{ "document": { "category": "csaf_security_advisory", "csaf_version": "2.0", "distribution": { "tlp": { "label": "WHITE", "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/" } }, "lang": "en", "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata. Net::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse \"..\". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing \"..\" segments therefore resolves outside the download directory. Because the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.", "title": "Vulnerability Description" } ], "publisher": { "category": "other", "contact_details": "gdt@cpan.org", "name": "giterlizzi", "namespace": "https://github.com/giterlizzi/" }, "references": [ { "category": "self", "summary": "CPANSA-Net-BitTorrent-2026-57079 JSON", "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/giterlizzi/perl-CPANSA-CSAF/develop/csaf/white/2026/cpansa-net-bittorrent-2026-57079.json" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr", "url": "https://github.com/sanko/Net-BitTorrent.pm/security/advisories/GHSA-5wc6-r65f-62rr" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "CVE-2026-57079 (NVD)", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57079" } ], "title": "Net-BitTorrent vulnerability", "tracking": { "current_release_date": "2026-06-30T00:00:00", "generator": { "engine": { "name": "CSAF Perl Toolkit", "version": "0.26" } }, "id": "CPANSA-Net-BitTorrent-2026-57079", "initial_release_date": "2026-06-30T00:00:00", "revision_history": [ { "date": "2026-06-30T00:00:00", "number": "1", "summary": "First release" } ], "status": "final", "version": "1" } }, "product_tree": { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:cpan/>0", "product": { "name": "Net-BitTorrent greater than 0", "product_id": "CSAFPID-0001", "product_identification_helper": { "purl": "pkg:cpan/Net-BitTorrent" } } } ], "category": "product_name", "name": "Net-BitTorrent" } ] }, "vulnerabilities": [ { "cve": "CVE-2026-57079", "cwe": { "id": "CWE-22", "name": "Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')" }, "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "Net::BitTorrent versions through 2.0.1 for Perl write files outside the download directory via path traversal in peer-supplied metadata.\n\nNet::BitTorrent validates file path components only on the .torrent-file ingest path. The peer and magnet metadata path (_on_metadata_received, reached from the BEP09 ut_metadata extension) passes attacker-supplied file names straight to Storage::add_file and Storage::_parse_file_tree, where Path::Tiny's child() does not collapse \"..\". A v2 file tree key, a v1 files[].path element, or a single-file name containing \"..\" segments therefore resolves outside the download directory.\n\nBecause the peer also controls the piece hashes and the served bytes, content verification passes, so a malicious magnet or peer writes attacker-chosen content to an attacker-chosen path on the downloading host.", "title": "Vulnerability Description" } ], "product_status": { "known_affected": [ "CSAFPID-0001" ] }, "scores": [ { "cvss_v3": { "baseScore": 5.3, "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N", "version": "3.1" }, "products": [ "CSAFPID-0001" ] } ] } ] }