Eumenides, ll. 650–676, p. 167.

It cannot be necessary to remind any scholar who may read the foregoing translation, of the historical interest that attaches to this passage, and, indeed, to the whole conclusion of The Furies. A mere reference to Grote's "History of Greece" (Vol. IV., ch. 46), to Muller's "Dissertation on the Eumenides," and Oncken's "Athen und Hellas," will suffice to recall a vexed literary and historical problem, and the conflict of doctors who disagree.

But those unacquainted with the literature and politics of ancient Greece (and for such, of course, this translation is mainly intended) will hardly fail to have recognized, in the last part of the concluding drama, a definitely political and patriotic fervour which the legend of the House of Atreus seems hardly calculated to arouse. The cause of Orestes is decided in his favour; but it is impossible to feel that the theatrical interest of the drama is concentrated, as might be expected, on his acquittal: it has been shifted to the Tribunal of Areopagus, before which he is tried, and thence to the destiny of the Athenian race and its dependence on celestial and terrestrial deities.

The general explanation of this political turn and complexion given to the play is simple enough; the details are involved in great obscurity: and the precise attitude of Æschylus' mind to the politics of the day remains uncertain.

The Senate of Areopagus was at this time the object of a considerable popular jealousy. Of immemorial antiquity, and strengthened by the memory of its courage and patriotism at the time of the Persian invasion, it either had, or was believed to have, become oligarchical in its opinions and corrupt in its practice. Grote perhaps overstates the case against the Areopagus; and, in any case, his argument that, because the senate at Sparta was corrupt, that at Athens must have been so as well (Hist. IV., p. 105), should be received with caution. But there is every reason to trust his conclusion that the Areopagus, consisting almost entirely of ex-ministers, and claiming large judicial, censorial, and revisionary powers—a claim based on undefined prescription rather than on positive law—was a tribunal very unlikely to satisfy an expanding and restless democracy.

Justly or unjustly, such a popular feeling arose against it, and culminated in a measure—passed, after much resistance, by Ephialtes and Pericles, leaders of the popular party—by which the Areopagus was deprived of all its vague and comprehensive powers, and retained only the jurisdiction over homicide. This it was allowed to retain, not only on political, but also on religious grounds; in Grote's words, "the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion."

It might appear that the whole tenor of The Furies is to glorify the Areopagus in its hour of trial; and, consequently, that the political leaning of Æschylus, in this point at any rate, is obvious. Such a conclusion is, to some extent, fortified by Aristophanes' sketch of Æschylus, in the Frogs, as a stalwart champion and representative of old ideas.

On the other hand, it is plausibly urged that The Furies only glorifies the Areopagus as a tribunal for homicide, which function was expressly retained for it by Ephialtes and Pericles; that the policy of an alliance with Argos, unmistakably commended towards the close of the play, was a Periclean policy: in short, the Æschylus is advocating, or cordially acquiescing in, the Periclean ideas. It is even suggested that his opposition is directed against a certain reactionary innovation, so to speak, by which obsolete privileges of the Areopagus were to be revived, and that the close of The Furies is in reality an exhortation to all to be content with the high though limited jurisdiction left to the Areopagus, over matters of homicide.

There is here, it is plain, a literary and historical problem of considerable complexity, with which I do not think myself competent to deal. I will only hazard two opinions, of a negative kind. First, that the text of The Furies, however closely scanned, is not decisive enough in its allusions to enable us to measure the angle of Æschylus' political views with exactness. The solution of the problem must be sought elsewhere, if indeed it be soluble.

Secondly, that it is an error to treat the political references of a poet as the responsible utterances of a political leader; to demand the same consistency, or the same defence for inconsistency, from the former as from the latter.

Men's attitude of mind towards policy or institutions, secular or religious, comes under the cognizance of a poet and thinker long before it develops into a political force, or presents any point, of support or resistance, to a politician. From the speculative standpoint, a change, e.g., may be seen to be salutary or necessary, but the motives for which it is popularly demanded, base or dangerous. (No better illustration of this can be found, perhaps, than in Coleridge's Table Talk, and his attitude of mind towards reform, etc.) It is for party-leaders, like Ephialtes and Pericles, to deal strenuously and practically with the problems and forces of the hour; it is for Æschylus, as for Plato, to point independently to the wide scope, for good or for evil, opened up by political and judicial changes, or by a league with Argos.