τῶν εἰδῶν αὐτῆς The εἴδη meant are epic poetry, Tragedy, and Comedy, as is clear from 6, 1449 b 21, where the main subjects for consideration in the Poetics are enumerated. Lyric poetry, apart from an occasional reference to the Dithyramb and Nome, or the chorica in Tragedy, is ignored in the existing Poetics; and there is little or no reason to suppose it to have been discussed in the lost portion of the book. The probability is that, from the importance of its musical element, it belonged in Aristotle's classification of the arts to the theory of μελοποία rather than to that of poetry proper. The work of the two lyric poets Phrynis and Timotheus is put under the head of μελοποιία in Metaph. a 1, 993 b 15; and in the Problems, where Phrynichus is said to have been a μελοποιός rather than a tragedian (Probl. 18. 31, 920 II Διὰ τί οἱ περὶ Φρύνιχον ἦσαν μᾶλλον μελοποιοί; διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων ;), the same view is implied of the lyric parts of Tragedy. It is to be remembered too that Aristophanes in Ran. 1250 makes Euripides begin his criticism of the chorica in Aeschylus by calling him a κακὸς μελοποιός. For the antithesis in the text comp. 26, 1462 b 16 καὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδῶν. —Top. 1. 15, 106b 37 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων [scil. ὀνομάτων], ὅταν αὐτὸ πλεοναχῶς λέγηται, καὶ ἡ πτῶσις ἡ ἀπ᾿ αὐτοῦ πλεοναχῶς ῥηθήσεται, καὶ εἰ ἡ πτῶσις, καὶ αὐτό. —Eth. E. 7. 15, 1248 b 22 δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἱ πράξεις.

ἥν τινα δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἔχει = ὅ τι δύναται ἕκαστον: comp. Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 5 τούτων δὲ ὕβρις μὲν καὶ κέρδος τίνα ἔχουσι δύναμιν καὶ πῶς αἴτια, σχεδόν ἐστι φανερόν ... δῆλον δὲ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ καὶ τί δύναται καὶ πῶς αἰτία στάσεως. Each species of poetry has its special capacities, which enable it to do what the rest either cannot do at all or cannot do so well and effectively. Other Aristotelian instances of δύναμις with a sense approximating to our 'function' or 'effect' will be found in Bon. Ind. 206 b 29.

συνίστασθαι συνίστασθαι is a passive in 26, 1462 b 16, and probably also in 24, 1460 a 28. That it is a passive in the present passage is shown by the parallels, τοὺς συνεστῶτας εὖ μύθους in 7, 1450 b 32, and οὕτω συνεστάναι τὸν μῦθον in 14, 1453 b 4.

καλῶς ἕξειν : 13, 1453 a 12 τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον. — 24, 1459 b 12 τὰς διανοίας καὶ τὴν λέξιν ἔχειν καλῶς. As anything good of its kind may be said to be καλόν, so anything that is in the condition in which it ought to be is said to καλῶς ἔχειν (comp. Bon. Ind. 360 b 38).

ἔτι δὲ ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων scil. ἡ ποίησις. Many of the translators, however, suppose the subject to be ἕκαστον εἶδος ('ex quot et cujusmodi partibus constent singulae species,' Goulston). The question is considered in chap. 6 in reference to Tragedy, and in 24, 1450 b 10 in reference to epic poetry.

περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι μεθόδου : Soph. el. 33, 183 b 12 δεδήλωται δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τῆς αὐτῆς μεθόδου τῶν λόγων ἐστίν. The meaning of μέθοδος, a favourite word with Aristotle, has been discussed by Waitz, Org. 2 p. 297 (comp. Bon. Ind. 449 b 43).

λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κτέ. The language here is very like that in Soph. el. 1, 164 a 20 περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων . . . λέγωμεν ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων (comp. De sensu 1, 436 b; De part. an. 1. 5, 646 a 3; 2. 10, 655 b 28; Eth. E. 1. 7, 1217 a 18; Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 1). In order to determine the definition of poetry, or rather of Tragedy as the highest form of the art, Aristotle starts with the assumption that Tragedy, together with certain other allied arts, comes under the general head of μίμησις, 'imitation,' and then proceeds by successive divisions of this genus to note one by one the various points which differentiate it from the rest. (1) Tragedy has language, metre, and music as its means of imitation; the music in it, however, comes in only from time to time, in the choral parts—which distinguishes it from the Nome and the Dithyramb. (2) It represents noble personages—which distinguishes it from Comedy. (3) It has a dramatic form—which distinguishes it from the Epic. The logical order here exemplified is what Aristotle regards as the natural order of procedure: Phys. 1. 7, 189 a 31 ἔστι γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τὰ κοινὰ πρῶτον εἰπόντας οὕτω τὰ περὶ ἕκαστον ἴδια θεωρεῖν.

ἐποποιία κτέ. This enumeration of imitative arts comprises the four great species of poetry distinguished by Plato in Rep. 394 c, together with two purely musical arts, αὐλητική and κιθαριστική. These last may be supposed to be added partly on account of the manifest analogy between them and poetry, both being imitative arts appealing to the ear, and partly also on account of the historical connexion of poetry with music (comp. Cicero De Orat. 3, 174 musici, qui erant quondam idem poetae).

ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις : 6, 1449 b 26 ἡ τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις. — Plato Gorg. 501 e ἡ τῶν διθυράμβων ποίησις; 502 b ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις.

διθυραμβοποιητική Plato cites the Dithyramb as an instance of the non-imitative type of poetry: Rep. 394 c τῆς ποιήσεως . . . ἡ μὲν διὰ μιμήσεως ὅλη ἐστίν, ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις, τραγῳδία τε καὶ κωμῳδία, ἡ δὲ δι᾽ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ εὕροις δ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν μάλιστά που ἐν διθυράμβοις. By Aristotle's time, however, the Dithyramb (as also the Nome) had lost its original form, and become 'imitative' or semi-dramatic. This change is noted in Probl. 19. 15, 918 b 18 οἱ διθύραμβοι, ἐπειδὴ μιμητικοὶ ἐγένοντο, οὐκέτι ἔχουσιν ἀντιστρόφους, πρότερον δὲ εἶχον. Aristotle cites it as representing an imitative or dramatic form of lyric—a lyrical μίμησις.

τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη : De Caelo 3. 1, 298 b 2 τὴν πλείστην τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίας. The αὐλός was the accompaniment of the Dithyramb and the κιθάρα of the Nome. Aristotle is thinking rather of music without words, i.e. ψιλὴ αὔλησις and ψιλὴ κιθάρισις. Plato in the Laws (669 d) sets his face against this purely instrumental music on the ground that it ends in a mere display of technical execution (θαυματουργία) and a 'brutish noise' (φωνῆς θηριώδους σφόδρα φίλον). Aristotle's qualified form of expression show he is not unaware of exceptions.

μιμήσεις The general meaning of μιμεῖσθαι is either 'to do what another has done', or 'to make something like something else'. The primitive sense must have been 'to play the μίμος,' to reproduce language, tones, gestures, etc.. In actual use the word includes counterfeiting movement (dancer), voice (musician), and forms (painter/sculptor). Plato in the Republic opposes μίμησις to narrative, restricting it to the dramatic mode (Rep. 393 b, 394 b). In the Poetics, Aristotle is inconsistent, including narrative in one place (3, 1448 a 21) and excluding it in another (24, 1460 a 9).

τὸ σύνολον qualifies πᾶσαι, what is said of the class as a whole being opposed to the specific differences; comp. Plato Soph. 220 b.

τῷ γένει ἑτέροις Forchhammer's correction τῷ ἐν ἑτέροις is supposed to be confirmed by 22 and b 29. The sense, however, is just as well expressed by the simple dative. As the means under consideration—λόγος, ἁρμονία, and ῥυθμός—differ in kind, they are rightly described as γένει ἕτερα. Aristotle often omits the article in such formulas: Top. 1. 7, 103 a 13 γένει ταὐτά; H. A. 2. 1, 497 b 9; Metaph. I 10, 1059 a 14 γένει ἕτερα.

ἢ τῷ ἕτερα ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως The distinction is already in Plato, Rep. 398 b ἅ τε γὰρ λεκτέον καὶ ὡς λεκτέον εἴρηται.

καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον Other instances of parallelismus antitheticus will be found in 3, 1448 a 22; 6, 1449 b 26; 15, 1454 a 30; 24, 1460 a 16.

ὥσπερ γὰρ κτέ. Aristotle prepares us for the difference of means in these arts by pointing to the difference of means in a larger group. The distinction between arts addressing the eye and the ear is frequently noted by Plato (Rep. 373 b, 603 b; Crat. 423 d; Gorg. 474 e). Aristotle has a special reason for saying ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, because the imitative capacity of the voice renders language and poetry possible: Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 21 ὑπῆρξε δὲ καὶ ἡ φωνὴ πάντων μιμητικώτατον τῶν μορίων ἡμῖν.

πολλά is not otiose. The art of the painter or sculptor has limits; it can only indirectly express character and feeling. The theory in Lessing's Laocoon is based on an idea already in Aristotle.

μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες : Xenophon Mem. 3. 10. 1 σώματα διὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἀπεικάζοντες ἐκμιμεῖσθε.

οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας is thrown in parenthetically, like 8, 1451 a 24 ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν. As opposed to τέχνη, συνήθεια means much the same as ἐμπειρία (Eth. N. 8. 7, 1158 a 14; 10. 10, 1181 a 9). The contrast is between skill depending on practice and that directed by consciousness of rules.

ἕτεροι δὲ corresponds to a foregoing τινές in Eth. N. 1. 1, 1094 b 18.

διὰ τῆς φωνῆς = τῇ φωνῇ. Aristotle has allowed himself to repeat the prepositional construction used in the parenthesis. The emendation of Madius, διὰ τῆς φύσεως, ignores the whole point of the analogy: the diversity of means. The diversity of means in the group under consideration—λόγος, ῥυθμός, and ἁρμονία—is like the diversity of χρώματα, σχήματα, and φωνή.

ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ The three terms had already appeared in the same sense in Plato's analysis of the song or choral in Rep. 398 D τὸ μέλος ἐκ τριῶν ἐστι συγκείμενον, λόγου τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ (comp. Laws 661 C; 669 D). His terminology, however, is not always quite the same; he sometimes says ῥυθμὸς καὶ μέτρον (Phil. 17 D, Gorg. 502 C) or μέτρον καὶ ῥυθμός (Rep. 601 A) in lieu of ῥυθμός; and μέλος, 'melody' or 'tune', in lieu of ἁρμονία (Rep. 400 A, Gorg. 502 C, Laws 656 C, etc.). Aristotle also, in more than one passage in the Poetics (1, 1447 b 25; 6, 1449 b 31), has put μέλος in place of ἁρμονία; and in one instance (6, 1449 b 29) he combines the two terms as synonyms. It is clear, therefore, that in its present application ἁρμονία means no more than 'melody' or 'tune'. ῥυθμός is properly 'time' or 'pace'. It is a very general word, since it includes the element of rhythm in language and in the movements of the dance, as well as that in music; comp. Plato Laws 665 A τῇ δὴ τῆς κινήσεως τάξει [scil. εἶπομεν ὡς] ῥυθμὸς ὄνομα εἴη, τῇ δ᾿ αὖ τῆς φωνῆς, τοῦ τε ὀξέος ἅμα καὶ βαρέος συγκεραννυμένων, ἁρμονία ὄνομα προσαγορεύοιτο, χορεία δὲ τὸ ξυναμφότερον κληθείη. — 672 E Ὅλη μέν που χορεία ὅλη παίδευσις ἦν ἡμῖν, τούτου δ᾿ αὖ τὸ μὲν ῥυθμοί τε καὶ ἁρμονίαι, τὸ κατὰ τὴν φωνήν... τὸ δέ γε κατὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κίνησιν ῥυθμὸν μὲν κοινὸν τῇ τῆς φωνῆς εἶχε κινήσει, σχῆμα δ᾿ ἴδιον. ἐκεῖ δὲ μέλος ἡ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις (see also Symp. 187 B and Phil. 17 C). The various applications of ῥυθμός are thus summarized in Aristoxenus (p. 411, 8 Marquard): ἔστι δὲ τὰ ῥυθμιζόμενα τρία· λέξις, μέλος, κίνησις σωματική. Plato's view as to the great imitative capacities of rhythm and harmony and music generally may be seen in Rep. 399 A sqq., in Laws 668 A sqq., and more briefly put, in Laws 798 E τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικήν ἐστι τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων και χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων. The point is recognized with equal clearness by Aristotle in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 18 ἔστι δ᾿ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ᾿ ἀνδρείας καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν... (a38) ἐν δὲ τοῖς μέλεσιν αὐτοῖς ἔστι μιμήματα τῶν ἠθῶν ... (a57) τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμούς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας.

χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις : a reminiscence of Plato Laws 669 D διασπῶσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ῥυθμὸν μὲν καὶ σχήματα μέλους χωρίς, λόγους ψιλοὺς εἰς μέτρα τιθέντες, μέλος δ᾿ αὖ καὶ ῥυθμὸν ἄνευ ῥημάτων, ψιλῇ κιθαρίσει τε καὶ αὐλήσει προσχρώμενοι.

χρώμεναι , scil. ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

τυγχάνουσιν On the construction with κἂν see Vahlen, Beitr. 1, p. 35. Mr. Newman in a note on Pol. 2. 1, 1260 b 31 seems to doubt the necessity of restoring the indicative in this and other similar places in Aristotelian texts.

ἡ τῶν συρίγγων The word to be supplied is apparently μίμησις— not τέχνη, as is assumed in HSt. s.v. σύριγξ, and in Bon. Ind. 735 a 39. The Platonic ἡ τῶν λόγων τέχνη in Phaedr. 260 D is not a true parallel. For a similar genitive after μίμησις comp. Lucian De salt. 64 ἡ μίμησις τῆς ὀρχήσεως.

αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ κτἑ. is an unnecessary clause, as ὀρχηστική is not one of the arts in the list in a13 ; it will be observed too that there is a change in the form of expression, μιμοῦνται, instead of χρώμεναι with ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν understood. The clause would seem to have been originally an afterthought, worked in by Aristotle as soon as he saw that there was an art that used rhythm alone. His giving a reason for this mention of ὀρχηστική may be supposed to imply a consciousness of its being a new point, and one requiring demonstration.

αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν The traditional reading οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν has been corrected into ἔνιοι τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Twining ; into οἱ (πολλοί) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Heinsius; and into οἱ (χαρίεντες) τῶν ὀρχηστῶν by Zeller. It is assumed that Aristotle may have wished to recognize the fact, of which Plato had spoken in Laws 795 E, that dancing is sometimes a mere exercise of the body and without dramatic meaning. A much simpler correction, however, is αἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν, with μιμήσεις (rather than τέχναι) understood from the context. Aristotle is thinking of the professional dancers, who told a story in pantomime, by the mere movements and attitudes of their bodies (comp. Sittl, Die Gebärden der Gr. u. Röm. p. 244).

σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν : the rhythms in their movements, in the succession of their σχήματα, their gestures or attitudes (see on 26, 1462 a 3). The emphasis is on ῥυθμῶν; that the attitudes of the dancer might be dramatic, and represent 'what men do or have done to them', was too obvious to require saying. Aristotle is insisting on the 'ethical' significance which rhythm imparts to the dance. On rhythm as expressive of character and temperament see Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 18 and the Platonic passages referred to on 22.

ἤθη : the character and temperament of the personages represented, as distinct from their πάθη καὶ πράξεις, 'what they do or have done to them'. The meaning of πάθη καὶ πράξεις is sufficiently shown by 9, 1451 b 11 τί ᾿Αλκιβιάδης ἔπραξεν ἢ τί ἔπαθεν, and 13, 1453 a 22 παθεῖν δεινὰ ἢ ποιῆσαι (see also on 11, 1452 b). πάθη is generally assumed (e. g. in Bon. Ind. 557 a 49) to denote in this passage 'feelings' or 'emotions'. The words πάθη καὶ πράξεις cover the whole ground of the story in the dance; so that Aristotle, if he had cared to anticipate the term used later on in 6, 1450 a 4, might have said here, without difference of meaning, ἤθη καὶ μύθους.

ἡ δὲ [ἐποποιία] κτέ. Suckow's correction, τυγχάνει οὖσα, is to be found in his Form der Platonischen Schriften p. 53. With it, and the readings implied in the Arabic Version, the whole passage becomes intelligible and in harmony with the context. We were told at the outset in 22 that the three means of imitation, ῥυθμός, λόγος, and ἁρμονία, may be employed either singly or in certain combinations. Having just spoken (1) of imitation ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ and (2) of imitation ἐν ῥυθμῷ alone, Aristotle passes on (3) to imitation ἐν λόγῳ—whether alone, or in combination with rhythm or metre, and finally (4) to imitation ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ καὶ ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ. This exhausts the possibilities, since it is evident that ἁρμονία alone, and the combination ἁρμονία + λόγος, need not be taken into account. The third of his four heads Aristotle divides, and recognizes three possible forms of means, (1) λόγος alone, (2) λόγος + some one kind of metre, and (3) λόγος + a plurality of metres. In other words he distinguishes between (1) imitations in prose, (2) imitations in some one metre (hexameters, trimeters, etc.), and (3) imitations in a plurality of metres. Of this large and well-marked class of imitative literature, which includes the Mime, the 'imaginary conversations' of Socrates, the Epic, and Chaeremon's Centaur, Aristotle observes that it has 'remained to this day without a distinctive name'. The common fact here is μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ, but there is, he says, no one common name connoting the common fact and equally applicable to all the kinds within the class. Those who retain ἐποποιία, with the addition of ἀνώνυμος at the end of the sentence, suppose it to mean 'word-poetry' (Wortdichtung, Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81). Such a special and unique sense, however, for a term like ἐποποιία is highly improbable, and also against the analogy of all the similar compounds (e.g. λογοποιία, μελοποιία, μυθοποιία, ὀνοματοποιία), in which the ποιία means simply the making of something, just as much as in ἀρτοποιία, ὁδοποιία, παιδοποιία and the like. And even if the word could bear its new meaning, it would be inappropriate here, as the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversation' were prose imitations—not poems. To a Greek of Aristotle's time the idea of a prose poem would have seemed a contradiction in terms.

τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις = τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις ψιλοῖς: comp. 2, 1448 a 11 τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν. ψιλοῖς, which in this connexion means χωρίς ἁρμονίας, 'without melody' (v. Tyrwhitt ad loc. and Bon. Ind. 433b29), differentiates this group of imitative arts from the semi-musical arts considered later on, at the end of the chapter; comp. Plato Phaedr. 278 C ποίησιν ψιλὴν ἢ ἐν ᾠδῇ συντέθηκε, and Laws 669 D (quoted on 23). λόγοις ψιλοῖς has been taken by several (including Bon. Ind. 862b31) to mean 'prose' in the present passage—a sense which ψιλὸς λόγος has no doubt in a good many instances, e. g. in Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 14, 33. But there is nothing in the general meaning of the word to necessitate this interpretation here. ψιλός means simply 'by itself', without some accessory, whatever the accessory thus excluded may happen to be (v. HSt. s. v.). ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. μέτρα has to be understood in the concrete sense of 'kinds of verse', i. e. as equivalent to λόγοι ἔμμετροι or λόγοι + ῥυθμός. Aristotle remembers that the literary form of imitation is generally in verse, and accordingly adds ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. The addition, however, has a sort of reflex influence on the general term λόγοις which precedes it, and by the contrast it suggests gives the word for the moment the special sense of 'prose', as distinct from verse. Other instances of a general term with its meaning modified by what follows will be found in 22, 1458 a 28 and 25, 1460 b 11. The logical scheme of the statement in 29—b 23 may be thus exhibited:— Language without music prose verse in some one kind of metre in a plurality of metres Plato has the same division in Laws 810 B, where he is protesting against the divorce of poetry and literature from music: πρὸς δὲ δὴ μαθήματα ἄλυρα ποιητῶν κείμενα ἐν γράμμασι, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ᾽ ἄνευ [ῥυθμῶν τμημάτων], δὴ συγγράμματα κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον, τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας, σφαλερὰ γράμμαθ ἡμῖν ἐστι παρά τινων καταλελειμμένα. Here ἄλυρα corresponds to Aristotle's ψιλοῖς, τοῖς μὲν μετὰ μέτρων τοῖς δ᾽ ἄνευ to his τοῖς λόγοις ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, and κατὰ λόγον εἰρημένα μόνον τητώμενα ῥυθμοῦ τε καὶ ἁρμονίας to his μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς.

ἀνώνυμος : Phys. 5. 2, 226 b 26 ἡ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν κίνησις ἀλλοίωσις ἔστω τοῦτο γὰρ ἐπέζευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα . . . ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν τὸ μὲν κοινὸν ἀνώνυμον, καθ᾽ ἑκάτερον δ᾽ αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις. — De anima 2. 7, 418 a 26 ὁρατὸν δ᾽ ἔστιν χρῶμά τε, καὶ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν. — H. A. 10. 40, 623 b 5 ἔστι δέ τι γένος τῶν ἐντόμων, ἑνὶ μὲν ὀνόματι ἀνώνυμόν ἐστιν. — Pol. 3. 1, 1275 a 30 ἀνώνυμον τὸ κοινὸν ἐπὶ δικαστοῦ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστοῦ. For other instances see Bon. Ind. 69b2. Aristotle has often to speak of a class as being still without a name, because its existence has not yet been recognized by ordinary thought (comp. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 81).

τυγχάνει οὖσα . Similarly in De sensu 5, 447 b 7 Thurot would restore ὑπάρχει οὖσα for υπάρχουσα.

ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν : scil. ὄνομα; comp. Meteor. 4. 9, 387 b 2 οὐ γὰρ κεῖται ὄνομα κοινόν. — H. A. 4. 7, 531 b 22 οὐκ ἐπέζευκται κοινὸν ὄνομα οὐδέν.

τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους . The surviving fragments (Kaibel, CGF. 1 pp. 152 and 182) show that the mimes of Sophron and Xenarchus were in prose (comp. Bernhardy, Gr. Litt. 2. 2 p. 533). And as their very name is suggestive of μίμησις, Aristotle points to them as an indisputable example of prose-imitation, μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ χωρὶς ἁρμονίας καὶ ῥυθμοῦ. A very similar view of them is implied in a fr. of the dialogue περὶ ποιητῶν (72 Teubn.): οὐκοῦν οὐδὲ ἐμμέτρους τοὺς καλουμένους Σώφρονος μίμους μὴ φῶμεν εἶναι λόγους καὶ μιμήσεις, ἢ τοὺς Ἀλεξαμενοῦ τοῦ Τηίου τοὺς πρώτους γραφέντας τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 82; Kaibel l. c., p. 152) . The fr. makes it clear that Aristotle saw a certain affinity between the Mime and the 'Socratic Conversations' of Alexamenus ; and with it before us, it is not difficult to divine the reason for the juxtaposition of the Mime and the Σωκρατικὸς λόγος in the present passage of the Poetics ; the two things differed in name, but at the same time they had an essential element in common, that of being prose-imitations, μιμήσεις ἐν λόγῳ, and not (like poetry) ἐν μέτρῳ.

τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους As used here and in Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 20, the term Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι must be taken to cover the ground of the whole of this species of literature, the 'Socratic Conversations' not only of Alexamenus, but also of Plato, Aeschines and the rest (comp. Joel, Archiv f. Gesch. der Phil. 8, 468). A certain resemblance between the Platonic Dialogue and the Mime is presupposed in the story (Duris fr. 45 in Müller, FHG. 2 p. 480) of Plato having been a zealous student and imitator of Sophron. It is difficult, therefore, to agree with Teichmüller's view, that Aristotle's intention was to contrast the Mime and the Dialogue, and insist on the difference between them.

οὐδὲ εἰ : De interpr. 11, 20 b 25 οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἐρώτησις μία οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν ἀληθής. — 14, 24 a 3 οὐδὲν διοίσει οὐδ᾽ ἂν καθόλου τιθῶμεν τὴν κατάφασιν. — Soph. el. 11, 171 b 12 τὰ γὰρ ψευδογραφήματα οὐκ ἐριστικά . . . οὐδέ γ εἴ τί ἐστι ψευδογράφημα περὶ ἀληθές. At this point Aristotle runs off into a digression (comp. 9, 1451 b 1) in order to minimize the importance of the element of metre in the imitative forms of literature. Even if a mime and a dialogue were both written in verse, either in some one (b11-12) or in several kinds of metre (b 20), they would still be without a common name connoting the μίμησις in them, which is their essential point of agreement. The writer of such a versified mime or dialogue might no doubt be described in ordinary parlance as an ἐποποιός or ἐλεγειοποιός, or by some similar name indicating the kind of verse in which his work happens to be written. Names of this kind, however, are misleading, since they imply that the verse rather than the μίμησις embodied in it is the essence of the literary form of imitation. Metre, in Aristotle's view, is only one of the accidents of poetry.

ἐλεγειοποιοὺς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιοὺς There is no need to understand, still less insert, τοὺς μὲν before ἐλεγειοποιούς (v. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 265); comp. the instances cited by Vahlen (ad loc.); to which may be added Soph. el. 21, 178 a 3, Metaph. Δ 28, 1024 a 33.

οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν = ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν. For the position of the negative comp. Plato Phaed. 77 E ὡς δεδιότων... πειρῶ ἀναπείθειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μὴ ὡς ἡμῶν δεδιότων, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως ἔνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παῖς, ὅστις τὰ τοιαῦτα φοβεῖται.

Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ In a fragment (fr. 70 Teubn.) of the dialogue he is declared to have been a master of all the resources of epic language: Ομηρικὸς ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ δεινὸς περὶ τὴν φράσιν γέγονε, μεταφορικός τ᾽ ὧν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῖς περὶ ποιητικὴν ἐπιτεύγμασι χρώμενος. This is not inconsistent with the present passage; Aristotle's meaning is that, though Empedocles may be a poet in his form, he is not a poet in his matter. A philosophic poem comes under the head of what the ancients termed didascalice, its purpose being to teach or instruct, rather than to interest us in a μίμησις, a picture of life and manners. That Empedocles was not in any real sense a poet is implied in Plato Theaet. 152 E καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμφερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος — where Empedocles, it will be observed, is put into distinct contrast with Homer. This view of him is more clearly stated in later writers, e.g. in Plutarch, De aud. poet. 16 C τὰ δ᾽ Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηριακά Νικάνδρου καὶ γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος λόγοι εἰσὶ κεχρημένοι παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὥσπερ ὄχημα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν διαφύγωσιν. — Schol. Dionys. Thr. p. 166. 13 Hilgard οὐκ ἔστι ποιητὴς ὁ μέτρῳ μόνῳ χρώμενος· οὐδὲ γὰρ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ὁ τὰ φυσικὰ γράψας, οὐδὲ οἱ περὶ ἀστρολογίας εἰπόντες, οὐδὲ ὁ Πύθιος ἐμμέτρως χρησμῳδῶν.

ποιητὴν The poet is tacitly assumed to be a μιμητὴς ἐν μέτροις (comp. 24, 1460 a 7; 25, 1460 b 8).

ὁμοίως recalls the idea of the original assertion in b9, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικούς λόγους. Vahlen quotes Eth. N. 1. 12, 1101 b 21 δῆλον ὅτι τῶν ἀρίστων οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος ... ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν where οὐκ ἔστιν ἔπαινος is to be understood. ὁμοίως often represents the apodosis of a conditional sentence (v. An. pr. 1. 9, 30 b 1; 1. 14, 33 a 12; 1. 38, 49 a 1; De caelo 1. 4, 271 a 13; 2. 4, 287 a 19; De anima 1. 1, 402 b 8). The equivalent τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον is used in just the same way in An. pr. 2. 24, 69 a 11 τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κἂν εἰ διὰ πλειόνων τῶν ὁμοίων ἡ πίστις γίνοιτο.

Χαιρήμων For the little that remains of his see Nauck, TGF. p. 784. Aristotle terms it a ῥαψῳδία as though it were a sort of epic; and it is clear that in 24, 1460 a 2 he still regards it as coming under that head. If Athenaeus 608 e speaks of it as a δρᾶμα πολύμετρον, the explanation is that such a bizarre experiment in literature might very well be placed in more than one class. The title was no doubt taken from its subject; not from its monstrous combination of metres, as Welcker imagines (). There were several comedies (Kock, CAF. 3 p. 698) and also an ode (by Lasus of Hermione) with this or a very similar title.

ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων : to be taken with μικτὴν (comp. Vahlen, Aristotelische Aufsätze 2 p. 42). ἁπάντων must be an exaggeration, since it is inconceivable that every kind of metre was represented in Chaeremon's poem. Similar instances of overstatement are to be found in b28 (πᾶσιν), in 18, 1455 b 33 (τὸ ὅλον), in 22, 1458 a 34 (ἅπαντα), and in De anima 2. 6, 418 a 11, 19 (v. Rodier ad loc.).

καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον This clause has been altered in some apographs into (οὐκ ἤδη καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον and in others into καὶ (τοῦτον) ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον. Various other corrections have been recently suggested, e. g. κατὰ (τοῦτο) ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον (M. Schmidt), δικαίως ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον (Ueberweg), καίτοι ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον (Rassow and Gomperz). Susemihl omits the clause (with Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 38), but finds a place for προσαγορευτέον by inserting it after ποιητήν in b20. The clause (if we retain the reading of the MS.) seems to come in in much the same way as that in b18, διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν. As an illustration of the third of his three possibilities (comp. Vahlen, Beitr. 1 p. 4) Aristotle cites Chaeremon's Centaur; and his assumption is that, as a work of this description is a μίμησις (comp. a21 ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν) and also in verse (b22 ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν μέτρων), the author is a μιμητὴς ἐν μέτροις, and therefore rightly regarded as a poet, though popular language does not give him a special name of the type of those considered in the preceding section (b13-19). The argument, therefore, will come to this: If a mime and a dialogue were written in a medley of metres, the writers would have to be recognized as poets; but we should have no common name for the two works themselves, notwithstanding their similarity in form as well as nature. Some such meaning seems to be demanded by the general logic of the argument, which is directed to show that not only the prose forms of the literary 'imitation', but also the various poetic forms of it are 'to this day' without a general name (a9 ἀνώνυμος τυγχάνει οὖσα μέχρι τοῦ νῦν). The only difficulty is to see how the clause καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον is brought in. Vahlen (ad loc.) takes it as following after the apodosis implied in ὁμοίως—'adnecti non positae sed cogitatae apodosi sententiam (καὶ ποιητὴν προσαγορευτέον)'. I suspect that it was primarily meant to apply to Chaeremon, and that it is loosely subjoined to what is said of him in the context, as an assertion of his claim to be ranked among the poets in spite of his metrical absurdities. The question may perhaps be asked: If it was possible to give ποιητής the sense assumed for it in this chapter and elsewhere, why did not Aristotle recognize the word ποίημα as an equally legitimate 'common name' for all the various species of verse-imitation? The answer may perhaps be this, that he thought it to be (like ἐποποιός, ἐλεγειοποιός, etc.) too directly suggestive of the metrical form (comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 30), which he puts aside as only one of the accidents even of the poetical 'imitation'. The term 'Poet', as used by most of the ancients, is the subject of a valuable inquiry by H. Weil (, p. 237), who shows that the nearest modern representative of it is 'author' or 'composer'. Its primary meaning is the man who writes the words, or composes the music, in contradistinction to the rhapsodists, actors, singers or musicians, who present the work to the public (comp. Plato Rep. 373 C ποιηταί τε καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ῥαψῳδοί, ὑποκριταί, χορευταί, κτέ.). But as the literary work which had to be thus recited or sung was by custom in verse, the 'poet' was also a writer of verses. The idea of verse in fact became part of the conventional meaning of the word—as also of the verb ποιεῖν, which often means to write or say in verse; the compounds, likewise, ἐποποιός, ἐλεγειοποιός, etc., all denote writers of some kind of verse. ποιεῖν is thus opposed to λέγειν, to speak in prose, and the ποιητής either to the συγγραφεύς, who writes prose, or to the ἰδιώτης, the ordinary man who speaks in prose. Another association attaching to the word had its origin in the matter with which early Greek poetry was connected. The poet was distinguished from the historian or chronicler by the fact that he was so constantly dealing with a remote or legendary past, in the treatment of which there was ample room for play of imagination. All the great poetical subjects are classed by Plato under the general head of 'myths' or fictions (Rep. 377 A and 382 D; comp. Xenophanes fr. 1, 21 Diels); and it was an understood thing that a free use of fiction was one of the privileges of the poet: Solon fr. 29 Bergk πολλά ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί. — Isocrates 195 e τῶν γε παλαιῶν καθόδων αὗται μάλιστ᾽ εὐδοκιμοῦσιν, ἂς παρὰ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀκούομεν· οὗτοι γὰρ οὐ μόνον τῶν γεγενημένων τὰς καλλίστας ἡμῖν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν καινὰς συντιθέασιν (also Horace A. P. 9). This recognition of an element of fiction in poetry is perhaps the nearest approach the ancients make to our idea of 'poetic creation'. The ordinary conception in antiquity of the poet was that he was, just like the painter (v. Poet. 15, 1454 b 9, and 25, 1460 b 8), an imitator, and that his work was not so much a creation as a copy, more or less faithful, of something already existing in legend or life.

μέλει = ἁρμονίᾳ in the scheme in 22.

μέτρῳ , which now takes the place of the original term λόγῳ in 22, has the concrete sense of 'verse' or versified language, i.e. as equivalent to λόγος ἔμμετρος or λόγος + ῥυθμός (comp. 4, 1448 b 21). It is an ill-chosen word, therefore, as it says too much, and, if understood strictly, would make the ῥυθμῷ with which the enumeration begins, a superfluity.

αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος As Teichmüller points out, πᾶσιν repeats the πᾶσι in 24, χρῶνται having to be supplied. The antithesis is between ἅμα and κατὰ μέρος; so that in lieu of the latter Aristotle might have said οὐχ ἅμα ἀλλὰ κατὰ μέρος. Comp. Meteor. 1. 14, 351 a 28 ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐ κατὰ μέρος ταῦτα συμβαίνει πάσχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα πᾶν ἀκμάζειν καὶ φθίνειν ἀναγκαῖον. — Plato Theaet. 189 E ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει (also Bon. Ind. 455 b 14 and 571 b 47). Aristotle's language would naturally imply that, whereas the three means of expression, language, metre, and music, are inseparable in the Dithyramb and Nome, they appear separately and by turns in the Drama. This, however, is an overstatement (see on ἁπάντων in b22), as it is only the musical element that comes in intermittently, in the choral parts of the play (6, 1449 b 30).

μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας : comp. 1, 1447 a 28; 3, 1448 a 27; 6, 1449 b 36; 1450 b 3, 9; 1451 b 29. This is to all appearance another reminiscence of Plato: Rep. 396 C μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα. — 603 C πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις.

ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους is explained by what follows, κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες (comp. 5, 1449 a 32). This, Aristotle adds, is the primary and most universal distinction between man and man; nearly all other distinctions of character may be classed under this one common head. Pol. 5. 2, 1303 b 15 μεγίστη μὲν οὖν ἴσως διάστασις ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία.

ἀκολουθεῖ : De part. an. 2. 1, 646 a 17 αἱ δ᾿ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν.

ἤτοι βελτίονας ... τοιούτους , scil. μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι. We have been prepared for this distinction by the preceding ἐπεὶ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι; but the third possibility, that the personages represented may be on the same level as ourselves (ἢ καὶ τοιούτους), is a new point, which is felt to require a word of proof. Aristotle accordingly reminds us of a similar fact in painting (a5): the personages in the works of Dionysius are just like ourselves (ὁμοίους).

ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς Plutarch, who defines poetry as a μιμητική τέχνη καὶ δύναμις ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ, quotes a saying, commonly attributed to Simonides, ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι φθεγγομένην τὴν ποίησιν, ποίησιν δὲ σιγῶσαν τὴν ζωγραφίαν (De aud. poet. 17 F). The comparison is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (v. Rep. 377 E, 597 E, 603 B, 605 A etc.).

γραφεῖς The Attic form γραφῆς has survived in the text of Meteor. 3. 2, 372 a 7, and De sensu 3, 440 a 8.

Πολύγνωτος : comp. 6, 1450 a 27.

Παύσων : Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 36 δεῖ μὴ τὰ Παύσωνος θεωρεῖν τοὺς νέους, ἀλλὰ τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός. If he was the same as the Pauson of Aristoph. Ach. 854, he must have had a certain sort of affinity to our modern caricaturists; it will be seen also that Aristotle regards his work as the analogue of that of the parodists and comic poets in literature.

Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν ὁμοίους, as the context shows (comp. τοιούτους in a5), means 'like ourselves', neither better nor worse than the average man. εἰκάζειν (= to produce an εἰκών or portrait) is practically synonymous with μιμεῖσθαι, the word ordinarily used by Aristotle even of a painter. In 1, 1447 a 19 he has the more precise expression, μιμοῦνται ἀπεικάζοντες. The Dionysius meant is Dionysius of Colophon. The epithet ἀνθρωπογράφος (Pliny N. H. 35. 113) would certainly seem peculiarly applicable to Aristotle's Dionysius, as a realistic painter, whose gods and heroes were too like ordinary men.

ἕτερα is qualified and explained by the τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον that follows. The personages represented differ in the way just described, i. e. as being either better or worse than, or on the same level as, the ordinary man.

ὀρχήσει : Plato Laws 814 E δύο μὲν αὐτῆς (scil. ὀρχήσεως) εἴδη χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον (comp. also 655 C; 798 D). For the kind of dancing Aristotle has in mind here see on 1, 1447 a 27.

αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει : see on 1, 1447 a 15.

τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν is a general expression for the group of purely literary imitative arts, which were described in 1, 1447 b 29 as using τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις. Ψιλομετρία—a term misunderstood by later writers (v. Bernays, Heraklit. Briefe p. 116)—means verse without music (χωρὶς ἁρμονίας; see on 1447 a 29). The qualifying addition 'without music' might no doubt have been appended to τοὺς λόγους also ; but it is more wanted where it is, so as to distinguish the verse that was simply recited from the verse that was sung. From this point onward Aristotle ignores the prose imitations (the Mime and the Dialogue), and deals only with 'poetry', the versified forms of imitative literature (μίμησις ἐν μέτροις; see on 1, 1447 b 23). τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους = ἐν τῷ περὶ τοὺς λόγους, the preposition being understood from the preceding context (comp. Bon. Ind. 63 b 40). The restoration of τῷ for τὸ in 25, 1461 a 33 admits of the same explanation. For τὸ περί τι in the sense of 'the class comprising' see Plato Soph. 221 B, Symp. 205, Rep. 394 B.

Κλεοφῶν In 22, 1458 a 20 his diction is said to be ταπεινή. Aristotle notes elsewhere the ludicrous effect his occasional attempts at fine language produced owing to the incongruity between the expression and the matter he dealt with: Rhet. 3. 7, 1408 a 10 τὸ δὲ πρέπον ἕξει ἡ λέξις, ἐὰν ᾖ ... τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν ἀνάλογον. τὸ δ᾿ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν ἐὰν μήτε περὶ εὐόγκων αὐτοκαβδάλως λέγηται μήτε περὶ εὐτελῶν σεμνῶς, μηδ᾿ ἐπὶ τῷ εὐτελεῖ ὀνόματι ἐπῇ κόσμος. εἰ δὲ μή, κωμῳδία φαίνεται, οἷον ποιεῖ Κλεοφῶν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔνια ἔλεγε καὶ εἰ εἶπειεν ἂν πότνια συκῆ. In the present passage we are told that his personages were 'like ourselves' (ὁμοίους), neither better than the ordinary man, like those in Homer, nor worse, like those in a parody. From the context as well as the company in which he is placed it is plain that he is to be regarded as a sort of epic poet. He is taken as the representative of the prosaic Epic—the Epic of the commonplace, as distinct from the noble Epic of Homer and the debased Epic known as parody. His work being put under the head of ψιλομετρία, 'verse without the accompaniment of song,' he cannot have been in Aristotle's view either a lyric or a dramatic poet. The notion that he was the writer of a dialogue entitled the 'Mandrobulus' is based on an erroneous interpretation of Soph. el. 15, 174 b 19.

Ἡγήμων : see Brandt, Parodorum epicorum reliq., p. 37, and Kock, CAF. 1, p. 700. Parody was an element in the humour of the Old Comedy, as also of Epicharmus; and there were certainly others before Hegemon who travestied Homer. What Aristotle means, however, is that Hegemon was the first to take up parody as a special form of poetical literature. According to Athenaeus 699 A he was the first to present a parody in the poetical contests in the theatre: πρῶτος εἰσῆλθεν εἰς τοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς θυμελικοὺς Ἡγήμων, καὶ παρ᾿ Ἀθηναίοις ἐνίκησεν ἄλλαις τε παρῳδίαις καὶ τῇ Γιγαντομαχία.

παρῳδίας A παρῳδία, in Aristotle's sense of the word, is a mock epic, a poem on an ignoble theme in epic language and metre.

Νικοχάρης : he may perhaps be the same as the comic poet of the same name (Kock, CAF. 1 p. 770). We know nothing more of his work, and there is some uncertainty even as to its title. Δειλιάς (which is assonant to Ιλιάς) would mean, as Twining says, the 'Poltroniad'; Δηλιάς, either the 'Tale of Delos', or the 'Tale of Delium'; it is practically impossible to say which.

ὥσπερ γᾶς κτἑ. It is important to bear in mind that in A the ὥσπερ here ends a line, and that the γᾶς stands at the beginning of another. The better apographs have either ὡς περγᾶς or ὡς πέργας. The reading ὡς Πέρσας καὶ Κύκλωπας was probably due to a corrector who knew of the Πέρσαι as a nome of Timotheus. Vahlen suggests that ὥσπερ γὰρ Κύκλωπας should be restored on the supposition (1) that Timotheus and Philoxenus may represent the ignoble Nome and Dithyramb, and (2) that instances of the opposite were not wanted, as the Nome and Dithyramb were so generally associated with noble subjects. Castelvetro was probably right in recognizing in γᾶς the second half of Ἀργᾶς, the name of one notorious in antiquity as the writer of a debased kind of nome. The text, when entire, may have given the name of another writer of nomes, who was put in contrast with Argas, and also the name of a common subject differently treated by the two poets (ὥσπερ (-- καὶ Ἀργᾶς).

Κύκλωπας Polyphemus must have been a stock-subject in literature, as there were dramas with the title Κύκλωψ by Epicharmus, Aristias, and Antiphanes, as well as the existing play of Euripides. The plural here denotes not several Cyclopses, but Polyphemus as treated in different poems. For the Κύκλωψ ἢ Γαλάτεια of Philoxenus see Bergk, LG. 3 p. 609. It seems to have been a covert satire on the elder Dionysius; we may suppose, then, that Philoxenus made his Cyclops an ignoble personage, χείρων ἢ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς.

ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ τῇ διαφορᾷ Vahlen retains the traditional ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ διαφορᾷ, taking it to mean 'in ipsa quam dico differentia'.

βούλεται : this is their general tendency and intention, though there may be exceptions to the rule. τῶν νῦν replaces the ἢ καθ᾿ ἡμᾶς in * 4. Aristotle is thinking more especially of the chief personages in Tragedy, who belong in most instances to the heroic age.

τούτων τρίτη διαφορά : τούτων τῶν λεχθεισῶν μιμήσεων in a7.

ἕκαστα τούτων : the objects with the possibilities of difference described in chap. 2. Though the objects of the poetic imitations are properly persons, the neuter is used as a more general way of designating them. It reappears in the formula (repeated from 1, 1447 a 17) ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὥς in a 25.

τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι The subject understood with μιμεῖσθαι is τὸν μιμούμενον; and the participles which follow in 21-22 are in apposition to that. In a 23, however, where Aristotle is dealing with the Drama, he has to put the participles in the plural (ὡς πράττοντας), and the subject is definitely mentioned as τοὺς μιμουμένους.

ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα κτέ. The amended reading (ἢ) ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ὁτὲ δὲ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον is anticipated in Goulston's paraphrase. As Aristotle began by speaking of the objects imitated in the neuter, he describes the imitator as identifying himself with 'something else' (ἕτερόν τι). The statement is on the same lines as that in Plato Rep. 392 D—394 D, which distinguishes between three forms of διήγησις: (1) simple narration, (2) imitative or dramatic narration, and (3) the mixed manner, which we see in Homer. Aristotle's ἀπαγγέλλοντα recalls Plato's δι᾿ ἀπαγγελίας αὐτοῦ τοῦ ποιητοῦ. Plato uses μιμεῖσθαι only for the dramatic mode, whereas Aristotle uses it in a much wider sense. Aristotle's general view of the Epic is that it comes under the head of narrative, as distinct from dramatic, imitation (5, 1449 b 11). Homer is said to reduce the element of narrative to a minimum, taking every opportunity of making his personages come forward and speak for themselves, just as though they were characters in a play.

ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα : another instance of parallelismus antitheticus (see on 1, 1447 a 18) ; it is the converse in sense of De caelo 2. 6, 288 a 31 εἴτε... ἀλλοιοῖτο καὶ μὴ διαμένοι τὸ αὐτό. The antithesis is between what the poet says in propria persona and what he says in an assumed character.

ἢ πάντα ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους πάντα, the correction of Casaubon, is in apposition to the τὰ αὐτά in 20, and serves to distinguish the Drama from the Epic, which is at best only partially dramatic. If πάντας be retained, it has to be taken with τοὺς μιμουμένους as the object. However, τὰ αὐτά is too important logically to be ignored. In this third participial clause the participles are in the plural, and the grammatical subject (τοὺς μιμουμένους) is expressed. The explanation is probably that Aristotle is thinking for the moment of the actors rather than of the poet himself. A play is conceived to be something which 'they act', i.e., with a plurality of imitators concerned in it: comp. 6, 1449 b 26 δρώντων; b 31 πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν; 1450 a 21 πράττουσιν. The use of the present of μιμεῖσθαι as a passive is not impossible, but there is no clear instance of it. In 15, 1454 b 26, where Aristotle wants a present passive, he uses a periphrasis, ὁ τὴν μίμησιν παρέχων.

ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις κτέ. Comp. 1, 1447 a 16 διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν κτέ.. The preposition here denotes the sphere within which the poetic imitation works. ταύταις is the real subject and preparative to the enumeration ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὡς.

ὥστε τῇ μὲν κτἑ. is a sort of corollary to what was said in chap. 2 and the opening section of chap. 3. Aristotle is now viewing plays in their relation to the authors, and the actors are ignored. In chap. 6 there are several instances of his passing unconsciously from the one point of view to the other.

πράττοντας γὰρ μιμοῦνται The dramatic poet makes his personages appear on the stage and go through a semblance of action. The difference between Aristotle's language here and in 23 is to be noted: the dramatic poet μιμεῖται πράττοντας; the actor μιμεῖται ὡς πράττων.

δρῶντας This reminds Aristotle of a current explanation of the word drama, ὅτι μιμοῦνται δρώντας, and leads to a digression on the Dorian claim to the discovery of the Drama. They support this by an appeal to language, maintaining that κωμῳδία and the general term δράμα are of Dorian origin. This passage is the source of corresponding statements in the grammarians, such as Anon. De Comoedia τὴν κωμῳδίαν ηὑρῆσθαί φασιν ὑπὸ Σουσαρίωνος. — Diomedes 486 P. Comoedia dicta ἀπὸ τῶν κωμῶν.

οἱ Μεγαρεῖς On the Megarian Comedy see Meineke, FCG. I p. 18. The Megarian claim is noted by the anonymous commentator on Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 24. Aristotle says nothing about Susarion here or in chap. 5.

τῆς παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς δημοκρατίας Megara is said to have expelled the tyrant Theagenes about B.C. 600.

οἱ ἐκ Σικελίας , the Megarians of Megara Hyblaea—literally, the Megarians 'on the Sicilian side'. For this use of the preposition comp. Pol. 8. 7, 1341 a 28 οἱ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, 'those on the philosophic side'.

Ἐπίχαρμος In 5, 1449 b 6 he and Phormis are said to have been the first to discard the Comedy of personalities ; so that from this point of view he was the forerunner of the New Comedy, i. e. of what Aristotle regards as Comedy proper. Plato had already given him the premier place in Comedy: Theaet. 152 E τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῳδίας μὲν Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δὲ Ὅμηρος. The Sicilian origin of Comedy is often asserted by post-Aristotelian writers: Theocritus Ep. 17. 1 ὁ τὰν κωμῳδίαν εὑρὼν Ἐπίχαρμος; Solinus 5. 13 Hic [scil. in Sicilia] primum inventa comoedia; Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἀπὸ Σικελίας· ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἤστην Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμις ... κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη; Prol. de Comoedia 3 = Kaibel CGF. p. 7 Ἐπίχαρμος· οὗτος πρῶτος τὴν κωμῳδίαν διερριμμένην ἀνεκτήσατο πολλὰ προσφιλοτεχνήσας; Suidas s.v. Ἐπίχαρμος εὗρε τὴν κωμῳδίαν ἐν Συρακούσαις ἅμα Φόρμῳ.

Χιωνίδου καὶ Μάγνητος From this mention of them here, as also from the allusion to them further on, in 5, 1449 b 3, it is clear that Aristotle knows of no Attic writers of Comedy earlier than Chionides and Magnes ; and even these apparently are mere names to him. Magnes is expressly described by Suidas as a much younger man than Epicharmus: ἐπιβάλλει δ᾿ Ἐπιχάρμῳ νέος πρεσβύτῃ. Suidas' statement that Epicharmus was producing comedies at Syracuse six years before the Persian war (i. e. in B.C. 485) is of some importance, as showing that Epicharmus was conceived to be coeval with a generation at Athens anterior to Chionides and the regular drama which began with him. There is no very serious difference, therefore, between Suidas and Aristotle as to the priority of Epicharmus.

καὶ τῆς τραγῳδίας = τῆς δὲ τραγῳδίας. Vahlen illustrates the change of construction by Soph. el. 11, 171 b 8 συλλογισμὸς ἐριστικὸς καὶ σοφιστικός ἐστιν εἷς μὲν ὁ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός ... καὶ ὅσοι μὴ ὄντες κτέ., where καὶ ὅσοι seems to stand for ἕτεροι δὲ ὅσοι.

ἔνιοι , i. e. the Sicyonians: Herod. 5. 67 τά τε δὴ ἄλλα οἱ Σικυώνιοι ἐτίμων τὸν Ἀδρηστον καὶ δὴ πρὸς τὰ πάθεα αὐτοῦ τραγικοῖσι χοροῖσι ἐγέραιρον. Themistius Or. 27, 406 Dind. καὶ τραγῳδίας εὑρεταὶ μὲν Σικυώνιοι, τελεσιουργοὶ δὲ Ἀττικοὶ ποιηταί. — Suidas s.v. Θέσπις τραγικὸς ἑκκαιδέκατος ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου γενομένου τραγῳδιοποιοῦ ᾿Επιγένους τοῦ Σικυωνίου τιθέμενος.

περιοικίδας : Pol. 6. 5, 1320 b 6 ἀεὶ γάρ τινας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ δήμου πρὸς τὰς περιοικίδας ποιοῦσιν εὐπόρους. As understood at Athens the term κώμη meant a quarter of the city, as distinct from the outlying townships (δῆμοι): Plato Laws 746 D φρατρίας καὶ δήμους καὶ κώμας. — Isocrates 149 A διελόμενοι τὴν μὲν πόλιν κατὰ κώμας τὴν δὲ χώραν κατὰ δήμους.

κωμῳδούς ἀπὸ τοῦ κωμάζειν. The connexion is indirectly implied in the juxtaposition of the two words in the law cited in Demosthenes 21. 10 ἡ πομπὴ καὶ οἱ παῖδες καὶ ὁ κῶμος καὶ οἱ κωμῳδοὶ καὶ οἱ τραγῳδοί.

καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν κτέ. The argument comes practically to this: Plays confessessly represent actions: now if they had been originally an Athenian invention, one would expect them to have been called πράγματα rather than δράματα; πράττειν being the ordinary Athenian word for to act. That Aristotle does not accept this view of δρᾶν and πράττειν is indirectly shown by his own use of the words. He has just said (a27) πράττοντας καὶ δρῶντας, and in his definition of Tragedy (6, 1449 b 26) his word is δρώντων, though he might easily have said πραττόντων.

τῆς μιμήσεως is the genitive after τῶν διαφορῶν. Vahlen illustrates the order by Plato, Phil. 17 C ἐπειδὰν λάβῃς τὰ διαστήματα ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῆς φωνῆς.

ἐοίκασι Setting aside the antiquarian questions raised in chap. 3, Aristotle asserts that the birth of poetry was due to large natural causes. The origin of poetry generally (γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως) is attributable to the imitative instinct in all men. The origin of the two great kinds of poetry (διεσπάσθη δὲ b24), of which Tragedy and Comedy were the ultimate developments, is attributable to the personal tendencies and differences of character in the individual poets (τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη b24).

αἰτίαι δύο The two causes are those mentioned in the immediate context, τὸ μιμεῖσθαι (b5) and τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι (b8). These Aristotle regards as two distinguishable facts in human nature. τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι, instead of coming in as a mere afterthought after τὸ μιμεῖσθαι, involves a different idea, and relates to a different class of persons—the public interested in works of art, as distinct from the artists who produce them.

μιμητικώτατον : Probl. 30. 6, 956 a 14 Διὰ τί ἀνθρώπῳ πειστέον δὴ μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλῳ ζῴῳ; ... ἢ ὅτι μιμητικώτατον;. μανθάνειν γὰρ δύναται διὰ τοῦτο. Vahlen illustrates this use of the neuter singular by De somn. 3, 457 b 24 καταπίπτουσι ... οἱ ἄνθρωποι, μόνον γὰρ ὀρθὸν τῶν ζῴων, and Pol. 1. 2, 1253 a 16 τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τἆλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ ... αἴσθησιν ἔχειν.

μαθήσεις : Quintilian 10. 2, 1 Neque enim dubitari potest quin artis pars magna contineatur imitatione. nam ut invenire primum fuit estque praecipuum, sic ea quae bene inventa sunt utile sequi.

σημεῖον A σημεῖον is that which proves or confirms a proposition; an αἴτιον, something that explains or gives a reason for it. Aristotle defines a σημεῖον in An. pr. 2. 27, 70 a 7 σημεῖον δὲ βούλεται εἶναι πρότασις ἀποδεικτικὴ ἀναγκαία ἢ ἔνδοξος.

ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων : 're ipsa'. τῶν ἔργων here is often rendered by 'works of art'.

γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν : Rhet. 1. 11, 1371 b 4 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἡδέα εἶναι οἷον τό τε μεμιμημένον ... καὶ πᾶν ὃ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ᾖ, κἂν μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον· οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει. — De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 11 καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν [i.e. τῶν ζῴων τῶν μὴ κεχαρισμένων] θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν.

ἀτιμοτάτων : De anima 1. 2, 404 b 3 ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν [i.e. νοῦν] τοῖς ζώοις, καὶ μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις. — De part. an. 1. 5, 645 a 15.

καὶ τοῦτο . For the conjunction comp. 13, 1453 a 17 σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ γιγόμενον. — De somno 3, 456 a 28 σημεῖον δὲ τούτων καὶ τὰ ὑπνωτικά. — Meteor. 2. 8, 367 a 11 τεκμήριον δ᾿ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον.

θεωροῦντας μανθάνειν : comp. Rhet. 1. c., and Plato Rep. 475 D οἱ ... φιλοθεάμονες πάντες ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμανθάνειν χαίροντες τοιοῦτοι εἶναι. Our pleasure in the contemplation of a picture or other work of imitative art is explained here to be the natural concomitant of an intellectual act, the discovery or recognition on our part of the meaning of the picture.

οὐχ ᾗ . οὐχὶ for οὐχ ᾗ is found in Kb in Eth. N. 8. 12, 1161 b 1, 18 and in D (the Marcianus) in An. post. 1. 23, 84 b 8.

κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ὄντος ἡμῖν τοῦ μιμεῖσθαι What Aristotle is now considering is the evolution of the poet ; and he tells us that the imitative aptitude of the poet is only a higher and more developed form of that natural aptitude for imitation which is common to all mankind.

καὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας καὶ τοῦ ῥυθμοῦ seem to be added as an afterthought, in recognition of the historical connexion between music and poetry. Except in its lyric forms, however, poetry was now no longer combined with music ; in Aristotle's view, also, even metre is at the most only one of its accidents (1, 1447 b 11).

ἐξ ἀρχῆς is much the same thing as ἐν ἀρχῇ. The antithesis between ἐξ ἀρχῆς πεφυκότες and προάγοντες will be not unlike that in Metaph. A 2, 982 b 13 ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀπόρων θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες.

αὐτά : loosely used for 'their work' or 'performances'; it anticipates what is termed in the next line 'their improvisations'. προάγειν is here (and again in 4, 1449 a 13) a transitive verb. The meaning of the word in the present context is to 'advance', or 'carry a stage further', as may be seen from the parallel in Soph. el. 33, 183 b οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς εὑρόντες παντελῶς ἐπὶ μικρόν τι προήγαγον· οἱ δὲ νῦν εὐδοκιμοῦντες ... οὕτως ηὐξήκασιν.

αὐτοσχεδιασμάτων On the verb αὐτοσχεδιάζειν = 'to speak off-hand, without premeditation or previous study'. The fact is described in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 54 θεὸς δ᾿ ὑπὸ καλὸν ἄειδεν, ἐξ αὐτοσχεδίης πειρώμενος. The phallic-song, in which Aristotle finds the germ of Comedy, was sometimes described as an ᾠδὴ αὐτοσχέδιος.

διεσπάσθη δὲ corresponds with the γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως in b4. κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη: comp. Plato Rep. 396 C sqq..

τὰς καλὰς ... πράξεις καὶ τὰς τῶν τοιούτων As Düntzer and Bernays have shown, this is not a tautology, as the actions of those who are καλοὶ (τῶν τοιούτων) are not always καλαὶ πράξεις; comp. Plato Rep. 396 C μάλιστα μὲν μιμούμενος τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἀσφαλῶς τε καὶ ἐμφρόνως πράττοντα, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ ἧττον ἢ ὑπὸ νόσων ἢ ὑπὸ ἐρώτων ἐσφαλμένον ἢ καὶ ὑπὸ μέθης ἢ τινος ἄλλης ξυμφορᾶς.

ψόγους has the same same concrete sense of 'invectives' in Plato Laws 829 C ἐγκώμιά τε καὶ ψόγους ποιεῖν. The earliest, as well as the most eminent representative of this kind of literature, was Archilochus, the ψογερὸς Ἀρχίλοχος βαρυλόγοις ἔχθεσιν πιαινόμενος of Pindar (Pyth. 2. 100).

ὕμνους καὶ ἐγκώμια : Plato Rep. 607 A ὕμνους θεοῖς καὶ ἐγκώμια τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. — Etym. Gud. s. v. ὕμνος Ὕμνος ἐγκωμίου διαφέρει καθὸ ὁ μὲν ὕμνος ἐπὶ θεοῦ λέγεται τὸ δὲ ἐγκώμιον ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου. On hymns and encomia as very primitive forms of Greek poetry see Bergk, Gr. Litt. 1 p. 423.

εἰκὸς δὲ εἶναι πολλούς , scil. τοιούτους; comp. Goulston's version, 'verisimile autem est, qui talia condiderint, extitisse multos'. Aristotle says this because he thinks that even in those days the baser sort (οἱ εὐτελέστεροι b26) were probably in a majority ; he has no romantic illusions as to the superiority of the men of an earlier age (Pol. 2. 8, 1269 a 5). On the pre-Homeric poets, to whom Aristotle refers, comp. Sextus Emp. Adv. math. 1. 204 οὐχ ὑπὸ πάντων ὁμολογεῖται ποιητὴς ἀρχαιότατος εἶναι Ὅμηρος· ἔνιοι γὰρ Ησίοδον προήκειν τοῖς χρόνοις λέγουσιν, Λίνον τε καὶ Ὀρφέα καὶ Μουσαῖον καὶ ἄλλους παμπληθεῖς: see also Bernhardy Gr. Litt. 1 p. 308. Aristotle, however, was quite aware that the writings which bore the names of these legendary poets were not really by them (H. A. 6. 6, 563 a 18; see Bernays, Dialoge d. Aristot. p. 95).

ἐκείνου ὁ Μαργίτης : Eustratius on Eth. N. 6. 7, 1141 a 14 (p. 320 30 Heylb.) παράγει . . . καί τινα ποίησιν Μαργίτην ὀνομαζομένην Ὁμήρου. μνημονεύει δ᾿ αὐτῆς οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς Ἀριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ ποιητικῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀρχίλοχος καὶ Κρατίνος καὶ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τῷ ἐπιγράμματι καὶ μαρτυροῦσιν εἶναι Ὁμήρου τὸ ποίημα. On the Margites, which Aristotle thus attributes to Homer, see Kinkel, EGF. p. 64. This statement in the Poetics does not throw any light on the question of the original form of the Margites, whether the iambic lines in it were a primitive part of the poem, or subsequently added by Pigres (see Goettling, Op. Acad. p. 167, and Hiller, N. Jahrb. f. Phil. 1887 p. 13 for a discussion of it) ; it stands in a parenthesis, and must not be taken in any direct connexion with the ἐν οἷς... ἰαμβεῖον ἦλθε μέτρον that follows.

καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα refers to writings more or less like the Margites by post-Homeric poets—not to other minor poems of a light order attributable to Homer himself, as Bergk (Gr. Litt. 1 p. 775) suggests.

ἐν οἷς = ἐν δὲ τούτοις, scil. τοῖς ψόγοις, the relative beginning a new sentence, as in 24, 1459 b 12 οἷς ἅπασιν. — Phys. 8. 3, 253 b 12 πρὸς οὓς . . οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι. — Metaph. Θ 3, 1046 b 33 οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν. — Λ 8, 1074 b 8 ὧν εἴ τις χωρίσας αὐτὸ λάβοι μόνον τὸ πρῶτον.

κατὰ τὸ ἁρμόττον : 17, 1455 b 10 κατὰ τὸ εἰκός. — Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 22 and 9, 1367 b 12 κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον (opposed to παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον). — Eth. N. 4. 6, 1123 a 20 παρὰ τὸ δέον. The reading of the Aldine (and of Parisinus 2038), καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον, has been accepted by Bon. Ind. 357 b 48.

ἦλθε : the verb has the same sense in Eth. N. 5. 8, 1133 a 20 ἐφ᾿ ὃ τὸ νόμισμα ἐλήλυθε. — Pol. 1. 9, 1258 a 6 τὸ ἕτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς διὰ τοῦτ᾿ ἐλήλυθεν.

ἰαμβεῖον καλεῖται : Strabo 422 Cas. ὁ μὲν (scil. ὁ δάκτυλος) ὕμνοις ἐστὶν οἰκεῖος ὁ δ᾿ ἴαμβος κακισμοῖς. — Proclus Chrestom. 7, p. 346 Gaisf. τὸν ἴαμβον τάττεσθαι μὲν ἐπὶ λοιδορίας τὸ παλαιόν· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἰαμβίζειν κατά τινα γλῶσσαν λοιδορεῖν ἔλεγον ... ἔοικε δὲ ὁ ἴαμβος τὸ μὲν παλαιὸν ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ψόγον καὶ ἔπαινον γραφομένων ὁμοίως λέγεσθαι ἐπεὶ δέ τινες ἐπλεόνασαν ἐν ταῖς κακολογίαις τὸ μέτρον, ἐκεῖθεν τὸ ἰαμβίζειν εἰς τὸ ὑβρίζειν ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας ἐκπεσεῖν. — Schol. Hephaest. 6, p. 182 Gaisf. ἐκλήθη δὲ ἴαμβος, ἀφ᾿ οὗ τὸ μέτρον παρονομάζεται ἰαμβικόν, ἐπείπερ οἱ ὑβρίζειν καὶ λοιδορεῖν τινὰς βουλόμενοι τούτῳ ἐχρῶντο τῷ μέτρῳ· ἰαμβίζειν γὰρ ἔλεγον οἱ παλαιοὶ τὸ ὑβρίζειν. — Suetonii Reliq. p. 19 Reiff. Iambus est carmen maledicum appellatum est autem παρὰ τὸ ἰαμβίζειν, quod est maledicere.

τῶν παλαιῶν . The reference is apparently to Homer and Archilochus, as the first and greatest representatives of the two great directions in poetry; comp. Velleius Paterc. 1. 5 Neque quenquam alium, cuius operis primus auctor fuerit, in eo perfectissimum praeter Homerum et Archilochum reperiemus. Dio Chrysost. Or. 33, p. 5 R. δύο γὰρ ποιητῶν γεγονότων ἐξ ἅπαντος τοῦ αἰῶνος, οἷς οὐδένα τῶν ἄλλων συμβάλλειν ἄξιον, Ὁμήρου τε καὶ Ἀρχιλόχου, τούτων Ὅμηρος μὲν σχεδὸν πάντα ἐνεκωμίασε Ἀρχίλοχος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἦκε [fort. ἠξε], τὸ ψέγειν. Their pre-eminence is implied in the juxtaposition of the two names in Heraclitus fr. 119 (42 Diels) τόν τε Ὅμηρον ἔφασκεν ἄξιον ἐκ τῶν ἀγώνων ἐκβάλλεσθαι καὶ ῥαπίζεσθαι καὶ Ἀρχίλοχον ὁμοίως.

τὰ σπουδαῖα : [no further note in snippet].

ποιητής : comp. Plato Apol. 18 B τὰ μετέωρα φροντιστής.

οὐχ ὅτι εὖ , scil. ἐποίησεν. Homer 'wrote well', as a master of the art of poetic expression (comp. 24, 1459 b 16; 1460 b 1) ; his poems are 'imitations', or pictures of human life, which distinguishes them from those of Empedocles and others (comp. 1, 1447 b 15) ; and they are moreover 'dramatic imitations', i. e. not unlike those in the Drama (comp. 24, 1460 a 5). In this way, then, Aristotle intimates that Homer not only dealt with the same kind of subject as Tragedy (τὰ σπουδαία), but also anticipated the dramatic manner.

σχήματα . . . ὑπέδειξεν , 'marked out for us the great outlines of Comedy'. σχῆμα has the same sense in 5, 1449 b 3, and in Plato Laws 5, 737 D σχήματος ἕνεκα καὶ ὑπογραφῆς. For the use of ὑπέδειξε comp. Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 25 ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπέδειξε πρῶτος. — Ath. Pol. 41 Ἀριστείδης μὲν ὑπέδειξεν, Ἐφιάλτης δὲ ἐπετέλεσεν. — Isocrates 268 C ταῦτα πράττοντες καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑποδεικνύοντες.

οὐ ψόγον ἀλλὰ τὸ γελοῖον δραματοποιήσας The sense is that, when Homer passed from σπουδαία to φαῦλα, his treatment of the latter was more akin to that in the comic poets than to that in the ἰαμβοποιοί; Margites with him was only ridiculous—not vicious or held up to obloquy as vicious, as a writer of ψόγοι would have made him. A ψόγος dwells on some serious vice of character; whereas Comedy, as Aristotle conceives it, deals only with those lesser faults which we are able to laugh at (see on 5, 1449 a 33). This view of the Margites is not quite in harmony with that in 4, 1448 b 30, where it is regarded as a ψόγος, the first known instance of the kind. With οὐ ψόγον Vahlen supplies ποιήσας from the δραματοποιήσας that follows. This is legitimate enough, but hardly necessary, as δραματοποιεῖν, 'to write, or describe, as a dramatist would' (see on 22, 1458 b 9) is just as applicable to ψόγον as it is to τὸ γελοῖον (comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'non vituperium sed ridiculum dramatice exprimens'). The meaning Aristotle attaches to it may be seen from μιμήσεις δραματικὰς ἐποίησεν in b35 (v. ad loc.).

ὥσπερ Ἰλιὰς καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια Vahlen illustrates this insertion of the article before by De resp. 17, 478 b 28 ἔστι δὲ θάνατος καὶ ἡ φθορὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς μὴ ἀτελέσιν, and Rhet. 3. 13, 1414 b 13 ἔσται οὖν ... διήγησις ἕτερον καὶ ἡ ἐπιδιήγησις καὶ προδιήγησις, and a number of other passages in Aristotle (comp. also Riddell, Digest of Idioms § 240 G). On the other hand Spengel would restore the article before on account of its appearance in the parallel in 26, 1462 b 8 ὥσπερ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ἔχει πολλὰ τοιαῦτα μέρη καὶ ἡ Ὀδύσσεια (comp. also 24, 1459 b 14 ἡ μὲν Ἰλιὰς ... ἡ δὲ Οδύσσεια). There is as a rule nothing exceptional or anomalous in Aristotle's usage in reference to the article with the titles of books. He is apt to omit it, just as Athenaeus does, when the title is given in the actual form which it would have as the heading of a MS. (comp. Apollonius Synt. 1, 26), after the preposition ἐν. The Poetics supply a number of examples of this usage, e.g. 16, 1455 a 2 ἐν Ἀλκίνου ἀπολόγῳ. — 24, 1460 a 35 τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσείᾳ ἄλογα. — 14, 1454 a 1 ἐν Ἀντιγόνη. — 16, 1455 a 4 ἐν Χοηφόροις. — 24, 1460 a 31 ἐν Ἠλέκτρᾳ. — 32 ἐν Μυσοῖς. — 25, 1461 a 21 ἐν Ορέστῃ. In 24, 1460 a 30, however, the traditional text omits the article with a title in the nominative; for it is clear that in this place means the , in the same way as with us 'Hamlet' may mean the play, not the person. In many places in which the article is omitted, the title is used in a general sense as a common noun; thus in Soph. el. 24, 180 a 21 δός μοι Ιλιάδα means 'give me an Iliad' (i. e. a copy of the Iliad). Instances of this in the Poetics are 8, 1451 a 20 Ἡρακληίδα Θησηίδα, 'a Heracleid, a Theseid'. — 24, 1459 b 15 Ὀδύσσειαν, 'an Odyssey'. — 23, 1459 a 3 Ἰλιάδος καὶ ᾿Ὀδυσσείας, 'a poem like the Iliad or Odyssey'. — b 4 Κυπρίων, 'a poem like the '. I am inclined to think, therefore, that Spengel was right in suggesting ὥσπερ (ἡ) Ιλιάς in the present passage; and also that in 24, 1460 a 30 the true reading must be ὥσπερ (ὁ) Οἰδίπους.

ἑκατέραν τὴν ποίησιν recalls the distinction drawn in 4, 1448 b 24 between the two great forms of poetry, the higher and the lower.

κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν φύσιν : 4, 1448 b 24 κατὰ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἤθη.

ἀντὶ τῶν ἰάμβων κωμῳδοποιοὶ ἐγένοντο Vahlen compares De part. an. 2. 13, 657 b 34 ἀντὶ ταύτης τῆς φυλακῆς πάντα σκληρόφθαλμά ἐστιν, and Herod. 7. 62 ἀντὶ τῶν πίλων μιτρηφόροι ἦσαν.

ἔχει... τοῖς εἶδεσιν ἱκανῶς Aristotle assumes that Tragedy has by this time attained to its natural form (15 ἔσχε τὴν αὐτῆς φύσιν); but he declines to consider the question whether there is still a possibility of improvement in the treatment of its various formative constituents. The suggestion that the εἴδη here meant are the same as the μέρη distinguished in chap. 6, from another point of view, is due to Madius. εἶδος in the sense of a formative constituent is perhaps unique in Aristotle, but there are certainly a few instances of it in Plato Rep. iv, where the three faculties in the soul are sometimes described as εἴδη (434 D, 439 E, 440 B) and sometimes as μέρη (442 B, C). The alternative interpretation is to take εἴδη in the logical sense of 'species'. This view, though not improbable in itself (comp. 18, 1455 b 32), is hardly reconcileable with the use of εἴδη in 6, 1450 a 13 as a designation for the μέρη with which the chapter is dealing.

αὐτό τε καθ᾿ αὑτὸ κρῖναι The conjunction serves to connect κρῖναι with ἐπισκοπεῖν, the second clause being complementary to the first (comp. 6, 1450 b 3). Similarly in De anima 3. 3, 427 b 15 φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοίας· αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις, the second clause (αὐτή τε κτέ.) is explanatory of the first. κρῖναι has been taken as an infinitive of limitation by Vahlen, who quotes H. A. 9. 38, 622 a 20 τῶν δ᾿ ἐντόμων ἐργατικώτατον ζῴων ἐστί, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα συγκρίνεσθαι πάντα, τό τε τῶν μυρμήκων γένος καὶ τὸ τῶν μελιττῶν. As far as I can see, an infinitive of limitation would not be quite in place in a passage like the present. For the antithesis between καθ᾿ αὑτὸ and πρὸς τὰ θέατρα comp. Top. 5. 1, 128 b 16 ἀποδίδοται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον ἢ καθ᾿ αὐτὰ καὶ ἀεὶ ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτέ. — Cat. 6, 5 b 16 οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ καθ᾿ αὑτὸ μέγα λέγεται ἢ μικρόν, ἀλλὰ τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφέρεσθαι. κρίνειν has an indirect question after it in Metaph. A 4, 984 b 31 τούτους μὲν οὖν πῶς χρὴ διανείμαι ἐξέστω κρίνειν ὕστερον.

γενομένης δ᾿ οὖν ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικής = γενομένη δ᾿ οὖν ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστική. Having begun with γενομένης αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς, scil. τῆς τραγῳδίας, Aristotle sees that the same is true of Comedy, and adds a parenthesis to show that; after which he says in 13 ηὐξήθη, just as though γενομένη... αὐτοσχεδιαστική had begun the clause. For another instance of a gen. abs. in lieu of a nominative see 17, 1455 a 3. A parenthetical addition of very similar form is found in 5, 1449 b 12, and also in Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 b 11. ἀπ᾿ ἀρχῆς is used adverbially in the same sense as ἐξ ἀρχῆς. Several of the recent editors and translators, however, take ἀρχῆς and αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς together as meaning an 'improvisational beginning'. This certainly simplifies matters, but it may be doubted whether ἀρχὴ αὐτοσχεδιαστική would naturally bear that meaning.

τῶν ἐξαρχόντων ἐξάρχειν τὸν διθύραμβον, ἢ τὰ φαλλικά, dicebantur qui choro utrivis canendo praeiverunt; qui, ut verisimile est, ab initio poetae ipsi fuerunt, says Tyrwhitt, quoting Archilochus (fr. 77 Bergk ὡς Διωνύσοι᾿ ἄνακτος καλὸν ἐξάρξαι μέλος οἶδα διθύραμβον). By the ἐξάρχων here Aristotle means the poet-composer, who supplied both words and air, and taught them to the chorus—not as is sometimes supposed, the κορυφαῖος, who was only one of the chorus. ἐξάρχειν διθύραμβον is practically a synonym for διδάσκειν διθύραμβον, the expression in Herodotus i. 23. It is clear that Aristotle has in his own mind a general view of the historical development of early Greek poetry, but he tells us as little as possible about it. The intention of the Poetics is to give us a theory of the Epic and of the Drama, not a treatise on the history and archaeology of the Drama. Tragedy began when the author of the dithyramb came forward with an 'improvisation', i. e. with a ῥῆσις or spoken statement, which he improvised in the interval between the two halves of the song of the chorus. The allusion in τῶν ἐξαρχόντων in the text is probably to Thespis, whom he is known to have mentioned in a fragment preserved by Themistius Or. 26, 382 Dind. οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιὼν ᾔδεν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν;. The 'prologue and speech' introduced by Thespis may be identified with the improvisations of the actor-poet, which transformed the Dithyramb into Tragedy.

φαλλικά Photius Lex. Φαλλικόν· ποίημα αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ἀδόμενον. — Hesychius Φαλλικόν· ὄρχημά τι· οἱ δὲ μέλος· ἄλλοι ᾠδὴν αὐτοσχέδιον ἐπὶ τῷ φαλλῷ ἀδομένην. In these phallus-songs Aristotle sees the origin of Comedy; it arose through the author of the song 'improvising' some scurrilous tale, and becoming in this way the forerunner of the single actor of the earliest form of Comedy.

προαγόντων : see on 4, 1448 b 22.

μεταβολάς : 5, 1449 a 37 αἱ τῆς τραγῳδίας μεταβάσεις.

ἐπαύσατο For the tense of the participle comp. An. post. 2. 1, 89 b 27 εὑρόντες γὰρ ὅτι ἐκλείπει πεπαύμεθα. — Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 32 θεωρήσαντες ἂν τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα ... ἴσως ἂν ἐπαύσαντο ταύτης τῆς παιδικῆς δόξης.

φύσιν : Pol. 1. 2, 1252 b 32 ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας.

καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν πλῆθος There is no need to assume a lacuna here. Having shown how Tragedy began with a single actor, Aristotle proceeds to note the introduction of a second, and after that, of a third actor. The increasing prominence of the actor is in his view the most significant fact in the evolution of the Drama. The καί is explanatory, introducing a series of statements in support of the original assertion that Tragedy underwent many changes before attaining to its ultimate form.

ὑποκριτῶν The actor is called a ὑποκριτής because he was the poet's spokesman, who interpreted his text to the public. The term must have acquired this sense at the time when the poet left the acting to others, instead of being himself the performer of his pieces, as he originally was according to Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 23. The position of the ὑποκριτής was analogous to that of the ῥαψῳδός; they were both intermediaries who interpreted the words of a poet to the public. Plato in the in one place terms him a ἑρμηνεύς and in another ὑποκριτής, apparently without any difference of meaning: Ion 530 C τὸν γὰρ ῥαψῳδὸν ἑρμηνέα δεῖ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς διανοίας γίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀκούουσι, and 535 E οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ θεατὴς τῶν δακτυλίων ὁ ἔσχατος ... ὁ δὲ μέσος σὺ ὁ ῥαψῳδὸς καὶ ὑποκριτής, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητής.

Αἰσχύλος comp. the Aristotelian survey of the progress of the Drama in Themistius Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. οὐ προσέχομεν Ἀριστοτέλει ὅτι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ὁ χορὸς εἰσιὼν ᾔδεν εἰς τοὺς θεούς, Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογόν τε καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν, Αἰσχύλος δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν καὶ ὀκρίβαντας, τὰ δὲ πλείω τούτων Σοφοκλέους ἀπελαύσαμεν καὶ Εὐριπίδου? There is no doubt a discrepancy between this and the statement in the text about Aeschylus, but it need not disturb us, unless we assume Aristotle to have been incapable of a change of opinion even on a small matter of learned research. Ancient opinion was divided on the point: Vita Aeschyli (Dindorf, Poet. scen. prol. p. 3) ἐχρήσατο δ᾿ ὑποκριτῇ πρώτῳ μὲν Κλεάνδρῳ, ἔπειτα καὶ τὸν δεύτερον αὐτῷ προσῆψε Μυννίσκον τὸν Χαλκιδέα τὸν δὲ τρίτον ὑποκριτὴν αὐτὸς ἐξεῦρεν, ὡς δὲ Δικαίαρχος ὁ Μεσσήνιος, Σοφοκλῆς.

τὸν λόγον the portion recited or spoken, as opposed to τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ, the portion sung (18, 1456 a 28 τὰ ἀδόμενα); comp. the use of λόγοι in 6, 1450 b 6, 9 in the sense of the speeches or ῥήσεις in a play. Λόγος is a word with a Protean variety of meanings even in the Poetics. In 1, 1447 a 22 it means 'language', as opposed to metre and music; in 6, 1450 b 15 'prose', as distinct from verse; in 22, 1459 a 13 an 'oration', as opposed to a poem; in 15, 1454 a 18 (comp. 19, 1456 a 37), the 'language', as distinct from the action, of the personages; in 17, 1455 b 17 (comp. 5, 1449 b 8), the 'story', as distinct from its setting in the actual poem. And in 20, 1457 a 23 it is one of the technical terms of Aristotelian logic or grammar.

πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν 'made it assume the leading part in the play'. For this metaphorical use of πρωταγωνιστής comp. that of the derivative πρωταγωνιστεῖν in Pol. 8. 4, 1338 b 29 ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων τι ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός. Instances of this extension of meaning (which is common enough in later Greek) will be found in HSt. s.v. πρωταγωνιστής. Aristotle is apt to use technical terms of theatrical origin in their popular sense (see on 14, 1453 b 8 χορηγίας) even in a book like the Poetics.

σκηνογραφίαν i. e. Sophocles was the first to have the screen behind the actors painted to represent the façade of a palace or a temple, or whatever else the play required as its background. The improvement here ascribed to Sophocles was sometimes attributed to Aeschylus (Sommerbrodt, Scaenica p. 142; Haigh, Attic Th. p. 181).

ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος so as to suggest an idea of the importance or dignity of the object: comp. Eth. N. 4. 4, 1122 b 32 μέγεθος ἔχει καὶ ἀξίωμα. — Pol. 5, 10, 1313 a 7 τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῆς ἀρχῆς. The ἀπεσεμνύνθη in the next line shows this to be at any rate by implication the sense of μέγεθος in the present passage. Aristotle evidently had in his own mind a clear and precise conception of the origin of Tragedy, though it is difficult for us to recover more than fragments of it from a statement so brief and allusive as that in the text. He merely tells us (1) that the most primitive tragedies dealt with short stories; (2) that the language of the primitive actor, instead of being serious and solemn, was sportive or jocose , and (3) in trochaics, not in iambics. By way of explanation of this last point, he adds that, as Tragedy was originally akin to the satyric drama, the language of the primitive tragic actor had still something of the rhythm of the dance about it. Aristotle's idea of the original tragic actor may possibly have been that he also was made up as a satyr. He certainly mentions one characteristic of the stage-satyr, his jesting language , and seems to imply another, viz. his dance-like movements.

ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων : such as might be told, for instance, in a single act. For the asyndeton comp. 5, 1449 b 12; De anima 3. 2, 426 b 24; De sensu 3, 440 a 8 οἷον ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφῆς ποιοῦσιν· ἑτέραν χρόαν ἐφ᾿ ἑτέραν ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφουσιν; Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 b 11.

ὀψὲ ἀπεσεμνύνθη The time meant is presumably the age of Phrynichus.

ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον ἐγένετο : Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30 οἱ τὰς τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ... ἐκ τῶν τετραμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων.

ὀρχηστικωτέραν : 24, 1459 b 37 τὸ δὲ ἰαμβεῖον καὶ τετράμετρον κινητικὰ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀρχηστικὸν τὸ δὲ πρακτικόν. — Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 32 τῶν δὲ ῥυθμῶν ὁ μὲν ἡρῷος σεμνὸς καὶ λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας δεόμενος, ὁ δ᾿ ἴαμβος αὐτή ἐστιν ἡ λέξις ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διὸ μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες. δεῖ δὲ σεμνότητα γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκστῆσαι. ὁ δὲ τροχαῖος κορδακικώτερος δηλοῖ δὲ τὰ τετράμετρα· ἔστι γὰρ ῥυθμὸς τροχαῖος τὰ τετράμετρα. — Longinus 41. 1 μικροποιοῦν δ᾿ οὐδὲν οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ὑψηλοῖς ὡς ῥυθμὸς κεκλασμένος λόγου καὶ σεσοβημένος, οἷον δὴ πυρρίχιοι καὶ τροχαῖοι καὶ διχόρειοι, τέλεον εἰς ὀρχηστικὸν συνεκπίπτοντες. ὀρχηστικός in this connexion means practically μιμητικὸς ὀρχήσεως, just as ἠθικός in the Poetics means μιμητικὸς ἤθους. Similarly λεκτικός = μιμητικὸς λέξεως (comp. 21, 1459 a 12), πρακτικός = μιμητικὸς πράξεως, and παθητικός = μιμητικὸς πάθους.

λέξεως , 'speech' as opposed to song (comp. on 21, 1459 a 12).

αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις : 24, 1460 a 4 αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις διδάσκει τὸ ἁρμόττον αὐτῇ αἱρεῖσθαι. — De caelo 3. 8, 306 b 15 ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ τοῦτο σημαίνειν ἡμῖν. — Hippocrates 3 p. 606 K. ἀνευρίσκει ἡ φύσις αὐτὴ ἑωυτῇ τὰς ἐφόδους οὐκ ἐκ διανοίας, οἷον τὸ σκαρδαμύσσειν καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα ὑπουργέει καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· ἀπαίδευτος ἡ φύσις ἐοῦσα καὶ οὐ μαθοῦσα τὰ δέοντα ποιέει.

λεκτικὸν : 21, 1459 a 11 ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἰαμβείοις διὰ τὸ ὅτι μάλιστα λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι ταῦτα ἁρμόττει ὅσοις κἂν ἐν λόγοις τις χρήσαιτο. Comp. also Rhet. 3. 1, 1404 a 30, 3. 8, 1408 b 32. The term is sufficiently explained by πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους in 26.

διαλέκτῳ , 'talk', 'converse', as in Plato Symp. 203 A διὰ τούτου πᾶσά ἐστιν ἡ ὁμιλία καὶ ἡ διάλεκτος θεοῖς πρὸς ἀνθρώπους: comp. Rhet. 3. 8, 1408 b 34 μάλιστα πάντων τῶν μέτρων ἰαμβεῖα φθέγγονται λέγοντες, and 3. 2, 1404 b 34 πάντες γὰρ μεταφοραῖς διαλέγονται. For the general meaning of διάλεκτος see on 22, 1458 b 32. Horace's alternis aptus sermonibus (A. P. 81) is a distant echo of this statement of Aristotle's. Cicero also observes that ordinary speech constantly falls into iambics: Orator 189 senarios vero et Hipponacteos effugere vix possumus; magnam enim partem ex iambis nostra constat oratio.

λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας ἁρμονία here seems to mean 'pitch' (τόνος) as in Rhet. 3. 1, 1403 b 31. Aristoxenus recognizes a similar distinction between the musical and the conversational μέλος: λέγεται γὰρ δὴ καὶ λογῶδές τι μέλος, τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ τῶν προσῳδιῶν τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν· φυσικὸν γὰρ τὸ ἐπιτείνειν καὶ ἀνιέναι ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι.

ἐπεισοδίων : see on 12, 1452 b 20.

ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται is added to explain the main statement, τὰ ἄλλα . . . ἔστω εἰρημένα. For the general form of the sentence Vahlen compares Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 b 19 τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προσδιορισαίμεθ᾿ ἄν, ἔστω προσδιωρισμένα.

κοσμηθῆναι = ἐπικοσμηθῆναι. Certain elements in a play Aristotle dismisses as κόσμοι, decorative accessories rather than structural parts of the work. With this use of κοσμεῖν we may compare that of ἡδύνειν in 6, 1449 b 28 and 24, 1460 b 3, to denote the addition of accessories designed to make the work agreeable to us.

ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία κτέ. The progress of Tragedy having been sketched, the next point to be considered is the progress of Comedy (a 37—b 8). The statement is introduced by a definition (a 32-37) based on hints already given in preceding chapters as to the nature of Comedy. In 2, 1448 a 16 Comedy was said to deal with personages worse than the average man (χείρους, = φαυλότεροι in the present passage) ; and in 4, 1448 b 36 its subject was assumed to be τὸ γελοῖον. These two points Aristotle reconciles and combines in a rough provisional definition before proceeding to the question more immediately before him, that of the μεταβάσεις of Comedy. It is not necessary, therefore, to suppose this defining clause to be out of place. If we try the experiment of transferring it to another place, it will be found that little or nothing is gained by this disturbance of the traditional order.

ὥσπερ εἴπομεν : in 2, 1448 a 17 and 4, 1448 b 37.

πᾶσαν κακίαν : Plato Rep. 490 D ὁρᾶν αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν ἀχρήστους, τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς κακοὺς πᾶσαν κακίαν. — Demosthenes 18, 279 τὸ δὲ δὴ καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἔμ᾿ αὐτὸν ἀγῶνας ἐάσαντα νῦν ἐπὶ τόνδ᾿ ἤκειν καὶ πᾶσαν ἔχει κακίαν.

ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον a compressed statement, practically equivalent to οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ καθ᾿ ἕν τι εἶδος κακίας· τοῦ γὰρ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. The personages in Comedy are worse than most men, but only in one particular respect, as presenting a certain harmless deformity or ugliness of character, which makes them ridiculous only—not objects for blame or aversion. It is, in Aristotle's view, the harmlessness of the evil in them that makes them fit objects of laughter.

τὸ γὰρ γελοῖον κτέ. Two kinds of possible objects of laughter are implied in the text. (1) An act is γελοῖον when it is of the nature of a harmless mistake or blunder (ἁμάρτημα ἀνώδυνον) ; and (2) a person is γελοῖος when he presents some moral or physical deformity of the same harmless kind (αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον). The negative element here is a very essential part of the definition. Plato also, who thinks that the spectacle of human ignorance is the true object of laughter in Comedy, explains that, to be laughable, the ignorance must be harmless (ἀβλαβὴς τοῖς ἄλλοις). As γελοῖα are the basis of all Comedy, Aristotle must be assumed to have devoted a section of his theory of Comedy (in the lost Second Book) to the causes and conditions of laughter, in the same way as we find him analysing τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν in chaps. 13-14 of the existing Poetics. It is not impossible that several traces of his theory survive in Cicero's discussion of the 'Ridiculous' in De Oratore 2, 58-59, which seems to be on distinctly Aristotelian lines.

ἁμάρτημα : see on 13, 1453 a 16.

αἶσχος (like the adj. αἰσχρός) includes moral as well as physical deformity. Though the illustration in 36 relates to physical ugliness, Aristotle is really thinking of the ugliness of character in the personages of Comedy, who have been described as being χείρους τῶν νῦν (2, 1448 a 17). Their visible ugliness is part of their ὄψις (see on 6, 1449 b 33), which lies outside the limits of the art of the poet himself.

τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον For the masks in Comedy see Pollux 4, 143.

αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον : Plato Rep. 506 C βούλει οὖν αἰσχρὰ θεάσασθαι, τυφλά τε καὶ σκολιά, ἐξὸν παρ᾿ ἄλλων ἀκούειν φανά τε καὶ καλά;.

ἀνώδυνον : comp. ἄνευ ὀδύνης in 37. ὀδύνη is a pain that one feels strongly. Plato Crat. 419 C ὀδύνη δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς ἐνδύσεως τῆς λύπης κεκλημένῃ ἔοικεν. The Stoic definition (Diog. Laert. 7. 112) was ὀδύνη λύπη ἐπίπονος, translated by Cicero (Tusc. 4. 8) by aerumna aegritudo laboriosa.

εὐθὺς : 'to take the first instance that occurs'; in 10, 1452 a 36 it means suapte natura (Bon. Ind. 296 a 13).

κωμῳδῶν The word being intended to bear the sense of the comic actor, i. e. the actor-poet, since Aristotle is referring to the time when the actor was the poet himself. This sense of the word in the Greek of Aristotle's period has been contested by Mr. H. P. Richards; but I think he has carried his negation too far, more especially as we find the corresponding word τραγῳδοί in the sense of the tragic actors in 22, 1458 b 32. The traditional doctrine of the grammarians was that κωμῳδοί was used for the actors as well as for the members of the chorus in Comedy: Ammonius π. διαφ. λέξ. p. 86 Valck. Κωμῳδὸς καὶ Τραγῳδὸς λέγεται ὁ χορευτής καὶ ὑποκριτής. That κωμῳδοί may refer to the actors even in strict Attic seems to be shown by Plato Phaedr. 236 C ἵνα μὴ τὸ τῶν κωμῳδῶν φορτικὸν πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαζώμεθα ποιεῖν. For Aristotle's time, however, the use seems to be pretty clearly established by the language of his contemporary, Chares of Mytilene: ὑπεκρίθησαν δὲ τραγῳδοὶ μὲν Θεσσαλὸς καὶ Ἀθηνόδωρος καὶ Ἀριστόκριτος, κωμῳδοὶ δὲ Λύκων καὶ Φορμίων καὶ Ἀρίστων. And half a century after Aristotle this was the normal sense of the term, as is proved by inscriptions of the period. The history of the word, therefore, runs parallel with that of the comic chorus. Whatever its form may have been, it was no longer a very important part of a comedy. And if that was the fact, the gradual restriction of the term κωμῳδός to the actor would be the natural result of the absence or diminished importance of the chorus in the Comedy of the period.

ὀψέ ποτε Aristotle seems to have had a definite date in his mind. He conceives the history of Attic Comedy to begin with Chionides, who is said to have exhibited as early as B.C. 487; but the formal recognition of it by the state must have come later, probably about B.C. 465.

ἐθελονταὶ ἦσαν Intelligi potest de Choro, sed etiam de poetis... ἐκαλοῦντο δὲ καὶ ἐθελονταὶ διδάσκαλοι, δραμάτων δηλαδή, ὅτε τις μὴ λαβὼν χορὸν μηδὲ χορηγητὴν ἔχων ἑαυτῷ τὰ πάντα παρεῖχε. Hinc enim poetarum, nascente Comoedia, conditio difficilis maxime apparet, quod non modo Chorum docere sed etiam conducere, nutrire, vestibus alioque omni apparatu instruere necesse haberent (Tyrwhitt). A somewhat similar use of the term seems to have survived at Thebes, where ἐθελοντής is said to have been the name for the actor in a rude species of burlesque. The alternative to Tyrwhitt's interpretation is to suppose the reference to be either to volunteer χορηγοί (Demosth. 21. 13 ὑπεσχόμην ἐγὼ χορηγήσειν ἐθελοντής), or to volunteer actors and chorus-singers.

σχήματα : comp. 4, 1448 b 36 and Bon. Ind. 740 a 24. It has been thought that the form of expression here may imply some slowness to grant the name ποιητής to a comedian.

μνημονεύονται As soon as Comedy became a state institution, an official record of the successful poets must have been kept in the public archives.

ἀπέδωκεν : De sensu 2, 438 b 17 ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοιχείων. In Plato Laws 2, 669 C ἀποδοῦναι and προσαρμόττειν are treated as synonyms.

προλόγους The term is defined in 12, 1452 b 19. The introduction of a 'prologue' in Tragedy was sometimes said to have been due to Thespis: Themist. Or. 26 p. 382 Dind. Θέσπις δὲ πρόλογον καὶ ῥῆσιν ἐξεῦρεν. It was obviously a significant moment in the history of the Drama when the play, instead of beginning with a choral song, opened with a statement spoken by an actor.

πλήθη : comp. the use of πλήθη in 4, 1449 a 28 and 21, 1458 a 13. The plural is in keeping with that in προλόγους and μύθους in the context.

μύθους : see on b 9.

Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις These words cannot be retained where they stand. No appropriate verb can be supplied with them; for though Aristotle might have said μύθους ἀπέδωκε, he could hardly have meant to say μύθους ποιεῖν ἀπέδωκε. And even if ἀπέδωκε is to be understood, there is an awkward asyndeton in τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς. which on this assumption should surely be τὸ μὲν 〈οὖν〉 ἐξ ἀρχῆς, as is actually read in certain of the apographs. From the reminiscence of this passage (comp. Welcker, Kl. Scr. I p. 330) in Themistius Or. 27 p. 406 Dind. καὶ κωμῳδία τὸ παλαιὸν ἤρξατο μὲν ἐκ Σικελίας (ἐκεῖθεν γὰρ ἤστην Ἐπίχαρμός τε καὶ Φόρμος), κάλλιον δὲ Ἀθήναζε συνηυξήθη, it would seem that the words Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις were originally part of a clause which came in after ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν, and that what Aristotle wrote was something like this: τὸ δὲ μύθους ποιεῖν τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκ Σικελίας ἦλθεν (ἦσαν γὰρ Ἐπίχαρμος καὶ Φόρμις ἐκεῖθεν), τῶν δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Κράτης κτέ. (v. J. of Phil. 5 p. 118)

Κράτης : his 'floruit' may be put about B. C. 450. For the fragments of his comedies see Kock, CAF. 1 p. 130; Meineke, FCG. 1 p. 58.

ἀφέμενος τῆς ἰαμβικῆς ἰδέας Ac mihi quidem hoc Aristoteles significare voluisse videtur, cum Cratinus ceterique antiquiores comici certos quosdam homines in fabulis suis exagitassent populoque ridendos propinassent, Cratetem primum apud Athenienses extitisse qui Epicharmi exemplo comicae poesios materiam a singulorum hominum irrisione ad generales morum notationes rerumque descriptiones traduceret. Quod autem lacessendi consuetudinem omisisse Crates ab Aristotele dicitur, id plane fragmenta fabularum confirmant, in quibus nihil prorsus reperias ex quo certos quosdam homines eum carpsisse intellegatur Meineke l. c. p. 59. The 'iambic form' of Comedy is the Old Comedy, which, from the personal nature of its satire, was only one remove from the 'invective' of Archilochus and the Iambographers (4, 1449 a 4). It is thus characterized in Horace Sat. 1. 4. 1 Eupolis atque Cratinus Aristophanesque poetae Alque alii, quorum comoedia prisca virorum est, Si quis erat dignus describi, quod malus aut fur, Quod moechus forel aut sicarius aut alioqui Famosus, multa cum libertate notabant.

καθόλου ποιεῖν λόγους is the opposite of περὶ τὸν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον ποιεῖν (see 9, 1451 b 14). The implied antithesis is between a story about some particular person, e. g. Alcibiades, and one about (for instance) 'a man', or 'a man of such and such a type' (ὁ τοιόσδε, Rhet. 1. 2, 1355 b 30), i. e. as we should say, 'a character', the representative of a possible class. A 'character' is a coherent group of qualities disengaged from the various accidents which coexist with it in the concrete individual; it is therefore in the nature of things something general and attributable to several, whereas the individual as such is unique. Aristotle's view is that the personages in Crates, as in all the higher forms of poetry, are 'characters', i. e. more or less idealized personages, not real men as in History, the ψόγος, and the Old Comedy. How these abstracts of human personality come to get proper names attached to them in the Drama is a point which Aristotle considers at some length in 9, 1451 b 13-22 (comp. 17, 1455 b 12).

μύθους : i.e. his stories were as imaginary as his personages. μῦθος according to Plato Rep. 377 A is a λόγος ψευδής (either taken from legend or invented by the poet himself), though there may be some element of truth in it.

ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία κτέ. At this point, the evolution of the Drama having been sketched, Aristotle inserts a provisional note on the points of agreement and difference between Tragedy and epic poetry, which anticipates to a certain extent the longer statement in chaps. 23-24. The two points of agreement had been already intimated, the first in 4, 1448 b 34, and the second in 5, 1449 a 20.

μέχρι μὲν τοῦ ... εἶναι : 7, 1451 a 10 μέχρι τοῦ σύνδηλος εἶναι. — Top. 8. 1, 155 b 7 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τοῦ εὑρεῖν τὸν τόπον ὁμοίως τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ ἡ σκέψις. The construction συνακολουθεῖν μέχρι occurs in Phys. 1. 5, 188 b 26 μέχρι μὲν οὖν τούτου σχεδὸν συνηκολουθήκασι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεῖστοι—where also συνακολουθεῖν, just like ἀκολουθεῖν here, is the opposite of διαφέρειν (188 b 30: comp. Bon. Ind. 26 a 23). In these and similar instances the preposition μέχρι is to be understood as inclusive of that which is mentioned as the limit (comp. Eucken, Sprachgebr. p. 17). A difficulty has been found in ἠκολούθησεν (by Thurot and Spengel), on the ground that it would be more natural to speak of Tragedy following the Epic than of the Epic following Tragedy. This view assumes that ἀκολουθεῖν must mean to 'follow after' in order of time, whereas the word may very well mean 'go with' (comp. Rhet. 1. 6, 1362 b 29), i. e. 'agree with'. The aorist seems to imply that the fact has been already recognized. With the traditional reading μόνου (retained by Vahlen) the infinitive εἶναι which follows is out of construction.

διὰ μέτρου μεγάλου For the preposition comp. 1, 1447 a 27 διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν. — 4, 1449 a 11 διὰ τριμέτρων. — 4, 1449 a 16 διὰ τῶν μέτρων. — 6, 1449 b 30 διὰ μέτρων. As here used, μέτρον μέγα seems to mean a large kind of verse, one fitted for a large subject (comp. 4, 1449 a 6 μείζονα σχήματα). The hexameter is a metre of this description (24, 1460 a 3); and Aristotle may be presumed, I think, to have taken the same view of the tragic iambic as corresponding to the μέγεθος of the tragic stories, and the gravity of the tragic diction (comp. 4, 1449 a 19). Vahlen, retaining the manuscript reading μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου, takes μέτρον μέγα to mean spatium magnum sive fines ampli ; this, however, is hardly probable with τὸ μέτρον in the sense of 'metre' in the very next line (comp. Gomperz, Zu Aristoteles' Poetik 1 p. 25). The following are some of the attempts at emending this passage: μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου (the Aldine, and corr. Parisinus 2038); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μέτρῳ [μετὰ λόγου] (Tyrwhitt); μέχρι μόνου τοῦ διὰ λόγου ἐμμέτρου μεγάλου (Ueberweg); μέχρι μὲν τοῦ [μέτρου μεγάλου] (Christ).

μίμησις . . . σπουδαίων : as was said in 4, 1448 b 34. σπουδαίων is presumably neuter (comp. 4, 1448 b 34, and the note on 3, 1448 a 19).

τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἁπλοῦν ἔχειν scil. τὴν ἐποποιίαν. ἁπλοῦν is the opposite of ποικίλον (comp. Bon. Ind. 76 b 12) ; the contrast is between the one metre of the Epic (v. 24, 1459 b 32) and the variety of metres in Tragedy.

ταύτῃ In illustration of the construction Vahlen quotes 23, 1459 a 30 ταύτῃ θεσπέσιος ἂν φανείη τῷ μηδὲ τὸν πόλεμον ἐπιχειρῆσαι ποιεῖν ὅλον. — Pol. 7. 15, 1334 a 41 οὐ ταύτῃ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων, τῷ μὴ νομίζειν. — Plato Rep. 605 C τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ὁμιλεῖν ταύτῃ ὡμοίωται.

ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει scil. διαφέρει ἡ ἐποποιία. Having laid this down, however, Aristotle remembers that the difference did not always exist; he accordingly repeats his original proposition by a resumptive καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 660), in order to introduce a qualifying clause, καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον κτέ.. The clause marked as a parenthesis is equivalent to ἡ μὲ γὰρ κτέ. (actually found in some apographs), and is similar in form to that in 4, 1449 a 19 (v. ad loc.). Aristotle is thinking of a very obvious fact, viz. that an epic (the Iliad or Odyssey, for instance) runs to several thousand lines, whereas a tragedy rarely exceeds some 1,600. This difference he never loses sight of; he notes it in 17, 1455 b 16, and (in a context just like the present) in 24, 1459 b 17 διαφέρει δὲ κατά τε τῆς συστάσεως τὸ μήκος ἡ ἐποποιία καὶ τὸ μέτρον; and he returns to it in his concluding chapter (26, 1462 a 18) where the comparative merits of the two forms of poetry are under discussion. These parallels, as Teichmüller has seen, are enough to show that μῆκος must denote here not the ambitus actionis, the imaginary duration of the action of the poem, as is often supposed, but rather the real length of the work itself, a length to be measured by the number of lines the work would take up in a book, or the hours it would need for recitation. It has the same sense in 7, 1451 a 6 and in 24, 1459 b 18. A reason for this difference of length, one quite sufficient for Aristotle's purpose, is given in the parenthesis, ἡ μὲν ὅτι μάλιστα κτέ.. He regards it as the natural consequence of another kind of difference, viz. the fact that the action in a Greek tragedy is as a rule kept within a limit of some 24 hours, whereas that in an epic may extend over weeks, or even years. There being this difference, therefore, in the extent of the action, the quantum of matter to be included in the story, it is only natural that there should be a corresponding difference in the length of the literary statement in the two instances, and that an epic poem accordingly should be of greater length than a tragedy. A certain correspondence between the length and the quantum of matter in a poem is recognized in 26, 1462 b 2. Assuming this correspondence, Aristotle explains the great length of an epic, as compared with a tragedy, as due to the great length of time over which the epic action extends. In other words, he passes from the idea of the actual length, the actual time required for the recitation, to that of the imaginary time covered by the action of the poem; and he does this on the tacit assumption that the two things are so closely connected that the one may serve to explain the other (comp. Ueberweg, Aristoteles über Dichtkunst p. 57). Teichmüller's theory, that Aristotle is referring in the parenthesis to the time of the actual recitation or performance, and thinking of the series of dramas (a trilogy or tetralogy) presented on the stage in a single day, may be set aside at once, not only on archaeological grounds, but also because it assumes an impossible sense for ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου.

πειρᾶται means much the same thing as βούλεται in 2, 1448 a 18. The same anxiety to avoid overstatement is to be seen in ὅτι μάλιστα and ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν in the context.

μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου cannot be, as Teichmüller imagines, a way of describing the natural day of 12 hours or so ; the periphrasis is deliberately chosen in order to make it clear that the solar day of 24 hours is meant. A περίοδος of the sun is not its half-circuit, but its circuit, i. e. the time it takes to come round again to an assumed starting-point. For other Aristotelian instances of this sense of the word see Bon. Ind. 582 b 29. The statement in the text was often quoted in former times as evidence for the assertion that the so-called 'Unity of Time' was one of Aristotle's rules for the Drama. 'The stage', says Sydney in his (p. 63 Arber), 'should always represent but one place; and the uttermost time presupposed in it should be, both by Aristotle's precept and common sense, but one day'. What Aristotle actually says is not a precept, but only an incidental recognition of a fact in the practice of the theatre in his age. The same is true also of the 'Unity of Place', which was believed to be implied as a rule in 24, 1459 b 25. The 'Unity of Action', however, is very emphatically asserted in chaps. 8–11 and elsewhere.

μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν = 'to vary, or depart, from that only a little', i. e. 'to exceed that limit only a little'. The reference is not to variation within the limit, but to variation beyond it.

τὸ πρῶτον In the earliest drama, says Aristotle, the Unity of Time was not observed with strictness, any more than it is in epic poetry. This passage has been discussed by M. Maurice Croiset ( p. 373; comp. Heimsoeth, De tragoediae graecae trilogiis p. iv), who suggests that Aristotle may be referring to the period anterior to the institution of the trilogy, when a long tragic story, instead of being dealt with in three tragedies, may be supposed to have been told in one. It is clear that the action in such a play would be very like that of an epic, and cover a longer time than 24 hours. One may ask how in the absence of some device like the modern curtain the lapse of time between act and act could be sufficiently indicated; and one may also ask whether there was the same chorus throughout the performance. These are difficulties which we have now no means of answering.

ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις The preposition shows that Aristotle is thinking not of the time of the performance, but of something within the play, the imaginary time of the action in it (Ribbeck, Rh. Mus. 24, 135); comp. 13, 1453 a 25 τοῦτο δρᾷ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις.

μέρη : i.e. the constituents enumerated and distinguished in 6, 1449 b 31 sqq.. The parts peculiar to Tragedy are melody and 'spectacle' (24, 1459 b 10).

διόπερ κτέ. Similarly in chaps. 23–24, before explaining the differences between epic poetry and Tragedy, Aristotle is at some pains to show that a good epic will have much the same structure as a good tragedy, and that in most respects the same canons of construction are applicable to it (23, 1459 a 17—24, 1459 b 17). The corollary ends at ἐπῶν; what follows (μὲν γὰρ κτέ.) is a reason in support of the main statement (b 16).

περὶ . . . τῆς ἐν ἑξαμέτροις μιμητικῆς : in chaps. 23–24.

περὶ κωμῳδίας : in the lost Second Book of the Poetics.

ἀναλαβόντες : Top. 6. 14, 151 b 19 καλῶς εἰρημένον ὅρον ἀναλαβεῖν. — Meteor. 1. 3, 339 a 33 ἀναλαβόντες οὖν τὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς θέσεις . . λέγωμεν. — 1. 8, 345 b 31 ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ἀναλαβόντες τὴν ὑποκειμένην ἀρχὴν ἡμῖν. — Rhet. 1. 13, 1373 b 27 ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι λέγωμεν.

ὅρον τῆς οὐσίας : the definition of its essence, or essential nature; comp. Metaph. Z 13, 1039 a 19 δοκεῖ γε πᾶσι καὶ ἐλέχθη πάλαι ἢ μόνον εἶναι οὐσίας ὅρον ἢ μάλιστα. — De part. an. 1. 1, 642 a 26 ὁρίσασθαι τὴν οὐσίαν. — 4. 5, 678 a 34 τῷ λόγῳ... τῷ ὁρίζοντι τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῶν.

ἔστιν οὖν τραγῳδία κτέ. The definition, which is in logical form, per genus et differentias, professes to be a summary of points already established; and in its principal elements it is that. (1) That Tragedy is a μίμησις was said in 1, 1447 a 13 ; and that it is a μίμησις πράξεως is implied in 1, 1447 a 28. (2) σπουδαίας, which differentiates Tragedy from Comedy, recalls chap. 2 and 4, 1448 b 34—καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης being added in recognition apparently of the point indicated in 4, 1449 a 19. (3) The means in Tragedy were noted in 1, 1447 b 24–28 ; and (4) the dramatic manner of its imitation in 3, 1448 a 23–28. But for the concluding clause, on the effect of Tragedy on the emotions, we have not been prepared by anything in the earlier chapters. Aristotle no doubt regarded one part of it, δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου, as self-evident, but the rest is presumably an anticipation of a point worked out at length in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. In just the same way we find him using the term προαιρετική in the definition of virtue in Eth. N. 2. 6, 1106 b 36, and reserving the formal explanation of προαίρεσις for 3. 4, 1111 b 4. This concluding clause is an integral part of the definition, since the end of the thing to be defined cannot be ignored in any logically complete statement of its nature (De anima 1. 1, 403 a 25; Metaph. H 2, 1043 a 14).

τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης The point is considered in chap. 7, where 'completeness' is said to imply a whole of some magnitude (7, 1450 b 24). We have not yet been told that the action in Tragedy must be a τελεία πρᾶξις, but from the explanatory μέγεθος ἐχούσης Aristotle would seem to regard the point as the natural consequence of the μέγεθος mentioned already in 4, 1449 a 19 as one of the characteristics of Tragedy proper. In that case the term distinguishes Tragedy proper with its complete and self-contained stories from the rudimentary Drama of an earlier period.

ἡδυσμένῳ : Plato Rep. 607 A εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδυσμένην μοῦσαν παραδέξῃ ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἔπεσιν, ἡδονή σοι καὶ λύπη ἐν τῇ πόλει βασιλεύσετον. The word is taken from cookery (comp. De sensu 4, 442 a 10). The nature of the metaphor may be seen, in the case of the substantive ἥδυσμα, from Aristotle's criticism of the style of Alcidamas in Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 a 19 οὐ γὰρ ἡδύσματι χρῆται ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐδέσματι τοῖς ἐπιθέτοις ('the sauce with him is the dish'). Said of language ἡδυσμένος implies the accession of something (here metre and music) to make it agreeable, just as κοσμηθῆναι in 4, 1449 a 29 meant the accession of something to make the work beautiful. An echo of this passage (comp. 6, 1450 b 11) may perhaps be recognized in Plutarch Erot. 769 C λόγῳ ποίησις ἡδύσματα (τὰ) μέλη καὶ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμοὺς ἐφαρμόσασα , and also in Strabo 818 Cas. φλυαροῦσιν ὥσπερ μέλος ἢ ῥυθμὸν [ἢ] ἥδυσμά τι τῷ λόγῳ τὴν τερατείαν προσφέροντες. The metaphor reappears in Shakespeare, 2. 2 I remember one said there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savoury.

ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν scil. τῶν ἡδυσμάτων, understood from ἡδυσμένῳ. Similarly in Isocrates 190 D περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ξένοις τὰ δὲ καινοῖς τὰ δὲ μεταφοραῖς, καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἶδεσι διαποικίλαι τὴν ποίησιν one may supply τῶν ὀνομάτων with εἶδεσι. For another instance of this allusive use of εἶδος see 25, 1461 b 22. In what follows (b 29) ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν is replaced by τοῖς εἶδεσι ; the reading of the MS., ἑκάστου, seems to have arisen through χωρίς having been mistaken for a preposition. The juxtaposition of χωρίς and ἑκάστῳ is just like that in Pol. 7. 1, 1323 b 41 καὶ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ καὶ κοινῇ ταῖς πόλεσιν (comp. χωρὶς ἕκαστον in De caelo 2. 12, 292 a 13, b 27) . The implied antithesis in the present passage is between 'each separately' (χωρίς), and 'all together, and at once' (ἅμα: comp. De gen. et corr. 1. 5, 322 a 13, and Metaph. E 4, 1027 b 23). Tragedy (unlike the Dithyramb etc.) has the ἥδυσμα of metre in the dialogue, and that of melody only in the choral parts (see on 1, 1447 b 28). ἑκάστῳ, therefore, is loosely put for ἑκατέρῳ (comp. Pol. 3. 12, 1282 b 38, and HSt. s. v.).

δρώντων scil. τῶν μιμουμένων , the subject being omitted as it is in 13, 1450 a 10 , 21, b 31, and 26, 1461 b 29. Other Aristotelian instances of this ellipse with a gen. absolute may be seen in Bon. Ind. 149 b 29. Tyrwhitt, with less probability, as it seems to me, supplies μίμησις with δρώντων, comparing 3, 1448 a 29 μιμοῦνται δρῶντας.

οὐ δι᾿ ἀπαγγελίας scil. μιμουμένων.

δι᾽ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου means practically δι᾿ ἐλεεινῶν καὶ φοβερῶν, 'by piteous and alarming scenes'; comp. Goulston's paraphrase, 'per misericordiam metumque factis expressum'. The more abstract form of expression is adopted in order to prepare the way for τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων. For the use of the preposition in this connexion comp. διὰ μέτρων περαίνεσθαι in b 30. — De part. an. 3. 4, 666 a 15 περαίνονται [scil. αἱ κινήσεις] διὰ τοῦ ἕλκειν καὶ ἀνιέναι. — Plato Gorg. 450 D διὰ λόγου πᾶν περαίνουσι. — Rep. 392 D δι᾿ ἀμφοτέρων περαίνουσιν (v. Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 85). This excitement of pity and fear is, as far as the poet is concerned, the end of Tragedy, but it is in truth only a means to its ultimate end, its κάθαρσις of such emotions.

τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν 'its catharsis of such emotions' , just as ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μίμησιν (1, 1447 a 22; 6, 1449 b 31) means 'to make their imitation', and ποιεῖν τὴν ἡδονήν (4, 1448 b 18), 'to produce its pleasure' (comp. 4, 1448 b 7, and Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 593). The article, in fact, is not so otiose as is usually supposed. This interpretation of the article removes more than one of the preliminary difficulties in this much debated passage, the implication being that a cathartic effect is not peculiar to Tragedy; so that the text is seen at once to stand in close relation to the passage in Pol. 8. 7 (v. Fr. V), in which the existence of several forms of catharsis is affirmed. Aristotle recognizes there a catharsis of 'enthusiasm' effected by certain kinds of music, as well as a catharsis of pity and fear effected by Tragedy ; and there is reason to think that a catharsis of laughter also must have been similarly posited as the effect and ultimate justification of Comedy in the lost Second Book of the Poetics. τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων, therefore, is a general expression for this whole group of disturbing emotions (enthusiasm, pity, fear, etc.), instead of being, as is so often thought, either limited to the two emotions (pity and fear) which appear in the context, or applying to the emotions in general. The great difficulty, however, in this formula is as to the interpretation of κάθαρσις. Is the term to be understood as a physiological metaphor, in the sense of 'purging', or 'clearing away' ; or as a metaphor from the religious rite of lustration, in the sense of 'purification'? The ancient evidence, in Aristotle and elsewhere, is to my mind very decidedly in favour of the first interpretation. I. This, the pathological interpretation, as it may be called, is now generally associated with the names of Weil (1848) and Bernays (1857), who each independently arrived at a very similar conclusion. It is in reality much older; all its essential points in fact are to be found in Tyrwhitt's note on the present passage : 'Satis apparet, Aristotelem hic regulam de tragoedia tragica instituisse, qua scilicet probaret affectus misericordiae et metus, qui in tragoediis vehementissime excitantur, non ex eo nutriri et validiores effici, quod Plato criminabatur, sed contra levari et exhauriri; et proinde affectuum horum purgationem opus esse proprium et quasi finem Tragoediae; cum caeterae Poesis species vel ad doctrinam, vel ad delectationem magis aptae sint.'. To understand Aristotle's position we have to go back to Plato's condemnation of the Drama in the Tenth Book of the Republic. One of Plato's points is, that the Drama appeals mainly to two of the inferior elements in the soul, our faculty for grief (τὸ θρηνῶδες, τὸ ἐλεεινόν) and our faculty for laughter ; and that its effect is to gratify these at the expense of the reason, and ultimately to weaken or nullify the self-control prescribed by reason (Rep. 605 c-606 c). As a view like this, supported by so great a name, could hardly be ignored by Aristotle in an Art of Poetry based throughout on the assumption of the legitimacy of the Drama, and of the emotional effects it aims at, his catharsis theory may very well be supposed to have been intended as his answer to the Platonic indictment. Though the formal exposition of the theory, as it was to be read in the complete Poetics, is no longer before us, it is still possible to recover some idea of it from the two statements in the Politics on the 'cathartic' effect of certain kinds of music. In Pol. 8. 6, 1341 a 21, as a reason for leaving the flute to professionals, instead of making it part of a liberal education for all, Aristotle explains that the flute, instead of having an 'ethical' effect, is simply orgiastic or exciting, and to be kept for the times when the hearing of music is a 'catharsis' rather than a form of instruction: οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ αὐλὸς ἠθικὸν ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὀργιαστικόν, ὥστε πρὸς τοὺς τοιούτους αὐτῷ καιροὺς χρηστέον ἐν οἷς ἡ θεωρία κάθαρσιν μᾶλλον δύναται ἢ μάθησιν. It will be seen that a sharp distinction is drawn here between the emotional effect of the flute, and the 'ethical' effect of certain other kinds of music ; and that κάθαρσις is in Aristotle's view connected with the former rather than with the latter. A much more important passage, however, is that in Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 32, which will be found in extenso among the Fragments of the Poetics (Fr. V). It begins by assuming a current division of 'airs' into ἠθικά, πρακτικά, καὶ ἐνθουσιαστικὰ μέλη, and a similar classification of 'harmonies' or modes. The distinction here is between (1) the music that imitates character, and has thus a reflex influence on the character of the hearer (comp. Pol. 8. 5, 1340 b); (2) that which imitates action (comp. Plato Rep. 399 A), and moves us to it ; and (3) that which imitates, and so arouses in us, the orgy of emotion termed by the Greeks 'enthusiasm'. The most 'ethical' harmonies may be practised by all, as a regular part of their lives; whereas the other two kinds are to be left to professionals. This tolerance of the 'enthusiastic harmonies' in a well-ordered state Aristotle justifies by showing that they stand in much the same position as Tragedy. There are certain emotions, he tells us, which arise in some degree in every man's soul, and in a disquieting degree (ἰσχυρῶς) in certain of us, e.g. pity and fear. Enthusiasm is one of these disturbing emotions. Experience, however, shows that the enthusiastic music (that of the hymns of Olympus, for instance) has a salutary effect on those subject to accesses (κατοκώχιμοι) of enthusiasm, restoring them to a normal condition of calm and peace (καθισταμένους: comp. Bon. Ind. 356 a 35 and 375 a 8), just as though they had undergone a cure or catharsis at the hands of a physician (ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως). The same sort of treatment (πάσχειν) is required by other emotional natures also, e.g. by those liable to accesses of pity and fear, and by the rest of mankind likewise, in so far as they have a share in these feelings ; all want a certain catharsis, a pleasurable relief (κουφίζεσθαι) from emotion. And it is in just the same way (i.e. by the relief they bring) that the cathartic airs give a harmless delight to mankind. The sense of κάθαρσις in the Politics is well explained by Sepulveda in his note on 8. 6, 1341 a 23: 'Purgatio intelligitur expulsio cuiuspiam affectus'; and again in that on 8. 7, 1342 a 6 (τῷ δὲ ἧττον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον): 'Itaque plus et minus, tamen omnes moventur affectibus, a quibus iucunde per musicam sanantur et quasi medicamento quodam adhibito purgantur' (comp. J. of Phil. 27 p. 269). The term in fact is a metaphor from medicine, as Aristotle intimates by making it a synonym for ἰατρεία (ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως), in a context too which presents a whole series of words which either have, or may have, a medical meaning (πάθος, πάσχειν, ἰσχυρῶς, κίνησις, κατοκώχιμοι, καθισταμένους, κουφίζεσθαι, καθαρτικά). In Greek physiology and pathology κάθαρσις is a very general term for a physical clearance or discharge, the removal by art or an effort of nature of some bodily product (some περίττωμα, as Aristotle would call it), which, if allowed to remain, would cause discomfort or harm. The κάθαρσις of the soul as described in the Politics is a similar process in reference to certain emotions (πάθη)—the tacit assumption being apparently that the emotions in question are analogous to those peccant humours in the body which, according to the ancient humoral theory of medicine, have to be expelled from the system by the appropriate κάθαρσις. With some adaptation of the statements and hints in Pol. 8. 7, as thus interpreted, it is not difficult to recover the outlines at any rate of the Aristotelian theory of the cathartic effect of Tragedy: Pity and fear are elements in human nature, and in some men (τοὺς ἐλεήμονας καὶ τοὺς φοβητικούς) they are present in a disquieting degree (ἰσχυρῶς). With these latter the tragic excitement is a necessity (ἀναγκαῖον πάσχειν) ; but it is also in a certain sense good for all. It serves as a sort of medicine, producing a catharsis to lighten and relieve the soul (κουφίζεσθαι) of the accumulated emotion within it ; and as the relief is wanted, there is always a harmless pleasure attending the process of relief. This, then, may be taken as Aristotle's answer to the Platonic argument in the Republic ; it shows that the pleasure we derive from the moving scenes in Tragedy is not, as Plato had maintained, a demoralizing, but on the contrary a harmless pleasure, (χαρὰ ἀβλαβής). The legitimacy of this pleasure is assumed throughout the Poetics (see especially 14, 1453 b 11), but its precise nature is not explained, either in the existing book or elsewhere, by Aristotle. It falls naturally enough, however, into its place in the classification of pleasures in the Nicomachean Ethics, which recognizes the existence of a class of things as pleasurable not directly and in themselves, but through their effect, as being of the nature of cures or remedies (ἰατρεῖαι) to remove the disquietude arising from an unsatisfied want, and restore us to a normal condition of body or mind (Eth. N. 7. 13, 1152 b 34; 7. 15, 1154 b 17). The tragic excitement, which in the language of the Politics, acts as an ἰατρεία or κάθαρσις, is clearly a pleasure of this kind, one of those described by Aristotle as ἰατρεύοντα ἡδέα. A further point in his idea of κάθαρσις may perhaps be noticed, as suggested at any rate by his use of the term to express the effect of Tragedy on the mind. A catharsis in the medical sense of the word is an ἰατρεία, and only for occasional use ; and its analogue, the παθημάτων κάθαρσις, may very well be presumed to resemble it in this respect. In assuming Tragedy, therefore, to have a cathartic rather than a permanent moral effect, Aristotle would seem to have been mindful of the position of the Drama in Greek life, and to have seen that the dramatic performances in the theatre were not sufficiently frequent or continuous to generate a moral habit, or make a lasting impression for good or evil on character—a point overlooked not only by Plato but also by Lessing and most of the modern interpreters of the Aristotelian theory of Tragedy (comp. E. Müller, Theorie der Kunst bei den Alten 2 p. 378). In the phrase παθημάτων κάθαρσις the genitive after κάθαρσις, denoting the object purged away or removed, is a construction not uncommon in Aristotle's physiological writings (v. Bon. Ind. 354 b 22); and it is found also in other authors, e.g. Hippocrates 1 p. 104 K. πτυέλων καθάρσεις. — p. 654 καθάρσεις τοῦ θερμοῦ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. — 3 p. 502 τῶν ἀπὸ πλευμόνων καθάρσεις. — Thucydides 2. 49 ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς. — Demosthenes 64. 12 κάθαρσις αἵματος. — Polybius 5. 100. 6 ἀνακάθαρσις πτώματος. The same construction is found with κάθαρσις (etc.) in its metaphorical application to the analogous process in the mind: Plato Phaed. 69 B κάθαρσίς τις τῶν τοιούτων πάντων, 'a purging away of all such things' (Jowett), where the object purged away or removed is shown by the context to be certain affections of the soul (ἡδονῶν καὶ φόβων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν τοιούτων). — Plutarch De cap. ex inimicis utilit. 91 F τῶν παθῶν τούτων ποιούμενος εἰς τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀποκαθάρσεις. — Iamblichus De myst. 1. 12 κάθαρσις παθῶν. — Hierocles in Aur. carm. p. 124 (Needham) ἡ τῶν λυμαινομένων παθῶν ἐκκάθαρσις. — p. 134 κάθαρσις τῆς οἰήσεως. — p. 194 ἀποκάθαρσις νείκους. Aristotle's τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν may perhaps be an unconscious reminiscence of the phrase in Plato. The idea of κάθαρσις, in the sense of a working-off of emotion brought about by something that excites emotion, was not unknown in late Greek literature ; it is recognized in reference to music by Plutarch and Aristides Quintilianus, and in reference to the Drama by Iamblichus and Proclus. The theories reproduced by these writers are clearly of Peripatetic origin, and on exactly the same lines as the Aristotelian justification of the emotional forms of music and of the Drama in the brief statement in the Politics. (1) In his very curious chapter on the ἀκροθώρακες, on whom wine is said to have a sedative effect, Plutarch illustrates the paradox (Qu. conv. 3. 8, 657 A) by a parallel instance, that of the sad airs at funerals, which, while exciting the grief of the mourners, at the same time work off their sorrow:— ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ θρηνῳδία καὶ ὁ ἐπικήδειος αὐλὸς ἐν ἀρχῇ πάθος κινεῖ καὶ δάκρυον ἐκβάλλει [ἐκκαλεῖ Emperius], προάγων δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς οἶκτον οὕτω κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαιρεῖ [ἐξερᾶ Bernays] καὶ ἀναλίσκει τὸ λυπητικόν· ὁμοίως ἴδοις ἂν καὶ τὸν οἶνον, ὅταν σφόδρα ταράξῃ καὶ παροξύνῃ τὸ ἀκμαῖον καὶ θυμοειδές, αὖθις καταδύοντα [? καταλύοντα], καὶ καθιστάντα τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς πορρωτέρω μέθης προϊοῦσαν ἡσυχάζειν. (2) The language in Aristides Quintilianus De Musica 3. 25 (p. 13 Jahn), on the cathartic effect of the music and dancing in the Bacchic and other mysteries, has a more distinctly Aristotelian imprint on it:— διὸ καὶ τὰς Βακχικὰς τελετὰς καὶ ὅσαι ταύταις παραπλήσιοι λόγου τινὸς ἔχεσθαί φασιν, ὅπως ἂν ἡ τῶν ἀμαθεστέρων πτοίησις διὰ βίον ἢ τύχην ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν ταύταις μελῳδιῶν τε καὶ ὀρχήσεων ἅμα παιδιαῖς ἐκκαθαίρηται. (3) There are two passages in Iamblichus, which may serve to illustrate the Aristotelian idea of κάθαρσις. In De myst. 3. 9 (ed. Parthey), writing as a Neoplatonic occultist against the naturalistic explanation of enthusiasm, he insists that it is an error to regard the effect of the enthusiastic music as being of the nature of a mere ἀποκάθαρσις, a working-off or evacuation (ἀπέρασις) of some morbid product within the soul :— ἀπέρασιν δὲ καὶ ἀποκάθαρσιν ἰατρείαν τε οὐδαμῶς αὐτὸ κλητέον, οὐδὲ γὰρ κατὰ νόσημά τι ἢ πλεονασμὸν ἢ περίττωμα πρώτως ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμφύεται, θεία δε αὐτοῦ συνίσταται ἡ πᾶσα ἄνωθεν ἀρχὴ καὶ καταβολή. There is reason to think that the theory thus set aside was that of Theophrastus, and, through him, of Aristotle. And it will be seen how completely the language of the above passage harmonizes with the pathological interpretation of the formula, ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως in the Politics. The second passage is in De myst. 1. 11 :— αἱ δυνάμεις τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν πάντῃ μὲν εἰργόμεναι καθίστανται σφοδρότεραι, εἰς ἐνέργειαν δὲ βραχεῖαν [so Bernay's; βραχεῖς vulg.] καὶ ἄχρι τοῦ συμμέτρου προαγόμενοι χαίρουσι μετρίως καὶ ἀποπληροῦνται, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι πειθοῖ καὶ οὐ πρὸς βίαν ἀναπαύονται. διὰ δὴ τοῦτο ἔν τε κωμῳδίᾳ καὶ τραγῳδίᾳ ἀλλότρια πάθη θεωροῦντες ἵσταμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη καὶ μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν. The theory Iamblichus is accepting for the moment is that the passions cannot be suppressed for any length of time with impunity ; that they require an occasional outlet (comp. ἀποκαθαιρόμεναι) to keep them quiet ; and that the secret of our interest in the Drama is that it serves to work off emotion (τὰ οἰκεῖα πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν). It is clear that Iamblichus must have had a pathological explanation of the effect of the Drama before him. But he has taken the edge off the Aristotelian theory by giving it an ethical turn; it will be seen that he makes the catharsis of passions mean the same thing as the moderation of them (μετριώτερα ἀπεργαζόμεθα καὶ ἀποκαθαίρομεν), thus anticipating by many centuries the interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις now usually associated with the names of Heinsius and Lessing. (4) The cathartic effect of the Drama is one of the many controversial points discussed by Proclus in his commentary on Plato's Republic. The passages bearing on it will be found quoted under Fr. V. According to Proclus the Aristotelian answer to Plato was that the Drama serves a useful purpose as an outlet for emotions which would disturb the peace of the soul, if their just claims were not recognized and from time to time duly satisfied by means of some such gratification as is supplied in the theatre. This view of the effect of the Drama Proclus attributes to Aristotle ; his reference, however, to other apologists for the Drama may make one hesitate to believe him to have found it for himself in the now lost Second Book of the Poetics. The statement in its existing form seems rather to have been taken from some follower of Aristotle, possibly from Theophrastus, its phraseology representing the sense rather than the words of the Aristotelian original. Disengaged from its Neoplatonic surroundings in Iamblichus and Proclus, the catharsis theory before them may be thus reconstructed in outline: The Drama has a therapeutic (comp. Proclus τὸ πεπονηκὸς αὐτῶν θεραπεύσαντας) rather than a directly moral effect ; and the excitement it supplies is required by us at times (comp. Proclus δεόμενα δέ τινος ἐν καιρῷ κινήσεως) to carry off (comp. παθῶν ἀπεράσεις in both Iamblichus and Proclus) or purge away (comp. Iamblichus πάθη ἀποκαθαίρομεν) certain emotions, and relieve the soul of the disquietude they would cause (comp. Proclus ἀνενοχλήτους ἡμᾶς ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν ... ποιεῖν), if defrauded of the satisfaction naturally due to them (comp. Proclus πρὸς ἀφοσίωσιν τῶν παθῶν). The whole theory in fact is simply a fuller and more complete version of that we still have in brief in the Politics, with ἀποκάθαρσις or ἀπέρασις in place of the primitive Aristotelian term, κάθαρσις. II. Notwithstanding the arguments of Weil and Bernays, the old interpretation of παθημάτων κάθαρσις, which makes it mean the 'purification' of certain passions, is far from being extinct even in our own day. Κάθαρσις is supposed to be a metaphor from the religious rite of purification, whereby the hand or soul was cleansed from some pollution or stain of sin. Understood in this sense, therefore, the term would naturally imply that certain passions require 'purification' from something, i.e. from something more or less of the nature of an impurity. What this element of impurity is, and in what sense the emotions in question are supposed to become 'pure', are points on which there is no slight divergence of opinion among the upholders of this interpretation of κάθαρσις. The principal explanations which have been propounded may be roughly distinguished and classified as follows: (1) Tragedy is said to purify pity and fear, because the frequent excitement of these emotions in the theatre has a tendency to weaken their force, and thus moderate and reduce them to just measure (Heinsius, Milton, Lessing, etc.). (2) The lessons and examples in Tragedy have a purifying and moderating effect on pity, fear, and other evil passions (Victorius, etc.). (3) The tragic pity and fear are regarded as pure, because they are aroused not by real suffering, but only by the imaginary woes of the theatre; so that there is no admixture of pain in them (Batteux, etc.). (4) They are regarded as pure, because, as aroused by Tragedy, they are disinterested emotions, with no self-regarding element in them (Brandis, Susemihl). (5) They are pure, because the sublimity of Tragedy exalts pity and fear into high and noble forms of feeling (Hermann). The first of these, the only view that calls for serious consideration, has an especial interest for us owing to the fact that in the eighteenth century it found a very distinguished exponent in Lessing. It must be admitted, however, that Lessing himself did little more than expand the old idea of 'moderating' the passions, and translate it back into the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'The tragic purification of the passions,' he says, 'consists merely in the conversion of pity and fear into virtuous habits of mind'. 'Da nämlich, es kurz zu sagen, diese Reinigung in nichts anderm beruht, als in der Verwandlung der Leidenschaften in tugendhafte Fertigkeiten, bei jeder Tugend aber, nach unserm Philosophen, sich dies diesseits und jenseits ein Extrem findet, zwischen welchem sie inne steht: so muss die Tragödie, wenn sie unser Mitleid in Tugend verwandeln soll, uns von beiden Extremen des Mitleids zu reinigen vermögend sein; welches auch von der Furcht zu verstehen' (Hamb. Dram. St. 78). As Heinsius had said something very like this long before him, Lessing's originality here is not so marked as his power of statement. The whole theory, as stated even by Lessing, is open to many and very grave objections. (1) It confuses two distinct things, the purification of a feeling and the purification of the soul from a feeling. (2) It confuses the ideas of 'pure' and 'moderate', though there is no direct logical or other relation between them; excess or defect in certain matters may be a fault, but they cannot be termed 'impurities'. (3) It rests on a false hypothesis as to the position of Tragedy in the social life of ancient Greece; the performance of Tragedy was too occasional to have a marked and abiding effect on the moral character of the hearers. (4) Even if the tragic excitement of emotion be supposed to have been sufficiently frequent to produce a habit, it does not follow that the resulting habit would be one of moderation in the matter of feeling; we have no right to suppose that the habitual indulgence of strong emotion (e.g. pity and fear) will weaken its force or reduce it to just measure. Habits according to Aristotle arise from corresponding activities, Eth. N. 2. 1 p. 1103 b 21 ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. We should expect, therefore, that the strong emotion aroused by Tragedy would, if habitualized by repetition, end in a habit of strong emotion, not in a habit of subdued or moderate emotion, not in that mean state of feeling which Aristotle identifies with virtue. The primary error, however, in this and similar interpretations of παθημάτων κάθαρσις is that it reads a directly moral meaning into the term, as though the theatre were a school, and the tragic poet a teacher, of morality. That, however, is not Aristotle's theory; the great function of the tragic poet, he thinks, is to excite certain emotions, and procure us the pleasure that must accompany such excitement (Poet. 14, 1453 b 11). This pleasurable excitement of emotion, in fact, is with him the end and aim of Tragedy, so far as the poet himself is concerned. The statesman, however, viewing human nature and society as a whole, is able to look beyond all this, and see the ultimate justification of the existence of Tragedy. In the , accordingly, Aristotle recognizes the usefulness of Tragedy, explaining that it supplies a natural want, as a sort of catharsis of emotion, which as emotional creatures men require from time to time to keep their souls in health and quietude. This is a reasonable apology for Tragedy, and a sufficient answer to Plato's criticism. One may perhaps also say of it, that it is more consonant with fact and experience than the moral or disciplinary purpose which many still profess to regard as the true raison d'étre of the theatre.

ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος The και is explanatory, μέλος being added as a synonym to explain ἁρμονία (v. on 1, 1447 a 22).

διὰ μέτρων is opposed to διὰ μέλους: comp. Probl. 19. 31, 920 b 12 διὰ τὸ πολλαπλάσια εἶναι τότε τὰ μέλη ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις τῶν μέτρων. — Plato Symp. 187 D μέλεσί τε καὶ μέτροις. — Lysis 205 A οὗ τι τῶν μέτρων δέομαι ἀκοῦσαι οὐδὲ μέλος. — Isocrates 191 B ταῖς ᾠδαῖς καὶ τοῖς μέτροις.

πράττοντες ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν scil. οἱ μιμούμενοι. Aristotle is thinking not of the poet but of the performers, who tell the story by acting it on the stage (v. on 3, 1448 a 23). πράττοντες recalls the idea of the δρώντων in the preceding definition of Tragedy.

ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος ὄψις is usually rendered by 'spectaculum,' 'apparatus,' 'scenery,' or mise en scène; according to Twining it comprehends 'scenery, dresses—the whole visible apparatus of the theatre'. This explanation is too wide; the reference is merely to the visible appearance of the actors when got up in character by the σκευοποιός or costumier (see on 6, 1450 b 20). Aristotle accordingly more than once uses the word in a concrete sense in the plural, because each of the characters would require a special and distinctive make-up. The formula ὁ τῆς ὄψεως κόσμος implies that the visible make-up of the actors is of the nature of a decorative adjunct (v. on 4, 1449 a 29), a mere accessory to the poet's work (v. 6, 1450 b 16), on which he, as an artist, has no right to rely for his effects (v. 14, 1453 b 7). The term ὄψις like many other technical words in the Poetics was probably already familiar in this sense in the language of the theatre (comp. Festschrift Theodor Gomperz dargebracht p. 166).

μελοποιία (properly the making of μέλη) replaces the original term μέλος as a synonym for it; comp. 6, 1450 b 16, and Pol. 8. 7, 1341 b 23 τὴν μουσικὴν ὁρῶμεν διὰ μελοποιίας καὶ ῥυθμῶν οὖσαν.

λέγω δὲ λέξιν μὲν ταύτην is to be compared with λέγω γὰρ μῦθον τοῦτον in 6, 1450 a 4 (v. ad loc.). A definition is given because λέξις is a term with several meanings (v. on 21, 1459 a 12). The present definition describes the λέξις in a play in reference to the poet, as the 'composition of the verses'; that which comes later on, in 6, 1450 b 13, views it rather from the side of the dramatic personages, as the 'expression of their thought in words'.

μέτρων has the concrete sense of 'verses', like τοῖς μέτροις in 1, 1447 b 29 (comp. on b 30).

πᾶσαν πᾶσιν, the emendation of Madius, may perhaps seem to be supported by the fragment of Democritus (fr. 165 Diels), ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ὃ πάντες ἴσμεν. But no change is really wanted; instead of defining μελοποιία Aristotle thinks it enough to say that its whole nature is too obvious to require explanation.

ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι κτέ. Comp. μίμησις πράξεως in the preceding definition. Having spoken of the externals of a tragedy, its ὄψις, λέξις and μελοποιία, Aristotle passes on to elements of another kind, those which constitute its internal content. The subject in a tragedy is an action with the personages concerned therein as agents. The μῦθος, the fable or plot of the play, represents the action as such; the ἦθος and διάνοια manifested in the language of the dramatis personae represent the personality of the agents. Oedipus, for instance, is in a poem only a name for a certain group of qualities, moral and intellectual, which his actions and the language put into his mouth reveal to us (comp. 9, 1451 b 7).

ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν Intellectual as well as moral states are included under ποιότητες (Cat. 8, 8 b 29). A little further on, however, in 1450 a 5, Aristotle uses the term ποιούς τινας as though it naturally referred rather to the ἦθος or moral character. For the antithesis between ἦθος and διάνοια comp. Pol. 8. 1, 1337 a 38 οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος, and the distinction assumed throughout the Nicomachean Ethics and elsewhere between the ἠθικαί and the διανοητικαὶ ἀρεταί.

πέφυκεν begins the apodosis. There are thus in the natural order of things, says Aristotle, two distinguishable factors in the action of the individual agent, his ἦθος and his διάνοια; these are the inner causes of men's actions, and of the success or failure of their lives. πέφυκεν is, like the Platonic φύσιν ἔχει (Rep. 473 C, 489 B), impersonal. Vahlen illustrates this usage from Pol. 2. 2, 1261 b 7 οὔτε πέφυκε μίαν οὕτως εἶναι τὴν πόλιν. — 4. 12, 1296 b 26 ἐνταῦθα πέφυκεν εἶναι δημοκρατίαν, and Demosthenes 14, 30 τὰς κρήνας καὶ τὰ φρέατα ἐπιλείπειν πέφυκεν.

κατὰ ταύτας = κατὰ τὰς πράξεις; comp. a 19 κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον.

τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μῦθος ἡ μίμησις To complete the statement Aristotle might very well have added a clause like τῶν δὲ πραττόντων τὰ ἤθη καὶ αἱ διάνοιαι; and it has been suggested (J. of Phil. 5 p. 119) that these words or something equivalent must have dropped out. In a context like the present, however, this second point may have been left to be mentally supplied by the reader (comp. Vahlen ad loc.), as the emphatic mention of the first point (τῆς μὲν πράξεως κτέ.) is enough to suggest it (comp. De interpr. 14, 23 b 30, and Waitz ad loc.). For this use of μέν solitarium comp. 26, 1462 b 5, and Waitz on An. pr. 2. 11, 61 b 19.

τοῦτον (= τοῦτο) is preparative and explained by τὴν σύνθεσιν τῶν πραγμάτων. The assimilation of gender has been a stumbling-block to Madius and others, though found again in 22, 1458 a 26 αἰνίγματός τε γὰρ ἰδέα αὕτη ἐστί, τὸ λέγοντα ὑπάρχοντα ἀδύνατα συνάψαι (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 74).

διάνοιαν scil. εἶναι λέγω. Instead of attempting a definition, Aristotle evades the difficulty by saying that διάνοια is manifested in the argumentative and reflective utterances of the dramatis personae (comp. infra b 11). The statement here is merely provisional, as one may see by comparing the fuller exposition in 19, 1456 a 34 — b 8—where we are told among other things that the διάνοια of a personage may be shown in his actions as well as in his words. Διάνοια in the sense it bears in the Poetics is, like ἦθος, an element in the personality of the dramatis personae. It is their intellectual capacity, as evinced in their language (or it may be, in their actions), and it is to be seen whenever they argue or make an appeal to the feelings of their hearers, in other words, when they reason or plead with one of the other dramatis personae in the same sort of way as a rhetor might do. Hence it is that the general theory of the διάνοια in a play is said (19, 1456 a 34) to belong to Rhetoric rather than Poetry; and a speech with a great display of διάνοια in it is a rhetorical speech (v. on b 6). The term answering to Aristotle's διάνοια in Isocrates is ἐνθυμήματα, 'arguments': Isocr. 191 B μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν . . . τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν . . . ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. — 319 D καὶ γὰρ τῇ λέξει ποιητικωτέρᾳ καὶ ποικιλωτέρᾳ τὰς πράξεις δηλοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ὀγκωδεστέροις καὶ καινοτέροις χρῆσθαι ζητοῦσιν.

λέγοντες : comp. b 6 ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων, and b 7 πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας. Aristotle is thinking more immediately of the ῥήσεις in a tragedy, and of the intellectual, i. e. the rhetorical or argumentative, capacity they may reveal in the personages.

ἀποδεικνύασίν τι : ἀποδεικνύουσί τι ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. — 19, 1456 a 37 τό τε ἀποδεικνύναι καὶ τὸ λύειν. — Rhet. 1. 1, 1355 a 5 ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις· τότε γὰρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα ὅταν ἀποδεδεῖχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν.

ἢ καὶ ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην The equivalent in b 12 is the more general expression, καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται, but it is hardly worth while to bring the two passages into unison by restoring here (with Bernays, Zwei Abhandl. p. 155) ἢ καθόλου ἀποφαίνονται, on the assumption that γνώμην may have come in as a gloss. A γνώμη as defined in the Rhetoric is a maxim, or general proposition relating to the conduct of life: Rhet. 2. 21, 1394 a 21 ἔστι δὲ γνώμη ἀπόφανσις, οὐ μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον, οἷον ποιός τις Ιφικράτης, ἀλλὰ καθόλου· καὶ οὐ περὶ πάντων καθόλου, οἷον ὅτι τὸ εὐθὺ τῷ καμπύλῳ ἐναντίον, ἀλλὰ περὶ ὅσων αἱ πράξεις εἰσί, καὶ αἱρετὰ ἢ φευκτά ἐστι πρὸς τὸ πράττειν. The corresponding Latin term was sententia: Quintilian 8. 5. 3 Antiquissimae sunt quae proprie . . . sententiae vocantur, quas Graeci γνώμας appellant: utrumque autem nomen ex eo acceperunt, quod similes sunt consiliis aut decretis.

μέρη εἶναι ἕξ An answer to the question announced in 1, 1447 a 10 ἐκ πόσων καὶ ποίων ἐστὶ μορίων.

καθ᾿ ὃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία The word μέρος being ambiguous (Metaph. Δ 25, 1023 b 12; Ζ 10, 1034 b 32), this clause had to be added to mark the distinction between the 'parts' at present under consideration and those to be enumerated hereafter in chap. 12. The parts here described are the formative constituents of a tragedy; whereas those defined in chap. 12 are the sections into which it is divided. It is through these various formative constituents that we are able to speak of a tragedy as ποία τις—as good or bad, as ἠθική or πεπλεγμένη or παθητική, or whatever else it may be said to be, when we come to judge of its quality.

οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν = οὐκ ὀλίγοι τῶν ποιητῶν. The ὡς εἰπεῖν which follows should perhaps be transposed and inserted after πᾶν in the next line. Of the many emendations that have been propounded the simplest certainly is that of Bursian, οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν 〈ἀλλὰ πάντες〉, on which that formerly suggested by myself, ὀλίγου αὐτῶν 〈ἅπαντες〉 (J. of Phil. 14 p. 44), was based. οὐκ ὀλίγοι αὐτῶν, however, has on it a certain stamp of genuineness. The sense seems to be this: The six parts are in the nature of things possible elements in every tragedy, so to say; and due use has been made of them by not a few of the poets. The statement may be compared with those in a 25, 36, and 18, 1456 a 3, where the existence is recognized of plays weak or deficient in some of the parts. For the sense of ἔχει in this passage (='admits of', 'has in it the possibility of') comp. 2, 1448 a 7; and for the distinction between it and κέχρηνται, Eth. N. 7. 4, 1146 b 32 ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ. — 1147 a 1 ἔχοντα μὲν ἀμφοτέρας [scil. τὰς προτάσεις] οὐδὲν κωλύει πράττειν παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, χρώμενον μέντοι τῇ καθόλου ἀλλὰ μὴ τῇ κατὰ μέρος (comp. Bon. Ind. 854 b 37).

εἴδεσι : see on 4, 1449 a 7.

ὄψεις : see on 6, 1449 b 33.

πᾶν , i. e. every play; comp. 12, 1452 a 18 ἁπάντων. — 18, 1456 a 31 ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο.

μέγιστον κτέ. Aristotle proceeds at this point to arrange the six elements in the order of their relative importances; and he begins by asserting, with an abundance of reasons which seems to imply that it was a subject of controversy at the time, the supreme importance of the μῦθος. As it is the first duty of a tragedy to represent an action, the μῦθος or story of action in it must be the first and most essential element in its construction. The characters, i.e. the personal agents, are mainly required in order to work out the story, and as means to that end; so that this element is to be deemed of secondary and subordinate significance as compared with the μῦθος. The paramount importance of plot in Drama has been re-asserted with equal emphasis in our own time by an eminent living dramatist: 'The idea, the plot, always comes first. The plot, in a sense, is nine-tenths of a play' (H. A. Jones, Strand Magazine 34 p. 379).

ἡ τῶν πραγμάτων σύστασις = ὁ μῦθος. As the action in a tragedy is a whole of some magnitude (comp. 4, 1449 a 19; 6, 1449 b 25), it must have a plurality of incidents (πράγματα) embodied in it. What Aristotle means by a combination of incidents may be seen from his synopses of the Iphigenia and Odyssey in 17, 1455 b 2 sqq..

βίου : Plato Laws 817 B ἡμεῖς ἐσμὲν τραγῳδίας αὐτοὶ ποιηταὶ κατὰ δύναμιν ὅτι καλλίστης ἅμα καὶ ἀρίστης· πᾶσα οὖν [? γοῦν] ἡμῖν ἡ πολιτεία ξυνέστηκε μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου, ὃ δή φαμεν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως εἶναι τραγῳδίαν τὴν ἀληθεστάτην. — Lycurgus in Leocr. 102 οἱ ποιηταὶ μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. Alcidamas described the Odyssey as a καλὸν ἀνθρωπίνου βίου κάτοπτρον (Aristot. Rhet. 3. 3, 1406 b 12). Of Menander also it was said: Μένανδρε καὶ βίε, πότερος ἄρ᾿ ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο; (Nauck, Aristophanis Byz. Fragm. p. 249).

καὶ εὐδαιμονίας : Plato Rep. 603 C πράττοντας, φαμέν, ἀνθρώπους μιμεῖται ἡ μιμητικὴ βιαίους ἢ ἑκουσίας πράξεις καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πράττειν ἢ εὖ οἰομένους ἢ κακῶς πεπραγέναι.

ἐν πράξει According to the definition in Eth. N. 1. 6, 1098 a 16 happiness is a certain kind of activity, a ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ᾿ ἀρετήν. Comp. Phys. 2. 6, 197 b 4 ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γάρ. — Pol. 7. 3, 1325 a 32 ἡ γὰρ εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς ἐστιν (also Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 21; Rhet. 1. 5, 1360 b 14).

τὸ τέλος : Eth. N. 1. 8, 1098 b 18 πράξεις τινὲς λέγονται καὶ ἐνέργειαι τὸ τέλος.

οὐ ποιότης : Eth. N. 10. 2, 1173 a 14 οὐδὲ γὰρ αἱ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐνέργειαι ποιότητές εἰσιν, οὐδ᾿ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

πράττουσι scil. οἱ μιμούμενοι. The reference is to the actors (see on 3, 1448 a 23) rather than the poets.

συμπεριλαμβάνουσιν scil. ἐν τῇ μιμήσει, 'they include in the representation'; συμπεριλαμβάνειν in this sense is not infrequent in later Greek (v. HSt. s. v.). It is hardly necessary, therefore, to reject it for the reading of one of the apographs, συμπαραλαμβάνουσιν, though it is no doubt quite true that manuscripts are apt to confuse the two prepositions.

διὰ τὰς πράξεις διά in this connexion must mean 'with a view to', 'for the sake of', as in Thuc. 2. 89. 4 διὰ τὴν σφετέραν δόξαν.

καὶ ὁ μῦθος The καί is explanatory, 'that is to say'.

τὸ δὲ τέλος μέγιστον ἁπάντων modelled on the proverb in Plato Rep. 377 A ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον, which reappears in Aristotle Soph. el. 33, 183 b 22 μέγιστον γὰρ ἴσως ἀρχὴ παντός, ὥσπερ λέγεται. — Probl. 10. 13, 892 a 29 ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον· ἥμισυ γάρ.

τῶν νέων As it is clear from 14, 1453 b 28 that Euripides is not classed among the old poets (οἱ παλαιοί), οἱ νέοι, 'the moderns,' must mean the poets from Euripides downwards. It is to be observed also that, when Aristotle a little further on in this chapter distinguishes between οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ νῦν, the point noted as characteristic of 'the moderns' (ῥητορικῶς ποιοῦσι λέγοντας) is manifestly true of Euripides, and was recognized as true of him by the ancients themselves (see on ῥητορικῶς, b 8).

ἀήθεις : 24, 1460 a 11 οὐδέν᾿ ἀήθη ἀλλ᾿ ἔχοντα ἤθη. ἀήθης is, like other compounds of α privativum (De anima 2. 10, 427 a 26; Metaph. Δ 22, 1022 b 32), an ambiguous word, as it may mean either 'destitute of character', or merely 'deficient in character'. Aristotle must be using it in this latter sense, since a play with personages wholly destitute of character is hardly conceivable. The language in the illustration which follows from painting, οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος, is an instance of a common form of exaggeration, just like that in the saying of Pope, Most women have no characters at all.

τοιοῦτοι i. e. ἀήθεις.

οἷον καὶ τῶν γραφέων Ζεῦξις πρὸς Πολύγνωτον πέπονθεν : De gen. an. 5. 3, 783 a 6 ἔστι δ᾿ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων . . . μαλακὴν μὲν ἔχει τὴν τρίχα ἧττον δὲ λεπτήν, οἷον τὸ τῶν δασυπόδων πρὸς τὸ τῶν προβάτων πέπονθεν. — Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 22 οἷον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν.

γραφέων For other illustrations from painting see on 2, 1448 a 5.

Πολύγνωτον The same view of him, as one who knew how to indicate character in painting, is implied in Pol. 8. 5, 1340 a 37 τὰ Πολυγνώτου κἂν εἴ τις ἄλλος τῶν γραφέων ἢ τῶν ἀγαλματοποιῶν ἐστιν ἠθικός.

Ζεύξιδος This taken in connexion with what is said of him later on, in 25, 1461 b 12, would seem to show that, in Aristotle's view, Zeuxis sacrificed expression to beauty.

ῥήσεις i. e. the speeches put into the mouths of the personages in a play or poem (comp. 15, 1454 a 31; 18, 1450 b 31). The word had been already used in this technical sense by both Plato and Aristophanes.

ἠθικάς In the Rhetoric the ἠθικὸς λόγος is one designed to create a favourable idea of the speaker's ἦθος, in contradistinction to the παθητικὸς λόγος, which addresses the feelings, and the ἀποδεικτικὸς λόγος, which addresses the reason of his audience. In matters of imitative art, however, the usual meaning of ἠθικός is μιμητικὸς ἤθους, 'expressive of character' (comp. Bon. Ind. 315 b 21)—which is the sense the word has in the present and other passages in the Poetics. Thus in 18, 1456 a 1 a certain kind of tragedy is termed the ἠθική τραγῳδία, 'the tragedy of character', because its main interest is as a portraiture of character; in 23, 1459 b 16 the Odyssey is described as ἠθική, because it is more of a portraiture of character than the Iliad; in 24, 1460 b 3 certain passages in a poem are termed ἠθικά μέρη, as serving to bring out the ἦθος of the personages in the story.

λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημένας , 'made perfect in the matter of language and thought'. The same use of the dative is found in a 36 τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσιν ἀκριβοῦν. — 24, 1460 b 2 τῇ δὲ λέξει δεῖ διαπονεῖν; and in Alcidamas De soph. 12 οἱ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκριβῶς ἐξειργασμένοι [scil. λόγοι].

οὔπω ποιήσει ὃ ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον : Rhet. 3. 2, 1404 b 2 ὁ λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ δηλοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον. The Arabic version seems to suggest οὔπω (see on 9, 1451 b 13) rather than οὐ. For the fut. with οὔπω comp. Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 a 22 ὥστε ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὔπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἑκούσιον προσῇ. — 6. 13, 1144 a 35 ὥστε τὴν μὲν ἤδη τὴν δ᾿ οὔπω εἰληφὼς ἔσται. The imperfect in ἦν τῆς τραγῳδίας ἔργον implies that the point has been already settled in the preceding discussion (comp. Bon. Ind. 754 a 40), the reference being presumably to 6, 1449 b 36, where Tragedy is said to be a μίμησις πράξεως.

ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον scil. ποιήσει, as in Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 18 εἰ γὰρ εἰδείη ὅτι τὰ κοῦφα εὔπεπτα κρέα καὶ ὑγιεινά, ποῖα δὲ κοῦφα ἀγνοοῖ, οὐ ποιήσει ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ εἰδὼς ὅτι τὰ ὀρνίθεια [κοῦφα καὶ] ὑγιεινὰ ποιήσει μᾶλλον. For the form of antithesis comp. De caelo 2. 3, 286 a 5 πόρρω δ᾿ οὐχ οὕτω τῷ τόπῳ, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ ... ὀλίγην ἔχειν αἴσθησιν , and the instances collected by Vahlen (ad loc.) and Schwab (Schanz's Beiträge 4. 1, p. 66).

τούτοις refers back to the ῥήσεις ἠθικαὶ καὶ λέξει καὶ διανοίᾳ εὖ πεποιημέναι of 29. Aristotle's point is, that the dramatic effectiveness of a tragedy depends before all else on its plot, and that no literary or rhetorical brilliancy will make up for a weak plot.

ψυχαγωγεῖ comp. b 17 ψυχαγωγικόν. Said of a work of art the word means no more than to 'move' or 'rivet the attention', and is thus the equivalent of our word 'attract' or (as people now sometimes say) 'fascinate'. This sense of ψυχαγωγεῖν is as old as Xenophon: Mem. 3. 10. 6 ὃ δὲ μάλιστα ψυχαγωγεῖ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, τὸ ζωτικὸν φαίνεσθαι, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνεργάζῃ τοῖς ἀνδριασιν;. It is found more than once in Isocrates: 24 D δέδεικται τοῖς ἐπιθυμοῦσι τοὺς ἀκροωμένους ψυχαγωγεῖν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν νουθετεῖν καὶ συμβουλεύειν ἀφεκτέον, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα λεκτέον οἷς ὁρῶσι τοὺς ὄχλους μάλιστα χαίροντας. — 191 A τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως αὐταῖς ταῖς εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Later writers also often use the word in the sense of to 'attract' or 'please'; comp. the Antiatticista in Bekker's Anecdota 116 ψυχαγωγεῖν: τὸ τέρπειν, and Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 168.

αἵ τε περιπέτειαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίσεις These are considered later on in chap. 11. It will be observed that Aristotle uses the two terms without explanation, as though they were already part of the established language of the theatre. The appositional clause comes in as an afterthought, at some distance from the words it illustrates (comp. Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 1 p. 282).

συνίστασθαι is apparently a middle in 24, 1460 a 34 also (v. ad loc.).

οἷον καὶ introduces not an instance but a parallel from a different class of things just like ὥσπερ καὶ, from which it is often hardly distinguishable in sense (comp. Top. 6. 9, 148 a 4; Eth. N. 9. 1, 1164 a 15; Rhet. 3. 11, 1412 a 11; 3. 12, 1413 b 25) . In De mem. 1, 450 b 20 and in Plato Phaedr. 255 C οἷον is so completely equivalent to ὥσπερ as to have a οὕτως as its antecedent. In Poet. 25, 1460 b 33 οἷον ... ταύτῃ is practically the same thing as ὥσπερ ... οὕτως.

ἀρχὴ A little before this the μῦθος was said to be the τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας (a 22). From one point of view it is the ἀρχή, as being the necessary basis of every tragedy; from another it is the τέλος, because it is this much more than the characters that Tragedy μίμησις πράξεως has to represent.

ψυχὴ : Isocrates 142 B ἔστι γὰρ ψυχὴ πόλεως οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ πολιτεία. — 261 B πᾶσα πολιτεία ψυχὴ πόλεώς ἐστιν. — [Demosthenes] 60. 23 ἡ τῶνδε τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀρετὴ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἦν ψυχὴ τἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν — Martianus Capella 3, 268 Est accentus, ut quidam putaverunt, anima vocis.

παραπλήσιον κτέ. This clause Castelvetro and others would transpose and insert after σύστασιν πραγμάτων in 33. It comes in, however, naturally enough where it stands, as an afterthought to illustrate the secondary position (δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη) of the element of character in a play. So also in the sister art of painting, says Aristotle, the colouring is of subordinate importance in comparison with the design which makes the work to mean something and be like something; a portrait is a portrait, and will give us the pleasure of one, even though executed in mere whites and greys; whereas a medley of much more beautiful colours without a design to give them meaning will not produce the same pleasure, because we cannot see that it represents anything. The nature of the pleasure found in a work of imitative art was explained in 4, 1448 b 13.

εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε κτέ. The sense is thus given by Goulston: 'si quis tabulam, pigmentis licet pulcherrimis, temere fusimque illeverit; non perinde spectantem oblectet, ac si, albo licet colore, imaginem delinearet certam: pari modo in tragoediis absque constitutione rerum minus valent mores quam morum expers fabula.'. The object left to be understood with ἐναλείψειε is τὸν πίνακα, the 'panel' or 'canvas', as we should say; ἀλείφειν and ἐπαλείφειν are used in just the same way, in the sense of covering a surface with colour. ἐναλείφειν, it is to be observed, has apparently a different kind of object in De gen. an. 2. 6, 743 b 23 οἱ γραφεῖς ὑπογράψαντες ταῖς γραμμαῖς οὕτως ἐναλείφουσι τοῖς χρώμασι τὸ ζῷον ('painters first sketch the outline of the figure before proceeding to work it out in colour'). χύδην means 'without system or order', i.e. without a design to give form and sense to the whole. The direct opposite of this unmeaning medley of the most beautiful colours (εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην) is a portrait in plain whites and greys (λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα); in what follows, therefore, εἰκόνα serves as an antithesis to χύδην (comp. Vahlen, Symb. Phil. Bonn. p. 166) and λευκογραφήσας to τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις. λευκογραφεῖν, as a derivative from λευκογράφος (a word no longer to be found), is to 'paint monochromes in white', i.e. in shades of white and grey (it would seem) on a dark ground. Zeuxis, whom Aristotle has just mentioned in 27, was among other things a painter of monochromes in white—pinxit et monochromata ex albo (Pliny N. H. 35. 64; comp. Brunn, Gr. Künstler 2 p. 55). A portrait, however, even though it be a mere monochrome in whites (comp. λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα), will have a meaning, and give the mind the intellectual pleasure which accompanies the recognition of the meaning (comp. 4, 1448 b 15); whereas a medley of beautiful colours has no meaning, and the pleasure it gives the beholder is of a wholly different order (comp. 4, 1448 b 18 οὐχ ᾗ μίμημα ποιήσει τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ ... τὴν χροιάν). The antithesis, therefore, is simply between beautiful colours without an εἰκών, and an εἰκών without any beauty of colour. Vahlen's view of the import of these words is somewhat different. He thinks that λευκογραφήσας may denote the preliminary sketch (like ὑπογράφειν in the above-quoted passage in the De gen. an.) in white, which is afterwards filled in with colour, when the picture comes to be finished; so that the clause may be taken to describe two stages in the process of painting, (1) λευκογραφεῖν εἰκόνα, and (2) ἐναλείφειν φαρμάκοις, and serves to illustrate the order of procedure in Tragedy, where the μῦθος is said to come first, as the ἀρχὴ τῆς τραγῳδίας, and the ἤθη second: 'orationis formam sic accipio, εἴ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλίστοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα εἰ ἐναλείψειε φαρμάκοις', ut χύδην, h. e. nulla ante delineatione facta, et λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα inter se opponantur'. This very subtle interpretation seems to me to read more into Aristotle's words than is required for the argument. Aristotle would perhaps have said: οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειε καὶ εἰ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα οὕτως ἐναλείψειε τοῖς φαρμάκοις.

ἔστιν τε μίμησις πράξεως κτέ. supports the statement (38-39) before the parenthesis by recalling the general fact on which it is based (v. 20-23).

τρίτον δὲ ἡ διάνοια As the intellectual quality of the dramatis personae comes out mainly in what they are made to say, διάνοια is provisionally explained (see on 6) as a power of making the best of one's case or of saying the right thing.

τὰ ἐνόντα scil. ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, as in Isocr. 292 E ὑπισχνοῦνται τοιούτους ῥήτορας τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν ἐνόντων ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παραλιπεῖν (comp. Bon. Ind. 250 a 56). The whole expression τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα covers the same ground as that in Rhet. 2. 22, 1396 b 5 τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα.

ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων has been taken to mean 'in soluta oratione' (Paccius), and 'in orationibus' (Valla) or 'in eloquentia', 'bei der Beredsamkeit' (Vahlen). The explanation, however, in the context, ἐποίουν λέγοντας (57), is enough to show that the λόγοι Aristotle has in mind are the λόγοι in a play, i.e. the ῥήσεις put into the mouths of the personages. This is apparently the sense the word bears in the next sentence also, τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ᾿ ὅλως ἔστιν τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων (b 9).

τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον Aristotle seems to be thinking of what is said in a play by the chief personages (e. g. the tragic hero), and of the kind of intellectual capacity (διάνοια) revealed in their statements. One has to remember that the chief personages in ancient Tragedy are not ordinary men, and that the tragic hero is expressly said by Aristotle (13, 1453 a 10-21) to be always in the best tragedies a man of great position and lineage. In a play, therefore, such personages might very well be made to speak πολιτικῶς, 'like statesmen', and to show a statesmanlike power of saying what is appropriate to the situation before them (τὰ ἁρμόττοντα). But it would also be possible to make them speak ῥητορικῶς, 'like rhetors', with something of the rhetor's cleverness in seizing on the various possible points that may be urged on the occasion (τὰ ἐνόντα, i.e. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα). Though ῥητορική stands in a certain relation to πολιτική (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 27), the distinction between them is a very real one with Aristotle; πολιτική is with him the practical wisdom of the statesman (Eth. N. 6. 8, 1141 b 23), and ῥητορική only a form of the art of argumentation—a δύναμις τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους (Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 a 33), or δύναμις περὶ ἑκάστου τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν (Rhet. 1. 2, 1355 b 26). There is no reference to πολιτική in chap. 19. Aristotle may perhaps have felt that the practice of the later dramatists (οἱ νῦν) was too firmly established to admit of change, and that the tragic personages accordingly must still be allowed to speak ῥητορικῶς, as they did in the Tragedy of his time.

ἀρχαῖοι : the dramatists anterior to Euripides (see on 6, 1450 a 25).

πολιτικῶς . ... λέγοντας which Valla rendered by 'civiliter dicentes', is often taken to mean 'to speak the language of civil life', like ordinary citizens, as distinct from the professional orator. But as the context shows that the ability to speak πολιτικῶς implies something of πολιτική in the speaker (comp. Newman on Pol. 2. 11, 1273 b 12), πολιτικῶς would seem rather to mean 'like a πολιτικός'—the statesman being assumed to say that which is befitting (τὰ ἁρμόττοντα) without any ostentation of rhetorical cleverness (comp. HSt. s. v. πολιτικός). Vahlen (Symb. phil. Bonn. p. 175) supposes the expression to coincide in sense with the ἠθικῶς λέγειν of Rhet. 3. 17, 1418 b 38 which means ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως λέγειν, as opposed to ἀπὸ διανοίας λέγειν (Rhet. 3. 16, 1417 a 23). The objection to this interpretation is twofold. (1) Aristotle is to all appearance not contrasting διάνοια with ἦθος, but distinguishing between the two forms it may assume in the dramatic ῥήσεις. (2) πολιτικῶς λέγειν can hardly be identical with ἠθικῶς λέγειν; the personages in Comedy speak ἠθικῶς, but it would be a paradox to say of them that they speak πολιτικῶς, in the sense of there being something of πολιτική in their utterances.

ῥητορικῶς Euripides is termed by Aristophanes (Pax 534) a ποιητὴς ῥηματίων δικανικῶν. Quintilian also (10. 1, 68) thinks the study of his plays one of the best preparations for the bar: 'Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, iis qui se ad agendum comparant utiliorem longe fore Euripidem. namque is et sermone magis accedit oratorio generi et sententiis densus et in iis quae a sapientibus tradita sunt paene ipsis par, et dicendo ac respondendo cuilibet eorum qui fuerunt in foro diserti comparandus.'.

ἦθος A statement is said to have ἦθος in it when it reveals the moral purpose of the speaker, the kind of thing that he purposes to do or not to do. ἦθος is an element in oratory also, as the credibility of the orator often depends on the impression one forms of his character. The language in the text may be compared with that in Rhet. 2. 21, 1395 b 13 ἦθος δ᾿ ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι ἐν ὅσοις δήλη ἡ προαίρεσις· αἱ δὲ γνῶμαι πᾶσαι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸν τὴν γνώμην λέγοντα καθόλου περὶ τῶν προαιρετῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἂν χρησταὶ ὦσιν αἱ γνῶμαι, καὶ χρηστοήθη φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσι τὸν λέγοντα. — 3. 16, 1417 a 16 ἠθικὴν δὲ χρὴ τὴν διήγησιν εἶναι. ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο ἂν εἰδῶμεν τί ἦθος ποιεῖ. ἓν μὲν δὴ τὸ προαίρεσιν δηλοῦν, ποιὸν δὲ τὸ ἦθος τῷ ποιὰν ταύτην· ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ποιὰ τῷ τέλει. διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. ἀλλ᾿ οἱ Σωκρατικοί· περὶ τοιούτων γὰρ λέγουσιν..

ὁποῖά τις. This (the reading of o) is very rightly retained by Vahlen, who translates the clause by quod aperiat voluntatem, qualia quis in quibus apertum non est aut appetat aut fugiat; the explanation is added to show that προαίρεσις is to be taken in a wide sense, which may include aversion as well as desire. For an explanatory clause of this form comp. 16, 1455b10 συνελογίσαντο τὴν εἱμαρμένην ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ εἵμαρτο ἀποθανεῖν, and Plato 535 A μέμνησαι οὖν τὴν προτέραν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀρχόντων, οἷους ἐξελέξαμεν ; ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον is added because there are situations in which the moral purpose of the agent is too obvious to require to be revealed in an 'ethical' speech; see 19, 1456 b7 for a parallel statement on the subject of διάνοια.

προαιρεῖται. Though the usual opposite of φεύγειν is the simple verb αἱρεῖσθαι (Bon. Ind. 18b3), there is a certain propriety in προαιρεῖται in a clause explanatory of προαίρεσις. The word is found in a similar antithesis in 10. 1, 1172b25 τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδέα προαιροῦνται, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ φεύγουσιν.

διόπερ κτέ. In the we are told that a mathematical argument does not admit of any colouring of character, because the facts with which it deals are indifferent to us—not objects of either desire or aversion: 3. 16, 1417b9 διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔχουσιν οἱ μαθηματικοὶ λόγοι ἤθη, ὅτι οὐδὲ προαίρεσιν· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔχουσιν. In like manner a speech in a play may be on a subject wholly indifferent to the speaker, and in that case there is no room for any infusion of ἦθος into his statement.

καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται replaces the ἀποφαίνονται γνώμην in 7 (v. ad loc.).

τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν λόγῳ κτέ. On the reading which I have ventured to introduce into the text see the 5 p. 1191. It is clear that the four elements in a tragedy, the μύθος ἤθη διάνοια and λέξις, belong to it as a work of literature, and that the music and 'spectacle' are accessories, which attach to it only when it comes to be acted on the stage. Apart from these accessories, a tragedy is, like an epic (comp. 23, 1459 b10), a μίμησις ἐν λόγῳ (see on 1, 1447 29), and all the elements which constitute it are ἐν λόγῳ. τὰ ἐν λόγῳ, therefore, is a comprehensive designation for the four literary elements, as distinct from the non-literary elements (τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν b 15), the music and 'spectacle', with which the enumeration concludes. If τῶν μὲν λόγων be retained, the genitive Comp. Markland's ἐστιν ἐν ὑπολόγῳ for ἐστι μὲν ὑπὸ λόγῳ in Lysias 4. 18, and Canter's ἀκοὴ ἐν ἡμῖν for ἀκοὴ μὲν ἡμῖν in Clem. Al. 7. 36, 852 P. has to be taken as an objective gen. after λέξις. Valla renders the words by orationum dictio, Paccius by sermonum dictio, and Goulston by ipsarum orationum elocutio. The main difficulty, however, is in the particle, which has never been satisfactorily explained. Vahlen formerly ( p. 181) connected the clause with that which follows in 615 τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν κτέ., supposing the sense to be 'viertens für die Dialoge (τῶν λόγων) die sprachliche Form; für das übrige (τῶν λοιπῶν) die Melopöie'. His later view (1885) is that the μέν in τῶν μὲν λόγων may be an instance of μέν solitarium, and that Aristotle may have meant at first to append something about the τῶν δὲ μελῶν... Such a division of the fourth part, it seems to me, is wholly inconsistent with the general scheme of the six parts, which is throughout this chapter so clearly before Aristotle's mind, as well as with the express mention of the μελοποιία in its proper place in the next sentence.

ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται. If the reference is to 6, 1449 b 34, where the λέξις is defined as ἡ τῶν μέτρων σύνθεσις, Aristotle must have forgotten the exact terms of his previous formula. The point, however, is practically the same in both instances; λέξις is to be understood in the sense of 'diction' or 'expression in language', and not in any of the other senses which the word might bear (see on 23, 1459 12).

διὰ τῆς ὀνομασίας διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων, i. e. by means of the words or language of the speaker. As the ὄνομα, which includes the verb and the adverb as well as the noun, is the directly significant part of all language, ὀνομασία means practically the same thing as vocabulary or language.

ἑρμηνείαν, 'communication', 'expression'; the Latin equivalent for it is interpretatio. After ἑρμηνείαν we may supply τῶν ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ, the spoken word being the outward sign or expression of a thought in the mind: 1, 16ª3 ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα. On the meaning of ἑρμηνεία in Aristotle see Waitz, 1 p. 323, and Steinthal, 1 p. 235.

ἔχει τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν ταὐτὸ δύναται, 'is practically the same thing' (see on 1, 1447ª8).

πέντε Similar instances of an intrusive numeral will be found in 1. 2, 1356 21, and 1. 13, 1373 b3 (v. Roemer ad loc.). Vahlen accepts the correction πέμπτον, in the sense of quinto loco: 'reliquarum autem partium (h. e. quae post illas quattuor iam reliquae sunt duae) quinto loco μελοποιία gravissimum est condimentum, ὄψις autem ad poeticam artem omnino non pertinet'.

μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων: see on 6, 1449 b 25 (ἡδυσμένῳ). For the pleasure given by music comp. 8. 5, 1339 b 20 τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων. — 1340 a 2 δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς μετέχειν ἀπ᾿ αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν· ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής. — οἱ μὲν γὰρ νέοι διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν ἀνήδυντον οὐδὲν ὑπομένουσιν ἑκόντες, ἡ δὲ μουσικὴ φύσει τῶν ἡδυσμένων [ἡδυσμάτων] ἐστίν. Bernays ( p. 157) supposed that a further statement on the subject of music, like that in the (Kaibel, 1 p. 52), μέλος τῆς μουσικῆς ἐστιν ἴδιον, ὅθεν ἀπ᾿ ἐκείνης τὰς αὐτοτελεῖς ἀφορμὰς δεήσει λαμβάνειν, may have dropped out after ἡδυσμάτων.

ψυχαγωγικόν: see on 33.

ἀτεχνότατον: 13, 1453 67 τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὄψεως τοῦτο παρασκευάζειν ἀτεχνότερον καὶ χορηγίας δεόμενόν ἐστιν. ἄτεχνος is frequently used in the sense of 'depending on means outside the art itself'; comp. 3. 16, 1416 b 18 σύγκειται γὰρ ἔχων ὁ λόγος τὸ μὲν ἄτεχνον, οὐθὲν γὰρ αἴτιος ὁ λέγων τῶν πράξεων, τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς τέχνης. The opposite of it in this sense is ἔντεχνος (Bon. Ind. 11964).

ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις κτέ. The tragic effect may be produced by a good tragedy even without any actual performance of it on a stage, i. e. as a mere work of literature (comp. 14, 1453b4, and 26, 1462ª11). The reading of Ao here, ὡς γὰρ, is defended by Vahlen, who translates it by quia enim (wenn nämlich), on the assumption that the apodosis is omitted in the same way as in 8. 6, 1157 3 οἱ δ᾽ ἀγαθοὶ δι᾽ αὐτοὺς φίλοι· ᾗ γὰρ ἀγαθοί [scil. φίλοι εἰσίν].—8. 10, 1159 10 οἱ χρήσιμοι δὲ καὶ ἡδεῖς ἐπὶ πλεῖον διαμένουσιν ἕως γὰρ ἂν πορίζωσιν ἡδονὰς ἢ ὠφελείας ἀλλήλοις [scil. διαμένουσιν], and certain more or less similar passages. The present passage (with the reading ὡς γὰρ) does not seem to me to be a genuine parallel. On behalf of the amended reading (ἡ γὰρ) it has to be remembered that a confusion between ἡ and the compendium for ὡς is not so uncommon in MSS. of a certain date (Bast, p. 780).

ἄνευ ἀγῶνος. ἀγών is generally rendered by certamen or 'contest', but it is not clear that that is the sense Aristotle attaches to it in the present and other places (7, 1451b; 13, 1453ª27) of the . It seems to mean rather little more than a 'public performance'. Similarly ἀγωνίζεσθαι in 7, 1451ª8 and 24, 146089 means apparently 'to perform in public', συναγωνίζεσθαι in 18, 1456ª26 'to take part in such a performance'; and ἀγώνισμα in 9, 1451b37 a 'work to be performed in public'. The word ἀγωνιστής, likewise, in 8. 7, 1342=18 and 19. 15, 918b 28, means no more than a 'public' or 'professional performer' (comp. πρωταγωνιστής etc.). In 3. 12, 1413b4 ἀγωνιστικὴ λέξις means the style allowable in public speaking, as distinct from the γραφικὴ λέξις, the more formal style required for a purely literary work. The idea of contest or competition, there- fore, is not always a recognizable element in the meaning of this group of words (comp. Nitzsch, 2 p. 113).

ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν: 13, 1453ª27 ἐπὶ τῶν σκηνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγώνων. — 19. 15, 918 28 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστής. — 3. 12, 141358 ἔστι δὲ λέξις γραφικὴ μὲν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη, ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ ἡ ὑποκριτικωτάτη κτέ. The present clause shows that the ὄψις is ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς; the next, that it is ἀτεχνότατον.

ὄψεων: for the plural see on 6, 1449b 33.

σκευοποιοῦ, the theatrical costumier, who enabled the actors to appear in character by supplying the masks, dresses, and other paraphernalia of their make-up; comp. Aristophanes 230 καὶ μὴ δέδιθ· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐξῃκασμένος. ὑπὸ τοῦ δέους γὰρ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἤθελε τῶν σκευοποιῶν εἰκάσαι (v. Schol. ad loc.). — Aelian 2. 13 οἱ σκευοποιοὶ ἔπλασαν αὐτὸν ὡς ὅτι μάλιστα ἐξεικάσαντες. — Pollux 4. 115 σκευὴ μὲν ἡ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν στολή . . . σκευοποιός δὲ ὁ προσωποποιός. — 2. 47 ἡ δὲ νέα κωμῳδία καὶ προσωποποιὸν εἴρηκεν ὃν ἡ ἀρχαία σκευοποιὸν ἐκάλει (ν. Meineke, FCG. 4 p. 680). For σκευή in the sense of the make-up of actors see Eurip. Suppl. 1054, Aristoph. Ran. 108, Plato Rep. 577 b.

κεῖται: as has been stated in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449b 25 (comp. Bon. Ind. 380b 43).

τελείας καὶ ὅλης. Although there is strictly speaking a certain distinction between the idea of 'complete' (τέλειος: . Metaph. Δ 16, 1021 b12) and that of 'whole' (ὅλος: ν. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 26), the two terms are so closely allied in sense as to be all but synonymous: 3. 6, 207ª13 ἄπειρον μὲν οὖν ἐστιν οὗ κατὰ ποσὸν λαμβάνουσιν αἰεί τι λαβεῖν ἔστιν ἔξω. οὗ δὲ μηδὲν ἔξω, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τέλειον καὶ ὅλον οὕτω γὰρ ὁριζόμεθα τὸ ὅλον, οὗ μηθέν ἄπεστιν ὅλον δὲ καὶ τέλειον ἢ τὸ αὐτὸ πάμπαν ἢ σύνεγγυς τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.

ἐχούσης τι μέγεθος: see on 4, 1449 19 and 6, 1449 b 25.

μηδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος 'of no size,' as we say, means the same thing as πάμμικρον in b 37 (Sauppe ap. Teichmüller, Aristot. Forsch. p. 54), just as in 6, 1450 a 28 οὐδὲν ἔχει ἦθος means practically 'has but very little character' in it.

μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης By a 'beginning' Aristotle does not mean something without antecedents, but only something that may be detached as it were from its antecedents, and viewed apart from them as the first term in a new series of events.

μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνο δ᾿ comp. 6, 1450 a 30 μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο. — b 31 καὶ μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνο. An. pr. 1. 4, 25 b 35 καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν.

ἰδέαις ἰδέα, 'form,' 'sort,' or 'kind,' is frequently used, just like εἶδος, which has much the same sense, without any genitive to explain it. Instances of this allusive, or rather evasive, use will be found in 5, 1449 b 8, in 19, 1456 b 3, and in 22, 1458 b 18. It is a favourite term with Isocrates also: 24 c ἀμφοτέραις ταῖς ἰδέαις ταύταις κατεχρήσαντο. — 36 A χρὴ δὲ δοκιμάζειν τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἐν ταῖς αὐταῖς ἰδέαις ἁπάσας, ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν δικαιοσύνην ἐν ταῖς ἀπορίαις, τὴν δὲ σωφροσύνην ἐν ταῖς δυναστείαις κτέ. — 319 D ταῖς ἄλλαις ἰδέαις ἐπιφανεστέραις καὶ πλείοσιν ὅλον τὸν λόγον διοικοῦσιν. — De perm. § 183 τὰς ἰδέας ἁπάσας, αἷς ὁ λόγος τυγχάνει χρώμενος, διεξέρχονται τοῖς μαθηταῖς. For instances from other authors see Campbell's Essay on Plato's use of language, Rep. of Plato 2. p. 301.

τὸ καλὸν κτέ. Having just laid it down that the μῦθος must be a complete whole, Aristotle assumes that it must also be a beautiful whole, and proceeds to show that, if it is to be that, it must be of a certain magnitude, neither too long nor too short. Beauty, he says, depends on two conditions: the beautiful object must be (1) large enough to allow of our seeing the orderly arrangement of its parts, and (2) not so large as to be incapable of being taken in as a whole in one coup d'œil. With this we may compare Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ μέγιστα εἴδη τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον—where τάξις corresponds with the first, and τὸ ὡρισμένον with the second of the two conditions in the present passage. For the form of the opening statement comp. De long. vitae 5, 466 a 26 τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ζῷα καὶ φυτά.

ζῷον : 23, 1459 a 20 ἵν᾿ ὥσπερ ζῷον ἓν ὅλον ποιῇ τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονήν. The analogy between a literary whole and a living organism is postulated in Plato Phaedr. 264 c ἀλλὰ τόδε γε οἶμαί σε φάναι ἄν, δεῖν πάντα λόγον ὥσπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι σῶμά τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, ἀλλὰ μέσα τε ἔχειν καὶ ἄκρα, πρέποντ᾿ ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῷ ὅλῳ γεγραμμένα. It seems to mean here a living, as distinct from an artificial, whole, as it clearly does in Top. 1. 15, 106 a 20 τῷ καλῷ τῷ μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ ζῴου τὸ αἰσχρόν, τῷ δ᾿ ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκίας τὸ μοχθηρόν.

ταῦτα = τὰ μέρη implied in συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν.

πρᾶγμα a 'thing': Top. 1. 5, 102 a 18 ἴδιον δ᾿ ἐστὶν μὴ δηλοῖ μὲν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, μόνῳ δ᾿ ὑπάρχει καὶ ἀντικατηγορεῖται τοῦ πράγματος. — De anima 3. 8, 432 a 3 πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωρισμένον.

μέγεθος ὑπάρχειν μὴ τὸ τυχόν : De gen. an. 2. 6, 745 a 5 ἔστι γάρ τι πᾶσι τοῖς ζώοις πέρας τοῦ μεγέθους. — Pol. 7. 4, 1326 a 35 ἔστι τι καὶ πόλεσι μεγέθους μέτρον, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ζῴων φυτῶν ὀργάνων.

μεγέθει : Eth. N. 4. 7, 1123 b 6 ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ᾿ ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ᾿ οὐ.

τάξει According to Top. 3. 1, 116 b 21, beauty is thought to consist in συμμετρία (τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι); and according to Metaph. M 3, 1078 a 36 in τάξις καὶ συμμετρία καὶ τὸ ὡρισμένον. In the beauty of a μῦθος, however, there is no room for the idea of συμμετρία.

συγχεῖται The reason for our not seeing any beauty in a very minute creature is that we perceive it as a whole too quickly to discern the parts and the order and symmetry there may be in them. συγχεῖται = 'becomes blurred, or indistinct', as in H. A. 7. 5, 585 a 34 συγκεχυμένον μέλαν.

θεωρία 'sight' or 'view' (comp. Bon. Ind. 329 a 31).

ἀναισθήτου χρόνου There is no necessity to bracket χρόνου (with Bonitz). The time a thing takes to be seen may be of perceptible or of imperceptible duration; and in the latter case it may very well be described as an ἀναίσθητος χρόνος, a time too short for one to be conscious of its duration. This expression appears in the definition of the 'sudden' in Phys. 4. 13, 222 a 15 τὸ δ᾿ ἐξαίφνης τὸ ἐν ἀναισθήτῳ χρόνῳ διὰ μικρότητα ἐκστάν.

οὔτε παμμέγεθες comp. the rule for the size of the πόλις in Pol. 5. 2, 1302 b 35 and 7. 4, 1326 a 35.

ὥστε marks the apodosis (comp. 9, 1452 a 10 and Bon. Ind. 873 a 31).

καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων The argument proceeds on the assumption of an analogy between a beautiful whole that addresses the eye, and one that addresses the mind; and the conclusion is that as the one is εὐσύνοπτον, so the other must be εὐμνημόνευτον. At this point Aristotle changes his construction, repeating his original statement (1450 b 34) in the form required for an argument from analogy, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων . . . οὕτω καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μύθων, with συστημάτων as a short equivalent for the foregoing ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν. A σύστημα is a product of combination, something that comes into being through a union, natural or artificial, of parts into a whole; a state, for instance, is a σύστημα (Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168 b 32) as being due to a combination of classes or individuals, and a ζῷον is a σύστημα (De gen. an. 2. 4, 740 a 20), as being an organized whole of parts. The present passage, however, implies a more restricted sense of σύστημα, as though the term were properly applicable only to a whole that is made, as distinct from an organic whole, which grows to be what it is. This or some similar sense is suggested by the passage also in Eth. N. 9. 8, 1168 b 32 ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος—where the implication is that a man is not a σύστημα proper, though his composite nature gives him a certain resemblance to one. The difficulty in the manuscript reading σωμάτων is that the word would have to be understood in one of two senses, either in that of ‘material substances’, or in that of ‘living bodies’. The first interpretation is out of the question, since beauty is in the τάξις or συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν, and, therefore, in the form, not in the matter, of things. The second, which makes ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων and ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων mere synonyms, leaves us without any equivalent for the ἅπαν πρᾶγμα ὃ συνέστηκεν ἐκ τινῶν of his original statement (1450 b 34), which was, if I am not mistaken, far too important for Aristotle's argument to be ignored in any résumé of it (comp. J. of Phil. 5 p. 120).

ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων see on 1450 b 36.

εὐσύνοπτον 'easily taken in as a whole by the eye', as opposed το εὐμνημόνευτον (a 5), 'easily taken in as a whole by the memory'. The word, however, is metaphorically used as equivalent to εὐμνημόνευτος in 23, 1459 a 33, as also in Rhet. 3. 9, 1409 b 35 λέγω δὲ περίοδον λέξιν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ τελευτὴν αὐτὴν καθ᾿ αὑτὴν καὶ μέγεθος εὐσύνοπτον. ἡδεῖα δ᾿ ἡ τοιαύτη καὶ εὐμαθής .. εὐμαθὴς δὲ ὅτι εὐμνημόνευτος.

ὅρος ὁ μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας the limit in practice, in contradistinction to the theoretic limit of length, ὁ κατ᾿ αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος (a 9). In actual practice the length of the play is determined by the conditions of the public performances (ἀγῶνες) in which it will be presented on the stage; the time it is to occupy there is fixed by custom and convention rather than theory.

τὴν αἴσθησιν scil. ">τῶν θεατῶν (see on 15, 1454 b 15); comp. 4, 1449 a 8 πρὸς τὰ θέατρα. The language here, though quite general, seems to refer more especially to the power of attention in the audiences.

ἑκατὸν τραγῳδίας ἀγωνίζεσθαι an extreme instance like the μυρίων σταδίων ζῷον in a 2. The subject of ἀγωνίζεσθαι, if expressed, would be 'the performers', ἀγωνίζεσθαί τι in stage matters being synonymous with ὑποκρίνεσθαί τι; comp. Demosth. 19, 246 τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δρᾶμα Μόλων ἠγωνίζετο. — 250 ἃ ἡγωνίσω καὶ ἀκριβῶς ἐξηπίστασο. — 337 τὰ Θυέστου... ἠγωνίζετο (see on 6, 1450 b 18). In the sense of 'contend', as said of the dramatic poet, it would require an instrumental dative (τραγῳδίαις) after it. The personification implied in Tyrwhitt's rendering, 'si centum tragoedias in theatro certare oporteret', is (I think) questionable in Aristotle. Goulston takes ἀγωνίζεσθαι as a passive (= agi) as it certainly sometimes is.

πρὸς κλεψύδρας For the preposition comp. fr. 468 Teubn. μέτρον τί ἐστιν ὕδατος πρὸς μεμετρημένον ἡμέρας διάστημα ῥέον ... πρὸς δὴ τοῦτο ἠγωνίζοντο οἱ μέγιστοι καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀγῶνες.

ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτέ †φασιν† The idea of tragedies having been at some date or other timed by the clepsydra is to my mind highly improbable, and there is no hint of such a thing elsewhere. The language also here is not free from difficulties. Tyrwhitt translates it by 'quemadmodum aliquando alias etiam factum esse perhibent'; and Vahlen (Berlin Academy, Sitzungsberichte 1897 p. 639) by 'wie man sagt, dass sie auch sonst gespielt haben'. To get this out of the words, and make them relate to Tragedy, or rather the past history of Tragedy, it becomes necessary to supply (with Vahlen) an aorist infinitive, ἀγωνίσασθαι, from the preceding imperfect ἠγωνίζοντο, and also to make ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε mean simply 'once' or 'formerly', though its natural meaning would be 'at a certain other time'. Two instances have been pointed out of ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε: Xenophon Anab. 6. 4. 12 ὑμᾶς δεῖ παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μαχουμένους εἴ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε [= 'si unquam alias']; Lucian Hermot. 24 ἤδη γάρ ποτε καὶ ἄλλοτε [= 'alias quondam'] πρεσβύτου ἀνδρὸς ἤκουσα διεξιόντος. These, however, are not enough to show that ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοτε can only refer to an indefinite past or future; with a verb in the present it may very well refer to the indefinite present also, and have the sense of 'at certain other times', just in the same way as ποτέ, with a present, means 'at certain times' in Soph. el. 16, 175 a 27 συμβαίνει δέ ποτε καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς διαγράμμασιν, and in the familiar antithesis of ποτέ and ἀεί. M. Schmidt's correction, εἰώθασιν (for φασιν), though perhaps too bold, yields an unimpeachable sense, 'as is regularly done at certain other times', i. e. by another class of ἀγωνισταί, the pleaders in the law-courts. As a variation on it, to make the sense clearer, I would suggest ὥσπερ ποτὲ καὶ ἄλλοι εἰώθασιν.

ὁ δὲ ... ὅρος is appositional to what follows.

ὁ μείζων scil. μῦθος; comp. Tyrwhitt's rendering 'quo maior est fabula'.

σύνδηλος is explained in the reference to this passage in 24, 1459 b 18 τοῦ μὲν οὖν μήκους ὅρος ἱκανὸς ὁ εἰρημένος· δύνασθαι γὰρ δεῖ συνορᾶσθαι τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος.

ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κτέ. A reminiscence apparently of the language of Plato Rep. 423 B Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, οὗτος ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλιστος ὅρος τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄρχουσιν, ὅσην δεῖ τὸ μέγεθος τὴν πόλιν ποιεῖσθαι... Τίς, ἔφη, ὅρος; Οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, τόνδε· μέχρι οὗ ἂν ἐθέλῃ αὐξανομένη εἶναι μία, μέχρι τούτου αὔξειν, πέρα δὲ μή.

κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων scil. τῶν πραγμάτων (see on 6, 1449 b 26). The consequents must be always the natural or necessary effect of the antecedents. A well-constructed μῦθος is a consecutive whole, not a mere series of incidents which happen to follow one after the other in actual order of time (comp. 10, 1452 a 19); and it is this that differentiates it from a history or a biography (comp. 9, 1451 a 36), which records everything that may have befallen a community or an individual, however loose and separate the various incidents were in themselves (comp. 23, 1459 a 23). The poetic story in fact must satisfy our sense of logic, incident following after incident as its necessary and inevitable, or as its probable and natural consequence. The technical meaning of the terms εἰκός and ἀναγκαῖον in Aristotle may be seen from An. post. 2. 27, 70 a 4 τὸ μὲν εἰκός ἐστι πρότασις ἔνδοξος· ὃ γὰρ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ἴσασιν οὕτω γινόμενον ἢ μὴ γινόμενον, ἢ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν, τοῦτ᾿ ἐστὶν εἰκός, οἷον τὸ μισεῖν τοὺς φθονοῦντας ἢ τὸ φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρωμένους. — Rhet. 1. 2, 1357 a 34 τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰκός ἐστιν [τὸ] ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γινόμενον ... τὸ περὶ τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν. — Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 b 28 τὸ ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. — Δ 5, 1015 a 34 τὸ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν ἀναγκαῖόν φαμεν οὕτως ἔχειν. The distinction between the two terms had been already recognized by Plato: Theaet. 149 C εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον. — Tim. 40 E ἄνευ τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξεων λέγουσιν. They were, it would seem, already established in the rhetorical terminology of the sophists (Stallbaum on Tim. 40 E).

εἰς εὐτυχίαν κτἑ. This is obviously meant to apply only to the tragic hero, not to the secondary personages in the play, about whom Aristotle has very little to say. Though he acknowledges the legitimacy of a transition from misery to happiness as a dramatic motive — it will be remembered that it is the motive in the Iphigenia in Tauris (comp. 17, 1455 a 12 καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἡ σωτηρία) — he does not think it so distinctively tragic or so effective in Tragedy as the opposite kind of transition, that from happiness to misery (13, 1453 a 14 sqq.).

μεταβάλλειν The synonym for this in 13, 1453 a 2 is μεταπίπτειν. The implied subject of μεταβάλλειν is 'the tragic hero'; comp. 13, 1452 b 34 οὔτε τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρας δεῖ μεταβάλλοντας φαίνεσθαι ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν, and 14, 1453 a 1 οὐδ᾿ αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν.

μύθος δ᾽ ἐστὶν εἷς κτἑ. See Schoemann, Opusc. Acad. 3 p. 31. ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται: i. e. certain post-Homeric poets, whose theory apparently is inferred from their practice (comp. a 21).

πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ ἄπειρα De caelo 1. 9, 278 a 19 ὁρῶμεν ... πλείω καὶ ἄπειρα ὄντα τὰ ὁμοιοειδῆ. Vahlen (Rh. Mus. 28 p. 184) quotes also Plato Theaet. 159 B ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ ἄπειρα. — Tim. 31 A πότερον οὖν ὀρθῶς ἕνα οὐρανὸν προσειρήκαμεν, ἢ πολλοὺς καὶ ἀπείρους λέγειν ἦν ὀρθότερον;

τῷ ἑνὶ Phys. 2. 5, 196 b 28 τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη. On the strength of this parallel τῷ ἐνί in the present passage is taken as a neuter by Vahlen, who translates the clause accordingly by 'in unam rem innumera cadunt'. This interpretation, it seems to me, misses the point — the distinction Aristotle assumes between the many things that befall the individual (πολλὰ τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίνει), i. e. that he suffers or has done to him, and the many things that he does (πράξεις ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν a 18). That τῷ ἑνί is masculine here is shown not only by περὶ ἕνα (a 17), πράξεις ἑνός (a 18), and ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη (25) in the context, but also by the parallel in 23, 1459 a 23 ὅσα ἐν τούτῳ συνέβη περὶ ἕνα ἢ πλείους. The version in the Paraphrase of Averroes, 'uni rei multa accidunt', implies the same interpretation.

ἐνίων which has been questioned by Spengel and others, is an understatement of a kind not so uncommon in Aristotle (see on 6, 1450 a 12). The sense is: In the infinite variety of things that befall the individual in the course of his life there are some [i. e. many] which it is impossible to bring into relation with the rest, as parts of one connected whole. The qualifying ἐνίων is like ἐνίοτε in 23, 1459 a 27 οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς χρόνοις ἐνίοτε γίνεται θάτερον μετὰ θάτερον, ἐξ ὧν ἐν οὐδὲν γίνεται τέλος. ἐξ ὧν ἐνίων has been rendered by 'ex quorum aliquibus' (Tyrwhitt), or 'quorum ex quibusdam' (Hermann). In the parallel, however, in Dem. 18. 12 περὶ ὧν ἐνίων both Weil and Goodwin regard ἐνίων as appositional; and the same view has been taken of the word in Dem. 19. 260 (τὰς ἀκροπόλεις αὐτῶν ἐνίων), and in Xen. Anab. 6. 6. 34 (περὶ ὑμῶν ἐνίων). Another instance of this same ambiguity is in Meteor. 1. 3, 339 b 9 πολὺ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἐνίων ἐλάττων ἐστίν (comp. L. Dindorf in HSt. s. v. ἔνιος). There is a clear instance of the appositional use of ἔνιοι, in a different case, in Poet. 9, 1451 b 19 ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ἐνíαις μὲν κτέ.

πάντες ἐοίκασιν ἁμαρτάνειν comp. 23, 1459 a 29, 37.

Ἡρακληίδα Several were known in antiquity (Kinkel, EGF. 1 p. 212, 249, 254).

Θησηίδα Kinkel, 1 p. 217.

προσήκειν = 'must be', 'ought to be' according to the fitness of things, as in Meteor. 1. 3, 340 a 26, De anima 1. 5, 411 b 15, Rhet. 2. 2, 1379 b 3, and Plato Rep. 362 C.

Ὀδύσσειαν for the absence of the article see on 4, 1448 b 38.

οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη i. e. his poem was not made to cover the whole ground of the life of Ulysses, but only a selected section of it, a limited group of incidents sufficiently coherent and connected to form a single action of the requisite kind (μίαν πρᾶξιν οἷαν λέγομεν a 28). The unity in the story of the Odyssey, as Aristotle conceives it, may be seen from his survey of the poem in 17, 1455 b 17. The sense of the οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα in the text may be illustrated by the very similar expressions in 18, 1456 a 13 τὸν τῆς Ἰλιάδος ὅλον ποιεῖν μῦθον, 16 πέρσιν Ἰλίου ὅλην ποιεῖν, and 23, 1459 a 32 τὸν πόλεμον ποιεῖν ὅλον.

ὧν οὐδὲ θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν, scil. αὐτῷ συνέβη. This and the second incident, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, are given as examples of two disconnected events in the life of Ulysses (ὧν οὐδὲ θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, a 27). The antithetic particles (μέν, δέ) imply a difference between them; the one (πληγῆναι) is a πάθος, and the other (μανῆναι προσποιήσασθαι) a πρᾶξις — a distinction which the preceding context (see on a 17) shows to have been already present in Aristotle's mind. I have ventured to restore οὐδέ in place of οὐδέν for two reasons, partly because with οὐδέν the verb (γενέσθαι) seems to have two subjects (οὐδέν and θάτερον), and partly because the ὧν being followed by θατέρου and θάτερον naturally refers to the two incidents just mentioned. It has been urged, as one of the difficulties in this statement, that the wounding of Ulysses is actually part of the Odyssey, being described at considerable length in the story of the Discovery in Od. 19, 392-466. The Discovery is certainly part of the action of the Odyssey (v. 17, 1455 b 21), but the incident on Parnassus is in a very different position; it comes in as an episode (v. 17, 1455 b 23), not as one of the series of incidents which form the action of the poem. The action in the Odyssey (summarized in 17, 1455 b 17 sqq.) extends over a space of some six weeks; but the encounter of the boy Ulysses with the boar belonged to a period of his life not covered by the Odyssey. The second incident, his feigned madness, is said to have been part of the story in the Cypria (Kinkel, EGF. p. 18). Bergk (Gr. Litt. I p. 711) thinks there may have been some epic in which both incidents were included. The superior unity of the Homeric Epic is emphatically reasserted in 23, 1459 a 30.

ὧν = ἀλλὰ τούτων.

μίαν πρᾶξιν οἵαν λέγομεν 'a single action of the kind we are describing', i. e. one that forms a coherent and closely connected whole. The opposite of this is the μία πρᾶξις πολυμερής of the inferior epics (23, 1459 b 1). The reading of Ac, οἷαν λέγοιμεν, may have arisen through OIAN being misread, and taken to stand for οἷ᾽ἄν.

διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι has been rendered in various ways— by 'diversum reddatur vel moveatur' (Victorius), by 'dissolvatur et luxetur' (Heinsius), and by 'differatur et moveatur' (Tyrwhitt). The general sense is clear: when a part in a whole is removed, by being transferred to another place or withdrawn altogether, the continuity of the whole is broken at that point. Both διαφέρεσθαι and κινεῖσθαι seem to be (as Heinsius must have seen) metaphors from surgery. διαφέρεσθαι may be regarded as a synonym for διίστασθαι, the term in use in medical Greek for the diastasis of a limb as distinct from a complete luxation (ἐξίστασθαι or ὀλισθάνειν); comp. Hippocrates 3 p. 132 K. ὁκόσα διίσταται καὶ ὁκόσα ὀλισθάνει. If this view is correct, the κινεῖσθαι which follows will mean to be 'dislocated'. Hippocrates often has κινεῖσθαι and κίνημα in the sense of 'displacement' as an equivalent for diastasis (comp. 3 p. 81 K. ἢν δέ τι κινηθῇ ἐκ τῆς χώρης).

προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσόν comp. Metaph. M 10, 1076 a 2 οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα [scil. οὐσία] τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα, and Plato Rep. 449 D μέγα γάρ τι οἰόμεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνόμενον. For this use of the participle see Goodwin, Syntax of Gk. moods and tenses § 829 (6).

οὐδὲν μόριον it is not a part of the whole, but an accident or addition to it; comp. De gen. an. 1. 4, 717 b 34 οὐθὲν γάρ εἰσι μόριον τῶν πόρων οἱ ὄρχεις, ἀλλὰ πρόσκεινται καθάπερ τὰς λαίας προσάπτουσιν αἱ ὑφαίνουσαι τοῖς ἱστοῖς. In Metaph. Γ 5, 1010 a 30 οὗτος [scil. ὁ περὶ ἡμᾶς τόπος] οὐθὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν μόριον τοῦ παντός ἐστιν, the phrase means practically 'is as nothing compared with', just like οὐδὲν μέρος in Isocrates 90 E εἴ τις ἀθρήσειε καὶ σκέψαιτο τὰς τῶν Ἑλλήνων συμφοράς, οὐδὲν ἂν μέρος οὖσαι φανεῖεν τῶν ... ἡμῖν γεγενημένων.

φανερὸν δὲ κτέ. In Aristotle's view a history is a chronicle, or register, of events taken just as they came in order of time, however separate and disconnected they may have been in themselves (23, 1459 a 21). The present distinction between a history, in this sense of the term, and a poetic story is a corollary to what he lays down in chaps. 7-8 on the unity and logical coherence of the parts in a well-constructed story. The action in such a story is a πρᾶξις μία καὶ ὅλη (6, 1449 b 32), i. e. a whole with a beginning, middle, and end (7, 1450 b 26) ; each incident resulting from something that goes before it, and the entire series from the state of things presupposed, as the ἀρχή of the whole, at the opening. Given a personage of a certain character and in a certain position as the beginning of the story, all the rest must be the natural or necessary consequence of this initial situation. Hence it follows that the incidents in the poetic story are not only possible but also always possible, because they are such as may or must happen at any time, whenever the man and the circumstances are found together. Aristotle accordingly notes two great points of contrast between history and poetry: (1) whereas the former is a record of actual events (τὰ γενόμενα), the latter describes rather possible incidents of another kind, τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον (a 38); (2) whereas the one tells us what is true only of some particular person (or persons) at a particular time, the other tells us something universally true (τὰ καθόλου b 7), something that will hold good at all times of all persons of the same type in a similar set of circumstances.

τὰ δυνατά scil. γενέσθαι (comp. b 32). The qualifying κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον excludes the third kind of δυνατά, viz. τὰ γενόμενα. These also are obviously possible (see b 17 and De interpr. 13, 23 a 7), but as mere γενόμενα they belong to history rather than poetry. A little further on, however (b 29), Aristotle explains that under certain conditions even historic incidents may be a legitimate subject for poetry.

οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν κτέ. see 1, 1447 b 17, where it is shown that metre is only one of the accidents of poetry.

διαφέρει scil. ὁ ἱστορικὸς τοῦ ποιητοῦ.

σπουδαιότερον is the opposite of φαυλότερον. In Plato also σπουδαῖος (v. Ast, Lex. s.v.) is applied to things in the sense of axius spoudēs, 'of serious value or interest', as the opposite of either 'trivial' (φαῦλος) or 'ludicrous' (γελοῖος: see on 4, 1448 b 34). Poetry, as Aristotle conceives it, is 'more philosophic', because of the large and generalized view of human nature which it implies; it tells us in effect what all men of a certain character may or must do in a certain set of circumstances, whereas historic truth is limited to particular times and persons. A great master of rhetoric, Diderot, has enlarged on this text in a well-known passage in his (Œuvres t. 3 p. 18 ed. 1821): 'O Richardson! j'oserai dire que l'histoire la plus vraie est pleine de mensonges, et que ton roman est plein de vérités. L'histoire peint quelques individus; tu peins l'espèce humaine: l'histoire attribue à quelques individus ce qu'ils n'ont ni dit, ni fait; tout ce que tu attribues à l'homme, il l'a dit et fait l'histoire n'embrasse qu'une portion de la durée, qu'un point de la surface du globe; tu as embrassé tous les lieux et tous les temps. Le cœur humain, qui a été, est et sera toujours le même, est le modèle d'après lequel tu copies. Si l'on appliquait au meilleur historien une critique sévère, y en a-t-il aucun qui la soutînt comme toi? Sous ce point de vue, j'oserai dire que souvent l'histoire est un mauvais roman; et que le roman, comme tu l'as fait, est une bonne histoire. O peintre de la nature c'est toi qui ne mens jamais.'.

μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου μᾶλλον implies a qualification, which reappears in another form in b 9 οὗ στοχάζεται ἡ ποίησις ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη. Poetry deals with 'characters' rather than actual individuals, and with universal rather than particular truth. Its universality, however, is somewhat disguised by the proper names it attaches to its characters, which acquire in this way a certain resemblance to the real personages of history. A reason for the retention in Tragedy of traditional names is given further on, in b 15.

τὰ καθόλου... τὰ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον The present explanation of the terms may be compared with that in De interpr. 7, 17 a 39 λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ᾿ ἕκαστον δὲ μὴ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν τῶν καθόλου, Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκαστον; comp. also Rhet. 1. 2, 1356 b 28 οὐδεμία δὲ τέχνη σκοπεῖ τὸ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον, οἷον ἡ ἰατρικὴ (οὐ) τί Σωκράτει τὸ ὑγιεινόν ἐστιν ἢ Καλλίᾳ, ἀλλὰ τί τῷ τοιῷδε ἢ τοῖς τοιοῖσδε. — 2. 4, 1382 a 4 ἡ μὲν ὁργὴ ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ καθ᾿ ἕκαστα, οἷον Καλλίᾳ ἢ Σωκράτει, τὸ δὲ μίσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη. For a similar use of καθόλου see 17, 1455 b 1. The element of 'universality' in Greek Tragedy, as Aristotle understands it, means no more than is indicated in his present distinction between a poem and a history; and it is in no wise peculiar to Tragedy. Aristotle tells us it was to be seen in the Comedy of his time (b 11); and it is found in just the same way in the modern novel—even in the historical and in the so-called realistic novel. In all these forms of imaginative literature the personages are, as we say, 'characters', in other words, ideal personalities, made to act and speak in accordance with the law of character which the author has assumed for each. The novel, however (owing in some degree to its length), admits of characters of a subtlety and complexity which would have been simply impossible in the ancient Drama. The Greek dramatist was practically restricted to the larger and more obvious types of character, which did not require much explanation to make them intelligible to his public in the brief space of time allotted to his work.

ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη = καίπερ ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη; comp. 25, 1461 a 30 οὐ πινόντων οἶνον. The characters in the Drama are 'universals', i. e. types of character rather than actual individuals; that is what poetry really means them to be, notwithstanding the individualizing proper names it attaches to them. The alternative rendering of ὀνόματα ἐπιτιθεμένη, 'in giving names to its personages' ('dum nomina imponit' Heinsius), would imply that the names were definitely chosen as significant of character. This would be true to some extent of those in Comedy (see infra on b 13 τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα), but not of those in Tragedy. As abstracts of character the personages ought to have general names, like those in Theophrastus, instead of the individualizing proper names given them in Drama. For the use of the middle verb in this connexion comp. 21, 1457 b 34 and Homer Od. 8. 552 οὐ μὲν γάρ τις πάμπαν ἀνώνυμός ἐστ᾿ ἀνθρώπων ... ἀλλ᾿ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τίθενται, ἐπεί κε τέκωσι, τοκῆες.

ἤδη i. e. now that the New Comedy has taken the place of the Old (see on 5, 1449 b 8), Comedy instead of satirizing individuals (like Cleon or Socrates) tells imaginary stories of imaginary personages labelled with imaginary names.

διὰ τῶν εἰκότων The same use of the preposition is found in 26, 1462 a 16 δι᾿ ἧς αἱ ἡδοναὶ συνίστανται. It denotes the basis or chief ingredient in a compound, as it often does in later Greek, e. g. in expressions like τὸ δι᾿ ἀλόης, τὸ διὰ κολοκυνθίδος, etc. in the medical writers; comp. also Dionysius Hal. 5 p. 14 R. διὰ γὰρ τῶν εὐτελεστάτων τε καὶ ταπεινοτάτων ὀνομάτων πέπλεκται πᾶσα ἡ λέξις.

οὕτω the reading of Ac, is too idiomatic to be lightly surrendered (comp. Bon. Ind. 546 b 13). The Arabic version is said to imply not οὕτω but οὐ; the same Arabic word, however, which Dr. Margoliouth renders by nequaquam, would seem to occur also in the Arabic text in 6, 1450 a 30, where it may be taken to represent οὔπω. One may suspect, therefore, that the Greek reading before the Syriac translator in the present passage was οὔπω, a mere corruption of οὕτω.

τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα Ritter has a note here on the names of the characters in the New Comedy. Aristotle's point is this. In the Old Comedy the names of the chief characters were already fixed and prescribed for the poet, because actually borne by the persons whom he wished to satirize. Socrates, Cleon, Agathon, Euripides are instances of such names in Aristophanes. But in the New Comedy the names were not thus fixed. In calling a soldier Thraso or Pyrgopolinices, for instance, the poet did not mean to satirize some actual person of that name; the name was a matter of choice or accident—invented it may be by the poet himself, or borrowed by him from his predecessors or from life. Such names may no doubt be stock-names, or have a certain conventional or etymological appropriateness as suggestive of certain types of character (comp. Dieterich, Pulcinella p. 45); but they obviously stand on quite a different footing from the real names in Aristophanes. Names also like Phormio, Chremes, Menedemus, etc., were in Comedy fictitious names, though outside Comedy they may have been borne by real persons (comp. on 21).

ὑποτιθέασιν 'lay down as a foundation,' so that the story may look like one founded on fact (comp. 17, 1455 b 12).

ἰαμβοποιοί see on 4, 1448 b 27 and 5, 1449 b 8.

τῶν γενομένων ὀνομάτων ἀντέχονται comp. Evanthius De Comoedia 4, 2 (Kaibel, CGF. 1 p. 66) omnis comoedia de fictis est argumentis; tragoedia saepe ab historica fide petitur. The reading γενομένων has been questioned, but (as it seems to me) without sufficient reason. τὰ γενόμενα ὀνόματα are the already existing names, as fixed in history or legend (γνώριμα b 20), in contradistinction to a newly-invented name (comp. τὰ ὀνόματα πεποίηται b 22), or one which, whether new or not, is arbitrarily assigned to a character by the poet (τὰ τυχόντα ὀνόματα b 13) at the time of writing.

πιθανόν (comp. πιστεύομεν in the next line) is the Greek equivalent of our modern term 'convincing', and practically synonymous with εἰκός (comp. 24, 1460 a 27) and ἔνδοξον (Bon. Ind. 593 a 35). The word was sufficiently established to be applied even by Xenophon to a work of art which has a look of life and reality: Mem. 3. 10, 7 ὁμοιότερά τε τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς καὶ πιθανώτερα ποιεῖς φαίνεσθαι. In 17, 1455 a 30 πιθανός is said of a person, the poet who writes 'convincingly'. The adv. πιθανῶς has the same sense in Aristophanes Thesm. 266 ἁνὴρ μὲν ἡμῖν οὗτοσὶ καὶ δὴ γυνὴ τὸ γ᾿ εἶδος· ἢν λαλῇς δ᾿, ὅπως τῷ φθέγματι γυναικιεῖς εὖ καὶ πιθανῶς ('play the woman well and convincingly').

ἐνίαις see on 8, 1451 a 18 for this appositional use of the word.

Ἀνθεῖ was first suggested, somewhat tentatively, by Welcker in his Gr. Tragödien p. 995. 'The Flower' would certainly be a very strange title for a Greek tragedy. The play being on a purely fictitious story, the names also of the characters, instead of being taken over from legend or history, were fictions, and due to the choice of the poet himself. But they need not be supposed to have been new or newly-coined names. Ἀνθεύς, for instance, seems to have been known already in mythical history as the name of certain legendary personages; and not so very long after Agathon's time it was actually borne by an Athenian citizen (Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica 953). In this respect, therefore, it was in just the same position as so many of the names in Comedy, Chremes, Menedemus, Phormio, and the like.

εὐφραίνει an incidental recognition of pleasure as the immediate end of Tragedy (see 14, 1453 b 12, and Döring, Kunstlehre des Aristoteles p. 104). εὐφραίνειν serves as a transitive to χαίρειν: Top. 2. 6, 112 b 21 ἔτι καὶ εἰ αὐτὸ αὐτῷ συμβεβηκὸς ἔθηκεν ὡς ἕτερον διὰ τὸ ἕτερον εἶναι ὄνομα, καθάπερ Πρόδικος διῃρεῖτο τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς χαρὰν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ εὐφροσύνην· ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὀνόματά ἐστιν. εἰ οὖν τις τὸ χαίρειν τῷ εὐφραίνεσθαι φήσει συμβεβηκέναι, αὐτὸ ἂν αὐτῷ φαίη συμβεβηκέναι. — Eth. E. 3. 2, 1231 a 6 τῶν ὀσμῶν ταύταις χαίρουσιν ὅσαι κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς εὐφραίνουσιν. The word may describe the pleasurable effect of anything, e. g. that of a painting (Poet. 6, 1450 a 2), of music (Pol. 8. 5, 1339 b 24), and of odours (Eth. E. l. c.; Rhet. 3. 4, 1407 a 10).

ὥστ᾿ οὐ πάντως ἂν εἴη ζητητέον Spengel suggested that the εἶναι of the MS. should be bracketed. In these negative statements of result with ὥστε οὐ, which are so common in Aristotle, the verb is usually either in the indicative, (1) expressed or (2) understood, or (3) in the potential optative, as the following passages from the Organon may suffice to show: (1) An. pr. 1. 36, 48 a 36 ὥστε οὐκ ἔσται μέσον τοῦ ΑΒ. — Top. 8. 11, 151 b 30 ὥστε οὐ τῷ ταῦτ᾿ εἶναι γίνεται ὁ συλλογισμός (comp. Poet. 22, 1458 a 5). (2) An. pr. 1. 32, 47 a 35 ὥστ᾿ οὐκ εἴ τι συμβαίνει τεθέντων τινῶν, πειρατέον ἀνάγειν εὐθύς. — Top. 6. 5, 142 a 4 ὥστ᾿ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ὁρισμὸς ἀποδοτέος (comp. Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a 12). (3) An. post. 1. 12, 77 b 12 ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἐν ἀγεωμετρήτοις περὶ γεωμετρίας διαλεκτέον. — An. pr. 1. 16, 36 a 14 ὥστε οὐδενὶ ἢ οὐ παντὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Β ἐνδέχοιτ᾿ ἂν ὑπάρχειν. — Top. 6. 12, 149 b 2 ὥστ᾿ οὐκ ἂν εἴη χρῶμα πυρὶ μεμιγμένον. — Soph. el. 6, 168 b 4 ὥστ᾿ εἰ ὁ ἔλεγχος συλλογισμός τις, οὐκ ἂν εἴη ὁ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔλεγχος. Two instances of εἶναι for ἂν εἴη are to be found in MSS. of great antiquity and value, one in Par. A of Plato (Tim. 17 B), and the other in Kb of the (8. 2, 1155 b 20). The error may have arisen either from the omission of an, a word very apt to be lost in MSS., or through ὥστ᾿ οὐ being misread and turned into ὡς τοῦ (as it has been in fact in Ac).

δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων refers back to the distinction drawn in the earlier part of the chap. 1451 b 1-5 between a poetic story and a history; a history was said to be still a history even if put into a metrical form. From this Aristotle once more (V. I. 1447 b 11) draws the conclusion that the story is a more essential part of a poem than the language or versification.

ὅσῳ ποιητὴς κτέ. is added as a further reason for regarding the story (rather than the verse) as the great and essential thing in a poem. The argument, which might have been more clearly stated, tacitly assumes what we have been told of the μῦθος and its pre-eminent importance in chap. 6. The poet's function, says Aristotle, is to imitate (ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν), and it is actions that he imitates (μιμεῖται δὲ τὰς πράξεις): but the μῦθος in a poem is what represents the action (τῆς μὲν πράξεως ὁ μύθος ἡ μίμησις, 6, 1450 a 4); the μύθος therefore is the poet's first business, and he must be accordingly a ποιητὴς τῶν μύθων, μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν μέτρων.

ποιητὴς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν: 1, 1447 b 15 οὐχ ὡς κατὰ τὴν μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. Vahlen, in the discussion on this chapter in his Beiträge, maintains that μίμησις may involve the idea of a poetic reconstruction of the traditional materials: 'Also die nach dem Gesetz der Wahrscheinlichkeit und Nothwendigkeit vollzogene dichterische Umbildung (μίμησις) des gegebenen, von Sage oder Geschichte überlieferten Stoffes macht den dramatischen Dichter aus' (Beitr. 1 p. 29). Such a meaning can hardly be ascribed to μίμησις (see on 1, 1447 a 16); it is rather part of the general idea of ποίησις (see on 1, 1447 b 23), which in the case of a traditional story implies a certain free handling of the materials to adapt them to the purposes of poetry (comp. 14, 1453 b 25).

κἂν ἄρα συμβῇ γενόμενα ποιεῖν, Up to this point the subject of a poem has been assumed to be always a μύθος, a fictitious story (see on 5, 1449 b 9), either invented by the poet himself (b 12, b 21) or adapted from legend. Aristotle, however, now remembers that there may be such a thing as an historical play, one with incidents taken from actual history (γενόμενα). Such incidents, he explains, are legitimate subjects for poetry, if they admit of being exhibited as probable and natural, as well as actual occurrences. It is only in this aspect, and on this condition, that they are admissible in poetry; as so many mere facts they belong to the domain of history.

κἂν ἄρα = καὶ ἐὰν ἄρα, the ἄpa implying that the supposition is not very probable (Kühner, Gr. Gr. 2. 2 p. 324).

τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων κτέ. An episodic story, as here defined, offends against the rule of unity and consecutiveness of incident laid down in chap. 8. Aristotle's theory is that in a well-constructed story every incident is wanted (8, 1451 a 32); so that a plot with irrelevant incidents violates a fundamental principle of dramatic construction. Plots of this faulty kind, he adds, are sometimes produced even by good poets through the practical exigencies of the theatre; as a play is expected to be of a certain length, if the story proves too short, it may have to be artificially lengthened out by the insertion of superfluous episodes. Tyrwhitt points to the as an instance of this: 'Fabulae ἐπεισοδιώδους luculentum satis exemplum habemus Promethea Aeschyli. Episodia enim Oceani, 284-396. et Iûs, 563-885. nec inter se, neque cum fabula principali ullam habent connexionem aut necessariam aut verisimilem Satis manifestum est et Io et Oceanum, et ipsas etiam Oceanidas, quae chorum constituunt, in id tantum sine ulla verisimilitudine induci, ut argumentum tenue in iustam Tragoediae magnitudinem extendant.' The episodic plot is mentioned here because of its resemblance to a history, since its incidents have no more necessary interconnexion than those in a chronicle. The paragraph, therefore, is a very natural sequel to the preceding discussion (b 1-32); and it is in its right place where it stands. Those who wish to find another place for it do so mainly on the ground that the text presupposes the distinction between the ἁπλοῦς and the πεπλεγμένος μῦθος explained in the next chapter. This anticipatory use of a technical term, however, is not so uncommon in Aristotle. Thus—to say nothing of his use of κάθαρσις in 6, 1449 b 28- we find him talking of περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις or ἀναγνωρισμός in 6, 1450 a 34 and 10, 1452 a 16, and giving an explanation of them afterwards in chap. 11. Besides this it has to be remembered that the expression ἁπλοῦς μύθος need not be assumed to have been an invention of Aristotle's; for it may very well have been merely adopted by him as one of the already existing terms of dramatic criticism (see infra on ἐπεισοδιώδεις, and on 6, 1449 b 33, 1450 a 34). Another difficulty was found in the text by Tyrwhitt, who proposed to remove it by reading τῶν δὲ ἄλλων μύθων, a suggestion which the Arabic Version is believed to confirm. The traditional reading τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν μύθων is supposed to restrict the fault in question to the ἁπλοῦς μύθος, whereas the same fault was no doubt quite possible in the πεπλεγμένος μύθος also. No such restriction, however, is involved in the text. All that Aristotle implies here is a distinction between the worst form of the ἁπλοῦς μύθος and the worst form of the πεπλεγμένος μύθος. The worst fault in the one is the irrelevant episode. That in the other is no doubt the ἀναγνώρισις διὰ σημείων, which is so emphatically condemned in 16, 1454 b 20 as the least artistic of Discoveries.

ἐπεισοδιώδεις. An ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is a plot in which the continuity of the action is not maintained. That the term was fairly established in this sense is shown by the metaphorical use of it in Λ 10, 1076 a 1 ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν οὐθὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα. — Ν 3, 1090 b 19 οὐκ ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ... ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγῳδία.

τὰ ἐπεισόδια for the origin of the term see on 12, 1452 b 20. In this definition of the ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος, as also in 4, 1449 a 28 and 18, 1456 a 33, ἐπεισόδιον has the technical sense given it in 12, 1452 b 20 ἐπεισόδιον δὲ μέρος ὅλον τραγῳδίας τὸ μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν, 'an episode is all that comes in in the interspace between two entire choral songs'. In other words the ἐπεισόδια together with the πρόλογος and ἔξοδος are the acted parts of the play, the 'acts', as we should say. The term, however, often has the more general meaning of an 'insertion'; a sense which takes us back to the early days of the Drama, when Tragedy was still essentially choral, and the episode, or acted part, was only a sort of interlude in the singing. There are several instances even in the Poetics of this sense of the word. In 17, 1455 b 13 the accessories worked into the story are termed 'episodes'—the process of working them in being ἐπεισοδιοῦν (v. 17, 1455 b 1; 24, 1459 b 30); and in 23, 1459 a 36 the Catalogue of the Ships is said to be one of the 'episodes' in the . The adj. ἐπεισοδιώδης in the present context involves the same notion; the ἐπεισοδιώδης μύθος is one with acts or incidents inserted into it, i. e. only loosely connected with the main course of the story.

ὑποκριτάς, κριτάς, the reading of certain of the apographs, has an air of plausibility, but it is difficult to see how the judges, whatever their weaknesses, could be responsible for the particular fault under consideration, the undue lengthening out of the story through the insertion of irrelevant episodes. The statement in the text has to be read in the light of that in 7, 1451 a 6, where Aristotle draws a distinction between the theoretical and the practical limit of length, and explains that the latter depends on conditions imposed by the public performances (πρὸς τοὺς ἀγῶνας καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν). As every play, as an acting play (comp. ἀγωνίσματα in the context), has by custom to be of a certain length, the poet, if his story proves too short, may have to spin it out (παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες) by the insertion of additional incidents, which will break the sequence of the story (διαστρέφειν τὸ ἐφεξῆς, 1452 a 1).

διὰ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, 'with a view to the actors,' may be taken as equivalent to διὰ τὴν ὑπόκρισιν, 'because the play has to be acted' (comp. Ueberweg ad loc.); the more concrete form of expression makes an antithesis to the δι' αὐτούς in 36. A much less probable interpretation of these words is that the actors are assumed to put pressure on the poet to make him provide them with parts of sufficient importance.

ἀγωνίσματα: see on 6, 1450 b 18; comp. Schol. Eurip. 88 ὦ κλεινὸν οἶκοις : ἡ τοῦ δράματος διάθεσις ἐνταῦθα ἀγωνιστικωτέρα γίνεται τὰ γὰρ τῆς Ἰοκάστης παρελκόμενά εἰσι καὶ ἕνεκα τοῦ θεάτρου ἐκτέταται (v. Trendelenburg, Gramm. gr. de arte tragica iudiciorum rel. p. 91).

παρατείναντες. The story being too short, they stretch it out, as it were, to make it fill up the time. This can only be done in two ways, either by a diffuse treatment of the incidents (comp. 26, 1462 b 2-7), or by the insertion of additional incidents not wanted for the main purpose of the story. A similar combination of a present and an aorist participle is found in 16, 1455 a 2 ἀκούων ... καὶ μνησθείς, and in 22, 1458 b 19 ποιήσαντος... μετατιθέντος.

διαστρέφειν ... τὸ ἐφεξῆς: comp. Aeschylus 1017 ἴχνος τὸ πρόσθεν οὐ διαστρέψω φρενός. The sense is that a side incident is introduced, one not in the natural course of the story—not in line with the rest.

ἀναγκάζονται. They do so because they cannot help it, not like the inferior order of poets, through their own fault (δι' αὐτούς). For another instance of ἀναγκάζεσθαι see 14, 1454 a 12.

καὶ μάλιστα. The καί emphasizes μάλιστα (comp. De sensu 3, 440 b 12; De part. an. 1. 5, 643 a 24; also Riddell, § 133). At this point Aristotle recognizes a new element of interest in Tragedy, the element of surprise, but only incidentally, in order to bring it under the canon of construction laid down in chap. 7. The φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά of Tragedy, he says, have the very greatest effect on the mind, when they come in unexpectedly, but at the same time as the natural or necessary consequence of incidents within the play itself (δι' ἄλληλα).

τὸ ... θαυμαστόν, the element of the marvellous, is recognized as a legitimate source of interest in Tragedy in 24, 1460 a 12. Teichmüller has a lengthy discussion on it ( 2 p. 282 sqq.).

οὕτως, i. e. if they come about δι' ἄλληλα, through incidents in the preceding part of the play.

ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου καὶ τῆς τύχης. Aristotle treats the two terms here as synonymous, though a distinction is drawn between them in 2. 4-6, (Bon. 780 b 33; comp. Torstrik, 9 p. 425).

ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες: 2. 8, 290 a 33 ἡ φύσις... ἔοικεν ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες ἀφελεῖν πάντα δι᾽ ὧν ἐνεδέχετο προϊέναι καθ αὐτά.

ἀνδριὰς ὁ τοῦ Μίτυος κτέ. Excerpted by the compiler of the 156, 846 a 22. The same story is told, apparently from another source, by Plutarch, 553 D καὶ τὸ Μίτυος τοῦ Ἀργείου κατὰ στάσιν ἀναιρεθέντος ἀνδριάντα χαλκοῦν ἐν ἀγορᾷ θέας οὖσης ἐμπεσεῖν τῷ κτείναντι τὸν Μίτυν καὶ ἀνελεῖν. A certain Mitys of Argos is mentioned in [Demosthenes] 59, 33 in connexion with an occurrence which took place in B.C. 374.

θεωροῦντι is usually understood to mean 'when he was looking at it' ('spectanti incidens,' Tyrwhitt; comp. Bon. 328 b 5). But as the parallel in Plutarch has θέας οὖσης, Dacier would seem to be right in translating it by 'au milieu d' une grande fête', taking it in the sense of 'being present at a θεωρία, or public spectacle'.

ὥστε see on 7, 1451 a 3.

εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν μύθων κτέ. Chap. 10 is a sequel to 9. 1452 a 1-11, and an application of its results. The real point is not in the formalistic distinction between the two kinds of μύθοι, with which it opens (12-18), but in the assertion that follows, viz. that even the complex story comes under the general canon of construction laid down in chap. 7, and that the element of surprise (the ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτεια) must be, like everything else in a play, part of the unity of the whole, the natural or necessary consequence of something before it (ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων 19).

εὐθὺς: see on 5, 1449 a 36. ὥσπερ ὥρισται, i. e. in chaps. 7-8.

περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμοῦ: see on 6, 1450 a 34. Both terms are explained in the next chapter.

ταῦτα. If any correction is wanted, αὐτά or τὰ μετ᾽ αὐτά is perhaps simpler than either τὰ ὕστερα (Gomperz) or τἀναντία (Bonitz) though this last has certainly the great advantage of supplying an easy explanation of the καθάπερ εἴρηται in 11, 1452 a 23. The objection to ταῦτα is its supposed inelegance and superfluity. It is not more inelegant, however, than the γίγνεσθαι that immediately precedes it (ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι ... ὥστε ... γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα); and its apparent superfluity is a common phenomenon with demonstratives in Greek (v. Kühner, 2. 1 p. 660).

διαφέρει γὰρ πολὺ τὸ γίγνεσθαι τάδε διὰ τάδε ἢ μετὰ τάδε. Aristotle's construction after διαφέρει is not always quite the same as that in the present passage. (1) The disjunctive is sometimes doubled: 1. 15, 1375 b 20 οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι [comp. Poet. 9, 1451 b 1; 18, 1456 a 30]. (2) It may be replaced by a καί: 1. 11, 77 a 13 τὸ δὲ μέσον οὐδὲν διαφέρει εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι λαβεῖν—or by τε καί: 18, 177 a 6 διαφέρει δὲ πλεῖστον ἐρωτώμενόν τε καὶ μὴ λύειν λόγον. (3) A clause also with εἰ may take the place of one with the infinitive: 9, 18 a 36 οὐδὲ τοῦτο διαφέρει εἴ τινες εἶπον τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἢ μὴ εἶπον.— 17, 176 a 6 οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτο διαφέρει ἢ εἰ ἤρετο κτέ. [comp. Poet. 18, 1456 a 30].

περιπέτεια, as a stage-term, seems to mean a complete change or reversal of situation within the limits of a single scene or act [v. p. 168]. Apart from the stage it has the sense of a sudden change of fortune in 1. 11, 1371 b 10, καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι [repentinae mutationes, Goulston] καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σῴζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων [scil. ἡδύ]. πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστά ταῦτα; and that of a reversal of the natural order of things in 8. 2, 590 b 13. This same idea of an unforeseen reversal of fortune is implied also in the adj. περιπετής in Herod. 8. 20 περιπετέα τε ἐποιήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα, and in Eurip. 982 περιπετεῖς ἔχεις τύχας, καὶ ξυμφορὰν τήνδ᾽ ἐσπεσοῦσ᾽ ἀμηχανεῖς. Every tragedy, according to Aristotle (7, 1451 a 13), describes a transition from happiness to misery or vice versa; but in the 'complex story' the change, however gradual it may be, seems to the hero to come upon him all at once, by a sudden reversal of the state of things; he thinks himself a happy man (let us say) at the beginning of an act, and a miserable man at the end of it. It has been argued, however, by Vahlen ( ii p. 6), and more recently by Dr. Lock ( 9, 251), that a περιπέτεια in Aristotle's sense of the term is something different from this—that it is conceived as arising when a man's actions (τῶν πραττομένων) are found to have consequences the direct opposite of what the agent meant or expected. The language in a 22-25 (v. ad loc.) hardly justifies such a very artificial interpretation of a word like περιπέτεια, which must be presumed to have been already an established and well-understood term of dramatic technique (see on 6, 1450 a 34 and comp. 10, 1452 a 15). If we refrain from putting pressure on isolated points, the general sense and connexion of ideas in Aristotle's statement is sufficiently clear. He begins by assuming (1) a working definition of περιπέτεια (ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολὴ καθάπερ εἴρηται), with an addition to remind us (2) that even an incident like this (καὶ τοῦτο δὲ) is in a well-constructed play κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, i. e. the natural or necessary consequence of antecedents in the story (10, 1452 a 18-20), as it is for instance (3) in the (a 24-26), and (4) in the (a 27-29). In the the sudden fall of Oedipus is the consequence of the revelation of his parentage (δηλώσας ὃς ἦν a 26), and the revelation of his parentage the consequence of the presence of the messenger from Corinth (ἐλθών a 25). Similarly in the the sudden change of situation—the salvation of Lynceus and death of his enemy (a 29) is the consequence of certain incidents in a previous act (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων a 28). This second instance—which seems to be added as a reminder that the περιπέτεια may be a turn for good (comp. τὸν δὲ σωθῆναι a 29) as well as a turn for evil—is too clearly described to leave any opening for any subtleties of interpretation. Aristotle's language puts before us an act or scene, which begins with Lynceus being led off for execution (ὡς ἀποθανούμενος a 27) and ends with his salvation (σωθῆναι a 29). This was the περιπέτεια—the εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή (a 22)—of the ; and as it came about according to Aristotle through incidents in the preceding portion of the play (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων a 28), it was in conformity with the great law of construction laid down in the preceding chapter and elsewhere.

καθάπερ εἴρηται may be taken (with Vahlen) as = κατὰ τοὺς εἰρημένους τρόπους, i. e. εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἢ εἰς δυστυχίαν, as was said in 7, 1451 a 13, and tacitly assumed in 6, 1450 a 3, 17. If we accept Bonitz's correction in 10, 1452 a 20, the reference will be to that passage.

καὶ τοῦτο δὲ κτέ. By omitting the stop before these words Vahlen makes them part of the definition of περιπέτεια. But it is much more natural to take them as an additional clause, like that in 10, 1452 a 18 ταῦτα δὲ δεῖ γίνεσθαι κτέ.—in which case the illustrations from the and are given as instances not of περιπέτεια in general, but of the kind of περιπέτεια which accords with Aristotelian principles of construction.

ὥσπερ λέγομεν: 'in the way we are saying', what follows being the explanation of this. The reference is to the formula at the end of chap. 10, ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίγνεσθαι ταῦτα.

τῷ Οἰδίποδι: Soph. 924. The is never mentioned in the or elsewhere in Aristotle.

ἐλθὼν κτέ. 'Bene factum est quod ipsam tragoediam adhuc superstitem habemus, nam alioqui ex Aristotelis verbis credere deberemus Nuntium eo consilio venisse ut Oedipum a metu circa matrem liberaret' (Tyrwhitt). It is to be remembered that the Messenger in the arrives in the scene (911-1085) preceding the peripety (1110-1185). Even after the announcement of the death of Polybus Oedipus is not quite freed from his old anxieties, as Merope, his supposed mother, is still living; all further disquietude on that account the Messenger seeks to allay by his assurance that Oedipus was no son of Merope but a foundling, whom he had himself received from one of the servants of Laius. This disclosure is enough for Iocasta (1056); but neither Oedipus nor the chorus has as yet any suspicion of its import. It is only in the next scene (1110-1185) that he learns the whole truth, and thus falls, all at once as it were, from happiness into misery. This is in brief the peripety in the ; and it is, as Aristotle says, the natural result of the arrival of the Messenger and his disclosure in the preceding scene. Vahlen and others point to this passage, ἐλθὼν ὡς εὐφρανῶν ... τοὐναντίον ἐποίησεν, as evidence for their contention, that a peripety is said to take place when something done by a man with a certain end in view has consequences of a directly opposite kind. If that were the meaning, the peripety in the would surely be a fact in the life of the Messenger, not the turning-point in that of Oedipus.

εὐφρανῶν: 934 sqq.

ἀπαλλάξων κτέ.: 989 sqq.

δηλώσας ὃς ἦν: 1016 sqq. It is this that leads to the examination of the Servant in the following scene, which is the immediate cause of the catastrophe.

τοὐναντίον: not the opposite of what the man intended, but the changed situation. The meaning is sufficiently shown by the use of τὸ ἐναντίον in the first line of the chapter.

Λυγκεῖ: the of Theodectes; comp. 18, 1455 b 29 and Nauck, p. 801. It is clear from Aristotle's account that it must have been a play with a 'double plot' (v. 13, 1453 a 30).

τὸν μὲν συνέβη κτέ. The construction is changed in order to show that the new situation was the result of something that had gone before it, some incident in a preceding scene (συνέβη ἐκ τῶν πεπραγμένων).

τῶν πεπραγμένων: comp. 10, 1452 a 19 ὥστε ἐκ τῶν προγεγενημένων συμβαίνειν κτέ., and 18, 1455 b 30 δέσις μὲν τά τε προπεπραγμένα καὶ ἡ τοῦ παιδίου λῆψις.

ἀναγνώρισις. Aristotle has already laid it down in 10, 1452 a 18-20 that the Discovery should arise ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου, and he does not repeat his rule in the present chapter. He assumes that in a 37 (ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου), and also later on, in chap. 16, which is a sort of appendix to this discussion (see esp. 16, 1455 a 16).

πρὸς εὐτυχίαν ... ὡρισμένων: comp. Eurip. 218 ed. Nauck ( p. 424) φεῦ φεῦ, τὸ δοῦλον ὡς ἁπανταχῇ γένος πρὸς τὴν ἐλάσσω μοῖραν ὥρισεν θεός.

περιπέτειαι. The plural is used, just as in 6, 1450 a 34, 18, 1456 a 19, 24, 1459 b 10, to denote the concrete instances of περιπέτεια, as actual incidents in plays. The formal incongruity of number in the juxtaposition of ἀναγνώρισις and περιπέτειαι in the present passage is certainly not greater than that in 9, 1451 a 3 μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων, or Thuc. 2. 4. 2 λίθοις τε καὶ κεράμῳ βαλλόντων. See also the instances quoted on 19, 1456 b 1 (μέγεθος καὶ μικρότητα).

οἵαν. Bon. 507 b 26 would restore οἵαν for οἷον in 2. 8, 1207 b 18.

οἷον (i. e. e.g.), it becomes necessary to understand περιπέτειαν after ἔχει.

ἡ ἐν τῷ Οἰδίποδι, scil. ἀναγνώρισις.

πρὸς ἄψυχα καὶ τὰ τυχόντα. The καί here means 'even', not 'and', as is often assumed by the interpreters. Aristotle distinguishes between three possible forms of Discovery, according as it relates to (1) persons, (2) things, or (3) acts or deeds. In dealing with the second form he adds that the things recognized may be even of a very casual kind, καὶ τὰ τυχόντα—thinking perhaps of objects like certain of the σημεῖα mentioned in 16, 1454 b 21 sqq.

ἔστιν ὡς ὅπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει. If we adopt Vahlen's suggestion, ἔστιν, ὅσ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει, we have to dissever τὰ τυχόντα from ἄψυχα, and take ὅσ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται συμβαίνει as an explanation of it. It is not easy to see how τὰ τυχόντα, i.e. concrete things of some sort or other, can be said to 'happen' or 'come about' (συμβαίνει) in a particular way. Spengel's reading ὅπερ εἴρηται aptly recalls the idea of ἀναγνώρισις as defined at the beginning of this paragraph, ἐξ ἀγνοίας εἰς γνῶσιν μεταβολή, ἢ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν. As this recognition of 'things' however is not a μεταβολὴ εἰς φιλίαν ἢ εἰς ἔχθραν, but at best only a means to that, Aristotle throws in the qualifying ἔστιν ὡς ('in a way', 'in a sense')—an expression that always implies some reserve or limitation; comp. 2. 5, 197 a 10 ἔστιν ὡς οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τύχης δόξειεν ἂν γίγνεσθαι.— 3. 2, 425 b 22 καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κεχρωμάτισται.— 1. 450 a 20 ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει τοῦτο?— 5. 12, 1136 b 30 καὶ ἔστιν ὡς τὰ ἄψυχα κτείνει. The construction πρὸς ἄψυχα συμβαίνει is sufficiently assured by the parallel in 7. 17, 1336 a 31 συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλίας καὶ πρὸς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων—where ταὐτὸ τοῦτο recalls a previous statement just in the same way as the ὅπερ εἴρηται in the amended text of the present passage (comp. 14 p. 45).

πέπραγε is transitive, as often in Aristotle, if our existing texts are to be trusted (comp. Bon. 632 a 17).

ἀναγνωρίσαι: see on b 5.

μάλιστα τοῦ μύθου: comp. 10, 1452 a 18 γίνεσθαι ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τοῦ μύθου. As the relationship between the parties is presupposed, the discovery of it in the course of the play is a very natural kind of incident.

μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως is explained by what follows, ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη ἀναγνώρισις κτέ.

ἢ ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον. The grammatical subject is ἀναγνώρισις, καὶ περιπέτεια being overlooked (see on 26, 1462 a 16). The Discovery will produce pity, when it synchronizes with the πάθος or anguish of the hero, as it does in the ; but may also only suggest the coming of evil, in which case it will arouse fear. It is to be remembered that pity arises through the spectacle of suffering actually present and before us; whereas fear is apprehension of evil still to come (see on 13, 1453 a 2).

ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀτυχεῖν καὶ τὸ εὐτυχεῖν κτέ. is a further reason for saying that the discovery of relationships is ἡ μάλιστα τῆς πράξεως (a 37). If the play has a happy ending, like the (a 27) or the for instance, such a Discovery will be a very natural way of bringing that about; and it is equally natural in the and other plays with an unhappy ending.

τινῶν ἐστιν ἀναγνώρισις. For the emphatic position of the indefinite pronoun comp. 13, 173 b 3 ἥ τε ὄρεξις τινὸς ὄρεξις καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τινὸς ἐπιθυμία καὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τινὸς διπλάσιον.

ἀναγνωρίσαι, scil. τίνες εἰσίν (to be supplied from the preceding δῆλος ἅτερος τίς ἐστιν), 'to reveal who they are', 'to make themselves known'—not as Tyrwhitt renders it, 'se invicem agnoscere'. The simple verb γνωρίζειν has (just like our English 'discover') two meanings, that of 'to learn' (= γιγνώσκειν) and that of 'to make known' (= γνώριμον ποιεῖν ἢ δηλοῦν). The first sense reappears in certain of the compounds (προγνωρίζειν, συγγνωρίζειν), and the second in others (διαγνωρίζειν, ἐπιγνωρίζειν). ἀναγνωρίζειν recalls both senses of γνωρίζειν, sometimes meaning 'to recognize', and sometimes 'to reveal'. (1) It means to 'recognize' in 14, 1453 b 31 ἀναγνωρίσαι τὴν φιλίαν, and (with φιλίαν or some such word understood) in 14, 1453 b 35; 1454 a 3, 6, 8. This is the sense of ἀναγνωριοῦντος also in 16, 1455 a 15—where τὸ τόξον is understood, as the context (τὸ τόξον γνώσεσθαι) will show; and of ἀναγνωρίσαι in 11, 1452 a 35 εἰ πέπραγέ τις ἢ μὴ πέπραγεν ἀναγνωρίσαι, 'utrum fecerit aliquis an non fecerit agnoscere' (Ritter). Another instance is in the passive, ἀνεγνωρίσθη ὑπὸ τῆς τροφοῦ, in 16, 1454 b 27. (2) On the other hand the word must mean 'reveal' in 16, 1454 b 32 ἀνεγνώρισεν ὅτι Ὀρέστης, 'manifestum fecit se esse Orestem' (Ritter), and in the parallel in 17, 1455 a 9, where ὅτι Ὀρέστης or some equivalent has to be understood after ἀνεγνώρισεν (comp. 17, 1455 b 21). The same sense is found in the passive in the present context (b 6), τῷ Ὀρέστῃ ἀνεγνωρίσθη, which means 'was revealed to Orestes', rather than 'was recognized' by him; and also (if I am not mistaken) in ἀνεγνωρίσθησαν in 16, 1455 a 3. A third sense has been found for ἀναγνωρίσας in 17, 1455 b 21, on which see note.

Ἰφιγένεια: comp. 16, 1454 b 32. The reference is to Eurip. 727 sqq.

τῷ Ὀρέστῃ is probably not a dative of the agent but equivalent to πρὸς τὸν Ὀρέστην.

ἐκείνου is to be taken as a genitive after the ἀναγνωρίσεως that follows in b 8 (comp. τινῶν b 3, and θατέρου a 4). For a genitive depending on a following genitive compare ἑκάστου in 18, 1456 a 6 (v. ad loc.), and Plato 534 B λόγον ἑκάστου τῆς οὐσίας [comp. Campbell, 2 p. 185].

περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστί. There is no reason to delete the preposition. The μύθος being a μίμησις πράξεως (comp. esp. 10, 1452 a 13), two parts of the μύθος (the περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις) are said to relate to certain portions of the πρᾶξις, i. e. to the kind of incidents already considered in the preceding statement (10, 1452 a 12-11, 1452 b 8). The μύθος in fact has a περιπέτεια and ἀναγνώρισις because the πρᾶξις which it represents is conceived as having them. It will be observed that the 'simple plot' of 10, 1452 a 12 is now tacitly set aside, no doubt on account of its inferior dramatic value (v. 13, 1452 b 31).

εἴρηται, 'has been already described, or explained'; comp. 25, 1460 b 24 τὸ γὰρ τέλος εἴρηται.— 2. 8, 420 b 21 τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρησεται.— 4. 7, 1127 a 18 οἱ μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην ὁμιλοῦντες εἴρηνται.

πάθος δέ ἐστὶ πρᾶξις κτέ. The term πάθος requires definition because of the variety of senses attaching to it. In ordinary language it often involves the idea of great suffering, and has the concrete sense of a great trouble or affliction of body or mind: Δ 21, 1022 b 19 πάθος λέγεται ... αἱ βλαβεραὶ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ κινήσεις, καὶ μάλιστα αἱ λυπηραὶ βλάβαι. ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη τῶν συμφορῶν καὶ λυπηρῶν πάθη λέγεται (comp. Bon. 557 a 26). The sense the present definition gives the word was probably one already established in theatrical usage (see on 6, 1450 a 34). The πάθος is, just like the ἀναγνώρισις and the περιπέτεια, one of the incidents of the play and as such part of the πρᾶξις or action. Aristotle defines it accordingly as a πρᾶξις of a certain kind, a πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά. Apart from the theatre the terms πάθος and πρᾶξις are natural opposites (comp. 1, 1447 a 28 and 5. 7, 1132 a 9).

πρᾶξις φθαρτικὴ ἢ ὀδυνηρά κτέ.: compare the enumeration of 'things piteous' (ἐλεεινά) in Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 4 ὅσα τε γὰρ τῶν λυπηρῶν καὶ ὀδυνηρῶν φθαρτικά, πάντα ἐλεεινά, καὶ ὅσα ἀναιρετικά, καὶ ὅσων ἡ τύχη αἰτία κακῶν μέγεθος ἐχόντων. ἔστι δ᾽ ὀδυνηρὰ μὲν καὶ φθαρτικὰ θάνατοι καὶ αἰκίαι σωμάτων καὶ κακώσεις καὶ γῆρας καὶ νόσοι καὶ τροφῆς ἔνδεια κτέ,

ἐν τῷ φανερῷ θάνατοι: i.e. violent deaths on the stage, before the eyes of the spectators, such as Horace condemns in A. P. 185 (comp. Tumlirz, , p. 16).

περιωδυνίαι signifies bodily agonies, as the context shows; comp. Eth. E. 1. 5, 1215 b 18 πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι ταιαῦτα τῶν ἀποβαινόντων, δι' προΐενται τὸ ζῆν, οἷον νόσους περιωδυνίας χειμῶνας.

ὅσα τοιαῦτα serves to include the less physical forms of pain. In the , which Aristotle so constantly holds up as the perfect model of a tragedy, the πάθος is the mental anguish of Oedipus (O. T. 1317 sqq.) much more than the physical horror of his self-inflicted blindness.

Bernays ( p. 167) and Bernhardy ( 2. 2 a p. 236), as well as most of the recent editors of the , agree with Ritter in rejecting chapter 12 as an interpolation. The reasons advanced by Ritter against it are threefold:—(1) that it breaks the continuity of the main discussion; (2) that it gives us a string of names and definitions of the external accidents of Tragedy, which it was not at all necessary for Aristotle's purposes to consider—'non nisi nuda nomina exhibentur, quorum descriptio non ex fine tragoediae proposito, non ex interna eius forma et constitutione, id quod deceret philosophum, sed ex habitu illius externo petitur'; (3) that the form of the conclusion, a mere repetition of the opening sentence, betrays the hand of an interpolator. These arguments, however, which are hardly so conclusive as has been supposed, ignore a good many points which have to be taken into account in the general balance of probabilities. (1) There is the mark of style; the terminology in κατὰ τὸ ποσὸν καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται κεχωρισμένα is Aristotelian, and the brevity of these clear-cut definitions can hardly be said to be un-Aristotelian. (2) Aristotle may very well be conceived to have felt that the parts κατὰ τὸ ποσόν were not only of great technical importance but also too obvious arid too recognized to be passed over in silence; and further that, as certain of them (πρόλογος and ἐπεισόδιον) had been already mentioned in the book, a short note explaining what they were might be expected. (3) Besides this, it has to be borne in mind that the very term 'parts', in the present sense of the word, had actually appeared in the definition of Tragedy in 6, 1449 b 25 ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χωρὶς ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις. In the analysis also of Tragedy in 6, 1450 a 7 ἀνάγκη οὖν πάσης τραγῳδίας μέρη εἶναι ἕξ, καθ᾽ ἃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία, the only motive for the qualifying clause καθ᾽ ἃ ποιά τις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία is to distinguish the parts under consideration from another series of parts of a different kind—the μέρη κατὰ τὸ ποσόν of the present chapter. It is clear that Aristotle was already thinking of these latter; and the clause added prepares us, as it were, for a more formal recognition of them. The doubt as to the genuineness of this chapter is often supposed to be confirmed by the difficulty of reconciling one or two of its definitions with the known facts of the Drama as seen in the works of the three great tragedians. If we look at the structure of our surviving Greek tragedies, certain of these definitions are either inadequate or untrue, 'It is not true to say that the stasimon is distinguished from the parodus by the absence of anapaests and trochaics. Anapaests are far from being universal in the parodus, while they occur not uncommonly at the beginning of stasima... and in the one of the stasima (1081-1115) is anapaestic throughout. Again, the ordinary trochaic metre is frequently found in stasima, while trochaic tetrameters are equally unknown both to the stasima and the parodi of tragedy' (Haigh, p. 356; comp. Westphal, p. 57). The question, however, on which so much ingenuity has been expended, admits of another answer if one remembers Aristotle's purpose in writing. His work is, in intention at any rate, a practical treatise, an Art of Poetry, not a record of learned research; and it was written for the benefit of the men of his own day, and with reference to the theatrical conditions of the time. Although he thinks that in certain particulars the existing practice of the stage should be reformed by a return to that of the older dramatists, the general assumption in the is the theatre as it was in the middle of the Fourth Century. One of the chief difficulties a student of the older Drama finds in this chapter is in a point relating to the Chorus. We do not know much of the economy of the later Tragedy; but one thing is fairly ascertained, that the chorus was no longer what it had been in the age of Sophocles and Euripides. Aristotle himself tells us (18, 1456 a 25) that its songs, instead of forming a more or less integral part of the play, had degenerated into mere lyrical intermezzi (ἐμβόλιμα). This, however, can hardly have been the only change it had undergone. The probability is that the dramatic dance also had been curtailed, and that, when once in its place in the orchestra, the chorus simply sang its pieces without any accompanying dance. What the comic poet Plato (fr. 130 Kock) said of the choruses of his day: ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις ὀρχοῖτ᾽ εὖ, θέαμ᾽ ἦν· νῦν δὲ δρῶσιν οὐδέν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀπόπληκτοι στάδην ἑστῶτες ὠρύονται, was presumably as true of those of Tragedy as of the rest in Aristotle's age. If it was true of Tragedy, however, the new state of things would naturally imply a new technique in the treatment of the χορικά; the so-called στάσιμα would be what their name in fact suggests, stationary songs, as opposed to the πάροδοι or entrance-songs; and there would accordingly be no place in them for verses in a metre of movement. The definition of the στάσιμον, therefore, as a μέλος ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου may not be quite so paradoxical as it seems at first sight (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64). The difficulty we find in this instance seems to be really due to the grammarians having transferred the word στάσιμον from the later to the earlier Tragedy, where the position of the 'sung parts' (as Aristotle calls them) was the same, though their structure and dramatic importance were not the same. This conclusion is confirmed by the way in which the ancients dealt with this chapter. The explanations of πάροδος, στάσιμον, etc., in the grammarians (to be seen in Westphal l. c. and elsewhere) reproduce the definitions in the text, but with modifications manifestly due to a desire to re-shape them into conformity with the actual facts of the great Drama, that of Sophocles and Euripides. 'Duodecimi capitis circumscriptio cum haud quaquam ad omnes tragoedias quadraret, pars eorum qui postea id genus tractarunt eam additis aliis notionibus amplificare, pars eam vocibus accuratius terminatis emendare, pars eam aliquo modo varietati rerum quae apud poetas obversatur adaptare studuerunt, unde haud paucae dissensiones manarunt' (L. Schmidt, p. viii). This may perhaps be taken as evidence not only for the antiquity of the definitions in this chapter (comp. Consbruch, p. 223), but also for their having made their appearance in a work of considerable authority at the time.

πρότερον: in chap. 6.

εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται: Metaph. Δ 25, 1023b 12 μέρος λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον εἰς ὃ διαιρεθείη ἂν τὸ ποσὸν ὁπωσοῦν.

ἁπάντων. The sense of this sentence seems to be rightly understood by Tyrwhitt (who is here only following Goulston): 'Atque hae quidem communes sunt tragoediarum omnium; propriae vero quarundam sunt e scena cantus et κόμμοι, sive planctus.' For the neuter ἁπάντων comp. πᾶν in 6, 1450b 13 and ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο in 18, 1456b 31. Hermann with less probability supposes χορευτῶν to be understood (comp. Haigh, p. 361). Others, understanding δραμάτων, imagine Comedy as well as Tragedy to be meant.

ταῦτα. It is not clear whether this refers to all the parts mentioned, or only to the two chorica, the πάροδος and στάσιμον. I incline to the second alternative, notwithstanding the arguments that have been urged against it (Klein, p. 5). Aristotle is thinking primarily of the parts sung; and by a very natural association of ideas he passes from the parts sung by the chorus first to the lyrical passages sung by an actor (or actors), and then to the dirges sung by an actor (or actors) and the chorus in conjunction.

τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς, the solos (μονῳδίαι), duets, and trios sung by the characters on the stage. These dramatic lyrics are recognized in Probl. 19. 15, 918b 26, and contrasted with the songs of the chorus: τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς οὐκ ἀντίστροφα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ χοροῦ ἀντίστροφα· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ὑποκριτὴς ἀγωνιστὴς καὶ μιμητής, ὁ δὲ χορὸς ἧττον μιμεῖται (see also Probl. 19. 30, 920b 8-18, 922b 16). Comp. Suidas Μονῳδία· ἡ ἀπὸ τῆς σκηνῆς ᾠδὴ ἐν τοῖς δράμασι. καὶ μονῳδεῖν τὸ θρηνεῖν, μονῳδία λέγεται ὅταν εἷς μόνος λέγῃ τὴν ᾠδὴν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοῦ ὁ χορός.

πρόλογος. The term, which appears several times in Aristophanes, is used in the sense the present definition gives it in 5, 1449b 4, and in Rhet. 3. 14, 1415 a 8 τὰ τοῦ δικανικοῦ προοίμια δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ταὐτὸ δύναται ὅπερ τῶν δραμάτων οἱ πρόλογοι καὶ τῶν ἐπῶν τὰ προοίμια .... (b18) καὶ οἱ τραγικοὶ δηλοῦσι περὶ (οὗ) τὸ δρᾶμα, κἂν μὴ εὐθὺς ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ γέ που.

ἐπεισόδιον may be compared with ἐξόδιον (from ἔξοδος); it seems to be derived from ἐπείσοδος, in the sense the word has in Sophocles, 729 ὁρῶ τιν᾿ ὑμᾶς ὀμμάτων εἰληφότας φόβον νεώρη τῆς ἐμῆς ἐπεισόδου ('my coming in upon you'). This seems to me a more probable explanation than those noted by Haigh, p. 353.

πάροδος. For the definitions of it in the grammarians see J. Aschauer, p. 5. As the negative part of the definition of στάσιμον, ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου, must be supposed to differentiate it from the parodus, it seems clear that in the view of the writer of this chapter anapaestic and trochaic passages were not out of place in the parodus. In the existing Greek tragedies, however, trochaic passages are all but unknown in the parodi, though they are common enough in Comedy: there is no instance of them in Sophocles or Euripides, and apparently only one in Aeschylus ( 155). All this points to the conclusion (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 64) that it is a later form of Tragedy that Aristotle is thinking of, and that the practice of the tragedians in this matter had changed since the time of Euripides. For the actual use of trochaics in the tragic parodi there is some faint evidence in Schol. Aristoph. 204 γέγραπται δὲ τὸ μέτρον τροχαϊκὸν πρόσφορον τῇ τῶν διωκόντων σπουδῇ. ταῦτα δὲ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν οἱ τῶν δραμάτων ποιηταὶ κωμικοὶ καὶ τραγικοί, ἐπειδὰν δρομαίως εἰσάγωσι τοὺς χορούς, ἵνα ὁ λόγος συντρέχῃ τῷ δράματι.

λέξις ὅλη. Ever since Twining's time there has been a tendency to press the meaning of λέξις, and distinguish it from μέλος (comp. K. O. Müller, 1 p. 510); it is supposed to stand for recitative, or to be a general term including recitative and song. This interpretation is hardly reconcileable with the language of the adjacent definitions. (1) The definition of the στάσιμον, as a μέλος ἄνευ ἀναπαίστου καὶ τροχαίου, presupposes the possibility of a μέλος with anapaests and trochaics; (2) the definition also of ἐπεισόδιον, as that which is μεταξὺ ὅλων χορικῶν μελῶν, will not apply to the first ἐπεισόδιον, if the parodus which precedes it is not to be regarded as a μέλος (comp. Westphal l. c. p. 58). λέξις ὅλη is to be compared with the μέρος ὅλον in the preceding definitions of πρόλογος, ἐπεισόδιον and ἔξοδος. The traditional reading λέξις ὅλου χοροῦ involves a distinction between the entire chorus and individual χορευταί, which would probably have had very little meaning in Aristotle's day, when the chorus had practically ceased to take a serious part in the action of the play.

στάσιμον. For the origin of this technical sense of the word it is usual to refer to Aristophanes 270 ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ στάντας ἐνθάδ' , ώνδρες, ᾄδοντας αὐτὸν ἐκκαλεῖν, as showing that στάσιμον meant the song sung when the chorus had taken up its position in the orchestra; and to 1280 μή, πρίν γ'᾽ ἂν ἀκούσῃς χἀτέραν στάσιν μελῶν—where the Scholiast explains στάσιν μελῶν by στάσιμον μέλος ἄδουσιν ἱστάμενοι οἱ χορευταί. The interpretation, however, of this second passage is by no means clear, as στάσις μελῶν may very well mean a set of songs, σύστημα μελῶν. The general sense of the adj. στάσιμος is without movement or action (= ἀκίνητος), and hence steady, stable, quiet. The στάσιμον, accordingly, should be the stationary song, as distinct from the πάροδος, a song of movement. This is exactly what Plato Comicus implies in his description of the chorus of his time (see above); and it is in accordance with the statements of the grammarians, e. g. that in Schol. Eurip. 202 τοῦτο τὸ μέλος στάσιμον λέγεται ὅταν γὰρ ὁ χορὸς μετὰ τὴν πάροδον λέγῃ τι μέλος πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἀνῆκον ἀκίνητος μένων, στάσιμον λέγεται τὸ ᾄσμα, and that in Schol. Soph. 216 τὸ μελιδάριον οὐκ ἔστι στάσιμον ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τὴς ἡδονῆς ὀρχοῦνται. If we may suppose that in Aristotle's time the chorus after the πάροδος stood motionless in its place in the orchestra, the songs in this part of a tragedy would be rightly termed στάσιμα; and the absence of anapaests and trochaics would be a good formal mark of distinction between them and the πάροδοι.

ἀναπαίστου: not the foot itself, but the verse or verses made up of it.

τροχαίου: trochaic verse or verses, in the same way as ἴαμβος often means an iambic verse. The reason for the exclusion of the trochaic tetrameter is that, as one of the κινητικὰ μέτρα, it has a special fitness for the dance (see on 4, 1449 a 21).

τοῖς νῦν εἰρημένοις, i. e. in the discussion in chaps. 7-11, which dealt with the μύθος in general and its unity of structure. Aristotle now turns to the question of the particular form of μύθος required to produce the emotional effect of Tragedy (pity and fear).

μὴ ἁπλῆν ἀλλὰ πεπλεγμένην: see the explanation of these terms in 10, 1452 a 12-18. The finest kind of tragedy involves a complex plot, because the element of surprise (comp. 9, 1452 a 4 and 14, 1454 a 4) in the complex plot accentuates the tragic impression (comp. 6, 1450 a 33 and 9, 1452 a 4). It may be observed, as an instance of Aristotle's inconsistency in matters of language, that in 13, 1453 a 13 the ἁπλοῦς μύθος is the opposite of the διπλοῦς, not (as here) of the πεπλεγμένος μύθος.

φοβερῶν καὶ ἐλεεινῶν εἶναι μιμητικήν: as was assumed in the definition of Tragedy (6, 1449 b 27), and again in 9, 1452 a 2 and 11, 1452 a 38. φοβερὰ καὶ ἐλεεινά (scil. πράγματα) is a comprehensive designation for the incidents distinctive of Tragedy, just as γελοῖα describes those of Comedy. A tragic scene may be either φοβερόν, alarming, suggestive of coming evil or danger to the hero, or ἐλεεινόν, piteous, a representation of his anguish and suffering. Fear (the opposite of hope) relates to the future; pity to evil or suffering actually present and before us. In Aristotle's time the definition of fear was expectation of coming evil, προσδοκία κακοῦ ( 3. 9, 1115 a 9), or προσδοκία μέλλοντος κακοῦ (Plato 198 B); or, as he puts it in 2. 5, 1382 a 21, λύπη τις ἢ ταραχὴ ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἢ λυπηροῦ. In pity on the other hand the evil or suffering, instead of being possible and prospective, is actual and before our eyes as it were: 2. 8, 1385 b 13 ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ (comp. Tumlirz, p. 15). The distinction between the φοβερά and ἐλεεινά in a play may be seen in the , in which we are gradually prepared for the piteous incidents of the catastrophe by a series of premonitions of coming evil in the earlier scenes. The sympathetic interest we are thus made to take in the fortunes of the tragic hero depends, according to Aristotle, on one condition, his being more or less like ourselves (ὅμοιος), i. e. neither exceptionally good nor exceptionally wicked. This ethical similarity is what renders fear for another possible with us, as we are told in the context, 13, 1453 a 5 φόβος περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον; and in the the same is said of pity: 2. 8, 1386 b 24 τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι ... κατὰ ἤθη. It would be easy, if it were worth while, to amplify the present statement by further illustrations from the corresponding chapters of the (2. 5 and 2. 8). The general point of view, however, in the two discussions is not the same. The pity and fear of the are the pity and fear of the judges whom the rhetor is addressing; it is part of his art to work, it may be, on their fears, and deter them from an adverse decision by showing how injurious its consequences may be to them and theirs. But the apprehension the tragic poet arouses in us is not of this personal description; it is a disinterested fear for another, the danger that arouses it being that of the hero, not that of the audience in the theatre. The point being so obvious, it is strange to see a diametrically opposite view taken by a critic of such distinction as Lessing. Aristotle's fear (he tells us) is not the fear which the impending evil of another arouses in us for that other; it is the fear that arises for ourselves from our likeness to the sufferer; it is the fear that the misfortunes, which we see hanging over him, may befall ourselves; it is the fear that we may ourselves become the pitied object ( 75). The rhetoric of Lessing's statement may perhaps conceal the underlying confusion of thought: he has confused our fear that something will happen with our recognition of the possibility that something may happen to us. This latter is the general condition of all sensibility to pity and fear; but it is not a πάθος, and cannot, therefore, be identical with either of these emotions (comp. Tumlirz l. c. p. 7; Zeller, 2. 2 p. 783). Lessing has an equally paradoxical view of the Aristotelian ἔλεος—one inspired, if I am not mistaken, by Hobbes rather than by Aristotle himself. He thinks that according to Aristotle the feeling of pity is impossible without fear for ourselves... fear is a necessary ingredient in pity ( 77); one of his modern followers even goes so far as to assert that the Aristotelian pity is only a disguised fear (eine verkappte Furcht, Döring, p. 310). This rapprochement of the two feelings is not warranted by the texts in the The logical weakness of Lessing's reasoning at times may be seen from his interpretation of 2. 5, 1382 b 26, where the enumeration of φοβερά is summed up in a brief formula, ὡς δ᾽ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐφ᾽ ἑτέρων γινόμενα ἢ μέλλοντα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν—speaking generally, one may say that all evils are fearful, which arouse pity when they befall or are about to befall others. On the strength of this Lessing tells us that with Aristotle pity necessarily involves a feeling of fear: So dachte Aristoteles von dem Mitleiden, und nur hieraus wird die wahre Ursache begreiflich, warum er in der Erklärung der Tragödie nächst dem Mitleiden, nur die einzige Furcht nannte. Nicht als ob diese Furcht hier eine besondere von dem Mitleiden unabhängige Leidenschaft sey... sondern weil, nach seiner Erklärung des Mitleids, dieses die Furcht nothwendig einschliesst; weil nichts unser Mitleid erregt, als was zugleich unsere Furcht erwecken kann ( 75). But the fact that a particular kind of evil (e. g. a painful death) is in one relation a cause of fear and in another of pity is not enough to show the substantial identity of the two feelings, or to prove that one of them includes the other. Aristotle's φοβερά ἐστιν ὅσα ἐλεεινά ἐστιν is not an analysis of the feeling of φόβος, but merely an attempt to determine the kind of facts to which it relates.. A distinction between them is implied not only in the present, but also in other passages of the ; comp. ἔλεος καὶ φόβος (6, 1449 b 27; 14, 1453 b 12), ἔλεον ἕξει ἢ φόβον (11, 1452 a 38), οὔτε ἔλεον οὔτε φόβον (scil. ἔχοι ἄν, 13, 1453 a 3), φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινόν (9, 1452 a 2; 13, 1452 b 2; 14, 1453 b 1), οὔτε ἐλεεινὸν οὔτε φοβερόν (13, 1453 a 1, 6). It will be seen from the instances just quoted that in the formula pity and fear, pity comes first, whereas in the corresponding formula φοβερά often precedes ἐλεεινά. The explanation may perhaps be this, that Aristotle (like Plato) assumes a tragedy to be a picture of human suffering (πάθος); so that the excitement of pity is its primary and essential purpose, the element of fear coming in as a sort of secondary matter, to quicken our sympathy with the tragic hero, and prepare us for a catastrophe. In a play like the , for instance, which Aristotle has so constantly in mind, the φοβερά precede the έλεεινά and lead up to them; but the great tragic interest is in the later scenes, in which Oedipus becomes an object of pity.

πρῶτον μὲν is answered by οὐδ᾽ αὐ in 1453 a 1 (comp. Plato 219 E; 935 A). The connexion between the main points in the discussion in this and the next chapter is as follows. After laying down (1) the general rule that, if a tragedy is to arouse pity and fear in us, the tragic hero must be a man of a certain type of character (13, 1452 b 34), Aristotle adds (2) that the tragic effect is enhanced by the play having an unhappy ending (13, 1453 a 12), and (3) weakened by a double plot, in which the unhappiness of certain of the personages is balanced by the happiness of others (13, 1453 a 30); and (4) that stories of horror in which kinsmen are involved have an especial tragic interest and value (14, 1453 b 14). This last leads him off (5) into a discussion on Discovery and its place in a play (14, 1453 b 26); the conclusion being (6) that, where kinsmen are concerned, the best form of tragedy is one in which a timely Discovery prevents the actual perpetration of the contemplated deed of horror (14, 1454 a 4).

ἐπιεικεῖς, the opposite of μοχθηρούς in 36; in ordinary usage ἐπιεικής is often synonymous with σπουδαῖος ἢ χρηστός (comp. 15, 1454 b 13), and opposed to φαῦλος (comp. 26, 1462 a 18) and similar terms (Bon. Ind. 271 b 36). The sense we are to attach to the term in this passage is shown by the equivalent that replaces it in 13, 1453 a 8 ἀρετῇ διαφέρων καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ. Aristotle tells us that a man of great worth and virtue is not sufficiently like ourselves (ὅμοιος) for the purposes of Tragedy, because his sufferings will create an overpowering feeling of indignation or disgust instead of pity. It is difficult to reconcile his present view with what he tells us elsewhere of the tragic hero (see on 13, 1453 a 16), or his present use of the term ἐπιεικής with that in 15, 1454 b 13. Besides this, according to the it is quite possible for one who is ἐπιεικής to be an object of pity: 2. 8, 1385 b 34 κἂν οἴωνταί τινας εἶναι τῶν ἐπιεικῶν (scil. ἐλεοῦσιν). All this may perhaps show that strict consistency of language is not always to be expected even in Aristotle.

μιαρόν: as an offence to our moral or religious feelings; comp. 14, 1453 b 39, 1454 a 3.

φιλάνθρωπον. The situation having no πάθος, actual or prospective, does not arouse any kind of tragic emotion; it does not appeal to our philanthropy, or our pity, or our fears. It is assumed here that τὸ φιλάνθρωπον has some sort of tragic value, but not the same as τὸ ἐλεεινόν or τὸ φοβερόν. τὸ φιλάνθρωπον is that which appeals to the φιλάνθρωποι. The φιλάνθρωπος, or tender-hearted man, is able to feel a certain commiseration even for the wicked in misfortune; this feeling, however, is not pity proper, since it lacks the moral basis of all pity, the belief that the misfortune is not deserved. This interpretation of τὸ φιλάνθρωπον accords with the use of the term in the context (1453 a 3; comp. 18, 1456 a 21), as well as with the ordinary Greek conception of φιλανθρωπία, fellow-feeling, kindliness, tender-heartedness (comp. L. Schmidt, 2 p. 277). A certain affinity between φιλανθρωπία and pity is recognized in 2. 13, 1390 a 19, where the tender-heartedness of the young is said to make them easily moved to pity: ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δια ταὐτὸ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν (comp. Tumlirz l. c. p. 13). A very different sense has been attached to the word by Twining and others, who suppose that the situation described as φιλάνθρωπον is one that satisfies our sense of poetical justice, a true lover of mankind being bound to rejoice at the punishment of evil-doers. Any one who remembers what φιλανθρωπία meant to a Greek, will at once see the improbability of this somewhat artificial rendering of τὸ φιλάνθρωπον in Aristotle.

μεταπίπτειν: comp. the use of μεταβάλλειν in 7, 1451 a 14 (and passim), and that of μεταβαίνειν in 18, 1455 b 27.

περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον. περί = in the case of, i. e. as we say, for; the preposition enables Aristotle to join φόβος and ἔλεος in the same construction. For this use of περί comp. 3. 9, 1115 a 22 εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας ἢ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται.—Plato 539 C ἵνα μὴ γίγνηται ὁ ἔλεος οὗτος περὶ τοὺς τριακοντούτας σοι.—Lysias 108, 39 περὶ τοὺς οὐδὲν ἔχοντας κακὸν ἐλεημονέστατοι δοκοῦντες εἶναι.

ἀνάξιον: Rhet. 2. 8, 1385 a 13 ἔστω δὴ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἢ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειεν ἂν παθεῖν ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινά, καὶ τοῦτο ὅταν πλησίον φαίνηται.

δυστυχοῦντα: for the participle see Goodwin, 829 (a). Another instance of the construction will be found in 14, 1453 b 23.

περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον. This disinterested fear, which rests, just like pity, on a basis of sympathy, is not recognized in the , where the point of view from which the emotions are considered is different (see on 13, 1452 b 32). The antithesis in the text, ὁ μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιόν ἐστιν ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, is too strongly put, since pity also is περὶ τὸν ὅμοιον, as one may see from Rhet. 2. 8, 1386 a 24 καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους ἐλεοῦσι κατὰ ἡλικίας, κατὰ ἤθη, κατὰ ἕξεις, κατὰ ἀξιώματα, κατὰ γένη.

δι᾽ ἁμαρτίαν τινά: a16 δι᾽ ἁμαρτίαν μεγάλην. ἁμαρτία in the Aristotelian sense of the term is a mistake or error of judgement (error in Lat.), and the deed done in consequence of it is an ἁμάρτημα (erratum). In the an ἁμάρτημα is said to originate not in vice or depravity but in ignorance of some material fact or circumstance: Eth. N. 5. 10, 1135 b 12 τὰ μὲν μετ᾿ ἀγνοίας ἁμαρτήματά ἐστιν ὅταν μήτε ὃν μήτε ὃ μήτε ᾧ μήτε οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπέλαβε πράξῃ· ἢ γὰρ οὐ βάλλειν ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ἢ οὐ τοῦτον ἢ οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα ᾠήθη... ὅταν μὲν οὖν παραλόγως ἡ βλάβη γένηται, ἀτύχημα, ὅταν δὲ μὴ παραλόγως ἄνευ δὲ κακίας, ἁμάρτημα (comp. Rhet. 1. 13, 1374 b 6). This ignorance, we are told in another passage, takes the deed out of the class of voluntary acts, and enables one to forgive or even pity the doer: Eth. N. 3. 2, 1110 b 31 οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία τοῦ ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ᾽ ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην), ἀλλ᾽ ἡ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη (comp. Thuc. 1. 32. 5). In thus making the tragic story turn on an ἁμαρτία Aristotle is probably thinking more immediately of the (comp. 14, 1453 b 29). It is strange that the ἁμαρτία or ἁμαρτία μεγάλη, of which Aristotle is speaking, should have been taken by Tumlirz (l. c. p. 25) and others to mean not an error of judgement, but some ethical fault or infirmity of character, like those indicated in 15, 1454 b 12. The Sophoclean Oedipus is a man of hasty temper (comp. 807), but his ἁμαρτία was not in that, but in the 'great mistake' he made, when he became unwittingly the slayer of his own father.

ἀνάγκη ἄρα κτέ. is a corollary to what has just been said on the construction of the καλλίστη τραγῳδία; two other forms of Tragedy, which had often been adopted by poets, are pronounced to be of inferior tragic quality and value.

τὸν καλῶς ἔχοντα μῦθον: comp. the expressions in the context, τὴν σύνθεσιν τῆς καλλίστης τραγῳδίας (13, 1452 b 31), and ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην καλλίστη τραγῳδία (13, 1453 a 22).

ἁπλοῦν... διπλοῦν: see on 13, 1452 b 31. The meaning of διπλοῦς in this connexion is explained later on, in * 31.

βελτίονος μᾶλλον ἢ χείρονος. No reason is given for this significant addition, but the intention of it is clear enough; it is an attempt to bring the present conception of the tragic hero as being ὅμοιος, like ourselves, of only average character and virtue, into line with that in certain other statements about him. Apart from this chapter, in fact, the general assumption in the is that the tragic hero should be not like the average man, but better than that—βελτίων ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς (2, 1448 a 4, 18; 15, 1454 b 9; comp. 25, 1460 b 34). For the purposes of the present chapter, however, which deals with the emotional effect of Tragedy and its conditions another and a somewhat different conception of the tragic hero is required; if we are to pity him and fear for him, he must be, like Oedipus and the pathetic characters in Euripides, a personage of a very human type, one like what we are ourselves. It would take some discussion to reconcile the two views, and explain away the inconsistency of language into which Aristotle has drifted.

τὸ γιγνόμενον: Meteor. 1. 14, 352 b 19 δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ γιγνόμενον. — 2. 8, 367 a 11 τεκμήριον δ᾽ ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον περὶ ταύτας τὰς νήσους. — De resp. 21, 480 a 26 μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον. — Pol. 7. 14, 1334 a 5 μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα τοῖς λόγοις. — Xenophon Hiero 9. 3 ὡς δὲ ταῦτα καλῶς ἔχει, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ γιγνόμενα (='quod vere fit, die Erfahrung': Sauppe, p. 25).

ἀπηρίθμουν: perhaps a metaphor from the counting of money, in which each coin has to be accepted and allowed to pass as good. 'ἀπαριθμεῖν nova significatione dicit... est ergo ἀπαριθμεῖν recevoir, mettre en conte, et approuver'. (Casaubon, in 1 p. 28.) In it is rendered by 'narrare', and in Liddell and Scott by 'recount'.

Ἀλκμέωνα. On this (the Attic) form of the name see s. v. and Meisterhans, p. 35. It survives in Ac in Rhet. 2. 23, 1397 b 3 and it is implied in Ἀλκμεωνίδης, the form the patronymic always has in the

Εὐριπίδῃ. Aristotle's conclusion as to the best form of Tragedy enables him to say a good word for Euripides, who had been blamed by critics for the unhappy ending of many of his plays. He insists that the procedure of Euripides is right, and points in confirmation to the eminent success of his plays on the stage, where in spite of all his faults Euripides is acknowledged to be the most moving and the most tragic of the tragedians. With this we may compare the estimate of Euripides in Quintilian 10. 1. 68 in adfectibus vero cum omnibus mirus, tum in iis qui in miseratione constant facile praecipuus. There is a long discussion of this passage by Neidhardt, 3 p. 279.