{ "document": { "aggregate_severity": { "text": "high" }, "category": "csaf_security_advisory", "csaf_version": "2.0", "distribution": { "tlp": { "label": "WHITE", "url": "https://www.first.org/tlp/" } }, "lang": "en", "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured.\n\nverify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs \"return if !$anchors && !$cacert;\" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with \"return $xml unless $cacert;\".\n\nAny caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.", "title": "Vulnerability Description" } ], "publisher": { "category": "other", "contact_details": "gdt@cpan.org", "name": "giterlizzi", "namespace": "https://github.com/giterlizzi/" }, "references": [ { "category": "self", "summary": "CPANSA-Net-SAML2-2026-18089 JSON", "url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/giterlizzi/perl-CPANSA-CSAF/develop/csaf/white/2026/cpansa-net-saml2-2026-18089.json" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Binding/POST.pm#L21", "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Binding/POST.pm#L21" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm#L84", "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Protocol/Assertion.pm#L84" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Role/VerifyXML.pm#L32", "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.85/source/lib/Net/SAML2/Role/VerifyXML.pm#L32" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.88/source/Changes", "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/TIMLEGGE/Net-SAML2-0.88/source/Changes" }, { "category": "external", "summary": "CVE-2026-18089 (NVD)", "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18089" } ], "title": "Net-SAML2 vulnerability", "tracking": { "current_release_date": "2026-08-03T00:00:00", "generator": { "engine": { "name": "CSAF Perl Toolkit", "version": "0.26" } }, "id": "CPANSA-Net-SAML2-2026-18089", "initial_release_date": "2026-08-03T00:00:00", "revision_history": [ { "date": "2026-08-03T00:00:00", "number": "1", "summary": "First release" } ], "status": "final", "version": "1" } }, "product_tree": { "branches": [ { "branches": [ { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:cpan/<0.86", "product": { "name": "Net-SAML2 less than 0.86", "product_id": "CSAFPID-0001", "product_identification_helper": { "purl": "pkg:cpan/Net-SAML2" } } }, { "category": "product_version_range", "name": "vers:cpan/>=0.86", "product": { "name": "Net-SAML2 greater than or equal 0.86", "product_id": "CSAFPID-0002", "product_identification_helper": { "purl": "pkg:cpan/Net-SAML2" } } } ], "category": "product_name", "name": "Net-SAML2" } ] }, "vulnerabilities": [ { "cve": "CVE-2026-18089", "cwe": { "id": "CWE-295", "name": "Improper Certificate Validation" }, "notes": [ { "category": "description", "text": "Net::SAML2 versions before 0.86 for Perl allow SAML authentication bypass by verifying responses against the response-embedded certificate in verify_xml when no trust anchor is configured.\n\nverify_xml in Net::SAML2::Role::VerifyXML runs \"return if !$anchors && !$cacert;\" as soon as the XML::Sig check succeeds, and that check uses the X.509 certificate taken from the response's own dsig:KeyInfo/dsig:X509Certificate element, so an unanchored response is checked only against the key it carries. Binding::POST declares cacert as an optional Maybe[Str] with no default, so a POST binding built without one takes that path, and _verify_encrypted_assertion returns early the same way with \"return $xml unless $cacert;\".\n\nAny caller that constructs Binding::POST or calls Assertion->new_from_xml without a cacert, cert_text, or anchors argument accepts a response signed by an attacker generated key whose self-signed certificate is embedded in that response, authenticating an arbitrary assertion.", "title": "Vulnerability Description" } ], "product_status": { "fixed": [ "CSAFPID-0002" ], "known_affected": [ "CSAFPID-0001" ] }, "scores": [ { "cvss_v3": { "baseScore": 7.5, "baseSeverity": "HIGH", "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N", "version": "3.1" }, "products": [ "CSAFPID-0001" ] } ] } ] }