be removed from the broadcast of the interview , but the President"
271,10,"wanted to keep it in, which Hicks thought was unusual. 374"
271,11,"Later that day, the President told senior advisors, including McGahn and Priebus , that he"
271,12,had reached out to Comey twice in recent weeks .375 The President acknowledged that McGahn
271,13,would not approve of the outreach to Comey because McGahn had previously cautioned the
271,14,President that he should not talk to Comey directly to prevent any perception that the White House
271,15,was interfering with investigations. 376 The President told McGahn that Comey had indicated the
271,16,FBI could make a public statement that the President was not under investigation if the Department
271,17,"of Justice approved that action. 377 After speaking with the President , McGahn followed up with"
271,18,Boente to relay the President 's understanding that the FBI could make a public announcement if
271,19,the Department of Justice cleared it.378 McGahn recalled that Boente said Comey had told him
271,20,"there was nothing obstructive about the calls from the President, but the y made Comey"
271,21,"uncomfortable. 379 According to McGahn , Boente responded that he did not want to issue a"
271,22,statement about the President not being under investigation because of the potential political
271,23,ramifications and did not want to order Comey to do it because that action could prompt the
271,24,37
271,25,"°Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum , at I."
271,26,371
271,27,"Comey 4/11/17 Memorandum, at I."
271,28,372
271,29,"Comey 4/ 11/17 Memorandum, at I. In a footnote to this statement in his memorandum, Corney"
271,30,"wrote, ""His use of these words did not fit with the flow of the call, which at that point had moved away"
271,31,"from any request ofme, but I have recorded it here as it happened."""
271,32,373
271,33,"Maria Bartiromo, Interview with Presid ent Trump, Fox Business Network (Apr. 12, 2017);"
271,34,"SCR012b_000054 (President 's Daily Diary, 4/11/17, reflecting Bartiromo interview from 12:30 - 12:55"
271,35,p.m.).
271,36,374
271,37,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 13."
271,38,375
271,39,"Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 9."
271,40,376
271,41,"Priebus 10/13/ 17 302, at 23; McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 9; see McGahn 11/30/ 17 302, at 9;"
271,42,"Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 2 (stating that White House Counsel attorneys had advised the President not to"
271,43,contact the FBI Director directly because it could create a perception he was interfering with investigations).
271,44,"Later in April, the President told other attorneys in the White House Counsel's Office that he had called"
271,45,"Comey even though he knew they had advised against direct contact. Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 2 (recalling"
271,46,"that the President said, ""I know you told me not to, but I called Comey anyway."")."
271,47,377
271,48,"McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 9."
271,49,378
271,50,"McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 9."
271,51,379
271,52,"McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 9; see Boente 1/3 1/ 18 302, at 6 (recalling that Comey told him after"
271,53,"the March 30, 2017 call that it was not obstructive)."
271,54,59
271,55,NA
272,1,U.S. Department of Justice
272,2,"AtterAey \\'erk Preattet // Ma)"" CeHtaiA Material Pl'eteetea UH:ael' Fea. R. Crim . P. €i(e)"
272,3,appointment of a Special Counsel. 380 Boente did not recall that aspect of his conversation with
272,4,"McGahn , but did recall telling McGahn that the direct outreaches from the President to Comey"
272,5,were a problem. 381 Boente recalled that McGahn agreed and said he would do what he could to
272,6,address that issue. 382
272,7,Analysis
272,8,In analyzing the President's reaction to Sessions 's recusal and the requests he mad e to
272,9,"Coats, Pompeo , Rogers , and Comey , the following evidence is relevant to the elements of"
272,10,obstruction of justice:
272,11,"a.       Obstructive act. The evidence shows that, after Comey's March 20, 2017"
272,12,"testimony , the President repeatedly reach ed out to intelligence agency leaders to discuss the FBT's"
272,13,investigation. But witnesses had different recollections of the precise content of those outreaches.
272,14,Some ODNI officials recalled that Coats told them immediately after the March 22 Oval Office
272,15,"meeting that the President asked Coats to intervene with Comey and ""stop "" the investigation. But"
272,16,the first-hand witnesses to the encounter remember the conversation differently. Pompeo had no
272,17,"memory of the specific meeting , but generally recalled the President urging officials to get the"
272,18,word out that the President had not done anything wrong relat ed to Russia. Coats recalled that the
272,19,"President asked that Coats state publicly that no link existed between the President and Russia , but"
272,20,did not ask him to speak with Corne y or to help end the investigation. The other outreaches by the
272,21,President during this period were similar in nature: The President asked Rogers if he could do
272,22,"anything to refute the stories linking the President to Russia, and the President asked Comey to"
272,23,"make a public statement that would "" lift the cloud "" of the ongoing inve stigation by making clear"
272,24,"that the President was not personally under investigation. These requests , while significant enough"
272,25,"that Rogers thought it important to document the encounter in a w ritten memorandum , were not"
272,26,interpreted by the officials who received them as directives to improperly interfere with the
272,27,investigation.
272,28,b.       Nexus to a proceeding. At the time of the President ' s outreaches to leaders of the
272,29,"intelligence agencies in late March and early April 2017, the FBI' s Russia investigation did not"
272,30,"yet involve grand jury proceedings. The outr eache s, however , came after and were in res ponse to"
272,31,"Comey's March 20, 2017 announcement that the FBI , as a part of its counterintelligence mission ,"
272,32,was conducting an investigation into Russian interfer ence in the 2016 pre sidential election.
272,33,Comey testified that the inve stigation included any links or coordination with Trump campaign
272,34,"officials and would ""include an assessment of whether any crimes wer e committed."""
272,35,"c.       Intent. As described above , the evidence does not establish that the President asked"
272,36,or directed intelligence agency leaders to stop or interfere with the FBI ' s Russia investigation-
272,37,"and the President affi rmatively told Comey that if "" some satellite"" was involved in Russian"
272,38,"election interferen ce ""it would be good to find that out. "" But the Presid ent 's intent in trying to"
272,39,"prevent Sessions ' s recu sal, and in rea ching out to Coat s, Pompeo , Rogers , and Corn ey following"
272,40,380
272,41,"McGahn 12/12/ 17302 , at9-10."
272,42,381
272,43,"Boente 1/31/18 302, at 7; McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 9."
272,44,382
272,45,"Boente 1/31/ 18 302, at 7."
272,46,60
272,47,NA
273,1,U.S. Department of Justice
273,2,At:torRe)'Work Pfot:ittet// Mtt)' CoRtttiflMaterial Proteetet:i Uflt:ierFet:i.R. Crim. P. 6(e)
273,3,"Comey's public announcement of the FBT's Russia investigation , is nevertheless relevant to"
273,4,understanding what motivated the President ' s other actions towards the investigation.
273,5,The evidence shows that the President was focused on the Russia investigation's
273,6,"implications for his presidency - and , specifically, on dispelling any suggestion that he was under"
273,7,"investigation or had links to Russia. In early March , the President attempted to prevent Sessions's"
273,8,"recusal, even after being told that Sessions was following DOJ conflict-of-interest rules. After"
273,9,"Sessions recused, the White House Counsel's Office tried to cut off further contact with Sessions"
273,10,"about the matter, although it is not clear whether that direction was conveyed to the President. The"
273,11,"President continued to raise the issue of Sessions's recusal and, when he had the opportunity, he"
273,12,pulled Sessions aside and urged him to unrecuse . The President also told advisors that he wanted
273,13,"an Attorney General who would protect him, the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric"
273,14,Holder to have protected their presidents. The Pr.esident made statements about being able to direct
273,15,"the course of criminal investigations, saying words to the effect of, ""Yo u're telling me that Bobby"
273,16,"and Jack didn't talk about investigations? Or Obama didn't tell Eric Holder who to investigate ?"""
273,17,After Comey publicly confirmed the existence of the FBT's Russia investigation on March
273,18,"20, 2017, the President was ""beside himself ' and expressed anger that Comey did not issue a"
273,19,statement correcting any misperception that the President himself was under investigation. The
273,20,President sought to speak with Acting Attorney General Boente directly and told McGahn to
273,21,contact Boente to request that Comey make a clarifying statement. The President then asked other
273,22,intelligence community leaders to make public statements to refute the suggestion that the
273,23,"President had links to Russia , but the leaders told him they could not publicly comment on the"
273,24,"investigation . On March 30 and April I I, against the advice of White House advisors who had"
273,25,informed him that any direct contact with the FBI could be perceived as improper interference in
273,26,"an ongoing investigation, the President made personal outreaches to Comey asking him to ""lift the"
273,27,"cloud"" of the Russia investigation by making public the fact that the President was not personally"
273,28,under investigation.
273,29,Evidence indicates that the President was angered by both the existence of the Russia
273,30,"investigation and the public reporting that he was under investigation, which he knew was not true"
273,31,based on Comey's represe ntations. The President complained to advisors that if people thought
273,32,"Russia helped him with the election, it would detract from what he had accomplished."
273,33,Other evidence indicate s that the President was concerned about the impact of the Russia
273,34,investigation on his ability to govern . The President complained that the perception that he was
273,35,"under investigation was hurting his ability to conduct foreign relations , particularly with Russia."
273,36,"The President told Coats he ""can't do anything with Russia ,"" he told Rogers that ""the thing with"
273,37,"the Russians"" was interfering with his ability to conduct foreign affairs, and he told Comey that"
273,38,"""he was trying to run the country and the cloud of this Russia business was making that difficult. """
273,39,61
273,40,NA
274,1,U.S. Department of Justice
274,2,Al:t:eifflC)'
274,3,"We,rk Pt2eicluct"
274,4,"// May Ce,Ataifl:Matct'ial Pretcctccl Ufl:clct'Fccl. R. Ct'im. P. 6Ec)"
274,5,D.       Events Leading Up To and Surrounding             the Termination        of FBI Director
274,6,Comey
274,7,Overview
274,8,"Comey was scheduled to testify before Congress on May 3, 2017. Leading up to that"
274,9,"testimony , the President continued to tell advisors that he wanted Comey to make public that the"
274,10,"President was not under investigation. At the hearing, Comey declined to answer questions about"
274,11,the scope or subjects of the Russia investigation and did not state publicly that the President was
274,12,"not under investigation. Two days later , on May 5, 2017, the President told close aides he was"
274,13,"going to fire Comey, and on May 9, he did so, using his official termination letter to make public"
274,14,that Comey had on three occasions informed the President that he was not under investigation.
274,15,The President decided to fire Comey before receiving advice or a recommendation from the
274,16,"Department of Justice ,.but he approved an initial public account of the termination that attributed"
274,17,it to a recommendation from the Department of Justice based on Comey 's handling of the Clinton
274,18,email investigation. After Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein resisted attributing the firing
274,19,"to his recommendation, the President acknowledged that he intended to fire Comey regardless of"
274,20,the DOJ recommendation and was thinking of the Russia investigation when he made the decision.
274,21,"The President also told the Russian Foreign Minister , ""I just fired the head of the F.B.I. He was"
274,22,"crazy , a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off .....            I'm not"
274,23,"under investigation."""
274,24,Evidence
274,25,I. Comey Testifies Before the Senate Judiciary Committee and Decline s to
274,26,Answer Questions About Whether the President is Under Investigation
274,27,"On May 3, 2017 , Comey was scheduled to testify at an FBI oversight hearing before the"
274,28,"Senate Judiciary Committee. 383 McGahn recalled that in the week leading up to the hear ing, the"
274,29,President said that it would be the last straw if Comey did not take the opportunity to set the record
274,30,straight by publicly announcing that the President was not under investigation. 384 The President
274,31,had previously told McGahn that the perception that the President was unde r investigation wa s
274,32,hurting his ability to carry out his presidential duties and deal with foreign leaders. 385 At the
274,33,"hearing, Comey declined to answer que stions about the status of the Russia investigation, stating"
274,34,"""[t]he Department of Justice ha[d] authorized [him] to confirm that [the Russia investigation]"
274,35,"exists,"" but that he was ""not going to say another word about it"" until the investigation was"
274,36,"completed. 386 Comey also declined to answer questions about whether investigators had ""ruled"
274,37,383
274,38,"Hearing on Oversight of the FBI before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3,"
274,39,2017).
274,40,384
274,41,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 10-11."
274,42,385
274,43,"McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 7, 10-11 (McGahn believed that two forei gn leaders had expressed"
274,44,"sympathy to the President for being under investigation); SC_AD_00265 (Donaldson 4/11 / 17 Notes) ("" P"
274,45,Called Comey - Day we told him not to? 'You are not under investigation' NK/C hina/Sapping
274,46,"Credibility"") ."
274,47,386
274,48,"Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (CQ Cong."
274,49,"Transcripts, at 70) (May 3, 2017) (testimony by FBI Director James Comey). Corney repeated this point"
274,50,62
274,51,NA
275,1,U.S. Department of Justice
275,2,Atterftey Werk Preettet // M1t)'Cm1taiHMatertttl Preteetee Utteer Feel. R. Crim.. P. 6Ee)
275,3,"out anyone in the Trump campaign as potentially a target ofth[ e] criminal investigation,"" including"
275,4,"whether the FBI had ""ruled out the president of the United States."" 387"
275,5,Comey was also asked at the hearing about his decision to announce 11 days before the
275,6,388
275,7,presidential election that the FBI was reopening the Clinton email investigation.              Comey stated
275,8,"that it made him ""mi ldly nauseous to think that we might have had some impact on the election, """
275,9,"but added that ""even in hindsight"" he ""would make the same decision."" 389 He later repeated that"
275,10,"he had no regrets about how he had handled the email investigation and believed he had ""done the"
275,11,"right thing at each turn."" 390"
275,12,"In the afternoon following Comey's testimony, the President met with McGahn, Sessions,"
275,13,"and Sessions's Chief of Staff Jody Hunt. 39 1 At that meeting, the President asked McGahn how"
275,14,Comey had done in his testimony and McGahn relayed that Corney had declined to answer
275,15,questions about whether the President was under investigation. 392 The President became very
275,16,"upset and directed his anger at Sessions. 393 According to notes written by Hunt, the President said,"
275,17,"""This is terrible Jeff. It's all because you recused. AG is supposed to be most important"
275,18,appointment. Kennedy appointed his brother. Obama appointed Holder. I appointed you and you
275,19,"recused yourself. You left me on an island. I can't do. anything."" 3 94 The President said that the"
275,20,recusal was unfair and that it was interfering with his ability to govern and undermining his
275,21,"authority with foreign leaders. 395 Sessions responded that he had had no choice but to recuse, and"
275,22,it was a mandatory rather than discretionary decision. 396 Hunt recalled that Sessions also stated at
275,23,"several times during his testimony. See id. at 26 (explaining that he was ""not going to say another peep"
275,24,"about [the investigation] until we' re done""); id. at 90 (stating that he would not provide any updates about"
275,25,"the status of investigation ""before the matter is concluded"")."
275,26,387
275,27,"Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115th Cong. (May 3, 2017)"
275,28,"(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 87-88) (questions by Sen. Blumenthal and testimony by FBI Director James 8."
275,29,Comey) .
275,30,388
275,31,"Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1 I 5th Cong. (May 3, 2017)"
275,32,"(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 15) (question by Sen. Feinstein)."
275,33,389
275,34,"Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017)"
275,35,"(CQ Cong . Transcripts, at I7) (testimony by FBI Director James 8. Comey)."
275,36,"390  Hearing on FBI Oversight Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, I 15th Cong. (May 3, 2017)"
275,37,"(CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 92) (testimony by FBI Director James B. Comey)."
275,38,391
275,39,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8."
275,40,392
275,41,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes); McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 6."
275,42,393
275,43,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8-9."
275,44,394 Hunt-000021 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes). Hunt said that he wrote down notes describing this meeting
275,45,"and others with the President after the events occurred. Hunt 2/ I/ 17 302, at 2."
275,46,395
275,47,"Hunt-000021-22 (Hunt 5/3/ 17 Notes) (""I have foreign leaders saying they are sorry I am being"
275,48,"investigated.""); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8 (Sessions recalled that a Chinese leader had said to the President"
275,49,"that he was sorry the President was under investigation, which the President interpreted as undermining his"
275,50,"authority); Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 8."
275,51,396
275,52,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 8; Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes) ."
275,53,63
275,54,NA
276,1,U.S. Department of Justice
276,2,"Attt'lrHe~·Werk Prt'ldttet // May Cei,taiH Materittl Pwteeted Uttder Fed . R . Crim. P. 6(e)"
276,3,some point during the conversation that a new start at the FBI would be appropriate and the
276,4,"President should consider rep lacing Comey as FBI director. 397 According to Sessions, when the"
276,5,"meeting concluded, it was clear that the President was unhappy with Comey, but Sessions did not"
276,6,think the President had made the decision to terminate Comey. 398
276,7,Bannon recalled that the President brought Comey up with him at least eight times on May
276,8,"3 and May 4, 2017 .399 According to Bannon, the President said the same thing each time: ""He"
276,9,told me three times I'm not under investigation. He's a showboater. He's a grandstander . I don't
276,10,"know any Russians. There was no collusion."" 400 Bannon told the President that he could not fire"
276,11,"Comey because ""that ship had sailed ."" 40 1 Bannon also told the President that firing Corney was"
276,12,"not going to stop the investigation, cautioning him that he cou ld fire the FBI director but could not"
276,13,fire the FBI. 402
276,14,2. The President Makes the Decision to Terminate Comey
276,15,"The weekend following Comey's May 3, 2017 testimony , the President traveled to his"
276,16,"resort in Bedminster, New Jersey .403 At a dinner on Friday, May 5, attended by the President and"
276,17,"various advisors and family members, including Jared Kushner and senior advisor Stephen Miller ,"
276,18,the President stated that he wanted to remove Comey and had ideas for a letter that would be used
276,19,to make the announcement. 404 The President dictated arguments and specific language for the
276,20,"letter, and Miller took notes. 405 As reflected in the notes, the President told Miller that the letter"
276,21,"should start , ""While I greatly appreciate you informing me that I am not under investigation"
276,22,concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated story on a Trump-Russia relationship -
276,23,"pertaining to the 2016 presidential election, please be informed that I, and I believe the American"
276,24,"public - including Os and Rs - have lost faith in you as Director of the FBT.""406 Following the"
276,25,"dinner, Miller prepared a termination letter based on those notes and research he conducted to"
276,26,"support the Pres ident 's arguments. 407 Over the weekend, the President provided several rounds of"
276,27,397
276,28,Hunt-000022 (Hunt 5/3/17 Notes).
276,29,398
276,30,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 9."
276,31,399
276,32,"Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20."
276,33,400
276,34,"Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20."
276,35,401
276,36,"Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20."
276,37,402
276,38,"Bannon 2/12/18 302, at 20-21; see Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 28."
276,39,403
276,40,"S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 4-5; SCR025_000019 (President's Daily Diary, 5/4/17)."
276,41,404
276,42,"S. Miller I 0/31/ 17 302, at 5."
276,43,405
276,44,"S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 5-6."
276,45,406
276,46,"S. Miller 5/5/ 17 Notes , at I; see S. Miller 10/31/ 17 302, at 8."
276,47,407
276,48,"S. Miller I0/31/17 302, at 6."
276,49,64
276,50,NA
277,1,U.S. Department of Justice
277,2,"AttflFHeyWe,rk Pre,e1:1et     // May Ce,HtaiHMaterial Pre,teetee UHeer Fee. R. Griff!..P. 6(e)"
277,3,edits on the draft letter. 408 Miller said the President was adamant that he not tell anyone at the
277,4,White House what they were preparing because the President was worried about leaks. 409
277,5,"In his discussions with Miller , the President made clear that he wanted the letter to open"
277,6,with a reference to him not being under investigation. 410 Miller said he believed that fact was
277,7,important to the President to show that Comey was not being terminated based on any such
277,8,"investigation. 411 According to Miller, the President wanted to establish as a factual matter that"
277,9,"Comey had been under a "" review period"" and did not have assurance from the President that he"
277,10,would be permitted to keep his job. 412
277,11,The final version of the termination letter prepared by Miller and the President began in a
277,12,"way that closely tracked what the President had dictated to Miller at the May 5 dinner: ""Dear"
277,13,"Director Comey, While I greatly appreciate your informing me, on three separate occasions, that 1"
277,14,am not under investigation concerning the fabricated and politically-motivated allegations of a
277,15,"Trump-Russia relationship with respect to the 2016 Presidential Election , please be informed that"
277,16,"T, along with members of both political parties and , most importantly, the American Public , have"
277,17,"lost faith in you as the Director of the FBI and you are hereby terminated."" 413 The four -page letter"
277,18,"went on to critique Comey's judgment and conduct, including his May 3 testimony before the"
277,19,"Senate Judiciary Committee, his handling of the Clinton email investigation, and his failure to hold"
277,20,"leakers accountable. 414 The letter stated that Comey had ""asked [the President] at dinner shortly"
277,21,"after inauguration to let [Comey] stay on in the Director's role , and [the President] said that [he]"
277,22,"would consider it,"" but the President had ""concluded that [he] ha[ d] no alternative but to find new"
277,23,415
277,24,"leadership for the Bureau - a leader that restores confidence and trust."""
277,25,"In the morning of Monday, May 8, 2017 , the President met in the Oval Office with senior"
277,26,"advisors , including McGahn , Priebus , and Miller, and informed them he had decided to terminate"
277,27,Comey. 416 The President rea d aloud the first paragraphs of the termination letter he wrote with
277,28,408
277,29,"S. Miller 10/31/ 17 302, at 6-8."
277,30,409
277,31,"S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 7. Miller said he did not want Priebus to be blindsided , so on Sunday"
277,32,"night he called Priebus to tell him that the President had been thinking about the ""Comey situation"" and"
277,33,"there would be an important discussion on Monday. S. Miller I 0/31/17 302, at 7."
277,34,4 10
277,35,"S. Miller 10/3 1/ 17 302, at 8."
277,36,411
277,37,"S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 8."
277,38,412
277,39,"S. Miller 10/31117 302, at 10."
277,40,4 13
277,41,SCRO13c_ 000003-06 (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).
277,42,414  SCRO13c_OOOO03-O6       (Draft Te1mination Letter to FBI Director Comey). Kushner said that the
277,43,termination letter reflected the reasons the President wanted to fire Comey and was the truest representation
277,44,"of what the President had said during the May 5 dinner. Kushner 4/11/ 18 302, at 25."
277,45,415
277,46,SCRO13c_O0OOO3       (Draft Termination Letter to FBI Director Comey).
277,47,416
277,48,"McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 1I; Priebus 10/ 13/17 302, at 24; S. Mil !er 10/31/17 302, at 11; Dhillon"
277,49,"11/21/t 7 302, at 6; Eisenberg I 1/29/17 302, at 13."
277,50,65
277,51,NA
278,1,U.S. Department of Justice
278,2,Attei=Re) ' Wei=lcPi=eti1:1et // Mil)' CeRtaiR Matei=ialPi=eteetetiUruier Feti. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
278,3,Miller and conveyed that the decision had been made and was not up for discussion. 417 The
278,4,President told the group that Miller had researched the issue and determined the President had the
278,5,authority to terminate Comey without cause. 418 In an effort to slow down the decision-making
278,6,"process, McGahn told the President that DOJ leadership was currently discussing Comey's status"
278,7,and suggested that White House Counsel's Office attorneys should talk with Sessions and Rod
278,8,"Rosenstein, who had recently been confirmed as the Deputy Attorney General. 41 9 McGahn said"
278,9,that previously scheduled meetings with Sessions and Rosenstein that day would be an opportunity
278,10,to find out what they thought about firing Comey. 420
278,11,"At noon, Sessions, Rosenstein, and Hunt met with McGahn and White House Counsel's"
278,12,Office attorney Uttam Dhillon at the White House. 421 McGahn said that the President had decided
278,13,to fire Comey and asked for Sessions's and Rosenstein's views. 422 Sessions and Rosenstein
278,14,criticized Comey and did not raise concerns about replacing him. 423 McGahn and Dhillon said the
278,15,fact that neither Sessions nor Rosenstein objected to replacing Comey gave them peace of mind
278,16,that the President's decision to fire Comey was not an attempt to obstruct justice. 424 An Oval
278,17,Office meeting was scheduled later that day so that Sessions and Rosenstein could discuss the
278,18,issue with the President. 425
278,19,"At around 5 p.m., the President and severa l White House officials met with Sessions and"
278,20,Rosenstein to discuss Comey. 426 The President told the group that he had watched Comey's May
278,21,417
278,22,"S. Miller I 0/31 / 17 302, at I I (observing that the President started the meeting by saying, ""I'm"
278,23,"going to read you a letter. Don't talk me out of this. I've made my decision .""); Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 6"
278,24,"(the President announced in an irreversible way that he was firing Comey); Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13"
278,25,"(the President did not leave whether or not to fire Comey up for discussion); Priebus 10/13/ 17 302 , at 25;"
278,26,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 11-12."
278,27,418
278,28,"Dhillon 302 11/21/17, at 6; Eisenberg 11/29/17 302, at 13; McGahn 12/12/_l7 302, at I 1."
278,29,419
278,30,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12, 13; S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 11; Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 7."
278,31,"Because of the Attorney General's recusal , Rosenstein became the Acting Attorney General for the Russia"
278,32,"investigation upon his confirmation as Deputy Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. § 508(a) (""In case of a"
278,33,"vacancy in the office of Attorney General, or of his absence or disability, the Deputy Attorne y General may"
278,34,"exercise all the duties of that office"")."
278,35,420
278,36,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 12."
278,37,421
278,38,"Dhillon 1 l/21/17 302, at 7; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17"
278,39,"Notes); see Gauhar-000056-72 (2/11/19 Memorandum to File attaching Gauhar handwritten notes) (""Ms."
278,40,"Gauhar determined that she likely recorded all these notes during one or more meetings on Tuesday, May"
278,41,"16, 2017 ."")."
278,42,422
278,43,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000056 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes)."
278,44,423
278,45,"Dhillon l I /21/ 17 302, at 7-9; Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 9; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 13."
278,46,424
278,47,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 13; Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302 , at 9."
278,48,425
278,49,Hunt-000026 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) ; see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
278,50,426
278,51,"Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 14; see Gauhar-000057 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17"
278,52,Notes).
278,53,66
278,54,NA
279,1,U.S. Department of Justice
279,2,"AttefHe)""Werk Preettet // Ma)"" Cefl:taifl:Matefial PFeteetee Ufl:ee1Fee. R. Crifl'I.P. 6(e)"
279,3,"3 testimony over the weekend and thought that something was ""not right"" with Comey. 427 The"
279,4,President said that Comey should be removed and asked Sessions and Rosenstein for their
279,5,"views. 428 Hunt, who was in the room , recalled that Sessions responded that he had previously"
279,6,recommended that Comey be replaced. 429 McGahn and Dhillon said Rosenstein described his
279,7,concerns about Comey's handling of the Clinton email investigation. 430
279,8,"The President then distributed copies of the termination letter he had drafted with Miller,"
279,9,and the discussion turned to the mechanics of how to fire Comey and whether the President 's letter
279,10,"should be used. 43 1 McGahn and Dhillon urged the President to permit Comey to resign, but the"
279,11,President was adamant that he be ftred. 432 The group discussed the possibility that Rosenstein and
279,12,Sessions could provide a recommendation in writing that Comey should be removed .433 The
279,13,"President agreed and told Rosenstein to draft a memorandum, but said he wanted to receive it first"
279,14,thing the next morning .434 Hunt ' s notes reflect that the President told Rosenstein to include in his
279,15,recommendation the fact that Comey had refused to confirm that the President was not personally
279,16,under investigation. 43 5 According to notes taken by a senior DOJ official of Rosenstein 's
279,17,"description of his meeting with the President , the President said, ""Put the Russia stuff in the"
279,18,"memo."" 436 Rosenstein responded that the Russia investigation was not the basis of his"
279,19,"recommendation , so he did not think Russia should be mentioned .437 The President told"
279,20,Rosenstein he would appr ec iate it if Rosenstein put it in his letter anyway .438 When Rosenstein
279,21,427
279,22,Hunt-000026-27 (Hunt 5/8/ 17 Notes).
279,23,428
279,24,"Sessions I/ 17/18 302, at IO; see Gauhar-000058 (Gauhar 5/ 16/17 Note s) (""POTUS to AG: What"
279,25,"is your rec?"")."
279,26,429
279,27,Hunt-000027 (Hunt 5/8/17 Notes) .
279,28,430
279,29,"McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 14; Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 7."
279,30,431
279,31,Hunt-000028 (Hunt 5/8/17 Note s).
279,32,432
279,33,"McGahn 12/12/ 17302,at 13."
279,34,433
279,35,Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/17 Not es).
279,36,434
279,37,"McCab e 9/26/17 302, at 13; Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauh ar 5/16/ 17"
279,38,"Notes) (""POTUS tells DAG to write a memo "")."
279,39,435
279,40,"Hunt-000028-29 (Hunt 5/8/ 17 Notes) (""POTUS asked if Rod's recommendation would includ e"
279,41,the fact that although Comey talks about the investigation he refuses to say that the President is not under
279,42,investigation . ... So it would be good if your recommendation would make mention of the fact that Comey
279,43,"refuse s to say public[ly] what he said privately 3 times."")."
279,44,436
279,45,Gauh ar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/ 17 Not es).
279,46,437
279,47,"Sessions 1/17/18 302 at 10; McCab e 9/26/ 17 302, at 13; see Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/ 16/17"
279,48,Notes).
279,49,438
279,50,Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); McCabe 5/ 16/17 Memorandum 1; McCabe 9/26/ 17
279,51,"302,a t 13."
279,52,67
279,53,NA
280,1,U.S. Department of Justice
280,2,AMerHeyWerk Prea:t:tet//       Mti:)' Genta.if!Material Preteetea: Una:er Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
280,3,"left the meeting, he knew that Comey would be terminated , and he told DOJ co lleagues that his"
280,4,"own reasons for replacing Comey were "" not [the President's] reasons."" 439"
280,5,"On May 9, Hunt delivered to the White House a letter from Sessions recommending"
280,6,"Comey's removal and a memorandum from Rosenstein , addressed to the Attorney General, titled"
280,7,"""Restoring Public Confidence in the FBJ.""440 McGahn recalled that the President liked the DOJ"
280,8,letters and agreed that they should provide the foundation for a new cover letter from the President
280,9,accepting the recommendation to terminate Comey. 44 1 Notes taken by Donaldson on May 9
280,10,reflected the view of the White House Counsel's Office that the President's original termination
280,11,"letter should""[ n Jot [seethe] light of day"" and that it would be better to offer""[ n ]o other rationales"""
280,12,for the firing than what was in Rosenstein's and Sessions's memoranda. 442 The President asked
280,13,Miller to draft a new termination letter and directed Miller to say in the letter that Comey had
280,14,"informed the President three times that he was not under investigation. 443 McGahn, Priebus, and"
280,15,444
280,16,"Dhillon objected to including that language , but the President insisted that it be included."
280,17,"McGahn, Priebus, and others perceived that language to be th e most important part of the letter to"
280,18,"439 Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 2; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes) (""DAG reasons not their"
280,19,"reasons [POTUS)""); Gauhar-000060 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes)("" 1st draft had a recommendation. Took it out"
280,20,"b/c knew decision had already been made."")."
280,21,440
280,22,"Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; 5/9/ 17 Letter, Sessions to President"
280,23,"Trump (""Based on my evaluation, and for the reasons expressed by the Deputy Attorney General in the"
280,24,"attached memorandum, I have concluded that a fresh start is needed at the leadership of the FBI.""); 5/9/17"
280,25,"Memorandum, Rosenstein to Sessions (concluding with, ""The way the Director handled the conclusion of"
280,26,"the email investigation was wrong. As a result, the FBI is unlikely to regain public and congressional trust"
280,27,until it has a Director who understands the gravity of the mistakes and pledges never to repeat them. Having
280,28,"refused to admit his errors, the Director cannot be expected to implement the necessary ·corrective actions."")."
280,29,"441 S. Miller 10/31/17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000031 (Hunt 5/9/ 17 Notes)."
280,30,"442 SC_AD _00342 (Donaldson 5/9/17 Notes). Donaldson also wrote ""[i]s this the beginning of the"
280,31,"end?"" because she was worried that the decision to terminate Comey and the manner in which it was carried"
280,32,"out would be the end of the presidency . Donaldson 11/6/17 302, at 25."
280,33,443
280,34,"S. Miller 10/3 1/ 17 302, at 12; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/ 17 Notes)."
280,35,444
280,36,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 15; S. Miller 10/3 1/17 302, at 12; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 8, 10;"
280,37,"Priebus l 0/13/ I 7 302, at 27; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 14- 15; Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/ 17 Notes)."
280,38,68
280,39,NA
281,1,U.S. Department of Justice
281,2,AH6rttey W6rk Pr6clttet// May C6tttaiH Material Pr6teetecl UflclerFecl. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
281,3,the President. 445 Dhillon made a final pitch to the President that Comey should be permitted to
281,4,"resign , but the President refused .446"
281,5,"Around the time the President's letter was finalized , Priebus summoned Spicer and the"
281,6,"press team to the Oval Office, where they were told that Comey had been terminated for the reasons"
281,7,"stated in the letters by Rosenstein and Sessions. 447 To announce Comey's termination , the White"
281,8,"House released a statement, which Priebus thought had been dictated by the President. 448 In full,"
281,9,"the statement read: ""Today , President Donald J. Trump informed FBI Director James Comey that"
281,10,he has been terminated and removed from office. President Trump acted based on the clear
281,11,recommendations of both Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein and Attorney General Jeff
281,12,"Sessions."" 449"
281,13,"That evening, FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe was summoned to meet with the"
281,14,President at the White House. 450 The President told McCabe that he had fired Comey because of
281,15,451
281,16,the decisions Comey had made in the Clinton email investigation and for many other reasons.
281,17,The President asked McCabe if he was aware that Comey had told the President three times that
281,18,he was not under investigation. 452 The President also asked McCabe whether many people in the
281,19,"FBI disliked Comey and whether McCabe was part of the ""resistance"" that had disagreed with"
281,20,Comey's decisions in the Clinton investigation .453 McCabe told the Pre sident that he knew Corney
281,21,"had told the President he was not under investigation , that most people in the FBI felt positively"
281,22,"about Comey , and that McCabe worked ""v ery closely"" with Corney and was part of all the"
281,23,decisions that had been made in the Clinton investigation. 454
281,24,445
281,25,"Dhillon 11/21/17 302 , at 10; Eisenberg 11/29/ 17 302 , at 15 (providing the view that the"
281,26,"President's desire to include the language about not being under investigation was the ""dr iving animus of"
281,27,"the whole thing""); Burnham 11/3/17 302, at 16 (Burnham knew the only line the President cared about was"
281,28,the line that said Comey advised the Presid ent on three separate occasions that the President was not under
281,29,"investigation). According to Hunt's notes, the reference to Comey's statement would indicate that"
281,30,"""notwithstanding"" Comey's having informed the President that he was not under investigation , the"
281,31,President was terminating Comey. Hunt-000032 (Hunt 5/9/17 Notes). McGahn said he believe d the
281,32,President wanted the language included so that people would not think that the President had terminated
281,33,"Comey because the President was under investigation. McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302 , at 15."
281,34,446
281,35,"McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 15; Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at 25; see SC_ AD_00342 (Donaldson"
281,36,"5/9/17 Notes) (""Resign vs. Removal. - POTUS /removal. "")."
281,37,447
281,38,"Spicer 10/16/ 17 302, at 9; McGahn 12/ 12/17 302, at 16."
281,39,448
281,40,"Priebus I OJ13/ l 7 302 , at 28."
281,41,449
281,42,"Statement of the Press Secretary, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (May 9, 2017)."
281,43,450
281,44,"McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 4; SCR025 _000044 (President's Daily Diary, 5/9/ 17); McCabe 5/ 10/17"
281,45,"Memorandum, at 1."
281,46,451
281,47,"McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/ 17 Memorandum, at I."
281,48,452
281,49,"McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2."
281,50,453
281,51,"McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2."
281,52,454
281,53,"McCabe 9/26/ 17 302, at 5; McCabe 5/ 10/ 17 Memorandum , at 1-2."
281,54,69
281,55,NA
282,1,U.S. Department of Justice
282,2,A1:torfle~·Worlc Proettet // Ma:yCofltttifl Material Proteetee UAeer Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
282,3,"Later that evening, the President told his communications team he was unhappy with the"
282,4,455
282,5,press coverage of Comey's termination and ordered them to go out and defend him .                     The
282,6,"President also called Chris Christie and, according to Christie, said he was getting ""killed"" in the"
282,7,"press over Comey ' s termination. 456 The President asked what he should do .457 Christie asked ,"
282,8,"""Did you fire [Comey] because of what Rod wrote in the memo?"", and the President responded,"
282,9,"""Yes."" 458 Christie said that the President should ""get Rod out there "" and have him defend the"
282,10,"decision. 459 The President told Christie that this was a "" good idea"" and said he was going to call"
282,11,Rosenstein right away .460
282,12,"That night, the White House Press Office called the Department of Justice and said the"
282,13,White House wanted to put out a statement saying that it was Rosenstein's idea to fire Comey. 461
282,14,462
282,15,"Rosenstein told other DOJ officials that he would not participate in putting out a ""false story."""
282,16,"The President then called Rosenstein directly and said he was watching Fox News, that the"
282,17,463
282,18,"coverage had been great, and that he wanted Rosenstein to do a press conference.                Rosenstein"
282,19,"responded that this was not a good idea because if the press asked him , he would tell the truth that"
282,20,Comey's firing was not his idea. 464 Sessions also informed the White House Counsel's Office that
282,21,evening that Rosenstein was upset that his memorandum was being po1trayed as the reason for
282,22,Comey ' s termination. 465
282,23,"In an unplanned press conference late in the evening of May 9, 2017 , Spicer told reporters,"
282,24,"""It was all [Rosenstein].      No one from the White House. It was a DOJ decision ."" 46 6 That evening"
282,25,"and the next morning , White House officials and spokespeople continued to maintain that the"
282,26,455
282,27,"Spicer 10/16/17 302, at 11; Hicks 12/8/17, at 18; Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 2."
282,28,45 6
282,29,"Christie 2/13/ I9 302, at 6."
282,30,457
282,31,"Christie 2/13/19 302 , at 6."
282,32,458
282,33,"Christie 2/13/ 19 302, at 6."
282,34,459
282,35,"Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6."
282,36,46
282,37,"° Christie 2/13/19 302, at 6."
282,38,"461  Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes); Page Memorandum , at 3 (recording events of 5/ 16/ 17);"
282,39,"McCabe 9/26/17 302, at 14."
282,40,462
282,41,"Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000059 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 Notes)."
282,42,46 3
282,43,"Rosenstein 5/23/17 302, at 4-5; Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 Notes)."
282,44,464 Gauhar-000071 (Gauhar 5/ 16/ 17 Notes). DOJ notes from the week of Comey ' s firing indicate
282,45,"that Priebus was ""screaming"" at the DOJ public affairs office trying to get Rosenstein to do a press"
282,46,"conference, and the DOJ public affairs office told Priebus that Rosenstein had told the President he was not"
282,47,doing it. Gauhar-000071-72 (Gauhar 5/16/17 Notes).
282,48,"465  McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at26 -27; Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at 11."
282,49,"466   Jenna Johnson, Aft er Trump fir ed Comey, White House staff scrambl ed to explain why,"
282,50,"Washington Post (May 10, 2017) (quotin g Spicer)."
282,51,70
282,52,NA
283,1,U.S. Department of Justice
283,2,At:ton1.e~·1.Vork Proettet   // May Cofltftifl Material Proteetee Uf!aer Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
283,3,President's decision to terminate Comey was driven by the recommendations                       the President
283,4,received from Rosenstein and Sessions. 467
283,5,"In the morning on May 10, 2017, President Trump met with Russian Foreign Minister"
283,6,Sergey Lavrov and Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in the Oval Office. 468 The media
283,7,subsequently reported that during the May 10 meeting the President brought up his decision the
283,8,"prior day to terminate Comey, telling Lavrov and Kislyak: ""Tjust fired the head of the F.B.I. He"
283,9,"was crazy, a real nut job. I faced great pressure because of Russia. That's taken off. ... I' m not"
283,10,"under investigation."" 469 The President never denied making those statements, and the White House"
283,11,"did not dispute the account, instead issuing a statement that said: ""By grandstanding and"
283,12,"politicizing the investigation into Russia's actions, James Comey created unnecessary pressure on"
283,13,"our ability to engage and negotiate with Russia. The investigation would have always continued,"
283,14,"and obviously, the termination of Comey would not have ended it. Once again , the real story is"
283,15,that our national security has been undermined by the leaking of private and highly classified
283,16,"information."" 470 Hicks said that when she told the President about the reports on his meeting with"
283,17,"Lavrov, he did not look concerned and said of Comey, ""he is crazy."" 471 When McGahn asked the"
283,18,"President about his comments to Lavrov, the President said it was good that Comey was fired"
283,19,because that took the pressure off by making it clear that he was not under investigation so he
283,20,could get more work done .472
283,21,"That same morning, on May 10, 2017, the President called McCabe. 473 According to a"
283,22,"memorandum McCabe wrote following the call , the Pre sident asked McCabe to come over to the"
283,23,White House to discuss whether the President should visit FBI headquarters and make a speech to
283,24,467
283,25,"See, e.g., Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (May 10, 2017) ;"
283,26,"SCR013_001088 (5/10/17 Email, Hemming to Cheung et al.) (internal White House email descr ibing"
283,27,comments on the Comey termination by Vice President Pence) .
283,28,468
283,29,"SCR08_000353 (5/9/17 White House Document, ""Working Visit with Foreign Minister Sergey"
283,30,"Lavrov of Russia""); SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et al.). The meeting had been"
283,31,"planned on May 2, 2017, during a telephone call betwe en the President and Russian President Vladimir"
283,32,"Putin, and the meeting date was confirmed on May 5, 2017, the same day the President dictated ideas for"
283,33,"the Comey termination letter to Stephen Miller. SCR08_001274 (5/10/17 Email, Ciaramella to Kelly et"
283,34,al.).
283,35,469
283,36,"Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told Russians That Firing ""Nut Job "" Camey Eased Pressure From"
283,37,"Investigation , New York Times (May 19, 2017)."
283,38,470
283,39,"SCR08 _ 002 l I 7 (5/19/17 Email, Walters to Farhi (CBS New s)) ; see Spicer I 0/ 16/ 17 302, at 13"
283,40,"(noting he would have been told to ""clean it up"" if the repo1ting on the meeting with the Russian Foreign"
283,41,"Minister was inaccurate, but he was never told to correct the reporting); Hicks 12/8/ 17 302, at 19 (recalling"
283,42,that the President never denied making the statements attributed to him in the Lavrov meetin g and that the
283,43,"President had said similar things about Comey in an off-the-record meeting with report ers on May 18, 2017 ,"
283,44,"calling Comey a ""nut job"" and ""crazy"")."
283,45,471
283,46,"Hicks 12/8/ 17 302 , at 19."
283,47,472
283,48,"McGahn 12/12/17 302, at 18."
283,49,473
283,50,"SCR025_000046 (President's Daily Diary, 5/10/17); McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1."
283,51,71
283,52,NA
284,1,U.S. Department of Justice
284,2,AUoffle'.YWork Proeuet // May CoRtaifl Material Proteetee Ufl:eer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
284,3,"employees. 474 The President said he had received ""hundreds"" of messages from FBI employees"
284,4,indicating their support for terminating Comey. 475 The President also told McCabe that Comey
284,5,"should not have been permitted to travel back to Washington , D.C. on the FBI's airplane after he"
284,6,"had been terminated and that he did not want Comey ""in the building again,"" even to collect his"
284,7,"belongings. 476 When McCabe met with the President that afternoon, the President , without"
284,8,"prompting, told McCabe that people in the FBI loved the President, estimated that at least 80% of"
284,9,"the FBI had voted for him , and asked McCabe who he had voted for in the 2016 presidential"
284,10,election. 477            ·
284,11,"In the afternoon of May 10, 2017, deputy press secretary Sarah Sanders spoke to the"
284,12,President about his decision to fire Comey and then spoke to reporters in a televised press
284,13,"conference. 478 Sanders told reporters that the President , the Department of Justice , and bipartisan"
284,14,"members of Congress had lost confidence in Comey, "" [a]nd most importantly, the rank and file of"
284,15,"the FBI had lost confidence in their director.               Accordingly, the President accepted the"
284,16,479
284,17,"recommendation of his Deputy Attorney General to remove James Comey from his position."""
284,18,"In response to questions from reporters , Sanders said that Rosenstein decided ""on his own"" to"
284,19,"review Comey's performance and that Rosenstein decided ""on his own"" to come to the President"
284,20,"on Monday, May 8 to express his concerns about Comey. When a reporter indicated that the ""vast"
284,21,"majority"" of FBI agents supported Comey, Sanders said , ""Look, we've heard from countless"
284,22,°
284,23,"members of the FBI that say very different things. "" 48 Following the press conference, Sanders"
284,24,"spoke to the President, who told her she did a good job and did not point out any inaccuracies in"
284,25,"her comments. 481 Sanders told this Offic e that her reference to hearing from ""co untless members"
284,26,"of the FBI"" was a ""slip of the tongue .""482 She also recalled that her statement in a separate press"
284,27,interview that rank-and-file FBI agents had lost confidence in Comey was a comment she made
284,28,"""in the heat of the moment"" that was not founded on anything. 483"
284,29,"Also on May I 0, 2017 , Sessions and Rosenstein each spoke to McGahn and expressed"
284,30,concern that the White House was creating a narrative that Rosenst ein had initiated the decision to
284,31,474
284,32,"McCabe 5/10/l 7 Memorandum, at 1."
284,33,475
284,34,"McCabe 5/ I 0/17 Memorandum , at I."
284,35,476
284,36,"McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at I; Rybicki 6/13/17 302, at 2. Comey had been visiting the"
284,37,"FBl' s Los Angeles office when he found out he had been term inated. Comey 11/15/17 302, at 22."
284,38,477
284,39,"McCabe 5/10/17 Memorandum, at 1-2. McCabe's memorandum documentin g his meeting with"
284,40,the President is consistent with notes taken by the White House Counse l' s Office. See SC_AD_00347
284,41,(Donaldson 5/10/17 Notes).                            ·
284,42,478
284,43,"Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4; Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing , C-SPAN (May I 0, 2017)."
284,44,479
284,45,"Sarah Sanders , White House Daily Briefing , C-SPAN (May I 0, 2017); Sanders 7/3/ 18 302, at 4."
284,46,480
284,47,"Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SP AN (May I 0, 2017)."
284,48,481
284,49,"Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4."
284,50,482
284,51,"Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 4."
284,52,483
284,53,"Sanders 7/3/18 302 , at 3."
284,54,72
284,55,NA
285,1,U.S. Department of Justice
285,2,AU6t=l'leyW6rlt Pt=6dttet   // Moy Col'ltttil'lMaterial Pt=6teetedUrtder Fed. R. Critfl. P. 6(e)
285,3,fire Comey. 484 The White House Counsel's Office agreed that it was factually wrong to say that
285,4,"the Department of Justice had initiated Comey 's termination ,485 and McGahn asked attorneys in"
285,5,the White House Counsel's Office to work with the press office to correct the narrative .486
285,6,"The next day , on May 11, 2017 , the President participated in an interview with Lester Holt."
285,7,The President told White House Counsel's Office attorneys in advance of the interview that the
285,8,"communications team could not get the story right, so he was going on Lester Holt to say what"
285,9,"really happened. 487 During the interview , the President stated that he had made the decision to fire"
285,10,"Comey before the President met with Rosenstein and Sessions. The President told Holt, ""I was"
285,11,going to fire regardless of recommendation . . . . [Rosenstein] made a recommendation. But
285,12,"regardless of recommendation , I was going to fire Comey knowing there was no good time to do"
285,13,"it."" 488 The President continued, ""And in fact, when I decided to just do it, I said to myself-I said,"
285,14,"you know, this Russia thing with Trump and Russia is a made-up story . It's an excuse by the"
285,15,"Democrats for having lost an election that they should've won."" 489"
285,16,In response to a question about whether he was angry with Comey about the Russia
285,17,"investigation , the President said, ""As far as I'm concerned, I want that thing to be absolutely done"
285,18,"properly."" 490 The President added that he realized his termination of Comey ""probably maybe will"
285,19,"confuse people"" with the result that it ""might even lengthen out the investigation,"" but he ""ha[d]"
285,20,491
285,21,"to do the right thing for the American people "" and Comey was ""the wrong man for that position."""
285,22,"The President described Comey as ""a showboat"" and ""a grandstander,"" said that ""[t]he FBI has"
285,23,"been in turmoil,"" and said he wanted ""to have a really competent , capable director. "" 492 The"
285,24,49 3
285,25,President affirmed that he expected the new FBI director to continue the Russia investigation.
285,26,"On the evening of May 11, 2017 , following the Lester Holt interview, the President"
285,27,"tweeted, ""Russia must be laughing up their sleeves watchin g as the U.S. tears itself apart over a"
285,28,"Democrat EXCUSE for losing the election .""49 4 The same day, the media reported that the"
285,29,President had demanded that Comey pledge his loyalty to the President in a private dinner shortly
285,30,484
285,31,"McGahn 12/12/ 17 302, at 16-17; Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at 26; see Dhillon 11/21/17 302, at"
285,32,11.
285,33,485
285,34,"Donaldson 11/6/ 17 302, at 27."
285,35,48 6
285,36,"McGahn 12/ 12/ 17 302, at 17."
285,37,487
285,38,"Dhillon 11/21/ 17 302, at 11."
285,39,488
285,40,"Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2."
285,41,489
285,42,"Intervi ew with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 2."
285,43,490
285,44,"Interview with Presiden t Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 3."
285,45,491
285,46,"Intervi ew with Presid ent Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcript, at 3."
285,47,49 2
285,48,"Interview with Pr esident Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcrip t, at 1, 5."
285,49,493
285,50,"Interview with President Donald Trump, NBC (May 11, 2017) Transcrip t, at 7."
285,51,494
285,52,@rea!DonaldTrump 5/11 /l 7 (4:34 p.m. ET) Tweet.
285,53,73
285,54,NA
286,1,U.S. Department of Justice
286,2,Attenatey Werk Preattet // May CeAte:iAMaterial Pt'eteetea UAaer Fea. R . Criffi. P. 6(e)
286,3,"after being sworn in .495 Late in the morning of May 12, 2017, the President tweeted, "" Again, the"
286,4,story that there was collusion between the Russians & Trump campaign was fabricated by Dems
286,5,"as an excuse for losing the election. "" 496 The President also tweeted , ""James Comey better hope"
286,6,"that there are no 'tapes' of our conversations before he starts leaking to the press!"" and ""When"
286,7,"James Clapper himself, and virtually everyone else with knowledge of the witch hunt, says there"
286,8,"is no collusion, when does it end? "" 497"
286,9,Analysis
286,10,"In analyzing the President's decision to fire Comey, the following evidence is relevant to"
286,11,the elements of obstruction of justice:
286,12,a.       Obstructive act. The act of firing Comey removed the individual overseeing the
286,13,FBI's Russia investigation. The President knew that Comey was personally involved in the
286,14,"investigation based on Comey's briefing of the Gang of Eight , Corney's March 20, 2017 public"
286,15,"testimony about the investigation, and the President's one -on-one conversations with Comey."
286,16,Firing Comey would qualify as an obstructive act if it had the natural and probable effect
286,17,"of interfering with or impeding the investigation-for      example, if the termination would have the"
286,18,effect of delaying or disrupting the investigation or providing the President with the opportunity
286,19,to appoint a director who would take a different approach to the investigation that the President
286,20,perceived as more protective of his personal interests. Relevant circumstances bearing on that
286,21,issue include whether the President's actions had the potential to discourage a successor director
286,22,or other law enforcement officials in their conduct of the Russia investigation . The President fired
286,23,"Comey abruptly without offering him an opportunity to resign, banned him from the FBI building,"
286,24,"and criticized him publicly, calling him a "" showboat"" and claiming that the FBI was "" in turmoil"""
286,25,under his leadership. And the President followed the termination with public statements that were
286,26,"highly critical of the investigation; for example, three days after firing Comey , the President"
286,27,"referred to the investigation as a ""witch hunt "" and asked, ""when does it end? "" Those actions had"
286,28,the potential to affect a successor director ' s conduct of the investigation.
286,29,"The anticipated effect of removing the FBI director, however , would not necessarily be to"
286,30,"prevent or impede the FBI from continuing its investigation.               As a general matter, FBI"
286,31,investigations run under the operational direction of FBI personnel levels below the FBI director.
286,32,"Bannon made a similar point when he told the President that he could fire the FBI director , but"
286,33,could not fire the FBI. The White House issued a press statement the day after Comey was fired
286,34,"that said, ""The investigation would have always continued, and obviously, the termination of"
286,35,"Comey would not have ended it."" Tn addition, in his May 11 interview with Lester Holt, the"
286,36,President stated that he understood when he made the decision to fire Comey that the action might
286,37,"prolong the investigation. And the President chose McCabe to serve as interim dir ector , even"
286,38,"495 Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Camey Demurred., New"
286,39,"York Times (May 11, 2017)."
286,40,496
286,41,@realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (7:51 a.m. ET) Tweet.
286,42,497
286,43,@realDonaldTrump 5/12/17 (8:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 5/ 12/17 (8:54 a.m. ET)
286,44,Tweet.
286,45,74
286,46,NA
287,1,U .S. Department of Justice
287,2,"Atl6ffle)""W6rlt PF6duet // May C6HtttiflMtttefittl PF6teeteE:iUHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
287,3,"though McCabe told the President he had worked ""very closely "" with Comey and was part of all"
287,4,the decisions made in the Clinton investigation.
287,5,b.      Nexus to a proceeding . The nexus element would be satisfied by evidence showing
287,6,that a grand jury proceeding or criminal prosecution arising from an FBI investigation was
287,7,objectively foreseeable and actually contemplated by the President when he terminat ed Corne y.
287,8,"Several facts would be relevant to such a showing. At .the time the President fired Comey,"
287,9,a grand jury had not begun to hear evidence related to the Russia investigation and no grand jury
287,10,"subpoenas had been issued . On March 20, 2017, however , Comey had announced that the FBI"
287,11,"was investigating Russia's interference in the election , including ""an assessm ent of whether any"
287,12,"crimes were committed ."" It was widely known that the FBI , as part of the Russia investigation ,"
287,13,was investigating the hacking of the DNC's computers-a clear criminal offense.
287,14,"In addition , at the time the President fired Comey, evidence indicates the President knew"
287,15,"that Flynn was still under criminal investigation and could potentially be prosecuted, despite the"
287,16,"President's February 14, 2017 request that Comey ""let[] Flynn go."" On March 5, 2017, the White"
287,17,House Counsel's Office was informed that the FBI was asking for transition-period records
287,18,"relating to Flynn - indicating that the FBI was still actively investigating him . The same day, the"
287,19,"President told advisors he wanted to call Dana Boente, then the Acting Attorney Gen era l for the"
287,20,"Russia investigation, to find out whether the White House or the President was being investigated."
287,21,"On March 31, 2017, the President signaled his awareness that Flynn remained in legal jeopardy by"
287,22,"tweeting that ""Mike Flynn should ask for immunity"" before he agreed to provide testimony to the"
287,23,"FBI or Congress. And in late March or early April, the President asked McFarland to pass a"
287,24,"message to Flynn telling him that the President felt bad for him and that he should stay strong ,"
287,25,further demonstrating the President's awareness of Flynn's criminal exposure.
287,26,c.      Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the catalyst for the President ' s decision
287,27,to fire Comey was Corney 's unwillingness to publicly state that the President was not personally
287,28,"under investigation , despite the President's repeated requests that Comey make such an"
287,29,"announcement. In the week leading up to Comey's May 3, 2017 Senate Judiciary Committee"
287,30,"testimony , the President told McGahn that it would be the last straw if Comey did not set the record"
287,31,straight and publicly announce that the President was not under investigation. But during his May
287,32,"3 testimony , Comey refused to answer questions about whether the President was being"
287,33,"investigated. Comey's refusal angered the Presid ent, who criticized Sessions for leaving him"
287,34,"isolated and exposed, saying ""You left me on an island."" Two days later, the President told"
287,35,advisors he had decided to fire Comey and dictated a letter to Stephen Miller that began with a
287,36,"reference to the fact that the President was not being investigated: ""While I greatly appreciate you"
287,37,informing me that I am not under investigation concerning what I have often stated is a fabricated
287,38,"story on a Trump-Russia relationship .... "" The President later asked Rosenstein to include"
287,39,"""Russia"" in his memorandum and to say that Comey had told the President that he was not under"
287,40,"investigation . And the Pre sident 's final termination letter included a sentence , at the President's"
287,41,"insistence and against McGahn ' s advice, stating that Comey had told the President on three"
287,42,separate occasion s that he was not under investigation.
287,43,The President's other stated rationales for why he fired Comey are not similarly supported
287,44,by the evid ence. The termination letter the President and Stephen Miller prepared in Bedminster
287,45,75
287,46,NA
288,1,U.S. Department of Justice
288,2,Atterfl:e~·Werk Preattet // May CeRtaifl:Material Pl'eteeteEiUfl:EierFee. R. Crim. P. 6(ej
288,3,"cited Comey ' s handling of the Clinton email investigation , and the President told McCabe he fired"
288,4,Comey for that reason. But the facts surrounding Corney's handling of the Clinton email
288,5,"investigation were well known to the President at the time he assumed office , and the President"
288,6,had made it clear to both Comey and the President ' s senior staff in early 2017 that he wanted
288,7,Comey to stay on as director. And Rosenstein articulated his criticism of Corney's handling of the
288,8,Clinton investigation after the President had already decided to fire Comey. The President's draft
288,9,termination letter also stated that morale in the FBI was at an all-time low and Sanders told the
288,10,"press after Comey's termination that the White House had heard from ""countless"" FBI agents who"
288,11,had lost confidence in Comey. But the evidence does not support those claims. The President told
288,12,"Comey at their January 27 dinner that ""the people of the FBI really like [him],"" no evidence"
288,13,"suggests that the President heard otherwise before deciding to terminate Comey, and Sanders"
288,14,acknowledged to investigators that her comments were not founded on anything.
288,15,We also considered why it was important to the President that Comey announce publicly
288,16,that he was not under investigatio n. Some evidence indicates that the President believed that the
288,17,erroneous perception he was under investigation harmed his ability to manage domestic and
288,18,"foreign affairs , particularly in dealings with Russia. The President told Comey that the ""cloud"" of"
288,19,"""this Russia business "" was making it difficult to run the country. The President told Sessions and"
288,20,McGahn that foreign leaders had expressed sympathy to him for being under investigation and that
288,21,the perception he was under investigation was hurting his ability to address foreign relations issues .
288,22,"The President complained to Roger s that ""the thing with the Russians [was] messing up"" his ability"
288,23,"to get things done with Russia , and told Coats, ""I can't do anything with Russia , there's things I'd"
288,24,"like to do with Russia, with trade, with ISIS , they ' re all over me with this."" The President also"
288,25,may have viewed Comey as insubordinate for his failure to make clear in the May 3 testimony that
288,26,the President was not under investigation.
288,27,"Other evidence, however , indicates that the President wanted to protect himself from an"
288,28,"investigation into his campaign . The day after learning about the FBI's interview of Flynn , the"
288,29,"President had a one-on-one dinner with Comey, against the advice of senior aides, and told Corney"
288,30,"he needed Comey's ""loyalty."" When the President later asked Corney for a second time to make"
288,31,"public that he was not under investigation, he brought up loyalty again, saying ""Be cause I have"
288,32,"been very loyal to you, very loyal, we had that thing, you know."" After the President learned of"
288,33,"Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation, the President was furious and said he wanted an"
288,34,Attorney General who would protect him the way he perceived Robert Kennedy and Eric Holder
288,35,to have protected their presidents. The President also said he wanted to be able to tell his Attorney
288,36,"General ""who to investigate. """
288,37,"In addition , the President had a motive to put the FBI's Russia investigation behind him."
288,38,The evidence does not establish that the termination of Comey was designed to cover up a
288,39,"conspiracy between the Trump Campaign and Russia: As described in Volume I, the evidence"
288,40,uncovered in the investigation did not establish that the President or those close to him were
288,41,"involved in the charged Russian computer-hacking or active-measure conspiracies, or that the"
288,42,President otherwise had an unlawful relationship with any Russian official. But the evidence does
288,43,indicate that a thorough FBI investigation would uncover facts about the campaign and the
288,44,President personally that the President could have understood to be crimes or that would give rise
288,45,to personal and political concerns. Although the President publicly stated during and after the
288,46,"election that he had no connection to Russia, the Trump Organization, through Michael Cohen ,"
288,47,76
288,48,NA
289,1,U.S. Department of Justice
289,2,"Attorae:,· Work Proattet // May Coataia Mtt1:erialProteetee Uaaer Fee. R. Crira. P. 6(e)"
289,3,was pursuing the proposed Trump Tower Moscow project through June 2016 and candidate Trump
289,4,"was repeatedly briefed on the ro ress of those efforts. 498 In addition , some witnesses said that"
289,5,~s                aware that                              • ·
289,6,.--              at a time when public reports stated that Russian intelligence officials were behind the
289,7,"hacks, and that Trump privately sought information about future WikiLeaks releases. 499 More"
289,8,"broadly , multiple witnesses described the President 's preoccupation with press coverage of the"
289,9,Russia investigation and his persistent concern that it raised questions about the legitimacy of his
289,10,election. 500
289,11,"Finally, the President and White House aides initially advanced a pretextual reason to the"
289,12,"press and the public for Comey's termination. In the immediate aftermath of the firing, the"
289,13,President dictated a press statement suggesting that he had acted based on the DOJ
289,14,"recommendations, and White House press officials repeated that story. But the President had"
289,15,decided to fire Comey before the White House solicited those recommendations.                 Although the
289,16,President ultimately acknowledged that he was going to fire Comey regardless of the Department
289,17,"of Justice 's recommendations, he did so only after DOJ officials made clear to him that they would"
289,18,resist the White House ' s suggestion that they had prompted the process that led to Comey's
289,19,termination. The initial reliance on a pretextual justification could support an inference that the
289,20,"President had concerns about providing the real reason for the firing , although the evidence does"
289,21,"not resolve whether those concerns were personal , political, or both."
289,22,E.       The President's Efforts to Remove the Special Counsel
289,23,Overview
289,24,"The Acting Attorney General appointed a Special Counsel on May 17, 2017 , prompting"
289,25,the President to state that it was the end of his presidency and that Attorney General Sessions had
289,26,"failed to protect him and should resign. Sessions submitted his resignation, which the Presid ent"
289,27,ultimately did not accept. The President told senior advisors that the Special Counsel had conflicts
289,28,"of interest, but they responded that those claims were ""ridiculous"" and posed no obstacle to the"
289,29,Special Counsel ' s service. Department of Justice ethics officials similarly cleared the Special
289,30,"Counsel's service. On June 14, 2017 , the press reported that the President was being personally"
289,31,investigated for obstruction of ju stice and the President responded with a series of tweets
289,32,498
289,33,"See Volume II, Section II.K. l , infra."
289,34,499
289,35,"See Volume l, Section ITLD.1,supra ."
289,36,500  In addition to whether the President had a motive related to Russia-related matters that an FBI
289,37,"investigation could uncover, we considered whether the President's intent in firing Comey was connected"
289,38,to other conduct that could come to light as a result of the FBT's Russian-interference investigation. In
289,39,"paiticular, Michael Cohen was a potential subject of investigation because of his pursuit of the Trump"
289,40,Tower Moscow project and involvement in other activities. And facts uncovered in the Russia
289,41,"investigation, which our Office referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New"
289,42,"York, ultimately led to the conviction of Cohen in the Southern District ofNew York for campaign-finance"
289,43,"offenses related to payments he said he made at the direction of the President. See Volume II, Section"
289,44,"II.K.5, infra. The investigation, however, did not establish that when the President fired Comey, he was"
289,45,considering the possibility that the FBI's investigation would uncover these payments or that the President's
289,46,intent in firing Comey was otherwise connected to a concern about these matters coming to light.
289,47,77
289,48,NA
290,1,U.S. Department of Justice
290,2,"Atte,me~·We,rk Preiettet // M:1:1:y Ceittt1:1:i-H"
290,3,M1:1:teri1:1:I
290,4,"Pre,teetee Uttt:ierFet:i.R. Criffl..P. 6(e)"
290,5,"criticizing the Special Counsel ' s investigation. That weekend, the President called McGahn and"
290,6,directed him to have the Special Counsel removed because of asserted conflicts of interest.
290,7,McGahn did not carry out the instruction for fear of being seen as triggering another Saturday
290,8,Night Massacre and instead prepared to resign. McGahn ultimately did not quit and the President
290,9,did not follow up with McGahn on his request to have the Special Counsel removed.
290,10,Evidence
290,11,I. The Appointment of the Special Counsel and the President 's Reaction
290,12,"On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney General Rosenstein appointed Robert S. Mueller, ITTas"
290,13,Special Counsel and authorized him to conduct the Russia investigation and matters that arose
290,14,from the investigation .501 The President learned of the Special Counsel's appointment from
290,15,"Sessions, who was with the President, Hunt, and McGahn conducting interviews for a new FBI"
290,16,"Director. 502 Sessions stepped out of the Oval Office to take a call from Rosenstein, who told him"
290,17,"about the Special Counsel appointment, and Sessions then returned to inform the President of the"
290,18,"news. 503 According to notes written by Hunt , when Sessions told the President that a Special"
290,19,"Counsel had been appointed, the President slumped back in his chair and said, ""O h my God. This"
290,20,"is terrible. This is the end of my Presidency. I' m fucked ."" 504 The President became angry and"
290,21,"lambasted the Attorney General for his decision to recuse from the investigation , stating, ""How"
290,22,"could you let this happen, Jeff?"" 505 The President said the position of Attorney General was his"
290,23,"most important appointment and that Sessions had "" let [him] down ,"" contrasting him to Eric"
290,24,"Holder and Robert Kennedy. 506 Sessions recalled that the President said to him , ""y ou were"
290,25,"supposed to protect me,"" or words to that effect. 507 The President returned to the consequences of"
290,26,"the appointment and said, ""Eve ryone tells me if you get one of these indep endent counsels it ruin s"
290,27,your presidency . It takes years and years and I won 't be able to do anything. This is the worst
290,28,"thing that ever happened to me."" 508"
290,29,50 1
290,30,"Office of the Deputy Attorney General, Order No. 3915-2017, Appointment of Special Counsel"
290,31,"to Investigate Russian Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related Matters (May 17,"
290,32,2017).
290,33,502
290,34,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt_2/l/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039"
290,35,(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
290,36,503
290,37,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 18; McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 4; Hunt-000039"
290,38,(Hunt 5/17/17 Notes).
290,39,504
290,40,Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/17/ 17 Notes).
290,41,505
290,42,"Hunt-000039 (Hunt 5/ 17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 13- 14."
290,43,506
290,44,"Hunt-000040; see Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 14."
290,45,507
290,46,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14."
290,47,508
290,48,"Hunt-000040 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); see Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14. Early the next morning,"
290,49,"the President tweeted, ""This is the single greatest witch hunt of a politician in American history!"""
290,50,@realDonaldTrump 5/ 18/17 (7:52 a.m. ET) Tweet.
290,51,78
290,52,NA
291,1,U.S. Department of Justice
291,2,"Attorne,-· Work Proattet//      Me:y Coftte:ifl Material Proteetea Uflcler Fe€!. R. Criffl . P . 6(e)"
291,3,The President then told Sessions he should resign as Attorney General. 509 Sessions agreed
291,4,to submit his resignation and left the Oval Office. 510 Hicks saw the President shortly after Sessions
291,5,departed and described the President as being extremely upset by the Special Counsel's
291,6,"appointment. 51 1 Hicks said that she had only seen the President like that one other time, when the"
291,7,Access Hollywood tape came out during the campaign. 5 12
291,8,"The next day , May 18, 2017, FBI agents delivered to McGahn a preservation notice that"
291,9,discussed an investigation related to Comey's termination and directed the White House to
291,10,"preserve all relevant documents. 5 13 When he received the letter, McGahn issued a document hold"
291,11,to White House staff and instructed them not to send out any burn bags over the weekend while
291,12,he sorted things out. 514
291,13,"Also on May 18, Sessions finalized a resignation letter that stated, ""Pursuant to our"
291,14,"conversation of yesterday, and at your request , I hereby offer my resignation."" 5 15 Sessions,"
291,15,"accompanied by Hunt , brought the letter to the White House and handed it to the President. 516 The"
291,16,President put the resignation letter in his pocket and asked Sessions several times whether he
291,17,wanted to continue serving as Attorney General. 517 Sessions ultimately told the President he
291,18,"wanted to stay, but it was up to the President. 518 The President said he wanted Sessions to stay. 519"
291,19,"At the conclusion of the meeting , the President shook Sessions's hand but did not return the"
291,20,resignation letter. 520
291,21,When Priebus and Bannon learned that the President was holding onto Sessions's
291,22,"resignation letter , they became concerned that it could be used to influence the Department of"
291,23,Justice. 52 1 Priebus told Sessions it was not good for the President to hav e the letter because it
291,24,"509  Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 14."
291,25,5 10
291,26,"Hunt-000041 (Hunt 5/17/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14."
291,27,5 11
291,28,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 21."
291,29,5 12
291,30,"Hicks 12/8/ 17 302, at 21. The Access Hollywood tape was released on October 7, 2016, as"
291,31,"discussed in Volume I, Section III.D.1, supra."
291,32,5 13
291,33,"McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 9; SCR015_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House"
291,34,Staff).
291,35,514
291,36,"McGahn 12/ 14/ 17 302, at 9; SCRO15_000175-82 (Undated Draft Memoranda to White House"
291,37,"Staff). The White House Counse l' s Office had previously issued a document hold on February 27, 2017."
291,38,SCRO15_000171 (2/17/17 Memorandum from McGahn to Executive Office of the President Staff).
291,39,515
291,40,"Hunt-000047 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resigning as"
291,41,Attorney General).
291,42,516
291,43,"Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 14."
291,44,517
291,45,"Hunt-000047-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/ 18 302, at 14."
291,46,5 18
291,47,"Hunt-000048-49 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Sessions 1/17/ I 8 302, at 14."
291,48,519
291,49,"Sessions 1/ 17/ 18 302, at 14."
291,50,520
291,51,Hunt-000049 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
291,52,521
291,53,Hunt-000050-51 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
291,54,79
291,55,NA
292,1,U.S. Department of Justice
292,2,AtterRey Werle Pi=eattet// May CeRtttiRMaterial Prnteetea URE:ier          Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
292,3,"would function as a kind of ""shock collar"" that the President could use any time he wanted ; Priebus"
292,4,"said the President had ""DOJ by the throat."" 522 Priebus and Bannon told Sessions they would"
292,5,attempt to get the letter back from the President with a notation that he was not accepting
292,6,Sessions's resignation .523
292,7,"On May 19, 2017 , the President left for a trip to the Middle East. 524 Hicks recalled that on"
292,8,"the President's flight from Saudi Arabia to Tel Aviv, the President pulled Sessions's resignation"
292,9,"letter from his pocket, showed it to a group of senior advisors, and asked them what he should do"
292,10,"about it. 525 During the trip, Priebus asked about the resignation letter so he could return it to"
292,11,"Sessions, but the President told him that the letter was back at the White House, somewhere in the"
292,12,"residence. 526 It was not until May 30, three days after the President returned from the trip, that the"
292,13,527
292,14,"President returned the letter to Sessions with a notation saying, ""Not accepted ."""
292,15,2. The President Asse11s that the Special Counsel has Conflicts of Interest
292,16,"In the days following the Special Counsel's appointment, the President repeatedly told"
292,17,"advisors, including Priebus, Bannon, and McGahn, that Special Counsel Mueller had conflicts of"
292,18,interest. 528 The President cited as conflicts that Mueller had interviewed for the FBI Director
292,19,"position sho11ly before being appointed as Special Counsel, that he had worked for a law firm that"
292,20,"represented people affiliated with the President, and that Mueller had disputed certain fees relating"
292,21,to his membership in a Trump golf course in Northern Virginia. 529 The President's advisors pushed
292,22,522
292,23,"Hunt-000050 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes); Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21; Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 21."
292,24,523
292,25,Hunt-000051 (Hunt 5/18/17 Notes).
292,26,524
292,27,"SCR026_000110 (President's Daily Diary, 5/19/17)."
292,28,52 5
292,29,"Hicks 12/8/ 17 302, at 22."
292,30,"526  Priebus 10/13/17 302, at 21. Hunt's notes state that when Priebus returned from the trip, Priebus"
292,31,"told Hunt that the President was supposed to have given him the letter, but when he asked for it, the"
292,32,"President ""slapped the desk"" and said he had forgotten it back at the hotel. Hunt-000052 (Hunt Notes,"
292,33,undated).
292,34,527
292,35,"Hunt-000052-53 (Hunt 5/30/17 Notes); 5/18/17 Letter, Sessions to President Trump (resignation"
292,36,"letter). Robert Porter, who was the White House Staff Secretary at the time, said that in the days after the"
292,37,"President returned from the Middle East trip, the Presidenttook Sessions's letter out ofa drawer in the Oval"
292,38,"Office and showed it to Porter. Porter 4/13/18 302, at 8."
292,39,"528  Priebus 1/18/ 18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/ 18 302, at 10; McGahn 3/8/18 302 , at I; McGahn"
292,40,"12/14/17 302, at 10; Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12."
292,41,529
292,42,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 12; Bannon 2/14/18 302, at JO. In October 2011, Mueller resigned his"
292,43,"family's membership from Trump National Golf Club in Sterling, Virginia, in a letter that noted that ""we"
292,44,"live in the District and find that we are unable to make full use of the Club"" and that inquired ""whether we"
292,45,"would be entitled to a refund of a portion of our initial membership fee,"" which was paid in 1994. I 0/ 12/11"
292,46,"Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. About two weeks later, the controller of the club responded"
292,47,"that the Muellers' resignation would be effective October 31, 2011, and that they would be ""placed on a"
292,48,"waitlist to be refunded on a first resigned I first refunded basis"" in accordance with the club's legal"
292,49,80
292,50,NA
293,1,U.S. Department of Justice
293,2,Attorrtey Work Protittet // May CorttaiH Material Proteeteti U rttier Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
293,3,530
293,4,"back on his assertion of conflicts, telling the President they did not count as true conflicts."
293,5,"Bannon recalled telling the Pre sident that the purported conflicts were ""ridiculous"" and that non e"
293,6,of them was real or could come close to justifying precluding Mueller from serving as Special
293,7,"Counsel. 531 As for Mueller's interview for FBI Dir ector , Bannon recalled that the White House"
293,8,532
293,9,had invited Mueller to speak to the President to offer a persp ective on the institution of the FBI.
293,10,"Bannon said that , although the White House thought about beseeching Mueller to become Direct or"
293,11,"again , he did not come in looking for the job. 533 Bannon also told the President that the law firm"
293,12,position did not amount to a conflict in the legal community. 534 And Bannon told the President
293,13,"that the golf course dispute did not rise to the level of a conflict and claiming one was ""ridiculous"
293,14,"and petty ."" 535 The President did not respond when Bannon pushed back on the stated conflicts of"
293,15,interest. 536
293,16,"On May 23, 2017, the Department of Justice announced that ethics officials had determined"
293,17,"that the Special Counsel's prior law firm position did not bar his service, generating media reports"
293,18,"that Mueller had been cleared to serve. 537 McGahn recalled that around the same time, the"
293,19,President complained about the asserted conflicts and prodded McGahn to reach out to Rosenstein
293,20,about the issue. 538 McGahn said he responded that he could not make such a call and that the
293,21,539
293,22,President should instead consult his personal lawyer because it was not a White House issue .
293,23,"Contemporaneou s notes of a May 23, 2017 conv ersation between McGahn and the President"
293,24,reflect that McGahn told the President that he would not call Rosenstein and that he would suggest
293,25,that the President not make such a call either. 540 McGahn advised that the Pr es ident could discuss
293,26,"the issue with his personal attorney but it would ""look like still trying to meddle in [the]"
293,27,"investigation "" and ""knocking out Mueller "" would be ""[a]nother fact used to claim obst[ruction] of"
293,28,"documents. 10/27/ 11 Letter, Muellers to Trump National Golf Club. The Muellers have not had further"
293,29,contact with the club.            ·
293,30,530
293,31,"Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 3; Bannon I 0/26/ 18 302 , at 13 (confirming that he, Priebus , and McGahn"
293,32,pushed back on the asserted conflicts).
293,33,531
293,34,"Bannon I 0/26 /18 302, at 12-13."
293,35,532
293,36,"Bannon 10/26/18 302, at 12."
293,37,533
293,38,"Bannon 10/26/ 18 302, at 12."
293,39,534
293,40,"Bannon 10/26/ 18 302 , at 12."
293,41,535
293,42,"Bannon 10/26/18 302 , at 13."
293,43,536
293,44,"Bannon 10/26/18 302 , at 12."
293,45,537
293,46,"Matt Zapoto sky & Matea Gold , Justice Department ethics experts clear Mueller to lead Russia"
293,47,"probe , Washington Post (May 23, 2017)."
293,48,"538 McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at I; McGahn 12/14/ 17 302 , at 10; Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 12."
293,49,539
293,50,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 1. McGahn and Donaldson said that after the appointment of the Special"
293,51,"Co unsel, they considered them se lves potential fact witnesses and accordingly told the President that"
293,52,"inquiries related to the invest igation should be brought to his personal counsel. McGahn 12/14/ 17 302 , at"
293,53,"7; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5."
293,54,540
293,55,SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/3 1/17No tes).
293,56,81
293,57,NA
294,1,U.S. Department of Justice
294,2,A~erHe~· \\'erk Predttet // Moy CeHtoiH Material Preteeted UHaer Fee. R:.Crim. P. 6(e)
294,3,"just[ice]."" 541 McGahn told the President that his ""biggest exposure"" was not his act of firing"
294,4,"Comey but his ""other contacts"" and ""calls,"" and his ""ask re: Flynn."" 542 By the time McGahn"
294,5,"provided this advice to the President , there had been widespread reporting on the President ' s"
294,6,"request for Comey's loyalty, which the President publicly denied ; his request that Corney ""let[]"
294,7,"Flynn go,"" which the President also denied; and the President ' s statement to the Russian Foreign"
294,8,"Minister that the termination of Comey had relieved ""great pressure "" related to Russia , which the"
294,9,President did not deny. 543
294,10,"On June 8, 2017 , Comey testified before Congress about his interactions with the Pre sident"
294,11,"before his termination , including the request for loyalty, the request that Comey "" let[] Flynn go,"""
294,12,"and the request that Comey ""lift the cloud"" over the presidency caused by the ongoing"
294,13,investigation. 544 Comey's testimony led to a series of news reports about whether the President
294,14,"had obstructedjustice .545 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House"
294,15,Counsel's Office that investigators intended to interview intelligence community officials who had
294,16,546
294,17,allegedly been asked by the President to push back against the Russia investigation .
294,18,"On Monday, June 12, 2017, Christopher Ruddy, the chief executive ofNewsmax Media"
294,19,547
294,20,"and a longtime friend of the President 's, met at the White House with Priebus and Bannon."
294,21,Ruddy recalled that they told him the President was strongly considering firing the Special Counsel
294,22,541
294,23,SC_AD_00361 (Donaldson 5/31/17Notes).
294,24,542
294,25,SC AD 00361 (Donaldson 5/3 1/ 17 Notes).
294,26,"543  See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt, In a Private Dinner, Trump Demanded Loyalty. Comey"
294,27,"Demurred., New York Times (May 11, 2017); Michael S. Schmidt, Comey Memorandum Says Trump"
294,28,"Asked Him to End Flynn Investigation , New York Times (May 16, 2017); Matt Apuzzo et al., Trump Told"
294,29,"Russians That Firing 'Nut Job' Comey Eased Pressure From Investigation, New York Times (May 19,"
294,30,2017).
294,31,544
294,32,"Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee,"
294,33,"I 15th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (Statement for the Record of James B. Comey, former Director of the FBI, at"
294,34,"5-6). Comey testified that he deliberately caused his memorandum documenting the February 14, 2017"
294,35,"meeting to be leaked to the New York Times in response to a tweet from the President, sent on May 12,"
294,36,"2017, that stated ""James Comey better hope that there are no ' tapes' of our conversations before he starts"
294,37,"leaking to the press!,"" and because he thought sharing the memorandum with a reporter ""might prompt the"
294,38,"appointment of a special counsel."" Hearing on Russian Election Interference Before the Senate Select"
294,39,"Intellig ence Committee, 115th Cong. (June 8, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 55) (testimony by James B."
294,40,"Comey, former Director of the FBI)."
294,41,545
294,42,"See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Comey lays out the case that Trump obstructed justice , Washington"
294,43,"Post (June 8, 2017) (""Legal analysts said Comey's testimony clarified and bolstered the case that the"
294,44,"president obstructed justice."") ."
294,45,"546  6/9/17 Email, Special Counsel's Office to the White House Counsel's Office. This Office made"
294,46,the notification to give the White House an opportunity to invoke executive privilege in advance of the
294,47,"interviews. On June 12, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Admiral Rogers in the presence of"
294,48,"agency counsel. Rogers 6/12/17 302, at I . On June 13, the Special Counsel's Office interviewed Ledgett."
294,49,"Ledgett 6/13/17 302, at I. On June 14, the Office interviewed Coats and other personnel from his office."
294,50,"Coats 6/14/17 302, at 1; Gistaro 6/14/17 302, at I; Culver 6/14/17 302, at I."
294,51,547
294,52,"Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5."
294,53,82
294,54,NA
295,1,U.S. Department of Justice
295,2,"AttorHe'.,·Work Proa1:1et// Mtty CoHtttiHMt1:terit1:I   Proteetea Ut1:aerFea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
295,3,"and that he would do so precipitously, without vetting the decision through Administration"
295,4,officials. 548 Ruddy asked Priebus if Ruddy could talk publicly about the discussion they had about
295,5,"the Special Counsel, and Priebus said he could .549 Priebus told Ruddy he hoped another blow up"
295,6,"like the one that followed the termination of Comey did not happen .550 Later that day, Ruddy"
295,7,"stated in a televised interview that the President was ""considering perhaps terminating the Special"
295,8,"Counsel"" based on purported conflicts of interest. 551 Ruddy later told another news outlet that"
295,9,"""Trump is definitely considering"" terminating the Special Counsel and ""it's not something that ' s"
295,10,"being dismissed."" 552 Ruddy's comments led to extensive coverage in the media that the President"
295,11,was considering firing the Special Counsel. 553
295,12,White House officials were unhappy with that press coverage and Ruddy heard from
295,13,"friends that the President was upset with him. 554 On June 13, 2017, Sanders asked the President"
295,14,for guidance on how to respond to press inquiries about the possible firing of the Special
295,15,"Counsel. 555 The President dictated an answer, which Sanders delivered , saying that "" [w]hile the"
295,16,"president has every right to"" fire the Special Counsel, ""he has no intention to do so."" 556"
295,17,"Also on June 13, 2017, the President ' s personal counsel contacted the Special Counsel's"
295,18,Office and raised concerns about possible conflicts. 557 The President's counsel cited Mueller 's
295,19,"previous partnership in his law firm, his interview for the FBI Director position, and an asserted"
295,20,"personal relationship he had with Comey. 558 That same day, Rosenstein had testified publicly"
295,21,"before Congress and said he saw no evidence of good cause to terminate the Special"" Counsel ,"
295,22,"including for conflicts of interest. 559 Two days later, on June 15, 2017 , the Special Counsel's"
295,23,548
295,24,"Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 5-6."
295,25,549
295,26,"Ruddy 6/6/ l 8 302, at 6."
295,27,550
295,28,"Ruddy 6/6/18 302, at 6."
295,29,551
295,30,"Trump Confidant Christopher Ruddy says Mueller has ""real conflicts"" as special counsel, PBS"
295,31,"(June 12, 2017); Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump ls Considering Firing Mueller"
295,32,"as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017)."
295,33,"552 Katherine Faulders & Veronica Stracqualursi, Trump friend Chris Ruddy says Sp icer's 'bizarre'"
295,34,"statement doesn't deny claim Trump seeking Mueller firing, ABC (June 13, 2017)."
295,35,553
295,36,"See, e.g., Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Friend Says Trump ls Considering Firing"
295,37,"Mueller as Special Counsel, New York Times (June 12, 2017)."
295,38,554
295,39,"Ruddy 6/6/ 18 302, at 6-7."
295,40,555
295,41,"Sanders 7/3/ 18 302, at 6-7."
295,42,"556 Glenn Thrush et al., Trump Stews, Staff Steps In, and Mueller Is Safe for Now, New York Times"
295,43,"(June 13, 2017); see Sanders 7/3/18 302, at 6 (Sanders spoke with the President directly before speaking to"
295,44,the press on Air Force One and the answer she gave is the answer the President told her to give).
295,45,557
295,46,Special Counsel 's Office Attorney 6/13 / 17 Notes .
295,47,558
295,48,Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/13/17 Notes .
295,49,559
295,50,Hearing on Fiscal 2018 Justice Departm ent Budget before the Senate Appropriations
295,51,"Subcommitt ee on Commerce, Justice, and Science, 115th Cong. (June 13, 2017) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at"
295,52,"14) (testimony by Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General)."
295,53,83
295,54,NA
296,1,U.S. Department of Justice
296,2,"Ath:>fRey\\'erk Preattet // Ma,· CeRtaiR Material Preteetecl URcler Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
296,3,Office informed the Acting Attorney General's office about the areas of concern raised by the
296,4,President's counsel and told the President ' s counsel that their concerns had been communicated to
296,5,Rosenstein so that the Department of Justice could take any appropriate action. 560
296,6,3. The Press Reports that the President is Being Investigated for Obstruction of
296,7,Justice and the President Directs the White House Counsel to Have the Special
296,8,Counsel Removed
296,9,"On the evening of June l 4, 20 l 7, the Washington Post published an article stating that the"
296,10,561
296,11,Special Counsel was investigating whether the President had attempted to obstructjustice.                    This
296,12,was the first public report that the President himself was under investigation by the Special
296,13,"Counsel's Office, and cable news networks quickly picked up on the report. 562 The Post story"
296,14,"stated that the Special Counsel was interviewing intelligence community leaders , including Coats"
296,15,"and Rogers , about what the President had asked them to do in response to Comey's March 20,"
296,16,"20 l 7 testimony; that the inquiry into obstruction marked ""a major turning point "" in the"
296,17,"investigation ; and that while ""Trump had received private assurances from then-FBI Director"
296,18,"James B. Comey starting in January that he was not personally under investigation, "" ""[ o]fficials"
296,19,"say that changed shortly after Comey ' s firing. "" 563 That evening, at approximately l 0:3 l p .m. , the"
296,20,President called McGahn on McGahn' s personal cell phone and they spoke for about l 5
296,21,minutes. 564 McGahn did not have a clear memory of the call but thought they might have discussed
296,22,the stories reporting that the President was under inv estigation. 565
296,23,"Beginning early the next day , June 15, 2017, the President issued a series of tweets"
296,24,"acknowledging the existence of the obstruction investigation and criticizing it. He wrote : ""They"
296,25,"made up a phony collusion with the Russians story, found zero proof, so now they go for"
296,26,"obstruction of justice on the phony story . Nice""; 566 ""You are witnessing the single greatest WITCH"
296,27,567
296,28,"HUNT in American political history-led               by some very bad and conflicted people! "";               and"
296,29,"""C rooked H destroyed phones w/ hammer, 'bleached' emails, & had husband meet w/AG day s"
296,30,560
296,31,Special Counsel's Office Attorney 6/15/17 Notes.
296,32,561
296,33,"Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possible obstruction of justice,"
296,34,"officials say, Washington Post (June 14, 2017)."
296,35,562
296,36,"CNN, for example, began running a chyron at 6:55 p.m. that stated: ""WASH POST: MUELLER"
296,37,"INVESTIGATING TRUMP FOR OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE."" CNN, (June 14, 2017, published"
296,38,online at 7: 15 p.m. ET).
296,39,563
296,40,"Devlin Barrett et al., Special counsel is investigating Trump for possibl e obstruc tion of justice,"
296,41,"officials say , Washington Post (June 14, 2017)."
296,42,"564 SCR026_000183 (President's Daily Diary, 6/14/17) (reflecting call from the President to"
296,43,McGahn on 6/14/17 with start time 10:31 p.m. and end time 10:46 p.m.); Call Records of Don McGahn.
296,44,"565 McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 1-2. McGahn thought he and the President also probably talked about"
296,45,"the investiture ceremony for Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch, which was scheduled for the following"
296,46,"day. McGahn 2/28/18 302, at 2."
296,47,566
296,48,@rea!DonaldTrump 6/15/ l 7 (6:55 a.m. ET) Tweet.
296,49,567
296,50,@realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (7:57 a.m. ET) Tweet.
296,51,84
296,52,NA
297,1,U.S. Department of Justice
297,2,Attemey Werk Predttct // May Cefl:taifl:Material Prntcctcd Ufl:der Fed . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
297,3,"before she was cleared - & they talk about obstruction?"" 568 The next day, June 16, 2017, the"
297,4,"President wrote additional tweets criticizing the investigation: ""After 7 months of investigations"
297,5,"& committee hearings about my ' collusion with the Russians,' nobody has been able to show any"
297,6,"proof. Sad!""; 569 and ""I am being investigated for firing the FBI Director by the man who told me"
297,7,"to fire the FBI Director! Witch Hunt."" 570"
297,8,"On Saturday, June 17, 2017, the President called McGahn and directed him to have the"
297,9,Special Counsel removed. 571 McGahn was at home and the President was at Camp David .572 In
297,10,"interviews with this Office, McGahn recalled that the Pre sident called him at home twice and on"
297,11,both occasions directed him to call Rosenstein and say that Mueller had conflicts that precluded
297,12,him from serving as Special Counsel. 573
297,13,"On the first call, McGahn recalled that the President said something like , ""You gotta do"
297,14,"this. You gotta call Rod."" 574 McGahn said he told the President that he would see what he could"
297,15,do. 575 McGahn was perturbed by the call and did not intend to act on the request. 576 He and other
297,16,"advisors believed the asserted conflicts were ""s illy"" and ""not real, "" and they had previously"
297,17,communicated that view to the President. 577 McGahn also had made clear to the President that the
297,18,White House Counsel's Office should not be involved in any effort to press the issue of conflicts. 578
297,19,McGahn was concerned about having any role in asking the Acting Attorney General to fire the
297,20,Special Counsel because he had grown up in the Reagan era and wanted to be more like Judge
297,21,568
297,22,@realDonaldTrump 6/15/17 (3:56 p.m. ET) Tweet.
297,23,569
297,24,@rea!DonaldTrump 6/16/17 (7:53 a.m. ET) Tweet.
297,25,570
297,26,@realDonaldTrump 6/16/17 (9:07 a.m. ET) Tweet.
297,27,571
297,28,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 10."
297,29,572
297,30,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at I, 3; SCR026_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/ 17) (records"
297,31,"showing President departed the White House at 11:07 a.m. on June 17, 2017, and arrived at Camp David at"
297,32,11:37 a.m.).
297,33,573
297,34,"McGahn 3/8/ l 8 302, at 1-2; McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at I 0. Phone records show that the President"
297,35,"called McGahn in the afternoon on June 17, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 23 minutes."
297,36,"SCR026_000196 (President's Daily Diary, 6/17/17) (reflecting call from the President to McGahn on"
297,37,6/17/17 with start time 2:23 p.m. and end time 2:46 p.m.); (Call Records of Don McGahn). Phone records
297,38,do not show another call between McGahn and the President that day. Although McGahn recalled receiv ing
297,39,"multiple calls from the President on the same day, in light of the phone records he thought it was possible"
297,40,"that the first call instead occurred on June 14, 2017, shortly after the press reported that the President was"
297,41,"under investigation for obstruction of justice . McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3. While McGahn was not certain"
297,42,"of the specific dates of the calls, McGahn was confident that he had at least two phone conversations with"
297,43,the President in which the.President directed him to call the Acting Attorney General to have the Special
297,44,"Counsel removed. McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 1-3."
297,45,574
297,46,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at I."
297,47,575
297,48,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1."
297,49,576
297,50,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1."
297,51,577
297,52,"McGahn 3/8/ I 8 302, at 1-2."
297,53,578
297,54,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2."
297,55,85
297,56,NA
298,1,U.S. Department of Justice
298,2,"Aa:erHey Werk Preclttet // Ma.:,·CeHtaifl Material Preteetecl UReer Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)"
298,3,"Robert Bork and not "" Saturday Night Massacre Bork."" 579 McGahn considered the President 's"
298,4,580
298,5,request to be an inflection point and he wanted to hit the brakes.
298,6,When the President called McGahn a second time to follow up on the order to call the
298,7,"Department of Justice, McGahn recalled that the President was more direct , saying something like ,"
298,8,581
298,9,"""Call Rod, tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can 't be the Special Counsel.""              McGahn"
298,10,582
298,11,"recalled the President telling him ""Mueller has to go"" and ""C all me back when you do it."""
298,12,McGahn understood the President to be saying that the Special Counsel had to be removed by
298,13,"Rosenstein. 583 To end the conversation with the President , McGahn left the President with the"
298,14,impression that McGahn would call Rosenstein. 584 McGahn recalled that he had already said no
298,15,585
298,16,"to the President's request and he was worn down , so he just wanted to get off the phone."
298,17,McGahn recalled feeling trapped because he did not plan to follow the President's directive
298,18,but did not know what he would say the next time the President called .586 McGahn decided he had
298,19,"to resign .587 He called his personal lawyer and then called his chief of staff, Annie Donaldson, to"
298,20,inform her of his decision. 588 He then drove to the office to pack his belongings and submit his
298,21,resignation letter. 589 Donaldson recalled that McGahn told her the President had called and
298,22,demanded he contact the Department of Justice and that the President wanted him to do something
298,23,that McGahn did not want to do. 590 McGahn told Donaldson that the President had called at least
298,24,"twice and in one of the calls asked ""have you done it?"" 591 McGahn did not tell Donaldson the"
298,25,specifics of the President's requ est because he was consciously trying not to involve her in the
298,26,579
298,27,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2."
298,28,580
298,29,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2."
298,30,581
298,31,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5."
298,32,582
298,33,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2, 5; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3."
298,34,583
298,35,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 1-2, 5."
298,36,584
298,37,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2."
298,38,585
298,39,"McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2."
298,40,586
298,41,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2."
298,42,587
298,43,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2."
298,44,"588 McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2-3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4; Call Records"
298,45,of Don McGahn.
298,46,589
298,47,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 2; Donaldson 4/2/ l 8 302, at 4."
298,48,590
298,49,"Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4."
298,50,591
298,51,"Donaldson 4/2/ 18 302, at 4."
298,52,86
298,53,NA
299,1,U.S. Department of Justice
299,2,Attertte~· \1/erk PreElttet // May Cattta:irl:Material PreteeteEl UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
299,3,"investigation , but Donaldson inferred that the President's directive was related to the Russia"
299,4,investigation. 592 Donaldson prepared to resign along with McGahn. 593
299,5,"That evening, McGahn called both Priebus and Bannon and told them that he intended to"
299,6,"resign. 594   McGahn recalled that, after speaking with his attorney and given the nature of the"
299,7,"President ' s request, he decided not to share details of the President's request with other White"
299,8,"House staff. 595 Priebus recalled that McGahn said that the President had asked him to ""do crazy"
299,9,"shit, "" but he thought McGahn did not tell him the specifics of the President 's request because"
299,10,McGahn was trying to protect Priebus from what he did not need to know. 596 Priebus and Bannon
299,11,"both urged McGahn not to quit, and McGahn ultimately returned to work that Monday and"
299,12,"remained in his position. 597 He had not told the President directly that he planned to resign, and"
299,13,when they next saw each other the President did not ask McGahn whether he had followed through
299,14,with calling Rosenstein. 598
299,15,"Around the same time, Chris Christie recalled a telephone _call with the President in which"
299,16,599
299,17,the President asked what Christie thought about the President firing the Special Counsel.
299,18,Christie advised against doing so because there was no substantive basis for the Presiden t to fire
299,19,"the Special Counsel, and because the President would lose support from Republicans in Congress"
299,20,if he did so. 600
299,21,Analysis
299,22,"In analyzing the President's direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed,"
299,23,the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
299,24,"a.        Obstructive act. As with the President's firing of Comey, the attempt to remove"
299,25,the Special Counsel would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the
299,26,592
299,27,"McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 3-4; Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 4-5. Donaldson said she believed"
299,28,McGahn consciously did not share details with her because he did not want to drag her into the
299,29,"investigation. Donaldson 4/2/18 302, at 5; see McGahn 2/28/ 19 302, at 3."
299,30,593
299,31,"Donaldson 4/2/ 18 302, at 5."
299,32,594
299,33,"McGahn 12/ 14/17 302 , at IO; Call Records of Don McGahn ; McGahn 2/28/ 19 302 , at 3-4;"
299,34,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 6-7."
299,35,595
299,36,"McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 4. Priebus and Bannon confirmed that McGahn did not tell them the"
299,37,"specific details of the President's request. Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7; Bannon 2/14/18 302 , at 10."
299,38,596
299,39,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 3 02, at 7."
299,40,597
299,41,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3; McGahn 2/28/19 302, at 3-4."
299,42,598
299,43,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3."
299,44,599
299,45,"Christie 2/13/ I9 302 , at 7. Christie did not recall the precise date of this call, but believed it was"
299,46,"after Christopher Wray was announced as the nominee to be the new FBI director, which was on June 7,"
299,47,"2017. Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7. Telephone records show that the President called Christie twice after that"
299,48,"time period, on July 4, 2017, and July 14, 2017. Call Records of Chris Christie ."
299,49,60
299,50,"°Christie 2/13/19 302, at 7."
299,51,87
299,52,NA
300,1,U.S. Department of Justice
300,2,AtterAey Wark Pret:ittet// Ma)'' CeAtaifl Material Pl'ateetet:iUAt:ierFee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
300,3,investigation and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry. Even if the removal
300,4,"of the lead prosecutor would not prevent the investigation from continuing under a new app ointee,"
300,5,a factfinder would need to consider whether the act had the potential to delay further action in the
300,6,"investigation, chill the actions of any replacement Special Counsel, or otherwise impede the"
300,7,investigation.
300,8,A threshold question is whetherthe President in fact directed McGahn to have the Special
300,9,Counsel removed. After news organizations reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered
300,10,"McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly disputed these accounts , and"
300,11,privately told McGahn that he had simply wanted McGahn to bring conflicts of interest to the
300,12,"Department of Justice 's attention . See Volume II, Section II.I , infra. Some of the President's"
300,13,specific language that McGahn recalled from the calls is consistent with that explanation.
300,14,"Substantial evidence , however , supports the conclusion that the President went further and in fact"
300,15,directed McGahn to call Rosenstein to have the Special Counsel removed.
300,16,"First, McGahn's clear recollection was that the President directed him to tell Rosenstein"
300,17,"not only that conflicts existed but also that ""Mueller has to go ."" McGahn is a credible witness"
300,18,with no motive to lie or exaggerate given the position he held in the White House. 601 McGahn
300,19,"spoke with the President twice and understood the directive the same way both times , making it"
300,20,"unlikely that he misheard or misinterpreted the Presid ent 's request. In response to that request,"
300,21,McGahn decided to quit because he did not want to participate in events that he described as akin
300,22,"to the Saturday Night Massacre . He called his lawyer, drove to the White House, packed up his"
300,23,"office, prepared to submit a resignation letter with his chief of staff, told Priebus that the President"
300,24,"had asked him to "" do crazy shit,"" and informed Priebus and Bannon that he was leaving. Those"
300,25,acts would be a highly unusual reaction to a request to convey information to the Department of
300,26,Justice.
300,27,"Second, in the days before the calls to McGahn , the President, through his counsel , had"
300,28,"already brought the asserted conflicts to the attention of the Department of Justice. Accordingly ,"
300,29,the President had no reason to have McGahn call Rosenstein that weekend to raise conflicts issues
300,30,that already had been raised.
300,31,"Third , the President's sense ofurgency and repeated requests to McGahn to take immediate"
300,32,"action on a weekend- "" You gotta do this. You gotta call Rod.""-supp0ti McGahn's recollection"
300,33,that the President wanted the Department of Justice to take action to remove the Special Counsel.
300,34,Had the President instead sought only to have the Department of Justice re-examine asserted
300,35,"conflicts to evaluate whether they posed an ethical bar, it would have been unnecess ary to set the"
300,36,process in motion on a Saturday and to make repeated calls to McGahn.
300,37,"Finally, the President had discussed ""knocking out Mueller "" and raised conflicts of interest"
300,38,"in a May 23, 2017 call with McGahn , reflecting that the President connected the conflicts to a plan"
300,39,"to remove the Special Counsel. And in the days leading up to June 17, 2017, the President made"
300,40,"clear to Priebus and Bannon, who then told Ruddy, that the President was considering terminating"
300,41,"60 1 When this Office first interviewed McGahn about this topic, he was reluctant to share detailed"
300,42,information about what had occurred and only did so after continued questioning. See McGahn 12/14/17
300,43,302 (agent notes).
300,44,88
300,45,NA
301,1,U.S. Department of Justice
301,2,"AMorAe)""'Nork Proettet // Moy CoAtoifl Moteriol Proteetee UReer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
301,3,"the Special Counsel. Also during this time period, the President reached out to Christie to get his"
301,4,thoughts on firing the Special Counsel. This evidence shows that the President was not just seeking
301,5,an examination of whether conflicts existed but instead was looking to use asserted conflicts as a
301,6,way to terminate the Special Counsel.
301,7,"b.       Nexus to an official proceeding. To satisfy the proceeding requirement, it would"
301,8,be necessary to establish a nexus between the President's act of seeking to terminate the Special
301,9,Counsel and a pending or foreseeable grand jury proceeding .
301,10,"Substantial evidence indicates that by June 17, 2017, the President knew his conduct was"
301,11,under investigation by a federal prosecutor who could present any evidence of federal crimes to a
301,12,"grand jury. On May 23, 2017, McGahn explicitly warned the President that his ""biggest exposure """
301,13,"was not his act of firing Comey but his ""other contacts"" and ""calls,"" and his ""ask re: Flynn."" By"
301,14,"early June, it was widely reported in t}:iemedia that federal prosecutors had issued grand jury"
301,15,subpoenas in the Flynn inquiry and that the Special Counsel had taken over the Flynn
301,16,"investigation. 602 On June 9, 2017, the Special Counsel's Office informed the White House that"
301,17,investigators would be interviewing intelligence agency officials who allegedl y had been asked by
301,18,"the President to push back against the Russia investigation. On June 14, 2017 , news outlets began"
301,19,reporting that the President was himself being investigated for obstruction of justice. Based on
301,20,"widespread reporting, the President knew that such an investigation could include his request for"
301,21,"Comey's loyalty; his request that Corney ""let[] Flynn go""; his outreach to Coats and Rogers; and"
301,22,his termination of Comey and statement to the Russian Foreign Minister that the termination had
301,23,"relieved ""great pressure"" related to Russia. And on June 16, 2017, the day before he directed"
301,24,"McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed, the President publicly acknowledged that his"
301,25,"conduct was under investigation by a federal prosecutor, tweeting , ""I am being investigated for"
301,26,"firing the FBI Director by the man who told me to fire the FBI Director! """
301,27,c.       Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President's attempts to remove the
301,28,Special Counsel were linked to the Special Counsel's oversight of investigations that involved the
301,29,"President's conduct - and, most immediately , to reports that the President was being investigated"
301,30,for potential obstruction of justice.
301,31,"Before the President terminated Comey , the President considered it critically important that"
301,32,he was not under investigation and that the public not erroneously think he was being investigated.
301,33,"As described in Volume TI, Section TI.D, supra, advisors perceived the President , while he was"
301,34,"drafting the Comey termination letter, to be concerned more than anything else about getting out"
301,35,that he was not personally under investigation. When the President learned of the appointment of
301,36,"the Special Counsel on May 17, 2017, he expressed further concern about the investigation, saying"
301,37,"""[t]his is the end of my Presidency. "" The President also faulted Sessions for recusing , saying ""you"
301,38,"were supposed to protect me. """
301,39,"On June 14, 20 I 7, when the Washington Post reported that the Special Counsel was"
301,40,"investigating the President for obstruction of justice, the President was facing what he had wanted"
301,41,602
301,42,"See, e.g., Evan Perez et al., CNN exclusive-: Grand jury subpoenas issued in FBJ's Russia"
301,43,"investigation , CNN (May 9, 2017); Matt Ford, Why Mueller Is Taking Over the Michael Flynn Grand Jury ,"
301,44,"The Atlantic (June 2, 2017)."
301,45,89
301,46,NA
302,1,U.S. Department of Justice
302,2,"AtterHe'.',""1Nork Proettet // May CoHtttiflMaterial Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
302,3,to avoid: a criminal investigation into his own conduct that was the subject of widespread media
302,4,attention. The evidence indicates that news of the obstruction investigation prompted the President
302,5,"to call McGahn and seek to have the Special Counsel removed. By mid-June, the Department of"
302,6,Justice had already cleared the Special Counse l's service and the President's advisors had told him
302,7,"that the claimed conflicts of interest were ""s illy"" and did not provide a basis to remove the Special"
302,8,"Counsel. On June 13, 2017, the Acting Attorney General testified before Congress that no good"
302,9,"cause for removing the Special Counsel existed, and the Pres ident dictated a press statement to"
302,10,"Sanders saying he had no intention of firing the Special Counsel. But the next day, the media"
302,11,reported that the President was under investigation for obstruction of justice and the Specia l
302,12,Counsel was interviewing witnesses about events related to possible obstruction - spurring the
302,13,President to write critical tweets about the Specia l Counsel's investigation. The President called
302,14,McGahn at home that night and then called him on Saturday from Camp David . The evidence
302,15,accordingly indicat es that news that an obstruction investigation had been opened is what led the
302,16,President to call McGahn to have the Special Counsel terminated.
302,17,There also is evidence that the President knew that he should not have made thos e calls to
302,18,McGahn. The President made the calls to McGahn after McGahn had specifically told the
302,19,President that the White House Counsel's Office-and McGahn himself-could not be involved
302,20,in pressing conflicts claims and that the President shoul d consult with his personal counsel if he
302,21,"wished to raise conflicts. Instead of relying on his personal counsel to submit the conflicts claims ,"
302,22,the President sought to use his official powers to remove the Special Counsel. And after the media
302,23,"reported on the President's actions, he denied that he ever ordered McGahn to have the Special"
302,24,"Counsel terminated and made repeated efforts to have McGahn deny the story, as discussed in"
302,25,"Volume II, Section II.I, infra. Those denials are contrary to the evidence and suggest the"
302,26,President's awareness that the direction to McGahn could be seen as improper.
302,27,F.        The President's Efforts to Curtail the Special Counsel Investigation
302,28,Overview
302,29,"Two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed , the"
302,30,"President made another attempt to affect the course of the Russia investigation. On June 19, 20 17,"
302,31,the President met one-on-one with Corey Lewandowski in the Oval Office and dictated a message
302,32,to be delivered to Attorney General Sessions that would have had the effect of limiting the Russia
302,33,"investigation to future election interference only. One month later, the President met again with"
302,34,Lewandowsk i and followed up on the request to have Sessions limit the scope of the Russia
302,35,"investigation. Lewandowski told the President the message would be delivered soon. Hours later,"
302,36,"the President publicly criticized Sessions in an unplanned press interview, raising questions about"
302,37,Sessions ' s job security.
302,38,1. The Pre sident Asks Corey Lewandowski to Deliver a Message to Sessions to
302,39,Curtail the Spec ial Counsel Investigation
302,40,"On June 19, 2017, two days after the President directed McGahn to have the Spec ial"
302,41,"Counsel removed, the President met one-on-one in the Oval Office with his former campaign"
302,42,90
302,43,NA
303,1,U.S. Department of Justice
303,2,"AtterHey Werk Preettet // Ma-=,·CeHtttiH Meteriel Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P . 6(e)"
303,3,manager Corey Lewandowski. 603_ Senior White House advisors described Lewandowski as a
303,4,"""devotee"" of the President and said the relationship between the President and Lewandowski was"
303,5,"""close."" 604"
303,6,"During the June 19 meeting, Lewandowski recalled that , after some small talk, the"
303,7,605
303,8,President brought up Sessions and criticized his recusal from the Russia investigation.               The
303,9,President told Lewandowski that Sessions was weak and that if the President had known about the
303,10,"likelihood of recusal in advance , he would not have appointed Sessions. 606 The President then"
303,11,"asked Lewandowski to deliver a message to Sessions and said ""write this down. "" 607 This was the"
303,12,"first time the President had asked Lewandowski to take dictation, and Lewandowski wrote as fast"
303,13,as possible to make sure he captured the content correctly. 608
303,14,The President directed that Sessions should give a speech publicly announcing:
303,15,I know that I recused myself from certain things having to do with specific areas. But our
303,16,POTUS . .. is being treated very unfairly. He shouldn't have a Special Prosecutor/Counsel
303,17,"b/c he hasn't done anything wrong. I was on the campaign w/ him for nine months, there"
303,18,were no Russians involved with him. I know it for a fact b/c I was there. He didn't do
303,19,609
303,20,anything wrong except he ran the greatest campaign in American history.
303,21,The dictated message went on to state that Sessions would meet with the Special Counsel to limit
303,22,his jurisdiction to future election interference:
303,23,Now a group of people want to subvert the Constitution of the United States. T am going
303,24,to meet with the Special Prosecutor to explain this is very unfair and let the Special
303,25,Prosecutor move forward with investigating election meddl ing for future elections so that
303,26,nothing can happen in future elections. 6 10
303,27,"604 Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7; Dearborn 6/20/18 302, at 1 (describing Lewandowski as a ""comfort to"
303,28,"the President"" whose loyalty was appreciated). Kelly said that when he was Chief of Staff and the President"
303,29,"had meetings with friends like Lewandowski, Kelly tried not to be there and to push the meetings to the"
303,30,"residence to create distance from the West Wing. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 7."
303,31,605
303,32,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2."
303,33,606
303,34,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2."
303,35,607
303,36,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2."
303,37,608
303,38,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3."
303,39,"609 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 2-3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 1-2."
303,40,"610 Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/19/17 Notes, at 3."
303,41,91
303,42,NA
304,1,U.S. Department of Justice
304,2,AttarAey Wark Pt•asttet // May CaHtttiH Material Prateetes UAser Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
304,3,"The President said that if Sessions delivered that statement he would be the ""most popular guy in"
304,4,"the country."" 6 11 Lewandowski told the President he understood what the President wanted Sessions"
304,5,to do. 6 12
304,6,Lewandowski wanted to pass the message to Sessions in person rather than over the
304,7,613
304,8,phone.         He did not want to meet at the Department of Justice because he did not want a public
304,9,log of his visit and did not want Sessions to have an advantage over him by meeting on what
304,10,Lewandowski described as Sessions's turf. 614 Lewandowski called Sessions and arranged a
304,11,"meeting for the following evening at Lewandowski's office , but Sessions had to cancel due to a"
304,12,"last minute conflict. 6 15 Shortly thereafter, Lewandowski left Washington, D .C., without having"
304,13,had an opportunity to meet with Sessions to convey the President's message .6 16 Lewandowski
304,14,"stored the notes in a safe at his home , which he stated was his standard procedure with sensitive"
304,15,items. 617
304,16,2. The President Follows Up with Lewandowski
304,17,"Following his June meeting with the President, Lewandowski contacted Rick Dearborn,"
304,18,618
304,19,"then a senior White House official, and asked if Dearborn could pass a message to Sessions."
304,20,"Dearborn agreed without knowing what the message was, and Lewandowski later confirmed that"
304,21,619
304,22,Dearborn would meet with Sessions for dinner in late July and could deliver the message then.
304,23,Lewandowski recalled thinking that the President had asked him to pass the message because the
304,24,"President knew Lewandowski could be trusted , but Lewandowski believed Dearborn would be a"
304,25,better messenger because he had a longstanding relationship with Sessions and because Dearborn
304,26,was in the government while Lewandowski was not. 620
304,27,"On July 19, 2017, the President again met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office. 621"
304,28,"In the preceding days , as described in Volume IT, Section ILG, infra, emails and other information"
304,29,"about the June 9, 2016 meeting between several Russians and Donald Trump Jr. , Jared Kushner,"
304,30,"and Paul Manafort had been publicly disclosed. In the July 19 meeting with Lewandowski , the"
304,31,611
304,32,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3; Lewandowski 6/ 19/17 Notes, at 4."
304,33,612
304,34,"Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 3."
304,35,613
304,36,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 3-4."
304,37,614
304,38,"Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 4."
304,39,6 15
304,40,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4."
304,41,6 16
304,42,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4."
304,43,617
304,44,"Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 4."
304,45,618
304,46,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4; see Dearborn 6/20/ 18 302, at 3."
304,47,619
304,48,"Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 4-5."
304,49,620
304,50,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 4, 6."
304,51,621
304,52,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 5; SCR029b_000002-03 (6/5/18 Additional Response to Special"
304,53,Counsel Request for Certain Visitor Log Information).
304,54,92
304,55,NA
305,1,U.S. Department of Justice
305,2,"Afte!'tte,· Werk Prncluet // Mtty Cettte.itt Me.tel'ie.lPreteetecl UttclerFecl. R. Ctim. P. 6Ee)"
305,3,President raised his previous request and asked if Lewandowski had talked to Sessions. 622
305,4,Lewandowski told the President that the message would be delivered soon. 623 Lewandowski
305,5,"recalled that the President told him that if Sessions did not meet with him, Lewandowski should"
305,6,tell Sessions he was fired. 624
305,7,"Immediately following the meeting with the President, Lewandowski saw Dearborn in the"
305,8,anteroom outside the Oval Office and gave him a typewritten version of the message the President
305,9,had dictated to be delivered to Sessions. 625 Lewandowski told Dearborn that the notes were the
305,10,"message they had discussed, but Dearborn did not recall whether Lewandowski said the message"
305,11,"was from the President. 626 The message ""definitely raised an eyebrow"" for Dearborn, and he"
305,12,recalled not wanting to ask where it came from or think further about doing anything with it.627
305,13,Dearborn also said that being asked to serve as a messenger to Sessions made him
305,14,"uncomfortable. 628 He recalled later telling Lewandowski that he had handled the situation, but he"
305,15,"did not actually follow through with delivering the message to Sessions, and he did not keep a"
305,16,copy of the typewritten notes Lewandowski had given him.629
305,17,3. The President Publicly Criticizes Sessions in a New York Times Interview
305,18,"Within hours of the President ' s meeting with Lewandowski on July 19, 2017, the President"
305,19,gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he criticized Sessions's decision to
305,20,"recuse from the Russia investigation. 630 The President said that ""Sessions should have never"
305,21,"recused himself, and if he was going to recuse himself, he should have told me before he took the"
305,22,"job , and I would have picked somebody else."" 631 Sessions's recusal, the President said, was ""very"
305,23,unfair to the president. How do you take a job and then recuse yourself? Ifhe would have recused
305,24,"himself before the job, I would have said, 'Thanks, Jeff, but I can ' t, you know, I'm not going to"
305,25,622
305,26,"Lewandowski4/6/ 18 302, at 5."
305,27,623
305,28,"Lewandowski4/6/ 18 302, at 5."
305,29,624
305,30,"Lewandowski 4/6/ 18 302, at 6. Priebus vaguely recalled Lewandowski telling him that in"
305,31,approximatelyMay or June 2017 the President had asked Lewandowski to get Sessions's resignation.
305,32,"Priebus recalled that Lewandowskidescribedhis reaction as somethinglike, ""What can I do? I'm not an"
305,33,"employeeof the administration. I'm a nobody."" Priebus4/3/18 302, at 6."
305,34,625
305,35,"Lewandowski4/6/18 302, at 5. Lewandowski said he asked Hope Hicks to type the notes when"
305,36,"he went in to the Oval Office, and he then retrieved the notes from her partway through his meeting with"
305,37,"the President. Lewandowski4/6/18 302, at 5."
305,38,626
305,39,"Lewandowski4/6/ 18 3 02, at 5; Dearborn6/20/ 18 3 02, at 3."
305,40,627
305,41,"Dearborn6/20 / 18 302, at 3."
305,42,628
305,43,"Dearborn6/20 / t 8 302, at 3."
305,44,629
305,45,"Dearborn 6/20/18 302 , at 3-4."
305,46,630
305,47,"Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July"
305,48,"19, 2017)."
305,49,"63 1 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Int erview With Trump, New York Times (July"
305,50,"19,2017)."
305,51,93
305,52,NA
306,1,U.S. Department of Justice
306,2,At:terl'l.ey'Herlc Preettet // Ma)'' Cel'l.tail'I.
306,3,Material Preteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim.. P. 6(e)
306,4,"take you.' It's extremely unfair, and that's a mild word , to the president."" 632 Hicks , who was"
306,5,"present for the interview, recalled trying to ""throw [herself] between the reporters and [the"
306,6,"President]"" to stop parts of the interview, but the President ""loved the interview."" 633"
306,7,"Later that day , Lewandowski met with Hicks and they discussed the President's New York"
306,8,Times interview. 634 Lewandowski recalled telling Hicks about the President's request that he meet
306,9,with Sessions and joking with her about the idea of firing Sessions as a private citizen if Sessions
306,10,"would not meet with him. 635 As Hicks remembered the conversation, Lewandowski told her the"
306,11,President had recent ly asked him to meet with Sessions and deliver a message that he needed to
306,12,"do the ""right thing"" and resign. 636 While Hicks and Lewandowski were together, the President"
306,13,called Hicks and told her he was happy with how coverage of his New York Times interview
306,14,criticizing Sessions was p laying out. 637
306,15,4. The President Orders Priebus to Demand Sessions's Resignation
306,16,"Three days later, on July 21, 2017, the Washington Post repo1ted that U.S. intelligence"
306,17,intercepts showed that Sessions had discussed campaign-related matters with the Russian
306,18,"ambassador, contrary to what Sessions had said publicly .638 That evening, Priebus called Hunt to"
306,19,talk about whether Sessions might be fired or might resign. 639 Priebus had previously talked to
306,20,"Hunt when the media had reported on tensions between Sessions and the President, and , after"
306,21,"speaking to Sessions, Hunt had told Priebus that the President would have to fire Sessions if he"
306,22,"wanted to remove Sessions because Sessions was not going to quit. 640 According to Hunt, who"
306,23,"took contemporaneous notes of the July 21 call, Hunt told Priebus that, as they had previously"
306,24,"discussed, Sessions had no intention ofresigning. 641 Hunt asked Priebus what the President would"
306,25,632
306,26,"Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July"
306,27,"19, 2017)."
306,28,633
306,29,"Hicks 12/8/17 302, at 23."
306,30,634
306,31,"Hicks 3/13/ 18 302 , at 10; Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6."
306,32,635
306,33,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302 , at 6."
306,34,636
306,35,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at l 0. Hicks thought that the President might be able to make a recess"
306,36,"appointment of a new Attorney General because the Senate was about to go on recess. Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302 ,"
306,37,"at I 0. Lewandowski recalled that in the afternoon of July 19, 2017, following his meeting with the"
306,38,"President, he conducted research on recess appointments but did not share his research with the President."
306,39,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 7."
306,40,637
306,41,"Lewandowski 4/6/18 302, at 6."
306,42,638
306,43,"Adam Entous et al., Sessions discuss ed Trump campaign-related matters with Russian"
306,44,"ambassador, US. intelligence intercepts show, Washington Post (July 21, 2017). The underlying events"
306,45,"concerning the Sessions-Kislyak contacts are discussed in Volume I, Section IV.A.4.c, supra."
306,46,639
306,47,"Hunt 2/1118 302 , at 23."
306,48,640
306,49,"Hunt 2/1 /18 302, at 23 ."
306,50,641
306,51,"Hunt 2/1/18 302, at 23-24 ; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1."
306,52,94
306,53,NA
307,1,U.S. Department of Justice
307,2,"AttarAe)' 'Nark Pradttet // Ma)"" CarttaiA Material Pl'ateetea Urtaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
307,3,"accomplish by firing Sessions, pointing out there was an investigation before and there would be"
307,4,an investigation after .642
307,5,"Early the following morning, July 22 , 2017, the President tweeted , ""A new"
307,6,"INTELLIGENCE LEAK from the Amazon Washington Post, this time against A.G. Jeff Sessions."
307,7,"These illegal leaks, like Comey's, must stop!"" 643 Approximately one hour later , the President"
307,8,"tweeted, ""So many people are asking why isn't the A.G. or Special Council looking at the many"
307,9,"Hillary Clinton or Comey crimes. 33,000 e-mails deleted?"" 644 Later that morning , while aboard"
307,10,"Mar ine One on the way to Norfolk, Virginia, the President told Priebus that he had to get Sessions"
307,11,to resign immediately. 645 The President said that the country had lost confidence in Sessions and
307,12,"the negative publicity was not tolerable. 646 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Priebus,"
307,13,"the President told Priebus to say that he ""need[ ed] a letter of resignation on [his] desk immediately """
307,14,"and that Sessions had "" no choice"" but ""must immediately resign."" 647 Priebus replied that if they"
307,15,"fired Sessions, they would never get a new Attorney General confirmed and that the Department"
307,16,"of Justice and Congress would turn their backs on the President , but the President suggested he"
307,17,could make a recess appointment to replace Sessions. 648
307,18,"Priebus believed that the President's request was a problem , so he called McGahn and"
307,19,"asked for advice, explaining that he did not want to pull the trigger on something that was ""all"
307,20,"wrong. "" 649 Although the President tied his desire for Sessions to resign to Sessions's negative"
307,21,"press and poor performance in congressional testimony, Priebus believed that the President's"
307,22,desire to replace Sessions was driven by the President's hatred of Sessions ' s recusal from the
307,23,Russia investigation. 650 McGahn told Priebus not to follow the President 's order and said they
307,24,"should consult their personal counsel, with whom they had attorney-client privilege. 65 1 McGahn"
307,25,642
307,26,"Hunt 2/1 /18 302, at 23-24 ; Hunt 7/21/17 Notes, at 1-2."
307,27,643
307,28,@realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (6:33 a.m. ET) Tweet.
307,29,644
307,30,"@realDonaldTrJ.!mp7/22/17 (7:44 a.m. ET) Tweet. Three minutes later, the President tweeted,"
307,31,"""What about all of the Clinton ties to Russia, including Podesta Company, Uranium deal, Russian Reset,"
307,32,"big dollar speeches etc."" @realDonaldTrump 7/22/17 (7:47 a.m. ET) Tweet."
307,33,645
307,34,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 13-14."
307,35,646
307,36,"Priebus 1/18/ 18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4-5; see RP_ 000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes)."
307,37,647
307,38,RP_000073 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes).
307,39,64 8
307,40,"Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 5."
307,41,649
307,42,"Priebus 1/ 18/18 302, at 14; Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 4-5."
307,43,650
307,44,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 5."
307,45,"651 RP _000074    (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes); McGahn 12/ 14/ 17 302, at 11; Priebus 1/ 18/ 18 302, at 14."
307,46,Priebus followed McGahn's advice and called his personal attorney to discuss the President's request
307,47,because he thought it was the type of thing about which one would need to consult an attorney. Priebus
307,48,"1/18/18 302, at 14."
307,49,95
307,50,NA
308,1,U.S. Department of Justice
308,2,Att:arHeyWark Pr0Ei1:1et     // May CaHtail'lMaterial Prateetea UHEierFea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
308,3,and Priebus discussed the possibility that they would both have to resign rather than carry out the
308,4,President's order to fire Sessions. 652
308,5,"That afternoon, the President followed up with Priebus about demanding Sessions's"
308,6,"resignation, using words to the effect of, ""Did you get it? Are you working on it?"" 653 Priebus said"
308,7,"that he believed that his job depended on whether he followed the order to remove Sessions,"
308,8,although the President did not directly say so.654 Even though Priebus did not intend to carry out
308,9,"the President's directive, he told the President he would get Sessions to resign. 655 Later in the day,"
308,10,Priebus called the President and explained that it would be a calamity if Sessions resigned because
308,11,Priebus expected that Rosenstein and Associate Attorney General Rachel Brand would also resign
308,12,and the President would be unable to get anyone else confirmed. 656 The President agreed to hold
308,13,"off on demanding Sessions's resignation until after the Sunday shows the next day, to prevent the"
308,14,shows from focusing on the firing. 657
308,15,"By the end of that weekend , Priebus recalled that the President relented and agreed not to"
308,16,"ask Sessions to resign .658 Over the next several days, the President tweeted about Sessions. On"
308,17,"the morning of Monday , July 24, 2017 , the President criticized Sessions for neglecting to"
308,18,"investigate Clinton and called him ""beleaguered."" 659 On July 25 , the President tweeted, ""Attorney"
308,19,General Jeff Sessions has taken a VERY weak position on Hillary Clinton crimes (where are E-
308,20,"mails & DNC server) & Intel leakers! "" 660 The following day, July 26, the President tweeted , "" Why"
308,21,"didn't A.G . Sessions replace Acting FBI Director Andrew McCabe , a Comey friend who was in"
308,22,"charge of Clinton investigation. "" 661 According to Hunt, in light of the President's frequent public"
308,23,"attacks, Sessions prepared another resignation letter and for the rest of the year carried it with him"
308,24,in his pocket every time he went to the White House .662
308,25,652
308,26,"McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11; RP_000074 (Priebus 7/22/17 Notes) (""discuss resigning"
308,27,"together"")."
308,28,653
308,29,"Priebus 1/ 18/18 302 , at 14; Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 4."
308,30,654
308,31,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 4."
308,32,655
308,33,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15."
308,34,656
308,35,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15."
308,36,657
308,37,"Priebus l /18/ 18 302, at 15."
308,38,658
308,39,"Priebus 1/18/18 302, at 15."
308,40,659
308,41,"@realDonaldTrump 7/24/ 17 (8:49 a.m. ET) Tweet (""So why aren't the Committees and"
308,42,"investigators, and of course our beleaguered A.G., looking into Crooked Hillarys crimes & Russia"
308,43,"relations?"")."
308,44,660
308,45,@realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6: I 2 a.m. ET) Tweet. The President sent another tweet shortly
308,46,"before this one asking ""where is the investigation A.G."" @realDonaldTrump 7/25/17 (6:03 a.m. ET) Tweet."
308,47,661
308,48,@realDonaldTrump 7/26/ 17 (9:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.
308,49,662
308,50,"Hunt 2/ 1/ 18 302, at 24-25."
308,51,96
308,52,NA
309,1,U.S. Department of Justice
309,2,"AM6me, \l/6rk Pmettet // May Cmttaifl: Material Pr6teetee Ufl:eer Fee. R . Critt1:.P. 6(e)"
309,3,Analysis
309,4,In analyzing the President's efforts to have Lewandowski deliver a message directing
309,5,Sessions to publicly announce that the Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future
309,6,"election interference , the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:"
309,7,a.      Obstructive act. The President 's effort to send Sessions a message through
309,8,Lewandowski would qualify as an obstructive act if it would naturally obstruct the investigation
309,9,and any grand jury proceedings that might flow from the inquiry.
309,10,"The President sought to have Sessions announce that the President ""s houldn't have a"
309,11,"Speci al Prosecutor/Counsel "" and that Sessions was going to ""meet with the Special Prosecutor to"
309,12,explain this is very unfair and let the Special Prosecutor move forward with investigating election
309,13,"meddling for future elections so that nothing can happen in future elections ."" The President wanted"
309,14,"Sessions to disregard his recusal from the investigation, which had followed from a formal DOJ"
309,15,"ethics review , and have Sessions declare that he knew ""for a fact "" that ""there were no Russians"
309,16,"involved with the campaign"" because he ""was there. "" The President further directed that Sessions"
309,17,"should explain that the President should not be subject to an investigation "" because he hasn 't done"
309,18,"anything wrong. "" Taken together , the President 's directives indicate that Sessions was being"
309,19,instructed to tell the Special Counsel to end the existing investigation into the President and his
309,20,"campaign, with the Special Counsel being permitted to ""move forward with investigating election"
309,21,"meddling for future elections."""
309,22,"b.    Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's"
309,23,"initial one-on-one meeting with Lewandowski on June 19, 2017, the existence of a grand jury"
309,24,investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was ublic knowled e. B the time of the
309,25,"President's follow -u meetin with Lewandowski,"
309,26,"See Volume II, Section 11.G, infra. To satisfy the nexus requirement ,"
309,27,it would be nece ssary to show that limiting the Special Counsel's investigation would have the
309,28,natural and probable effect of impeding that grand jury proceeding .
309,29,c.     Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that the President 's effort to have Sessions
309,30,limit the scope of the Special Counsel's investigation to future election interference was intended
309,31,to prevent further investigative scrutiny of the President ' s and his campaign's conduct.
309,32,"As previously described , see Volume TT, Section II.B, supra, the Presiden t knew that the"
309,33,"Russia investigation was focused in part on his campaign , and he perceived allegations of Rus sian"
309,34,interference to cast doubt on the legitimacy of his election . The Pres ident further knew that the
309,35,investigation had broadened to include his own conduct and whether he had obstructed justice.
309,36,Those investigations would not proceed if the Special Counsel's jurisdiction were limited to future
309,37,election interferen ce only.
309,38,The timing and circumstance s of the President's actions support the conclusion that he
309,39,sought that result. The President's initial direction that Sessions should limit the Special Counsel's
309,40,investigation came just two days after the President had ordered McGahn to ~ave the Special
309,41,"Counsel removed, which itself followed public reports that the President wa s person a lly under"
309,42,97
309,43,NA
310,1,U .S. Department of Justice
310,2,A1:t:0rMey
310,3,Wark Pratlttet // Mtty CaMtttiMMttterittl Prnteetetl UMeerFee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
310,4,investigation for obstruction of justice. The sequence of those events raises an inference that after
310,5,"seeking to terminate the Special Counsel, the President sought to exclude his and his campaign's"
310,6,conduct from the investigation ' s scope. The President raised the matter with Lewandowski again
310,7,"on July 19, 2017, just days after emails and information about the June 9, 2016 meeting between"
310,8,"Russians and senior campaign officials had been publicly disclosed , generating substantial media"
310,9,coverage and investigative interest.
310,10,The manner in which the President acted provides additional evidence of his intent. Rather
310,11,"than rely on official channels , the President met with Lewandowski alone in the Oval Office . The"
310,12,"President selected a loyal ""devotee "" outside the White House to deliver the message, supporting"
310,13,"an inference that he was working outside White House channels , including McGahn, who had"
310,14,previously resisted contacting the Department of Justice about the Special Counsel. The President
310,15,"also did not contact the Acting Attorney General, who had just testified publicly that there was no"
310,16,"cause to remove the Special Counsel. Instead, the President tried to use Sessions to restrict and"
310,17,redirect the Special Counsel's investigation when Sessions was recused and could not properly
310,18,take any action on it.
310,19,"The July 19, 2017 events provide further evidence of the President's intent. The President"
310,20,followed up with Lewandowski in a separate one-on-one meeting one month after he first dictated
310,21,"the message for Sessions, demonstrating he still sought to pursue the request. And just hours after"
310,22,"Lewandowski assured the President that the message would soon be delivered to Sessions, the"
310,23,President gave an unplanned interview to the New York Times in which he publicly attacked
310,24,"Sessions and raised questions about his job security. Four days later, on July 22, 2017, the"
310,25,President directed Priebus to obtain Sessions's resignation. That evidence could raise an infer ence
310,26,that the President wanted Sessions to realize that his job might be on the line as he evaluated
310,27,"whether to comply with the President 's direction that Sessions publicly announce that,"
310,28,"notwithstanding his recusal , he was going to confine the Special Counsel's investigation to future"
310,29,election interference.
310,30,"G.      The President's Efforts to Prevent Disclosure of Emails About the June 9, 2016"
310,31,Meeting Behveen Russians and Senior Campaign Officials
310,32,Overview
310,33,"By June 2017 , the President became aware of emails setting up the June 9, 2016 meeting"
310,34,between senior campaign officials and Russians who offered derogatory information on Hillary
310,35,"Clinton as ""part of Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump. "" On multiple occasions"
310,36,"in late June and early July 2017, the President directe d aides not to publicly disclose the emails,"
310,37,and he then dictated a statement about the meeting to be issued by Donald Trump Jr. describing
310,38,the meeting as about adoption.
310,39,Evidence
310,40,"I. The President Learns About the Existence of Emails Concerning the June 9,"
310,41,2016 Trump Tower Meeting
310,42,In mid-June 2017 - the same week that the President first asked Lewandowski to pass a
310,43,message to Sessions - senior Administration officials became aware of emails exchanged during
310,44,98
310,45,NA
311,1,U.S. Department of Justice
311,2,"AM:eri,e,· Werk Prm:ittet // Ma,· Cei,taii, Material Preteeteti Ui,tier Feti. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)"
311,3,"the campaign arranging a meeting between Donald Trump Jr. , Paul Manafort, Jared Kushner, and"
311,4,"a Russian attorney. 663 As described in Volume I, Section TV.A.5, supra, the emails stated that the"
311,5,"""Crown [P]rosecutor of Russia"" had offered ""to provide the Trump campaign with some official"
311,6,"documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia "" as part"
311,7,"of ""Russia and its government's support for Mr. Trump."" 664 Trump Jr . responded , "" [I]f it's what"
311,8,"you say I love it,"" 665 and he, Kushner, and Manafort met with the Russian attorney and several"
311,9,"other Russian individuals at Trump Tower on June 9, 2016. 666 At the meeting, the Russian attorney"
311,10,claimed that funds derived from illegal activities in Russia were provided to Hillary Clinton and
311,11,"other Democrats , and the Russian attorney then spoke about the Magnitsky Act, a 2012 U.S. statute"
311,12,that imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian officials and that had resulted in a retaliatory
311,13,ban in Russia on U.S. adoptions of Russian children. 667
311,14,According to written answers submitted by the President in response to questions from this
311,15,"Office, the President had no recollection of learning of the meeting or the emails setting it up at the"
311,16,time the meeting occurred or at any other time before the election .668
311,17,The Trump Campaign had previously received a document request from SSCI that called
311,18,"for the production of various information, including , ""[a ] list and a description of all meetings"""
311,19,"between any ""individual affiliated with the Trump campaign"" and ""any individual formally or"
311,20,informally affiliated with the Russian government or Russian business interests which took place
311,21,"between June 16, 2015, and 12 pm on January 20, 2017,"" and associated records. 669 Trump"
311,22,Organization attorneys became aware of the June 9 meeting no later than the first week of June
311,23,"2017, when they began interviewing the meeting participants, and the Trump Organization"
311,24,attorneys provided the emails setting up the meeting to the President's personal counsel. 670 Mark
311,25,"Corallo, who had been hired as a spokesman for the President 's personal legal team, recalled that"
311,26,"he learned about the June 9 meeting around June 21 or 22, 201 7. 671 Priebus recalled learning about"
311,27,the June 9 meeting from Fox News host Sean Hannity in late June 2017. 672 Priebu s notified one
311,28,663
311,29,"Hick s 3/13/18 302, at 1; Raffel 2/8/ 18 302, at 2."
311,30,"664 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email , Goldstone to Trump Jr.); @D onaldJTrumpJR 7/ 11/17 (11:01 a.m."
311,31,ET) Tweet.
311,32,"665 RG000061 (6/3/16 Email, Trump Jr. to Goldstone); @DonaldJTrumpJR 7/11/17 (l 1:01 a.m."
311,33,ET) Tweet.
311,34,666
311,35,"Samochornov 7/12/17 302, at 4."
311,36,667
311,37,"See Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra (describing meeting in detail)."
311,38,"668 Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 8 (Response to Question I, Parts (a)"
311,39,through (c)). The President declined to answer questions about his knowledge of the June 9 meeti ng or
311,40,other events after the election.
311,41,"669 DJTFP _SCO _pDF _00000001 -02 (5/17/17 Letter, SSCI to Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.)."
311,42,670
311,43,"Goldstone 2/8/18 302, at 12; 6/2/17 and 6/5/17 Emails, Goldstone & Garten; Raffel 2/8/18 302,"
311,44,"at 3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2."
311,45,671
311,46,"Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 3."
311,47,672
311,48,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 7."
311,49,99
311,50,NA
312,1,U.S. Department of Justice
312,2,At:temey Werle Predttet // Mt1)'Cettttlitt Mt1terit1lPreteeteEIUrtEierFee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
312,3,"of the President 's personal attorneys, who told Priebus he was already working on it.673 By late"
312,4,674
312,5,"June, several advisors recalled receiving media inquiries that could relate to the June 9 meeting."
312,6,2. The President Directs Communications                  Staff Not to Publicly     Disclose
312,7,Information About the June 9 Meeting
312,8,Communications advisors Hope Hicks and Josh Raffel recalled discussing with Jared
312,9,675
312,10,Kushner and Ivanka Trump that the emails were damaging and would inevitably be leaked.
312,11,Hicks and Raffel advised that the best strategy was to proactively release the emails to the press. 676
312,12,"On or about June 22, 2017, Hicks attended a meeting in the White House residence with the"
312,13,"President , Kushner, and Ivanka Trump. 677 According to Hicks , Kushner said that he wanted to fill"
312,14,the President in on something that had been discovered in the documents he was to provide to the
312,15,"congressional committees involving a meeting with him, Manafort , and Trump Jr. 678 Kushner"
312,16,"brought a folder of documents to the meeting and tried to show them to the President , but the"
312,17,"President stopped Kushner and said he did not want to know about it, shutting the conversation"
312,18,down. 679
312,19,"On June 28, 2017, Hicks viewed the emails at Kushner ' s attorney's office. 680 She recalled"
312,20,"being shocked by the emails because they looked ""really bad."" 681 The next day , Hicks spoke"
312,21,"privat ely with the President to mention her concern about the emai ls, which she understood were"
312,22,soon going to be shared with Congress. 682 The President seemed upset because too many people
312,23,knew about the emails and he told Hicks that just one lawyer should deal with the matter. 683 The
312,24,"President indicated that he did not think the emails would leak, but said they would leak if everyone"
312,25,had access to them. 684
312,26,673
312,27,"Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 7."
312,28,674
312,29,"Corallo 2/ 15/ 18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at 8; Raffel 2/8/ l 8 302, at 3."
312,30,675
312,31,"Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2."
312,32,676
312,33,"Raffel 2/8/ 18 302, at 2-3, 5; Hicks 3/13/ l 8 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at 8."
312,34,677
312,35,"Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 6-7; Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, at I."
312,36,678
312,37,"Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1."
312,38,679
312,39,"Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 7; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at I. Counsel for Ivanka Trump provided an attorney"
312,40,proffer that is consistent with Hicks's account and with the other events involving lvanka Trump set forth
312,41,in this section of the report. Kushner said that he did not recall talking to the President at this time about
312,42,"the June 9 meeting or the underlying emails. Kushner 4/11/18 302, at 30."
312,43,680
312,44,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 1-2."
312,45,681
312,46,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2."
312,47,682
312,48,"Hicks I 2/7117 302 , at 8."
312,49,683
312,50,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8."
312,51,684
312,52,"Hicks 12/7/ l 7 302 , at 8."
312,53,100
312,54,NA
313,1,U.S. Department of Justice
313,2,Atleffle)· Werk Predttet // Moy Cetttoitt Material Pl'eteeted Uttder Fed . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
313,3,"Later that day, Hicks, Kushner, and Ivanka Trump went together to talk to the President. 685"
313,4,Hicks recalled that Kushner told the President the June 9 meeting was not a big deal and was about
313,5,"Russian adoption, but that emails existed setting up the meeting. 686 Hicks said she wanted to get"
313,6,"in front of the story and have Trump Jr. release the emails as part of an interview with ""so ftball"
313,7,"questions."" 687 The President said he did not want to know about it and they should not go to the"
313,8,"press. 688 Hicks warned the President that the emails were ""really bad "" and the story would be"
313,9,"""mass ive"" when it broke , but the President was insistent that he did not want to talk about it and"
313,10,said he did not want details. 689 Hicks recalled that the President asked Kushner when his document
313,11,°
313,12,production was due. 69 Kushner responded that it would be a couple of weeks and the President
313,13,"said, ""then leave it alone."" 69 1 Hicks also recalled that the President said Kushner's attorney should"
313,14,"give the emails to whomever he needed to give them to , but the President did not think they would"
313,15,be leaked to the press. 692 Raffel later heard from Hicks that the President had directed the group
313,16,not to be proactive in disclosing the emails because the President believed they would not leak. 693
313,17,3. The President Directs Trump Jr.'s Response to Press Inquiries About the
313,18,June 9 Meeting
313,19,"The following week, the President departed on an overseas trip for the G20 summit in"
313,20,"Hamburg, Germany, accompanied by Hicks, Raffel, Kushner , and Tvanka Trump , among others. 694"
313,21,"On July 7, 2017, while the President was overseas, Hicks and Raffel learned that the New York"
313,22,"Times was working on a story about the June 9 meeting. 695 The next day, Hicks told the President"
313,23,about the story and he directed her not to comment. 696 Hicks thought the President's reaction was
313,24,odd because he usually co nsidered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin .697 Later that
313,25,"day , Hicks and the President again spoke about the story. 698 Hicks recalled that the President asked"
313,26,685
313,27,"Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 8; Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 2."
313,28,686
313,29,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 2; Hicks 12/7/17 302 , at 9."
313,30,687
313,31,"Hick s 3/13/18 302 , at 2-3."
313,32,688
313,33,"Hicks 3/13/18 302 , at 2-3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9."
313,34,689
313,35,"Hick s 3/ 13/ 18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 9."
313,36,690
313,37,"Hicks 3/ 13/ 18 302, at 3."
313,38,691
313,39,"Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 3."
313,40,692
313,41,"Hicks 12/7/ 17 3 02, at 9."
313,42,693
313,43,"Raffel 2/8/ 18 302, at 5."
313,44,694
313,45,"Raffel 2/8/18 302 , at 6."
313,46,695
313,47,"Raffel 2/8/ 18 3 02, at 6-7; Hicks 3/ 13/ l 8 3 02, at 3."
313,48,696
313,49,"Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at 10; Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3."
313,50,697
313,51,"Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 10."
313,52,698
313,53,"Hicks 3/13/ I 8 302, at 3."
313,54,10 I
313,55,NA
314,1,U.S. Department of Justice
314,2,"Atterfte,, Werle Prnattet // Mtty Cefttttift Mttterittl Preteetea Uttaer Fea. R . Crim. P. 6(e)"
314,3,"her what the meeting had been about, and she said that she had been told the meeting was about"
314,4,"Russian adoption. 699 The President responded, ""then just say that."" 700"
314,5,"On the flight home from the G20 on July 8, 2017, Hicks obtained a draft statement about"
314,6,the meeting to be released by Trump Jr. and brought it to the President. 701 The draft statement
314,7,began with a reference to the information that was offered by the Russians in setting up the
314,8,"meeting: "" I was asked to have a meeting by an acquaintance I knew from the 2013 Miss Universe"
314,9,"pageant with an individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign."" 702"
314,10,"Hicks again wanted to disclose the entire story, but the President directed that the statement not be"
314,11,issued because it said too much. 703 The President told Hicks to say only that Trump Jr. took a brief
314,12,"meeting and it was about Russian adoption. 704 After speaking with the President, Hicks texted"
314,13,Trump Jr. a revised statement on the June 9 meeting that read:
314,14,It was a short meeting. I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We discussed a program about
314,15,the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular with American families years
314,16,"ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it was not a campaign issue at"
314,17,that time and there was no follow up. 705
314,18,"Hicks ' s text concluded , ""Are you ok with this? Attributed to you."" 706 Trump Jr. responded by"
314,19,"text message that he wanted to add the word ""primarily"" before ""discussed"" so that the statement"
314,20,"would read, ""We primarily discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children."" 707 Trump"
314,21,"Jr. texted that he wanted the change because ""[t]hey started with some Hillary thing which was bs"
314,22,"and some other nonsense which we shot down fast. "" 708 Hicks texted back, ""I think that's right too"
314,23,but boss man worried it invites a lot of questions[.) [U]ltimately [d]efer to you and [your attorney]
314,24,on that word Be I know it's important and I think the mention of a campaign issue adds something
314,25,"to it in case we have to go further. "" 709 Trump Jr. responded , ""lfl don't have it in there it appears"
314,26,"as though I'm lying later when they inevitably leak something ."" 710 Trump Jr. ' s statement-adding"
314,27,699
314,28,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 3; Hicks 12/7/17 302, at I 0."
314,29,700
314,30,"Hicks 3/13/ l 8 302, at 3; see Hicks 12/7/ 17 302, at I 0."
314,31,701
314,32,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 4."
314,33,702
314,34,Hicks 7/8/17 Notes.
314,35,703
314,36,"Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 4-5; Hicks I 2/7117 302, at 11."
314,37,704
314,38,"Hicks 12/7/17 302, at 11."
314,39,705
314,40,"SCRO 11a_000004 (7/8/ 17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.)."
314,41,706
314,42,"SCR01 la _000004 (7/8/17 Text Message, Hicks to Trump Jr.)."
314,43,707
314,44,"SCRO 11a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message , Trump Jr. to Hicks)."
314,45,708
314,46,"SCROl la_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message , Trump Jr. to Hicks)."
314,47,709
314,48,"SCRO 11a_000005 (7/8/17 Text Message , Hicks to Trump Jr.)."
314,49,710
314,50,"SCRO l la_000006 (7/8/ 17 Text Messa ge, Trump Jr. to Hicks)."
314,51,102
314,52,NA
315,1,U.S. Department of Justice
315,2,Al:terHey '.\'erk Presttet // Mtt)' Cefltttifl Mttterittl Preteetes Uf!der Fee. R . Crim. P. 6(e)
315,3,"the word ""primarily"" and making other minor additions-was                  then provided to the New York"
315,4,Times .711 The full statement provided to the Times stated:
315,5,It was a short introductory meeting.           I asked Jared and Paul to stop by. We primarily
315,6,discussed a program about the adoption of Russian children that was active and popular
315,7,"with American families years ago and was since ended by the Russian government, but it"
315,8,was not a campaign issue at the time and there was no follow up. I was asked to attend the
315,9,"meeting by an acquaintance, but was not told the name of the person I would be meeting"
315,10,with beforehand. 712
315,11,The statement did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton or any discussion
315,12,"of the Magnitsky Act or U.S. sanctions, which were the principal subjects of the meeting, as"
315,13,"described in Volume I, Section IV.A.5, supra ."
315,14,"A short while later, while still on Air Force One , Hicks learned that Priebus knew about"
315,15,"the emails, which further convinced her that additional information about the June 9 meeting would"
315,16,leak and the White House should be proactive and get in front of the story. 713 Hicks recalled again
315,17,"going to the President to urge him that they should be fully transparent about the June 9 meeting,"
315,18,"but he again said no , telling Hicks, ""You've given a statement. We're done."" 7 14"
315,19,"Later on the flight home, Hicks went to the President's cabin, where the President was on"
315,20,the phone with one of his personal attorneys. 715 At one point the President handed the phone to
315,21,"Hicks, and the attorney told Hicks that he had been working with Circa News on a separate story ,"
315,22,and that she should not talk to the New York Times. 716
315,23,"4. The Media Reports on the June 9, 2016 Meeting"
315,24,"Before the President's flight home from the G20 landed, the New York Times published"
315,25,"its story about the June 9, 2016 meeting. 717 In addition to the statement from Trump Jr., the Times"
315,26,story also quoted a statement from Corallo on behalf of the President's legal team suggesting that
315,27,the meeting might have been a setup by individuals working with the firm that produced the Steele
315,28,reporting. 718 Corallo also worked with Circa News on a story published an hour later that
315,29,7 11
315,30,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; see Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin"
315,31,"During Campaign , New York Times (July 8, 2017)."
315,32,712
315,33,"See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawy er Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New"
315,34,"York Times (July 8, 2017)."
315,35,713
315,36,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 6; Raffel 2/8/18 302, at 9-10 ."
315,37,714
315,38,"Hick s 12/7/17 302 , at 12; Raffel 2/8/18 302 , at 10."
315,39,7 15
315,40,"Hicks 3/ 13/18 302 , at 7."
315,41,716
315,42,"Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 7."
315,43,717
315,44,"See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawy er Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New"
315,45,"York Times (July 8, 2017); Raffel 2/8/ 18 302, at I 0."
315,46,718
315,47,"See Jo Becker et al., Trump Team Met With Lawyer Linked to Kremlin During Campaign, New"
315,48,"York Times (July 8, 2017)."
315,49,103
315,50,NA
316,1,U.S. Department of Justice
316,2,"AtterHey \\'erk Preelttet // Ma:,·CeHtaifl Material Preteeteel UHelerFeel.R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
316,3,questioned whether Democratic operatives had arranged the June 9 meeting to create the
316,4,appearance of improper connections between Russia and Trump family members. 7 19 Hicks was
316,5,upset about Corallo's public statement and called him that evening to say the President had not
316,6,approved the statement. 720
316,7,"The next day, July 9, 2017, Hicks and the President called Corallo together and the"
316,8,President criticized Corallo for the statement he had released. 721 Corallo told the President the
316,9,statement had been authorized and further observed that Trump Jr. 's statement was inaccurate and
316,10,that a document existed that would contradict it.722 Corallo said that he purposely used the term
316,11,"""document"" to refer to the emails setting up the June 9 meeting because he did not know what the"
316,12,"President knew about the emails. 723 Corallo recalled that when he referred to the ""document"" on"
316,13,"the call with the President , Hicks responded that only a few people had access to it and said ""it"
316,14,"will never get out."" 724 Corallo took contemporaneous notes of the call that say: ""Also mention"
316,15,"existence of doc. Hope says ' only a few people have it. It will never get out.""' 725 Hicks later told"
316,16,investigators that she had no memory of making that comment and had always believed the emails
316,17,"would eventually be leaked, but she might have been channeling the President on the phone call"
316,18,because it was clear to her throughout her conversations with the President that he did not think
316,19,the emaiis would leak.726
316,20,"On July 11, 2017, Trump Jr. posted redacted images of the emails setting up the June 9"
316,21,"meeting on Twitter; the New York Times reported that he did so ""[a]fter being told that The Times"
316,22,"was about to publish the content of the emails."" 727 Later that day, the media reported that the"
316,23,President had been personally involved in preparing Trump Jr.'s initial statement to the New York
316,24,"Times that had claimed the meeting ""primarily"" concerned ""a program about the adoption of"
316,25,"Russian children ."" 728 Over the next several days, the President 's personal counsel repeatedly and"
316,26,719
316,27,See Donald Trump Jr. gathered members of campaign/or meeting with Russian lawyer before
316,28,"election, Circa News (July 8, 2017)."
316,29,720
316,30,"Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 8; Corallo2/ 15/l 8 302, at 6- 7."
316,31,72 1
316,32,"Corallo 2/ 15/ 18 302, at 7."
316,33,722
316,34,"Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 7."
316,35,723
316,36,"Corallo 2/15/18302, at 7-9."
316,37,724
316,38,"Corallo 2/15/ 18 302, at 8."
316,39,725
316,40,"Corallo 2/15/18 302, at 8; Corallo 7/9/17Notes (""Sunday 9th - Hope calls w/ POTUSon line"")."
316,41,"Corallosaid he is ""I 00% confident""that Hicks said ""It will neverget out"" on the call. Corallo2/ 15/18302,"
316,42,at 9.
316,43,726
316,44,"Hicks 3/13/18302, at 9."
316,45,727
316,46,"@DonaldJTrumpJR7/11/17(11:01 a.m. ET) Tweet; Jo Becker et al., Russian Dirt on Clinton ?"
316,47,"'I Love It, 'Donald Trump Jr. Said, New York Times (July 11, 2017)."
316,48,728
316,49,"See, e.g., Peter Baker & Maggie Haberman,Rancor at White House as Russia Story Refuses to"
316,50,"Let the Page Turn, New York Times (July 11, 2017) (reporting that the President ""signed off ' on Trump"
316,51,Jr.'s statement).
316,52,104
316,53,NA
317,1,U.S. Department of Justice
317,2,Att0rAey Werk Pr0attet // May C0AtaiA Material Pr0teetea UAaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
317,3,729
317,4,inaccurately denied that the President played any role in drafting Trump Jr. 's statement.             After
317,5,"consulting with the President on the issue , White House Press Secretary Sarah Sanders told the"
317,6,"media that the President ""certainly didn't dictate"" the statement, but that ""he weighed in, offered"
317,7,"suggestions like any father would do."" 730 Several months later, the President's personal counsel"
317,8,"stated in a private communication to the Special Counsel's Office that ""the President dictated a"
317,9,"short but accurate response to the New York Times article on behalf of his son, Donald Trump,"
317,10,"Jr."" 731 The President later told the press that it was ""irrelevant"" whether he dictated the statement"
317,11,"and said, ""It's a statement to the New York Times .... That's not a statement to a high tribunal of"
317,12,"judges. "" 732"
317,13,ecial Counsel's Office                                      Trump Jr.
317,14,related to the June 9 meeting and those who attended the
317,15,"On July 19, 2017, the President had his follow-up meeting with Lewandowski and then"
317,16,met with reporters for the New York Times. In addition to criticizing Sessions in his Times
317,17,"interview , the President addressed the June 9, 2016 meeting and said he ""didn't know anything"
317,18,"about the meeting"" at the time. 734 The President added, ""A s I've said-most other people , you"
317,19,"know, when they call up and say, 'By the way, we have information on your opponent,' I think"
317,20,"most politicians - I was just with a lot of people , they said ... , 'Who wouldn ' t have taken a"
317,21,"meeting like that?""' 735"
317,22,Analysis
317,23,In analyzing the President's actions regarding the disclosure of information about the June
317,24,"9 meeting, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:"
317,25,"a.        Obstructive act. On at least three occasions between Jun e 29, 2017, and July 9,"
317,26,"2017, the President directed Hicks and others not to publicly disclose information about the June"
317,27,729
317,28,"See, e.g., David Wright, Trump lawyer: President was aware of ""nothing"" , CNN (July 12, 2017)"
317,29,"(quoting the President's personal attorney as saying, ""I wasn't involved in the statement drafting at all nor"
317,30,"was the President.""); see also Good Morning America, ABC (July 12, 2017) (""The President didn't sign"
317,31,"off on anything . .. . The President wasn't involved in that.""); Meet the Press, NBC (July 16, 2017) (""I do"
317,32,"want to be clear-the President was not involved in the drafting of the statement."")."
317,33,"730 Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2017); Sanders 7 /3/18 302, at 9"
317,34,"(the President told Sanders he ""weighed in, as any father would"" and knew she intended to tell the press"
317,35,what he ·said).
317,36,731
317,37,"1/29/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 18."
317,38,732
317,39,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle (June 15, 2018)."
317,40,733
317,41,"734 Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July"
317,42,"19,2017)."
317,43,735
317,44,"Peter Baker et al., Excerpts From The Times 's Interview With Trump, New York Times (July"
317,45,"19, 2017) ."
317,46,105
317,47,NA
318,1,U.S. Department of Justice
318,2,AttarRey Wark Praattet // May Cafltttifl Material Prateeteti URaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
318,3,"9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and a Russian attorney. On June 29, Hicks"
318,4,"warned the President that the emails setting up the June 9 meeting were ""really bad "" and the story"
318,5,"would be ""massive"" when it broke, but the President told her and Kushner to ""leave it alone. """
318,6,"Early on July 8, after Hicks told the President the New York Times was working on a story about"
318,7,"the June 9 meeting, the President directed her not to comment, even though Hicks said that the"
318,8,"President usually considered not responding to the press to be the ultimate sin. Later that day, the"
318,9,President rejected Trump Jr. 's draft statement that would have acknowledged that the meeting was
318,10,"with ""a n individual who I was told might have information helpful to the campaign ."" The"
318,11,President then dictated a statement to Hicks that said the meeting was about Russian adoption
318,12,(which the President had twice been told was discussed at the meeting) . The statement dictated
318,13,by the President did not mention the offer of derogatory information about Clinton.
318,14,Each of these efforts by the President involved his communications team and was directed
318,15,"at the press. They would amount to obstructive acts only if the President , by taking these actions,"
318,16,sought to withhold information from or mislead congressional investigators or the Special Counsel.
318,17,"On May 17, 2017, the President's campaign receiv ed a document request from SSCI that clearly"
318,18,"covered the June 9 meeting and underlying emails , and those documents also plainly would have"
318,19,been relevant to the Special Counsel ' s investigation .
318,20,But the evidence does not establish that the President took steps to prevent the emails or
318,21,other information about the June 9 meeting from being provided to Congress or the Special
318,22,Counsel. The series of discussions in which the President sought to limit access to the emails and
318,23,prevent their public release occurred in the context of developing a press strategy . The only
318,24,"evidence ,we have of the President discussing the production of documents to Congress or the"
318,25,"Special Counsel is the conversation on June 29, 2017, when Hicks recalled the President"
318,26,acknowledging that Kushner 's attorney should provide emails related to the June 9 meeting to
318,27,whomever he needed to give them to. We do not have evidence of what the President discussed
318,28,with his own lawyers at that time.
318,29,"b.     Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above, by the time of the President's"
318,30,"attempts to prevent the public release of the emails regarding the June 9 meeting, the existence of"
318,31,"a grand jury investigation supervised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge, and the"
318,32,President had been told that the emails were responsive to congressional inquiries. To satisfy the
318,33,"nexus requirement, however, it would be necessary to show that preventing the release of the"
318,34,emails to the public would have the natural and probable effect of impeding the grand jury
318,35,"proceeding or congressional inquiries. As noted abov e, the evidence does not establish that the"
318,36,President sought to prevent disclosur e of the emails in those official proceedings.
318,37,c.      intent. The evidence establishes the President' s substantial involvement in the
318,38,communications strategy related to information about his campaign's connections to Rus sia and
318,39,his desire to minimize public disclosures about those connection s. The President became aware
318,40,"of the emails no later than June 29, 2017, when he discussed them with Hicks and Kushner , and"
318,41,"he could have been aware of them as early as June 2, 2017, when lawyers for the Trump"
318,42,Organi zation began interviewing witnesses who participated in the June 9 meeting. The President
318,43,thereafter repeatedly rejected the advice of Hicks and other staffers to publicly release information
318,44,about the June 9 meeting. The President expressed concern that multiple people had access to the
318,45,emails and instructed Hicks that only one lawyer should deal with the matter. And the President
318,46,106
318,47,NA
319,1,U.S. Department of Justice
319,2,At:tarfl.e~·\\'ark Praattet // May CaRtaifl Material Prateetea URaer Fee. R. Crim . P . 6(e)
319,3,dictated a statement to be released by Trump Jr. in response to the first press accounts of the June
319,4,9 meeting that said the meeting was about adoption.
319,5,"But as described above , the evidence does not establish that the President intended to"
319,6,prevent the Special Counsel's Office or Congress from obtaining the emails setting up the June 9
319,7,meeting or other information about that meeting. The statement recorded by Corallo-that               the
319,8,"emails ""will never get out""-can be explained as reflecting a belief that the emails would not be"
319,9,"made public if the President's press strategy were followed, even if the emails were provided to"
319,10,Congress and the Special Counsel.
319,11,H.        The President's Further Efforts to Have the Attorney General Take Over the
319,12,Investigation
319,13,Overview
319,14,"From summer 2017 through 2018 , the President attempted to have Attorney General"
319,15,"Sessions reverse his recusal , take control of the Special Counsel's investigation , and order an"
319,16,investigation of Hillary Clinton.
319,17,Evidence
319,18,1. The President Again Seeks to Have Sessions Reverse his Recusal
319,19,"After returning Sessions's resignation letter at the end of May 2017 , but before the"
319,20,"President's July 19, 2017 New York Times interview in which he publicly criticized Sessions for"
319,21,"recusing from the Russia investigation, the President took additional steps to have Sessions reverse"
319,22,"his recusal. In particular, at some point after the May 17, 2017 appointment of the Special Counsel,"
319,23,"Sessions recalled, the President called him at home and asked if Sess ions would ""unrecuse """
319,24,"himself. 736 According to Sessions, the President asked him to reverse his recusal so that Sessions"
319,25,"could direct the Department of Justice to investigate and prosecute Hillary Clinton, and the ""gist"""
319,26,"of the conversation was that the President wanted Sessions to unrecus e from ""all of it,"" including"
319,27,"the Special Counsel's Russia investigation. 737 Sessions listened but did not respond, and he did"
319,28,not reverse his recusal or order an investigation of Clinton. 738
319,29,"In early July 2017, the President asked Staff Secretary Rob Porter what he thought of"
319,30,Associat e Attorney General Rachel Brand .739 Porter recalled that the President asked him if Brand
319,31,"was good, tough, and ""o n the team. "" 740 The President also asked if Porter thought Brand was"
319,32,interested in being responsible for the Special Counsel's investigation and whether she would want
319,33,736
319,34,"Sessions I /17/18 302, at 15. That was the second time that the President asked Sessions to"
319,35,"reverse his recusal from campaign-related investigations. See Volume II, Section 11.C.1, supra (describing"
319,36,President's March 2017 request at Mar-a-Lago for Sessions to unrecuse).
319,37,737
319,38,"Sessions 1/ 17/18 302, at 15."
319,39,738
319,40,"Sessions 1/17/18 302, at 15."
319,41,739
319,42,"Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6."
319,43,740
319,44,"Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/ 18 302, at 6."
319,45,107
319,46,NA
320,1,U.S. Department of Justice
320,2,"A*eirHeyWerk Pre,tl1:1et     // May CeiHtaiHMaterial Preiteetetl UHtlerFetl. R. Crim. P. 6Ee)"
320,3,"to be Attorney General one day. 74 1 Because Pmter knew Brand, the President asked him to sound"
320,4,742
320,5,her out about taking responsibility for the investigation and being Attorney General.
320,6,"Contemporaneous notes taken by Porter show that the President told Porter to ""Keep in touch with"
320,7,"your friend ,"" in reference to Brand. 743 Later , the President asked Porter a few times in passing"
320,8,"whether he had spoken to Brand, but Porter did not reach out to her because he was uncomfortable"
320,9,"with the task. 744 In asking him to reach out to Brand , Porter understood the President to want to"
320,10,"find someone to end the Russia investigation or fire the Special Counsel, although the President"
320,11,never said so explicitly. 745 Porter did not contact Brand because he was sensitive to the
320,12,implications of that action and did not want to be involved in a chain of events associated with an
320,13,effort to end the investigation or fire the Special Counsel. 746
320,14,"McGahn recalled that during the summer of 201 7, he and the President discussed the fact"
320,15,that if Sessions were no longer in his position the Special Counsel would report directly to a non-
320,16,recused Attorney General. 747 McGahn told the President that things might not change much under
320,17,"a new Attorney General. 748 McGahn also recalled that in or around July 2017 , the President"
320,18,frequently brought up his displeasure with Sessions. 749 Hicks recalled that the President viewed
320,19,Sessions's recusal from the Russia investigation as an act of disloyalty .750 In addition to criticizing
320,20,"Sessions's recusal , the President raised other concerns about Sessions and his job performance"
320,21,with McGahn and Hicks. 751
320,22,741
320,23,"Porter 4/13/ I 8 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6. Because of Sessions 's recusal, if Rosenstein"
320,24,"were no longer in his position, Brand would, by default, become the DOJ official in charge of supervising"
320,25,"the Special Counsel's investigation, and if both Sessions and Rosenstein were removed, Brand would be"
320,26,next in line to become Acting Attorney General for all DOJ matters. See 28 U.S.C. § 508.
320,27,742
320,28,"Porter 4/13/18 302, at 11; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 6."
320,29,743
320,30,SC_ RRP000020 (Potter 7/10/17 Notes).
320,31,744
320,32,"Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at I 1-12."
320,33,745
320,34,"Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 11-12."
320,35,746
320,36,"Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 11-12. Brand confirmed that no one ever raised with her the prospect of"
320,37,"taking over the Russia investigation or becoming Attorney General. Brand 1/29/ 19 302, at 2."
320,38,747
320,39,"McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 11."
320,40,748
320,41,"McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 11."
320,42,749
320,43,"McGahn 12/14/ 17 302, at 9."
320,44,750
320,45,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 10."
320,46,751
320,47,"McGahn 12/14/17 302, at 9; Hicks 3/ 13/ l 8 302, at 10."
320,48,108
320,49,NA
321,1,U.S. Department of Justice
321,2,"Aaerfle:,· Wark Pretittet // Mu:,·Cafltttifl:Muterittl Pt1ateetetiUfl:tierFeti. R. Ct1im.P. 6(e)"
321,3,2. Additional Efforts to Have Sessions Unrecuse or Direct Investigations Covered
321,4,by his Recusal
321,5,"Later in 2017 , the President continued to urge Sessions to reverse his recusal from"
321,6,campaign-related investigations and considered replacing Sessions with an Attorney General who
321,7,would not be recused.
321,8,"On October 16, 2017, the President met privately with Sessions and said that the"
321,9,Department of Justice was not investigating individuals and events that the President thought the
321,10,"Department should be investigating. 752 According to contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, who"
321,11,"was at the meeting, the President mentioned Clinton's emails and said, ""Don 't have to tell us, just"
321,12,"take [a] look."" 753 Sessions did not offer any assurances or promises to the President that the"
321,13,"Department of Justice would comply with that request. 754 Two days later, on October 18, 2017 ,"
321,14,"the President tweeted, ""Wow, FBI confirms report that James Comey drafted letter exonerating"
321,15,"Crooked Hillary Clinton long before investigation was complete. Many people not interviewed,"
321,16,including Clinton herself. Comey stated under oath that he didn't do this-obviously a fix? Where
321,17,"is Justice Dept? "" 755 On October 29, 2017, the President tweeted that there was ""A NGER &"
321,18,"UNITY"" over a ""lack of investigation"" of Clinton arid ""the Comey fix ,"" and concluded : "" DO"
321,19,"SOMETHTNG!"" 756"
321,20,"On December 6, 2017, five days after Flynn pleaded gui lty to lying about his contacts with"
321,21,"the Russian government, the President asked to speak with Sessions in the Oval Office at the end"
321,22,"of a cabinet meeting. 757 During that Oval Office meeting , which Porter attended , the President"
321,23,"again suggested that Sessions could "" unrecuse,"" which Porter linked to taking back supervision of"
321,24,the Russia investigation and directing an investigation of Hillary Clinton. 758 According to
321,25,"contemporaneous notes taken by Porter, the President said , ""T don't know if you could un-recuse"
321,26,yourself. You'd be a hero. Not telling yo u to do anything. Dershowitz says POTUS can get
321,27,involved. Can order AG to investigate . I don 't want to get involved. I'm not going to get involved.
321,28,"I'm not going to do anything or direct you to do anything . I just want to be treated fairly."" 759"
321,29,"According to Porter's notes, Sessions responded, ""We are taking steps; whole new leadership"
321,30,752
321,31,"Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10."
321,32,753
321,33,"SC RRP000024 (Porter 10/ 16/17 Notes); see Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10."
321,34,754
321,35,"Porter 5/8/18 302, at 10."
321,36,755
321,37,@realDonaldTrump 10/ 18/ 17 (6:21 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 10/18/17 (6:27 a.m.
321,38,ET) Tweet.
321,39,756
321,40,@realDonaldTrump 10/29/ 17 (9:53 a.m. ET) Tweet;@realDonaldTrump 10/29/ 17 (10:02 a.m.
321,41,ET) Tweet; @rea!DonaldTrump 10/29/17 ( 10:17 a.m. ET) Tweet.
321,42,757
321,43,"Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 5-6; see SC_RRP000031 (Porter 12/6/ 17 Notes) ("" 12:45pm With the"
321,44,"President, Gen. Kelly, and Sessions (who I pulled in after the Cabinet meeting)""); SC_RRP000033 (Porter"
321,45,"12/6/17 Notes) (""Post-cabinet meeting - POTUS asked me to get AG Sessions. Asked me to stay. Also"
321,46,"COS Kelly."")."
321,47,758
321,48,"Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12; Porter 4/ 13/l 8 302, at 5-6."
321,49,759
321,50,"SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/17 Notes); see Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 6; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 12."
321,51,109
321,52,NA
322,1,U.S. Department of Justice
322,2,"AUtmte, Werk Pr0euet // Ma,· C0ntain Matertal Pr0teetee Under Fee. R. Critt1. P. 6(e)"
322,3,"team. Professionals; will operate according to the law ."" 760 Sessions also said, ""I never saw"
322,4,"anything that was improper,"" which Porter thought was noteworthy because it did not fit with the"
322,5,previous discussion about Clinton. 761 Porter understood Sessions to be reassuring the President
322,6,that he was on the President's team. 762
322,7,"At the end of December, the President told the New York Times it was ""too bad"" that"
322,8,Sessions had recused himself from the Russia investigation. 763 When asked whether Holder had
322,9,"been a more loyal Attorney General to President Obama than Sessions was to him, the President"
322,10,"said , ""I don ' t want to get into loyalty , but I will tell you that , I will say this: Holder protected"
322,11,"President Obama. Totally protected him . When you look at the things that they did , and Holder"
322,12,"protected the president. And (have great respect for that, I'll be honest."" 764 Later in January, the"
322,13,"President brought up the idea ofreplacing Sessions and told Porter that he wanted to ""clean house """
322,14,at the Department of Justice. 765 In a meeting in the White House residence that Porter attended on
322,15,"January 27, 2018, Porter recalled that the President talked about the great attorneys he had in the"
322,16,"past with successful win records, such as Roy Cohn and Jay Goldberg, and said that one of his"
322,17,"biggest failings as President was that he had not surrounded himself with good attorneys, citing"
322,18,Sessions as an example. 766 The President raised Sessions's recusal and brought up and criticized
322,19,the Special Counsel's investigation. 767
322,20,"Over the next several months , the President continued to criticize Sessions in tweets and"
322,21,media interviews and on several occasions appeared to publicly encourage him to take action in
322,22,"the Russia investigation despite his recusal. 768 On June 5, 2018, for example, the President"
322,23,760
322,24,"SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/ 17 Notes); see Porter 4/13/18 302, at 6."
322,25,761
322,26,"SC_RRP000033 (Porter 12/6/ 17 Notes); Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 6."
322,27,762
322,28,"Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 6-7."
322,29,763
322,30,"Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US. ""Look Very"
322,31,"Bad"" , New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017)."
322,32,"764 Michael S. Schmidt & Michael D. Shear, Trump Says Russia Inquiry Makes US. ""Look Very"
322,33,"Bad"", New York Times (Dec. 28, 2017)."
322,34,765
322,35,"Porter 4/13/18 302, at 14."
322,36,766
322,37,"Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15. Contemporaneous notes Porter took of the conversation state, ""Roy"
322,38,"Cohn (14-0) / Jay Goldberg (12-0)."" SC_RRP000047 (Potter 1/27/18 Notes)."
322,39,767
322,40,"Porter 5/8/18 302, at 15-16."
322,41,768
322,42,"See, e.g., @realDonaldTrump 2/28/ 18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet (""Why is A.G. Jeff Sessions asking"
322,43,"the Inspector General to investigate potentially massive FISA abuse. Will take forever, has no prosecutorial"
322,44,power and already late with reports on Comey etc. Isn't the I.G. an Obama guy? Why not use Justice
322,45,"Depattment lawyers? DISGRACEFUL!""); @realDonaldTrump 4/7/18 (4:52 p.m. ET) Tweet (""Lawmakers"
322,46,of the House Judiciary Committee are angrily accusing the Department of Justice of missing the Thursday
322,47,"Deadline for turning over UNREDACTED Documents relating to FISA abuse, FBI, Comey, Lynch,"
322,48,"McCabe, Clinton Emails and much more. Slow walking - what is going on? BAD!""); @realDonaldTrump"
322,49,"4/22/18 (8:22 a.m. ET) Tweet ("" 'GOP Lawmakers asking Sessions to Investigate Comey and Hillary"
322,50,"Clinton.' @FoxNews Good luck with that request!""); @realDonaldTrump 12/16/ 18 (3:37 p.m. ET) Tweet"
322,51,110
322,52,NA
323,1,U.S. Department of Justice
323,2,Ai:tarttey Wark P1•aettet // Mtty Catttttitt Material Pwteetee Utteer Fee . R. Crim. P. e(e)
323,3,"tweeted, ""The Russian Witch Hunt Hoax continues, all because Jeff Sessions didn ' t tell me he was"
323,4,going to recuse himself. .. . I would have quickly picked someone else. So much time and money
323,5,"wasted, so many lives ruined ...             and Sess ions knew better than most that there was No"
323,6,"Collusion!"" 769 On August 1, 2018, the President tweeted that '""Attorney General Jeff Sessions"
323,7,"should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now ."" 770 On August 23 , 2018, the President publicly"
323,8,criticized Sessions in a press interview and suggested that prosecutions at the Department of
323,9,Justice were politically motivated because Paul Manafo11 had been prosecuted but Democrats had
323,10,"not. 771 The President said, ""I put in an Attorney General that never took control of the Justice"
323,11,"Department, JeffSessions."" 772 That day, Sessions issued a press statement that said, ""I took control"
323,12,"of the Department of Justice the day I was sworn in .... While I am Attorney General , the actions"
323,13,773
323,14,"of the Department of Justice will not be improperly influenced by political considerations. ""           The"
323,15,"next day, the President tweeted a response: '""Department of Justice will not be improperly"
323,16,"influenced by political considerations.'         Jeff, this is GREAT, what everyone wants , so look into"
323,17,"all of the corruption on the 'other side' including deleted Emails, Comey lies & leaks, Mueller"
323,18,"conflicts , McCabe, Strzok, Page, Ohr, FISA abuse , Christopher Steele & his phony and corrupt"
323,19,"Dossier, the Clinton Foundation, illegal surveillance of Trump campaign, Russian collusion by"
323,20,"Dems - and so much more. Open up the papers & documents without redaction? Come on Jeff,"
323,21,"you can do it, the country is waiting!"" 774"
323,22,"On November 7, 2018, the day after the midterm elections , the President replaced Sessions"
323,23,with Sessions's chief of staff as Acting Attorney General. 775
323,24,Analysis
323,25,In analyzing the President's efforts to have Sessions unr ec use himself and regain control
323,26,"of the Russia investigation, the following considerations and evidence are relevant to the elements"
323,27,of obstruction of justice:
323,28,a. Obstructive act. To determine if the Presid ent ' s effo11s to have the Attorney General
323,29,"unrecuse could qualify as an obstructiv e act, it would be necessary to assess evidence on whether"
323,30,those actions would naturally impede the Russia investigation.              That inquiry would take into
323,31,"account the supervisory role that the Attorney General, if unrecused, would play in the Rus sia"
323,32,investigation . It also would have to take into account that the Attorney General's recusal covered
323,33,"(""Jeff Sessions should be ashamed of himself for allowing this total HOAX to get started in the first"
323,34,"place!"")."
323,35,769
323,36,@realDonaldTrump 6/5/18 (7:31 a.m. ET) Tweet.
323,37,770
323,38,@realDonaldTrump 8/ 1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet.
323,39,771
323,40,"Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018)."
323,41,772
323,42,"Fox & Friends Interview of President Trump, Fox News (Aug . 23, 2018)."
323,43,773
323,44,Sessions 8/23/18 Press Statement.
323,45,774 @ real Donald Trump 8/24/ 18 (6: 17 a.m. ET) Tweet ;@ realDonaldTrump 8/24/ 18 (6:28 a.m. ET)
323,46,Tweet.
323,47,775
323,48,@realDonaldTrump 11/7/18 (2:44 p.m. ET) Tweet.
323,49,I 11
323,50,NA
324,1,U.S. Department of Justice
324,2,At-terAey'.\'erk Pr0a1:1et// May CeAtaiAMaterial Preteetea UAaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
324,3,other campaign-related matters. The inquiry would not tum on what Attorney General Sessions
324,4,"would actually do if unrecused, but on wheth er the efforts to reverse his recusal would naturally"
324,5,have had the effect of impeding the Russia investigation.
324,6,"On multiple occasions in 2017, the President spoke with Sessions about reversing his"
324,7,recusal so that he could take over the Russia investigation and begin an investigation and
324,8,"prosecution of Hillary Clinton. For example, in early summer 2017 , Sessions recalled the"
324,9,"President asking him to unrecuse , but Sessions did not take it as a directive. When the President"
324,10,"raised the issue again in December 2017 , the President said, as recorded by Porter , ""Not telling"
324,11,you to do anything ... . I' m not going to get involv ed. I' m not going to do anything or direct you
324,12,"to do anything . I just want to be treated fairly."" The duration of the President's efforts-which"
324,13,spanned from March 2017 to August 2018-and the fact that the President repeatedly criticized
324,14,Sessions in public and in private for failing to tell the President that he would have to recuse is
324,15,relevant to assessing whether the President ' s effotts to have Sessions unrecuse could qualify as
324,16,obstructive acts.
324,17,"b. Nexus to an official proceeding. As described above , by mid-June 2017, the existence"
324,18,"of a grand jury investigation superv ised by the Special Counsel was public knowledge. In addition ,"
324,19,"in July 2017 , a different grand jury supervised by the Special Counsel was empaneled in the"
324,20,"District of Columbia, and the press reported on the existence of this grand jury in early August"
324,21,2017. 776 Whether the conduct towards the Attorney General would have a foreseeable impact on
324,22,those proceedings turns on much of the same evidence discussed above with respect to the
324,23,obstructive-act element.
324,24,c. Intent. There is evidence that at least one purpose of the President ' s conduct toward
324,25,Sessions was to have Sessions assume control over the Russia investigation and supervise it in a
324,26,"way that would restrict its scope. By the summer of 2017, the President was aware that the Special"
324,27,Counsel was investigating him personally for obstruction of justice. And in the wake of the
324,28,disclosures of emails about the June 9 meeting between Russians and senior members of the
324,29,"campaign , see Volume IT, Section TI.G, supra, it was evident that the investigation into the"
324,30,"campaign now included the President's son, son-in-law , and former campaign manager. The"
324,31,President had previously and unsuccessfully sought to have Sessions publicly announce that the
324,32,Special Counsel investigation would be confined to future election interference. Yet Sessions
324,33,"remained recused . In December 2017, shortly after Flynn pleaded guilty, the President spoke to"
324,34,Sessions in the Oval Office with only Porter present and told Sessions that he would be a hero if
324,35,he unrecused. Porter linked that request to the President's desir e that Sessions take back
324,36,supervision of the Russia investigation and direct an investigation of Hillary Clinton. The
324,37,"President said in that meeting that he ""just want[ ed] to be treated fairl y,"" which could refle ct his"
324,38,perception that it was unfair that he was being investigated while Hillary Clinton was not. But a
324,39,principal effect of that act would be to restore supervision of the Russia investigation to the
324,40,Attorney General-a position that the President frequently suggested should be occupied by
324,41,"someone like Eric Holder and Bobby Kennedy, who the President described as protecting their"
324,42,776
324,43,"E.g., Del Quentin Wilbur & Byron Tau, Special Counsel Robert Mueller Impanels Washington"
324,44,"Grand Jury in Russia Probe, Wall Street Journal (Aug. 3, 2017); Carol D. Leonnig et al., Special Counsel"
324,45,"Mueller using grand jury in federal court in Washington as part of Russia investigation, Washington Post"
324,46,"(Aug. 3, 2017)."
324,47,112
324,48,NA
325,1,U.S. Department of Justice
325,2,Alteme~' Werk Preclttet// Ma)' Cet1:tait1:MaterialPreteeteclURclerFecl. R. Crit'l'I
325,3,. P. 6(e)
325,4,presidents. A reasonable inference from those statements and the President ' s actions is that the
325,5,President believed that an unrecused Attorney General would play a protective role and could
325,6,shield the President from the ongoing Russia investigation .
325,7,I.      The President Orders McGahn to Deny that the President Tried to Fire the
325,8,Special Counsel
325,9,Overview
325,10,"In late January 2018, the media reported that in June 2017 the President had ordered"
325,11,McGahn to have the Special Counsel fired based on purported conflicts of interest but McGahn
325,12,"had refused, saying he would quit instead. After the story broke, the President, through his"
325,13,"personal counsel and two aides , sought to have McGahn deny that he had been directed to remove"
325,14,"the Special Counsel. Each time he was approached , McGahn responded that he would not refute"
325,15,the press accounts because they were accurate in reporting on the President's effort to have the
325,16,Special Counsel removed. The President later personally met with McGahn in the Oval Office
325,17,with only the Chief of Staff present and tried to get McGahn to say that the President never ordered
325,18,him to fire the Special Counsel. McGahn refused and insisted his memory of the President ' s
325,19,"direction to remove the Special Counsel was accurate. In that same meeting , the President"
325,20,challenged McGahn for taking notes of his discussions with the President and asked why he had
325,21,told Special Counsel investigators that he had been directed to have the Special Counsel removed .
325,22,Evidence
325,23,I. The Press Reports that the President Tried to Fire the Special Counsel
325,24,"On January 25, 2018, the New York Times reported that in June 2017 , the President had"
325,25,ordered McGahn to have the Department of Justice fire the Special Counsel. 777 According to the
325,26,"article, ""[a]mid the first wave of news media reports that Mr. Mueller was examining a possible"
325,27,"obstruction case, the president began to argue that Mr. Mueller had three conflicts of interest that"
325,28,"disqualified him from overseeing the investigation. "" 778 The article further reported that "" [a]fter"
325,29,"receiving the president's order to fire Mr. Mueller, the White House counsel ... refused to ask the"
325,30,"Justice Department to dismiss the special counsel , saying he would quit instead."" 779 The article"
325,31,"stated that the president ""ultimately backed down after the White House counsel threatened to"
325,32,"resign rather than carry out the directive."" 780 After the article was published, the President"
325,33,777
325,34,"Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When"
325,35,"White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25.2018) ."
325,36,"778 Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mu eller Fired, but Backed Off When"
325,37,"White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan.25.2018)."
325,38,779
325,39,"Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When"
325,40,"White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan.25 . 2018)."
325,41,780
325,42,"Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When"
325,43,"White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan.25.2018)."
325,44,113
325,45,NA
326,1,U.S. Department of Justice
326,2,AttorHe)' Werle Prot:ltiet// May Cot1taiHMaterial Proteetet:IUt1t:lerFeel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
326,3,"dismissed the story when asked about it by reporters, saying, ""Fake news, folks. Fake news. A"
326,4,"typical New York Times fake story."" 781"
326,5,"The next day, the Washington Post reported on the same event but added that McGahn had"
326,6,not told the President directly that he intended to resign rather than carry out the directive to have
326,7,"the Special Counsel terminated .782 In that respect , the Post story clarified the Times story, which"
326,8,"could be read to suggest that McGahn had told the President of his intention to quit, causing the"
326,9,783
326,10,President to back down from the order to have the Spec ial Counsel fired.
326,11,2. The President Seeks to Have McGahn Dispute the Press Reports
326,12,"On January 26, 2018, the President's personal counsel called McGahn 's attorney and said"
326,13,that the President wanted McGahn to put out a statement denying that he had been asked to tire
326,14,the Special Counsel and that he had threatened to quit in protest. 784 McGahn's attorney spoke with
326,15,McGahn about that request and then called the President's personal counsel to relay that McGahn
326,16,would not make a statement. 785 McGahn 's attorney informed the President's personal counsel that
326,17,the Times story was accurate in reporting that the President wanted the Special Counsel
326,18,"removed. 786 Accordingly, McGahn's attorney said, although the article was inaccurate in some"
326,19,787
326,20,"other respects, McGahn could not comply with the President ' s request to dispute the story."
326,21,Hicks recalled relaying to the President that one of his attorneys had spoken to McGahn ' s attorney
326,22,about the issue. 788
326,23,781
326,24,"Sophie Tatum & Kara Scannell, Trump denies he called for Mueller's firing, CNN (Jan. 26,"
326,25,"2018); Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Ordered Mueller Fired, but Backed Off When"
326,26,"White House Counsel Threatened to Quit, New York Times (Jan. 25, 2018)."
326,27,782
326,28,"The Post article stated, ""Despite internal objections, Trump decided to assert that Mueller had"
326,29,"unacceptable conflicts of interest and moved to remove him from his position. . . . In response, McGahn"
326,30,said he would not remain at the White House if Trump went through with the move.... McGahn did not
326,31,"deliver his resignation threat directly to Trump but was serious about his threat to leave."" Rosalind S."
326,32,"Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fire Mueller in June, bringing White House counsel to the"
326,33,"brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018)."
326,34,783
326,35,"Rosalind S. Helderman & Josh Dawsey, Trump moved to fir e Mueller in June, bringing White"
326,36,"House counsel to the brink of leaving, Washington Post (Jan. 26, 2018); see McGahn 3/8/ 17 302, at 3-4."
326,37,784
326,38,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 3 (agent note)."
326,39,785
326,40,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3 (agent note)."
326,41,786
326,42,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 3-4 (agent note)."
326,43,787
326,44,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4 (agent note)."
326,45,788
326,46,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Hicks also recalled that the President spoke on the phone that day"
326,47,with Chief of Staff John Kelly and that the President said Kelly told him that McGahn had totally refuted
326,48,"the story and was going to put out a statement. Hicks 3/ 13/18 302, at 11. But Kelly said that he did not"
326,49,"speak to McGahn when the article came out and did not tell anyone he had done so. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at"
326,50,1-2.
326,51,114
326,52,NA
327,1,U.S. Department of Justice
327,2,Atterttey \llerk Predttet // May Cetttttitt Mttterittl Preteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
327,3,"Also on January 26, 2017, Hicks recalled that the President asked Sanders to contact"
327,4,McGahn about the story .789 McGahn told Sanders there was no need to respond and indicated that
327,5,°
327,6,"some of the article was accurate. 79 Consistent with that position , McGahn did not correct the"
327,7,Times story.
327,8,"On February 4, 20 l 8, Priebus appeared on Meet the Press and said he had not heard the"
327,9,"President say that he wanted the Special Counsel fired. 791 After Priebus's appearance, the"
327,10,President called Priebus and said he did a great job on Meet the Press. 792 The President also told
327,11,793
327,12,"Priebus that the President had ""never said any of those things about"" the Special Counsel."
327,13,"The next day, on February 5, 2018, the President complained about the Times article to"
327,14,"Porter. 794 The President told Porter that the article was ""bullshit"" and he had not sought to"
327,15,terminate the Special Counsel. 795 The President said that McGahn leaked to the media to make
327,16,himselflook good. 796 The President then directed Porter to tell McGahn to create a record to make
327,17,clear that the President never directed McGahn to fire the Special Counsel. 797 Porter thought the
327,18,"matter should be handled by the White House communications office, but the President said he"
327,19,"wanted McGahn to write a letter to the file ""for our records"" and wanted something beyond a press"
327,20,statement to demonstrate that the reporting was inaccurate. 798 The President referred to McGahn
327,21,"as a ""lying bastard"" and said that he wanted a record from him .799 Porter recalled the President"
327,22,789
327,23,"Hicks 3/13/18 302, at 11. Sanders did not recall whether the President asked her to speak to"
327,24,"McGahn or if she did it on her own. Sanders 7/23/ 18 302, at 2."
327,25,790
327,26,"Sanders 7/23/18 302, at 1-2."
327,27,791
327,28,"Meet the Press Interview with Reince Priebus, NBC (Feb. 4, 2018)."
327,29,792
327,30,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 10."
327,31,793
327,32,"Priebus 4/3/18 302, at 10."
327,33,"794  Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 16-17. Porter did not recall the timing of this discussion with the"
327,34,"President. Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 17. Evidence indicates it was February 5, 2018. On the back of a pocket"
327,35,"card dated February 5, 2018, Porter took notes that are consistent with his description of the discussion:"
327,36,"""COS: (1) Letter from OM - Never threatened to quit- DJT never told him to fire M."" SC_RRP000053"
327,37,(Porter Undated Notes). Porter said it was possible he took the notes on a day other than February 5. Porter
327,38,"4/13/ 18 302, at 17. But Porter also said that ""COS"" referred to matters he wanted to discuss with Chief of"
327,39,"Staff Kelly, Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17, and Kelly took notes dated February 5, 2018, that state ""POTUS -"
327,40,"Don McGahn letter - Mueller + resigning."" WH0000I 7684 (Kelly 2/5/18 Notes) . Kelly said he did not"
327,41,"recall what the notes meant, but thought the President may have ""mused "" about having McGahn write a"
327,42,"letter. Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 3. McGahn recalled that Poiter spoke with him about the President's request"
327,43,"about two weeks after the New York Times story was published, which is consistent with the discussion"
327,44,"taking place on or about February 5. McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
327,45,795
327,46,"Pmter 4/13/18 302, at 17."
327,47,796
327,48,"Porter 4/ 13/18 3 02, at 17."
327,49,797
327,50,"Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 17."
327,51,798
327,52,"Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/ 18 302, at 18."
327,53,799
327,54,"Porter 4/13/ 18 302, at 17; Porter 5/8/18 302, at 18."
327,55,115
327,56,NA
328,1,U.S. Department of Justice
328,2,Att:effle:rWerk Prea1:1etII May Cm1tail'IMaterial Preteetea URaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
328,3,"saying something to the effect of, ""If he doesn't write a letter , then maybe I'll have to get rid of"
328,4,"him.""soo"
328,5,"Later that day, Porter spoke to McGahn to deliver the President's message .801 Porter told"
328,6,McGahn that he had to write a letter to dispute that he was ever ordered to terminate the Special
328,7,803
328,8,"Counsel. 802 McGahn shrugged off the request, explaining that the media reports were true."
328,9,McGahn told Porter that the President had been insistent on firing the Special Counsel and that
328,10,"McGahn had planned to resign rather than carry out the order, although he had not personally told"
328,11,the President he intended to quit. 804 Porter told McGahn that the President suggested that McGahn
328,12,"would be fired ifhe did not write the letter. 805 McGahn dismissed the thr eat, saying that the optics"
328,13,would be terrible if the President followed through with firing him on that basis. 806 McGahn said
328,14,he would not write the letter the President had requested. 807 Porter said that to his knowledge the
328,15,"issue ofMcGahn's letter never came up with the President again , but Porter did recall telling Kelly"
328,16,about his conversation with McGahn .808
328,17,"The next day, on February 6, 2018, Kelly scheduled time for McGahn to meet wit h him"
328,18,"and the President in the Oval Office to discuss the Times article. 809 The morning of the meeting ,"
328,19,"the President's personal counsel ca lled ,McGahn's attorney and said that the President was going"
328,20,to be speaking with McGahn and McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the
328,21,meeting. 810
328,22,The President bega n the Oval Office meeting by telling McGahn that the New York Times
328,23,"story did not "" look good"" and McGahn needed to correct it.811 McGahn recalled the President"
328,24,"said , ""I never said to fire Mueller. I never said 'fire. ' This story doesn't look good. You need to"
328,25,"correct this. You're the White House counsel."" 812"
328,26,800
328,27,"Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 17."
328,28,801
328,29,"Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
328,30,802
328,31,"Porter 4/ 13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4."
328,32,803
328,33,"Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
328,34,804
328,35,"Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
328,36,"805  Porter 4/13/18 302, at 17; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
328,37,806
328,38,"Porter 4/ 13/ 18 302, at 17-18; McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
328,39,807
328,40,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
328,41,808
328,42,"Potter 4/13/18 302, at 18."
328,43,"809  McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4; WH000017685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes). McGahn recalled that, before"
328,44,"the Oval Office meeting, he told Kelly that he was not inclined to fix the article. McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4."
328,45,"810  McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5 (agent note); 2/26/19 Email, Counsel for Don McGahn to Special"
328,46,"Counsel's Offic e ( confirming February 6, 2018 date of call from the President's personal counse l)."
328,47,81 1
328,48,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2."
328,49,812
328,50,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4 ; Kelly 8/2/18 302, at 2."
328,51,116
328,52,NA
329,1,U.S. Department of Justice
329,2,"Atterfle,.· 'ilerk PFeattet // Mtt,.. Cef!tttifl Mttterittl Preteetea Uf!der Fed. R. Critfl . P. 6(e)"
329,3,"In response , McGahn acknowledged that he had not told the President directl y that he"
329,4,"planned to resign , but said that the story was otherwise accurate. 8 13 The President asked McGahn , ·"
329,5,"""Did I say the word ' fire'?"" 814 McGahn responded, ""What you said is, ' Call Rod [Rosenstein] ,"
329,6,"tell Rod that Mueller has conflicts and can't be the Special Counsel. ""' 8 15 Th e President responded,"
329,7,"""I never said that. "" 81 6 The President said he merely wanted McGahn to raise the conflicts issue"
329,8,with Rosenstein and leave it to him to decide what to do. 817 McGahn told the President he did not
329,9,"und erstand the conversation that way and instead had heard , "" Call Rod. There are conflict s."
329,10,"Mueller has to go. "" 8 18 The President asked McGahn whether he would ""do a correction, "" and"
329,11,McGahn said no. 8 19 Mc Gahn thought the President was testing his mettle to see how committed
329,12,°
329,13,"McGahn was to what happened. 82 Kelly described the meeting as "" a little tense. """
329,14,821
329,15,The President also asked McGahn in the meeting why he had told Special Counsel's Office
329,16,822
329,17,investigators that the President had told him to have the Special Counsel removed.                      McGahn
329,18,responded that he had to and that his conversations with the President were not protected by
329,19,"attorney-client privilege. 823 The President then asked , ""What-about these notes? Why do you take"
329,20,"notes? Lawyers don ' t take note s. I never had a lawyer who took notes ."" 824 McGahn responded"
329,21,"that he keeps notes because he is a ""real lawyer "" and explained that notes creat e a record and are"
329,22,"not a bad thing. 825 The President said , "" I' ve had a lot of great law yers , like Roy Cohn . He did not"
329,23,"take notes. "" 826"
329,24,"After the Oval Office meeting concluded , Kelly recalled McGahn telling him that McGahn"
329,25,827
329,26,"and the President "" did have that conversation "" about removing the Special Coun sel.                   McGahn"
329,27,recalled that Kelly said that he had point ed out to the President after the Oval Office that McGahn
329,28,813
329,29,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 4."
329,30,8 14
329,31,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 4; Kelly 8/2/ 18 302, at 2."
329,32,815
329,33,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5."
329,34,816
329,35,"McGahn 3/ 8/ 18 302, at 5."
329,36,81 7
329,37,"McGahn 3/ 8/ 18 302, at 5."
329,38,8 18
329,39,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5."
329,40,819
329,41,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5; Kelly 8/2/ 18 302, at 2."
329,42,820
329,43,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5."
329,44,821
329,45,"Kelly 8/2/ 18 302, at 2."
329,46,822
329,47,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5."
329,48,823
329,49,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5."
329,50,"824  McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5. McGahn said the President was referring to Donaldson's notes, which"
329,51,"the President thought ofa s McGahn's notes. McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5."
329,52,82 5
329,53,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5."
329,54,826
329,55,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5."
329,56,827
329,57,"Kelly 8/2/ 18 302, at 2."
329,58,117
329,59,NA
330,1,U.S. Department of Justice
330,2,Attertte;· Werk Preelttet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteeteel Utteler Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
330,3,"had not backed down and wou ld not budge. 828 Following the Oval Office meeting, the President's"
330,4,"personal counsel called McGahn' s counsel and relayed that the President was '""fine"" with"
330,5,McGahn. 829
330,6,Analysis
330,7,In analyzing the President ' s efforts to have McGahn deny that he had been ordered to have
330,8,"the Special Counsel removed, the following evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of"
330,9,justice:
330,10,a.        Obstructive act. The President's repeated efforts to get McGahn to create a record
330,11,denying that the President had directed him to remove the Special Counsel would qualify as an
330,12,obstructive act if it had the natural tendency to constrain McGahn from testifying truthfully or to
330,13,"undermine his credibility as a potential witness ifhe testified consistently with his memory, rather"
330,14,than with what the record said.
330,15,There is some evidence that at the time the New York Times and Washington Post stories
330,16,"were published in late January 2018, the President believed the stories were wrong and that he had"
330,17,never told McGahn to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. The President correctly
330,18,"understood that McGahn had not told the President directly that he planned to resign. Tnaddition ,"
330,19,"the President told Priebus and Porter that he had not sought to terminate the Special Counsel , and"
330,20,"in the Oval Office meeting with McGahn , the President said , ""I never said to fire Mueller. I never"
330,21,"said 'fire.""' That evidence could indicate that the President was not attempting to persuade"
330,22,McGahn to change his story but was instead offering his own-but different-recollection                of the
330,23,substance of his June 2017 conversations with McGahn and McGahn 's reaction to them.
330,24,Other evidence cuts against that understanding of the President 's conduct. As previously
330,25,"described, see Volume IT, Section ILE, supra, substantial evidence supports McGahn's account"
330,26,"that the President had directe d him to have the Special Counsel removed, including the timing and"
330,27,cont ext of the President's directive ; the manner in which McGahn reacted; and the fact that the
330,28,"President had been told the conflicts were insubstantial, were being considered by the Department"
330,29,"of Justice , and should be raised with the President's personal counsel rather than brought to"
330,30,"McGahn. In addition, the President's subsequent denials that he had told McGahn to have the"
330,31,Specia l Counsel removed were carefully worded. When first asked about the New York Times
330,32,"story, the President said, ""Fake news, folks. Fake news. A typical New York Times fake story. """
330,33,"And when the President spoke with McGahn in the Oval Office, he focused on whether he had"
330,34,"used the word ""fire, "" saying, ""I never said to fire Mueller. I never said ' fire""' and ""Did T say the"
330,35,"word ' fire'?"" The President's asse rtion in the Oval Office meeting that he had never directed"
330,36,McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed thus runs counter to the evidence .
330,37,"Tn addition, even if the President sincerely disagreed with McGahn's memory of the June"
330,38,"17, 2017 events, the evidence indicates that the President knew by the time of the Oval Office"
330,39,828
330,40,"McGahn 3/8/18 302, at 5. Kelly did not recall discussing the Oval Office meetin g with the"
330,41,"Presid ent after the fact. Kelly 8/2/1 8 302, at 2. Handwritten notes taken by Kelly state, ""Do n[:] Mueller"
330,42,"discussion in June. - Bannon Priebus - came out okay."" WH0000l7685 (Kelly 2/6/18 Notes)."
330,43,829
330,44,"McGahn 3/8/ 18 302, at 5 (agent note)."
330,45,118
330,46,NA
331,1,U.S. Department of Justice
331,2,At:tarttey '.Varlc Pr01hiet // May Catttaitt Material Preteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Criffl. P. 6Ee)
331,3,meeting that McGahn's account differed and that McGahn was firm in his views . Shortly after the
331,4,"story broke, the President's counsel told McGahn 's counsel that the President wanted McGahn to"
331,5,"make a statement denying he had been asked to fire the Special Counsel, but McGahn responded"
331,6,through his counsel that that aspect of the story was accurate and he therefore could not comply
331,7,with the President's request. The President then directed Sanders to tell McGahn to correct the
331,8,"story, but McGahn told her he would not do so because the story was accurate in reporting on the"
331,9,"President's order . Consistent with that position, McGahn never issued a correction. More than a"
331,10,"week later, the President brought up the issue again with Porter, made comments indicating the"
331,11,"President thought McGahn had leaked the story , and directed Porter to have McGahn create a"
331,12,"record denying that the President had tried to fire the Special Counsel. At that point , the President"
331,13,"said he might ""have to get rid of' McGahn ifMcGahn did not comply. McGahn again refused and"
331,14,"told Porter, as he had told Sanders and as his counsel had told the President 's counsel , that the"
331,15,President had in fact ordered him to have Rosenstein remove the Special Counsel. That evidence
331,16,indicates that by the time of the Oval Office meeting the President was aware that McGahn did not
331,17,think the story was false and did not want to issue a statement or create a written record denying
331,18,facts that McGahn believed to be true . The President nevertheless persisted and asked McGahn to
331,19,repudiate facts that McGahn had repeatedly said were accurate.
331,20,"b.      Nexus to an official proceeding. By January 2018 , the Special Counsel ' s use of a"
331,21,grand jury had been further confirmed by the return of several indictments. The President also
331,22,"was aware that the Special Counsel was investigating obstruction-related events because, among"
331,23,"other reasons, on January 8, 20 I 8, the Special Counsel's Office provided his counsel with a"
331,24,detailed list of topics for a possible interview with the President. 830 The President knew that
331,25,McGahn had personal knowledge of many of the events the Special Counsel was investigating and
331,26,that McGahn had already been interviewed by Special Counsel investigators. And in the Oval
331,27,"Office meeting, the President indicated he knew that McGahn had told the Special Counsel's"
331,28,Office about the President's effort to remove the Special Counsel. The President challenged
331,29,McGahn for disclosing that information and for taking notes that he viewed as creating
331,30,"unnecessary legal exposure. That evidence indicates the President's awareness that the June 17,"
331,31,2017 events were relevant to the Special Counsel's investigation and any grand jury investigation
331,32,that might grow out ofit.
331,33,"To establish a nexus, it would be necessary to show that the President's actions would have"
331,34,"the natural tendency to affect such a proceeding or that they would hinder, delay , or prevent the"
331,35,communication of information to investigators. Because McGahn had spoken to Special Counsel
331,36,"investigators before January 2018, the President could not have been seeking to influence his prior"
331,37,statements in those interviews . But because McGahn had repeate dly spoken to investigators and
331,38,"the obstruction inquiry was not complete , it was foreseeable that he would be interviewed again"
331,39,on obstruction-related topics. If the President were focus ed solely on a press strategy in seeking
331,40,"to have McGahn refute the New York Times article, a nexus to a proceeding or to further"
331,41,investigative interviews would not be shown. But the President's efforts to have McGahn write a
331,42,"letter ""for our records"" approximately ten days after the stories had come out- well past the typical"
331,43,830
331,44,"1/29/ I 8 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1-2 (""In our"
331,45,"conversation of January 8, your office identified the following topics as areas you desired to address with"
331,46,the President in order to complete your investigation on the subjects of alleged collusion and obstruction of
331,47,"justice""; listing 16 topics)."
331,48,119
331,49,NA
332,1,U.S. Department of Justice
332,2,Attertte)· Werk Pretittet // Ma.)· Cettta.itt Ma.teria.1Preteeteti Utttier Feti. R . Crim. P. 6(e)
332,3,time to issue a correction for a news story-indicates the President was not focused solely on a
332,4,"press strategy, but instead likely contemplated the ongoing investigation and any proceedings"
332,5,arising from it.
332,6,c.      Intent. Substantial evidence indicates that in repeatedly urging McGahn to dispute
332,7,"that he was ordered to have the Special Counsel terminated , the President acted for the purpose of"
332,8,influencing McGahn 's account in order to deflect or prevent further scrutiny of the President's
332,9,conduct towards the investigation.
332,10,Several facts support that conclus ion. The President made repeated attempts to get
332,11,"McGahn to change his story. As described above, by the time of the last attempt , the evidence"
332,12,suggests that the President had been told on multiple occasions that McGahn believed the President
332,13,had ordered him to have the Special Counsel terminated. McGahn interpreted his encounter with
332,14,the President in the Oval Office as an attempt to test his mettle and see how committed he was to
332,15,his memory of what had occurred . The President had already laid the groundwork for pressing
332,16,McGahn to alter his account by telling Porter that it might be necessary to fire McGahn if he did
332,17,"not deny the story, and Porter relayed that statement to McGahn. Additiona l evidence of the"
332,18,President 's intent may be gleaned from the fact that his counsel was sufficiently alarmed by the
332,19,prospect of the President's meeting with McGahn that he called McGahn ' s counsel and said that
332,20,McGahn could not resign no matter what happened in the Oval Office that day. The President's
332,21,counsel was well aware ofMcGahn's resolve not to issue what he believed to be a false account
332,22,"of events despite the President's request. Finally , as noted above, the President brought up the"
332,23,Special Counsel investigation in his Oval Office meeting with McGahn and criticized him for
332,24,"telling this Office about the June 17, 2017 events. The President's statements reflect his"
332,25,understanding-and his displeasure-that those events would be part of an obstruction-of-justice
332,26,inquiry.
332,27,"J.      The President's Conduct Towards Flynn, Manafort, ~"
332,28,Overview
332,29,"In addition to the interactions with McGahn described above, the President has taken other"
332,30,"actions directed at possible witnesses in the Special Counsel's investigation , including Flynn,"
332,31,"Manafort, 1;c•w■""nd as described in the next section, Cohen. When Flynn withdrew from a joint"
332,32,"defense agreement with the President , the President ' s personal counsel stated that Flynn 's actions"
332,33,"would be viewed as reflecting ""hostility"" towards the President. During Manafort 's prosecution"
332,34,"and while the jury was deliberating, the President repeatedly stated that Manafott was bein treated"
332,35,unfair! and made it known that Mana fort could receive a ardon.
332,36,Evidence
332,37,I . Conduct Directed at Michael Flynn
332,38,"As previously noted , see Volume II, Section 11.B, supra, the President asked for Flynn's"
332,39,"resignation on February 13, 2017. Following Flynn ' s resignation , the President made positive"
332,40,"public comments about Flynn, describing him as a ""wonderful man,"" ""a fine person ,"" and a ""very"
332,41,120
332,42,NA
333,1,U.S. Department   of Justice
333,2,AttarHe)' Work Proettet // Ma)' CaHtaiH Material Proteetee UHeer Fee. R . Crim. P. 6(e)
333,3,"good person."" 831 The President also privately asked advisors to pass messages to Flynn conveying"
333,4,832
333,5,that the President still cared about him and encouraging him to stay strong.
333,6,"In late November 2017, Flynn began to cooperate with this Office. On November 22, 2017,"
333,7,Flynn withdrew from a joint defense agreement he had with the President. 833 Flynn's counsel told
333,8,the President's personal counsel and counsel for the White House that Flynn could no longer have
333,9,"confidential communications with the White House or the President. 834 Later that night, the"
333,10,President's pe rso nal counsel left a voicemail for Flynn's counsel that said:
333,11,"I understand your situation, but let me see if I can't state it in starker terms. . . . [I]t"
333,12,wouldn't surprise me if you've gone on to make a deal with ... the government. ... [I]f
333,13,". .. there's information that implicates the President, then we've go t a national security"
333,14,"issue, . . . so, you know, . . . we need some kind of heads up. Um, just for the sake of"
333,15,protecting all our interests ifwe can ....        [R]emember what we've always said about the
333,16,835
333,17,"' President and his feelings toward Flynn and , that still remains ...."
333,18,"On November 23, 2017, Flynn's attorneys returned the call from the President's personal"
333,19,counse l to acknowledge receipt of the voicemail. 836 F ly nn 's attorneys reiterated that they were no
333,20,longer in a position to sha re information under any sort of privilege. 837 According to Flynn ' s
333,21,838
333,22,"attorneys, the President's personal counsel was indignant and vocal in his disagreement.                  The"
333,23,President's personal counsel said that he interpret ed what they said to him as a reflection ofFlynn's
333,24,83 1
333,25,"See, e.g. , Remarks by President Trump in Press Conference, White House (Feb. 16, 2018)"
333,26,"(stating that ""Flynn is a fine person"" and ""I don't think [Flynn] did anything wrong. If anything, he did"
333,27,"something right . .. You know, he was just doing his job""); Interview of Donald J Trump, NBC (May 11,"
333,28,"2017) (stating that Flynn is a ""very good person"")."
333,29,832
333,30,"See Priebus I/18/17 302, at 9-10 (the President asked Priebus to contact Flynn the week he was"
333,31,terminated to convey that the President sti ll cared about him and felt bad about what happened to him;
333,32,"Priebus thought the President did not want Flynn to have a problem with him); McFarland 12/22/ 17 302,"
333,33,"at 18 (about a month or two after Flynn was terminated, the President asked McFarland to get in touch with"
333,34,"Flynn and tell him that he was a good guy, he should stay strong, and the President felt bad for him); Flynn"
333,35,"1/19/18 302, at 9 (reca lling the call from Priebus and an additional call from Hicks who said she wanted to"
333,36,"relay on behalf of the President that the President hoped Flynn was okay); Christ ie 2/13/19 302, at 3"
333,37,(describing a phone conversation between Kushner and Flynn the day after Flynn was fired where Kushner
333,38,"said , ""You know the President respects you. The President cares about you. I' II get the President to send"
333,39,"out a positive tweet about you later,"" and the President nodded his assent to Kushner's comment promising"
333,40,a tweet).
333,41,833
333,42,"Counsel for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302, at 1."
333,43,834
333,44,"Counsel for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302, at I."
333,45,835
333,46,"11/22/17 Voicemail Transcript, President's Personal Counsel to Counsel for Michael Flynn."
333,47,836
333,48,"Counse l for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302 , at 1."
333,49,837
333,50,"Counsel for Flynn 3/1/ 18 302, at 1."
333,51,838
333,52,"Counse l for Flynn 3/ 1/ 18 3 02, at I ."
333,53,121
333,54,NA
334,1,U.S. Department of Justice
334,2,AM:erAe~·\llerk Preattet // May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
334,3,839
334,4,hostility towards the President and that he planned to inform his client of that interpretation.
334,5,Flynn 's attorneys understood that statement to be an attempt to make them reconsider their position
334,6,because the President's personal counsel believed that Flynn would be disturbed to know that such
334,7,a message would be conveyed to the President. 840
334,8,"On December 1, 2017 , Flynn pleaded gui lty to making false statements pursuant to a"
334,9,"cooperation agreement. 841 The next day, the President told the press that he was not concerned"
334,10,about what Flynn might tell the Special Counsel. 842 In response to a question about whether the
334,11,"President still stood behind Flynn, the President responded , ""We'll see what happens. "" 843 Over"
334,12,"the next several days , the President made public statements expressing sympathy for Flynn and"
334,13,"indicating he had not been treated fairly. 844 On December 15, 2017, the President responded to a"
334,14,"press inquiry about whether he was considering a pardon for Flynn by saying, ""I don't want to talk"
334,15,about pardons for Michael Flynn yet. We'll see what happens. Let's see. I can say this: When
334,16,"you look at what ' s gone on with the FBI and with the Justice Department, people are very, very"
334,17,"angry. ""845"
334,18,2. Conduct Directed at Paul Manafort
334,19,"On October 27, 2017, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manafort and former"
334,20,"deputy campaign manager Richard Gates on multiple felony counts, and on February 22, 2018, a"
334,21,grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia indicted Manafort and Gates on additional felony
334,22,839
334,23,"Counsel for Flynn 3/1 / 18 302, at 2. Becaus e of attorney-client privilege issues, we did not seek"
334,24,to interview the President 's personal counsel about the extent to which he discussed his statements to
334,25,Flynn's attorneys with the President.
334,26,84
334,27,"°Counsel for Flynn 3/ 1/18 302, at 2."
334,28,"84 1 Information, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1:17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. 1, 2017) , Doc. 1; Plea"
334,29,"Agreement, United States v. Michael T Flynn, 1: 17-cr-232 (D.D.C. Dec. I , 2017), Doc. 3."
334,30,842
334,31,"President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2,"
334,32,2017).
334,33,843
334,34,"President Trump Remarks on Tax Reform and Michael Flynn 's Guilty Plea, C-SPAN (Dec. 2,"
334,35,2017).
334,36,"844  See @realDonaldTrump 12/2/ 17 (9:06 p.m. ET) Tweet (""So General Flynn lies to the FBI and"
334,37,"his life is destro yed, while Crooked Hillary Clinton, on that now famous FBl holiday 'interrogat ion' with"
334,38,"no swear ing in and no recording , lies many times ... and nothing happens to her? Rigged system, or just"
334,39,"a doubl e standard?""); President Trump Departure Remarks , C-SPAN (Dec. 4, 2017) (""Well, I feel badly"
334,40,"for General Flynn . I feel very badly. He' s led a very strong life. And I feel very badly. "")."
334,41,845
334,42,"President Trump White House Departure, C-SPAN (Dec. 15, 2017)."
334,43,122
334,44,NA
335,1,U.S. Department of Justice
335,2,A~OfAC)'Work Proauct // Mti:~·CoAtfl:iA          Mti:tcriti:IProteetea UAaCI'Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
335,3,counts. 846 The charges in both cases alleged criminal conduct by Manafort that began as early as
335,4,2005 and continued through 2018. 847
335,5,"In January 2018, Manafort told Gates that he had talked to the President's personal counsel"
335,6,"and they were ""going to take care of us."" 848 Mana fort told Gates it was stupid to plead, saying that"
335,7,"he had been in touch with the President's personal counsel and repeating that they should "" sit tight """
335,8,"and ""we'll be taken care of."" 849 Gates asked Manafort outright if anyone mentioned pardons and"
335,9,Manafort said no one used that word. 850
335,10,"As the proceedings against Manafort progressed in court, the President told Porter that he"
335,11,851
335,12,never liked Manafort and that Manafort did not know what he was doing on the campaign.                        The
335,13,President discussed with aides whether and in what way Manafort might be cooperating with the
335,14,"Special Counsel's investigation, and whether Manafort knew any information that would be"
335,15,harmful to the President. 852
335,16,"In public, the President made statements criticizing the prosecution and suggesting that"
335,17,"Manafort was being treated unfairly. On June I 5, 2018, before a scheduled court hearing that day"
335,18,on whether Manafort's bail should be revoked based on new charges that Manafort had tampered
335,19,"with witnesses while out on bail , the President told the press , ""T feel badly about a lot of them"
335,20,846
335,21,"Indictment, United States v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, I: 17-cr-201 (D.D.C ."
335,22,"Oct, 27, 2017), Doc. 13 (""Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment""); Indictment , United States v. Paul J."
335,23,"Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates III, I: l 8-cr-83 (E.D. Va. Feb. 22, 2018), Doc. 9 (""Manafort and Gates"
335,24,"E.D. Va. Indictment"")"
335,25,847
335,26,Manafort and Gates D.D.C. Indictment; Manafort and Gates E.D. Va. Indictment.
335,27,"848 Gates 4/ 18/18 302, at 4. In February 2018, Gates pleaded guilty, pursuant to a cooperation plea"
335,28,"agreement , to a superseding criminal information charging him with conspiring to defraud and commit"
335,29,"multiple offenses (i.e. , tax fraud, failure to report foreign bank accounts , and acting as an unregistered agent"
335,30,"of a foreign principal) against the United States, as well as making false statements to our"
335,31,"Office. Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Richard W. Gates III, 1: I7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb ."
335,32,"23, 2018), Doc. 195; Plea Agreement, United States v. Richard W. Gates III , l : I7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 23,"
335,33,"2018), Doc . 205. Gates has provided information and in-court testimony that the Office has deemed to be"
335,34,reliable.
335,35,849
335,36,"Gates 4/ 18/18 302, at 4."
335,37,850
335,38,"Gates 4/ 18/ 18 302, at 4. Manafort told this Office that he never told Gates that he had talked to"
335,39,the President' s personal counsel or suggested that they would be taken care of. Manafort also said he hoped
335,40,"for a pardon but never discussed one with the President, although he noticed the President 's public"
335,41,"comments about pardons. Manafort 10/ 1/ 18 302, at 11. As explained in Volume I, Section IV.A.8 , supr a,"
335,42,Manafort entered into a plea agreement with our Office. The U.S. District Court for the District of
335,43,Columbia determined that he breached the agreement by being untruthful in proffer sessions and before the
335,44,"grand jury. Order, United States v. Man afo rt, l: l 7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Feb. 13, 2019), Doc. 503."
335,45,"851   Porter 5/8/ 18 302, at 11. Priebus recalled that the President never really liked Manafort. See"
335,46,"Priebus 4/3/ 18 302, at 11. Hicks said that candidate Trump trusted Manafort's jud gment while he worked"
335,47,"on the Campaign, but she also once heard Trump tell Gates to keep an eye on Manafort. Hicks 3/13/ 18"
335,48,"302, at 16."
335,49,852
335,50,"Porter 5/8/18 302, at 11; McGahn 12/ 14/17 302, at 14."
335,51,123
335,52,NA
336,1,U.S. Department of Justic e
336,2,"Attorfl:ey'Nork Proclttet// Ma)'""Cofl:taifl:Material Proteetecl Ufl:cler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
336,3,"because I think a lot of it is very unfair. I mean , I look at some of them where they go back 12"
336,4,"years. Like Manafort has nothing to do with our campaign. But I feel so-I tell you, I feel a little"
336,5,badly about it. They went back 12 years to get things that he did 12 years ago? ... I feel badly
336,6,"for some people, because they've gone back 12 years to find things about somebody, and I don't"
336,7,"think it' s right. "" 853 In response to a question about whether he was considering a pardon for"
336,8,"Manafort or other individuals involved in the Special Counsel's investigation , the President said,"
336,9,"""I don't want to talk about that. No, I don't want to talk about that. ... But look, I do want to see"
336,10,"people treated fairly. That's what it's all about."" 854 Hours later, Manafort's bail was revoked and"
336,11,"the President tweeted, ""W ow, what a tough sentence for Paul Manafort , who has represented"
336,12,"Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other top political people and campaigns. Didn't know"
336,13,Manafort was the head of the Mob. What about Comey and Crooked Hillary and all the others?
336,14,"Very unfair!"" 855"
336,15,"Immediately following the revocation ofManafort ' s bail, the President 's personal lawyer ,"
336,16,"Rudolph Giuliani, gave a series of interviews in which he raised the possibility of a pardon for"
336,17,"Manafort. Giuliani told the New York Daily News that ""[w]hen the whole thing is over, things"
336,18,"might get cleaned up with some presidential pardons. "" 856 Giuliani also said in an interview that,"
336,19,although the President should not pardon anyone whil e the Special Counsel's investigation was
336,20,"ongoing, "" when the investigation is concluded , he 's kind of on his own, right?"" 857 In a CNN"
336,21,"interview two days later , Giuliani said, "" I guess I should clarify this once and for all. . . . The"
336,22,pre sident has issued no pardons in this investigation. The president is not going to issue pardons
336,23,"in this investigation .... When it' s over , hey, he's the president of the United States. He retains"
336,24,"his pardon power. Nobody is taking that away from him."" 858 Giuliani rejected the suggestion that"
336,25,his and the President 's comments could signal to defendants that they should not cooperate in a
336,26,"criminal prosecution becau se a pardon might follow , saying the comments were "" certainly not"
336,27,"intended that way."" 859 Giuliani said the comments only acknowledged that an individual involved"
336,28,"in the investigation would not be ""excluded from [a pardon] , if in fact the president and his advisors"
336,29,".. . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly."" 860 Giuliani observed that pardons"
336,30,"were not unusual in political investigations but said, ""T hat doesn't mean they're going to happ en"
336,31,853
336,32,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White House (June 15, 2018)."
336,33,854
336,34,"Remarks by President Trump in Press Gaggle, White Hous e (June 15, 2018)."
336,35,855
336,36,@rea!DonaldTrump 6/ 15/ 18 ( 1:41 p.m. ET) Tweet.
336,37,856
336,38,"Chris Sommerfeldt , Rudy Giuliani says Mueller probe 'might get cleaned up' with 'presidential"
336,39,"pardons ' in light of Paul Manafort going to jail, New York Daily News (June 15, 2018)."
336,40,857
336,41,"Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Orders Paul Manafort Jailed Before Trial, Citing New Obstruction"
336,42,"Charges , New York Time s (June 15, 2018) (quoting Giuliani)."
336,43,858
336,44,"State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018); see Karoun Demitjian,"
336,45,"Giuliani suggests Trump may pardon Manafort after Mueller's probe, Washing ton Post (June 17, 20 18)."
336,46,859
336,47,"State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018)."
336,48,860
336,49,"State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018)."
336,50,124
336,51,NA
337,1,U.S. Department of Justice
337,2,"Attorf!e::,·'.VorkProe1:1et// May Cof!taifl Material Proteetee Urtt:lerFet:I.R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
337,3,"here. Doesn't mean that anybody should rely on it. ... Big signal is, nobody has been pardoned"
337,4,"yet. ,,s61"
337,5,"On July 31, 2018, Manafort's criminal trial began in the Eastern District of Virginia,"
337,6,"generating substantial news coverage. 862 The next day, the President tweeted, ""This is a terrible"
337,7,"situation and Attorney General Jeff Sessions should stop this Rigged Witch Hunt right now , before"
337,8,"it continues to stain our country any further. Bob Mueller is totally conflicted , and his 17 Angry"
337,9,"Democrats that are doing his dirty work are a disgrace to USA!"" 863 Minutes later , the President"
337,10,"tweeted, ""Paul Manafort worked for Ronald Reagan, Bob Dole and many other highly prominent"
337,11,and respected political leaders. He worked for me for a very short time. Why didn't government
337,12,tell me that he was under investigation . These old charges have nothing to do with Collusion-a
337,13,"Hoax!"" 864 Later in the day , the President tweeted, ""Looking back on history, who was treated"
337,14,"worse , Alfonse Capone , legendary mob boss, killer and 'Public Enemy Number One,' or Paul"
337,15,"Manafort , political operative & Reagan/Dole darling, now serving solitary confinement - although"
337,16,"convicted of nothing? Where is the Russian Collusion?"" 865 The President's tweets about the"
337,17,"Manafort trial were widely covered by the press. 866 When asked about the President ' s tweets,"
337,18,"Sanders told the press, ""Certainly, the President's been clear. He thinks Paul Manafort's been"
337,19,"treated unfairly."" 867"
337,20,"On August 16, 2018, the Manafort case was submitted to the jury and deliberations began."
337,21,"At that time , Giuliani had recently suggested to reporters that the Special Counsel investigation"
337,22,"needed to be ""done in the next two or three weeks,"" 868 and media stories reported that a Manafort"
337,23,acquittal would add to criticism that the Special Counsel investigation was not worth the time and
337,24,869
337,25,"expense, whereas a conviction could show that ending the investigation would be premature."
337,26,861
337,27,"State of the Union with Jake Tapper Transcript, CNN (June 17, 2018)."
337,28,862
337,29,"See, e.g. , Katelyn Polantz, Takeaways from day one of the Paul Manafort trial, CNN (July 31,"
337,30,"2018); Frank Bruni, Paul Manafort 's Trial Is Donald Trump's, Too, New York Times Opinion (July 31,"
337,31,"2018); Rachel Weiner et al., Paul Manafort trial Day 2: Witnesses describe extravagant clothing purchases,"
337,32,"home remodels, lavish cars paid with wire transfers, Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018)."
337,33,863
337,34,"@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:24 a.m. ET) Tweet. Later that day, when Sanders was asked"
337,35,"about the President's tweet, she told reporters, ""It's not an order. It's the President's opinion."" Sarah"
337,36,"Sanders, White House Daily Briefing , C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018)."
337,37,864
337,38,@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (9:34 a.m. ET) Tweet.
337,39,865
337,40,@realDonaldTrump 8/1/18 (11 :35 a.m. ET) Tweet.
337,41,866
337,42,"See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump calls Manafort pros ecution ""a hoax,"" says Sessions"
337,43,"should stop Mueller investigation ""right now"", Washington Post (Aug. 1, 2018) ; Louis Nelson , Trump"
337,44,"claims Manafort case has ""nothing to do with collusion"" , Politico (Aug. I. 2018)."
337,45,867
337,46,"Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Aug. 1, 2018)."
337,47,868
337,48,"Chris Strohm & Shannon Pettypiece, Mueller Prob e Doesn't Need to Shut Down Befor e"
337,49,"Midterms, Officials Say, Bloomberg (Aug. 15, 2018)."
337,50,869
337,51,"See, e.g., Katelyn Polantz et al., Manafort jury ends first day of deliberations without a verdict,"
337,52,"CNN (Aug. 16, 2018); David Voreacos, What Mueller's Manafort Case Means f or the Trump Battle to"
337,53,125
337,54,NA
338,1,U.S. Department of Justice
338,2,Att0rl'\e~ W0rlt Pr0tlttet // May CeAtaiA Material Prnteetetl UAtler Fetl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
338,3,"On August 17, 2018, as jury deliberations continued, the President commented on the trial from"
338,4,the South Lawn of the White House . In an impromptu exchange with reporters that lasted
338,5,"approximately five minutes, the President twice called the Special Counsel's investigation a"
338,6,"""rigged witch hunt."" 870 When asked whether he would pardon Manafort if he was convicted, the"
338,7,"President said , ""I don't talk about that now. I don ' t talk about that."" 871 The President then added,"
338,8,"without being asked a further question , ""I think the whole Manafort trial is very sad when you look"
338,9,at what's going on there. I think it's a very sad day for our country. He worked for me for a very
338,10,"short period of time . But you know what, he happens to be a very good person. And l think it's"
338,11,"very sad what they've done to Paul Manafort."" 872 The President did not take further questions. 873"
338,12,"In response to the President's statements, Manafort's attorney said, ""Mr. Manafort really"
338,13,"appreciates the support of President Trump."" 874"
338,14,"On August 21 , 2018, the jury found Manafort guilty on eight felony counts. Also on"
338,15,"August 21 , Michael Cohen pleaded guilty to eight offenses , including a campaign-finance"
338,16,"violation that he said had occurred ""in coordination with, and at the direction of, a candidate for"
338,17,"federal offtce."" 875 The President reacted to Manafort ' s convictions that day by telling reporters ,"
338,18,"""Paul Manafort ' s a good man"" and ""it's a very sad thing that happened."" 876 The President"
338,19,"described the Special Counsel's investigation as ""a witch hunt that ends in disgrace. "" 877 The next"
338,20,"day, the President tweeted , "" I feel very badly for Paul Manafort and his wonderful family. ' Justice'"
338,21,"took a 12 year old tax case, among other things , applied tremendous pressure on him and, unlike"
338,22,"Michael Cohen, he refused to ' break'-make           up stories in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for"
338,23,878
338,24,"a brave man!"""
338,25,"In a Fox News interview on August 22 , 2018, the President said: "" [Cohen] makes a better"
338,26,"deal when he uses me, like everybody else. And one of the reasons l respect Paul Manafort so"
338,27,much is he went through that trial - you know they make up stories . People make up stories. This
338,28,"Come, Bloomberg (Aug. 2, 2018); Gabby Morrongiello , What a guilty verdict for Manafort would mean"
338,29,"for Trump and Mueller, Washington Examiner (Aug. 18, 2018)."
338,30,870
338,31,"President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018)."
338,32,87 1
338,33,"President Trump Rem,irks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe , C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018)."
338,34,"872  President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe, C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018)."
338,35,873
338,36,"President Trump Remarks on John Brennan and Mueller Probe , C-SPAN (Aug. 17, 2018)."
338,37,874
338,38,"Trump calls Manafort ""very good person , "" All In with Chris Hayes (Aug. 17, 2018) (transcript);"
338,39,"Manafort        lawyer:      We     appreciate     Trump 's     support,    CNN      (Aug.     17,     2018)"
338,40,(https://www .cnn.com/videos/poli tics/2 018/08/ 17/paul-manafort-attorney-trump-j Uiy-del iberations-
338,41,schneider- lead-vpx .cnn).
338,42,875
338,43,"Transcript at 23, United States v. Michael Cohen, l: 18-cr-602 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018), Doc."
338,44,7 (Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript).
338,45,876
338,46,"President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPAN (Aug. 21, 2018)."
338,47,877
338,48,"President Trump Remarks on Manafort Trial, C-SPA N (Aug. 21, 2018)."
338,49,878
338,50,@realDonaldTrump 8/22/18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet.
338,51,126
338,52,NA
339,1,U.S. Department of Justice
339,2,AHerfle~' Werk Preclttet // May Cefltaifl Material Preteetecl Uflcler Fecl. R. Crim. P . 6(e)
339,3,"whole thing about flipping, they call it, T know all about flipping."" 879 The President said that"
339,4,"flipping was ""not fair"" and ""almost ought to be outlawed ."" 880 ln response to a question about"
339,5,"whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort, the President said, ""T have great respect for"
339,6,"what he's done, in terms of what he's gone through .... He worked for many, many people many,"
339,7,"many years , and T would say what he did , some of the charges they threw against him, every"
339,8,"consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does."" 88 1 Giuliani told journalists that the"
339,9,"President ""really thinks Manafort has been horribly treated"" and that he and the President had"
339,10,"discussed the political fallout if the President pardoned Manafort. 882 The next day, Giuliani told"
339,11,the Washington Post that the President had asked his lawyers for advice on the possib ility of a
339,12,"pardon for Manafort and other aides , and had been counseled against considering a pardon until"
339,13,the investigation concluded. 883
339,14,"On September 14, 2018 , Manafort pleaded guilty to charges in the District of Columbia"
339,15,and signed a plea agreement that required him to cooperate with investigators. 884 Giuliani was
339,16,reported to have publicly said that Manafort remained in a joint defense agreement with the
339,17,"President following Manafort's guilty plea and agreement to cooperate, and that Manafort 's"
339,18,attorneys regularly briefed the President ' s lawyers on the topics discussed and the information
339,19,"Manafort had provided in interviews with the Special Counsel's Office. 885 On November 26, 2018,"
339,20,the Special Counsel's Office disclosed in a public court filing that Manafort had breached his plea
339,21,"agreement by lying about multiple subjects. 886 The next day , Giuliani said that the President had"
339,22,"been ""upset for weeks"" about what he considered to be ""the un-American , horrible treatment of"
339,23,879
339,24,"Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded"
339,25,the previous day).
339,26,88
339,27,"°Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded"
339,28,the previous day).
339,29,881
339,30,"Fox & Friends Exclusive Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Aug. 23, 2018) (recorded"
339,31,the previous day).
339,32,882
339,33,".         Maggie Haberman & Katie Rogers, ""How Did We End Up Here?"" Trump Wonders as the White"
339,34,"House Soldiers On, New York Times (Aug. 22, 2018)."
339,35,883
339,36,"Carol D. Leonnig & Josh Dawsey, Trump recently sought his lawyers' advice on possibility of"
339,37,"pardoning Manafort, Giuliani says, Washington Post (Aug. 23, 2018)."
339,38,884
339,39,"Plea Agreement, United States v. Paul J Manafort, Jr., l:l7-cr-201 (D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018),"
339,40,Doc. 422.
339,41,885
339,42,"Karen Freifeld & Nathan Layne, Trump lawyer: Manafort said nothing damaging in Mueller"
339,43,"interviews, Reuters (Oct. 22, 2018); Michael S. Schmidt et al., Mana/art's Lawyer Said to Brief Trump"
339,44,"Attorn eys on What He Told Mueller, New York Times (Nov. 27, 2018); Dana Bash, Mana/art team briefed"
339,45,"Giuliani        on      Mueller      meetings,        CNN,        Posted      11/28/18,     available      at"
339,46,https://www.cnn.com/videos/pol itics/2018/ 11/28/manafort-lawyers-keeping-trump-lawyers-gi ul iani-
339,47,"updated-mueller-probe-bash-sot-nr-vpx.cnn; see Sean Hannity, Interview with Rudy Giuliani, Fox News"
339,48,"(Sept. 14, 2018) (Giuliani: ""[T]here was a quote put out by a source close to Manafort that the plea"
339,49,"agreement has, and cooperation agreement has, nothing to do with the Trump campaign .... Now, I know"
339,50,"that because 1've been privy to a lot of facts I can't repeat."")."
339,51,886
339,52,"Joint Status Report, United States v. Paul J Mana/art , Jr., (D.D.C Nov. 26, 2018), Doc. 455."
339,53,127
339,54,NA
340,1,U.S . Department of Justice
340,2,Atterttey Werk Pl'ea1:1et// May CentaiH Material Preteetea Uttaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
340,3,"Manafort."" 887 In an interview on November 28, 2018, the President suggested that it was ""very"
340,4,"brave"" that Manafort did not "" flip"":"
340,5,"If you told the truth, you go to jail. You know this flipping stuff is terrible. You flip and"
340,6,you lie and you get-the prosecutors will tell you 99 percent of the time they can get people
340,7,"to flip. It's rare that they can't. But I had three people: Manafort, Corsi-I don't know"
340,8,"Corsi, but he refuses to say what they demanded. 888 Manafort, Corsi                          . It 's"
340,9,889
340,10,actually very brave .
340,11,"Tn response to a question about a potential pardon for Manafort, the President said, ""It was never"
340,12,890
340,13,"discussed, but I wouldn't take it off the table. Why would I take it off the table? """
340,14,3. Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,15,Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,16,aHarm    to Ongoing Matter
340,17,IIIHarm to Ongoing Matter
340,18,Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,19,:•• Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,20,887
340,21,"Stephen Collinson, Trump appears consumed by Mueller investigation as details emerge, CNN"
340,22,"(Nov . 29, 2018)."
340,23,888
340,24,"""Corsi"" is a reference to Jerome Corsi,                              who was involved in efforts"
340,25,"to coordinate with WikiLeaks and Assange, and who stated publicly at that time that he had refused a plea"
340,26,"offer fro~                           ' s Office because he was ""not going to sign a lie."" Sara Murray & Eli"
340,27,"Watkins,~                             says he won't agree to plea deal, CNN (Nov. 26, 2018)."
340,28,889
340,29,"Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, Oval Office Interview with President Trump: Trump says"
340,30,"pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28 , 2018). That same day, the President"
340,31,"tweeted: ""While the disgusting Fake News is doing everything within their power not to report it that way,"
340,32,at least 3 major players are intimating that the Angry Mueller Gang ofDems is viciously telling witnesses
340,33,"to lie about facts & they will get relief. This is our Joseph McCarthy Era!"" @rea!DonaldTrump 11/28/ 18"
340,34,(8:39 a.m . ET) Tweet.
340,35,"890 Marisa Schultz & Nikki Schwab, New York Post Oval Office Interview with President Trump:"
340,36,"Trump says pardon for Paul Manafort still a possibility, New York Post (Nov. 28, 2018)."
340,37,Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,38,Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,39,Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,40,Harm to Ongoing Matter
340,41,128
340,42,NA
341,1,U.S. Department of Justice
341,2,"Attorfte)'"" Work Proauet // Ma)'' Cofttaift Material Prnteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
341,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,4,raHarm to Ongoing Matter
341,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,6,Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,7,1aHarm to Ongoing Matter
341,8,Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,9,-•          Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,10,895
341,11,896 Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,12,:· Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,13,:•· Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,14,· Harm to Ongoing Matter
341,15,129
341,16,NA
342,1,U.S. Department of Justice
342,2,Attol'Ae~·'Nol'icPl'oattet // May CoAtt1iAMatel'ial Pl'oteetea UAaer Fee. R. Cl'iffl.P. 6(e)
342,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,4,-Harm       to Ongoing Matter
342,5,111Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,6,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,7,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,8,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,9,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,10,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,11,900 Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,12,·• Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,13,• Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,14,1
342,15,• • Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,16,905
342,17,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,18,907
342,19,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,20,908
342,21,Harm to Ongoing Matter
342,22,130
342,23,NA
343,1,U.S. Department of Justice
343,2,"Atte,rRe:,·\ 1/e,rk Pfe,Eiuet// Ma:yCe,l'!ta:il'I"
343,3,Ma:teria:IPFoteeteEIUREief'FeEI.R. C!'im. P. 6(e)
343,4,Analysis
343,5,"In analyzing the President 's conduct towards Flynn , Manafort,        litlllll , the following"
343,6,evidence is relevant to the elements of obstruction of justice:
343,7,a.      Obstructive act. The President's actions towards witnesses in the Special Counsel's
343,8,investigation would qualify as obstructive if they had the natural tendency to prevent particular
343,9,"witnesses from testifying truthfully, or otherwise would have the probable effect of influencing,"
343,10,"delaying, or preventing their testimony to law enforcement."
343,11,"With regard to Flynn, the President sent private and public messages to Flynn encouraging"
343,12,him to stay strong and conveying that the President still cared about him before he began to
343,13,cooperate with the government. When Flynn's attorneys withdrew him from a joint defense
343,14,"agreement with the President, signaling that Flynn was potentially cooperating with the"
343,15,"government, the President's personal counsel initially reminded Flynn's counsel of the President's"
343,16,"warm feelings towards Flynn and said ""that still remains."" But when Flynn's counsel reiterated"
343,17,"that Flynn could no longer share information under a joint defense agreement , the President's"
343,18,personal counsel stated that the decision would be interpreted as reflecting Flynn's hostility
343,19,towards the President. That sequence of events could have had the potential to affec t Flynn's
343,20,"decision to cooperate, as well as the extent of that cooperation. Because of privilege issues,"
343,21,"however, we could not determine whether the President was personally involved in or knew about"
343,22,the specific message his counsel delivered to Flynn's counsel.
343,23,"With respect to Manafort, there is evidence that the President's actions had the potential to"
343,24,influence Manafort's decision whether to cooperate with the government. The President and his
343,25,"per so nal counsel made repeated statements suggesting that a pardon was a possibility for Mana fort,"
343,26,"while also making it clear that the President did not want Manafort to ""flip"" and cooperate with"
343,27,"the government. On June 15, 2018 , the day the judge presiding over Manafort's D.C. case was"
343,28,"considering whether to revoke his bail, the President said that he ""fe lt badly"" for Manafort and"
343,29,"stated , ""I think a lot of it is very unfair."" And when asked about a pardon for Manafort, the"
343,30,"President sai d, ""I do want to see people treated fairly. That 's what it's all about."" Later that day,"
343,31,"after Manafort's bail was revoked, t.he President called it a "" tough se ntence "" that was ""Very"
343,32,"unfair! "" Two days later , the President ' s personal counsel stated that individual s involved in the"
343,33,"Special Counsel ' s inve stigation could receive a pardon "" if in fact the [P]resident and his advisors"
343,34,".. . come to the conclusion that you have been treated unfairly ""- using languag e that paralleled"
343,35,"how the President had already described the treatment ofManafort. Those statements , combined"
343,36,"with the President's commendation ofManafort for being a ""brave man"" who "" refused to ' break ', """
343,37,suggested that a pardon was a more likely possibility if Mana fort continued not to cooperate wit h
343,38,the government.         And while Manafort eventually pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
343,39,"agreement, he was found to have violated the agreement by lying to inves tigators."
343,40,"The President ' s public statements during the Manafort tr ial, including during jury"
343,41,"deliberations, also had the potential to influence the trial jury. On the second day of trial, for"
343,42,"exa mple , the President called the prosecution a ""t errible situation "" and a "" hoax"" that ""con tinue s to"
343,43,"stain our country "" and referred to Manafort as a ""Reagan/Dole darling"" who was ""serving solitary"
343,44,"confinement"" even thou gh he was ""conv icted of nothing."" Those statements were widely picked"
343,45,up by the press. While jurors were instructed not to watch or read news stories about the case and
343,46,131
343,47,NA
344,1,U.S. Department of Justice
344,2,"Al:t:erHc,·Werk Preauet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fea. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)"
344,3,"are presumed to follow those instructions, the President's statements during the trial generated"
344,4,substantial media coverage that could have reached jurors if they happened to see the statements
344,5,or learned about them from others. And the President ' s statements during jury deliberations that
344,6,"Manafort ""happens to be a very good person"" and that "" it's very sad what they've done to Paul"
344,7,"Mana fort"" had the potential to influence jurors who learned of the statements, which the President"
344,8,made just as jurors were considering whether to convict or acquit Manafort.
344,9,"b.      Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's actions towards Flynn, Manafort,"
344,10,--           appear to have been connected to pending or ~d            official proceedings involving
344,11,each individual. The President's conduct towards Flynn~               principally occurred when both
344,12,were under criminal investigation by the Special Counsel's Office and press reports speculated
344,13,about whether they would cooperate with the Special Counsel's investigation. And the President's
344,14,conduct towards Manafort was directly connected to the official proceedings involving him. The
344,15,President made statements about Manafort and the charges against him during Manafort's criminal
344,16,"trial. And the President's comments about the prospect of Manafort "" flipping "" occurred when it"
344,17,was clear the Special Counsel continued to oversee grand jury proceedings .
344,18,c.      Intent. Evidence concerning the President's intent related to Flynn as a potential
344,19,"witness is inconclusive. As previously noted, because of privilege issues we do not have ev idence"
344,20,establishing whether the President knew about or was involved in his counsel ' s communications
344,21,with Flynn's counsel stating that Flynn's decision to withdraw from the joint defense agreement
344,22,"and cooperate with the government would be viewed as reflecting ""hostility "" towards the"
344,23,"President. And regardless of what the President ' s personal counsel communicated , the President"
344,24,continued to express sympathy for Flynn after he pleaded guilty pursuant to a cooperation
344,25,"agreement, stating that Flynn had ""led a very strong life"" and the President ""fe[lt] very badly """
344,26,about what had happened to him.
344,27,Evidence concerning the President's conduct towards Manafort indicates that the President
344,28,intended to encourage Manafort to not cooperate with the government. Before Manafort was
344,29,"convicted, the President repeatedly stated that Manafort had been treated unfairly . One day after"
344,30,"Manafort was convicted on eight felony charges and potentially faced a lengthy prison term , the"
344,31,"President said that Manafort was ""a brave man "" for refusing to ""b reak"" and that "" flipping"" ""almost"
344,32,"ought to be outlawed."" At the same time , although the President had privately told aides he did"
344,33,"not like Manafort, he publicly called Mana fort ""a good man"" and said he had a "" wonderful family."""
344,34,"And when the President was asked whether he was considering a pardon for Manafort , the"
344,35,"President did not respond directly and instead said he had ""g reat respect for what [Manafort]'s"
344,36,"done, in terms of what he's gone through."" The President added that ""so me of th e charges they"
344,37,"threw against him, every consultant, every lobbyist in Washington probably does."" In light of the"
344,38,"President's counsel's previous statements that the investigations ""m ight get cleaned up with some"
344,39,"presidential pardons"" and that a pardon would be possible if the President ""come[s ] to the"
344,40,"conclusion that you have been treated unfairl y,"" the evidence supports the inference that the"
344,41,132
344,42,NA
345,1,U.S. Department of Justice
345,2,"AttarRe,· Wark Prad:ttet // Mtt,. CaRtttiRMttterittlPrateeted: URd:erFed:.R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
345,3,"President intended Manafort to believe that he could receive a pardon, which would make"
345,4,cooperation with the government as a means of obtaining a lesser sentence unnecessary.
345,5,We also examined the evidence of the President's intent in making public statements about
345,6,Manafort at the beginning of his trial and when the jury was deliberating. Some evidence supports
345,7,"a conclusion that the President intended, at least in part , to influence the jury. The trial generated"
345,8,"widespread publicity, and as the jury began to deliberate, commentators suggested that an acquittal"
345,9,would add to pressure to end the Special Counsel's investigation. By publicly stating on the second
345,10,"day of deliberations that Manafort ""happens to be a very good person"" and that "" it's very sad what"
345,11,"they've done to Paul Manafort"" right after calling the Special Counsel 's investigation a ""rigged"
345,12,"witch hunt,"" the President ' s statements could, if they reached jurors, have the natural tendency to"
345,13,"engender sympathy for Manafort among jurors, and a factfinder could infer that the President"
345,14,"intended that result. But there are alternative explanations for the President's comments, including"
345,15,that he genuinely felt sorry for Manafort or that his goal was not to influence the jury but to
345,16,influence public opinion. The President's comments also could have been intended to continue
345,17,"sending a message to Manafort that a pardon was possible. As described above , the President"
345,18,"made his comments about Manafort being ""a very good person"" immediately after declining to"
345,19,answer a question about whether he would pardon Manafort.
345,20,133
345,21,NA
346,1,U.S. Department of Justice
346,2,AMon=tey'Nork Prodttet // Ma;· CoH:taiH:   Material Protedee UH:derFee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
346,3,K.      The President's Conduct Involving Michael Cohen
346,4,Overview
346,5,The President's conduct involving Michael Cohen spans the full period of our
346,6,"investigation. During the campaign, Cohen pursued the Trump Tower Moscow project on behalf"
346,7,"of the Trump Organization. Cohen briefed candidate Trump on the project numerous times,"
346,8,including discussing whether Trump should travel to Russia to advance the deal. After the media
346,9,"began questioning Trump ' s connections to Russia , Cohen promoted a ""party line "" that publicly"
346,10,distanced Trump from Russia and asserted he had no business there. Cohen continued to adhere
346,11,"to that party line in 2017, when Congress asked him to provide documents and testimony in its"
346,12,"Russia investigation. [n an attempt to minimize the President 's connections to Russia , Cohen"
346,13,submitted a letter to Congress falsely stating that he only briefed Trump on the Trump Tower
346,14,"Moscow project three times , that he did not consider asking Trump to travel to Russia , that Cohen"
346,15,"had not received a response to an outreach he made to the Russian government, and that the project"
346,16,"ended in January 2016, before the first Republican caucus or primary. While working on the"
346,17,"congressional statement , Cohen had extensive discussions with the President ' s personal counsel ,"
346,18,"who, according to Cohen, said that Cohen should not contradict the President and should keep the"
346,19,"statement short and ""tight."" After the FBI searched Cohen 's home and office in April 2018, the"
346,20,"President publicly asserted that Cohen would not ""flip"" and privately passed messages of support"
346,21,to him. Cohen also discussed pardons with the President's personal counsel and believed that if
346,22,"he stayed on message, he would get a pardon or the President would do ""something else"" to make"
346,23,"the investigation end. But after Cohen began cooperating with the government in July 2018 , the"
346,24,"President publicly criticized him, called him a ""rat,"" and suggested his family members had"
346,25,committed crimes.
346,26,Evidence
346,27,1. Candidate Trump's        Awareness   of and Involvement       m the Trump Tower
346,28,Moscow Project
346,29,The President's interactions with Cohen as a witne ss took place against the background of
346,30,the President's involvement in the Trump Tower Moscow project.
346,31,"As described in detail in Volume I, Section IV.A. 1, supra , from September 2015 until at"
346,32,"least June 2016, the Trump Organization pursued a Trump Tower Moscow project in Russia, with"
346,33,"negotiations conducted by Cohen, then-executive vice pres ident of the Trump Organization and"
346,34,special counsel to Donald J. Trump. 909             The Trump Organization had previously and
346,35,909
346,36,"In August 2018 and November 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to multiple crimes of deception,"
346,37,"including making false statements to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, as described later"
346,38,"in this section. When Cohen first met with investigators from this Office, he repeated the same lies he told"
346,39,"Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project. Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 12- 17. But after Cohen pleaded"
346,40,"guilty to offenses in the Southern District ofNew York on August 21, 2018, he met with investigators again"
346,41,and corrected the record. The Office found Cohen's testimony in these subsequent proffer sessions to be
346,42,consistent with and corroborated by other information obtained in the course of the Office's investigation.
346,43,"The Office's sentencing submission in Cohen's criminal case stated: ""Starting with his second meeting with"
346,44,"the [Special Counsel's Office] in September 2018 , the defendant has accepted responsibility not only for"
346,45,134
346,46,NA
347,1,U.S. Department of Justice
347,2,A*erH:ey '.Verk Pr0dttet // May C0H:taiH:     Material Pr0teeted UH:derFed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
347,3,"unsuccessfully pursued a building project in Moscow. 910 According to Cohen, in approximately"
347,4,September 2015 he obtained internal approval from Trump to negotiate on behalf of the Trump
347,5,Organization to have a Russian corporation build a tower in Moscow that licensed the Trump name
347,6,912
347,7,and brand .911 Cohen thereafter had numerous brief conversations with Trump about the project.
347,8,Cohen recalled that Trump wanted to be updat ed on any developments with Trump Tower Moscow
347,9,913
347,10,and on several occasions brought the project up with Cohen to ask what was happening on it.
347,11,Cohen also discussed the project on multiple occasions with Donald Trump Jr. and Ivanka
347,12,Trump.914
347,13,"In the fall of 2015, Trump signed a Lett er of Intent for the project that specified highly"
347,14,"lucrative terms for the Trump Organization. 915 In December 2015, Felix Sater, who was handling"
347,15,"negotiations between Cohen and the Russian corporation, asked Cohen for a copy of his and"
347,16,Trump ' s passports to facilitate travel to Russia to meet with government officials and possibl e
347,17,financing partners. 916 Cohen recalled discussing the trip with Trump and requesting a copy of
347,18,"Trump 's passport from Trump's personal secretary, Rhona Graff. 917"
347,19,"By January 2016, Cohen had becom e frustrated that Sater had not set up a meeting with"
347,20,"Russian government officials, so Cohen reached out directly by email to the office of Dmitry"
347,21,"his false statements concerning the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project, but also his broader efforts through"
347,22,"public statements and testimony before Congress to minimize his role in, and what he knew about, contacts"
347,23,between the [Trump Organization] and Russian interests during the course of the campaign. . . . The
347,24,information provided by Cohen about the [Trump Tower] Moscow Project in these proffer sessions is
347,25,consistent with and corroborat ed by other information obtained in the course of the [Special Counsel's
347,26,"Office 's] investigation ....   The defendant, without prompting by the [Special Counsel's Office], also"
347,27,corrected other false and misleading statements that he had made concerning his outreach to and contacts
347,28,"with Russian officials during the course of the campaign."" Gov't Sentencing Submission at 4, United States"
347,29,"v. Michael Cohen, I: I 8-cr-85O (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2018), Doc. 14. At Cohen's sentencing, our Office further"
347,30,"explained that Cohen had ""provided valuable information ... while taking care and being careful to note"
347,31,"what he knows and what he doesn't know."" Transcript at 19, United States v. Michael Cohen, I: l 8-cr-85O"
347,32,"(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2018), Doc. 17 (Cohen 12/ 12/ 18 Transcript)."
347,33,"910See Volume I, Section IV.A . I , supra (noting that starting in at least 2013, several employees of"
347,34,"the Trump Organization, including then-president of the organization Donald J. Trump, pursued a Trump"
347,35,Tower Moscow deal with severa l Russian counterparties).
347,36,"911Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 1-4; Cohen 8/7/18 302, at 15."
347,37,"912Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 2, 4."
347,38,"913 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4."
347,39,914
347,40,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 4, I 0."
347,41,"915MDC-H-OOO618-25(10/28/15 Letter oflntent , signed by Donald J. Trump, Trump Acquisition,"
347,42,"LLC and Andrey Rozov, LC. Expert Investment Company); Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at 3; Written Responses"
347,43,"of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III , Parts (a) through (g))."
347,44,"916 MDC-H-OOO6OO     ( 12/ 19/ 15 Email, Sater to Cohen)."
347,45,"917 Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 5."
347,46,135
347,47,NA
348,1,U.S. Department of Justice
348,2,AtterAey Werk Preauet // May CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
348,3,"Peskov, who was Putin's deputy chief of staff and press secretary. 918 On January 20, 2016 , Cohen"
348,4,"received an email response from Elena Poliakova , Peskov's personal assistant , and phone records"
348,5,"confirm that they then spoke for approximately twenty minutes, during which Cohen described the"
348,6,Trump Tower Moscow project and requested assistance in moving the project forward. 9 19 Cohen
348,7,°
348,8,recalled briefing candidate Trump about the call soon afterwards. 92 Cohen told Trump he spoke
348,9,"with a woman he identified as "" someone from the Kremlin ,"" and Cohen reported that she was very"
348,10,professional and asked detailed questions about the project. 921 Cohen recalled telling Trump he
348,11,wished the Trump Organization had assistants who were as competent as the woman from the
348,12,Kremlin. 922
348,13,Cohen thought his phone call renewed interest in the project. 923 The day after Cohen 's call
348,14,"with Poliakova , Sater texted Cohen , asking him to ""[c]all me when you have a few minutes to chat"
348,15,"... It's about Putin they called today."" 924 Sater told Cohen that the Russian government liked the"
348,16,"project and on January 25, 2016 , sent an invitation for Cohen to visit Moscow "" for a working"
348,17,"visit. "" 92 5 After the outreach from Sater, Cohen recalled telling Trump that he was waiting to hear"
348,18,back on moving the project forward. 926
348,19,"After January 2016 , Cohen continued to have conversations with Sater about Trump Tower"
348,20,Moscow and continued to keep candidate Trump updated about those discussions and the status
348,21,of the project. 927 Cohen recalled that he and Trump wanted Trump Tower Moscow to succeed and
348,22,928
348,23,that Trump never discouraged him from working on the project because of the campaign.                         In
348,24,"March or April 2016 , Trump asked Cohen if anything was happening in Russia .929 Cohen also"
348,25,9 18
348,26,"See FS00004 (12/30/15 Text Message, Cohen to Sater); TRUMPORG_MC_000233 (1/ 11/ 16"
348,27,"Email , Cohen to pr_peskova @prpress.gof.ru); MDC-H-000690 (1/14/ 16 Email, Cohen to"
348,28,"info@prpress.gov.ru); TRUMPORG_MC_000235 (1/16/ 16 Email, Cohen to pr_peskova @prpress.gov.ru)."
348,29,919
348,30,"1/20/ 16 Email, Poliakova to Cohen; Call Records ofMichael Cohen. (Showing a 22-minute call"
348,31,"on January 20, 2016, between Cohen and the number Poliakova provided in her email) ; Cohen 9/12/ 18 302,"
348,32,"at 2-3. After the call, Cohen saved Poliakova ' s contact information in his Trump Organi zation Outlook"
348,33,contact list. 1/20/16 Cohen Microsoft Outlook Entry (6:22 a.m.).
348,34,92
348,35,"°Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5."
348,36,921
348,37,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5-6; Cohen I l/12/18 302, at 4."
348,38,922
348,39,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5."
348,40,923
348,41,"Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302, at 5."
348,42,92 4
348,43,"FS0O0l l (1/21/ 16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen)."
348,44,925
348,45,"Cohen 9/12/ 18 302, at 5; 1/25/ 16 Email, Sater to Cohen (attachment)."
348,46,926
348,47,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5."
348,48,"927  Cohen 9/12/ 18 302, at 6. In later congressional testimony, Cohen stated that he briefed Trump"
348,49,on the project approximately six times after January 2016. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump
348,50,"Organization Before the House Oversight and Ref orm Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb . 27, 2019) (CQ Cong."
348,51,"Transcripts , at 24) (testimony of Michael Cohen)."
348,52,928
348,53,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 6."
348,54,929
348,55,"Cohen 9/18/ 18 302, at 4."
348,56,136
348,57,NA
349,1,U.S. Department of Justice
349,2,AttorHey Work Pros1:1et// Mey CoHteiHMeteriel Proteetes UHeer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
349,3,"recalled briefing Donald Trump Jr. in the spring-a conversation that Cohen said was not "" idle"
349,4,"chit chat"" because Trump Tower Moscow was potentially a $1 billion deal. 930"
349,5,"Cohen recalled that around May 2016 , he again raised with candidate Trump the possibility"
349,6,"of a trip to Russia to advance the Trump Tower Moscow project. 931 At that time, Cohen had"
349,7,"received several texts from Sater seeking to arrange dates for such a trip. 932 On May 4, 2016, Sater"
349,8,"wrote to Cohen , ""T had a chat with Moscow. ASSUMING the trip does happen the question is"
349,9,before or after the convention ..... Obviously the premeeting trip (you only) can happen anytime
349,10,933
349,11,"you want but the 2 big guys [is] the question. I said I would confirm and revert.""             Cohen"
349,12,"responded, ""My trip before Cleveland.              Trump once he becomes the nominee after the"
349,13,"convention."" 934 On May 5, 2016, Sater followed up with a text that Cohen thought he probably"
349,14,read to Trump:
349,15,Peskov would like to invite you as his guest to the St. Petersburg Forum which is
349,16,Russia ' s Davos it's June 16-19. He wants to meet there with you and possibly
349,17,introduce you to either Putin or Medvedev .... This is perfect. The entire business
349,18,class of Russia will be there as well. He said anything you want to discuss including
349,19,dates and subjects are on the table to discuss. 935
349,20,Cohen recalled discussing the invitation to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum with
349,21,candidate Trump and saying that Putin or Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev might be
349,22,there. 936 Cohen remembered that Trump said that he would be willing to travel to Russia if Cohen
349,23,"could "" lock and load"" on the deal. 937 TnJune 2016, Cohen decided not to attend the St. Petersburg"
349,24,938
349,25,Economic Forum because Sater had not obtained a formal invitation for Cohen from Peskov .
349,26,Cohen said he had a quick conversation with Trump at that time but did not tell him that the project
349,27,was over because he did not want Trump to complain that the deal was on-again -off- again if it
349,28,were revived. 939
349,29,"During the summer of 2016, Cohen recalled that candidate Trump publicly claimed that he"
349,30,had nothing to do with Russia and then shortly afterwards privately checked with Cohen about the
349,31,"status of the Trump Tower Moscow project, which Cohen found ""interesting."" 940 At some point"
349,32,93
349,33,"°Cohen 9/ 12/ 18 302 , at 10."
349,34,931
349,35,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7."
349,36,932
349,37,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7."
349,38,933
349,39,"FS000 15 (5/4/16 Text Message , Sater to Cohen)."
349,40,934
349,41,"FS000l5 (5/4/16 Text Message , Cohen to Sater)."
349,42,935
349,43,"FS00016-17 (5/5/16 Text Messages, Sater & Cohen)."
349,44,936
349,45,"Cohen 9/12/ l 8 302, at 7."
349,46,937
349,47,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7."
349,48,938
349,49,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 7-8."
349,50,939
349,51,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8."
349,52,94
349,53,"°Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2."
349,54,137
349,55,NA
350,1,U.S. Department of Justice
350,2,Atterttey Wm·k Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteetee Utteer Fee. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
350,3,"that summer, Cohen recalled having a brief conversation with Trump in which Cohen said the"
350,4,Trump Tower Moscow project was going nowhere because the Russian development company
350,5,"had not secured a piece of property for the project. 941 Trump said that was "" too bad,"" and Cohen"
350,6,did not recall talking with Trump about the project after that. 942 Cohen said that at no time during
350,7,the campaign did Trump tell him not to pursue the project or that the project should be
350,8,abandoned .943
350,9,"2. Cohen Determines to Adhere to a ""Party Line"" Distancing Candidate Trump"
350,10,From Russia
350,11,"As previously discussed, see Volume II, Section II.A , supra , when questions about possible"
350,12,"Russian support for candidate Trump emerged during the 2016 presidential campaign , Trump"
350,13,"denied having any personal, financial, or business connection to Russia , which Cohen described"
350,14,"as the ""party line"" or ""message"" to follow for Trump and his senior advisors. 944"
350,15,"After the election, the Trump Organization sought to formally close out certain deals in"
350,16,advance of the inauguration .945 Cohen recalled that Trump Tower Moscow was on the list of deals
350,17,"to be closed out. 946 In approximately January 2017, Cohen began receiving inquiries from the"
350,18,"media about Trump Tower Moscow, and he recalled speaking to the President-Elect when those"
350,19,inquiries came in. 947 Cohen was concerned that truthful answers about the Trump Tower Moscow
350,20,"project might not be consistent with the ""message"" that the President-Elect had no relationship"
350,21,with Russia. 948
350,22,"In an effort to ""stay on message, "" Cohen told a New York Times reporter that the Trump"
350,23,Tower Moscow deal was not feasible and had ended in January 2016. 949 Cohen recalled that this
350,24,"was part of a "" script"" or talking points he had developed with President-Elect Trump and others to"
350,25,"941 Cohen  3/19/19 302, at 2. Cohen could not recall the precise timing of this conversation, but said"
350,26,he thought it occurred in June or July 2016. Cohen recalled that the conversation happened at some point
350,27,"after candidate Trump was publicly stating that he had nothing to do with Russia. Cohen 3/ 19/ 19 302, at"
350,28,2.
350,29,942
350,30,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2."
350,31,943
350,32,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2."
350,33,944
350,34,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at l; Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3, 5; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9."
350,35,"945 Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 1-2; see also Rtskhiladze 4/4/18 302, at 8-9."
350,36,946
350,37,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 1-2."
350,38,947
350,39,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 3."
350,40,948
350,41,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4."
350,42,949
350,43,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5. The article was published on February 19, 2017, and reported that"
350,44,"Sater and Cohen had been working on plan for a Trump Tower Moscow ""as recently as the fall of2015"""
350,45,but had come to a halt because of the presidential campaign. Consistent with Cohen's intended patty line
350,46,"message, the article stated, ""Cohen said the Trump Organization had received a letter of intent for a project"
350,47,in Moscow from a Russian real estate developer at that time but determined that the project was not
350,48,"feasible."" Megan Twohey & Scott Shane, A Back-Channel Plan for Ukrain e and Russia, Courte sy of Trump"
350,49,"Associates, New York Times (Feb. 19, 2017)."
350,50,138
350,51,NA
351,1,U.S. Department of Justice
351,2,At:terHeyWork Prodttet // May CoHtaiHMaterial Proteeted UHder Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
351,3,°
351,4,dismiss the idea of a substantial connection between Trump and Russia. 95 Cohen said that he
351,5,discussed the talking points with Trump but that he did not explicitly tell Trump he thought they
351,6,were untrue because Trump already knew they were untrue. 951 Cohen thought it was important to
351,7,"say the deal was done in January 2016 , rather than acknowledge that talks continued in May and"
351,8,"June 2016 , because it limited the period when candidate Trump could be alleged to have a"
351,9,"relationship with Russia to an early point in the campaign , before Trump had become the party's"
351,10,presumptive nominee. 952
351,11,3. Cohen Submits False Statements to Congress Minimizing the Trump Tower
351,12,Moscow Project in Accordance with the Party Line
351,13,"In early May 2017, Cohen received requests from Congress to provide testimony and"
351,14,documents in connection with congressional investigations of Russian interference in the 2016
351,15,"election. 953 At that time, Cohen understood Congress's interest in him to be focused on the"
351,16,allegations in the Steele reporting concerning a meeting Cohen allegedly had with Russian officials
351,17,in Prague during the campaign. 954 Cohen had never traveled to Prague and was not concerned
351,18,"about those allegations , which he believed were provably false. 955 On May 18, 2017 , Cohen met"
351,19,"with the President to discuss the request from Congress, and the President instructed Cohen that"
351,20,he should cooperate because there was nothing there. 956
351,21,Cohen eventually entered into a joint defense agreement (JOA) with the President and other
351,22,individuals who were part of the Russia investigation. 957 In the months leading up to his
351,23,"congressional testimony , Cohen frequently spoke with the President's personal counsel. 958 Cohen"
351,24,95
351,25,"°Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 5-6 ."
351,26,951
351,27,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 6."
351,28,952
351,29,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at I 0."
351,30,953
351,31,"P-SCO-000000328 (5/9/17 Letter, HPSCI to Cohen); P-SCO-000000331 (5/12/17 Letter, SSCI"
351,32,to Cohen).
351,33,954
351,34,"Cohen 11/20/18 302 , at 2-3."
351,35,955
351,36,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2-3."
351,37,956
351,38,"Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 11/20/19 302, at 3."
351,39,957
351,40,"Cohen 11/ 12/18 302 , at 2."
351,41,958
351,42,"Cohen 11/ 12/18 302 , at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 , at 2-6. Cohen told investigators about his"
351,43,conversations with the President's personal counsel after waiving any privilege of his own and after this
351,44,"Office advised his counsel not to provide any communications that would be covered by any other privilege,"
351,45,"including communications protected by a joint defense or common interest privilege . As a result, most of"
351,46,what Cohen told us about his conversations with the President 's personal counsel concerned what Cohen
351,47,"had communicated to the President's personal counsel, and not what was said in response. Cohen described"
351,48,"certain statements made by the President's personal counsel, however , that are set forth in this section."
351,49,Cohen and his counsel were better positioned than this Office to evaluate whether any privilege protected
351,50,those statements because they had knowledge of the scope of their joint defense agreement and access to
351,51,privileg ed communications that may have provided context for evaluating the statements they shared. After
351,52,"interviewing Cohen about these matters, we asked the President's personal counsel if he wished to provide"
351,53,information to us about his conversations with Cohen related to Cohen's congressional testimony about
351,54,139
351,55,NA
352,1,U.S. Department of Justice
352,2,"Atterrte,-· \llerk Preettet // Ma,-· Certtairt Material Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
352,3,said that in those conversations the President ' s personal counsel would sometimes say that he had
352,4,just been with the President. 959 Cohen recalled that the President ' s personal counsel told him the
352,5,JOA was working well together and assured him that there was nothing there and if they stayed on
352,6,"message the investigations would come to an end soon. 960 At that time, Cohen's legal bills were"
352,7,"being paid by the Trump Organization ,961 and Cohen was told not to worry because the"
352,8,investigations would be over by summer or fall of 20 l 7.962 Cohen said that the President's
352,9,"personal counsel also conveyed that, as part of the JOA, Cohen was protected, which he would not"
352,10,"be if he ""went rogue."" 963 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel reminded him that"
352,11,"""the President loves you"" and told him that ifhe stayed on message, the President had his back. 964"
352,12,"In August 2017, Cohen began drafting a statement about Trump Tower Moscow to submit"
352,13,to Congress along with his document production. 965 The final version of the statement contained
352,14,"several false statements about the project. 966 First, although the Trump Organization continued to"
352,15,"pursue the project until at least June 2016, the statement said, ""The proposal was under"
352,16,consideration at the Trump Organization from September 2015 until the end of January 2016. By
352,17,"the end of January 2016 , I determined that the proposal was not feasible for a variety of business"
352,18,"reasons and should not be pursued further. Based on my business determi nations , the Trump"
352,19,"Organization abandoned the proposal."" 967 Second, although Cohen and candidate Trump had"
352,20,"discussed possible travel to Russia by Trump to pursue the venture, the statement said , ""Despite"
352,21,"overtures by Mr. Sater, I never considered asking Mr. Trump to travel to Russia in conn ection with"
352,22,this proposal. I told Mr. Sater that Mr. Trump would not travel to Russia unless there was a
352,23,"definitive agreement in place."" 968 Third, although Cohen had regularly briefed Trump on the status"
352,24,"Trump Tower Moscow. The President's personal counsel declined and, through his own counsel, indicated"
352,25,that he could not disaggregate information he had obtained from Cohen from information he had obtained
352,26,from other parties in the IDA. In view of the admonition this Office gave to Cohen's counsel to withhold
352,27,"communications that could be covered by privilege, the President's personal counsel 's uncertainty about"
352,28,"the provenance of his own knowledge, the burden on a privilege holder to establish the elements to support"
352,29,"a claim of privilege, and the substance of the statements themselves, we have included relevant statements"
352,30,"Cohen provided in this report. If the statements were to be used in a context beyond this report, further"
352,31,analysis could be warranted.
352,32,959
352,33,"Cohen l 1/20/18 302, at 6."
352,34,96
352,35,"°Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 2, 4."
352,36,961
352,37,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4."
352,38,962
352,39,"Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 8; Cohen 1 1/20/18 302, at 3-4."
352,40,963
352,41,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4."
352,42,964
352,43,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 2."
352,44,965
352,45,"P-SCO-000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Email and Attachment, Michael Cohen's"
352,46,Counsel to Cohen). Cohen said it was not his idea to write a letter to Congress about Trump Tower Moscow.
352,47,"Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 7."
352,48,966
352,49,"P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
352,50,967
352,51,"P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
352,52,968
352,53,"P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
352,54,140
352,55,NA
353,1,U.S. Department of Justice
353,2,"At:tertte,.· Werk Pretlttet // May Cetttttifl: Materia:l Preteetetl Ufl:tler Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
353,3,"of the project and had numerous conversations about it, the statement said, ""Mr. Trump was never"
353,4,"in contact with anyone about this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a"
353,5,"non-binding letter of intent in 2015."" 969 Fourth, although Cohen's outreach to Peskov in January"
353,6,"2016 had resulted in a lengthy phone call with a representative from the Kremlin, the statement"
353,7,"said that Cohen did ""not recall any response to my email [to Peskov ], nor any other contacts by"
353,8,"me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian government officials about the proposal."" 970"
353,9,"Cohen's statement was circulated in advance to, and edited by, members of the JDA. 97 1"
353,10,"Before the statement was finalized, early drafts contained a sentence stating, ""The building project"
353,11,"led me to make limited contacts with Russian government officials. "" 972 In the final version of the"
353,12,"statement, that line was deleted. 973 Cohen thought he was told that it was a decision of the JOA to"
353,13,"take out that sentence, and he did not push back on the deletion. 974 Cohen recalled that he told the"
353,14,President's personal counsel that he would not contest a decision of the JDA. 975
353,15,"Cohen also recalled that in drafting his statement for Congress , he spoke with the"
353,16,President's personal counsel about a different issue that connected candidate Trump to Russia:
353,17,Cohen's efforts to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin in New York during the 2015 United
353,18,"Nations General Assembly. 976 In September 2015, Cohen had suggested the meeting to Trump,"
353,19,who told Cohen to reach out to Putin ' s office about it. 977 Cohen spoke and emailed with a Russian
353,20,"official about a possible meeting, and recalled that Trump asked him multiple times for updates on"
353,21,"the proposed meeting with Putin. 978 When Cohen called the Russian official a second time , she"
353,22,"told him it would not follow proper protocol for Putin to meet with Trump, and Cohen relayed that"
353,23,969
353,24,"P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
353,25,970
353,26,"P-SCO-00009478 (Statement of Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
353,27,971
353,28,"Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at 8-9. Cohen also testified in Congress that the President's counsel"
353,29,reviewed and edited the statement. Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House
353,30,"Oversight and Reform Committee, 116th Cong. (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 24-25) (testimony"
353,31,"by Michael Cohen). Because of concerns about the common interest privilege, we did not obtain or review"
353,32,"all drafts of Cohen's statement. Based on the drafts that were released through this Office's filter process,"
353,33,it appears that the substance of the four principal false statements described above were contained in an
353,34,early draft prepared by Cohen and his counsel. P-SCO-0000003680 and P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17
353,35,"Email and Attachment, Cohen's counsel to Cohen)."
353,36,972
353,37,"P-SCO-0000003687 (8/16/17 Draft Statement of Michael Cohen); Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4."
353,38,973
353,39,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4. A different line stating that Cohen did ""not recall any response to my"
353,40,"email [to Peskov in January 2016], nor any other contacts by me with Mr. Peskov or other Russian"
353,41,"government officials about the proposal"" remained in the draft. See P-SCO-0000009478 (Statement of"
353,42,"Michael D. Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
353,43,974
353,44,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 4."
353,45,975
353,46,"Cohen J l /20/18 302, at 5."
353,47,976
353,48,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at I 0-11."
353,49,977
353,50,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/ I 8 302, at 4."
353,51,978
353,52,"Cohen 9/ 18/18 302, at 11; Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5."
353,53,141
353,54,NA
354,1,U.S. Department of Justice
354,2,Atterfl:e:yWerk Pretlttet // MB:)' Cefl:taiHMaterial Preteetetl Ufl:tlerFett. R. Criffl. P. 6(e1
354,3,message to Trump. 979 Cohen anticipated he might be asked questions about the proposed Trump-
354,4,Putin meeting when he testified before Congress because he had talked about the potential meeting
354,5,°
354,6,on Sean Hannity's radio show. 98 Cohen recalled explaining to the President's personal counsel
354,7,"the ""whole story"" of the attempt to set up a meeting between Trump and Putin and Trump's role"
354,8,in it.981 Cohen recalled that he and the President's personal counsel talked about keeping Trump
354,9,"out of the narrative , and the President's personal counsel told Cohen the story was not relevant and"
354,10,should not be included in his statement to Congress .982
354,11,"Cohen said that his ""agenda"" in submitting the statement to Congress with false"
354,12,representations about the Trump Tower Moscow project was to minimize links between the project
354,13,"and the President, give the false impression that the project had ended before the first presidential"
354,14,"primaries, and shut down further inquiry into Trump Tower Moscow , with the aim of limiting the"
354,15,ongoing Russia investigations .983 Cohen said he wanted to protect the President and be loyal to
354,16,him by not contradicting anything the President had said. 984 Cohen recalled he was concerned that
354,17,ifhe told the truth about getting a response from the Kremlin or speaking to candidate Trump about
354,18,"travel to Russia to pursue the project , he would contradict the message that no connection existed"
354,19,"between Trump and Russia, and he rationalized his decision to provide false testimony because"
354,20,the deal never happened. 985 He was not concerned that the story would be contradicted by
354,21,individuals who knew it was false because he was sticking to the party line adhered to by the whol e
354,22,"group. 986 Cohen wanted the support of the President and the White House, and he believed that"
354,23,following the party line would help put an end to the Special Counsel and congressional
354,24,investigations. 987
354,25,"Between August 18, 2017, when the statement was in an initial draft stage , and August 28 ,"
354,26,"2017, when the statement was submitted to Congress , phone records reflect that Cohen spoke with"
354,27,"the President's pcersonal counsel almost daily. 988 On August 27, 2017, the day before Cohen"
354,28,979
354,29,"Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 5."
354,30,98
354,31,"°Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11."
354,32,981
354,33,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2."
354,34,98 2
354,35,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 2; see Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 11 (recalling that he was told that if he"
354,36,"stayed on message and kept the President out of the narrative, the President would have his back)."
354,37,983
354,38,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8; Information at 4-5, United States v. Michael Cohen, I: l 8-cr-850"
354,39,"(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), Doc. 2 (Cohen Information)."
354,40,984
354,41,"Cohen I 1/20/ 18 302, at 4."
354,42,985
354,43,"Cohen I I /20/18 302, at 4; Cohen 11/12/ 18 302, at 2-3, 4, 6."
354,44,986
354,45,"Cohen 9/12/l 8 302, at 9."
354,46,987
354,47,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 8-9."
354,48,988
354,49,"Cohen 11/12/18 302, at 2-3; Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen"
354,50,"(Reflecting three contacts on August 18, 2017 (24 seconds; 5 minutes 25 seconds; and IO minutes 58"
354,51,seconds); two contacts on August 19 (23 seconds and 24 minutes 26 seconds); three contacts on August 23
354,52,(8 seconds; 20 minutes 33 seconds; and 5 minutes 8 seconds); one contact on August 24 (11 minutes 59
354,53,seconds); 14 contacts on August 27 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; I minute 16 seconds; 1 minutes 35
354,54,142
354,55,NA
355,1,U.S. Department of Justice
355,2,Atteffl:ey Werle Pretlttct // May Cet~taiR Material Pretectea URacr Fca. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)
355,3,"submitted the statement to Congress, Cohen and the President's personal counsel had numerous"
355,4,"contacts by phone, including calls lasting three , four, six, eleven , and eighteen minutes. 989 Cohen"
355,5,"recalled telling the President's personal counsel, who did not have first-hand knowledge of the"
355,6,"project, that there was more detail on Trump Tower Moscow that was not in the statement,"
355,7,including that there were more communications with Russia and more communications with
355,8,°
355,9,candidate Trump than the statement reflected. 99 Cohen stated that the President's personal
355,10,counsel responded that it was not necessary to elaborate or include those details because the project
355,11,"did not progress and that Cohen should keep his statement short and ""t ight"" and the matter would"
355,12,"soon come to an end. 991 Cohen recalled that the President's personal counsel said "" his client """
355,13,"appreciated Cohen , that Cohen should stay on message and not contradict the President , that there"
355,14,"was no need to muddy the water, and that it was time to move on. 992 Cohen said he agreed because"
355,15,it was what he was expected to do. 993 After Cohen later pleaded guilty to making false statements
355,16,"to Congress about the Trump Tower Moscow project, this Office sought to speak with the"
355,17,"President's personal counsel about these conversations with Cohen , but counsel declined , citing"
355,18,potential privilege concerns. 994
355,19,"At the same time that Cohen finalized his written submission to Congress , he served as a"
355,20,"source for a Washington Post story published on August 27, 2017 , that reported in depth for the"
355,21,"first time that the Trump Organization was ""pursuing a plan to develop a massive Trump Tower"
355,22,"in Moscow"" at the same time as candidate Trump was ""running for president .in late 2015 and early"
355,23,"2016."" 995 The article reported that ""the project was abandoned at the end of January 2016, just"
355,24,"before the presidential primaries began, several people familiar with the propo sal said."" 996 Cohen"
355,25,"recalled that in speaking to the Post, he held to the false story that negotiations for the deal ceased"
355,26,in January 2016 .997
355,27,seconds; 6 minutes 16 seconds; I minutes 10 seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds ; 4
355,28,minutes 56 seconds ; 11 minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds).
355,29,989
355,30,"Cohen 11/20/18 302 , at 5; Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting 14 contacts on August"
355,31,"27, 2017 (28 seconds; 4 minutes 37 seconds; 1 minute 16 seconds; I minutes 35 seconds; 6 minutes 16"
355,32,seconds; I minutes IO seconds; 3 minutes 5 seconds; 18 minutes 55 seconds; 4 minutes 56 seconds; 11
355,33,minutes 6 seconds; 8 seconds; 3 seconds; 2 seconds; 2 seconds)).
355,34,99
355,35,"°Cohen  1l /20/ 18 302, at 5."
355,36,991
355,37,"Cohen 1I /20/18 302, at 5. Cohen also vaguely recalled telling the President's personal counsel"
355,38,that he spoke with a woman from the Kremlin and that the President' s personal counsel responded to the
355,39,"effect of ""so what?"" because the deal never happened. ·Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5."
355,40,992
355,41,"Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 5."
355,42,993
355,43,"Cohen 11/20/18 302, at 5."
355,44,994
355,45,"2/8/19 email, Counsel for personal counsel to the President to Special Counsel's Office."
355,46,995
355,47,"Cohen 9/18/18 302 , at 7; Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump"
355,48,"Tower in Moscow while he ran/ or p resident, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017)."
355,49,996
355,50,"Carol D. Leonnig et al., Trump's business sought deal on a Trump Tower in Moscow while he"
355,51,"ran/or president, Washington Post (Aug. 27, 2017)."
355,52,997
355,53,"Cohen 9/18/ I 8 302, at 7."
355,54,143
355,55,NA
356,1,U.S. Department of Justice
356,2,Attorttey Work Proettet // Ma)' CoHtaiH Material Proteetee UHeer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
356,3,"On August 28, 2017, Cohen submitted his statement about the Trump Tower Moscow"
356,4,project to Congress. 998 Cohen did not recall talking to the President about the specifics of what
356,5,999
356,6,the statement said or what Cohen would later testify to about Trump Tower Moscow.                          He
356,7,recalled speaking to the President more generally about how he planned to stay on message in his
356,8,"testimony . 1000 On September 19, 2017, in anticipation of his impending testimony, Cohen"
356,9,"orchestrated the public release of his opening remarks to Congress, which criticized the allegations"
356,10,"in the Steele material and claimed that the Trump Tower Moscow project ""was terminated in"
356,11,January of 2016; which occurred before the Iowa caucus and months before the very first
356,12,"primary."" 1001 Cohen said the release of his opening remarks was intended to shape the narrative"
356,13,and let other people who might be witnesses know what Cohen was saying so they could follow
356,14,the same message. 1002 Cohen said his decision was meant to mirror Jared Kushner's decision to
356,15,"release a statement in advance of Kushner's congressional testimony, which the President's"
356,16,"personal counsel had told Cohen the President liked. 1003 Cohen recalled that on September 20,"
356,17,"2017, after Cohen's opening remarks had been printed by the media, the President's personal"
356,18,counsel told him that the President was pleased with the Trump Tower Moscow statement that had
356,19,gone out. 1004
356,20,"On October 24 and 25 , 2017, Cohen testified before Congress and repeated the false"
356,21,statements he had included in his written statement about Trump Tower Moscow. 1005 Phone
356,22,records show that Cohen spoke with the President's personal counsel immediately after his
356,23,testimony on both days. 1006
356,24,4. The President Sends Messages of Support to Cohen
356,25,"In January 2018, the media reported that Cohen had arranged a $130,000 payment during"
356,26,the campaign to prevent a woman from publicly discussing an alleged sexual encounter she had
356,27,998
356,28,"P-SCO-000009477 - 9478 (8/28/17 Letter and Attachment, Cohen to SSCI)."
356,29,999
356,30,"Cohen 11/ 12/18 302, at 2; Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9."
356,31,100
356,32,"°Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 9."
356,33,1001
356,34,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7; see, e.g., READ: Michael Cohen 's stat ement to the Senate intelligence"
356,35,"committee , CNN (Sept. 19, 2017)."
356,36,1002
356,37,"Cohen 9/18/18 302, at 7."
356,38,1003
356,39,"Cohen 9/ 18/ 18 302, at 7; Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 6."
356,40,1004
356,41,"Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 6. Phone records show that the President 's personal counsel called"
356,42,"Cohen on the morning of September 20, 2017, and they spoke for approximately 11 minutes, and that they"
356,43,"had two more contacts that day, one of which lasted approximately 18 minutes. Call Records of Michael"
356,44,"Cohen. (Reflecting three contacts on September 20, 2017, with calls lasting for 11 minutes 3 seconds; 2"
356,45,seconds; and 18 minutes 38 seconds).
356,46,1005
356,47,"Cohen Information, at 4; Executive Session, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S."
356,48,"House of Representatives, Interview of Michael Cohen (Oct. 24, 2017), at I 0-11, 117-119."
356,49,1006
356,50,"Call Records of Michael Cohen. (Reflecting two contacts on October 24, 2017 (12 minutes 8"
356,51,"seconds and 8 minutes 27 seconds) and three contacts on October 25, 2017 (1 second; 4 minutes 6 seconds;"
356,52,and 6 minutes 6 seconds)).
356,53,144
356,54,NA
357,1,U.S. Department of Justice
357,2,"Atteme, Werk Prea1:1et// Ma,· Cefltaifl Material Proteetea Uflaer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
357,3,with the President before he ran for office. 1007This Office did not investigate Cohen's campaign-
357,4,"period payments to women. 1008 However, those events, as described here, are potentially relevant"
357,5,to the President's and his personal counsel's interactions with Cohen as a witness who later began
357,6,to cooperate with the government.
357,7,"On February 13, 2018, Cohen released a statement to news organizations that stated, ""In a"
357,8,"private transaction in 20 I 6, I used my own personal funds to facilitate a payment of $130,000 to"
357,9,[the woman]. Neither the Trump Organization nor the Trump campaign was a party to the
357,10,"transaction with [the woman], and neither reimbursed me for the payment, either directly or"
357,11,"indirectly."" 1009 In congressional testimony on February 27, 2019, Cohen testified that he had"
357,12,discussed what to say about the payment with the President and that the President had directed
357,13,"Cohen to say that the President ""was not knowledgeable .. . of [Cohen's] actions"" in making the"
357,14,"payment. 1010 On February 19, 2018, the day after the New York Times wrote a detailed story"
357,15,"attributing the payment to Cohen and describing Cohen as the President's ""fixer,"" Cohen received"
357,16,"a text message from the President's personal counsel that stated , "" Client says thanks for what you"
357,17,"do ."" 1011"
357,18,"On April 9, 2018, FBI agents working with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern"
357,19,1012
357,20,"District of New York executed search warrants on Cohen's home, hotel room, and office.                  That"
357,21,"day, the President spoke to reporters and said that he had ""just heard that they broke into the office"
357,22,"of one of my personal attorneys-a good man."" 1013 The President called the searches ""a real"
357,23,"disgrace"" and said, ""It's an attack on our country, in a true sense. It's an attack on what we all"
357,24,"1007 See, e.g., Michael Rothfeld & Joe Palazzolo , Trump Lawyer Arranged $130,000 Payment for"
357,25,"Adult-Film Star's Silence, Wall Street Journal (Jan . 12, 2018)."
357,26,1008
357,27,The Office was authorized to investigate Cohen 's establishment and use of Essential
357,28,"Consultants LLC, which Cohen created to facilitate the $130,000 payment during the campaign, based on"
357,29,evidence that the entity received funds from Russian-backed entities. Cohen's use of Essential Consultants
357,30,"to facilitate the $130,000 payment to the woman during the campaign was part of the Offic e's referral of"
357,31,certain Cohen-related matters to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New Yor k.
357,32,1009
357,33,"See, e.g., Mark Berman, Longtime Trump attorney says he made $130,000 payment to Stormy"
357,34,"Daniels with his money, Washington Post (Feb. 14, 2018)."
357,35,1010Hearing on Issues Related to Trump Organization Before the House Oversight and Reform
357,36,"Committee, I W"" Cong . (Feb. 27, 2019) (CQ Cong. Transcripts, at 147-148) (testimony ofMichael Cohen)."
357,37,Toll records show that Cohen was connected to a White House phone number for approximately five
357,38,"minutes on January 19, 2018, and for approximately seven minutes on January 30, 2018, and tha t Cohen"
357,39,"called Melania Trump's cell phone several times between January 26, 2018, and January 30, 2018. Call"
357,40,Records of Michael Cohen.
357,41,1011
357,42,"2/19/18 Text Message, Presid ent 's personal counsel to Cohen; see Jim Rutenberg et al., Tools"
357,43,"of Trump's Fixer: Payouts, Intimidation and the Tabloids, New York Times (Feb. 18, 2018) ."
357,44,1012
357,45,"Gov't Opp. to Def. Mot. for Temp. Restraining Ord er, In the Matter of Search Warrants"
357,46,"Executed on April 9, 2018, 18-mj-3161 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2018) , Doc. 1 (""On April 9, 2018, agents from"
357,47,the New York field office of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation . . . executed search warrants for Michael
357,48,"Cohen ' s residence, hotel room, office, safety deposit box, and electronic devices."")."
357,49,"1013 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House"
357,50,"(Apr. 9, 2018)."
357,51,145
357,52,NA
358,1,U.S. Department of Justice
358,2,Atteffle~· Werk Preeltiet // May Cel'ltail'IMaterial Prnteetea U!'laer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
358,3,"stand for. "" 1014 Cohen said that after the searches he was concerned that he was ""an open book ,"""
358,4,"that he did not want issues arising from the payments to women to "" come out ,"" and that his false"
358,5,"statements to Congress were ""a big concern. "" 1015 ."
358,6,"A few days after the searches, the President called Cohen . 1016 According to Cohen , the"
358,7,"President said he wanted to ""che~k in"" and asked if Cohen was okay, and the President encouraged"
358,8,"Cohen to ""hang in there "" and ""stay strong."" 1017 Cohen also recalled that following the searches he"
358,9,heard from individuals who were in touch with the President and relayed to Cohen the President's
358,10,"support for him. 1018 Cohen recalled that                     , a friend of the President's, reached out"
358,11,"to say that he was with ""the Boss"" in M r La o nd t e President had said ""he loves you"" and"
358,12,not to worry. 1019 Cohen recalled that                                                     for the Trump
358,13,"Organization, told him, ""the boss loves you.""                                                    , a friend"
358,14,"of the Pres ident's, told him, ""everyone knows the boss has your back. """
358,15,"On or about April l 7, 20 l 8, Cohen began speaking with an attorney , Robert Costello , who"
358,16,1022
358,17,"had a close relationship with Rudolph Giuliani , one of the President's personal lawyers."
358,18,"Costello told Cohen that he had a ""back channel of communication"" to Giuliani, and that Giuliani"
358,19,"had said the ""channel"" was ""crucial"" and ""must be maintained. "" 1023 On April 20, 2018, the New"
358,20,1024
358,21,York Times published an article about the President's relationship with and treatment of Cohen.
358,22,"The President responded with a series of tweets predicting that Cohen would not "" flip "" :"
358,23,The New York Times and a third rate reporter . . . are going out of their way to destroy
358,24,Michael Cohen and his relationship with me in the hope that he will ' flip. ' They use non-
358,25,"existent 'sources' and a drunk/drugged up loser who hates Michael, a fine person with a"
358,26,wonderful family. Michael is a businessman for his own account/lawyer who I have always
358,27,"liked & respected. Most people will flip if the Government lets them out of trouble, everi"
358,28,"1014 Remarks by President Trump Before Meeting with Senior Military Leadership, White House"
358,29,"(Apr. 9, 2018)."
358,30,1015
358,31,"Cohen, 10/17/18 302, at 11."
358,32,1016
358,33,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4."
358,34,1017
358,35,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 4."
358,36,1018
358,37,"Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at 11."
358,38,1019
358,39,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11."
358,40,102
358,41,"°Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11."
358,42,1021
358,43,"Cohen 9/12/18 302, at 11."
358,44,1022
358,45,"4/17/18 Email, Citron to Cohen; 4/19/18 Email, Costello to Cohen; MC-SCO-001 (7/7/18"
358,46,"redacted billing statement from Davidoff, Hutcher & Citroh to Cohen)."
358,47,1023
358,48,"4/21/18 Email, Costello to Cohen."
358,49,1024
358,50,"See Maggie Haberman et al., Micha el Cohen Has Said He Would Take a Bullet for Trump."
358,51,"Maybe Not Anymor e., New York Times (Apr. 20, 2018)."
358,52,146
358,53,NA
359,1,U .S. Department of Justice
359,2,"AtterAey Werle Preattet II Mtt)"" CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
359,3,"if it means lying or making up stories. Sorry, I don't see Michael doing that despite the"
359,4,horrible Witch Hunt and the dishonest media! 1025
359,5,"In an email that day to Cohen, Costello wrote that he had spoken with Giuliani. 1026 Costello told"
359,6,"Cohen the conversation was ""Very Very Positive[.] You are ' loved' ... they are in our corner ... ."
359,7,"Sleep well tonight[] , you have friends in high places."" 1027"
359,8,Cohen said that following these messages he believed he had the support of the White
359,9,"House if he continued to toe the party line, and he determined to stay on message and be part of"
359,10,"the team. 1028 At the time, Cohen's understood that his legal fees were still being paid by the Trump"
359,11,"Organization, which he said was important to him. 1029 Cohen believed he needed the power of the"
359,12,1030
359,13,"President to take care of him , so he needed to defend the President and stay on message."
359,14,Cohen also recalled speaking with the President's personal counsel about pardons after the
359,15,"searches of his home and office had occurred, at a time when the media had reported that pardon"
359,16,discussions were occurring at the White House. 1031 Cohen told the President ' s personal counsel
359,17,"he had been a loyal lawyer and servant, and he said that after the searches he was in an"
359,18,"uncomfortable position and wanted to know what was in it for him. 1032 According to Cohen, the"
359,19,"President's personal counsel responded that Cohen should stay on message, that the investigation"
359,20,"was a witch hunt, and that everything would be fine. 1033 Cohen understood based on this"
359,21,conversation and previous conversations about pardons with the President ' s personal counsel that
359,22,"as long as he stayed on message, he would be taken care of by the President, either through a"
359,23,pardon or through the investigation being shut down. 1034
359,24,1025
359,25,@realDonaldTrump 4121118(9: 10 a.m. ET) Tweets.
359,26,1026
359,27,"4121/18 Email, Costello to Cohen."
359,28,1028
359,29,"Cohen 9112/18 302, at 11."
359,30,1029
359,31,"Cohen 9112118302, at 10."
359,32,103
359,33,"°Cohen 9/ 12/18 302, at IO."
359,34,1031
359,35,"Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 7. At a White House press briefing on April 23, 2018, in response to a"
359,36,"question about whether the White House had ""close[d] the door one way or the other on the President"
359,37,"pardoning Michael Cohen,"" Sanders said, ""It's hard to close the door on something that hasn't taken place."
359,38,I don't like to discuss or comment on hypothetical situations that may or may not ever happen. I would
359,39,"refer you to personal attorneys to comment on anything specific regarding that case, but we don 't have"
359,40,"anything at this point."" Sarah Sanders, White House Daily Briefing, C-SPAN (Apr. 23, 2018)."
359,41,1032
359,42,"Cohen 11/20/ 18 302, at 7; Cohen 3/ 19/19 302, at 3."
359,43,1033
359,44,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3."
359,45,1034
359,46,"Cohen 3/19/19 302, at 3-4."
359,47,147
359,48,NA
360,1,U.S. Department of Justice
360,2,Atteme) '.llerk Pretittet // May Cen:taifl Material Preteetee Uf!tier Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
360,3,"On April 24, 2018, the President responded to a reporter's inquiry whether he would"
360,4,"consider a pardon for Cohen with, ""Stupid question. "" 1035 On June 8, 2018 , the President said he"
360,5,"""hadn't even thought about "" pardons for Manafort or Cohen, and continued, ""It 's far too early to"
360,6,1036
360,7,"be thinking about that. They haven't been convicted of anything. There's nothing to pardon. """
360,8,"And on June 15, 2018 , the President expressed sympathy for Cohen, Manafort, and Flynn in a"
360,9,"press interview and said, "" I feel badly about a lot of them , because I think a lot of it is very"
360,10,"unfair. "" 1037"
360,11,5. The President's Conduct After Cohen Began Cooperating with the Government
360,12,"On July 2, 2018, ABC News reported based on an ""e xclusive "" interview with Cohen that"
360,13,"Cohen ""strongly signaled his willingness to cooperate with special counsel Robert Mueller and"
360,14,federal prosecutors in the Southern District of New York--even if that puts President Trump in
360,15,"jeopardy."" 1038 That week, the media repotted that Cohen had added an attorney to his legal team"
360,16,who previously had worked as a legal advisor to President Bill Clinton . 1039
360,17,"Beginning on July 20 , 2018 , the media reported on the existence of a recording Cohen had"
360,18,made of a conver sation he had with candidate Trump about a payment made to a second woman
360,19,"who said she had had an affair with Trump. 1040 On July 21, 2018, the President responded :"
360,20,"""Inconceivable that the government would break into a lawyer ' s office (early in the morning)-"
360,21,almost unheard of. Even more inconceivable that a lawyer would tape a client-totally              unh eard
360,22,1041
360,23,"of & perhaps illegal. The good news is that your favorite President did nothing wrong!""                   On"
360,24,"July 27, 2018, after the media reported that Cohen was willing to inform investigators that Donald"
360,25,1042
360,26,"Trump Jr. told his father about the June 9, 2016 meeting to get ""dirt"" on Hillary Clinton,                the"
360,27,"President tweeted: ""[S]o the Fake News doesn't waste my time with dumb questions, NO , I did"
360,28,"NOT know of the meeting with my son, Don jr. Sounds to me like someone is try ing to make up"
360,29,1035
360,30,Remarks by President Trump and Pres ident Macron of France Before Restricted Bil.ateral
360,31,"Meeting, The White House (Apr. 24, 2018)."
360,32,"1036   President Donald Trump Holds Media Availability Before Departing for the G- 7 Summit, CQ"
360,33,"Newsmaker Transcripts (June 8, 2018)."
360,34,"1037   Remark s by President Trump in Press Gaggle, The White House (June 15, 2018)."
360,35,1038
360,36,"EXCLUSIVE: Michael Cohen says family and country, not President Trump, is his 'first"
360,37,"loyalty', ABC (July 2, 2018). Cohen said in the interview, ""To be crystal clear, my wife , my daughter and"
360,38,"my son, and this country have my first loyalty. """
360,39,"1039  See e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Michael Cohen hires Clinton scandal veteran Lanny Davis,"
360,40,"Politico (July 5, 2018)."
360,41,1040
360,42,"See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to"
360,43,"Playboy Model, New York Times (July 20, 2018)."
360,44,104 1
360,45,@r~alDonaldTrump 7/21/18 (8:10 a.m. ET) Tweet.
360,46,1042
360,47,"See, e.g., Jim Sciutto, Cuomo Prime Time Transcript, CNN (July 26, 20 18)."
360,48,148
360,49,NA
361,1,U.S. Department of Justice
361,2,",r\M;e,rHe,· '.Ve,rkPre,ettet // Ma,· Cm1:taiHMaterial Pre,teetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
361,3,stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam (Taxi cabs maybe?). He even retained Bill
361,4,1043
361,5,"and Crooked Hillary's lawyer. Gee, I wonder if they helped him make the choice!"""
361,6,"On August 21, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to eight"
361,7,"felony charges, including two counts of campaign-finance violations based on the payments he"
361,8,had made during the final weeks of the campaign to women who said they had affairs with the
361,9,"President. 1044 During the plea hearing, Cohen stated that he had worked ""at the direction of' the"
361,10,"candidate in making those payments. 1045 The next day, the President contrasted Cohen ' s"
361,11,"cooperation with Manafort 's refusal to cooperate, tweeting, ""I feel very badly for Paul Manafort"
361,12,"and his wonderful family. 'Justice' took a 12 year old tax case, among other things, applied"
361,13,"tremendous pressure on him and , unlike Michael Cohen , he refused to 'break'-make                up stories"
361,14,"in order to get a 'deal.' Such respect for a brave man!"" 1046"
361,15,"On September 17, 2018, this Office submitted written questions to the President that"
361,16,included questions about the Trump Tower Moscow project and attached Cohen's written
361,17,"statement to Congress and the Letter of Intent signed by the President. 1047 Among other issues ,"
361,18,the questions asked the President to describe the timing and substance of discussions he had with
361,19,"Cohen about the project, whether they discussed a potential trip to Russia, and whether the"
361,20,"President ""at any time direct[ ed] or suggest[ ed] that discussions about the Trump Moscow project"
361,21,"should cease,"" or whether the President was ""informed at any time that the project had been"
361,22,"abandoned."" 1048"
361,23,"On November 20, 2018, the President submitted written responses that did not answer those"
361,24,questions about Trump Tower Moscow directly and did not provide any information about the
361,25,timing of the candidate's discussions with Cohen about the project or whether he participated in
361,26,"any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued. 1049 Instead , the"
361,27,President's answers stated in relevant part:
361,28,"I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall ; they were brief, and"
361,29,"they were not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal , and I do not recall any"
361,30,discussion of travel to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with
361,31,1043
361,32,@realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:26 a.m. ET) Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:38 a.m. ET)
361,33,"Tweet; @realDonaldTrump 7/27/18 (7:56 a.m. ET) Tweet. At the time of these tweets, the press had"
361,34,reported that Cohen's financial interests in taxi cab medallions were being scrutinized by investigators.
361,35,"See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo et al., Michael Cohen Secretly Taped Trump Discussing Payment to Playboy Model,"
361,36,"New York Times (July 20, 2018) ."
361,37,1044
361,38,Cohen Information.
361,39,1045
361,40,"Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript, at 23."
361,41,1046
361,42,@realDonaldTrurnp 8/22/ 18 (9:21 a.m. ET) Tweet.
361,43,1047
361,44,"9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel (attaching written"
361,45,"question s for the President, with attachments)."
361,46,1048
361,47,"9/ 17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Couns el (attaching written"
361,48,"question s for the President), Question III, Parts (a) through (g)."
361,49,1049
361,50,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018)."
361,51,149
361,52,NA
362,1,U.S. Department of Justice
362,2,"AMeri,c:,· 'Nerk Preauct // Ma:,· CentaiH Material Pretcctca Uttacr Fca. R. Criffl. P. 6(c)"
362,3,"anyone else at the Trump Organization, although it is possible. T do not recall being aware"
362,4,at the time of any communications between Mr. Cohen and Felix Sater and any Russian
362,5,government official regarding the Letter oflntent. 1050
362,6,"On November 29, 2018, Cohen pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress"
362,7,based on his statements about the Trump Tower Moscow project. 1051 In a plea agreement with this
362,8,"Office , Cohen agreed to ""provide truthful information regarding any and all matters as to which"
362,9,"this Office deems relevant."" 1052 Later on November 29, after Cohen's guilty plea had become"
362,10,"public, the President spoke to reporters about the Trump Tower Moscow project, saying:"
362,11,I decided not to do the project. . . . I decided ultimately not to do it. There would have
362,12,"been nothing wrong ifI did do it. Ifl did do it, there would have been nothing wrong. That"
362,13,was my business .... It was an option that I decided not to do .... I decided not to do it.
362,14,The primary reason . . . T was focused on running for President. . . . I was running my
362,15,"business while I was campaigning. There was a good chance that I wouldn't have won, in"
362,16,which case I would 've gone back into the business. And why should I lose lots of
362,17,opportunities? 1053
362,18,"The President also said that Cohen was ""a weak person. And by being weak, unlike other people"
362,19,that you watch-he is a weak person. And what he's trying to do is get a reduced sentence. So
362,20,"he's lying about a project that everybody knew about. "" 1054 The President also brought up Coh en 's"
362,21,"written submission to Congress regarding the Trump Tower Moscow project: ""So here 's the story:"
362,22,Go back and look at the paper that Michael Cohen wrote before he testified in the House and /or
362,23,"Senate . It talked about his position."" 1055 The President added , ""Even if [Cohen] was right, it"
362,24,1056
362,25,"doesn't matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."""
362,26,"In light of the President 's public statements following Cohen's guilty plea that he ""decided"
362,27,"not to do the project,"" this Office again sought informa tion from the President about whether he"
362,28,"participated in any discussions about the project being abandoned or no longer pursued , including"
362,29,"when he ""decided not to do the project ,"" who he spoke to about that decision , and what motivated"
362,30,1050
362,31,"Written Responses of Donald J. Trump (Nov. 20, 2018), at 15 (Response to Question III, Parts"
362,32,(a) through (g)).
362,33,105 1
362,34,Cohen Information; Cohen 8/21/18 Transcript.
362,35,1052
362,36,"Plea Agreement at 4, United States v. Michael Cohen, 1: l 8-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov . 29, 2018)."
362,37,1053
362,38,"President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SP AN (Nov. 29, 2018) . In contrast to the President's"
362,39,"remarks following ·cohen's guilty plea, Cohen's August 28, 2017 statement to Congress stated that Cohen,"
362,40,"not the Presid ent, ""decided to abandon the proposal"" in late January 2016; that Cohen ""did not ask or brief"
362,41,"Mr. Trump ... before I made the decision to terminate further work on the proposal""; and that the decision"
362,42,"· to abandon the proposal was ""unrelated "" to the Campaign. P-SCO-000009477 (Statement of Michael D."
362,43,"Cohen, Esq. (Aug. 28, 2017))."
362,44,1054
362,45,"President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018)."
362,46,1055
362,47,"President Trump Departure Remarks, C-SPAN (Nov. 29, 2018)."
362,48,1056
362,49,"President Trump Departure Remarks , C-SPAN (Nov . 29, 2018)."
362,50,150
362,51,NA
363,1,U.S. Department of Justice
363,2,"Attente)"" Werk Preettet // May Centain Material Preteetee Under Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
363,3,the decision. 1057 The Office also again asked for the timing of the President's discussions with
363,4,"Cohen about Trump Tower Moscow and asked him to specify ""what period of the campaign"" he"
363,5,"was involved in discussions concerning the project. 1058 In response, the President's personal"
363,6,"counsel declined to provide additional information from the President and stated that ""the President"
363,7,"has fully answered the questions at issue. "" 1059"
363,8,"In the weeks following Cohen ' s plea and agreement to provide assistance to this Office,"
363,9,the President repeatedly implied that Cohen's family members were guilty of crimes. On
363,10,"December 3, 2018, after Cohen had filed his sentencing memorandum, the President tweeted,"
363,11,"'""Michael Cohen asks judge for no Prison Time.' You mean he can do all of the TERRIBLE,"
363,12,"unrelated to Trump, things having to do with fraud, big loans , Taxis , etc., and not serve a long"
363,13,"prison term? He makes up stories to get a GREAT & ALREADY reduced deal for himself, and"
363,14,get his wife and father-in-law (who has the money?) off Scott Free. He lied for this outcome and
363,15,"should, in m o inion serve a full and com lete sentence."" 1060"
363,16,1062
363,17,"On Decem her 12, 2018, Cohen was sentenced to three years of imprisonment.              The next"
363,18,"day, the President sent a series of tweets that said:"
363,19,I never directed Michael Cohen to break the law .... Those charges were just agreed to by
363,20,"him in order to embarrass the president and get a much reduced prison sentence, which he"
363,21,"did-including         the fact that his family was temporarily let off the hook. As a lawyer ,"
363,22,Michael has great liability to me! 1063
363,23,"On December 16, 2018, the President tweeted, ""Remember, Michael Cohen only became a 'Rat'"
363,24,after the FBI did something which was absolutely unthinkable & unheard of until the Witch Hunt
363,25,was illegally started. They BROKE INTO AN ATTORNEY'S OFFICE! Why didn't they break
363,26,"into the DNC to get the Server, or Crooked ' s office?"" 1064"
363,27,"In January 2019 , after the media reported that Cohen would provide public testimony in a"
363,28,"congressional hearing, the President made additional public comments suggesting that Cohen's"
363,29,1057
363,30,"1/23/19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President's Personal Counsel."
363,31,1058
363,32,"1/23/ 19 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to President ' s Personal Counsel."
363,33,1059
363,34,"2/6/ l 9 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office."
363,35,1060
363,36,@rea!DonaldTrump 12/3/18 (10:24 a.m. ET and l 0:29 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis added).
363,37,1061
363,38,@realDonaldTrump 12/3/18 ( 10:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.
363,39,1062
363,40,Cohen 12/12/18 Transcript.
363,41,1063
363,42,"@realDonaldTrump 12/ 13/18 (8: 17 a.m. ET, 8:25 a.m. ET, and 8:39 a.m. ET) Tweets (emphasis"
363,43,added).
363,44,1064
363,45,@realDonaldTrump 12/16/ 18 (9:39 a.m. ET) Tweet.
363,46,151
363,47,NA
364,1,U.S. Department of Justice
364,2,"AU6rtte)' W6rk Pr6ettet // Ma,· C6tttaitt Material Pwteetee UAeer Fee . R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
364,3,"family members had committed crimes. In an interview on Fox on January 12, 2019 , the Presid ent"
364,4,was asked whether he was worried about Cohen's testimony and responded:
364,5,"[I]n order to get his sentence reduced, [Cohen] says ""I have an idea , I'll ah, tell-I'll give"
364,6,"you some information on the president. "" Well , there is no information. But he should give"
364,7,information maybe on his father-in-law because that's the one that people want to look at
364,8,because where does that money-that's the money in the family. And I guess he didn't
364,9,"want to talk about his father-in-law, he's trying to get his sentence reduced. So it's ah,"
364,10,1065
364,11,"pretty sad. You know, it' s weak and it's very sad to watch a thing like that."
364,12,"On January 18, 2019, the President tweeted, ""Kevin Corke, @FoxNews ' Don 't forget ,"
364,13,"Michael Cohen has already been convicted of perjury and fraud, and as recently as this week, the"
364,14,Wall Street Journal has suggested that he may have stolen tens of thousands of dollars .... ' Lying
364,15,"to reduce his jail time! Watchfather-in-law/"" 1066"
364,16,"On January 23, 2019, Cohen postponed his congressional testimony, citing threats against"
364,17,"his family. 1067 The next day, the President tweeted , ""So interesting that bad lawyer Michael Cohen,"
364,18,"who sadly will not be testifying before Congress , is using the lawyer of Crooked Hillary Clinton"
364,19,"to represent him-Gee , how did that happen? "" 1068"
364,20,"Also in January 2019, Giuliani gave pres s interviews that appeared to confirm Cohen's"
364,21,account that the Trump Organization pursued the Trump Tow er Moscow project well past January
364,22,"2016. Giuliani stated that "" it's our understanding that [discussions about the Trump Moscow"
364,23,"project] went on throughout 2016 . Weren't a lot of them , but there we re conversations. Can't be"
364,24,sure of the exact date. But the president can remember having conversation s with him about it.
364,25,"The president also remembers-yeah,             probably up-could       be up to as far as October,"
364,26,"November."" 1069 In an interview with the New York Times , Giuliani quoted the President as saying"
364,27,"that the discussions regarding the Trump Moscow project were ""going on from the day I"
364,28,"announced to the day I won."" 1070 On January 21, 2019 , Giuliani issued a statement that said: ""My"
364,29,recent statements about discussions during the 2016 campaign between Michael Cohen and
364,30,candidate Donald Trump about a potential Trump Moscow ' project ' were hypothetical and not
364,31,"based on conversations I had with the president. "" 107 1"
364,32,1065
364,33,"Jeanine Pirro Interview with President Trump, Fox News (Jan. 12, 2019) (emphasis added)."
364,34,1066
364,35,@rea!DonaldTrump 1/18/ 19 ( 10:02 a.m. ET) Tweet (emphasis added).
364,36,1067
364,37,"Statement by Lanny Davis, Cohen ' s personal counsel (Jan . 23, 2019)."
364,38,1068
364,39,@realDonaldTrump 1/24/ 19 (7:48 a.m. ET) Tweet.
364,40,1069
364,41,"Meet the Press Interview with Rudy Giuliani , NBC (Jan . 20, 2019)."
364,42,1070
364,43,"Mark Mazzetti et al., Moscow Skyscraper Talks Continu ed Through ""the Day I Won, "" Trump"
364,44,"Is Said to Acknowledge, New York T imes (Jan. 20, 2019)."
364,45,107 1
364,46,"Maggie Haberman, Giuliani Says His Moscow Trump Tower Comments Were ""Hypothetical"","
364,47,"New York Times (Jan. 2 1, 2019). In a letter to this Office , the President's counsel stated that Giuliani 's"
364,48,"pub! ic comments ""were not intended to suggest nor did they reflect knowledge of the existence or timing"
364,49,152
364,50,NA
365,1,U.S. Department of Justice
365,2,AMeirflC)'Werk Preiattet // May Cemtaifl Material Preitectea Uf!aer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
365,3,Analysis
365,4,"In analyzing the President's conduct related to Cohen, the following evidence is relevant"
365,5,to the elements of obstruction of justice.
365,6,a.      Obstructive act. We gathered evidence of the President ' s conduct related to Cohen
365,7,on two issues: (i) whether the President or others aided or participated in Cohen's false statements
365,8,"to Congress, and (ii) whether the President took actions that would have the natural tendency to"
365,9,prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to the government.
365,10,"i.       First , with regard to Cohen's false statements to Congress , while there is"
365,11,"evidence, described below , that the President knew Cohen provided false testimony to Congress"
365,12,"about the Trump Tower Moscow project, the evidence available to us does not establish that the"
365,13,President directed or aided Cohen ' s false testimony.
365,14,"Cohen said that his statements to Congress followed a ""party line"" that developed within"
365,15,the campaign to align with the President's public statements distancing the President from Russia.
365,16,"Cohen also recalled that , in speaking with the President in advance of testifying, he made it clear"
365,17,that he would stay on message-which Cohen believed they both understood would require false
365,18,testimony. But Cohen said that he and the President did not explicitly discuss whether Cohen's
365,19,"testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow project would be or was false, and the President did"
365,20,not direct him to provide false testimony. Cohen also said he did not tell the President about the
365,21,specifics of his planned testimony. During the time when his statement to Congress was being
365,22,"drafted and circulated to members of the JOA, Cohen did not speak directly to the President about"
365,23,"the statement, but rather communicated with the President's personal counsel-as corroborated by"
365,24,phone records showing extensive communications between Cohen and the President's personal
365,25,counsel before Cohen submitted his statement and when he testified before Congress.
365,26,"Cohen recalled that in his discussions with the President's personal counsel on August 27,"
365,27,2017- the day before Cohen's statement was submitted to Congress - Cohen said that there were
365,28,more communications with Russia and more communications with candidate Trump than the
365,29,"statement reflected. Cohen recalled expressing some concern at that time. According to Cohen,"
365,30,the President's personal counsel-who            did not have first-hand knowledge of the project -
365,31,"responded by saying that there was no need to muddy the water , that it was unnecessary to include"
365,32,"those details because the project did not take place, and that Cohen should keep his statement short"
365,33,"and tight, not elaborate, stay on message, and not contradict the President. Cohen's recollection"
365,34,of the content of those conversations is consistent with direction about the substance of Cohen ' s
365,35,"draft statement that appeared to come from members of the JOA. For example , Cohen omitted"
365,36,any reference to his outreach to Russian government officials to set up a meeting between Trump
365,37,"and Putin during the United Nations General Assembly, and Cohen believed it was a decision of"
365,38,of conversations beyond that contained in the President's [written responses to the Special Counsel 's
365,39,"Office]."" 2/6/19 Letter, President 's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office."
365,40,153
365,41,NA
366,1,U .S. Department of Justice
366,2,AttarHe:y Werk Predttet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted UHder Fed. R . Crim. P. 6(e)
366,3,"the IDA to delete the sentence, ""The building project led me to make limited contacts with Russian"
366,4,"government officials."""
366,5,The President's personal counsel declined to provide us with his account of his
366,6,"conversations with Cohen, and there is no evidence available to us that indicates that the President"
366,7,was aware of the information Cohen provided to the President's personal counsel. The President's
366,8,"conversations with his personal counsel were presumptively protected by attorney-client privilege ,"
366,9,and we did not seek to obtain the contents of any such communications. The absence of evidence
366,10,about the President and his counsel's conversations about the drafting of Cohen ' s statement
366,11,"precludes us from assessing what, if any, role the President played."
366,12,"ii.    Second, we considered whether the President took actions that would have"
366,13,the natural tendency to prevent Cohen from providing truthful information to criminal
366,14,investigators or to Congress.
366,15,"Before Cohen began to cooperate with the government, the President publicly and privately"
366,16,"urged Cohen to stay on message and not "" flip."" Cohen recalled the President's personal counsel"
366,17,"telling him that he would be protected so long as he did not go "" rogue. "" In the days and weeks"
366,18,"that fol lowed the Apri 12018 searches of Cohen ' s home and office, the President told reporters that"
366,19,"Cohen was a ""good man"" and said he was ""a fine person with a wonderful family ... who I have"
366,20,"always liked & respected."" Privately, the President told Cohen to ""hang in there"" and ""stay"
366,21,"strong."" People who were close to both Cohen and the President passed messages to Cohen that"
366,22,"""the President loves you,"" ""the boss loves you,"" and ""everyone knows the boss has your back ."""
366,23,"Through the President ' s personal counsel, the President also had previously told Cohen ""thanks"
366,24,"for what you do"" after Cohen provided information to the media about payments to women that ,"
366,25,"according to Cohen, both Cohen and the President knew was false. At that time , the Trump"
366,26,"Organization continued to pay Cohen's legal fees, which was important to Cohen. Cohen also"
366,27,"recalled discussing the possibility of a pardon with the President's personal counsel, who told him"
366,28,to stay on message and everything would be fine. Th e President indicated in his public statements
366,29,"that a pardon had not been ruled out , and also stated publicly that "" [m]ost people will flip if the"
366,30,"Government lets them out of trouble"" but that he ""d[idn 't] see Michael doing that. """
366,31,"After it was reported that Cohen intended to cooperate with the government , however, the"
366,32,"President accused Cohen of ""mak[ing] up stories in order to get himself out of an unrelated jam"
366,33,"(Taxi cabs maybe?), "" called Cohen a ""rat,"" and on multiple occasions publicly suggested that"
366,34,Cohen's family members had committed crimes. The evidence concerning this sequence of events
366,35,could suppot1 an inference that the President used inducements in the form of positive messages
366,36,"in an effort to get Cohen not to cooperate, and then turned to attacks and intimidation to deter the"
366,37,provision of information or undermine Cohen's credibility once Cohen began cooperating.
366,38,"b.      Nexus to an official proceeding. The President's relevant""conduct towards Cohen"
366,39,"occurred when the President knew the Special Counsel's Office, Congress, and the U.S. Attorney's"
366,40,Office for the Southern District of New York were investigating Cohen's conduct. The President
366,41,acknowledged through his public statements and tweets that Cohen potentially could cooperate
366,42,with the government investigations.
366,43,154
366,44,NA
367,1,U.S. Department of Justice
367,2,AH8f'fl:e~'.V8rk Pr8E:ittet// May Cm~taiflMaterial Pr8teeteE:iUHE:ierFee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
367,3,c.      Intent. In analyzing the President's intent in his actions towards Cohen as a
367,4,"potential witness , there is evidence that could support the inference that the President intended to"
367,5,discourage Cohen from cooperating with the government because Cohen's information would shed
367,6,adverse light on the President's campaign-period conduct and statements.
367,7,i.      Cohen's false congressional testimony about the Trump Tower Moscow
367,8,project was designed to minimize connections between the President and Russia and to help limit
367,9,"the congressional and DOJ Russia investigations -a goal that was in the President's interest, as"
367,10,"reflected by the President's own statements. During and after the campaign, the President made"
367,11,"repeated statements that he had ""no business"" in Russia and said that there were ""no deals that"
367,12,"could happen in Russia, because we 've stayed away."" As Cohen knew , and as he recalled"
367,13,"communicating to the President during the campaign, Cohen ' s pursuit of the Trump Tower"
367,14,Moscow project cast doubt on the accuracy or completeness of these statements.
367,15,"In connection with his guilty plea, Cohen admitted that he had multiple conversations with"
367,16,"candidate Trump to give him status updates about the Trump Tower Moscow project , that the"
367,17,"conversations continued through at least June 2016, and that he discussed with Trump possible"
367,18,"travel to Russia to pursue the project. The conversations were not off-hand, according to Cohen,"
367,19,"because the project had the potential to be so lucrative. In addition, text messages to and from"
367,20,Cohen and other records further establish that Cohen's efforts to advance the project did not end
367,21,"in January 2016 and that in May and June 2016, Cohen was considering the timing for possible"
367,22,trips to Russia by him and Trump in connection with the project.
367,23,The evidence could support an inference that the President was aware of these facts at the
367,24,time of Cohen's false statements to Congress. Cohen discu ssed the project with the President in
367,25,"early 2017 following media inquiries. Cohen recalled that on September 20, 2017, the day after"
367,26,"he released to the public his opening remarks to Congress - which said the project ""was terminated"
367,27,"in January of 2016""-the President 's personal counsel told him the President was pleased with"
367,28,"what Cohen had said about Trump Tower Moscow. And after Cohen ' s guilty plea, the President"
367,29,"told reporters tha.t he had ultimately decided not to do the project , which supports the inference"
367,30,that he remained aware of his own involvement in the project and the period during the Campaign
367,31,in which the project was being pursued.
367,32,ii.    The President's public remarks following Cohen's guilty plea also suggest
367,33,that the President may have been concerned about what Cohen told investigators about the Trump
367,34,Tower Moscow project. At the time the President submitted written answers to questions from
367,35,"this Office about the project and other subjects , the media had reported that Cohen was cooperating"
367,36,with the government but Cohen had not yet pleaded guilty to making false statements to Congress.
367,37,"Accordingly, it was not publicly known what information about the project Cohen had provided"
367,38,"to the government. In his written answers, the President did not provide details about the timing"
367,39,and substance of his discussions with Cohen about the project and gave no indication that he had
367,40,"decided to no longer pursue the project. Yet after Cohen pleaded guilty, the President publicly"
367,41,stated that he had personally made the decision to abandon the proje ct. The President then declined
367,42,to clarify the seeming discrepancy to our Office or answer additional questions. The content and
367,43,timing of the President's provision of information about his knowledge and actions regarding the
367,44,Trump Tower Moscow project is evidence that the President may have been concerned about the
367,45,information that Cohen could provide as a witness.
367,46,155
367,47,NA
368,1,U.S. Department of Justice
368,2,"Attoff\e)""Wodc Pfoelttet// Mtt)""CoHtttiAMaterittl Proteeteel UHeer Feel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
368,3,111.    The President's concern about Cohen cooperating may have been directed
368,4,at the Southern District of New York investigation into other aspects of the President's dealings
368,5,with Cohen rather than an investigation of Trump Tower Moscow . There also is some evidence
368,6,that the President's concern about Cohen cooperating was based on the President's stated belief
368,7,that Cohen would provide false testimony against the President in an attempt to obtain a lesser
368,8,"sentence for his unrelated criminal conduct. The President tweeted that Manafort, unlike Cohen ,"
368,9,"refused to ""break "" and ""make up stories in order to get a 'deal.""' And after Cohen pleaded guilty"
368,10,"to making false statements to Congress, the President said , ""what [Cohen]'s trying to do is get a"
368,11,"reduced sentence. So he's lying about a project that everybody knew about."" But the President"
368,12,"also appeared to defend the underlying conduct, saying , ""Even if [Cohen] was right, it doesn't"
368,13,"matter because I was allowed to do whatever I wanted during the campaign."" As described above ,"
368,14,there is evidence that the President knew that Cohen had made false statements about the Trump
368,15,Tower Moscow project and that Cohen did so to protect the President and minimize the President ' s
368,16,connections to Russia during the campaign.
368,17,"iv.     Finally, the President's statements insinuating that members of Cohen 's"
368,18,family committed crimes after Cohen began cooperating with the government could be viewed as
368,19,an effort to retaliate against Cohen and chill further testimony adverse to the President by Cohen
368,20,"or others. It is possible that the President believes, as reflected in his tweets, that Cohen ""ma[d]e[]"
368,21,"up stories"" in order to get a deal for himself and ""g et his wife and father-in-law .. . off Scott Free."""
368,22,It also is possible that the President's mention of Cohen 's wife and father-in-law were not intended
368,23,to affect Cohen as a witness but rather were part of a public-relations strategy aimed at discr editing
368,24,Cohen and deflecting attention away from the President on Cohen-related matters. But the
368,25,"President's suggestion that Cohen 's family members committed crimes happened more than once ,"
368,26,including just before Cohen was sentenced (at the same time as the President stated that Cohen
368,27,"""should, in my opinion, serve a full and complete sentence"") and again just befor e Cohen was"
368,28,scheduled to testify before Congress. The timing of the statements supports an inferenc e that they
368,29,were intended at least in part to discourage Cohen from further cooperation.
368,30,L.       Overarching Factual Issues
368,31,Although this report does not contain a traditional prosecution decision or declination
368,32,"decision, the evidence supports several general conclusions relevant to analysis of the facts"
368,33,concerning the President's course of conduct.
368,34,1. Three features of this case render it atypical compared to the heartland obstruction -of-
368,35,justice prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice.
368,36,"First, the conduct involved actions by the President. Some of the conduct did not implicate"
368,37,the President's constitutional authority and raises gar den-vari ety obstruction-of-justice issues.
368,38,"Other events we investigated , howev er, drew upon the President's Article II authority, which"
368,39,"raised constitutional issues that we address in Volume II, Section III.B , infra. A factual analysis"
368,40,of that conduct would have to take into account both that the President's acts were facially lawful
368,41,and that his position as head of th e Executive Branch provides him with unique and powerful
368,42,"means of influencing official proceedings , subordinate officers, and potential witnesses."
368,43,156
368,44,NA
369,1,U.S. Department of Justice
369,2,Atter11ey Werk Preettet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteetee U11eer Fee . R . Cril'H. P. 6(e)
369,3,"Second, many obstruction cases involve the attempted or actual cover-up of an underlying"
369,4,crime. Personal criminal conduct can furnish strong evidence that the individual had an improper
369,5,"obstructive purpose, see, e.g., United States v. Willoughby, 860 F.2d 15, 24 (2d Cir. 1988), or that"
369,6,"he contemplated an effect on an official proceeding , see, e.g., United States v. Binday, 804 F.3d"
369,7,"558, 591 (2d Cir . 2015). But proof of such a crime is not an element of an obstruction offense."
369,8,"See United States v. Greer, 872 F.3d 790, 798 (6th Cir . 2017) (stating , in applying the obstruction"
369,9,"sentencing guideline, that ""obstruction of a criminal investigation is punishable even if the"
369,10,prosecution is ultimately unsuccessful or even if the investigation ultimately reveals no underlying
369,11,"crime""). Obstruction of justice can be motivated by a desire to protect non-criminal personal"
369,12,"interests, to protect against investigations where underlying criminal liability falls into a gray area ,"
369,13,or to avoid personal embarrassment. The injury to the integrity of the justice system is the same
369,14,regardless of whether a person committed an underlying wrong.
369,15,"In this investigation, the evidence does not establish that the President was involved in an"
369,16,underlying crime related to Russian election interference. But the evidence does point to a range
369,17,of other possible personal motives animating the President's conduct. These include concerns that
369,18,continued investigation would call into question the legitimacy of his election and potential
369,19,uncertainty about whether certain events-such          as advance notice of WikiLeaks ' s release of
369,20,"hacked information or the June 9, 2016 meeting between senior campaign officials and Russians-"
369,21,"could be seen as criminal activity by the President, his campaign, or his family."
369,22,"Third , many of the President's acts directed at witnesses, including discouragement of"
369,23,"cooperation with the government and suggestions of possible future pardons , occurred in public"
369,24,view. While it may be more difficult to establish that public-facing acts were motivated by a
369,25,"corrupt intent, the President's power to influence actions , persons, and events is enhanced by his"
369,26,unique ability to attract attention through use of mass communications . And no principle of law
369,27,excludes public acts from the scope of obstruction statutes. If the likely effect of the acts is to
369,28,"intimidate witnesses or alter their testimony , the justice system's integrity is equally threatened."
369,29,"2. Although the events we investigated involved discrete acts- e.g., the President's"
369,30,"statement to Comey about the Flynn investigation , his termination of Corney, and his efforts to"
369,31,remove the Special Counsel - it is important to view the President ' s pattern of conduct as a whole.
369,32,That pattern sheds light on the nature of the President ' s acts and the inferences that can be drawn
369,33,about his intent.
369,34,a. Our investigation found multiple acts by the President that were capable of exetting
369,35,"undue influence over law enforcement investigations, including the Russian-interference and"
369,36,obstruction investigations. The incidents were often carried out through one-on-one meetings in
369,37,which the Presid ent sought to use his official power outside of usual channels. These actions
369,38,ranged from efforts to remove the Special Counsel and to reverse the effe ct of the Attorney
369,39,General ' s recusal; to the attempted use of official power to limit the scope of the investigation; to
369,40,direct and indirect contacts with witnesses with the potential to influence their testimony. Viewing
369,41,"the acts collectively can help to illuminate their significance. For example , the President ' s"
369,42,direction to McGahn to have the Special Counsel removed was followed almost immediat ely by
369,43,his direction to Lewandowski to tell the Attorney General to limit the scope of the Russia
369,44,inve stigation to prospective election-interference only-a temporal connection that suggests that
369,45,both acts were taken with a related purpose with respect to the investigation.
369,46,157
369,47,NA
370,1,U.S. Department of Justice
370,2,"Atte,rttey Werk Pre,tlttet // May Ce,tttaiH Material Pre,teetetl UHtler Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
370,3,"The President ' s efforts to influence the investigation were mostly unsuccessful, but that is"
370,4,largely because the persons who surrounded the President declined to carry out orders or accede
370,5,"to his requests. Comey did not end the investigation of Flynn, which ultimately resulted in Flynn's"
370,6,prosecution and conviction for lying to the FBI. McGahn did not tell the Acting Attorney General
370,7,"that the Special Counsel must be removed , but was instead prepared to resign over the President's"
370,8,order. Lewandowski and Dearborn did not deliver the President ' s message to Sessions that he
370,9,should confine the Russia investigation to future election meddling only. And McGahn refused to
370,10,recede from his recollections about events surrounding the President's direction to have the Special
370,11,"Counsel removed, despite the President's multiple demands that he do so. Consistent with that"
370,12,"pattern, the evidence we obtained would not support potential obstruction charges against the"
370,13,President's aides and associates beyond those already filed.
370,14,"b. In considering the full scope of the conduct we investigated, the President's actions can"
370,15,be divided into two distinct phases reflecting a possible shift in the President's motives. In the
370,16,"first phase , before the President fired Comey, the President had been assured that the FBI had not"
370,17,opened an investigation of him personally. The President deemed it critically important to make
370,18,"public that he was not under investigation, and he included that information in his termination"
370,19,letter to Comey after other efforts to have that information disclosed were unsuccessful.
370,20,"Soon after he fired Comey, however, the President became aware that investigators were"
370,21,conducting an obstruction-of-justice inquiry into his own conduct. That awareness marked a
370,22,significant change in the President's conduct and the start of a second phase of action. The
370,23,President launched public attacks on the investigation and individuals involved in it who could
370,24,"possess evidence adverse to the President, while in private, the President engaged in a series of"
370,25,"targeted efforts to control the investigation. For instance, the President attempted to remove the"
370,26,Special Counsel; he sought to have Attorney General Sessions unrecuse himself and limit the
370,27,"investigation; he sought to prevent public disclosure of information about the June 9, 2016 meeting"
370,28,between Russians and campaign officials; and he used public forums to attack potential witnesses
370,29,who might offer adverse information and to praise witnesses who declined to cooperate with the
370,30,government. Judgments about the nature of the President's motiv es during each phase would be
370,31,informed by the totality of the evidence.
370,32,158
370,33,NA
371,1,U.S. Department of Justice
371,2,"AtterHe::, Werk Preattet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
371,3,III.   LEGAL DEFENSES To THE APPLICATION                OF OBSTRUCTION-OF-JUSTICE              STATUTES To
371,4,THE PRESIDENT
371,5,The President's personal counsel has written to this Office to advance statutory and
371,6,constitutional defenses to the potential application of the obstruction-of-justice statutes to the
371,7,"President's conduct. 1072 As a statutory matter , the President's counsel has argued that a core"
371,8,"obstruction-of-justice statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512( c)(2) , does not cover the President ' s actions .1073"
371,9,"As a constitutional matter, the President ' s counsel argued that the President cannot obstruct justice"
371,10,by exercising his constitutional authority to close Department of Justice investigations or terminate
371,11,"the FBI Director. 1074 Under that view, any statute that restricts the President ' s exercise of those"
371,12,powers would impermissibly intrude on the President's constitutional role. The President 's
371,13,counsel has conceded that the President may be subject to criminal laws that do not directly involve
371,14,"exercises of his Article JI authority, such as laws prohibiting bribing witnesses or suborning"
371,15,"perjury. 1075 But counsel has made a categorical argument that ""the President's exercise of his"
371,16,constitutional authority here to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations cannot
371,17,"constitutionally constitute obstruction of justice."" 1076"
371,18,"In analyzing counsel 's statutory arguments, we concluded that the President's proposed"
371,19,interpretation of Section 1512(c)(2) is contrary to the litigating position of the Department of
371,20,Justice and is not supported by principles of statutory construction.
371,21,"As for the constitutional arguments , we recogni zed that the Department of Justice and the"
371,22,courts have not definitively resolved these constitutional issues. We therefore analyzed the
371,23,President's position through the framework of Supreme Court precedent addressing the separation
371,24,"of powers. Under that framework, we concluded, Article IT of the Constitution does not"
371,25,categorically and permanently immunize the President from potential liability for the conduct that
371,26,"we investigated. Rather , our analysis led us to conclude that the obstruction-of-justice statutes can"
371,27,1072
371,28,"6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; see also 1/29/18"
371,29,"Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 2/6/ 18 Letter, President's Personal"
371,30,"Counsel to Special Counsel's Office; 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's"
371,31,"Office, at 4."
371,32,1073
371,33,"2/6/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2-9. Counsel has"
371,34,"also noted that other potentially applicable obstruction statutes, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1505, protect only"
371,35,"pending proceedings. 6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 7-8."
371,36,"Section 1512(c)(2) is not limited to pending proceedings, but also applies to future proceedings that the"
371,37,"person contemplated. See Volume II, Section III.A, supra."
371,38,1074
371,39,"6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 1 (""[T]he President"
371,40,"cannot obstruct ... by simply exercising these inherent Constitutional powers."")."
371,41,1075
371,42,"6/23/17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. 1."
371,43,1076
371,44,"6/23/ 17 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. I (dashes"
371,45,"omitted); see also 8/8/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 4 (""[T]he"
371,46,obstruction-of-justice statutes cannot be read so expansively as to create potential liability based on facially
371,47,lawful acts undertaken by the President in furtherance of his core Article TTdiscretionary authority to
371,48,"remove principal officers or carry out the prosecution function."")."
371,49,159
371,50,NA
372,1,U.S. Department of Justice
372,2,"AtterHey Werk Preattet // Ma::,·CeHtttiHMa:teria:1Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
372,3,"validly prohibit a President's corrupt efforts to use his official powers to curtail, end, or interfere"
372,4,with an investigation .
372,5,A.       Statutory Defenses to the Application of Obstruction-Of-Justice Provisions to
372,6,the Conduct Under Investigation
372,7,The obstruction-of-justice statute most readily applicable to our investigation is 18 U.S.C .
372,8,§ 1512( c)(2). Section I 512( c) provides:
372,9,(c) Whoever corruptly-
372,10,"(!) alters, destroys , mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or"
372,11,"attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for"
372,12,use in an official proceeding; or
372,13,"(2) otherwise obstructs, influences , or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts"
372,14,"to do so,"
372,15,"shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both."
372,16,"The Department of Justice has taken the position that Section 1512( c )(2) states a broad,"
372,17,"independent, and unqualified prohibition on obstruction of justice. 1077 While defendants have"
372,18,argued that subsection (c)(2) should be read to cover only acts that would impair the availability
372,19,"or integrity of evidence because that is subsection (c)(l)'s focus, strong arguments weigh against"
372,20,that proposed limitation. The text of Section 1512(c )(2) confirms that its sweep is not tethered to
372,21,Section 1512( c )(1 ); courts have so interpreted it; its history does not counsel otherwise; and no
372,22,"principle of statutory construction dictates a contrary view. On its face, therefore, Section"
372,23,"1512( c)(2) applies to all corrupt means of obstructing a proceeding, pending or contemplated-"
372,24,"including by improper exercises of official power. In addition, other statutory provisions that are"
372,25,potentially applicable to certain conduct we investigated broadly prohibit obstruction of
372,26,"proceedings that are pending before courts, grand juries, and Congress. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503,"
372,27,1505. Congress has also specifically prohibited witness tampering. See 18 U .S.C. § 1512(6 ).
372,28,I. The Text of Section I 5 l 2{c){2) Prohibits a Broad Range of Obstructive Acts
372,29,Several textual features of Section 1512( c)(2) support the conclusion that the provision
372,30,broadly prohibits corrupt means of obstructing justice and is not limited by the more specific
372,31,"prohibitions in Section 1512( c)(I), which focus on evidence impairment."
372,32,"First, the text of Section 1512(c)(2) is unqualified: it reaches acts that ""obstruct[] ,"
372,33,"influence[], or impede[] any official proceeding"" when committed ""corruptly."" Nothing in Section"
372,34,1512(c)(2)'s text limits the provision to acts that would impair the integrity or availability of
372,35,"evidence for use in an official proceeding. In contrast, Section 1512(c)(I) explicitly includes the"
372,36,"requirement that the defendant act ""with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability"
372,37,1077
372,38,"See U.S. Br., United States v. Kumar, Nos. 06- 5482-cr(L), 06-5654-cr(CON) (2d Cir. filed"
372,39,"Oct. 26, 2007), at pp. 15-28; United States v. Singleton, Nos. H-04-CR-514SS, H-06-cr-80 (S.D. Tex. filed"
372,40,"June 5, 2006)."
372,41,160
372,42,NA
373,1,U.S. Department of Justice
373,2,"Atten1ey '.llerlc Preelttet // Ma)' Cei,taif'I Material Preteeteel Ui,eler Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
373,3,1
373,4,"for use in an official proceeding,"" a requirement that Congress also included in two other sections"
373,5,of Section 1512. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(a)(2)(B)(ii) (use of physical force with intent to cause a
373,6,"person to destroy an object ""w ith intent to impair the integrity or availability of the object for use"
373,7,"in an official proceeding""); 1512(6)(2)(B) (use of intimidation, threats, corrupt persuasion , or"
373,8,"misleading conduct with intent to cause a person to destroy an object ""w ith intent to impair the"
373,9,"integrity or availability of the object for use in an official proceeding""). But no comparable intent"
373,10,or conduct element focused on evidence impairment appears in Section 1512(c)(2). The intent
373,11,"element in Section l 512(c)(2) comes from the word ""corruptly."" See, e.g., United .States v."
373,12,"McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (""The intent element is important because the word"
373,13,"' corruptly ' is what serves to separate criminal and innocent acts of obstruction."") (internal"
373,14,"quotation marks omitted). And the conduct element in Section 1512(c)(2) is ""obstruct[ing],"
373,15,"influenc[ing], or imped[ing]"" a proceeding. Congress is presumed to have acted intentionally in"
373,16,the disparate inclusion and exclusion of evidence-impairment language. See Loughrin v. United
373,17,"States, 573 U.S. 351, 358 (2014) (""[W]hen 'Congress includes particular language in one section"
373,18,of a statute but om its it in another' -let alone in the very next provision- th is Court ' presume[ s]'
373,19,"that Congress intended a difference in meaning"") (quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,"
373,20,"23 (1983)); accord Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 777(2018)."
373,21,"Second, the structure of Section 1512 supports the conclusion that Section 1512(c)(2)"
373,22,defines an independent offense. Section 1512(c)(2) delineates a complete crime with different
373,23,elements from Section I 5 I 2(c)(I )-and each subsection of Section 1512(c) contains its own
373,24,"""attempt"" prohibition, underscoring that they are independent prohibitions. The two subsections"
373,25,"of Section 1512(c) are connected by the conjunction ""or,"" indicating that each provides an"
373,26,"alternative basis for criminal liability. See Loughrin , 573 U.S. at 357 (""ordinary use [of ' or '] is"
373,27,"almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings"")"
373,28,"(internal quotation marks omitted). In Loughrin, for example, the Supreme Court relied on the use"
373,29,"of the word ""or"" to hold that adjacent and overlapping subsections of the bank fraud statute, 18"
373,30,"U .S.C. § 1344, state distinct offenses and that subsection 1344(2) therefore should not be"
373,31,interpreted to contain an additional element specified only in subsection 1344(1). Id.; see also
373,32,"Shaw v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 462, 465-469 (2016) (recognizing that the subsections of the"
373,33,"bank fraud statute ""overlap substantially"" but identifying distinct circumstances covered by"
373,34,"each). 1078 And here, as in Loughrin, Section 1512(c)'s ""two clauses have separate numbers, line"
373,35,"breaks before, between, and after them, and equivalent indentation-thus placing the clauses"
373,36,"visually on an equal footing and indicating that they have separate meanings."" 573 U.S. at 359."
373,37,"Third, the introductory word ""otherwise"" in Section 1512(c)(2) signals that the provision"
373,38,covers obstructive acts that are different from those listed in Section 1512(c)(I). See Black's Law
373,39,"Dictionary 1101 (6th ed. 1990) (""otherwise"" means ""in a different manner; in another way, or in"
373,40,"other ways""); see also, e.g., American Heritage College Dictionary Online (""I. In another way;"
373,41,1078
373,42,The Office of Legal Counsel recently relied on several of the same interpretiveprinciples in
373,43,"concluding that language that appearedin the first clause of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § I084, restricting its"
373,44,"prohibitionagainst certain betting or wagering activities to ""any sporting event or contest,"" did not apply"
373,45,"to the second clause of the same statute, which reaches other betting or wagering activities. See"
373,46,"Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling (Nov. 2, 2018), slip op. 7 (relying"
373,47,"on plain language);id. at 11 (finding it not ""tenable to read into the second clause the qualifier 'on any"
373,48,"sporting event or contest' that appears in the first clause""); id. at 12 (relying on Digital Realty)."
373,49,161
373,50,NA
374,1,U.S. Department ofJustice
374,2,Atlertte:) \\'erk Pretlttet // May CetttttiH Material Preteetetl Utttler Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
374,3,"differently; 2. Under other circumstances""); see also Gooch v. United States, 297 U .S. 124, 128"
374,4,"(1936) (characterizing ""o therwise"" as a ""broad term"" and holding that a statutory prohibition on"
374,5,"kidnapping ""for ransom or reward or otherwise"" is not limited by the words ""ransom"" and"
374,6,"""reward"" to kidnappings for pecuniary benefits); Collazos v. United States, 368 F.3d 190,200 (2d"
374,7,"Cir. 2004) (construing ""otherwise"" in 28 U.S.C. § 2466(l)(C) to reach beyond the ""specific"
374,8,"examples"" listed in prior subs ec tions, thereby covering the ""myriad means that human ingenuity"
374,9,"might devise to permit a person to avoid the jurisdiction of a court""); cf Begay v. United States,"
374,10,"553 U.S. 137, 144 (2006) (recognizing that ""otherwise"" is defined to mean "" in a different way or"
374,11,"manner ,"" and holding that the word ""ot herwise "" introducing the residual clause in the Armed"
374,12,"Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), can, but need not necessarily , ""r efer to a crime"
374,13,"that is similar to the listed examples in some respects but different in others""). 1079 The purpose of"
374,14,"the word ""otherwise"" in Section 1512( c )(2) is therefore to c larify that the provision covers"
374,15,obstructive acts other than the destruction of physical evidence with the intent to impair its
374,16,"integrity or availability , which is the conduct addressed in Section l 5 l 2(c)( I). The word"
374,17,"""o therwise"" does not signal that Section 1512( c )(2) has less breadth in covering obstructive"
374,18,conduct than the languag e of the provision implies.
374,19,2. Judicial Decisions Support a Broad Reading of Section 15 12(c)(2)
374,20,"Courts have not limited Section 1512( c)(2) to conduct that impairs evidence, but instead"
374,21,have read it to cover obstructive acts in any form.
374,22,"As one court explained , "" [t]his expansive subsection operates as a catch-all to cover"
374,23,'othe rwis e' obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific offense like document
374,24,"destruction, which is listed in (c)(l)."" United States v. Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 286 (7th Cir."
374,25,"2014) (some quotation marks omitted). For example, in United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp . 2d"
374,26,"195 (D.D.C. 2009), the court rejected the argument that""§ 1512( c )(2)'s reference to conduct that"
374,27,"'othe rwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding' is limited to conduct that is"
374,28,"similar to the type of co nduct proscribed by subsection (c)(l)-namely,          conduct that impairs the"
374,29,"integrity or availability of 'reco rd[s] , docum ents [s], or other object[s] for use in an official"
374,30,"proceeding."" Id. at 224. The court explained that ""t he meaning of§ 1512(c)(2) is plain on its"
374,31,"face."" Id. (alternations in original). And courts have upheld convictions under Section l 5 12(c)(2)"
374,32,"that did not involve evidence impairment, but instead resulted from conduct that more broadly"
374,33,"thwarted arrests or investigations. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 862 F.3d 223 , 238 (2d Cir."
374,34,"2017) (police officer tipped off suspects about issuance of arrest warrants before ""outsta nding"
374,35,"warrants could be executed, thereby potentially interfering with an ongoing grand jury"
374,36,"proceeding""); United States v. Ahrensfield, 698 F.3d 1310, 1324-1326 (10th Cir. 2012) (officer"
374,37,"disclosed existence of an undercover inve stiga tion to its target) ; United States v. Phillips, 583 F .3d"
374,38,"1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 2009) ( defendant disclosed identity of an undercover officer thus preventing"
374,39,"him from making controlled purchases from methamphetamine dealers). Those cases illu strate ,"
374,40,that Section 1512(c)(2) applies to corrupt acts- including by public officials-that           frustrate the
374,41,1079
374,42,"In Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 15 (2011), the Supreme Court substantially abandoned"
374,43,"Begay's reading of the residual clause, and in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), the Court"
374,44,"invalidated the residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. Begay 's analysis of the word ""otherwise"" is"
374,45,thus of limited value.
374,46,162
374,47,NA
375,1,U.S. Department of Justice
375,2,"Atte>f'flC)""'ifeFk Prnauet // Mtt) Centttin Mttl:eFittlPreteet:ea Unaer Feel. R. CFiffl. P. 6(e)"
375,3,"commencement or conduct of a proceeding, and not just to acts that make evidence unavailable or"
375,4,impair its integrity.
375,5,Section 1512(c)(2)'s breadth is reinforced by the similarity of its language to the omnibus
375,6,"clause of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which covers anyone who "" corruptly ... obstructs, or impedes , or"
375,7,"endeavors to influence , obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice."" That clause of"
375,8,"Section 1503 follows two more specific clauses that protect jurors, judges , and court officers. The"
375,9,"omnibus clause has nevertheless been construed to be ""far more general in scope than the earlier"
375,10,"clauses of the statute."" United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). ""The omnibus clause"
375,11,is essentially a catch -all provision which generally prohibits conduct that interferes with the due
375,12,"administration of justice. "" United States v. Brenson , 104 F.3d 1267, 1275 (11th Cir. 1997). Courts"
375,13,"have accordingly given it a ""non-restrictive reading."" United States v. Kumar, 617 F .3d 612, 620"
375,14,"(2d Cir. 201 O);id. at 620 n.7 (collecting cases from the Third, Fourth , Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh"
375,15,"Circuits). As one court has explained, the omnibus clause ""prohibits acts that are similar in result,"
375,16,"rather than manner , to the conduct described in the first part of the statute."" United States v."
375,17,"Howard, 569 F.2d 1331, 1333 (5th Cir. 1978). While the specific clauses ""fo rbid certain means"
375,18,"of obstructing justice ... the omnibus clause aims at obstruction of justice itself, regardless of the"
375,19,"means used to reach that result."" Id. ( collecting cases). Given the similarity of Section 1512( c )(2)"
375,20,"to Section 1503 's omnibus clause , Congress would have expected Section 1512(c)(2) to cover acts"
375,21,"that produced a similar result to the evidence-impairment provisions-i.e., the result of obstructing"
375,22,"justice-rather       than covering only acts that were similar in manner. Read this way, Section"
375,23,1512( c )(2) serves a distinct function in the federal obstruction-of-justice statutes: it captures
375,24,"corrupt conduct, other than document destruction , that has the natural tendency to obstruct"
375,25,contemplated as well as pending proceedings.
375,26,"Section 1512( c )(2) overlaps with other obstruction statutes, but it does not render them"
375,27,"superfluous.         Section 1503, for example, which covers pending grand jury and judicial"
375,28,"proceedings, and Section 1505, which covers pending administrative and congressional"
375,29,"proceedings , reach ""endeavors to influence , obstruct, or impede "" the proceedings-a broader test"
375,30,"for inchoate violations than Section 1512(c)(2)'s ""attempt"" standard, which requires a substantial"
375,31,"step towards a completed offense. See United States v. Sampson , 898 F.3d 287,302 (2d Cir.2018)"
375,32,"(""[E]fforts to witness tamper that rise to the level of an ' endeavor ' yet fall short of an 'attempt'"
375,33,"cannot be prosecuted under§ 1512."") ; United States v. Leisure , 844 F.2d 1347, 1366- 1367 (8th"
375,34,"Cir . 1988) (collecting cases recognizing the difference between the ""endeavor "" and ""attempt"""
375,35,"standards).      And 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which prohibits destruction of documents or records in"
375,36,"contemplation of an investigation or proceeding, does not require the ""nexus"" showing under"
375,37,"Ag uilar , which Section 1512( c)(2) demands. See, e.g., United States v. Yielding, 657 F .3d 688,"
375,38,"712 (8th Cir.2011) (""The requisite knowledge and intent [under Section 1519] can be present even"
375,39,"if the accused lacks knowledge that he is likely to succeed in obstructing the matter.""); United"
375,40,"States v. Gray, 642 F.3d 371, 376-377 (2d Cir. 2011) (""[I]n enacting§ 1519, Congress rejected"
375,41,any requirement that the government prove a link between a defendant 's conduct and an imminent
375,42,"or pending official proceeding.""). The existence of even ""substantial"" overlap is not ""uncommon """
375,43,"in criminal statutes . Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 359 n.4; see Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 458-469 ; Aguilar, 515"
375,44,"U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (""T he fact that there is now some overlap between§ 1503 and"
375,45,§ 1512 is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause
375,46,"of§ 1503 and the other provisions of§ 1503 itself.""). But given that Section s 1503, 1505, and"
375,47,163
375,48,NA
376,1,U.S. Department of Justice
376,2,At:tertte~· '.l/erk Pretittet // May Cetttaitt Material Preteeteti Utttier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
376,3,"1519 each reach conduct that Section 1512( c)(2) does not, the overlap provides no reason to give"
376,4,"Section 1512( c )(2) an artificially limited construction. See Shaw, 137 S. Ct. at 469. 108 0"
376,5,3. The Legislative History of Section l512(c)(2) Does Not Justify Narrowing Its
376,6,Text
376,7,"""Given the straightforward statutory command"" in Section l512(c)(2), ""there is no reason"
376,8,"to resort to legislative history."" United States v. Gonzales, 520 U .S. 1, 6 (1997). In any event, the"
376,9,legislative history of Section 1512(c)(2) is not a reason to impose extratextual limitations on its
376,10,reach.
376,11,"Congress enacted Section 1512( c)(2) as part the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No."
376,12,"107-204, Tit. XI, § 1102, 116 Stat. 807.              The relevan t section of the statute was entitled"
376,13,"""Ta mpering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding."" 116 Stat. 807"
376,14,(emphasis added). That title indicates that Congress intended the two clauses to have independent
376,15,effect. Section 1512( c) was added as a floor amendment in the Senate and explained as closing a
376,16,"certain ""loophole"" with respect to ""document shredding."" See 148 Cong. Rec. S6545 (July I 0,"
376,17,2002) (Sen. Lott) ; id. at S6549-S6550 (Sen: Hatch). But those explanations do not limit the enacted
376,18,"text. See Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 115 (1988) (""[l]t is not the law that a"
376,19,"statute can hav e no effects which are not explicitly mentioned in its legislative history. ""); see also"
376,20,"Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (20 18) (""Even if Congress did not"
376,21,"foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reaso n not to give the statutory text a fair"
376,22,"reading.""). The floor sta tements thus cannot detract from the meaning of the enacted text. See"
376,23,"Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 457 (2002) (""Floor statements from two Senators"
376,24,.cannot amend the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. We see no reason to give greater
376,25,"weight to the views of two Senators than to the collective votes of both Houses , which are"
376,26,"memorialized in the unambiguous statutory text.""). That principle has particular force where one"
376,27,"of the proponents of the amendment to Section 1512 introduced his remarks as only ""briefly"
376,28,"elaborat[ing] on some of the specific provisions contained in this bill."" 148 Cong. Rec. S6550"
376,29,(Sen. Hatch).
376,30,"Indeed , the language Congress used in Section 1512( c)(2)-prohibiting                ""corr uptly ..."
376,31,"obstruct[ing], influenc[ing] , or imp ed[ing ] any official proceeding"" or attemp tin g to do so--"
376,32,parallels a provision that Congress considered years earlier in a bill designed to strengthen
376,33,protections against witness tampering and obstruction of justice. While the earlier provision is not
376,34,"a direct antecedent of Section 15 12(c)(2), Congress's understanding of the broad scope of the"
376,35,1080
376,36,"The Supreme Court's decision in Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018), does not"
376,37,support imposing a non-textual limitation on Section I 512(c)(2). Marinello interpreted the tax obstruction
376,38,"statute, 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a), to require ""a ' nexus' between the defendant's conduct and a particular"
376,39,"administrative proceeding."" Id. at 1109. The Court adopted that construction in light of the similar"
376,40,"interpretation given to ""other obstruction provisions,"" id. (citing Aguilar and Arthur Andersen), as well as"
376,41,"considerations of context, legislative history, structure of the criminal tax laws, fair warning, and lenity. Id."
376,42,"at 1106-1108. The type of ""nexus"" element the Court adopted in Marinello already applies under Section"
376,43,"1512(c)(2), and the remaining considerations the Court cited do not justify reading into Section l 512(c)(2)"
376,44,"language that is not there. See Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 ( 1997) (the Court ""ordinarily resist[ s]"
376,45,"reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face."")."
376,46,164
376,47,NA
377,1,U.S. Department of Justice
377,2,Attorfl:ey Werle Protlttet // Mtty Cofltftifl:Mttterittl Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
377,3,"earlier provision is instructive. Recognizing that ""the proper administration of justice may be"
377,4,"impeded or thwarted"" by a ""variety of corrupt methods ... limited only by the imagination of the"
377,5,"criminally inclined,"" S. Rep . No. 532, 97th Cong. , 2d Sess . 17-18 (1982), Congress considered a"
377,6,"bill that would have amended Section 1512 by making it a crime , inter alia, when a person"
377,7,"""corruptly .. . influences, obstructs , or impedes . . . [t]he enforcement and prosecution of federal"
377,8,"law, "" ""administration of a law under which an official proceeding is being or may be conducted,"""
377,9,"or the ""exercise of a Federal legislative power of inquiry ."" Id. at 17- 19 (quoting S. 2420)."
377,10,The Senate Committee explained that:
377,11,[T]he purpose of preventing an obstruction of or miscarriage of justice cannot be fully
377,12,carried out by a simple enumeration of the commonly prosecuted obstruction offenses.
377,13,There must also be protection against the rare type of conduct that is the product of the
377,14,inventive criminal mind and which also thwarts justice.
377,15,"Id. at 18. The report gave examples of conduct "" actually prosecuted under the current residual"
377,16,"clause [in 18 U.S.C. § 1503] , which would probably not be covered in this series [of provisions]"
377,17,"without a residual clause."" Id. One prominent example was "" [a] conspiracy to cover up the"
377,18,Watergate burglary and its aftermath by having the Central Intelligence Agency seek to interfe re
377,19,"with an ongoing FBI investigation of the burglary."" Id. (citing United States v. Haldeman, 559"
377,20,F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir . 1976)). The report ther efore indicates a congressional awareness not only that
377,21,residual-clause language resembling Section 1512( c )(2) broadly covers a wide variety of
377,22,"obstructive conduct, but also that such language reaches the improper use of governmental"
377,23,"processes to obstruct justice-specifically        , the Watergate cover-up orchestrated by White House"
377,24,"officials including the President himself. See Haldeman , 559 F .3d at 51, 86-87 , 120-129, 162 . 1081"
377,25,4. General Principles of Statutory Construction Do Not Suggest That Section
377,26,1512(c)(2) is Inapplicable to the Conduct in this Inv estigation
377,27,"The requirement of fair warning in criminal law, the interest in avoiding due process"
377,28,"concerns in potentially vague statutes, and the rule of lenity do not justify narrowing the reach of"
377,29,Section 1512( c )(2) ' s text. 1082
377,30,"a. As with other criminal laws, the Supreme Court has ""e xercised restraint"" in interpreting"
377,31,"obstruction-of-justice provisions, both out ofrespect for Congres s's role in defining crimes and in"
377,32,"the interest of providing individuals with "" fair warning "" of what a criminal statute prohibits ."
377,33,"Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 , 1106 (2018); Arthur Andersen, 544 U.S. at 703;"
377,34,1081
377,35,"The Senate ultimately accepted the House version of the bill, which excluded an omnibus"
377,36,"clause. See United States v. Poindexter, 951 F.2d 369, 382-383 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (tracing history of the"
377,37,"proposed omnibus provision in the witness-protection legislation). During the floor debate on the bill,"
377,38,"Senator Heinz, one of the initiators and primary backers of the legislation, explained that the omnibus clause"
377,39,"was beyond the scope of the witness-protection measure at issue and likely ""duplicative"" of other"
377,40,"obstruction laws, 128 Cong. Rec. 26,810 (1982) (Sen. Heinz), presumably referring to Sections 1503 and"
377,41,1505.
377,42,1082
377,43,"In a separate section addressing considerations unique to the presidency, we consider principles"
377,44,"of statutory construction relevant in that context. See Volume Tl, Section III.B.l, infra."
377,45,165
377,46,NA
378,1,U.S. Department of Justice
378,2,Atteme)' Werle Predttet // Ma) Centain Material Preteeted Under Fed . R. Crim . P. 6(e)
378,3,"Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599-602 . In several obstruction cases, the Court has imposed a nexus test that"
378,4,requires that the wrongful conduct targeted by the provision be sufficiently connected to an official
378,5,"proceeding to ensure the requisite culpability. Marinello, 138 S. Ct. at 1109; Arthur Andersen,"
378,6,"544 U.S. at 707-708; Aguilar, 515 U .S. at 600-602 . Section 1512(c)(2) has been interpreted to"
378,7,"require a similar nexus. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 916 F.3d 368 , 386 (4th Cir. 2019);"
378,8,"United States v. Petruk, 781 F .3d 438, 445 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Phillips , 583 F.3d"
378,9,"1261, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Reich , 4 79 F .3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2007). To satisfy"
378,10,"the nexus requirement , the government must show as an objective matter that a defendant acted"
378,11,"""in a manner that is likely to obstruct justice,"" such that the statute "" excludes defendants who have"
378,12,"an evil purpose but use means that would only unnaturally and improbably be successful."""
378,13,"Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 601-602 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 599 (""the endeavor"
378,14,"must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice "")"
378,15,(internal quotation marks omitted). The government must also show as a subjective matter that
378,16,"the actor ""contemplated a particular, foreseeable proceeding. "" Petruk, 781 F.3d at 445 . Those"
378,17,requirements alleviate fair-warning concerns by ensuring that obstructive conduct has a close
378,18,enough connection to existing or future proceedings to implicate the dangers targeted by the
378,19,obstruction laws and that the individual actually has the obstructive result in mind.
378,20,"b. Courts also seek to construe statutes to avoid due process vagueness concerns. See, e.g.,"
378,21,"McDonnell v. United States , 136 S. Ct. 2355 , 2373 (2016) ; Skilling v. United States , 561 U.S. 358,"
378,22,"368 , 402-404 (2010). Vagueness doctrine requires that a statute define a crime "" with sufficient"
378,23,"definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited "" and "" in a manner that"
378,24,"does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. "" Id. at 402-403 (internal quotation"
378,25,"marks omitted). The obstruction statutes' requirement of acting ""corruptly"" satisfies that test."
378,26,"""Acting 'corruptly' within the meaning of§ 1512(c)(2) means acting with an improper"
378,27,"purpose and to engage in conduct knowingly and dishonestly with the specific intent to subvert ,"
378,28,"impede or obstruct"" the relevant proceeding. United States v. Gordon, 710 F .3d 1 124, I 151 (10th"
378,29,Cir . 2013) (some quotation marks omitted). The majority opinion in Aguilar did not address the
378,30,"defendant's vagueness challenge to the word ""corruptly, "" 515 U .S. at 600 n. 1, but Justice Scalia's"
378,31,"separate opinion did reach that issue and would have rejected the challenge, id. at 616-617 (Scalia,"
378,32,"J., joined by Kennedy and Thomas , JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) . ""Statutory"
378,33,"language need not be colloquial ,"" Justice Scalia explained , and ""the term ' corruptly' in criminal"
378,34,laws has a longstanding and well-accepted meaning. It denotes an act done with an intent to give
378,35,"some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others. "" Id. at 616 (internal"
378,36,quotation marks omitted; citing lower court authority and legal dictionaries). Justice Scalia added
378,37,"that ""in the context of obstructing jury proceedings, any claim of ignorance of wrongdoing is"
378,38,"incredible."" Id. at 617. Lower courts have also rejected vagueness challenges to the word"
378,39,"""corruptly. "" See, e.g ., United St ates v. Edwards, 869 F.3d 490, 501-502 (7th Cir. 2017); United"
378,40,"States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280-1281 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Howard, 569 F.2d"
378,41,"1331, 1336 n.9 (5th Cir . 1978). This well-established intent standard precludes the need to limit"
378,42,the obstruction statutes to only certain kinds of inherently wrongful conduct. 1083
378,43,1083
378,44,"In United States v. Poindexter, 951 F .2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the court of appeals found the"
378,45,"term ""corruptly"" in 18 U.S.C. § 1505 vague as applied to a person who provided false information to"
378,46,"Congress. After suggesting that the word ""corruptly"" was vague on its face, 951 F.2d at 378, the court"
378,47,166
378,48,NA
379,1,U.S. Department of Justice
379,2,"Attet'fley Werk Pre,duet // Mft; Ce,HtftiHMateriftl Preteetee UHeer Fed . R. Crilfl. P. 6(e)"
379,3,"c. Finally, the rule of lenity does not justify treating Section 1512( c )(2) as a prohibition on"
379,4,"evidence impairment, as opposed to an omnibus clause. The rule of lenity is an interpretive"
379,5,principle that resolves ambiguity in criminal laws in favor of the less-severe construction .
379,6,"Cleveland v. United States , 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000). ""[A ]s [the Court has] repeatedly emphasized,"""
379,7,"however, the rule of lenity applies only if, ""after considering text, structure , history and purpose,"
379,8,there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute such that the Court must simply
379,9,"guess as to what Congress intended."" Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S . 169, 188 n. 10 (2014)"
379,10,"(internal quotation marks omitted) . The rule has been cited, for example , in adopting a narrow"
379,11,"meaning of""tangible object"" in an obstruction statute when the prohibition's title, history, and list"
379,12,"of prohibited acts indicated a focus on destruction of records . See Yates v. United States, 135 S."
379,13,"Ct. 1074 , 1088 (2015) (plurality opinion) (interpreting ""tangible object"" in the phrase ""record ,"
379,14,"document, or tangible object"" in 18 U.S.C . § 1519 to mean an item capable of recording or"
379,15,"preserving information).· Here, as discussed above, the text, structure , and history of Section"
379,16,"l 5 I 2(c)(2) leaves no ""grievous ambiguity"" about the statute's meaning.              Section l 512(c)(2)"
379,17,defines a structurally independent general prohibition on obstruction of official proceedings.
379,18,5. Other Obstruction Statutes Might Apply to the Conduct in this Investigation
379,19,"Regardless whether Section 1512( c)(2) covers all corrupt acts that obstruct , influence, or"
379,20,"impede pending or contemplated proceedings, other statutes would apply to such conduct in"
379,21,"pending proceedings, provided that the remaining statutory elements are satisfied. As discussed"
379,22,"above, the omnibus clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) applies generally to obstruction of pending"
379,23,"judicial and grand proceedings. 1084 See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 598 (noting that the clause is ""far"
379,24,"more general in scope"" than preceding provisions).               Section I 503(a)'s protections extend to"
379,25,witness tampering and to other obstructive conduct that has a nexus to pending proceedings. See
379,26,"Sampson, 898 F.3d at 298-303 & n.6 (collecting cases from eight circuits holding that Section"
379,27,"1503 covers witness-related obstructive conduct, and cabining prior circuit authority) . And"
379,28,Section 1505 broadly criminalizes obstructive conduct aimed at pending agency and congressional
379,29,"proceedings. 1085 See, e.g., United States v. Rainey , 757 F.3d 234, 241-247 (5th Cir. 2014)."
379,30,"concluded that the statute did not clearly apply to corrupt conduct by the person himself and the ""core"""
379,31,conduct to which Section 1505 could constitutionally be applied was one person influencing another person
379,32,to violate a legal duty. Id . at 379-386. Congress later enacted a provision overturning that result by
379,33,"providing that ""[a]s used in [S]ection 1505, the term 'c orruptly ' means acting with an improper purpose,"
379,34,"personally or by influencing another, including by making a false or misleading statement, or withholding,"
379,35,"concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other information."" 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). Other courts"
379,36,have declined to follow Poindexter either by limiting it to Section 1505 and the specific conduct at issue in
379,37,"that case, see Brenson, 104 F.3d at 1280-1281; reading it as narrowly limited to ce1tain types of conduct,"
379,38,"see United States v. Morrison , 98 F.3d 619, 629-630 (D.C. Cir. I 996); or by noting that it predated Arthur"
379,39,"Andersen 's interpretation of the term ""corruptly,"" see Edwards , 869 F.3d at 501-502."
379,40,1084
379,41,Section \ 503(a) provides for criminal punishment of:
379,42,"Whoever ... corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or"
379,43,"communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or"
379,44,"impede, the due administration of justice."
379,45,1085
379,46,Section 1505 provides for criminal punishment of:
379,47,167
379,48,NA
380,1,U.S. Department of Justice
380,2,AM:erHe)  · 'Nerk PreElttet// Ma)· CeHtaiHMaterial Preteetea UHElerFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
380,3,"Finally, 18 U.S.C. § l 512(b)(3) criminalizes tampering with witnesses to prevent the"
380,4,communication of information about a crime to law enforcement. The nexus inquiry articulated
380,5,"in Aguilar-that an individual has ""knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial"
380,6,"proceeding,"" 515 U.S. at 599- does not apply to Section 1512(6)(3). See United States v. Byrne,"
380,7,"435 F .3d I 6, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2006). The nexus inquiry turns instead on the actor's intent to prevent"
380,8,"communications to a federal law enforcement official. See Fowler v. United States, 563 U.S. 668,"
380,9,673-678 (2011 ).
380,10,*       *      *
380,11,"In sum, in light of the breadth of Section 1512( c)(2) and the other obstruction statutes, an"
380,12,argument that the conduct at issue in th is investigation falls outside the scope of the obstruction
380,13,laws lacks merit.
380,14,B.         Constitutional Defenses to Applying Obstruction-Of-Justice                 Statutes to
380,15,Presidential Conduct
380,16,The President has broad discretion to direct criminal investigations. The Constitution vests
380,17,"the ""executive Power"" in the President and enjoins him to ""take Care that the Laws be faithfully"
380,18,"executed.""      U.S. CONST. ART IT, §§ 1, 3. Those powers and duties form the foundation of"
380,19,"prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Armstrong , 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (Attorney"
380,20,"General and United States Attorneys ""have this latitude because they are designated by statute as"
380,21,the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to ' take Care that
380,22,"the Laws be faithfully executed. ""' ). The President also has authority to appoint officers of the"
380,23,"United States and to remove those whom he has appointed . U .S. CONST.ART II,§ 2, cl. 2 (granting"
380,24,"authority to the President to appoint all officers with the advice and consent of the Senate , but"
380,25,"providing that Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, the"
380,26,"heads of departments , or the courts of law); see also Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company"
380,27,"Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 , 492-493 , 509 (2010) (describing removal authority as"
380,28,"flowing from the President's ""responsibility to take care that the laws be faithfully executed"")."
380,29,"Although the President has broad authority under Article II, that authority coexists with"
380,30,"Congress's Article I power to enact laws that protect congressional proceedings , federal"
380,31,"investigations , the courts, and grand juries against corrupt efforts to undermine their functions."
380,32,"Usually , those constitutional powers function in harmony , with the President enforcing the"
380,33,criminal laws under Article ITto protect against corrupt obstructive acts. But when the President ' s
380,34,"official actions come into conflict with the prohibitions in the obstruction statutes , any"
380,35,constitutional tension is reconciled through separation -of-powers analysis.
380,36,"Whoever corruptly ... influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence,"
380,37,"obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending"
380,38,"proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, or the due"
380,39,and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which any inquiry or investigation is
380,40,"being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the"
380,41,Congress.
380,42,168
380,43,NA
381,1,U.S. Department of Justice
381,2,AUertte;· Werk Preal'tet // MB:)''Centaitt Material Preteetea Uttaer Feel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
381,3,"The President's counsel has argued that ""the President ' s exercise of his constitutional"
381,4,authority ... to terminate an FBI Director and to close investigations ... cannot constitutionally
381,5,"constitute obstruction of justice."" 1086 As noted above, no Department of Justice position or"
381,6,"Supreme Court precedent directly resolved this issue. We did not find counsel's contention ,"
381,7,"however, to accord with our reading of the Supreme Court authority addressing separation-of-"
381,8,"powers issues . Applying the Court's framework for analysis , we concluded that Congress can"
381,9,validly regulate the President's exercise of official duties to prohibit actions motivated by a corrupt
381,10,intent to obstruct justice. The limited effect on presidential power that results from that restriction
381,11,would not impermissibly undermine the President's ability to perform his Article II functions.
381,12,1. The Requirement of a Clear Statement to Apply Statutes to Presidential
381,13,Condu ct Does Not Limit the Obstruction Statutes
381,14,"Before addressing Article II issues directly , we consider one threshold statutory -"
381,15,"construction principle that is unique to the presidency: ""The principle that general statutes must"
381,16,be read as not applying to the President if they do not expressly apply where application would
381,17,"arguably limit the President's constitutional role ."" OLC , Application of 28 USC. § 458 to"
381,18,"Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C . 350, 352 (1995). This ""c lear"
381,19,"statement rule,"" id., has its source in two principles: statut es should be construed to avoid serious"
381,20,"constitutional questions , and Congress should not be assumed to have altered the constitutional"
381,21,"separation of powers without clear assurance that it intended that result. OLC, The Constitutional"
381,22,"Separation of Powers Between the President and Congress, 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 178 (1996)."
381,23,The Supreme Court has applied that clear-statement rule in several cases. In one leading
381,24,"case , the Court construed the Admini strative Procedure Act , 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., not to apply"
381,25,"to judicial review of pre sidential action. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-801 (1992)."
381,26,"The Court explained that it ""would requir e an express statement by Congress before assuming it"
381,27,"intended the President's performance of his statutory duti es to be reviewed for abuse of discretion. """
381,28,"Id. at 801. In another case, the Court interpreted the word ""utili ze d"" in the Federal Advisory"
381,29,"Comm ittee Act (F ACA) , 5 U.S.C. App., to apply only to the use of advisory committees"
381,30,"established directly or indirectly by the government , thereby excluding the American Bar"
381,31,Association's advice to the Department of Ju stice about federal judicial candidates. Public Citizen
381,32,"v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S . 440, 455 , 462 -467 (1989). Th e Court explained"
381,33,"that a broader interpretation of the term "" utili zed"" in F ACA would raise serious quest ions whether"
381,34,"th e statute "" infringed unduly on the President's Article II pow er to nominate federal judges and"
381,35,"violated the doctrine of separation of powers. "" Id. at 466-467. Another case found that an"
381,36,"established canon of statutory construction applied with ""s pecial force "" to provisions that would"
381,37,impinge on the President's foreign-affairs powers if construed broadly. Sale v. Haitian Centers
381,38,"Council, 509 U.S. 155, 188 ( 1993) (applying the presumption against extraterritorial application"
381,39,to construe the Refu gee Act of 1980 as not governing in an overseas context where it could affect
381,40,"""foreign and military affairs for which the President has uniqu e responsibility""). See Application"
381,41,"1086 6/23/ 17 Letter, President' s Personal Counsel to Special Counsel's Office, at 2 n. I ."
381,42,169
381,43,NA
382,1,U.S. Department of Justice
382,2,Af1:6meyWerk Pred1:1et// May C6ntain Material Prnteeted Under Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
382,3,"of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges , 19 Op. O.L.C. at 353-354"
382,4,"(discussing Franklin, Public Citizen , and Sale)."
382,5,The Department of Justice has relied on this clear-statement principle to interpret certain
382,6,"statutes as not applying to the President at all, similar to the approach taken in Franklin. See, e.g.,"
382,7,"Memorandum for Richard T. Burress , Office of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman,"
382,8,"Deputy Attorney General , Re: Conflict of Interest Problems Arising out of the President's"
382,9,Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to
382,10,"the Constitution , at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974) (criminal conflict-of-interest statute , 18 U.S .C. § 208,"
382,11,does not apply to the President). Other OLC opinions interpret statutory text not to apply to certain
382,12,presidential or executive actions because of constitutional concerns. See Application of 28 U.S. C.
382,13,"§ 458 to Presidential Appoin tments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 350-357 (consanguinity"
382,14,"limitations on court appointments, 28 U.S.C. § 458, found inapplicable to ""presidential"
382,15,"appointments of judges to the federal judiciary""); Constraints Imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 1913 on"
382,16,"Lobbying Efforts, 13 Op. O.L.C. 300, 304-306 (1989) (limitation on the use of appropriated funds"
382,17,for certain lobbying programs found inapplicable to certain communications by the President and
382,18,executive officials).
382,19,"But OLC has also recognized that this clear-statement rule ""does not apply with respect to"
382,20,"a statute that raises no separation of powers questions were it to be applied to the President,"" such"
382,21,"as the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201. Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential"
382,22,"Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. OLC explained that "" [a]pplication"
382,23,"of § 20 I raises no separation of powers question , let alone a serious one ,"" because [t]he"
382,24,"Constitution confers no power in the President to receive bribes."" Id. In support of that conclusion ,"
382,25,OLC noted constitutional provisions that forbid increases in the President's compensation while
382,26,"in office , ""which is what a bribe would function to do,"" id. (citing U.S. CONST.ART. II, § 1, cl. 7),"
382,27,"and the express constitutional power of ""Congress to impeach [and convict] a President for , inter"
382,28,"alia, bribery,"" id. (citing U.S. CONST.ARTII,§ 4)."
382,29,"Under OLC's analysis, Congress can permissibly criminalize ce1tain obstructive conduct"
382,30,"by the President, such as suborning perjury , intimidating witnesses, or fabricating evidence ,"
382,31,because those prohibitions raise no separation-of-powers questions. See Application of 28 U.S.C.
382,32,"§ 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11. The"
382,33,"Constitution does not authorize the President to engage in such conduct, and those actions would"
382,34,"transgress the President's duty to ""take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. "" U.S . CONST."
382,35,"ART IT, §§ 3. In view of those clearly permissible applications of the obstruction statutes to the"
382,36,"President, Franklin's holding that the President is entirely excluded from a statute absent a clear"
382,37,statement would not apply in this context.
382,38,A more limited application of a clear-statement rule to exclude from the obstruction statutes
382,39,"only certain acts by the President - for example, removing prosecutors or ending investigations"
382,40,for corrupt reasons - would be difficult to implement as a matter of statutory interpretation. It is
382,41,not obvious how a clear-statement rule would apply to an omnibus provision like Section
382,42,1512( c)(2) to exclude corruptly motivated obstructive acts only when carried out in the President ' s
382,43,"conduct of office. No statutory term could easily bear that specialized meaning. For example, the"
382,44,"word ""corruptly"" has a well-established meaning that does not exclude exercises of official power"
382,45,"for corrupt ends. Indeed, an established definition states that ""corruptly"" mean s action with an"
382,46,170
382,47,NA
383,1,U.S. Department of Justice
383,2,At:temey Werk PFeattet // Mtt)' CeHtttiHMttterittl Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
383,3,"intent to secure an improper advantage ""inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others."""
383,4,BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 276 (3d ed. 1969) (emphasis added). And it would be contrary
383,5,to ordinary rules of statutory construction to adopt an unconventional meaning of a statutory term
383,6,"only when applied to the President. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 522 (2008)"
383,7,"(plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rejecting proposal to ""giv [e] the same word, in the same statutory"
383,8,"provision, different meanings in different factual contexts""); cf Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 462-"
383,9,"467 (giving the term ""utilized"" in the F ACA a uniform meaning to avoid constitutional questions)."
383,10,Nor could such an exclusion draw on a separate and established background inter pretive
383,11,"presumption, such as the presumption against extraterritoriality applied in Sale. The principle that"
383,12,"courts will construe a statute to avoid serious constitutional questions "" is not a license for the"
383,13,"judiciary to rewrite language enacted by the legislature."" Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52,"
383,14,"59-60 ( 1997). ""It is one thing to acknowledge and accept ... well defined (or even newly"
383,15,"enunciated), generally applicable, background principles of assumed legislative intent. It is quite"
383,16,another to espouse the broad proposition that criminal statutes do not have to be read as broadly
383,17,"as they are written, but are subject to case-by-case exceptions."" Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S."
383,18,"398, 406 (1998)."
383,19,"When a proposed construction ""would thus function as an extra-textual limit on [a statute ' s]"
383,20,"compass,"" thereby preventing the statute ""from applying to a host of cases falling within its clear"
383,21,"terms,"" Loughrin, 573 U.S. at 357, it is doubtful that the construction would reflect Congress's"
383,22,"intent. That is particularly so with respect to obstruction statutes , which ""have been given a broad"
383,23,"and all-inclusive meaning."" Rainey, 757 F .3d at 245 ( discussing Sections 1503 and 1505) (internal"
383,24,"quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, since no establis hed principle of interpr etation would"
383,25,"exclude the presidential conduct we have investigated from statutes such as Sections 1503, 1505,"
383,26,"I 5 12(b), and l 512(c)(2), we proceed to examine the separation-of-powers issues that could be"
383,27,raised as an Article II defense to the application of those statutes.
383,28,2. Separation-of-Powers Principles Support the Conclusion that Congress May
383,29,Validly Prohibit Corrupt Obstructive Acts Carried Out Through the President's
383,30,Official Powers
383,31,"When Congress imposes a limitation on the exercise of Article II powers, the limitation 's"
383,32,"validity depends on whether the measure ""disrupts the balance between the coordinate branches. """
383,33,"Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). ""Eve n whe n a branch does"
383,34,"not arrogate power to itself, ... the separation-of-powers doctrine requires that a branch not impair"
383,35,"another in the performance of its cons titutional duties."" Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748,"
383,36,"757 (1996). The ""separation of powers does not mean ,"" however, ""that the branches 'ought to"
383,37,"have no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other.""' Clinton v. Jones , 520 U.S."
383,38,"681,703 (1997) (quoting James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, pp. 325-326 (J. Cooke ed. 1961)"
383,39,"(emphasis omitted)). In this context, a balancing test applies to assess separation -of-powers issues."
383,40,"Applying that test here, we concluded that Congress can validly make obstruction-of-justice"
383,41,statutes applicable to corruptly motivated official acts of the President w ithout impermissibly
383,42,undermining his Article II functions .
383,43,171
383,44,NA
384,1,U.S. Department of Justice
384,2,"AtterHe,· Werk Pr0attet // May Cel'ltaifl Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
384,3,a. The Supreme Court's Separation-of-Powers Balancing Test Applies
384,4,In This Context
384,5,"A congressionally imposed limitation on presidential action is assessed to determine ""the"
384,6,extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionall y assigned
384,7,"functions, "" and, if the ""potential for disruption is present[ ,] ... whether that impact is justified by"
384,8,"an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress. """
384,9,"Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S . at 443; see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,753-"
384,10,"754 (1982); United States v. Nixon , 418 U.S. 683, 706-707 (l 974). That balancing test applies to"
384,11,1087
384,12,a congressional regulation of presidential power through the obstruction-of-justice laws.
384,13,"When an Article II power has not been ""explicitly assigned by the text of the Constitution"
384,14,"to be within the sole province of the President, but rather was thought to be encompassed within"
384,15,"the general grant to the President of the 'executive Power, ""' the Court has balanced competing"
384,16,"constitutional considerations. Public Citizen, 491 U.S . at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the"
384,17,"judgment, joined by Rehnquist , C.J., and O 'C onnor, J.). As Justice Kennedy noted in Public"
384,18,"Citizen, the Court has applied a balancing test to restrictions on ""the President's power to remove"
384,19,"Executive officers, a power [that] ... is not conferred by any explicit provision in the text of the"
384,20,"Constitution (as is the appointment power), but rather is inferred to be a necessary part of the grant"
384,21,"of the 'executive Power. ""' Id. (citing Morrison v. Olson , 487 U.S . 654, 694 (l 988), and Myers v."
384,22,"United States, 272 U.S. 52, 115-116 ( 1926)). Consistent with that statement , Morrison sustained"
384,23,a good-cause limitation on the removal of an inferior officer with defined prosecutorial
384,24,responsibilities after determining that the limitation did not impermissibly undermine the
384,25,"President's ability to perform his Article II functions. 487 U.S. at 691-693, 695-696 . The Court"
384,26,"has also evaluated other general executive-power claims through a balancing test. For example,"
384,27,the Court evaluated the President's claim of an absolute privilege for presidential communications
384,28,about his official acts by balancing that interest against the Judicial Branch's need for evidence in
384,29,"a criminal case. United States v. Nixon, supra (recognizing a qualified constitutional privilege for"
384,30,presidential communications on official matters). The Court has also upheld a law that provided
384,31,for archival access to presidential records despite a claim of absolute presidential privilege over
384,32,"the records. Administrator of General Services , 433 U.S. at 443-445, 451-455. The analysis in"
384,33,those cases supports applying a balancing test to assess the constitutionality of applying the
384,34,obstruction-of-justice statutes to presid ential exercises of executive power .
384,35,Only in a few instances has the Court applied a different framework. When the President's
384,36,"power is "" both 'exclusive' and 'conclusive' on the issue ,"" Congress is precluded from regulating"
384,37,"its exercise. Zivotofsky v. Kerry , I 35 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015). In Zivotofsky , for example, the"
384,38,"Court followed ""Justice Jackson ' s familiar tripartite framework"" in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co."
384,39,"v. Sawyer, 343 U.S . 579, 635-638 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), and held that the President's"
384,40,1087
384,41,OLC applied such a balancing test in concluding that the President is not subject to criminal
384,42,"prosecution while in office, relying on many of the same precedents discussed in this section. See A Sitting"
384,43,"President's Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222, 237-238, 244-245"
384,44,"(2000) (relying on, inter alia, UnitedStates v. Nixon, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, and Clinton v. Jones, and quoting"
384,45,the legal standard from Administrator of General Services v. Nixon that is applied in the text). OLC
384,46,"recognized that ""[t]he balancing analysis"" it had initially relied on in finding that a sitting President is"
384,47,"immune from prosecution had ""been adopted as the appropriate mode of analysis by the Court."" Id. at 244."
384,48,172
384,49,NA
385,1,U.S. Department of Justice
385,2,At:terttey \llerk Predttet // May Cetttaitt :Material Pfeteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
385,3,"authority to recognize foreign nations is exclusive. Id. at 2083, 2094. See also Public Citizen 491"
385,4,"U.S. at 485-486 (Kennedy , J ., concurring in the judgment) ( citing the power to grant pardons under"
385,5,"U.S. CONST., ART. TT,§ 2, cl. 1, and the Presentment Clauses for legislation , U.S. CONST., ART. T,"
385,6,"§ 7, Cls. 2, 3, as examples of exclusive presidential power s by virtue of constitutional text)."
385,7,"But even when a power is exclusive , ""Congress ' powers, and its central role in making"
385,8,"laws, give it substantial authority regarding many of the policy determinations that precede and"
385,9,"follow"" the Pre sident ' s act. Zivotofsky , 135 S. Ct. at 2087 . For example , although the President ' s"
385,10,"power to grant pardons is exclusive and not subject to congressional regulation, see United States"
385,11,"v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147- 148 (1872) , Congress has the authority to prohibit the corrupt"
385,12,"use of "" anything of value "" to influence the testimony of another person in a judicial , congres sional ,"
385,13,"or agency proceeding , 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(3)-which            would include the offer or promise of a"
385,14,pardon to induce a person to testify falsely or not to testify at all. The offer of a pardon would
385,15,precede the act of pardoning and thus be within Congr ess ' s power to regulate even if the pardon
385,16,"itself is not. Just as the Speech or Debate Clause , U.S. CONST.ART. I, § 6, cl. I, absolutely protects"
385,17,"legislative acts, but not a legislator ' s ""taking or agreeing to take money for a promise to act in a"
385,18,"certain way ... for it is taking the bribe , not performance of the illicit compact , that is a criminal"
385,19,"act,"" United States v. Brewster, 408 U .S. 501, 526 (1972) ( emphasis omitted) , the promis e of a"
385,20,pardon to corruptly influence testimony would not be a constitutionally immunized act. The
385,21,application of obstruction statutes to such promises therefor e would rais e no serious separation-
385,22,of-powers issue .
385,23,b. The Effect of Obstruction-of-Justice Statutes on the President's
385,24,Capacity to Perform His Article II Responsibilities is Limited
385,25,"Under the Supreme Court's balancing test for analyzing separation-of-power s issues , the"
385,26,first task is to assess the degree to which applying ob struction-of-justice statutes to presidential
385,27,actions affects the President ' s ability to carry out his Article II responsibilitie s. Administrator of
385,28,"General Services , 433 U.S. at 443. As discu ssed above , applying obstruction -of-ju stice statutes"
385,29,to presidential conduct that does not involve the Presid ent's conduct of office-such as influencing
385,30,the testimony of witnesses-is constitutionally unproblematic. The President has no more right
385,31,than other citize ns to impede official proceedings by corruptl y influencing witness testimon y. The
385,32,conduct would be equall y improper whether effe ctuated through direct efforts to produce false
385,33,"testimony or suppress the truth , or through the actual , threatened , or promised use of official"
385,34,powers to achieve the same result.
385,35,"Th e President 's action in curtailing criminal investigations or prosecutions, or discharging"
385,36,"law enforcement officials, raises different questions. Each type of action involves the exercise of"
385,37,"executive discretion in furtherance of the President's duty to ""t ake Care that the Laws be faithfull y"
385,38,"executed. "" U.S. CONST., ART. II, § 3. Congre ss may not supplant the Pre sident's exer cise of"
385,39,executive power to supervise prosecutions or to remov e officer s who occupy law enforc ement
385,40,"positions. See Bowsher v. Synar , 478 U.S. 714 , 726-727 (1986) (""Con gress cannot reserve for"
385,41,itself the pow er of removal of an offic er charged with the execution of the laws except by
385,42,impeachment. ... [Becau se t]he structure of the Con stitution does not permit Congress to execut e
385,43,"the laws, ...       [t]his kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws .. ·. is"
385,44,"constitutionally impermi ssible.""). Yet the obstruction -of-justice statute s do not aggrandi ze power"
385,45,"in Congr ess or usurp executive authority. Instead, they impo se a discrete limitation on conduct"
385,46,173
385,47,NA
386,1,U.S. Department of Justice
386,2,"Atteffley Werk Product/ / Ma, Contain Material Protected Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
386,3,"only when it is taken with the ""corrupt "" intent to obstruct justice. The obstruction statutes thus"
386,4,would restrict presidential action only by prohibiting the President from acting to obstruct official
386,5,"proceedings for the improper purpose of protecting his own interests. See Volume IT, Section"
386,6,"TII.A.3, supra."
386,7,The direct effect on the President ' s freedom of action would correspondingly be a limited
386,8,"one. A preclusion of ""corrupt"" official action is not a major intrusion on Article II powers. For"
386,9,"example, the proper supervision of criminal law does not demand freedom for the President to act"
386,10,"with the intention of sh ielding himself from criminal punishment, avoiding financial liability , or"
386,11,"preventing personal embarrassment.         To the contrary, a statute that prohibits official action"
386,12,"undertaken for such personal purposes furthers , rather than hinders, the impartial and eve nhanded"
386,13,administration of the law. And the Constitution does not mandate that the President have
386,14,"unfettered authority to direct investigations or prosecutions , with no limits whatsoever, in order to"
386,15,"carry out his Article II functions. See Heckler v. Chaney, 4 70 U.S. 821 , 833 ( 1985) (""Congress"
386,16,"may limit an agency ' s exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either by setting substantive"
386,17,"priorities , or by otherwise circumscribing an agency ' s power to discriminate among issues or cases"
386,18,"it will pursue.""); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S . at 707 ("" [t]o read the Art. II powers of the"
386,19,President as providing an absolute privilege [to withhold confidential communications from a
386,20,criminal trial] . .. would upset the constitutional balance of 'a workable government ' and gravely
386,21,"impair the role of the courts under Art. III"")."
386,22,Nor must the President have unfettered authority to remove all Executive Branch officials
386,23,involved in the execution of the laws. The Constitution establishes that Congress has legislative
386,24,authority to structure the Executive Branch by authorizing Congress to create executive
386,25,"departm ents and officer positions and to specify how inferior officers are appointed . E.g., U.S."
386,26,"CONST., ART. I, § 8, cl. 18 (Necessary and Proper Clause); ART. II, § 2, cl. 1 (Opinions Clause);"
386,27,"ART. TI, § 2, cl. 2 (Appointments Clause); see Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 499. While the"
386,28,President ' s removal power is an important means of ensuring that officers faithfully execute the
386,29,"law, Congress has a recognized authority to place certain limits on removal. Id. at 493-495."
386,30,The President's removal powers are at their zenith with respect to principal officers-that
386,31,"is, officers who must be appointed by the President and who report to him directly. See Free"
386,32,"Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493, 500 . The President's ""exclusive and illimitable power of"
386,33,"removal"" of those principal officers furthers ""the President's ability to ensure that the laws are"
386,34,"faithfully executed. "" Id. at 493, 498 (internal quotation marks omitted); Myers, 272 U.S. at 627."
386,35,"Thus, ""there are some ' purely executive' officials who must be removable by the President at will"
386,36,"if he is able to accomplish his constitutional role. "" Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690; Myers, 272 U.S. at"
386,37,"134 (the President ' s ""cabinet officers must do his will, "" and "" [t]he moment that he loses confidence"
386,38,"in the intelligence , ability, judgment , or loyalty of any one of them, he must have the power to"
386,39,"remove him without delay""); cf Humphr ey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935)"
386,40,(Congress has the power to create independent agencies headed by principal officers removable
386,41,"only for good cause). In light of those constitutional precedents, it may be that the obstruction"
386,42,statutes could not be constitutionally applied to limit the removal of a cabinet officer such as the
386,43,"Attorney General. See 5 U.S.C. § 101; 28 U.S.C. § 503. In that context, at least absent"
386,44,circumstances showing that the President was clearly attempting to thwart accountability for
386,45,"personal conduct while evading ordinary political checks and balances , even the highly limited"
386,46,174
386,47,NA
387,1,U.S. Department of Justice
387,2,"Att6mey W6rk Pl'6t!1:1et   // Ma,· C6rttairt Material Pr6teetet! Urtt!er Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
387,3,regulation imposed by the obstruction statutes could possibly intrude too deeply on the President's
387,4,freedom to select and supervise the members of his cabinet.
387,5,"The removal of inferior officers, in contrast, need not necessarily be at will for the President"
387,6,"to fulfill his constitutionally assigned role in managing the Executive Branch. ""[I]nferior officers"
387,7,are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by other officers appointed by
387,8,"the President with the Senate's consent."" Free Enterprise Fund , 561 U.S. at 510 (quoting Edmond"
387,9,"v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted) . The Supreme"
387,10,Court has long recognized Congress ' s authority to place for-cause limitations on the President's
387,11,"removal of""inferior Officers"" whose appointment may be vested in the head of a department. U.S."
387,12,"CONST. ART. II, § 2, cl. 2. See United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 485 (1886) (""The"
387,13,constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment [of inferior officers in the heads
387,14,"of departments] implies authority to limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as"
387,15,"Congress may enact in relation to the officers so appointed "") (quoting lower court decision);"
387,16,"Morrison, 487 U.S. at 689 n. 27 (citing Perkins); accord id. at 723-724 & n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)"
387,17,"(recognizing that Perkins is ""est ablished"" law); see also Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 493-"
387,18,495 (citing Perkins and Morrison). The category of inferior officers includes both the FBI Director
387,19,"and the Special Counsel, each of whom reports to the Attorney General. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 509,"
387,20,"5 I 5(a), 531; 28 C.F .R. Part 600. Their work is thus ""directed and supervised"" by a presidentially-"
387,21,"appointed, Senate-confirmed officer. See In re: Grand Jury Investigation, _ F .3d _, 2019 WL"
387,22,"921692, at *3-*4 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 2019) (holding that the Special Counsel is an ""inferior officer"""
387,23,for constitutional purposes).
387,24,Where the Constitution permits Congress to impose a good-cause limitation on the removal
387,25,"of an Executive Branch officer, the Constitution should equally permit Congress to bar removal"
387,26,"for the corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. Limiting the, range of permissible reasons for"
387,27,"removal to exclude a ""corrupt"" purpose imposes a lesser restraint on the President than requiring"
387,28,"an affirmative showing of good cause. It follows that for such inferior officers, Congress may"
387,29,constitutionally restrict the President's removal authority if that authority was exercised for the
387,30,corrupt purpose of obstructing justice. And even if a particular inferior officer's position might be
387,31,of such importance to the execution of the laws that the President must have at-will removal
387,32,"authority, the obstruction-of-justice statutes could still be constitutionally applied to forbid"
387,33,removal for a corrupt reason. 1088 A narrow and discrete limitation on removal that precluded
387,34,"corrupt action would leave ample room for all other considerations , including disagreement over"
387,35,policy or loss of confidence in the officer's judgment or commitment. A corrupt-purpose
387,36,prohibition therefore would not undermine the President' s ability to perform his Article II
387,37,"functions. Accordingly, because the separation-of-powers question is ""whether the removal"
387,38,restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President ' s ability to perform his
387,39,"constitutional duty,"" Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691, a restriction on removing an inferior officer for a"
387,40,088
387,41,"'     Althoughthe FBT director is an inferiorofficer, he is appointedby the President and removable"
387,42,"by him at will, see 28 U.S.C. § 532 note, and it is not clear that Congress could constitutionallyprovidethe"
387,43,"FBI director with good-causetenure protection. See OLC, Constitutionality of Legislation Extending the"
387,44,"Term of the FBI Director, 2011 WL 2566125, at *3 (O.L.C. June 20, 2011) (""tenure protectionfor an officer"
387,45,"with the FBT Director's broad investigative,administrative,and policymakingresponsibilitieswould raise"
387,46,a serious constitutionalquestion whether Congress had 'impede[d] the President's ability to perform his
387,47,"constitutionalduty' to take care that the laws be faithfullyexecuted"")(quotingMorrison, 487 U.S. at 691 )."
387,48,175
387,49,NA
388,1,U.S. Department of Justice
388,2,At:tarl'!ey\\'ark Praelttet // Mtt)' Cal'ltttil'IMttterittl Prnteeteel Ul'!EierFeel. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
388,3,corrupt reason-a         reason grounded in achieving personal rather than official ends-does                   not
388,4,seriously hinder the President's performance of his duties. The President retains broad latitude to
388,5,"supervise investigations and remove officials , circumscribed in this context only by the"
388,6,requirement that he not act for corrupt personal purposes. 1089
388,7,"c. Congress Has Power to Protect Congressional, Grand Jury, and"
388,8,Judicial Proceedings Against Corrupt Acts from Any Source
388,9,"Where a law imposes a burden on the President ' s performance of Article II functions,"
388,10,"separation-of -powers analysis considers whether the statutory measure ""is justified by an"
388,11,"overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress."""
388,12,"Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443. Here, Congress enacted the obstruction-of -"
388,13,"justice statutes to protect, among other things, the integrity of its own proceedings , grand jury"
388,14,"investigations, and federal criminal trials. Those objectives are within Congress ' s authority and"
388,15,serve strong governmental interests.
388,16,i. Congress has Article I authority to define generally applicable criminal law and apply it
388,17,to all persons-including         the President.       Congress clearly has authority to protect its own
388,18,legislative functions against corrupt efforts designed to impede legitimate fact -gathering and
388,19,"lawmaking efforts . See Watkins v. United States , 354 U.S. 178, 187, 206-207 (1957); Chapman"
388,20,"v. United States, 5 App. D.C. 122, 130 ( 1895). Congress also has authority to establish a system"
388,21,"of federal courts , which includes the power to protect the judiciary against obstructive acts . See"
388,22,"U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, els. 9, 18 (""The Congress shall have Power ... To constitute Tribunals"
388,23,"inferior to the supreme Court"" and ""To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for"
388,24,"carrying into Execution the foregoing powers""). The long lineage of the obstruction-of-justice"
388,25,"statutes, which can be traced to at least 183 I , attests to the necessity for that protection. See An"
388,26,"Act Declaratory of the Law Concerning Contempts of Court, 4 Stat. 487-488 § 2 (1831) (making"
388,27,"it a crime if""any person or persons shall corruptly ... endeavor to influence , intimidate, or impede"
388,28,"any juror , witness , or officer, in any court of the United States , in the discharge of his duty, or"
388,29,"shall, corruptly ... obstruct, or impede , or endeavor to obstruct or impede , the due administration"
388,30,"of justice therein "")."
388,31,ii. The Article TII courts have an equally strong interest in being protected against
388,32,"obstructive acts, whatever their source. As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Nixon,"
388,33,"a ""primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch"" is ""to do justice in criminal prosecutions. """
388,34,"418 U.S. at 707; accord Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia , 542"
388,35,"U.S. 367, 384 (2004) . In Nixon, the Court rejected the President's claim of absolute executive"
388,36,"privilege because ""the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably"
388,37,1089
388,38,The obstruction statutes do not disqualify the President from acting in a case simply because
388,39,he has a personal interest in it or because his own conduct may be at issue. As the Department of Justice
388,40,"has made clear, a claim of a conflict of interest, standing alone, cannot deprive the President of the ability"
388,41,"to fulfill his constitutional function. See, e.g., OLC, Application of 28 U.S.C. § 458 to Presidential"
388,42,"Appointments of Federal Judges, 19 O.L.C. Op. at 356 (citing Memorandum for Richard T. Burress, Office"
388,43,"of the President, from Laurence H. Silberman, Deputy Attorney General, Re: Conflict of Interest Problems"
388,44,Arising out of the President's Nomination of Nelson A. Rockefeller to be Vice President under the Twenty-
388,45,"Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, at 2, 5 (Aug. 28, 1974))."
388,46,176
388,47,NA
389,1,U.S. Department of Justice
389,2,"Alterfl.e:,· 'i\'01k Proattet // May Cefl.taift Material Proteetea UAaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
389,3,relevant in a criminal trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
389,4,"impair the basic function of the courts."" 407 U.S. at 712. As Nixon illustrates, the need to"
389,5,safeguard judicial integrity is a compelling constitutional interest. See id. at 709 (noting that the
389,6,denial of full disclosure of the facts surrounding relevant presidential communications threatens
389,7,""" [t]he very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system"")."
389,8,"iii. Finally, the grand jury cannot achieve its constitutional purpose absent protection from"
389,9,corrupt acts . Serious federal criminal charges generally reach the Article III courts based on an
389,10,"indictment issued by a grand jury. Cobbledick v. United States , 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940) (""The"
389,11,"Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process. ""). And the grand jury 's"
389,12,"function is enshrined in the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST.AMEND.V . (""[n]o person shall be held"
389,13,"to answer"" for a serious crime ""unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury""). "" [T]he"
389,14,whole theory of [the grand jury ' s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional
389,15,"government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people,"""
389,16,"United States v. Williams, 504 U.S . 36, 47 (1992), ""pledged to indict no one because of prejudice"
389,17,"and to free no one because of special favor."" Costello v. United States, 350 U .S. 359, 362 (1956) ."
389,18,"If the grand jury were not protected against corrupt interference from all per sons , its function as"
389,19,an independent charging body would be thwarted. And an impartial grand jury investigation to
389,20,determine whether probable cause exists to indict is vital to the criminal justice process.
389,21,*       *       *
389,22,The final step in the constitutional balancing process is to assess whether the separation-
389,23,of-powers doctrine permits Congress to take action within its constitutional authority
389,24,notwithstanding the potential impact on Article II functions. See Administrator of General
389,25,"Services, 433 U.S. at 443 ; see also Morrison, 487 U.S . at 691-693 , 695-696; United States v. Nixon,"
389,26,"418 U.S. at 711-712. In the case of the obstruction-of-justice statutes, our assessment of the"
389,27,weighing of interests leads us to conclude that Congress has the authority to impose the limited
389,28,restrictions contained in those statutes on the President 's official conduct to protect the integrity
389,29,of important functions of other branches of government.
389,30,A general ban on corrupt action doe s not unduly intrude on the President 's responsibility
389,31,"to ""ta ke Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."" U.S. CONST.ART IT, §§ 3. 1090 To the contrary,"
389,32,"the concept of ""faithful execution"" connotes the use of power in the interest of the public, not in"
389,33,"the office holder's personal interests. See 1 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English"
389,34,"Language 763 (1755) (""faithfully"" def. 3: "" [w]ith strict adherence to duty and allegiance""). And"
389,35,immunizing the President from the generally applicable criminal prohibition against corrup t
389,36,"obstruction of official proceedings would seriously impair Congress's power to enact laws ""to"
389,37,"promote objectives within [its] constitutional authority,"" Administrator of General Services, 433"
389,38,"U.S. at 425- i.e., protecting the integrity of its own proceedings and the proceedings of Article TTI"
389,39,courts and grand juries.
389,40,1090
389,41,"As noted above , the President's selection and removal of principal executive officers may have"
389,42,a uniqu e constitutional status.
389,43,177
389,44,NA
390,1,U.S. Department of Justice
390,2,"AtteirHey \lle,rk Proattet II Ma) CoHtaiH Material Proteetea UHaer Fee:!.R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
390,3,"Accordingly, based on the analysis above, we were not persuaded by the argument that the"
390,4,President has blanket constitutional immunity to engage in acts that would corruptly obstruct
390,5,justice through the exercise of otherwise-valid Article TI powers. 1091
390,6,3. Ascertaining Whether the President Violated the Obstruction Statutes Would
390,7,Not Chill his Performance of his Article II Duties
390,8,Applying the obstruction statutes to the President ' s official conduct would involve
390,9,"determining as a factual matter whether he engaged in an obstructive act , whether the act had a"
390,10,"nexus to official proceedings, and whether he was motivated by corrupt intent. But applying those"
390,11,standards to the President's official conduct should not hinder his ability to perform his Article II
390,12,"duties. Cf Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S . at 752- 753 & n.32 (taking into account chilling effect on"
390,13,the President in adopting a constitutional rule of presid ential immunity from private civil damages
390,14,action based on official duties). Several safeguards would prevent a chilling effect: the existence
390,15,"of settled legal standards, the presumption of regularity in prosecutorial actions , and the existence"
390,16,of evidentiary limitations on probing the President's motives. And historical experience confirms
390,17,that no impermissible chill should exist.
390,18,"a. As an initial matter , the term ""corruptly"" sets a demanding standard. It requires a"
390,19,"concrete showing that a person acted with an intent to obtain an "" improper advantage for [him]self"
390,20,"or someone else, inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others."" BALLENTINE'SLAW"
390,21,"DICTIONARY276 (3d ed. 1969); see United States v. Pasha, 797 F .3d 1122, 1132 (D.C. Cir.2015);"
390,22,"Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 616 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That standard"
390,23,parallels the President 's constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful execution of the laws. And
390,24,virtually everything that the President does in the routine conduct of office will have a clear
390,25,"governmental purpose and will not be contrary to his official duty. Accordingly, the President has"
390,26,"no reason to be chilled in those actions because, in virtually all instances , there will be no credible"
390,27,basis for suspecting a corrupt personal motive.
390,28,That point is illustrated by examples of conduct that would and would not satisfy the
390,29,stringent corrupt-motive standard. Direct or indirect action by the President to end a criminal
390,30,invest igation into his own or his family members' conduct to protect against personal
390,31,embarrassment or legal liability would constitute a core example of corruptly motivated conduct.
390,32,So too would action to halt an enforcement proceeding that directly and adversely affected the
390,33,"President's financial interests for the purpose of protecting those interests. In those examples,"
390,34,1091
390,35,A possible remedy through impeachment for abuses of power would not substitute for potential
390,36,"criminal liability after a President leaves office. Impeachment would remove a President from office, but"
390,37,would not address the underlying culpability of the conduct or serve the usual purposes of the criminal law.
390,38,"Indeed, the Impeachment Judgment Clause recognizes that criminal law plays an independent role in"
390,39,"addressing an official's conduct, distinct from the political remedy of impeachment. See U.S. CONST.ART."
390,40,"l, § 3, cl. 7. Impeachment is also a drastic and rarely invoked remedy, and Congress is not restricted to"
390,41,"relying only on impeachment, rather than making criminal law applicable to a former President, as OLC"
390,42,"has recognized. A Sitting President's Amenability to Indictm ent and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C."
390,43,"at 255 (""Recognizing an immunity from prosecution for a sitting President would not preclude such"
390,44,prosecution once the President 's term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or
390,45,"impeachment."")."
390,46,178
390,47,NA
391,1,U.S. Department of Justice
391,2,"AtterHey Werle Prntittet // Mtt, Cel'ttttil't Mttterittl Preteeteti UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
391,3,official power is being used for the purpose of protecting the President's personal interests. In
391,4,"contrast, the President's actions to serve political or policy interests would not qualify as corrupt."
391,5,The President's role as head of the government necessarily requires him to take into account
391,6,political factors in making policy decisions that affect law-enforcement actions and proceedings.
391,7,"For instance, the President 's decision to curtail a law-enforcement investigation to avoid"
391,8,international friction would not implicate the obstruction-of-justice statutes. The criminal law
391,9,does not seek to regulate the consideration of such political or policy factors in the conduct of
391,10,"government. And when legitimate interests animate the President 's conduct, those interests will"
391,11,almost invariably be readil y identifiable based on objective factors. Because the President ' s
391,12,"conduct in those instances will obviously fall outside the zone of obstruction law, no chilling"
391,13,concern should arise.
391,14,"b. There is also no reason to believe that investigation s, let alone prosecutions, would"
391,15,occur except in highly unusual circumstances when a credible factual basis exists to be lieve that
391,16,"obstruction occurred. Prosecuto ria l action enjoys a presumption of regularity: absent ""clea r"
391,17,"evidence to the contrary , courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged their official"
391,18,"duties."" Armstrong, 5 17 U.S. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272"
391,19,"U.S . I, 14-15 (1926)). The presumption of prosecutorial regularity would provide even greater"
391,20,protection to the President than exists in routine cases given the prominence and sensitivity of any
391,21,matter involving the President and the likelihood that such matters will be subject to thorough and
391,22,careful review at the most senior levels of the Department of Justice. Under OLC's opinion that a
391,23,"sitting President is entitled to immunity from indictment, only a successor Administration would"
391,24,be able to prosecute a former President. But that consideration does not suggest that a President
391,25,would have any basis for fearing abusive investigations or prosecutions after leavin g office. There
391,26,"are ""obv ious political checks"" against initiating a baseless inv est igation or prosecution of a former"
391,27,"President. See Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 448 (considering political checks"
391,28,"in separation-of-powers analysis). And the Attorney General holds ""the power to conduct the"
391,29,"criminal litigation of the United States Government,"" United States v. Nixon, 4 I 8 U .S. at 694"
391,30,"(citing 28 U.S.C. § 516), which provides a strong institutional safeguard against politicized"
391,31,investigations or prosecutions . 1092
391,32,1092
391,33,Similar institutional safeguards protect Department of Justice officers and line prosecutors
391,34,against unfounded investigations into prosecutorial acts. Prosecutors are generally barred from
391,35,"participating in matters implicating their personal interests, see 28 C.F.R. § 45.2, and are instructed not to"
391,36,"be influenced by their ""own professional or personal circumstances,"" Justice Manual § 9-27.260, so"
391,37,prosecutors would not frequently be in a position to take action that could be perceived as corrupt and
391,38,"personally motivated. And if such cases arise, criminal investigation would be conducted by responsible"
391,39,"officials at the Department of Justice, who can be presumed to refrain from pursuing an investigation absent"
391,40,a credible factual basis. Those facts distinguish the criminal context from the common-law rule of
391,41,"prosecutorial immunity, which protects against the threat of suit by ""a defendant [who] often will transform"
391,42,"his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascription of improper and malicious actions."" Imbler v."
391,43,"Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,425 (1976). As the Supreme Court has noted, the existence of civil immunity"
391,44,"does not justify criminal immunity. See O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 503 (1974) (""Whatever may be"
391,45,"the case with respect to civil liability generally, ... we have never held that the performance of the duties"
391,46,"of judicial, legislative, or executive officers, requires or contemplates the immunization of otherwise"
391,47,"criminal deprivation of constitutional rights."") (citations omitted)."
391,48,179
391,49,NA
392,1,U.S. Department of Justice
392,2,"Atteme)"" Werk Preattet // Mtt) Ce,l'ltttil'I"
392,3,Mttterittl Preteetea U!'laer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
392,4,"These considerations distinguish the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon v. Fitzgerald that,"
392,5,"in part because inquiries into the President's motives would be ""highly intrusive,"" the President is"
392,6,absolutely immune from private civil damages actions based on his official conduct. 457 U.S. at
392,7,"756- 757. As Fitzgerald recognized, ""there is a lesser public interest in actions for civil damages"
392,8,"than, for example, in criminal prosecutions. "" Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 754 n.37; see Cheney, 542"
392,9,U.S. at 384. And private actions are not subject to the institutional protections of an action under
392,10,"the supervision of the Attorney General and subject to a presumption of regularity . Armstrong,"
392,11,517 U.S. at 464.
392,12,c. In the rare cases in which a substantial and credible basis justifies conducting an
392,13,"investigation of the President, the process of examining his motivations to determine whether he"
392,14,acted for a corrupt purpose need not have a chilling effect. Ascertaining the President's
392,15,"motivations would turn on any explanation he provided to justify his actions, the advice he"
392,16,"received, the circumstances surrounding the actions, and the regularity or irregularity of the"
392,17,process he employed to make decisions. But grand juries and courts would not have automatic
392,18,"access to confidential presidential communications on those matters; rather, they could be"
392,19,"presented in official proceedings only on a showing of sufficient need. Nixon, 418 U.S . at 712; In"
392,20,"re Sealed Case, 121 F .3d 729, 754, 756- 757 (D .C. Cir. 1997); see also Administrator of General"
392,21,"Services, 433 U.S. at 448-449 (former President can invoke presidential communications privilege,"
392,22,"although successor's failure to support the claim ""detracts from [its] weight"")."
392,23,"In any event, probing the President's intent in a criminal matter is unquestionably"
392,24,constitutional in at least one context: the offense of bribery turns on the corrupt intent to receive
392,25,a thing of value in return for being influenced in official action. 18 U.S.C. § 20l(b)(2). There can
392,26,"be no serious argument against the President's potential criminal liability for bribery offenses ,"
392,27,"notwithstanding the need to ascertain his purpose and intent. See U.S. CONST.ART. I, § 3; ART. IT,"
392,28,"§ 4; see also Application of 28 US. C. § 458 to Presidential Appointments of Federal Judges, 19"
392,29,"Op. O.L.C. at 357 n.11 (""Application of§ 20 I [to the President] raises no separation of powers"
392,30,"issue, let alone a serious one ."")."
392,31,"d. Finally, history provides no reason to believe that any asserted chilling effect justifies"
392,32,"exempting the President from the obstruction laws. As a historical matter , Presidents have very"
392,33,seldom been the subjects of grand jury investigations. And it is rarer still for circumstances to
392,34,raise even the possibility of a corrupt personal motive for arguably obstructive action through the
392,35,"President's use of official power. Accordingly, the President's conduct of office should not be"
392,36,chilled based on hypothetical concerns about the possible application of a corrupt -motive standard
392,37,in this context.
392,38,*        *       *
392,39,"In sum, contrary to the position taken by the President ' s counsel, we concluded that, in"
392,40,"light of the Supreme Court precedent governing separation-of-powers issues , we had a valid basis"
392,41,"for investigating the conduct at issue in this report. In our view, the application of the obstruction"
392,42,statutes would not impermissibly burden the President's performance of his Article II function to
392,43,supervise prosecutorial conduct or to remove inferior law-enforcement officers. And the
392,44,protection of the criminal justice system from corrupt acts by any person-including                 the
392,45,"President-accords      with the fundamental principle of our government that ""[n]o [person] in this"
392,46,180
392,47,NA
393,1,U.S. Department of Justice
393,2,"Atterr,e, Werk Preettet // May Cer,tair, Material Preteetee UAeer Fee. R. Griff!. P. 6(e)"
393,3,"country is so high that he is above the law."" United States v. Lee, I 06 U.S. 196, 220 (1882); see"
393,4,"also Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. at 697 ; United States v. Nixon , supra."
393,5,181
393,6,NA
394,1,U.S. Department of Justice
394,2,"Atteme')"" Werk Preettet // Mtt')""CeHtttil'lMatertttl Preteetee UHeer Fee . R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
394,3,IV. CONCLUSION
394,4,"Because we determined not to make a traditional prosecutorial judgment, we did not draw"
394,5,ultimate conclusions about the President ' s conduct. The evidence we obtained about the
394,6,President's actions and intent presents difficult issues that would need to be resolved if we were
394,7,"making a traditional prosecutorial judgment. At the same time , if we had confidence after a"
394,8,"thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not commit obstruction of justice,"
394,9,"we would so state. Based on the facts and the applicable legal standards, we are unable to reach"
394,10,"that judgment. Accordingly, while this report does not conclude that the President committed a"
394,11,"crime, it also does not exonerate him."
394,12,182
394,13,NA
395,1,U.S . Department of Justice
395,2,AttorHe~· Work PFOettet // May CoHtaiH Material Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
395,3,Appendix A
395,4,NA
396,1,U.S. Department of Justice
396,2,Atteme~· Weft< Preettet // May Cet'ttaiH Material Prnteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
396,3,NA
397,1,U.S. Department of Justice
397,2,AMerHey \llerk Predttet // May CeHtaiH Material Preteeted U1~derFed . R. Cl'itfl. P. 6(e)
397,3,(©fficeof tqe :!E)eputtJ    J\ttortteJJ ®enera-1
397,4,"~uel1i11sfn1t, ~.<!l..20530"
397,5,ORDER.NO. 3915-2017
397,6,APPOfNTMENTOF SPECIAL COUNSEL
397,7,TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCEWITH THE
397,8,2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND RELATED MATTERS
397,9,"By virtue of the authority vested in me as Acting Attorney General, including 28 U.S,C."
397,10,"§§ 509, 5 I 0, and 5 I 5, in order to discharge my responsibility to provide supervision and"
397,11,"management of the Department of Justice, and to ensurea full and thorough investigation of the"
397,12,"Russian govemment's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election, I hereby order as"
397,13,follows:
397,14,(a)     Robert S. Mueller II[ is appointed to serve as Special Counsel for the United States
397,15,Department of Justice.
397,16,(b)     The Special Counsel is authorized to conduct the investigation continued by then-FBI
397,17,Director James B. Comey in testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
397,18,"Intelligence on March 20, 2017, including:"
397,19,(i)     any links and/or coordination belwecn the Russian government and individuals
397,20,associated with the campaign of President Donald Trump; and
397,21,(ii)    any matters that arose or may nrisc directly from the investigation; and
397,22,(iii)   any other matters within the scope of 2~ C.F.R. § 600.4(a).
397,23,"(c)     If the Special Counsel believes it is necessary and appropriate, the Special Counsel is"
397,24,authorized to prosecute federal crimes arising from the investigation of these matters.
397,25,(d)     Sections 600.4 through 600.IO of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations are
397,26,applicable to the Special Counsel.
397,27,~n/t-2--
397,28,Date
397,29,A-1
397,30,NA
398,1,U.S. Department of Justice
398,2,AtterHe~·Werk Preti1:1ct
398,3,// May CeHtaiHMaterial Pretecteti UHtierFeti. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
398,4,NA
399,1,U.S. Department of Justice
399,2,AMoniey\Vork Procluet// Ma)' Cm1tainMaterial Proteetecl Uncler Fecl. R. Crirn. P. 6(e)
399,3,AppendixB
399,4,NA
400,1,U.S. Department of Justice
400,2,Material Proteetecl Uncler Fecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
400,3,"Attomey Work Product/,' May COF1tain"
400,4,NA
401,1,U.S. Department of Justice
401,2,At:t:orflc)'Work Proauet II Ma)' CoHtaiflMaterial Protcetca UHElcrFea. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
401,3,APPENDIX B: GLOSSARY
401,4,The following glossary contains names and brief descriptions of individuals and entities
401,5,referenced in the two volumes of this report. It is not intended to be comprehensive and is intended
401,6,only to assist a reader in the reading the rest of the report.
401,7,Referenced Persons
401,8,"Agalarov, Aras             Russian real-estate developer ( owner of the Crocus Group); met Donald"
401,9,Trump in connection with the Miss Universe pageant and helped arrange
401,10,"the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya"
401,11,and Trump Campaign officials.
401,12,"Agalarov, Emin             Performer, executive vice president of Crocus Group, and son of Aras"
401,13,"Agalarov; helped arrange the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower"
401,14,between Natalia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials.
401,15,"Akhmetov, Rinat           Former member in the Ukrainian parliament who hired Paul Manafort to"
401,16,"conduct work for Ukrainian political pai1y, the Party of Regions."
401,17,"Akhmetshin, Rinat         U.S. lobbyist and associate of Natalia Veselnitskaya who attended the"
401,18,"June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump"
401,19,Campaign officials.
401,20,"Aslanov,                  Head of U.S. department of the Internet Research Agency, which"
401,21,"Dzheykhun (Jay)           engaged in an ""active measures"" social media campaign to interfere in"
401,22,the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
401,23,"Assange, Julian           Founder of WikiLeaks, which in 2016 posted on the internet documents"
401,24,stolen from entities and individuals affiliated with the Democratic Party.
401,25,"Aven, Petr                Chairman of the board of Alfa-Bank who attempted outreach to the"
401,26,Presidential Transition Team in connection with anticipated post-ele ction
401,27,sanctions.
401,28,"Bannon, Stephen            White House chief strategist and senior counselor to President Trump"
401,29,(Steve)                    (Jan. 2017-Aug.2017);      chief executive of the Trump Campaign.
401,30,"Baranov, Andrey            Director of investor relations at Russian state-owned oil company,"
401,31,"Rosneft, and associate of Carter Page."
401,32,"Berkowitz, Avi             Assistant to Jared Kushner."
401,33,"Boente, Dana               Acting Attorney General (Jan. 2017 - Feb. 2017); Acting Deputy"
401,34,Attorney General (Feb . 2017 - Apr. 2017).
401,35,"Bogacheva, Anna            Internet Research Agency employee who worked on ""active measures"""
401,36,social media campaign to interfere in in the 2016 U.S. presid ential
401,37,election; traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014.
401,38,"Bossert, Thomas            Former homeland security advisor to the President who also served as a"
401,39,(Tom)                      senior official on the Presidential Transition Team .
401,40,B-1
401,41,NA
402,1,U.S. Department of Justice
402,2,At1:on10y'Nork Produet // May Contain Material Proteeted Uncler Fed. R. Cril'l'I.P. 6(e)
402,3,"Boyarkin, Viktor       Employee of Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska."
402,4,"Boyd, Charles          Chairman of the board of directors at the Center for the National Interest,"
402,5,a U.S.-based think tank with operations in and connections to Russia.
402,6,"Boyko, Yuriy           Member of the Ukrainian political party Opposition Bloc and member of"
402,7,the Ukrainian parliament.
402,8,"Brand, Rachel          Associate Attorney General (May 2017 - Feb. 2018)."
402,9,"Browder, William       Founder of Hermitage Capital Management who lobbied in favor of the"
402,10,"(Bill)                 Magnitsky Act, which imposed financial and travel sanctions on Russian"
402,11,officials.
402,12,"Bulatov, Alexander     Russian intelligence official who associated with Carter Page in 2008."
402,13,"Burchik, Mikhail       Executive director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an"
402,14,"""active measures"" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S."
402,15,presidential election.
402,16,"Burck, William         Personal attorney to Don McGahn, White House Counsel."
402,17,"Burnham, James         Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office who attended January"
402,18,2017 meetings between Sally Yates and Donald McGahn.
402,19,"Burt, Richard          Former U.S. ambassador who had done work Alfa-Bank and was a board"
402,20,member of the Center for the National Interest.
402,21,"Bystrov, Mikhail       General director of the Internet Research Agency, which engaged in an"
402,22,"""active measures"" social media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S ."
402,23,presidential election.
402,24,"Calamari, Matt          Chief operating officer for the Trump Organization."
402,25,"Caputo, Michael         Trump Campaign advisor."
402,26,"Chaika, Yuri            Prosecutor general of the Russian Federation who also maintained a"
402,27,relationship with Aras Agalarov.
402,28,"Christie, Chris        Former Governor of New Jersey."
402,29,"Clapper, James         Director of National Intelligence (Aug. 2010 - Jan. 2017)."
402,30,"Clovis, Samuel Jr.     Chief policy advisor and national co-chair of the Trump Campaign."
402,31,"Coats, Dan             Director of National Intelligence."
402,32,"Cobb,Ty                Special Counsel to the President (July 2017 - May 2018)."
402,33,"Cohen, Michael         Former vice president to the Trump Organization and special counsel to"
402,34,Donald Trump who spearheaded an effo11 to build a Trump-branded
402,35,property in Moscow. He admitted to lying to Congress about the project.
402,36,"Comey, James Jr.      Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Sept. 4, 2013 - May 9,"
402,37,2017).
402,38,B-2
402,39,NA
403,1,U.S. Department of Justice
403,2,"Attorfte)' '.\'erk Product// Ma)' Co1,tai1,Material Protected U1,der Fed. R. Criltl.. P. 6(e)"
403,3,"Conway, Kellyanne          Counselor to President Trump and manager of the Trump Campaign."
403,4,"Corallo, Mark              Spokesman for President Trump's personal legal team (June 2017 - July"
403,5,2017).
403,6,"Corsi, Jerome"
403,7,"Costello, Robert           Attorney who represented he had a close relationship with Rudolph"
403,8,"Giuliani , the President's personal counsel."
403,9,"Credico , Randolph         Radio talk show host who interviewed Julian Assange in 2016."
403,10,(Randy)
403,11,"Davis, Richard              Partner with Pegasus Sustainable Century Merchant Bank, business"
403,12,"(Rick) Jr.                  partner of Paul Manafort, and co-founder of the Davis Manafort lobbying"
403,13,firm.
403,14,"Dearborn , Rick             Former White House deputy chief of staff for policy who previously"
403,15,served as chief of staff to Senator Jeff Sessions.
403,16,"Dempsey, Michael            Office of Director of National Intelligence official who recalled"
403,17,discussions with Dan Coats after Coats ' s meeting with President Trump
403,18,"on March 22, 2017."
403,19,"Denman , Diana              Delegate to 2016 Republican National Convention who proposed a"
403,20,platform plank amendment that included armed support for Ukraine.
403,21,"Deripaska, Oleg             Russian businessman with ties to Vladimir Putin who hired Paul"
403,22,Manafort for consulting work between 2005 and 2009.
403,23,"Dhillon, Uttam              Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office (Jan. 2017- June 2018)."
403,24,"Dmitriev, Ki rill           Head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDlF); met with Erik"
403,25,"Prince in the Seychelles in January 2017 and, separately, drafted a U.S.-"
403,26,Russia reconciliation plan with Rick Gerson.
403,27,"Donaldson, Annie             Chief of staff to White House Counsel Donald McGahn (Jan.2017 - Dec."
403,28,2018).
403,29,"Dvorkovich, Arkady           Deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation and chairman of the"
403,30,board of directors of the New Economic School in Moscow. He met with
403,31,Carter Page twice in 2016.
403,32,"Dvoskin, Evgeney             Executive of Gen bank in Crimea and associate of Felix Sater."
403,33,"Eisenberg, John             Attorney in the White House Counsel's Office and legal counsel for the"
403,34,National Security Council.
403,35,"Erchova, Lana               Ex-wife of Dmitry Klokov who emailed Ivanka Trump to introduce"
403,36,(a/k/a Lana                 Klokov to the Trump Campaign in the fall of 2015.
403,37,Alexander)
403,38,B-3
403,39,NA
404,1,U.S. Department of Justice
404,2,"Attort1e:,· Work Pl'oEluet// Ma:,·Cot1tainMaterial ProteeteEIUt1tlerFetl. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
404,3,"Fabrizio, Anthony         Partner at the research and consulting firm Fabrizio, Lee & Associates ."
404,4,(Tony)                    He was a pollster for the Trump Campaign and worked with Paul
404,5,Manafort on Ukraine-related polling after the election.
404,6,"Fishbein, Jason           Attorney who performed worked for Julian Assange and also sent"
404,7,WikiLeaks a password for an unlaunched website PutinTrump.org on
404,8,"September 20, 2016."
404,9,"Flynn, Michael G.         Son of Michael T. Flynn, National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017-Feb."
404,10,"(a/k/a Michael            13, 2017)."
404,11,Flynn Jr.)
404,12,"Flynn, Michael T.         National Security Advisor (Jan. 20, 2017 - Feb. 13, 2017), Director of"
404,13,"the Defense Intelligence Agency (July 2012-Aug.7,       2014) , and Trump"
404,14,Campaign advisor.        He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI about
404,15,communications with Ambassador Sergey Kislyak in December 2016.
404,16,"Foresman, Robert          Investment banker who sought meetings with the Trump Campaign in"
404,17,"(Bob)                     spring 2016 to discuss Russian foreign policy, and after the election met"
404,18,with Michael Flynn.
404,19,"Futerfas, Alan            Outside counsel for the Trump Organization and subsequently personal"
404,20,counsel for Donald Trump Jr.
404,21,"Garten, Alan              General counsel of the Trump Organization."
404,22,"Gates, Richard           Deputy campaign manager for Trump Campaign, Trump Inaugural"
404,23,"(Rick) III               Committee deputy chairman, and longtime employee of Paul Manafort."
404,24,He pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States and violate
404,25,"U.S. laws, as well as making false statements to the FBI."
404,26,"Gerson, Richard          New York hedge fund manager and associate of Jared Kushner. During"
404,27,"(Rick)                   the transition period, he worked with Kirill Dmitriev on a proposal for"
404,28,reconciliation between the United States and Russia.
404,29,"Gistaro, Edward           Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration ."
404,30,"Glassner, Michael         Political director of the Trump Campaign who helped introduce George"
404,31,Papadopoulos to others in the Trump Campaign.
404,32,"Goldstone, Robert         Publicist for Emin Agalarov who contacted Donald Trump Jr. to arrange"
404,33,"the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Natalia Veselnitskaya"
404,34,and Trump Campaign officials.
404,35,"Gordon, Jeffrey           National security advisor to the Trump Campaign involved in changes to"
404,36,(J.D .)                   the Republican party platform and who communicated with Russian
404,37,Ambassador Sergey Kislyak at the Republican National Convention.
404,38,"Gorkov, Sergey            Chairman of Vnesheconombank (VEB), a Russian state-owned bank ,"
404,39,who met with Jared Kushner during the transition period.
404,40,"Graff, Rhona              Senior vice-president and executive assistant to Donald J. Trump at the"
404,41,Trump Organization.
404,42,B-4
404,43,NA
405,1,U.S. Department of Justice
405,2,/\Horney \l/01·k Prodttet // May Cot½taittMaterial Prntectcd Uttdcr Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(c)
405,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
405,4,"Hawker, Jonathan          Public relations consultant at FTI Consulting; worked with Davis"
405,5,Manafort International LLC on public relation s campaign in Ukraine.
405,6,"Heilbrunn, Jacob           Editor of the Nat ional Interest , the periodical that officially hosted"
405,7,candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy speec h.
405,8,"Hicks, Hope                White Hou se communications director (Aug. 2017 - Mar. 2018) and"
405,9,press secretary for the Trump Campaign.
405,10,"Holt, Lester              NBC News anchor who interviewed Pre s ident Trump on May 11, 2017."
405,11,"Hunt, Jody                Chief of staff to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Feb. 2017 - Oct. 2017)."
405,12,"Ivanov, Igor              President of the Russia n International Affairs Council and former"
405,13,Russian foreign minister. Ivan Timofeev told George Papadopoulos that
405,14,"Ivanov advised on arranging a ""Moscow visit"" for the Trump Campaign."
405,15,"Ivanov, Sergei            Special representative of Vladimir Putin, former Russian deputy prime"
405,16,"minister, and former FSB deputy director. In Janua ry 2016, Michael"
405,17,Cohen emailed the Kremlin requesting to speak to Ivanov.
405,18,"Kasowitz, Marc            Pres ident Trump's personal counsel (May 2017 - July 2017)."
405,19,"Katsyv, Denis             Son of Peter Katsyv; owner of Rus s ian company Prevezon Ho ldin gs Ltd."
405,20,and associate of Natalia Ve se lnitskaya.
405,21,"Katsyv, Peter             Russian bu sinessman and father of Denis Katsyv ."
405,22,Harm to Ongoing Matter
405,23,"Kaveladze, IrakJi         Vice president at Crocus Group and Aras Agalarov's deputy in the United"
405,24,"(Ike)                     States. He participated in the June 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower"
405,25,between Nata lia Veselnitskaya and Trump Campaign officials.
405,26,"Kaverzina, Irina          Employee of the internet Re sea rch Agency, which engaged in an ""active"
405,27,"measures"" soc ial media campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S."
405,28,presidential election .
405,29,"Kelly, John               White Hou se chief of staff (Ju ly 2017 - Jan.2019) ."
405,30,"Khalilzad, Zalmay         U.S. spec ial representative to Afghanistan and former U.S. ambassador."
405,31,He met with Senator Jeff Sessions during foreign policy dinners put
405,32,together through the Center for the National Interest.
405,33,"Kilimnik,                 Russian-Ukrainian politica l co nsultant and long-time employee of Paul"
405,34,Konstantin                Manafort assessed by the FBI to have tie s to Russian intelligence.
405,35,"Kislyak, Sergey           Former Russian ambassador to the United States and current Russian"
405,36,sena tor from Mordovia.
405,37,"Klimentov, Denis          Employee of the New Economic School who informed high-ranking"
405,38,Russian government officials of Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
405,39,B-5
405,40,NA
406,1,U.S. Department of Justice
406,2,Atlorrrn)' Werle Prodttet // May CoHtaiHMaterial Proteeted UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
406,3,"Klimentov, Dmitri        Brother of Denis Klimentov who contacted Kremlin press secretary"
406,4,Dmitri Peskov about Carter Page's July 2016 visit to Moscow.
406,5,"Klokov, Dmitry           Execut ive for PJSC Federal Grid Company of Unified Energy System"
406,6,and former aide to Russia's mini ster of energy . He communicated with
406,7,Michael Cohen about a possible meet ing between Vladimir Putin and
406,8,candidate Trump.
406,9,"Kobyakov, Anton          Advisor to Vladimir Putin and member of the Roscongress Foundation"
406,10,who invited candidate Trump to the St. Peter sburg International
406,11,Econom ic Forum.
406,12,"Krickovic, Andrej        Professor at the Higher Schoo l of Economics who recommended that"
406,13,Carter Page give a July 20 16 commencement address in Moscow.
406,14,"Krylova,                 Internet Re searc h Agency employee who worked on ""act ive measures"""
406,15,Aleksandra               social medi a campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S . presidential election;
406,16,traveled to the United States under false pretenses in 2014.
406,17,"Kushner, Jared           President Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor to the President."
406,18,"Kuznetsov, Sergey        Russian government official at the Russian Embassy to the United States"
406,19,who transmitted Vladimir Putin's congratulations to President-Elect
406,20,"Trump for his electora l victory on November 9, 2016 ."
406,21,"Landrum, Pete            Advisor to Senator Jeff Sessions who attended the September 2016"
406,22,meeting between Sessions and Ru ss ian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
406,23,"Lavrov, Sergey           Russian minister of foreign affairs and former permanent representative"
406,24,of Russia to the United Nations.
406,25,"Ledeen, Barbara          Senate staffer and associate of Michael Flynn who sought to obta in"
406,26,Hillary Clinton ema ils during the 2016 U.S. presidenti al cam pai gn
406,27,period.
406,28,"Ledeen, Michael          Member of the Presidential Transition Team who advised on foreign"
406,29,policy and national secur ity matters.
406,30,"Ledgett, Richard         Deputy director of the Nationa l Security Agency (Jan.2014-Apr. 2017);"
406,31,"present when President Trump called Michael Rogers on March 26, 2017."
406,32,"Lewandowski,             Campa ign manager for the Trump Campaign (Jan. 2015 - June 2016)."
406,33,Corey
406,34,"Luff, Sandra             Legislative director for Senato r Jeff Sess ions; attended a September 2016"
406,35,meeting between Sessions and Rus sian Ambassador Sergey Ki slyak.
406,36,"Lyovochkin, Serhiy       Member of Ukrainian parli ame nt and member of Ukrai nian politica l"
406,37,"party, Opposition Bloc Party ."
406,38,"Magnitsky, Sergei        Russian tax speci alist who alleged Rus sian government corruption and"
406,39,died in Russian police custody in 2009 . His death prompted passage of
406,40,B-6
406,41,NA
407,1,U.S. Departm ent of Justice
407,2,AUor1rn)Work Prodttet // May Cm1taittMaterial Proteeted Uttder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
407,3,1
407,4,"the Magn itsky Act, whic h imposed financial and travel sanctions on"
407,5,Russian official s.
407,6,"Malloch, Theodore    Chief executive officer of Global Fiduciary Governance and the"
407,7,(Ted)                Roosevelt Group. He was a Lond on-ba sed associate of Jerome Corsi.
407,8,"Manafort, Paul Jr.   Trump campaign member (March 2016-Aug.             2016) and chairman and"
407,9,chief strategist (May 2016 - Aug. 2016).
407,10,"Mashburn, John       Trump administration official and former policy director to the Trump"
407,11,Campaign.
407,12,"McCabe, Andrew       Acting director of the FBI (May 2017 - Aug. 2017); deputy director of"
407,13,the FBI (Feb. 2016 - Jan. 2018).
407,14,"McCord, Mary         Acting Assi stant Attorney Genera l (Oct. 2016- May 2017)."
407,15,"McFarland,           Deputy White House National Security Advisor (Jan. 2017 - May 2017)."
407,16,Kathleen (K.T.)
407,17,"McGahn, Donald       White Hou se Counsel (Jan. 2017 - Oct. 2018)."
407,18,(Don)
407,19,"Medvedcv, Dmitry     Prime Minister of Russia."
407,20,"Melnik, Yuriy        Spokesperson for the Rus sian Embassy in Washington , D.C., who"
407,21,connected with George Papadopoulos on soc ial media.
407,22,"Mifsud, Joseph       Maltese national and former London-based professor who , immediately"
407,23,"after returning from Mo scow in April 2016, to ld George Papadopoulos"
407,24,"that the Russians had ""d irt"" in the form of thou sands of Clinton emails."
407,25,"Miller, Matt         Trump Campaign staff member who was present at the meeting of the"
407,26,Nationa l Security and Defense Platform Subcommittee in July 2016.
407,27,"Miller, Stephen      Sen ior advisor to the Pres ident."
407,28,"Millian, Sergei      Founder of the Russian American Chamber of Commerce who met with"
407,29,George Papadop oulos during the campai gn.
407,30,"Mnuchin, Steven      Secretary of the Trea sury."
407,31,Harm to Ongoing Matter
407,32,"Miiller -Maguhn,     Member of hacker association Chaos Computer Club and associate of"
407,33,"Andrew               Julian Assange, founder of WikiLeaks."
407,34,"Nader, George        Advi sor to the United Arab Emirates's Crown Prin ce who arranged a"
407,35,meeting between Kirill Dmitriev and Erik Prince during the transiti on
407,36,period.
407,37,"Netyksho, Viktor     Rus sian military officer in command of a unit involv ed in Russian hack-"
407,38,and-release operations to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presid ential election.
407,39,B-7
407,40,NA
408,1,U.S. Depar tment of Justice
408,2,"Att:erne)"" Werle Prnelttet// Ma)' CeRtaiRMaterial Prnteeteel UReiefFeel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
408,3,"Oganov, Georgiy          Advisor to Oleg Deripaska and a board member of investment compa ny"
408,4,Basic Element. He met with Paul Manafort in Spain in early 2017.
408,5,"Oknyan sky, Henry        Florida-based Russian individual who claimed to have derogatory"
408,6,(a/k/a Henry             inform ation pertaining to Hillary C linto n. He met with Roger Stone in
408,7,Greenberg)               May 2016.
408,8,"Page, Carter             Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who advocated pro-"
408,9,Russian views and made July 2016 and December 20 16 visits to Moscow .
408,10,"Pap adopoulos ,          Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign who received information"
408,11,"George                   from Joseph Mifsud that Russ ians had ""d irt"" in the form of thousands of"
408,12,Clinton email s. He pleaded guilty to lying to the FBI abo ut his contact
408,13,with Mifsud.
408,14,"Parscale, Bradley        Digital media director for the 2016 Trump Campaign."
408,15,"Patten, William          Lob by ist and busine ss partner of Konstantin Kilimnik."
408,16,(Sam) Jr.
408,17,"Peskov, Dmitry           Deputy ch ief of staff of and press secre tary for the Russian presidentia l"
408,18,admini stration.
408,19,"Phares , Walid           Foreign policy advisor to the Trump Campaign and co-secre tary general"
408,20,of the Transat lantic Parliamentary Gro up on Counterterrorism (TAG).
408,21,"Pinedo , Richard         U.S. perso n who pleaded guilty to a single-co unt information of identity"
408,22,fraud .
408,23,"Podesta, John Jr.        Clinton campaign cha irman whose ema il accou nt was hacke d by the"
408,24,GRU . WikiLeaks released his sto len emails during the 20 16 campaign.
408,25,"Podobnyy , Victor        Russian intelligence officer who interacte d with Carter Page whi le"
408,26,operating inside the United States; later charged in 2015 with consp iring
408,27,to act as an unregistered agent of Russia.
408,28,"Poliakova , Elena        Personal ass istant to Dmitry Peskov who responded to Mic hael Cohen's"
408,29,outre ach about the Trump Tower Moscow project in January 20 16.
408,30,"Polon skaya, Olga        Russian national introduced to George Papadopoulos by Jose ph Mifsud"
408,31,as an individua l with connect ions to Vladimir Putin.
408,32,"Pompeo , Michael         U.S. Secretar y of State; director of the Centra l Int elligence Age ncy (Jan ."
408,33,2017 - Apr. 2018).
408,34,"Porter , Robert          White House staff secretary (Jan. 2017 - Feb. 20 18)."
408,35,"Priebus, Reince          White Hou se chief of staff (Jan. 2017 - July 2017); cha ir of the"
408,36,Repu blican Nat ional Comm ittee (Jan. 2011-Jan . 20 17).
408,37,"Prigozhin, Yevgeniy      Head of Ru ssian companies Concord -Catering and Conco rd Management"
408,38,"and Consulting ; supported and financed the Internet Resea rch Agenc y,"
408,39,"wh ich engaged in an ""act ive measures "" socia l media campaign to"
408,40,interfere in the 20 16 U.S. presidential elect ion.
408,41,B-8
408,42,NA
409,1,U.S. Department of Justice
409,2,Attorne)' Work Produet // May CoHtaifl Material Proteeted URder Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
409,3,"Prikhodko, Sergei       First deputy head of the Russian Government Office and former Russian"
409,4,"deputy prime minister. In January 2016, he invited candidate Trump to"
409,5,the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
409,6,"Prince, Erik            Businessman and Trump Campa ign supporter who met with Presidential"
409,7,Transition Team offic ials after the election and traveled to the Seychelles
409,8,to meet with Kirill Dmitriev in January 2017.
409,9,"Raffel, Josh            White House communication s advisor (Apr. 2017 - Feb. 2018)."
409,10,"Rasin, Alexei           Ukrainian associate of Henry Oknyansky who claimed to pos sess"
409,11,derogatory info rmation regarding Hillary Clinton.
409,12,"Rogers, Michael         Director of the National Security Agency (Apr. 2014 - May 2018)."
409,13,"Rosenstein, Rod         Deput y Attorney General (Apr. 20 17 - pre sent) ; Acting Attorney General"
409,14,for the Russian election interference investigation (May 2017 - Nov.
409,15,2018).
409,16,"Rozov , Andrei          Chairman of LC. Expert Investment Company, a Ru ssian real-estate"
409,17,development corporation that signed a letter of intent for the Trump
409,18,Tower Moscow project in 2015.
409,19,"Rtskhiladze, Giorgi     Executive of the Silk Road Transatlantic A lliance, LLC who"
409,20,communicated with Cohen about a Trump Tower Moscow proposal.
409,21,"Ruddy, Christopher      Chief execut ive of Newsmax Media and associate of Pre sident Trump."
409,22,"Rybicki, James          FBI chiefofstaff(May     2015- Feb. 20 18)."
409,23,"Samochornov,            Trans lator who worked with Nata lia Veselnitskaya and attended a June"
409,24,"Anatoli                 9, 2016 meeting at Trump Tower between Veselnitskaya and Trump"
409,25,Campaign officials.
409,26,"Sanders, Sarah          White House press sec retar y (July 2017 - present)."
409,27,Huckabee
409,28,"Sater, Felix            Real-estate advisor who worked with Michael Cohen to pursue a Trump"
409,29,Tower Moscow project.
409,30,"Saunders, Paul J.       Executive with the Center for the National Interest who worked on"
409,31,outlines and logistic s of candidate Trump's April 2016 foreign policy
409,32,speech.
409,33,"Sechin, Igor            Ex ecutive chairman of Rosneft , a Russian-stated owned oil company."
409,34,"Sessions, Jefferson     Attorney Gen eral (Feb. 2017 - Nov. 2018); U.S. Senator (Jan . 1997 -"
409,35,III (Jeff)              Feb. 2017); head of the Trump Campaign's foreign poli cy advisory team.
409,36,"Shoygu, Sergey          Russian Minister of Defense."
409,37,"Simes, Dimitri          President and chief execut ive officer of the Center for the National"
409,38,Interest.
409,39,B-9
409,40,NA
410,1,U.S. Depa11ment of Ju stice
410,2,Atterne) Werlt Predttet // May Ce11tB:i11
410,3,1
410,4,Material Preteeted U11derFed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
410,5,"Smith, Peter           Investment banker active in Republican politics who sought to obta in"
410,6,Hillary Clinton emails during the 2016 U.S. presidential campai gn
410,7,period.
410,8,"Spicer, Sean           White Hou se press sec retary and communi cat ion s dir ector (Jan . 2017 -"
410,9,July 201 7).
410,10,"Stone, Roger"
410,11,"Tillerson, Rex         U.S. Secretary of State (Feb . 2017 - Mar . 2018)."
410,12,"Timofeev, Ivan         Director of programs at the Ru ssian International Affa irs Co uncil and"
410,13,program dir ecto r of the Valdai Di scussion Club w ho comm unicated in
410,14,"2016 with George Papadopoulos, attemptin g to arrange a meeting"
410,15,between the Russian government and the Trump Campaign.
410,16,"Trump, Donald Jr.      President Trump 's son; tru stee and executive vice president of the Trump"
410,17,"Organization; helped arrange and attended the June 9, 20 16 meeting at"
410,18,Trump Tower between Na talia Vese lnitskaya and Trump Ca mpaign
410,19,offic ials.
410,20,"Trump, Eric            President Trump 's son; trustee and executive vice pres ident of the Trump"
410,21,Organization.
410,22,"Trump, Ivanka          President Trump's daught er; advisor to the President          and former"
410,23,exec utive vice president of the Trump Organization.
410,24,"Ushakov, Yuri          Aide to Vladim ir Putin and former Ru ssian ambassador to the United"
410,25,Viktorovich            States; identified to the President ia l Transition Team as the proposed
410,26,channel to th e Rus sian government.
410,27,"Vaino, Anton           Chief of staff to Ru ss ian president Vladimir Put in."
410,28,"Van der Zwaan,         For mer attorney at Skadden , Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP; worke d"
410,29,Alexander              with Paul Manafort and Rick Gates.
410,30,"Vargas, Catherine      Execut ive assistant to Jared Kushner."
410,31,"Vasilchenko, Gleb      Internet Re search Agency empl oyee who engaged in an ""active"
410,32,"measures "" soc ia l med ia campaign to interfere in the 2016 U.S ."
410,33,presidential election.
410,34,"Veselnitskaya,         Russian atto rney who advoca ted for the repea l of the Magn itsky Act and"
410,35,"Natalia                was the princip al spea ker at the June 9, 2016 meetin g at Trump Tower"
410,36,with Trump Campa ign officia ls.
410,37,"Weber, Shlomo          Rector of the New Eco nomic Schoo l (NES) in Moscow who inv ited"
410,38,Carter Page to speak at NES commenceme nt in July 2016.
410,39,"Yanukovych, Viktor     For mer pre sident of Ukrain e who had worked with Paul Manafort."
410,40,B-10
410,41,NA
411,1,U.S. Dep artment of Justice
411,2,Attorne)' Wol'ltProd1:1et
411,3,"// Ma)' CorHaiRMate,•ialPrnteeted URder Fed. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)"
411,4,"Yate s, Sally           Acting Attorney General (Jan. 20, 2017 - Jan. 30, 2017); Deputy"
411,5,"Attorney Gen era l (Jan. 10, 2015 - Jan. 30, 2017)."
411,6,"Yatsenko, Sergey        Deputy ch ief financial office r of Gazprom, a Russian state-owne d energy"
411,7,"company , and assoc iate of Carter Page."
411,8,"Zakharova , Maria       Direc tor of the Russ ian Ministry of Foreign Affair's Information and"
411,9,Press Department who received notificati on of Ca rter Page's speech in
411,10,July 2016 from Deni s Klimentov.
411,11,"Zayed al Nahyan ,       Crown Prince of Abu Dh abi and deput y supreme comm ander of the"
411,12,Mohammed bin            United Arab Em irates (UAE) armed forces.
411,13,Entities and Organizations
411,14,"Alfa-Bank                   Russia's largest comm erc ial bank, wh ich is headed by Petr Ave n."
411,15,Center for the National     U.S.-based think tank with expertise in and connections to Russ ia.
411,16,"Interest (CNI)              CNI's publication, the Nat ional Interest, hosted candidate Trump 's"
411,17,foreign pol icy speec h in April 20 16.
411,18,"Concord                     Umbrella term for Concord Management and Consulting , LLC and"
411,19,"Concord Catering, which are Russ ian companies contro lled by"
411,20,Yevgeniy Prigozhin.
411,21,"Crocus Group or             A Russian real- estate and prop erty development company th at, in"
411,22,"Crocus International        2013 , hosted the Miss Universe Pageant , and from 2013 through 20 14,"
411,23,worked wit h the T rump Organization on a Trump Moscow project.
411,24,DCLeaks                     Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
411,25,document s durin g the 2016 U .S. presidential camp aign per iod.
411,26,Democratic                  Political committ ee wo rking to elect Dem ocrats to the House of
411,27,Congressional               Representatives; hacked by the GRU in April 2016.
411,28,Campaign Committee
411,29,Democratic National         Formal governing body for the Democratic Party; hacked by the GRU
411,30,Committee                   in Apri l 20 16.
411,31,Duma                        Lower House of the national leg islature of the Russian Federat ion.
411,32,Gazpro m                    Russian oil and gas com pany majo rity-owned           by the Ru ss ian
411,33,government.
411,34,"Global Energy Capital,      Investme nt and manage ment firm founded by Ca rter Page."
411,35,LLC
411,36,Global Partners in          Event hosted in partnership with the U.S. Department of State and the
411,37,"Diplomacy                   Repub lican National Conventi on. In 2016 , Jeff Sess ions and J .D."
411,38,Gordon delivered speeches at the event and interacted wit h Russian
411,39,Ambassador Sergey Kislyak.
411,40,B-11
411,41,NA
412,1,U.S. Department of Justice
412,2,"Attorne)"" Wol'lt Predttet // Mey CofltttiflMeteriel Proteeted U1~derFed. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)"
412,3,Guccifer 2.0                  Fictitious online persona operated by the GRU that released stolen
412,4,documents during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign period.
412,5,I.C. Expert Investment        Russian real-estate and development corporation that signed a letter of
412,6,Company                       intent with a Trump Organization subsidiary to develop a Trump
412,7,Moscow property.
412,8,Internet Research            Russian entity based in Saint Petersburg and funded by Concord that
412,9,"Agency (IRA)                  engaged in an ""active measures"" social media campaign to interfere in"
412,10,"the 20 I 6 V,S. presidential election."
412,11,KLS Research LLC             Business established by an associate of and at the direction of Peter
412,12,Smith to further Smith's search for Hillary Clinton emails.
412,13,Kremlin                      Official residence of the president of the Russian Federation; it is used
412,14,colloquially to refer to the office of the president or the Russian
412,15,government.
412,16,LetterOne                    Company that includes Petr Aven and Richard Burt as board members.
412,17,"During a board meeting in December 2016, Aven asked for Burt 's help"
412,18,to make contact with the Presidential Transition Team.
412,19,"Link Campus                  University in Rome, Italy, where George Papadopoulos was"
412,20,University                    introduced to Joseph Mifsud.
412,21,London Centre of             International law advisory organization in London that employed
412,22,International Law            Joseph Mifsud and George Papadopoulos.
412,23,Practice (LCILP)
412,24,Main Intelligence            Russian Federation's military intelligence agency.
412,25,Directorate of the
412,26,General Staff (GRU)
412,27,New Economic School          Moscow-based school that invited Carter Page to speak at its July 2016
412,28,in Moscow (NES)              commencement ceremony.
412,29,Opposition Bloc              Ukrainian political party that incorporated members of the defunct
412,30,Party of Regions .
412,31,Party of Regions             Ukrainian political party of former President Yanukovych. It was
412,32,generally understood to align with Russian policies.
412,33,Pericles Emerging            Company registered in the Cayman Islands by Paul Manafort and his
412,34,Market Partners LLP          business partner Rick Davis. Oleg Deripaska invested in the fund.
412,35,Prevezon Holdings Ltd.       Russian company that was a defendant in a U.S. civil action alleging
412,36,the laundering of proceeds from fraud exposed by Sergei Magnitsky.
412,37,Roscongress                  Russian entity that organized the St. Petersburg International
412,38,Foundation                   Economic Forum.
412,39,Rosneft                      Russian state-owned oil and energy company.
412,40,Russian Direct               Sovereign wealth fund established by the Russian Government in 2011
412,41,Investment Fund              and headed by Kirill Dmitriev .
412,42,B-12
412,43,NA
413,1,U.S. Department of Justice
413,2,Attorney \\'erk Prodttet // Ma)· C0Htait1~foterial Proteeted Ut1de1• Ped. R. Cri1T1.P. 6(e)
413,3,Russian International       Russia-based nonprofit established by Russian government decree. It
413,4,"Affairs Council             is associated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and its members"
413,5,"include Ivan Timofeev, Dmitry Peskov, and Petr Aven."
413,6,Silk Road Group             Privately held investment company that entered into a licensing
413,7,agreement to build a Trump-branded hotel in Georgia.
413,8,St. Petersburg              Annual event held in Russia and attended by prominent Russian
413,9,International Economic      politicians and businessmen.
413,10,Forum
413,11,Tatneft                     Russian energy company.
413,12,Transatlantic               European group that sponsored a summit between European
413,13,"Parliamentary Group         Parliament lawmakers and U.S. persons. George Papadopoulos , Sam"
413,14,"on Counterterrorism         Clovis, and Walid Phares attended the TAG summit in July 2016."
413,15,"Unit 26165 (GRU)            GRU military cyber unit dedicated to targeting military, political,"
413,16,"governmental, and non-governmental organizations outside of Russia."
413,17,"It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and organizations,"
413,18,"as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in order to interfere"
413,19,in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
413,20,Unit 74455 (GRU)            GRU military unit with multiple departments that engaged in cyber
413,21,operations. It engaged in computer intrusions of U.S. persons and
413,22,"organizations, as well as the subsequent release of the stolen data, in"
413,23,order to interfere in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.
413,24,Valdai Discussion Club      Group that holds a conference attended by Russian government
413,25,"officials, including President Putin."
413,26,"WikiLeaks                   Organization founded by Julian Assange that posts information online,"
413,27,"including data stolen from private, corporate, and U.S. Government"
413,28,entities. Released data stolen by the GRU during the 2016 U.S.
413,29,presidential election.
413,30,B-13
413,31,NA
414,1,U.S. Department of Justice
414,2,Attorne)' 'Norlc Prodttet // May Cm1taiflMaterial Proteeted URder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
414,3,Index of Acro nyms
414,4,CNI                 Center for the National Interest
414,5,DCCC                Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
414,6,DNC                 Democratic National Committee
414,7,FBI                 Federal Bureau oflnvestigatio n
414,8,FSB                 Russian Federal Security Service
414,9,"GEC                 Global Energy Capital, LLC"
414,10,GRU                 Russian Federation's Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff
414,11,HPSCI               U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
414,12,HRC                 Hillary Rodham Clinton
414,13,IRA                 Internet Research Agency
414,14,LCILP               London Centre of International Law Practice
414,15,NATO                North Atlantic Treaty Organization
414,16,NES                 New Economic School
414,17,NSA                 National Security Agency
414,18,ODNI                Office of the Director of National Intelligence
414,19,PTT                 Presidential Transition Team
414,20,RDIF                Russian Direct Investment Fund
414,21,RIAC                Russian International Affairs Council
414,22,SBOE                State boards of elections
414,23,sco                 Special Counsel's Office
414,24,SJC                 U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
414,25,SSCI                U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
414,26,TAG                 Transatlantic Parliamentary Group on Counterterrorism
414,27,VEB                 Vnesheconombank
414,28,B-14
414,29,NA
415,1,U.S. Department of Justice
415,2,AMorttcy Werle Proauet // Ma) ' Contain Material Protected UHder Fca. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
415,3,AppendixC
415,4,NA
416,1,U.S. Department of Justice
416,2,Attomey Wm•kPfoe:lttet// Mtty Cofltttifl Mttterittl Pfoteetee:IUt1e:lerFee. R. Cfim. P. 6(e)
416,3,NA
417,1,U.S. Department of Justice
417,2,i'\Jterfle~· Werk Preattet // May CeHtttifl Material Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
417,3,APPENDIXC
417,4,INTRODUCTORY NOTE
417,5,The President provided written responses through his personal counsel to questions
417,6,submitted to him by the Special Counsel 's Office. We first explain the process that led to the
417,7,submission of written questions and then attach the President ' s responses.
417,8,"Beginning in Dec ember 2017, this Office sought for more than a year to interview the"
417,9,President on topics relevant to both Russian-election interference and obstruction-of-justice . We
417,10,"advised counsel that the President was a "" subject"" of the investigation unde r the definition of the"
417,11,"Justice Manual -"" a person whose conduct is within the scope of the grand jury's investigation. """
417,12,"Justice Manual § 9-11.151 (2018). We also advised counsel that""[ a]n interview with the President"
417,13,"is vital to our investigation"" and that this Office had "" carefull y considered the constitutional and"
417,14,"other arguments raised by . .. counsel , and they d[id] not provide us with reason to forgo seeking"
417,15,"an interview ."" 1 We additionally stated that ""it is in the interest of the Presidency and the public"
417,16,"for an interview to take place"" and offered ""numerous accommodations to aid the President 's"
417,17,"preparation and avoid surprise."" 2 After extensive discussions with the Department of Justice about"
417,18,"the Special Counsel's objective of securing the President's testimon y, thes e accommodations"
417,19,included the submissions of written questions to the Presid ent on certain Russia-related topics. 3
417,20,"We received the President's written responses in late November 2018. 4 In December 2018 ,"
417,21,"we informed counsel of the insufficiency of those responses in several respect s. 5 We noted, among"
417,22,"other things , that the President stated on more than 30 occasions that he ""does not 're call ' or"
417,23,"' remember ' or have an ' independent recollection""' of information called for by the questions. 6"
417,24,"Other answers were ""incomplete or impreci se."" 7 The written responses , we inform ed counsel,"
417,25,"""demonstrate the inadequacy of the written format , as we hav e had no opportunity to ask follow-"
417,26,up questions that would ensure complete answers and potentially refresh your client ' s recollection
417,27,"or clarify the extent or nature of his lack of recollection."" 8 We again requested an in-person"
417,28,"interview , limited to certain topics , advising the President ' s counsel that "" [t]his is the President ' s"
417,29,1
417,30,"5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President 's Personal Counsel, at 1."
417,31,2
417,32,"5/16/18 Letter, Special Counsels's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at l ; see 7/30/18"
417,33,"Letter, Special Counsel 's Office to the President 's Personal Counsel, at I (describing accommodation s)."
417,34,"3 9/17/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President 's Personal Counsel, at I (submitting"
417,35,written questions).
417,36,"4  11/20/18 Letter, President' s Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel ' s Office (transmittin g"
417,37,written responses of Donald J. Trump).
417,38,5
417,39,"12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Counsel, at 3."
417,40,6
417,41,"12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President's Personal Co unsel, at 3."
417,42,"7 12/3/ 18 Letter, Special Counsel ' s Office to the President 's Personal Counsel, at 3; see (noting,"
417,43,"""for example,"" that the President ""did not answer whether he had at any time directed or suggested that"
417,44,discussions about the Trump Moscow Project should cease ... but he has since made public comments
417,45,"about that topic"")."
417,46,8
417,47,"12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel's Office to the President' s Personal Counsel, at 3."
417,48,C-1
417,49,NA
418,1,U.S. Department of Justice
418,2,A1:terHe~·Werk Preclttet // May CeHtaiH Material Proteetecl UHder Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
418,3,opportunity to voluntarily provide us with information for us to evaluate in the context of all of
418,4,"the evidence we have gathered."" 9 The President declined. 10"
418,5,"Recognizing that the President would not be interviewed voluntarily, we considered"
418,6,whether to issue a subpoena for his testimony. We viewed the written answers to be inadequate.
418,7,"But at that point, our investigation had made significant progress and had produced substantial"
418,8,"evidence for our report. We thus weighed the costs of potentially lengthy constitutional litigation ,"
418,9,"with resulting delay in finishing our investigation , against the anticipated benefits for our"
418,10,"investigation and report. As explained in Volume II, Section H.B., we determined that the"
418,11,substantial quantity of information we had obtained from other sources allowed us to draw relevant
418,12,"factual conclusions on intent and credibility , which are often inferred from circumstantial evidence"
418,13,and assessed without direct testimony from the subject of the investigation.
418,14,*       *        *
418,15,"9 12/3/18 Letter, Special Counsel to the President's Personal Counsel."
418,16,"10 12/12/18 Letter, President's Personal Counsel to the Special Counsel's Office, at 2."
418,17,C-2
418,18,NA
419,1,U.S. Department of Justice
419,2,AttorHey Work Proettet // May CeHtaiH Mat:erial Proteetee UHeer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
419,3,WRITTEN QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED UNDER OATH BY PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP
419,4,"I.      June 9, 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower"
419,5,"a. When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner"
419,6,was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially
419,7,negative information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the
419,8,information from and the substance of the discussion.
419,9,b. Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016
419,10,"between, among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the"
419,11,"emails reflected in Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with"
419,12,"Rob Goldstone and Emin Agalarov between June 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016."
419,13,"i. Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these"
419,14,"communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with"
419,15,"you, when, and the substance of the discussion(s)."
419,16,ii. When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected
419,17,in Exhibit A?
419,18,iii. When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved or was
419,19,described as being part of Russia and its government's support for your
419,20,candidacy?
419,21,iv. Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or
419,22,"any portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you"
419,23,"communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and"
419,24,why you took that action.
419,25,"c. On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a"
419,26,"meeting at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer,"
419,27,11
419,28,"Natalia Veselnitskaya (the June 9 meeting"")."
419,29,"i. Other than as set forth in your answers to I.a and l.b, what, if anything,"
419,30,"were you told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the"
419,31,"scheduling of such a meeting? Describe who you discussed this with,"
419,32,"when, and what you were informed about the meeting."
419,33,ii. When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9
419,34,meeting were Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian
419,35,government? Describe who you learned this information from and the
419,36,substance of the discussion(s).
419,37,iii. What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting?
419,38,Describe each conversation in which you were told about what was
419,39,"discussed at the meeting, who the conversation was with, when it"
419,40,"occurred, and the substance of the statements they made about the"
419,41,meeting.
419,42,C-3
419,43,NA
420,1,U.S. Department of Justice
420,2,Attort'iey Work Proattet // Ma)'' Cotttaitt Material Proteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
420,3,"iv. Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part,"
420,4,"adoption and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that"
420,5,"discussion with, when, and the substance of the discussion."
420,6,"d. For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day"
420,7,were you in Trump Tower?
420,8,"i. Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort , or Jared"
420,9,"Kushner on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those"
420,10,conversations or meetings include any reference to any aspect of the June
420,11,"9 meeting? If yes, describe who you spoke with and the substance of the"
420,12,conversation.
420,13,e. Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of
420,14,"the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when ,"
420,15,and the substance of the communication.
420,16,"f.  Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort ,"
420,17,"or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family,"
420,18,"Natalia Veselnitskaya, Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took"
420,19,"place after June 9, 2016 and concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to"
420,20,"assist the campaign? If yes, describe who you learned this information from,"
420,21,"when, and the substance of what you learned."
420,22,"g. On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part , ""I am going to give"
420,23,a major speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing
420,24,"all of the things that have taken place with the Clintons."""
420,25,i. Why did you make that statement?
420,26,ii. What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
420,27,iii. What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
420,28,iv. Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9
420,29,meeting?
420,30,"v. Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who?"
420,31,"vi. Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7,"
420,32,2016?
420,33,h. Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or
420,34,the Russian government supported your candidacy or oppos ed th e candidacy of
420,35,"Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe th e source(s) of the information , when you we re"
420,36,"informed , and the content of such discussion(s)."
420,37,i.  Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign
420,38,"government or foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladim ir Putin, had provided,"
420,39,"wi shed to provide, or offer ed to provide tangible support to your campaign,"
420,40,including by way of offering to provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If
420,41,C-4
420,42,NA
421,1,U.S. Department of Justice
421,2,"Attel'fl:e~·'.\'e,rk Preclttet // Ma)' CeAtaiAMaterial Pre,teeteclUAclerFecl. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
421,3,"yes, describe the source{s) of the information, when you were informed, and the"
421,4,content of such discussion(s).
421,5,II.      Russian Hacking/ Russian Efforts Using Social Media / Wikileaks
421,6,"a. On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated"
421,7,the computer network of the Democratic National Committee {DNC) and that
421,8,"Russian intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June"
421,9,"14, 2016, were you provided any information about any potential or actual"
421,10,"hacking of the computer systems or email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic"
421,11,"Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton,"
421,12,"or individuals associated with the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who provided"
421,13,"this information, when, and the substance of the information."
421,14,"b. On July 22, 2016, Wikileaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by"
421,15,Democratic party officials .
421,16,"i. Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that"
421,17,"Wikileaks, Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had"
421,18,possession of or planned to release emails or information that could help
421,19,"your campaign or hurt the Clinton campaign? If yes, describe who you"
421,20,"discussed this issue with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s)."
421,21,"ii. After the release of emails by Wikileaks on July 22, 2016, were you told"
421,22,that Wikileaks possessed or might possess additional information that
421,23,"could be released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this"
421,24,"information, when, and what you were told."
421,25,"c. Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly,"
421,26,"between Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and {a)"
421,27,"Wikileaks, {b) Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of Wikileaks, {d) Guccifer"
421,28,"2.0, (e) representatives of Guccifer 2.0, or {f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes,"
421,29,"describe who provided you with this information, when you learned of the"
421,30,"communications, and what you know about those communications."
421,31,"d. On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: ""Russia, if you're listening, I"
421,32,"hope you're able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will"
421,33,"probably be rewarded mightily by our press."""
421,34,"i. Why did you make that request of Russia,as opposed to any other country,"
421,35,"entity, or individual?"
421,36,"ii. In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have"
421,37,with anyone else about the substance of the statement?
421,38,iii. Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that
421,39,Russia was attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email
421,40,"accounts of Hillary Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided"
421,41,"this information, when, and what you were told."
421,42,C-5
421,43,NA
422,1,U.S. Department of Justice
422,2,Atlef'fle) \ltet'k Pt1eclttet// Moy CeHtttiHMotet1iolPrnteetecl UHE:ier
422,3,1                                                             Fee. R. Ct1iffl.P. 6(e)
422,4,"e. On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were"
422,5,released by WikiLeaks.
422,6,"· i. Where were you on October 7, 2016?"
422,7,"ii. Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7"
422,8,release that Wikileaks possessed or might possess emails related to John
422,9,"Podesta? If yes, describe who told you this, when, and what you were"
422,10,told.
422,11,"iii. Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including"
422,12,"Roger Stone, reaching out to Wikileaks, either directly or through an"
422,13,"intermediary, on or about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and"
422,14,describe the substance of the conversations or contacts.
422,15,"f.    Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger"
422,16,"Stone, having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with Wikileaks, Guccifer 2.0,"
422,17,"or DCLeaksregarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes,"
422,18,"describe who had such contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when"
422,19,"you became aware of the contacts, and the substance of the contacts."
422,20,"g. From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you"
422,21,communicate with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s)
422,22,with Mr. Stone.
422,23,"i. During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making"
422,24,"to assist your campaign, and what requests, if any, did you make of Mr."
422,25,Stone?
422,26,"ii. Did Mr. Stone ever discuss Wikileaks with you or, as far as you were aware,"
422,27,"with anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you"
422,28,"were told, from whom, and when."
422,29,iii. Did Mr. Stone at any time inform you about contacts he had with Wikileaks
422,30,"or any intermediary of WikiLeaks, or about forthcoming releases of"
422,31,"information? If yes, describe what Stone told you and when."
422,32,"h. Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential"
422,33,"pardon or other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had"
422,34,"the discussion(s) with, when, and the content of the discussion(s)."
422,35,"i.   Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those"
422,36,"in Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the"
422,37,"organization of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with,"
422,38,"when, and the content of the discussion(s)."
422,39,C-6
422,40,NA
423,1,U.S. Department of Justice
423,2,"Att6rfle, · \lt6rlc Pr6attet // Ma, · C6Htaifl Material Pt'6teetea UHElerFee. R. CriHl:.P. 6(e1"
423,3,Ill.     The Trump Organization Moscow Project
423,4,"a. In October 2015, a ""Letter of Intent,"" a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was"
423,5,"signed for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ""Trump"
423,6,"Moscow project"")."
423,7,i. When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow
423,8,project? By whom? What were you told about the project?
423,9,ii. Did you sign the letter of intent?
423,10,"b. In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated:"
423,11,"""To the best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about"
423,12,"this proposal other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding"
423,13,"letter of intent in 2015."" Describe all discussions you had with Mr . Cohen, or"
423,14,"anyone else associated with the Trump Organization, about the Trump Moscow"
423,15,"project, including who you spoke with, when , and the substance of the"
423,16,discussion(s).
423,17,c. Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and
423,18,"any Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov,"
423,19,"regarding the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this"
423,20,"information to you, when, and the substance of what you learned."
423,21,d. Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a
423,22,potential trip to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the
423,23,"Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with , when, and the"
423,24,substance of the discussion(s).
423,25,e. Did you at any tim e direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow
423,26,"project should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been"
423,27,"abandoned? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the"
423,28,"discussion(s), and why that decision was made."
423,29,f.    Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided
423,30,publicly or in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual
423,31,"investments or business deals the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the"
423,32,"Trump Moscow project? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when , and the"
423,33,substance of the discussion(s).
423,34,"g. Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or th e Trump Organization have"
423,35,"any other prospective or actual business intere st s, investments, or arrangements"
423,36,with Russia or any Russian interest or Russian ind ividual during the campaign? If
423,37,"yes, describe the business inte rests, investments, or arrangements ."
423,38,C-7
423,39,NA
424,1,U.S. Department of Justice
424,2,Atleme~· Werk Pretlttet // May Ce!ltttill Material Preteetee U!leer Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(c)
424,3,IV.     Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign
424,4,"a. Prior to mid-August 2016, did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to"
424,5,"the Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information"
424,6,"from, when, and the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's"
424,7,connections to the Ukrainian or Russian governments play any role in your
424,8,"decision to have him join your campaign? If yes, describe that role."
424,9,b. Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of you r
424,10,"campaign to Oleg Deripaska? If yes, describe who you learned this information"
424,11,"from, when, the substance of what you were told , what you understood the"
424,12,"purpose was of sharing such information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you"
424,13,responded to learning this information .
424,14,c. Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your
424,15,campaign sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to
424,16,any person located in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or
424,17,"Russian governments? If yes, identify who provided you with this information,"
424,18,"when, the substance of the discussion(s), what you understood the purpose was"
424,19,"of sharing the internal campaign information, and how you responded to learning"
424,20,this information.
424,21,"d. Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly, any posit ions"
424,22,"Ukraine or Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he"
424,23,communicated those positions to you and the substance of those
424,24,communications.
424,25,"e. During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with"
424,26,"you or senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had"
424,27,"conversations with on this topic, when, and what you were told ."
424,28,"f.  What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform"
424,29,regarding arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to
424,30,"the convention, what information did you have about this platform provision?"
424,31,"After the platform provision was changed, who told you about the change, when"
424,32,"did they tell you, what were you told about why it was changed, and who was"
424,33,involved?
424,34,"g. On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize"
424,35,"Crimea as Russianterritory and lift sanctions on Russia,you said: ""We'll be looking"
424,36,"at that . Yeah, we'll be looking."" Did you intend to communicate by that statement"
424,37,or at any other time during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or
424,38,recognize Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected?
424,39,C-8
424,40,NA
425,1,U.S. Department of Justice
425,2,At:terHe~·'+\'erk Pt'eattet // Mtty CeHtttiH Mttterittl Preteetea UHaer Fee. R. Ct'iffi. P. 6(e)
425,3,i. What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing
425,4,Russia's annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you
425,5,"spoke with about this topic, when, the substance of the discussion{s)."
425,6,V.     Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition
425,7,"a. Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala on November 10,"
425,8,"2016? If yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you"
425,9,told about about why your presence was requested?
425,10,"i. Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you"
425,11,had with any Russiansor representatives of the Russian government at the
425,12,event.
425,13,b. Following the Obama Administration's imposition of sanctions on Russia iri
425,14,"December 2016 {""Russia sanctions""), did you discuss with Lieutenant General"
425,15,"{LTG) Michael Flynn, K.T. McFarland, Steve Bannon, Reince Priebus, Jared Kushner,"
425,16,"Erik Prince, or anyone else associated with the transition what should be"
425,17,"communicated to the Russian government regarding the sanctions? If yes,"
425,18,"describe who you spoke with about this issue, when, and the substance of the"
425,19,discussion{s).
425,20,"c. On December 29 and December 31, 2016, LTG Flynn had conversations with"
425,21,Russian Ambassador Sergey Kislyak about the Russia sanctions and Russia's
425,22,response to the Russia sanctions.
425,23,i. Did you direct or suggest that LTG Flynn have discussions with anyone from
425,24,the Russian government about the Russia sanctions?
425,25,"ii. Were you told in advance of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016 conversation"
425,26,"that he was going to be speaking with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, describe"
425,27,"who told you this information, when, and what you were told. If no, when"
425,28,"and from whom did you learn of LTG Flynn's December 29, 2016"
425,29,conversation with Ambassador Kislyak?
425,30,iii. When did you learn of LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak's call on
425,31,"December 31, 2016? Who told you and what were you told?"
425,32,iv. When did you learn that sanctions were discussed in the December 29 and
425,33,"December 31, 2016 calls between LTG Flynn and Ambassador Kislyak?"
425,34,Who told you and what were you told?
425,35,"d. At any time between December 31, 2016, and January 20, 2017, did anyone tell"
425,36,you or suggest to you that Russia's decision not to impose reciprocal sanctions
425,37,was attributable in any way to LTG Flynn's communications with Ambassador
425,38,"Kislyak? If yes, identify who provided you with this information, when, and the"
425,39,substance of what you were told.
425,40,C-9
425,41,NA
426,1,U.S. Department of Justice
426,2,Attoffley Work Protittet // Mtty CotttttiH Mttterittl Proteeteti UAtier Fee. R. CrirA. P. 6(e)
426,3,"e. On January 12, 2017, the Washington Post published a column that stated that"
426,4,"LTG Flynn phoned Ambassador Kislyak several times on December 29, 2016. After"
426,5,"learning of the column, did you direct or suggest to anyone that LTG Flynn should"
426,6,"deny that he discussed sanctions with Ambassador Kislyak? If yes, who did you"
426,7,"make this suggestion or direction to, when, what did you say, and why did you"
426,8,take this step?
426,9,"i. After learning of the column, did you have any conversations with LTG"
426,10,Flynn about his conversations with Ambassador Kislyak in December 2016?
426,11,"If yes, describe when those discussions occurred and the content of the"
426,12,discussions.
426,13,f. Were you told about a meeting between Jared Kushner and Sergei Gorkov that
426,14,took place in December 2016?
426,15,"i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when , the substance of the"
426,16,"discussion(s}, and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting."
426,17,g. Were you told about a meeting or meetings between Erik Prince and Kiri II Dmitriev
426,18,or any other representative from the Russian government that took place in
426,19,January 2017?
426,20,"i. If yes, describe who you spoke with, when , the substance of the"
426,21,"discussion(s}, and what you understood was the purpose of the meeting(s)."
426,22,"h. Prior to January 20, 2017, did you talk to Steve Bannon, Jared Kushner, or any"
426,23,oth er individual associated with the transition regarding establishing an unofficial
426,24,"line of communication with Russia? If yes, describe who you spoke w ith, when,"
426,25,"the substance of the discussion(s), and what you understood was the purpose of"
426,26,such an unofficial line of communication.
426,27,C-10
426,28,NA
427,1,U.S. Department of Justice
427,2,"AMenwy Werk Preattet // Ma:,·Contain Mate1•ialPreteetea Unaer Feel. R. Ct1ittt. P. 6(e)"
427,3,RESPONSESOF PRESIDENTDONALDJ. TRUMP
427,4,I.     June 9. 2016 Meeting at Trump Tower
427,5,"a.     When did you first learn that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner was"
427,6,considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
427,7,information about Hillary Clinton? Describe who you learned the information from and the
427,8,substance of the discussion.
427,9,"b.     Attached to this document as Exhibit A is a series of emails from June 2016 between,"
427,10,"among others, Donald Trump, Jr. and Rob Goldstone. In addition to the emails reflected in."
427,11,"Exhibit A, Donald Trump, Jr. had other communications with Rob Goldstone and £min"
427,12,"Agalarov between )une 3, 2016, and June 9, 2016."
427,13,"i.     Did Mr. Trump, Jr. or anyone else tell you about or show you any of these"
427,14,"communications? If yes, describe who discussed the communications with you,"
427,15,"when, and the substance of the discussion(s),"
427,16,11.     When did you first see or learn about all or any part of the emails reflected     in
427,17,Exhibit A?
427,18,iii.    When did you first learn that the proposed meeting involved cirwas described as
427,19,being part of Russia and its government's support for your candidacy?
427,20,1v.    Did you suggest to or direct anyone not to discuss or release publicly all or any
427,21,"portion of the emails reflected in Exhibit A? If yes, describe who you"
427,22,"communicated with, when, the substance of the communication(s), and why you"
427,23,took that action.
427,24,"c.     On June 9, 2016, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, and Jared Kushner attended a meeting"
427,25,"at Trump Tower with several individuals, including a Russian lawyer, Natalia"
427,26,"Yeselnitskaya (the ""June 9 meeting"")."
427,27,"i.     Other than as set fotth in your answers to I.a and l.b, what, if anything, were you"
427,28,"told about the possibility of this meeting taking place, or the scheduling of such a"
427,29,"meeting? Describe who you discussed this with, when, and what you were informed"
427,30,about the meeting.
427,31,ii.    When did you learn that some of the individuals attending the June 9 meeting were
427,32,Russian or had any affiliation with any part of the Russian government? Describe
427,33,who you learned this information from and the substance of the discussion(s).
427,34,6
427,35,C-11
427,36,NA
428,1,U.S. Department of Justice
428,2,"Atte,n1ey 'Nork Prne1:1et// M1t:,·Ce,Ht1tiH M1tteri1tlPre,teetee UHeer Fee. R. Criffi. P. 6(e)"
428,3,iii.     What were you told about what was discussed at the June 9 meeting? Describe each
428,4,"conversation in which you were told about whal was discussed at lhe meeting, who"
428,5,"the conversation was with, when it occurred, and the substance of the statements"
428,6,lhey made about the meeting.
428,7,"iv.      Were you told that the June 9 meeting was about, in whole or in part, adoption"
428,8,"and/or the Magnitsky Act? If yes, describe who you had that discussion with, when,"
428,9,and the substance of the discussion.
428,10,"d.      For the period June 6, 2016 through June 9, 2016, for what portion of each day were you"
428,11,in Trump Tower?
428,12,"1.       Did you speak or meet with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner"
428,13,"on June 9, 2016? If yes, did any portion of any of those conversations or meetings"
428,14,"include any reference to any aspect of the June 9 meeting? If yes, describe who you"
428,15,spoke with and the substance of the conversation.
428,16,e.       Did you communicate directly or indirectly with any member or representative of the
428,17,"Agalarov family after June 3, 2016? If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the"
428,18,substance of the communication.
428,19,"f.       Did you learn of any communications between Donald Trump , Jr., Paul Manaforl, or Jared"
428,20,"Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Natalia Veselnitskaya,"
428,21,"Rob Goldstone, or any Russian official or contact that took place after June 9, 20 l 6 and"
428,22,concerned the June 9 meeting or efforts by Russia to assist the campaign ? If yes. describe
428,23,"who you learned this information from, when, and the substance of what you learned."
428,24,"g.       On June 7, 2016, you gave a speech in which you said, in part,' ·[ am going to give a major"
428,25,speech on probably Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things
428,26,that have taken place with the Clintons .''
428,27,1.       Why did you make that statement?
428,28,ii.      What information did you plan to share with respect to the Clintons?
428,29,111.     What did you believe the source(s) of that information would be?
428,30,iv.     Did you expect any of the information to have come from the June 9 meeting?
428,31,"v.       Did anyone help draft the speech that you were referring to? If so, who?"
428,32,"vt.     Why did you ultimately not give the speech you referenced on June 7, 2016?"
428,33,h.        Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
428,34,7
428,35,C-12
428,36,NA
429,1,U.S. Department of Justice
429,2,"AtteirRey\Ve,rkPreifittet// MB:)'CeiRtB:iRMateriB:IPre,teetefi Uttfier Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
429,3,"government supported your candidacy or opposed the candidacy of Hillary Clinton? If yes,"
429,4,"describe the source(s) of the information. when you were informed, and the content of such"
429,5,discussion(s).
429,6,1.       Did any person or entity inform you during the campaign that any foreign government or
429,7,"foreign leader, other than Russia or Vladimir Putin, had provided, wished to provide, or"
429,8,"offered to provide tangible support to your campaign, including by way of offering to"
429,9,"provide negative information on Hillary Clinton? If yes, describe the source(s) of the"
429,10,"information, when you were informed, and the content of such discussion(s)."
429,11,"Response to Question l, Parts (a) through (c)"
429,12,"I have no recollection of learning at the time that Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Jared"
429,13,Kushner was considering participating in a meeting in June 2016 concerning potentially negative
429,14,"information about Hillary Clinton. Nor do I recall learning during the campaign that the June 9,"
429,15,"2016 meeting had taken place, that the referenced emails existed. or that Donald J. Trump, Jr., had"
429,16,"other communications with Emin Agalarov or Robert Goldstone between June 3, 2016 and June"
429,17,"9, 2016."
429,18,"Response to Question I, Part {d)"
429,19,I have no independent recollection of what portion of these four days in June of2016 I spent in
429,20,"Trump Tower. This was one of many busy months during a fast-paced campaign, as the primary"
429,21,season was ending and we were preparing for the general election campaign.
429,22,I am now aware that my Campaign's calendar indicates that I was in New York City from June 6
429,23,"- 9, 2016. Calendars kept in my Trump Tower office reflect that I had various calls and meetings"
429,24,scheduled for each of these days. While those calls and meetings may or may not actually have
429,25,"taken place, they do indicate that I was in Trump Tower during a portion of each of these working"
429,26,"days, and I have no reason to doubt that I was. When I was in New York City, I stayed at my"
429,27,Trump Tower apartment.
429,28,My Trump Organization desk calendar also reflects that I was outside Trump Tower during
429,29,"portions of these days. The June 7, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to leave Trump Tower"
429,30,"in the early evening for Westchester where I gave remarks after winning the California, New"
429,31,"Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and South Dakota Republican primaries held that day. The June 8,"
429,32,2016 calendar indicates a scheduled departure in late afternoon to attend a ceremony at my son's
429,33,"school. The June 9, 2016 calendar indicates I was scheduled to attend midday meetings and a"
429,34,"fundraising luncheon at the Four Seasons Hotel. At this point, I do not remember on what dales"
429,35,"these events occurred, but I do not currently have a reason to doubt that they took place as"
429,36,scheduled on my calendar.
429,37,"Widely available media reports, including television footage, also shed light on my activities"
429,38,"during these days. For example, I am aware that my June 7, 2016 victory remarks at the Trump"
429,39,8
429,40,C-13
429,41,NA
430,1,U.S. Department ofJustice
430,2,AMerRe)·'.\'erk Preclttet // Ma)' Cm~tttil'lMtttel'ittlPreteetecl UftclerFecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
430,3,"National Golf Club in Briarcliff Manor, New York, were recorded and published by the media. 1"
430,4,remember winning those primaries and generally recall delivering remarks that evening.
430,5,"At this point in time, I do not remember whether I spoke or met with Donald Trump, Jr., Paul"
430,6,"Manafort, or Jared Kushner on June 9, 2016. My desk calendar indicates I was scheduled to meet"
430,7,"with Paul Manafort on the morning of June 9, but I do not recall if that meeting took place. It was"
430,8,"more than two years ago, at a time when I had many calls and interactions daily.               ·"
430,9,"Response to Question I, Part (e)"
430,10,I have no independent recollection of any communications I had with the Agalarov family or
430,11,"anyone r understood to be a representative of the Agalarov family after June 3, 2016 and before"
430,12,"the end of the campaign. While preparing to respond to these questions, I have become aware of"
430,13,"written communications with the Agalarovs during the campaign that were sent, received, and"
430,14,largely authored by my staff and which I understand have already been produced to you.
430,15,"In general, the documents include congratulatory letters on my campaign victories, emails about a"
430,16,painting Emin and Aras Agalarov arranged to have delivered to Trump Tower as a birthday
430,17,"present, and emails regarding delivery of a book written by Aras Agalarov. The documents reflect"
430,18,that the deliveries were screened by the Secret Service.
430,19,"Response to Question I, Part (t)"
430,20,"I do not recall being aware during the campaign of communications between Donald Trump, Jr.,"
430,21,"Paul Manafort, or Jared Kushner and any member or representative of the Agalarov family, Robert"
430,22,"Goldstone, Natalia Yeselnitskaya (whose name I was not familiar with), or anyone I understood"
430,23,to be a Russian official.
430,24,"Response to Question I, Part (g)"
430,25,"In remarks I delivered the night I won the California, New Jersey, New Mexico, Montana, and"
430,26,"South Dakota Republican primaries, I said, ""I am going to give a major speech on probably"
430,27,Monday of next week and we're going to be discussing all of the things that have taken place with
430,28,"the Clintons."" In general, l expected to give a speech referencing the publicly available, negative"
430,29,"information about the Clintons, including, for example, Mrs. Clinton's failed policies, the"
430,30,Clintons' use of the State Department to further their interests and the interests of the Clinton
430,31,"Foundation, Mrs. Clinton's improper use of a private server for State Department business, the"
430,32,"destruction of 33,000 emails on that server, and Mrs. Clinton's temperamental unsuitability for the"
430,33,office of President.
430,34,"In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that the Campaign"
430,35,"documents already produced to you reflect the drafting, evolution, and sources of information for"
430,36,"the speech I expected to give ""probably"" on the Monday following my June 7, 2016 comments."
430,37,These documents generally show that the text of the speech was initially drafted by Campaign staff
430,38,9
430,39,C-14
430,40,NA
431,1,U.S. Department of Justice
431,2,"Atterfl:e)""\\'erk PreEiuet// May Cofl:taifl:Material Prnteeted UHEierFee. R. Cri1fl.P. 6(e)"
431,3,"with input from various outside advisors and was based on publicly available material, including,"
431,4,"in particular, information from the book CUnton Cash by Peter Schweizer."
431,5,"The Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack took place in the early morning hours of Sunday, June 12,"
431,6,"2016. In light of that tragedy, I gave a speech directed more specifically to national security and"
431,7,terrorism than to the Clintons. That speech was delivered at the Saint Anselm College Institute of
431,8,"Politics in Manchester, New Hampshire, and, as reported, opened with the following:"
431,9,"This was going to be a speech on Hillary Clinton and how bad a President,"
431,10,"especially in these times of Radical Islamic Terrorism, she would be. Even her"
431,11,"former Secret Service Agent, who has seen her under pressure and in times of stress,"
431,12,has stated that she lacks the temperament and integrity to be president. There will
431,13,"be plenty of oppo1tunity to discuss these important issues at a later time, and I will"
431,14,deliver that speech soon. But today there is only one thing to discuss: the growing
431,15,threat of terrorism inside of our borders.
431,16,"I continued to speak about Mrs. Clinton's failings throughout the campaign, using the information"
431,17,"prepared for inclusion in the speech to which I referred on June 7, 2016."
431,18,"Response to Question I, Part (h)"
431,19,I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that Vladimir Putin or the Russian
431,20,"government ""suppotted"" my candidacy or ""opposed"" the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. However,"
431,21,I was aware of some reports indicating that President Putin had made complimentary statements
431,22,about me.
431,23,"Response to Question I, Part (i)"
431,24,I have no recollection of being told during the campaign that any foreign government or foreign
431,25,"leader had provided, wished to provide, or offered to provide tangible support to my campaign."
431,26,II.     Russian Hacking / Russian Efforts Using Social Media / WikiLeaks
431,27,"a.      On June 14, 2016, it was publicly reported that computer hackers had penetrated the"
431,28,computer network of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and that Russian
431,29,"intelligence was behind the unauthorized access, or hack. Prior to June 14, 20 I6, were you"
431,30,provided any information about any potential or actual hacking of the computer systems or
431,31,"email accounts of the DNC, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC),"
431,32,"the Clinton Campaign, Hillary Clinton, or individuals associated with the Clinton"
431,33,"campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and the substance of the"
431,34,information.
431,35,10
431,36,C-15
431,37,NA
432,1,U.S. Department of Justice
432,2,Atterfte~· \l/erk Proa1:1et// May Ce11tai11  Material Proteetea U11aerFea . R. Crim. P. 6(e)
432,3,"b.     On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 emails sent or received by Democratic"
432,4,party officials.
432,5,"1.       Prior to the July 22, 2016 release, were you aware from any source that WikiLeaks,"
432,6,"Guccifer 2.0, DCLeaks, or Russians had or potentially had possession of or planned"
432,7,to release emails or information that could help your campaign or hurt the Clinton
432,8,"campaign? If yes, describe who you discussed this issue with, when, and the"
432,9,substance of the discussion(s).
432,10,"11.      After the release of emails by WikiLeaks on July 22, 2016, were you told that"
432,11,WikiLeaks possessed or might possess additional information that could be
432,12,"released during the campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information,"
432,13,"when, and what you were told."
432,14,"c.      Are you aware of any communications during the campaign, directly or indirectly, between"
432,15,"Roger Stone, Donald Trump, Jr., Paul Manafort, or Rick Gates and (a) WikiLeaks, (b)"
432,16,"Julian Assange, (c) other representatives of WikiLeaks, (d) Guccifer 2.0, (e) representatives"
432,17,"of Guccifer 2.0, or (f) representatives of DCLeaks? If yes, describe who provided you with"
432,18,"this information, when you learned of the communications, and what you know about those"
432,19,communications.
432,20,"d.      On July 27, 2016, you stated at a press conference: "" Russia, if you' re listening, I hope"
432,21,"you' re able to find the 30,000 emails that are missing. I think you will probably be rewarded"
432,22,"mightily by our press."""
432,23,"1.       Why did you make that request of Russia, as opposed to any other country, entity,"
432,24,or individual?
432,25,"ii.      In advance of making that statement, what discussions, if any, did you have with"
432,26,anyone else about the substance of the statement?
432,27,iii.     Were you told at any time before or after you made that statement that Russia was
432,28,attempting to infiltrate or hack computer systems or email accounts of Hillary
432,29,"Clinton or her campaign? If yes, describe who provided this information, when, and"
432,30,what you were told.
432,31,"e.      On October 7, 2016, emails hacked from the account of John Podesta were released by"
432,32,WikiLeaks.
432,33,"i.       Where were you on October 7, 20 I 6?"
432,34,"ii.      Were you told at any time in advance of, or on the day of, the October 7 release that"
432,35,"WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta? If yes,"
432,36,"describe who told you this, when, and what you were told."
432,37,11
432,38,C-16
432,39,NA
433,1,U.S. Department of Justice
433,2,AtterRey Werk Presttet // Ma)' Cm~taiR Material Preteetes UAser Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
433,3,"iii.     Are you aware of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger"
433,4,"Stone, reaching out to WikiLeaks, either directly or through an intermediary, on or"
433,5,"about October 7, 2016? If yes, identify the person and describe the substance of the"
433,6,conversations or contacts.
433,7,"f.      Were you told of anyone associated with you or your campaign, including Roger Stone,"
433,8,"having any discussions, directly or indirectly, with WikiLeaks, Guccifer 2.0, or DCLeaks"
433,9,"regarding the content or timing of release of hacked emails? If yes, describe who had such"
433,10,"contacts, how you became aware of the contacts, when you became aware of the contacts,"
433,11,and the substance of the contacts.
433,12,"g.       From June 1, 2016 through the end of the campaign, how frequently did you communicate"
433,13,with Roger Stone? Describe the nature of your communication(s) with Mr. Stone.
433,14,"1.       During that time period, what efforts did Mr. Stone tell you he was making to assist"
433,15,"your campaign, and what requests. if any, did you make of Mr. Stone?"
433,16,"ii.      Did Mr. Stone ever discuss WikiLeaks with you or, as far as you were aware, with"
433,17,"anyone else associated with the campaign? If yes, describe what you were told, from"
433,18,whom. and when.
433,19,iii.    Did Mr. Stone at anytime inform you about contacts he had with WikiLeaks or any
433,20,"intermediary of WikiLeaks. or about forthcoming releases of information? If yes,"
433,21,describe what Stone told you and when.
433,22,"h.       Did you have any discussions prior to January 20, 2017, regarding a potential pardon or"
433,23,"other action to benefit Julian Assange? If yes, describe who you had the discussion(s) with,"
433,24,"when, and the content of the discussion(s)."
433,25,"i.       Were you aware of any efforts by foreign individuals or companies, including those in"
433,26,"Russia, to assist your campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization"
433,27,"of rallies? If yes, identify who you discussed such assistance with, when, and the content"
433,28,of the discussion(s).
433,29,"Response to Question II, Part (a)"
433,30,"I do not remember the date on which it was publicly reported that the DNC had been hacked, but"
433,31,my best recollection is that I learned of the hacking at or shortly after the time it became the subject
433,32,of media reporting. I do not recall being provided any information during the campaign about the
433,33,hacking of any of the named entities or individuals before it became the subject of media reporting.
433,34,12
433,35,C-17
433,36,NA
434,1,U.S. Department of Justice
434,2,Atterfte)' Werk Pret:ittet// May Cm1taiftMaterial Prnteetet:ilJFtt:ierFet:i.R. Crim. P. 6(e)
434,3,"Response to Question U, Part (b)"
434,4,I recall that in the months leading up to the election there was considerable media reporting about
434,5,the possible hacking and release of campaign-related information and there was a lot of talk about
434,6,"this matter. At the time, I was generally aware of these media reports and may have discussed these"
434,7,"issues with my campaign staff or others, but at this point in time - more than two years later - I"
434,8,"have no recollection of any particular conversation, when it occurred, or who the participants were."
434,9,"Response to Question II, Part (c)"
434,10,I do not recall being aware during the campaign of any communications between the individuals
434,11,named in Question II (c) and anyone I understood to be a representative of WikiLeaks or any of
434,12,the other individuals or entities referred to in the question.
434,13,"Response to Question II, Part (d)"
434,14,"I made the statement quoted in Question II (d) in jest and sarcastically, as was apparent to any"
434,15,objective observer. The context of the statement is evident in the full reading or viewing of the
434,16,"July 27, 2016 press conference, and I refer you to the publicly available transcript and video of"
434,17,that press conference. I do not recall having any discussion about the substance of the statement in
434,18,advance of the press conference. I do not recall being told during the campaign of any efforts by
434,19,Russia to infiltrate or hack the computer systems or email accounts of Hillary Clinton or her
434,20,campaign prior to them becoming the subject of media repo11ingand I have no recollection of any
434,21,particular conversation in that regard.
434,22,"Response to Question II, Part (e)"
434,23,"I was in Trump Tower in New York City on October 7, 2016. I have no recollection of being told"
434,24,that WikiLeaks possessed or might possess emails related to John Podesta before the release of
434,25,"Mr. Podesta's emails was reported by the media. Likewise, I have no recollection of being told"
434,26,"that Roger Stone, anyone acting as an intermediary for Roger Stone, or anyone associated with my"
434,27,"campaign had communicated with WikiLeaks on October 7, 2016."
434,28,"Response to Question II, Part (0"
434,29,I do not recall being told during the campaign that Roger Stone or anyone associated with my
434,30,campaign had discussions with any of the entities named in the question regarding the content or
434,31,timing of release of hacked emails.
434,32,"Response to Question ll, Part (g)"
434,33,I spoke by telephone with Roger Stone from time to time during the campaign. I have no
434,34,recollection of the specifics of any conversations I had with Mr. Stone between June 1.2016 and
434,35,13
434,36,C-18
434,37,NA
435,1,U.S. Department of Justice
435,2,Attert1ey Werk Preelttet // Mft)' CefttEtiHMEtteriEtl Prateeteel UHder Fed. R. Cri1fl.P. 6(e)
435,3,"November 8, 2016. I do not recall discussing WikiLeaks with him, nor do I recall being aware of"
435,4,"Mr. Stone having discussed WikiLeaks with individuals associated with my campaign, although I"
435,5,was aware that WikiLeaks was the subject of media reporting and campaign-related discussion at
435,6,the time.
435,7,"Response to Question II, Part (h)"
435,8,I do not recall having had any discussion during the campaign regarding a pardon or action to
435,9,benefit Julian Assange.
435,10,"Response to Question II, Part (i)"
435,11,I do not recall being aware during the campaign of specific effo11s by foreign individuals or
435,12,companies to assist my campaign through the use of social media postings or the organization of
435,13,rallies.
435,14,III.     The Trump Organization Moscow Project
435,15,"a.       In October 2015, a ""Letter of Intent,"" a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B, was signed"
435,16,"for a proposed Trump Organization project in Moscow (the ""Trump Moscow project"")."
435,17,1.      When were you first informed of discussions about the Trump Moscow project?
435,18,By whom? What were you told about the project?
435,19,ii.     Did you sign the letter of intent?
435,20,"b.       In a statement provided to Congress, attached as Exhibit C, Michael Cohen stated: ""To the"
435,21,"best of my knowledge, Mr. Trump was never in contact with anyone about this proposal"
435,22,"other than me on three occasions, including signing a non-binding letter of intent in 2015."""
435,23,"Describe all discussions you had with Mr. Cohen, or anyone else associated with the Trump"
435,24,"Organization, about the Trump Moscow project, including who you spoke with, when, and"
435,25,the substance of the discussion(s).
435,26,c.       Did you learn of any communications between Michael Cohen or Felix Sater and any
435,27,"Russian government officials, including officials in the office of Dmitry Peskov, regarding"
435,28,"the Trump Moscow project? If so, identify who provided this info1mation to you, when,"
435,29,and the substance of what you learned.
435,30,d.       Did you have any discussions between June 2015 and June 2016 regarding a potential trip
435,31,to Russia by you and/or Michael Cohen for reasons related to the Trump Moscow project?
435,32,"If yes, describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s)."
435,33,e.       Did you at any time direct or suggest that discussions about the Trump Moscow project
435,34,14
435,35,C-19
435,36,NA
436,1,U.S. Depa11rnentof Justice
436,2,A1:ten~eyWerk Prea1:iet// May Cefltttifl Material Prnteetea Uf1ae1•Feel.R. Crim. P. 6(e)
436,3,"should cease, or were you informed at any time that the project had been abandoned? If"
436,4,"yes, describe who you spoke with, when, the substance of the discussion(s), and why that"
436,5,decision was made.
436,6,f.       Did you have any discussions regarding what information would be provided publicly or
436,7,in response to investigative inquiries about potential or actual investments or business deals
436,8,"the Trump Organization had in Russia, including the Trump Moscow project? If yes,"
436,9,"describe who you spoke with, when, and the substance of the discussion(s)."
436,10,"g.       Aside from the Trump Moscow project, did you or the Trump Organization have any other"
436,11,"prospective or actual business interests, investments, or arrangements with Russia or any"
436,12,"Russian interest or Russian individual during the campaign? If yes, describe the business"
436,13,"interests, investments, or arrangements."
436,14,"Response to Question III , Parts (a) through (g)"
436,15,"Sometime in 2015, Michael Cohen suggested to me the possibility of a Trump Organization project"
436,16,"in Moscow. As I recall, Mr. Cohen described this as a proposed project of a general type we have"
436,17,done in the past in a variety of locations. I signed the non-binding Letter of Intent attached to your
436,18,questions as Exhibit B which required no equity or expenditure on our end and was consistent with
436,19,our ongoing efforts to expand into significant markets around the world.
436,20,"I had few conversations with Mr. Cohen on this subject. As I recall, they were brief, and they were"
436,21,"not memorable. I was not enthused about the proposal, and 1 do not recall any discussion of travel"
436,22,to Russia in connection with it. I do not remember discussing it with anyone else at the Trump
436,23,"Organization, although it is possible. I do not recall being aware at the time of any communications"
436,24,between Mr. Cohen or Felix Sater and any Russian government official regarding the Letter of
436,25,"Intent. In the course of preparing to respond to your questions, I have become aware that Mr."
436,26,"Cohen sent an email regarding the Letter of Intent to ""Mr. Peskov"" at a general, public email"
436,27,"account, which should show there was no meaningful relationship with people in power in Russia."
436,28,I understand those documents already have been provided to you.
436,29,I vaguely remember press inquiries and media reporting during the campaign about whether the
436,30,Trump Organization had business dealings in Russia. I may have spoken with campaign staff or
436,31,"Trump Organization employees regarding responses to requests for information, but 1 have no"
436,32,"current recollection of any particular conversation, with whom L may have spoken, when, or the"
436,33,"substance of any conversation. As I recall, neither I nor the Trump Organization had any projects"
436,34,or proposed projects in Russia during the campaign other than the Letter of Tntent.
436,35,IV.      Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Campaign
436,36,"a.       Prior to mid-August 2016 , did you become aware that Paul Manafort had ties to the"
436,37,"Ukrainian government? If yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, and"
436,38,the substance of what you were told. Did Mr. Manafort's connections to the Ukrainian or
436,39,15
436,40,C-20
436,41,NA
437,1,U.S. Department of Justice
437,2,"AtternC)""Werk Pretlttct // May Contain Material Pretcctctl Untlcr Fctl. R. Cri1t1.P. 6(c)"
437,3,Russian governments play any role in your decision to have him join your campaign? If
437,4,"yes, describe that role."
437,5,b.      Were you aware that Paul Manafort offered briefings on the progress of your campaign to
437,6,"Oleg Deripaska? lf yes, describe who you learned this information from, when, the"
437,7,"substance of what you were told, what you understood the purpose was of sharing such"
437,8,"information with Mr. Deripaska, and how you responded to learning this information."
437,9,c.      Were you aware of whether Paul Manafort or anyone else associated with your campaign
437,10,sent or directed others to send internal Trump campaign information to any person located
437,11,"in Ukraine or Russia or associated with the Ukrainian or Russian governments? If yes,"
437,12,"identify who provided you with this information, when, the substance of the discussion(s),"
437,13,"what you understood the purpose was of sharing the internal campaign information, and"
437,14,how you responded to learning this information.
437,15,"d.      Did Paul Manafort communicate to you, directly or indirectly. any positions Ukraine or"
437,16,"Russia would want the U.S. to support? If yes, describe when he communicated those"
437,17,positions to you and the substance of those communications.
437,18,"e.      During the campaign, were you told about efforts by Russian officials to meet with you or"
437,19,"senior members of your campaign? If yes, describe who you had conversations with on this"
437,20,"topic, when, and what you were told."
437,21,"f.      What role, if any, did you have in changing the Republican Party platform regarding"
437,22,"arming Ukraine during the Republican National Convention? Prior to the convention, what"
437,23,information did you have about this platform provision? After the platform provision was
437,24,"changed, who told you about the change, when did they tell you, what were you told about"
437,25,"why it was changed, and who was involved?"
437,26,"g.      On July 27, 2016, in response to a question about whether you would recognize Crimea as"
437,27,"Russian territory and lift sanctions on Russia, you said: ""We' ll be looking at that. Yeah,"
437,28,"we'll be looking."" Did you intend to communicate by that statement or at any other time"
437,29,during the campaign a willingness to lift sanctions and/or recognize Russia's annexation
437,30,of Crimea if you were elected?
437,31,1.      What consideration did you give to lifting sanctions and/or recognizing Russia's
437,32,annexation of Crimea if you were elected? Describe who you spoke with about this
437,33,"topic, when, the substance of the discussion(s)."
437,34,"Response to Question IV, Parts (a) through (d)"
437,35,"Mr. Manafort was hired primarily because of his delegate work for prior presidential candidates,"
437,36,"including Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bob Dole. I knew that Mr."
437,37,"Manafort had done international consulting work and, at some time before Mr. Manafort left the"
437,38,16
437,39,C-21
437,40,NA
438,1,U.S. Department of Justice
438,2,"Attertte:,· Werk Preettet // Ma:,· Cetttaitt Material Prnteetee Uttee1•Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
438,3,"campaign, I learned that he was somehow involved with individuals concerning Ukraine, but I do"
438,4,not remember the specifics of what I knew at the time.
438,5,l had no knowledge of Mr. Manafort offering briefings on the progress of my campaign to an
438,6,"individual named Oleg Deripaska, nor do I remember being aware of Mr. Manafort or anyone else"
438,7,associated with my campaign sending or directing others to send internal Trump Campaign
438,8,information to anyone I knew to be in Ukraine or Russia at the time or to anyone I understood to
438,9,be a Ukrainian or Russian government employee or official. I do not remember Mr. Manafort
438,10,communicating to me any particular positions Ukraine or Russia would want the United States to
438,11,support.
438,12,"Response to Question IV, Part (e)"
438,13,I do not recall being told during the campaign of efforts by Russian officials to meet with me or
438,14,"with senior members of my campaign. In the process of preparing to respond to these questions, I"
438,15,"became aware that on March 17, 2016, my assistant at the Trump Organization, Rhona Graff,"
438,16,"received an email from a Sergei Prikhodko, who identified himself as Deputy Prime Minister of"
438,17,"the Russian Federation, Foundation Roscongress, inviting me to participate in the St. Petersburg"
438,18,International Economic Forum to be held in June 2016. The documents show that Ms. Graff
438,19,prepared for my signature a brief response declining the invitation. I understand these documents
438,20,already have been produced to you.
438,21,"Response to Question IV, Part (t)"
438,22,"I have no recollection of the details of what, when, or from what source I first learned about the"
438,23,"change to the platform amendment regarding arming Ukraine, but I generally recall learning of the"
438,24,issue as pa1t of media reporting. I do not recall being involved in changing the language to the
438,25,amendment.
438,26,"Response to Question IV, Part (g)"
438,27,My statement did not communicate any position.
438,28,V.       Contacts with Russia and Russia-Related Issues During the Transition
438,29,"a.       Were you asked to attend the World Chess Championship gala oo November JO, 2016? If"
438,30,"yes, who asked you to attend, when were you asked, and what were you told about about"
438,31,[sic] why your presence was requested?
438,32,"1.      Did you attend any part of the event? If yes, describe any interactions you had with"
438,33,any Russians or representatives of the Russian government at the event.
438,34,17
438,35,C-22
438,36,NA
439,1,U.S. Department of Justice
439,2,AtterAey \\'erk Preettet // Ma)' Certtairt Material Preteetee Urteer Fee. R. Crim. P. 6(e1
439,3,"Response to Question V, Part (a)"
439,4,"I do not remember having been asked to attend the World Chess Champions hip gala, and I did not"
439,5,"attend the event. During the course of preparing to respond to these questions , I have become"
439,6,"aware of documents indicating that in March of 2016,the president of the World Chess Federation"
439,7,"invited the Trump Organization to host, at Trump Tower, the 2016 World Chess Championship"
439,8,Match to be held in New York in November 2016. r have also become aware that in November
439,9,"2016 , there were press inquiries to my staff regarding whether I had plans to attend the tournament ,"
439,10,which was not being held at Trump Tower. I understand these documents have already been
439,11,provided to you.
439,12,"Execut d on   NOfl&M,lf.rc,J,.0,              2018"
439,13,President of the United States
439,14,18
439,15,C-23
439,16,NA
440,1,U.S. Department of Justice
440,2,"AtterRe:,· Werk Preattet // May CatttaiR Material Preteetea Uttaer Fea. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
440,3,NA
441,1,U.S. Department of Justice
441,2,AMerttey Werk Prec:ittet// May Cetttaitt Material Preteetecl Uttc:ierFecl. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
441,3,AppendixD
441,4,NA
442,1,U.S. Department of Justice
442,2,"Attome:, Work Proattet // Ma:,-Cof!:tttif!:"
442,3,Ma:tefittlProteetea UHaef Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
442,4,NA
443,1,U.S. Department of Justice
443,2,"AttorHey Work Proattet // MB:)""CoHtB:iHMaterial Proteetea UHaer Fea . R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
443,3,APPENDIXD
443,4,"SPECIAL COUNSEL'S OFFICE TRANSFERRED , REFERRED, AND COMPLETED CASES"
443,5,"This appendix identifies matters transferred or referred by the Special Couns el's Office, as"
443,6,well as cases prosecuted by the Office that are now completed.
443,7,A. Transfers
443,8,The Special Counsel's Office has concluded its investigation into links and coordination
443,9,betwe en the Russian government and individuals associated with the Trump Campaign. Certain
443,10,matters assigned to the Office by the Acting Attorney General have not fully concluded as of the
443,11,"date of this report. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Office"
443,12,has transferred responsibility for those matters to other components of the Department of Justice
443,13,and the FBI. Those transfers include:
443,14,1. United States v. Bijan Rafiekian and Kami! Ekim Alptekin
443,15,US. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
443,16,(Awaiting trial)
443,17,"The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate, among other"
443,18,"things, po ssible criminal conduct by Michael Flynn in acting as an unregi stered agent for the"
443,19,"Government of Turkey . See August 2, 2017 Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S."
443,20,"Mueller, III. The Acting Attorn ey General later confirmed the Special Counsel's authorit y to"
443,21,"investigate Rafiekian and Alptekin becaus e they ""may have been jointly involved"" with Flynn in"
443,22,"FARA-related crimes. See October 20, 2017 Memorandum from Associate Depu ty Attorney"
443,23,General Scott Schools to Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein.
443,24,"On December 1, 2017 , Flynn pleaded guilty to an Information charging him with making"
443,25,false statements to the FBI about his contacts with the Ru ssian ambassador to the United States.
443,26,"As part of that plea, Flynn agreed to a Statement of the Offens e in which he acknowled ged that"
443,27,"the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) document s he filed on March 7, 2017 ""contained"
443,28,"materially false statements and omis sions."" Flynn ' s plea occurr ed before the Special Counsel had"
443,29,"made a final decision on whether to charge Rafiekian or Alptekin. On March 27, 2018, after"
443,30,"consultati on with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General , the Special Counsel ' s Office referred"
443,31,the investigation of Rafiekian and Alpt ekin to the National Security Divi sion (N SD) for any action
443,32,it deemed appropriate. The Special Counsel 's Office determined the referral was appropria te
443,33,"becau se the investigation of Flynn had been completed , and that investigation had provid ed the"
443,34,"rationale for the Office ' s investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin. At NS D' s request, the Eastern"
443,35,District of Virginia continued the investigation of Rafiekian and Alptekin .
443,36,2. United States v. Michael Flynn
443,37,US. Attorney's Officefor the District of Columbia
443,38,(A waiting sentencing)
443,39,0-1
443,40,NA
444,1,U.S. Department of Justice
444,2,At'lertle)' '.\'erk Preauet // Ma)'' CeAtaiA Material Preteetea UAaer Fee. R. Crim . P. 6(e)
444,3,3. United States v. Richard Gates
444,4,U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
444,5,(Awaiting sentencing)
444,6,"4. United States v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (Russian Social Media Campaign)"
444,7,U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
444,8,National Security Division
444,9,"(Post-indictment, pre-arrest & pre-trial 1)"
444,10,5. United States v. Konstanti n Kilimnik
444,11,U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
444,12,"(Post-indictment, pre-arrest)"
444,13,6. United States v. Paul Manafort
444,14,U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
444,15,U.S. Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia
444,16,(Post-conviction)
444,17,"7. United States v. Viktor Netyksho, et al. (Russian Hacking Operations)"
444,18,U.S. Attorney 's Office for the Western District of Pennsylvania
444,19,National Security Division
444,20,"(Post-indictment , pre-arrest)"
444,21,8. United States v. William Samuel Patten
444,22,U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
444,23,(Awaiting sentencing)
444,24,The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate aspects of
444,25,Patten's conduct that related to another matter that was under investigation by the Office. The
444,26,investigation uncovered evidence of a crime; the U.S . Attorney's Office for the District of
444,27,Columbia handled the prosecution of Patten.
444,28,9. Harm to Ongoing Matter
444,29,(Investigation ongoing)
444,30,"The Acting Attorney General authorized the Special Counsel to investigate , among other"
444,31,"things, crime or crimes arising out of payments Paul Manafort received from the Ukrainian"
444,32,"government before and during the tenure of President Viktor Yanukovych. See August 2, 2017"
444,33,"Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein to Robert S. Mueller , Ill. The Acting Attorney General"
444,34,"1 One defendant , Concord Management & Consulting LLC , appeared through counsel and is in pre-"
444,35,trial litigation.
444,36,D-2
444,37,NA
445,1,U.S. Department of Justice
445,2,Attorney Work Pree1:1et// May ContaiH Material Preteetee Uneer Fee. R. Criffl. P. 6(e)
445,3,",                                            !      Harm to Ongoing"
445,4,Matter
445,5,"On October 27, 2017, Paul Manafort and Richard Gates were charged in the District of"
445,6,Columbia with various crimes (including FARA) in connection with work they performed for
445,7,"Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine. On February 22, 2018, Manafort and Gates were"
445,8,charged in the Eastern District of Virginia with various other crimes in connection with the
445,9,payments they received for work performed for Russia-backed political entities in Ukraine .
445,10,"During the course of its                         , the Special Counsel's Office developed substantial"
445,11,evidence with respect to individuals and enti ies that wer
445,12,"On February 23, 2018, Gates pleaded guilty in the District of Columbia to a multi-"
445,13,object conspiracy and to making false statements; the remaining charges against Gates were
445,14,"dismissed .3 Thereafter, in consultation with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General, the Special"
445,15,Counsel's Office closed the                                        and referred them    1if•rn•  for further
445,16,investigation as it deemed appropriate. The Office based its decision to close those matters on its
445,17,"mandate, the indictments .ofManafort, Gates's plea, and its determination as to how best to allocate"
445,18,"its resources, among other reasons;"
445,19,At Harm to Ongoing Matter                                             d
445,20,the investigation of those closed matters.
445,21,10. United States v. Roger Stone
445,22,US . Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia
445,23,(Awaiting trial)
445,24,1 I. Harm to Ongoing Matter
445,25,(Investigation ongoing)
445,26,B. Referrals
445,27,"During the course of the investigation, the Office periodically identified evidence of"
445,28,potential criminal activity _that was outside the scope of the Special Counsel's jurisdiction
445,29,established by the Acting Attorney General. After consultation with the Office of the Deputy
445,30,"Attorney General, the Office referred that evidence to appropriate law enforcement authorities ,"
445,31,"principally other components of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Those referrals, listed"
445,32,3 Manafort was ultimately convicted at trial in the Eastern District of Virginia and pleaded guilty
445,33,"in the District of Columbia. See Vol. I, Section IV.A.8. The trial and plea happened after the transfer"
445,34,decision described here.
445,35,D-3
445,36,NA
446,1,U.S. Department of Justice
446,2,Att:orHe~·Work Proattet // Mtty CoHtttiHMutefittl Pfoteetea UHaef Fee. R. Cfiffl. P. G(e)
446,3,"alphabetically by subject, are summarized below."
446,4,2. Michael Cohen
446,5,"During the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel's Office uncovered evidence"
446,6,of potential wire fraud and FECA violations pertaining to Michael Cohen. That evidence was
446,7,referred to the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York and the FBI's New
446,8,York Field Office.
446,9,4.  lirllllll
446,10,"5.                                   Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP"
446,11,"During the course of the FARA investigation of Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, the Special"
446,12,Counsel's Office uncovered evidence of potential FARA violations pertaining to
446,13,"Gregory Cra ig, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Skadden) , and their work on behalf"
446,14,of the government of Ukraine .
446,15,"After consu ltation with the NSD, the evidence regarding Craig                          was"
446,16,"referred to NSD, and NSD elected to partne_r with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern"
446,17,District of New York and the FBI's New York Field Office. NSD later elected to partner on the
446,18,Craig matter with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia. NSD retained and
446,19,handled issues relating to Skadden itself.
446,20,6.
446,21,Harm to Ongoing Matter
446,22,0-4
446,23,NA
447,1,U.S . Department of Justice
447,2,"At:terAey Werk Pretittet // Ma, · CeAtaiA Material Preteeteti UAtier Feti. R. Crim. P. 6(e)"
447,3,Harm to Ongoing Matter
447,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
447,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
447,6,Harm to Ongoing Matter
447,7,D-5
447,8,NA
448,1,U .S. Department of Justice
448,2,Atterney Werk PreElttet// May Centttin Mtl-terittlPreteeteEIUnElerFeel. R. Crim. P. 6(e)
448,3,14.~
448,4,Harm to Ongoing Matter
448,5,Harm to Ongoing Matter
448,6,C. Completed Prosecutions
448,7,"In three cases prosecuted by the Special Counsel's Office, the defendants have completed"
448,8,or are about to complete their terms of imprisonment. Because no further proceedings are likely
448,9,"in any case, responsibility for them has not been transferred to any other office or component."
448,10,1. United States v. George Papadopoulos
448,11,"Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (December 7, 2018)"
448,12,2. United States v. Alex van der Zwaan
448,13,"Post-conviction, Completed term of imprisonment (June 4, 2018)"
448,14,3. United States v. Richard Pinedo
448,15,"Post-conviction , Currently in Residential Reentry Center (release date May 13, 2019)"
448,16,0-6
448,17,NA