{ "document": { "aggregate_severity": { "text": "critical" }, "category": "csaf_security_advisory", "csaf_version": "2.0", "distribution": { "tlp": { "label": "WHITE", "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/" } }, "lang": "en", "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.", "title": "Vulnerability Description" } ], "publisher": { "category": "other", "contact_details": "gdt@cpan.org", "name": "giterlizzi", "namespace": "https://github.com/giterlizzi/" }, "references": [ { "category": "self", "summary": "CPANSA-MojoX-Authentication-2026-86304 JSON", "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/giterlizzi/perl-CPANSA-CSAF/develop/csaf/white/2026/cpansa-mojox-authentication-2026-86304.json" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188", "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.004/source/lib/MojoX/Authentication/Model/SAML2.pm#L188" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes", "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/POLETTIX/MojoX-Authentication-0.006/source/Changes" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089", "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-18089" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "CVE-2026-86304 (NVD)", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86304" } ], "title": "MojoX-Authentication vulnerability", "tracking": { "current_release_date": "2026-09-06T00:00:00", "generator": { "engine": { "name": "CSAF Perl Toolkit", "version": "0.26" } }, "id": "CPANSA-MojoX-Authentication-2026-86304", "initial_release_date": "2026-09-06T00:00:00", "revision_history": [ { "date": "2026-09-06T00:00:00", "number": "1", "summary": "First release" } ], "status": "final", "version": "1" } }, "product_tree": { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:cpan/<0.006", "product": { "name": "MojoX-Authentication less than 0.006", "product_id": "CSAFPID-0001", "product_identification_helper": { "purl": "pkg:cpan/MojoX-Authentication" } } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:cpan/>=0.006", "product": { "name": "MojoX-Authentication greater than or equal 0.006", "product_id": "CSAFPID-0002", "product_identification_helper": { "purl": "pkg:cpan/MojoX-Authentication" } } } ], "category": "product_name", "name": "MojoX-Authentication" } ] }, "vulnerabilities": [ { "cve": "CVE-2026-86304", "cwe": { "id": "CWE-347", "name": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature" }, "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "MojoX::Authentication versions before 0.006 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass because parse_assertion builds Net::SAML2::Binding::POST without a trust anchor.\n\nparse_assertion in MojoX::Authentication::Model::SAML2 calls Net::SAML2::Binding::POST->new with no cacert, cert_text or anchors argument, then passes the returned XML to Net::SAML2::Protocol::Assertion->new_from_xml with the IdP signing certificate as cacert. In Net::SAML2 before 0.86 that certificate guards only encrypted assertions, so the signature on an unencrypted assertion is checked against the certificate the response itself carries.\n\nAn attacker starts a SAML login, then posts a response signed with a certificate of their own. The audience, InResponseTo and timestamp checks that follow are all satisfiable by the attacker, so the response authenticates any NameID it carries.", "title": "Vulnerability Description" } ], "product_status": { "fixed": [ "CSAFPID-0002" ], "known_affected": [ "CSAFPID-0001" ] }, "scores": [ { "cvss_v3": { "baseScore": 9.8, "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H", "version": "3.1" }, "products": [ "CSAFPID-0001" ] } ] } ] }