{
   "document": {
      "aggregate_severity": {
         "text": "critical"
      },
      "category": "csaf_security_advisory",
      "csaf_version": "2.0",
      "distribution": {
         "tlp": {
            "label": "WHITE",
            "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/"
         }
      },
      "lang": "en",
      "notes": [
         {
            "category": "description",
            "text": "Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.",
            "title": "Vulnerability Description"
         }
      ],
      "publisher": {
         "category": "other",
         "contact_details": "gdt@cpan.org",
         "name": "giterlizzi",
         "namespace": "https://github.com/giterlizzi/"
      },
      "references": [
         {
            "category": "self",
            "summary": "CPANSA-Net-OAuth-2026-72889 JSON",
            "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/giterlizzi/perl-CPANSA-CSAF/develop/csaf/white/2026/cpansa-net-oauth-2026-72889.json"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2",
            "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3",
            "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch",
            "url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/commit/c467adf45c8d77ac4b92ad78b3eebf949252ba7f.patch"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5",
            "url": "https://github.com/vurtdev/Net-OAuth/security/advisories/GHSA-c8rm-g5cm-4pf5"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes",
            "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Net-OAuth-0.33/changes"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2",
            "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/19/2"
         },
         {
            "category": "external",
            "summary": "CVE-2026-72889 (NVD)",
            "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72889"
         }
      ],
      "title": "Net-OAuth vulnerability",
      "tracking": {
         "current_release_date": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
         "generator": {
            "engine": {
               "name": "CSAF Perl Toolkit",
               "version": "0.26"
            }
         },
         "id": "CPANSA-Net-OAuth-2026-72889",
         "initial_release_date": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
         "revision_history": [
            {
               "date": "2026-08-19T00:00:00",
               "number": "1",
               "summary": "First release"
            }
         ],
         "status": "final",
         "version": "1"
      }
   },
   "product_tree": {
      "branches": [
         {
            "branches": [
               {
                  "category": "product_version_range",
                  "name": "vers:cpan/<0.33",
                  "product": {
                     "name": "Net-OAuth less than 0.33",
                     "product_id": "CSAFPID-0001",
                     "product_identification_helper": {
                        "purl": "pkg:cpan/Net-OAuth"
                     }
                  }
               },
               {
                  "category": "product_version_range",
                  "name": "vers:cpan/>=0.33",
                  "product": {
                     "name": "Net-OAuth greater than or equal 0.33",
                     "product_id": "CSAFPID-0002",
                     "product_identification_helper": {
                        "purl": "pkg:cpan/Net-OAuth"
                     }
                  }
               }
            ],
            "category": "product_name",
            "name": "Net-OAuth"
         }
      ]
   },
   "vulnerabilities": [
      {
         "cve": "CVE-2026-72889",
         "cwe": {
            "id": "CWE-347",
            "name": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature"
         },
         "notes": [
            {
               "category": "description",
               "text": "Net::OAuth versions before 0.33 for Perl allow the sender to choose the signature algorithm in verify.\n\nverify resolves the signature method class from the signature_method parameter of the incoming message. signature_method is required on every request, so the algorithm used to check a signature is chosen by whoever sent it, and nothing lets the verifying party pin the method instead. When a message names HMAC-SHA1 or HMAC-SHA256, the key is derived from consumer_secret and token_secret rather than from the key the provider deployed.\n\nA provider deployed on RSA-SHA1 holds only the consumer public key, and RFC 5849 does not use consumer_secret for that method, so the required parameter is filled with a placeholder. A client that names HMAC-SHA1 instead has its signature checked against that placeholder, so a guessable one is enough to forge requests for any consumer key and token.",
               "title": "Vulnerability Description"
            }
         ],
         "product_status": {
            "fixed": [
               "CSAFPID-0002"
            ],
            "known_affected": [
               "CSAFPID-0001"
            ]
         },
         "scores": [
            {
               "cvss_v3": {
                  "baseScore": 9.8,
                  "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
                  "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
                  "version": "3.1"
               },
               "products": [
                  "CSAFPID-0001"
               ]
            }
         ]
      }
   ]
}