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If the senses, in which the term imitation is applied by Aristotle to Poetry, have been rightly determined in the first Dissertation, there can be no difficulty with respect to the imitative nature of the Epic and Dramatic species. That of the Dithyrambic is not quite so obvious, and has accordingly been variously explained. The little, however, that remains of what Aristotle had said upon this subject, seems sufficient to release any commentator, who is willing to be released, from the trouble of conjectural ingenuity.
In Sect. 3. Part I. where the different objects of imitation are considered, he expressly makes Dithyrambic Poetry imitative of actions, characters, and manners, as well as the Epic and Dramatic; and he, particularly, mentions the Persians and the Cyclops as imitated in the Dithyrambic and Nomic Poetry of Timotheus and Philoxenus. ὡς ΠΕΡΣΑΣ και ΚΥΚΛΩΠΑΣ Τιμοθεος και Φιλοξενος
This, as we have seen, was, in Aristotle's view, imitation, whether the form of that imitation was partly dramatic and personative, or mere recital in the person of the Poet ἐυροις δ᾽ ἂν αυτην ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΠΟΥ ἐν Διθυραμβοις
. The expression is remarkable, and leaves room for more than a conjecture, that the Dithyrambic was sometimes imitative even in the strict sense of Plato; that is, that the dramatic mixture of the Epic was occasionally admitted.
Instances of this occur in the Odes of Pindar; and many of the Odes of Horace are dramatic
After what has been said, the reader will hardly think it necessary to have recourse to so distant and conjectural an interpretation as that of the Abbé Batteux, who says—"Le Dithyrambe est imitation, parceque le Poete, en le composant, exprime d'apres le vraisemblable, les sentimens, les transports, l'ivresse, qui doit regner dans le Dithyrambe."
"qui exprime le sentiment,"
he is reduced to the necessity of making out these sentiments, or feelings, to be, in some sort, imitations; for no other reason, than, that they are assumed and feigned—the temporary produce of that voluntary enthusiasm, which the Poet, by the force of his imagination, excites in himself during the moments of composition. But this belongs rather to the style and manner, than to the matter, of Poetry: if imitation at all, it is the imitation, not, properly, of the Poet, but of the man, in order to become the Poet.—The general character of Lyric Poetry is enthusiasm; and enthusiasm, says M. Batteux, "n'est autre chose qu'un sentiment quel qu'il soit—amour, colere, joie, admiration, tristesse, &c.—produit par une idee."
All this however has, manifestly, nothing to do with the imitation that we are considering.
The Lyric Poet is not always, and essentially, an imitator, any more than the Epic. While he is merely expressing his own sentiments, in his own person, we consider him not as imitating;—we inquire not whether they are the assumed sentiments of the Poetic character, or the real sentiments of the writer himself; we do not even think of any such distinction. He is understood to imitate, in the most general view, no otherwise than by fiction, by personation, by description, or by sound;
I will only add, that the Dithyrambic Poetry was, it seems, not originally imitative, but became so by degrees. This fact, and the causes of it, we learn from a curious passage, in the Harmonic Problems of Aristotle, which I shall have occasion to mention in another place.
I have followed the old and most authentic reading, δια της ΦΩΝΗΣ
: which, though not unexceptionable, has been rejected, I think, without sufficient reason. The philosopher is, here, only illustrating what he had said of the different means of poetical and musical imitation, by comparing those arts, in this respect, with other arts more strictly and obviously imitative.
That he meant to confine his illustration to Painting, was a groundless fancy of Dacier, which led him into two unnecessary corrections of the text, and a very forced and improbable explication of the whole passage. The remark of Aristotle, parenthetically flung in, about art and habit, (δι μεν δια τεχνης, δι δε δια συνηθειας
,) was by no means necessary to his illustration. Dacier extends the parenthesis by the reading he adopts, (δι μεν δια τέχνης, οι δε δια συνηθειας, ἐτεροι δε ΔΙ' ΑΜΦΟΙΝ
,) then wonders, why Aristotle, "qui n'ecrit pas un seul mot inutilement,"
should enter into such a detail; and then, wantonly alters the text, (from δια τεχνής
, to δια ΤΥΧΗΣ
,) in order to account for it in a manner, that leaves it more wonderful than he found it.
Castelvetro had before proposed a similar alteration—ἐτεροι δε ΑΜΦΟΤΕΡΟΙΣ
; but in a sense, which, could it be supported, would be far more to the purpose than that of Dacier: φύλακες
or magistrates, they were reduced to a worse condition, with respect to happiness, than the rest of the citizens. His answer is, that the aim of his legislation was, not to provide for the superior happiness of any one part of his commonwealth, but for the greatest possible happiness of the whole. "Suppose," says Socrates, "we were painting a statue; and any one should come, and object to us, as a fault, that we did not apply the most beautiful colours to the most beautiful parts of the body that we had made the eyes, for instance, black, when we should have given them, as being the chief beauty of the human form, a purple colour. It would," continues Socrates, "be a very reasonable apology, if we should request this critic not to insist on our making the eyes so beautiful, as to have no longer the appearance of eyes; but to consider, only, whether, by giving to each part its proper colour, we should not make the whole beautiful. This is precisely the apology I make for our legislation: I request the objector, not to insist on our allotting to the guardians of the state such a happiness, as would render them any thing else rather than guardians," &c. Ωσπερ ἐν ἀντι-ες
.
That the words χρωματα
and σχηματα
are very frequently joined by the Greek writers to denote painting, is certain. But Aristotle is not here speaking of the different Arts which employ these means of imitation, but of the means themselves, separately and abstractedly. The application of these, singly, or in their various combinations, to those arts, he has left to the reader. It seems probable, (as Victorius has observed,) that Sculpture, at least, was included in Aristotle's idea of σχηματα
. Possibly, too, the word may be here used in its widest sense, of figure or form in general; which would take in the outline of Painting, the solid figure of Sculpture, and the gestures of the personal Mimic.
That, at least, the word φωνη
is right, in the old reading, appears highly probable from the frequent mention of the voice, as a principal instrument of imitation, in antient authors. It is called by Aristotle, as Mr. Winstanley has judiciously observed, παντων μιμητικωτατον των μοριων ημων
.ΓΕΝΕΙ ἑτερα
. The same reason favours also the extension of the word σχηματα
to Sculpture, at least.
The only objection to the reading, δια της φωνης
, is, the improbability that Aristotle should, without any apparent reason, envelop the whole passage in embarrassment and ambiguity, by such a change of phrase : —ΔΙΑ φωνης
; — which every reader is naturally led to join, not with the datives, χρώμασι και σχημασι
, but with ΔΙΑ τέχνης
, and ΔΙΑ συνηθειας
: but the word φωνης
opposing such a construction, has therefore, probably, been changed to άμφοιν
. This objection has not been solidly answered, I think, either by Victorius, or any other commentator; nor can I think the change of phrase here by any means sufficiently accounted for, merely by assigning, as Victorius does, a passage of Lucian, where the phrase itself, (to which no one objects,) occurs. [See Mr. Winstanley's note.]—I am much inclined, therefore, to admit the reading said by Madius to have been found in an antient MS. and confirming the conjecture of Robortelli, —ἐτεροι δε ΤΗ ΦΩΝΗ.
This would clearly mark the bounds of the parenthesis, and fix the construction : και χρωμασι, και σχήμασι, πολλα μιμενται τινες —(—) ἐτεροι δε τη φωνῃ
.
The word Συριγξ
is usually understood to mean the Fistula Panis, constructed of reeds, differing in length, fastened together with wax and thread : —καλαμων συνθηκη, λινῳ και κηρῳ συνδεθείσα
— as it is described by Jul. Pollux.
[Lib. ii. 5. 31.]
But the Συριγξ
of Aristotle, whatever it was, is here mentioned with the Lyre, and the Flute, as having some, though an inferior, degree of the same power and effect: τοιαυται την δυναμιν
. This is hardly applicable to so very simple and rude an instrument as the pipe of Pan; a contrivance not beyond the invention of a school-boy. Instruments of nearly the same construction are found, at this day, not only in Turkey, and Arabia, but even in the island of New Amsterdam in the South Seas; and it is a circumstance somewhat curious, that, in France, the instrument of the Arcadian deity, or something very like it, is degraded to the use of travelling tinkers, and known by the name of
But the passage before us is not the only one, where the Syrinx is mentioned in a way which naturally leads one to suppose, that some instrument less simple and imperfect than the fistula Panis must be meant. It is often joined with the cithara and the flute, as an instrument of some importance and effect in concerts and choral accompaniments.Περί Ορχήσεως
, it appears, among other curious information upon the subject, that the words of the drama, which the pantomimic dancer was to express by gesture alone, were, at the same time, sung by a chorus, accompanied by various instruments, among which the syrinx is repeatedly mentioned, together with the Αυλος
or flute.αυτοσχεδι
] and another, of similar form, but more artificial construction, which he describes as consisting, not of reeds, but of a number of flutes [αύλοι πολλοι
] arranged in the same manner. The passage is defective; but this seems to me pretty clearly to be the drift of it.μεν ἐν, ( . συριγές) * * * καλαμων ἔτι συνθηκη λινῳ και κηρῳ συνδεθείσα, ήγε αυτοσχεδιο. * * ΑΥΛΟΙ πύλλοις ἐκαστα κ. τ. αλλ.
—Salmasius supplied the hiatus thus:—ΑΛΛ' Η ΣΠΟΥ-ΔΑΙΟΤΕΡΑ, άυλοι πολλοι,
&c. —I would not answer for the very words; but that something equivalent is omitted, I have little doubt. See Ed. Hemst. p. 387. Note 43.-where, by the way, Kuhnius commends the emendation, but appears to misunderstand it.
By flutes, he must, at least, be supposed to mean pipes of larger size, and of more solid materials, such as those of which flutes were made. It seems, on the whole, very probable, that the syrinx of Aristotle was either some such improved construction of the flute of Pan, or, as I rather incline to believe, some kind of single pipe, or flageolet. Any single pipe, modulated by the fingers, must be regarded as an instrument far superior to any kind of the fistula Panis, that could be played on only by the clumsy expedient of drawing it along the mouth;" suprà calamos unco percurrere labro,
" as Lucretius has well described the operation.Συριγξ
, by itself, is clearly and expressly applied to a single musical pipe or flute. But such a sense is perfectly analogous to other common applications of the word; and, on the other hand, I know of no clear authority that restrains the meaning of the word, whenever it is singly used, to the fistula Panis.Συριγξ
."μονοκαλαμα Συριγξ
invented by Mercury, and opposes it to the πολυκαλαμα
; and Spanheim, whose authority, in matters of erudition, is as great as the profoundest erudition can give to any man, understands this single-reed syrinx to be meant in the hymn to Mercury attributed to Homer, where it is said of that god, that—
ΣΥΡΙΓΓΩΝ ἐνοπην ποιησατο ΤΗΛΟΘ᾽ ΑΚΟΥΣΤΗΝ.
v. 509.
—a mode of characterizing the tone of the instrument, that reminds one of the "ear-piercing fife" of Shakspeare.
After all, a modern reader may be still surprised to find any degree of imitation, or expression, attributed to so trifling an instrument as a flageolet, or a common flute. But, in reading antient authors, it is frequently necessary, if we would either relish, or even understand them, properly, to lay aside modern ideas. And if this be necessary in general, it is, perhaps, peculiarly so in the subject of Music. Expression, in our musical language, usually conveys the idea of delicate and refined performance, and is almost appropriated to emotions of the tender and pathetic kind. But, with the antients, imitation, or expression (for the words appear to have been synonymous,) extended to every kind of emotion; to every effect produced, in any considerable degree, by Music upon the mind. Now very simple instruments, as well as very simple music, are capable of making impressions, and strong impressions, of the joyous kind, without any delicacy or refinement, either in the composition, or the execution. It is not, therefore, strange, that the syrinx, a shrill and lively pipe, should be ranked by Aristotle as an instrument of some expression; especially if, as it seems probable, the syrinx, of whatever kind, was considered as a pastoral instrument, and its expressions were, in consequence, aided by the association of rural and pastoral ideas. The rude syrinx of Pan was unquestionably of this kind, and appropriated to pastoral use; and, as far as it can be supposed to have affected by association, might, in the musical language of the Greeks, and by a hearer who felt that effect from it, be considered and spoken of as imitative, without impropriety. But being, as I conceive, of too simple and inconvenient a construction to admit of any expression but what it derived purely from associated ideas, it would not, I think, have been joined by Aristotle with the most expressive and refined instruments of the antients, the cithara, and the flute, and mentioned as of "similar power and effect."
ὁι των ὀρχηστων
: but there is great reason to suspect the reading. It is generally rendered, "Some dancers:"
but Victorius, who understands it in that sense, says—durus tamen sermo
; and produces no authority for such a phrase. Heinsius
ΠΟΛΛΟΙ των ὀρχησων
. The learned reader may, perhaps, agree with me, that—ΕΝΙοι των όρχησων
, would be preferable, as nearer to the text. It is not probable, that the degree of imitative skill here described was possessed by all dancers, or even by "the greater part"
of them. A passage from Aristocles is preserved by Athenæus, in which Telestes, a dancer employed by Æschylus, is mentioned as remarkable for this talent:—ΟΥΤΩΣ ΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΙΤΗΣ, ωστε, εν τω ορχεισθαι τες Επτα επι Θηβας, φανερα ποιεισθαι τα πραγματα δι ορχησεως.
κατα του ΣΕΒΑΣΤΟΝ μαλιστα τι μεν γαρ πρωται εκειναι [. ορχυσεις] ωσπερ τινες ριζαι και θεμελιοι της Ορχησεως ησαν.
—Lucian. de Salt. p. 927. Ed. Bened.
De Spectaculis
, immediately after that, De militaribus institutis
; and gives this reason: [Lib. ii. 4.]
scenica portenta
were the Pantomimes.
Aristotle says here, δια των σχηματιζομενων ῥυθμων
. It seems, at first view, that the inverse of this expression would have been more accurate—δια των ρυθμιζομενων σχηματων
—by rhythmic gestures. And, if he had been here considering the imitation of Dance, separately, and in itself, he probably would have expressed himself in that way. But dancing is here transiently mentioned,
ρυθμα δε ΚΑΘ' ΑΥΤΟΝ μεν [νοειται] επι ΨΙΛΗΣ ΟΡΧΗΣΕΩΣ.
The whole passage, where he is considering melody, rhythm, and words, in their separate use, and in their various combinations, is curious, and may serve to illustrate this part of Aristotle's treatise. See p. 31, 32. Ed. Meib.
σχηματα
) as the principal means of the imitation, would not have suited his purpose. It would, also, as Victorius and others have observed, have tended to confound the means of imitation in the poetic and musical arts, which he is here considering, with those means of a different kind, which he had just enumerated, as employed in arts of more obvious and strict imitation, and among which ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ
were mentioned.
It has been also objected, that Aristotle is, here, professedly instancing εν ταις ΕΙΡΗΜΕΝΑΙΣ τεχναις
—in the arts "above-mentioned"
and yet introduces Dancing, which had not been mentioned: a difficulty easily overcome, if we consider, that Dancing was among the musical arts; closely connected with Poetry, and, above all, with Tragedy.
In my translation of this perplexing passage, as far as the words—ποιοιτο την μιμησιν
—inclusively, I have given that sense which is now generally adopted, and in which almost all the
The passage sets out with an expression most unfortunately ambiguous, and demonstrated to be so, by the very confidence with which the ambiguity has been denied, by critics and commentators of great learning and sagacity, in favour of interpretations directly opposite to each other. Some, by the expression, λογοις ψιλοις
, have understood Aristotle to mean prose, and others, verse, without music.
—But this is far from being all the difficulty with which a translator has to struggle in this passage. In the words—ἐιθ ἐνι τινι γενει ΧΡΩΜΕΝΗ των μετρων τυγχανεσα ΜΕΧΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΥΝ
—there is, surely, something defective. All render this, "or, making use of some one kind of metre, AS IT HAS DONE to this day."
"Aut uno aliquo metrorum genere usa fit, quod à priscis temporibus ad nostrum usque factitatum est."
"Ou qu'elle se contente d'une seule espece, comme elle l'a fait jusq' à present."
"Per quello che si vede fare fino ai tempi d'oggi."
It is so rendered, I find, by the English translator of 1775; "either intermixing the various metres, or, using one particular sort to this very day."
"vel uno tantum
in plain English—"whether mixing different metres together, or using some one kind of metre to this day."
I am perfectly aware of the elliptical genius of the Greek language in general, and of Aristotle's style, in particular; yet to my ears, I confess, this English, nonsensical as it is, does not sound more strange than the Greek from which it is taken. Some word, or words, must, I should suppose, have been omitted between τυγχανεσα
, and, μέχρι
.
Again:—οὐδεν γαρ ἂν ἐχοιμεν ΟΝΟΜΑΣΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΟΝ τες Σωφρονος και Ξεναρχε μιμες, &c.
—I submit it to those who are versed in the Greek language, whether it seems probable, that, if Aristotle had meant to express the sense usually given to the words, (i. e. "for we should otherwise have no common name to give to,"
&c.) he would have expressed it in that Greek? I can only say that I know of no similar example. But farther: the words are conditional—οὐδεν γαρ ΑΝ ἐχοιμεν
—and yet the condition is by no means clearly pointed out. The sense may be, and has been, variously supplied. It seems not improbable, that there is some omission between the words, νυν
, and οὐδεν
.—I am not able entirely to repel a suspicion—for I give it as nothing more—that the words, μεχρι τε νων
, may belong to this sentence, and the whole may originally have stood thus:—ἐιτε μιγνυσα μετ᾿ ἀλληλων, ἐιθ ἐνι τινι γενα χρωμενη των μετρων τυγχανεσα. Μέχρι ΓΑΡ τε νων οὐδεν ΕΧΟΜΕΝ, &c.
i. e. "For we have hitherto no common appellation,"
&c.
γαρ
, and omitted αν
, for which omission there is MS. authority.
So much, as to the condition of the text in this passage. The interpretation, which I have followed, has been very ably defended by several of the commentators, whose arguments I need not repeat; by none, I think, so powerfully as by Paolo Beni: but it requires considerable patience to follow him through the controversial zigzag of his captious and fatiguing logic.
The strongest support furnished by Aristotle himself to this extension of the term Ποιητης
, or Maker, rather of his fable, than of his verse, has the same aspect. The same idea is also favoured by the extent which he has actually given to the term
An Epic Poem without elevation is, nearly, as repugnant to modern ideas as a Poem without verse. It would not appear much more strange to give the title of Epic Poem to
It may be worth remarking, farther, that there is one circumstance, which, I think, would evidently tend to render this doctrine of Aristotle—if it was his doctrine—less extraordinary to the ancients, than it appears to us; and that is, that the difference between metre, and well-measured prose, though, no doubt, sufficient to make them readily distinguished by the ear, seems to have been less than it is with us. To what a degree of refinement they carried their rules for the application of the various poetical feet to their prose compositions, and with what fastidious delicacy of ear they discriminated one combination of syllables from another, is well known from the writings of Cicero, Quintilian, Dion. Halicarnassensis, &c. It would be thought a strange expression, were a modern writer to say, comparing the Orator and the Poet, that the latter was "rather more confined by numbers:"
"numeris adstrictior paulo."
"at liberior aliquanto oratio."
—To the same purpose ibid. "Nam etiam Poetæ quæstionem attulerunt, quidnam esset illud quo ipsi differrent ab oratoribus. Numero maximè videbantur antea, et versu; nunc apud oratores jam ipse numerus increbuit."
"Itaque video visum esse nonnullis, Platonis & Democriti locutionem, etsi absit à versu, tamen, quòd incitatiùs feratur, et clarissimis verborum luminibus utatur, potius POEMA putandum quam comicorum Poetarum, apud quos, nisi quod versiculi sunt, nihil est aliud quotidiani dissimile sermonis."
But, after all, the chief point of difficulty appears to me to lie, not in Aristotle's asserting, that Poetry, in his idea of the word, might subsist without verse, but in his giving the name of
In my translation of the words, λογοις ψιλοις
, I have ventured to depart from the common interpretation; but without any material change in the sense. They are generally understood to mean prose; and Dacier asserts positively, that, "those two words are never joined by Aristotle or Plato in any other sense."
If he meant, that, wherever ψιλο
is joined to λογο
, it is always used to exclude metre only, he is certainly mistaken. He had, himself, but just before, quoted a passage of Plato, in which the expression, λόγοι ψίλοι
, appears clearly to mean, words without melody. It is in his second book De Legibus, where, complaining, in his usual strain, of the separation of Poetry and Music, he says of the Poets, that they employ ῥυθμον μεν και ῥηματα Μέλες χωρις, ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ΨΙΛΟΥΣ ΕΙΣ ΜΕΤΡΑ ΤΙΘΕΝΤΕΣ: μέλος δ'αν και ῥυθμες άνευ ῥηματων, ψιλη κιθαρισει τε και αυλησει προσχρωμενοι
.
σχηματα
to ρηματα
; a correction, which, I think, the learned reader will see to be obviously necessary, from the purport and expression of the whole passage. The opposition is clear—ρυθμον μεν και ΡΗΜΑΤΑ μέλες χωρις - μελθ δ' ΑΥ και ρυθμες άνευ ΡΗΜΑΤΩΝ
, Ed. Serr. vol. ii. p. 669.
λογες ψιλες ἐις μετρα τιθεντες
, Dacier translates, very strangely, "mettant de la simple prose en vers."
But what has turning prose into verse to
ψιλοι
, here, applied to λογοι
, answers evidently to μελες χωρις
, and excludes melody; just as, in ψιλη κιθαρίσει και άυλησει
, the same adjective answers to άνευ ῥηματων
, and excludes words. And this appears to me to be the obvious sense of ψιλοις
in the passage of Aristotle before us. By λόγοις ψίλοις
, I understand—not, words without metre, i. e. Prose—but, words without music.
λόγος ψιλες
. — This is not the only instance in Plato that contradicts the assertion of Dacier. In a passage of his άνευ όργανων, ψιλοις λογοις
are, I think, rightly rendered by "Sine ullis instrumentis, assâ tantùm simplicique voce."
ψιλος
, here, to the two means of imitation, melody and rhythm; which are excluded in the ψιλομετρια
, in the next chapter. The only difference is, that there he has joined the word ψιλά
to metre; here, to words in general. But in both places, the meaning is probably the same—i. e. "without melody and rhythm."
The word λογος
is, plainly, used by Aristotle, in his first enumeration of the means of imitation, [ἐν Ρυθμῳ και Λογῳ και Αρμονια
. cap. i.] in the general sense, of language, discourse, or words, whether with, or without metre; as we say, "the words of a song,"
&c. as opposed to the music
" —numeros memini, si VERBA tenerem."
Ecl. ix.λογά
was purposely used by Aristotle in this latitude, is rendered highly probable by his varying the expression, where he
Μετρῳ
, for Λογῳ
.
ρυθμῳ, και μέλει, και ΜΕΤΡΩΙ.
Μετροις
—"or verse."
And why?—Probably, because he thought his expression would be neither clear, nor exact, without it: not clear, because the most usual meaning of λογοι ψιλοι
being prose, it might have been so taken here, and he might have appeared to say, at least, though no one could reasonably suppose he meant it, that the Epic imitates by prose only—μονον τοις λόγοις ψιλοις
—not exact, because, metre being, as he himself expressly says, a species, or part, of rhythm,
τα γαρ μέτρα, ότι ΜΟΡΙΑ των ρυθμων ἐσι, φανερον.
ψιλοι
, that is, χωρις Αρμονίας και ΡΥΘΜΟΥ
. And this is exactly conformable to the expression of Plato in the passage above quoted, where he considers verse, even unaccompanied by music, as still consisting of rhythm and words, [ΡΥΘΜΟΝ μεν και ῥηματα Μέλεις χωρις;
]—plainly regarding metre as a species, or form, of rhythm.
I understand, therefore, the meaning of Aristotle, in this expression—τοις λόγοις ψιλοις, ή τοις μετροις
, to amount to this;—"by words, without the other means of melody and rhythm, or at most, with so much of rhythm only, as is implied in the idea of metre without rhythm, in its musical sense of strict time."
This sense of the words agrees perfectly with what follows—οὐδεν γαρ ἂν ἐχοιμεν
, &c. i. e. "For otherwise—if we do not allow the Epopœia to imitate by words, in the general sense, whether prose or verse—we shall have no common name for
The great advantage of this sense of λόγοις ψιλοις
is, that, while it leaves in full force that explanation of the whole passage, which I have followed, it removes, at the same time, or at least considerably weakens, what has always struck me as one of the strongest objections to it. Nothing appears to me more improbable, than, that Aristotle, advancing a doctrine so new, and so repugnant to the prevailing ideas of his own times, as, that a species of Poetry might subsist without verse, should chuse to present this novelty in the most offensive way, by beginning at once, and without any management, with the mention of prose: that he should say—"The Epic Poem imitates by prose alone, or, by verse."
If by λόγοις ψιλοις
he had meant prose, as Dacier and others contend, would he not naturally—one might say, unavoidably—have reserved those words for the last in the period? Would not the order, in short, have been this?—"by verse alone; and that either of a single kind, or mixed—or even by prose."
As I have rendered the words, prose is not mentioned at all, but implied only in the general expression of, words; as it is, equally, in his first enumeration of the means of imitation—ἐν ῥυθμῳ και ΛΟΓΩΙ και άρμονια
. At the worst, the idea of prose is not, as in the other version, presented before that of verse.
With respect to what I have said of the novelty of the philosopher's doctrine, and its remoteness from the common ideas of the ancients concerning the importance of metre to Poetry, I may refer even to his own way of speaking, in general, upon that subject. In his Rhetoric, for example, he says—ῥυθμον δει ἐχειν του λογον, Μετρον δε, μη ΠΟΙΗΜΑ ΓΑΡ ΕΣΤΑΙ.
—"In prose-composition there should be rhythm, but not metre: for then it will be a POEM."
ἔοικε [ . τα των Ποιητων, γυμνωθεντα γε των της μεσικής ΧΡΩΜΑΤΩΝ, ἀντα ἐφ άντων λεγομενα,] τοις των ΩΡΑΙΩΝ προσώποις, ΚΑΛΩΝ ΔΕ ΜΗ, όια γινεται ἴδειν, όταν αυται το ΑΝΘΟΣ προλιπη.
"versification is to Poetry, what bloom is to the human countenance."
He says, that versification is to Poetry, what bloom is to a face, that has no beauty but bloom.
"the Devil's wine."
It must be confessed, however, that he has poured a great deal of this wine into his own writings; and were they to be reduced to plain prose, and stripped of that άνθος
—that bloom and colouring of poetic diction, and poetic fancy, by which they are so distinguished, I should be in some pain for the appearance they would make.
But, to return:—After all that is to be said in favour of that interpretation, which, on the whole, I have thought it best to follow, I must end this note, as I began it, by declaring my conviction of the imperfect condition of the original, and confessing my doubt, whether the true meaning of Aristotle, in this passage, has yet been, or ever will be, discovered.
HAD Aristotle proposed only to extend the term "les Dialogues ne ressemblent-ils pas plutot au Poeme Dramatique, qu' au Poeme Epique?"
—An embarrassing question, and which, being at all events to be answered, he answers immediately, and roundly—"Non, sans doute."
And why? Because, says he, "the drama imitates by words and music, the Epic Poem, by words only."
But, to apply the expression of the philosopher to this critic—πλεξας ἐυ, λυει κακως
.
ἡδυσματα
of Poetic language.
λέγω δε ΗΔΥΣΜΕΝΟΝ λόγον, τον ἐχοντα ῥύθμον και άρμονιαν και ΜΕΤΡΟΝ.
ἡδυσματα
, or seasonings, of Tragedy;
μεγισον των ήδυσματων.
Oψις
, or Decoration, which he pronounces to be, of all the parts, "the most foreign to the Poet's art :"
ήκιστα δικειον της ποιητικης
.
ἐν δε τη Εποποϊία, δια το ΔΙΗΓΗΣΙΝ ειναι,
&c. and ibid. διηγηματική μιμησις,
is equivalent to ἡ Εποποιητική μιμησις,
It still remains, I confess, no inconsiderable difficulty with me, to conceive, that Aristotle should, by applying the term ἡ Εποποιία;
as if no other application of the word had been mentioned.
Of the MIMES of SOPHRON we can acquire but a very imperfect idea, either from what is said of them in ancient authors, or from the fragments that are preserved in Athenæus, Demetrius, and others. It has even been long disputed among the learned, whether they were prose or verse; and, at last, it seems to be settled, that they were neither; a kind of compromise comfortable enough to the disputants on both sides; for if the fragments are something between verse and prose, they, who assert them to be either, are something between right and wrong. I shall not enter into this discussion; but refer the reader to the remarks of the learned Πότερα των ζώων, κ. το αλ . 1792.
"une imitation composée de narration
But he produces no proof of this, nor do I know of any. I must farther observe, that, supposing what is related, of the fondness of Plato for the Mimes of Sophron, and of their having been his model in the μιμησις προσωπων
of his own dialogues, to be true, it may reasonably be inferred, that we ought by no means to confound them with the Roman Mimes, or to apply to them, as is too often done, all that is said of the latter by Diomedes, and other writers of that age. Such licentious and obscene trash would not, surely, have been found under the pillow of the moral and reforming Plato; and that, όλοῳ ἐπι γηρα ἐδῳ,
and, as some assert, even in the hour of death.
"Sophron, mimorum quidem scriptor, sed quem Plato adeo probavit, ut suppositos capiti libros ejus, cum moreretur, habuisse tradatur."
Συρακουσίαι, ή Αδωνιαζουσαι.
The Syracusian women, or, the women at the festival of Adonis.Παρέπλασε δε ποιηματιον ἐκ των παρα Σωφρονι θεωμένων τα Ισθμια.
Of the ΛΟΓΟΙ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΙΚΟΙ
, by which, undoubtedly, Aristotle meant chiefly, if not solely, the DIALOGUES of PLATO, I shall only observe, that they have all, in a high degree, the dramatic and imitative spirit, and that by far the greater part of them are in the unmixed dramatic form, so as to admit of representation;
Συναπτοντες τῳ μετρῳ το ποιειν.
—Not, "on applique au vers seul l'idée qu'on a de la Poesie,"
as "congiugnendo il verbo, Ποιειν, [Poiein, cio é fare,] con la qualità del metro."
I understand Aristotle's expression to mean, not the connection of the general idea of Poetry with that of Verse, though this indeed be implied; but, the junction of the word, ποιειν
, with the name of some particular metre, in the compound words, Ελεγειοποιοι
, Εποποιοι
, and the like.
Two Poems of Empedocles—that concerning Nature, and his Expiations—contained together, according to Diog. Laertius, five thousand hexameters, and another, on the subject of Medicine, six hundred.—τα μεν ἐν περι ΦΥΣΕΩΣ αυτῳ και δι Καθαρμοι, ἐἰς ἐπη τεινεσι πεντακισχίλια, ὁ δε ΙΑΤΡΙΚΟΣ λογώ, ἐἰς ἑπη ἑξακοσια
φυσικον
, for μεσικον
.
The earliest philosophy was natural philosophy, and the earliest vehicle of that philosophy was verse. Orpheus, Hesiod, Parmenides, Xenophanes, Empedocles, and Thales, are all mentioned by Plutarch as poet-philosophers of this kind. Pythagoras is said to have written a Poem Περι των αισθητων και νοητων
part of which is quoted by Diog. Laertius in his life of Plato. It was written in the Trochaic tetrameter, a very unphilosophical measure, if rightly characterized by Aristotle, who gives it the epithets of τροχερον ὀρκησικον ΚΟΡΔΑΚΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ
.
κορδακικωτερον
, cannot be adequately translated. "A jiggish measure,"
would be weak, to the force of the original. The "he will even dance the
Κοpδαξ
, sober, and without a mask.""Jolly mortals, fill your glasses,"
&c.
In his book "that Empedocles resembled Homer in the beauty of his DICTION; abounding in metaphors, and making a happy use of the other embellishments of Poetic language."
-- εν δε του Περι Ποιητων φησιν [Αρισοτελης] ότι και ΟΜΗΡΙΚΟΣ ὁ Εμπεδοκλής, και δεινθ περί την ΦΡΑΣΙΝ γέγονε, μεταφορικό τε ών, και τοις άλλοις τους περι ποιητικην ἐπιτευγμασι χρωμεν.
The conjecture of ἐκ ήδη και ποιητην προσαγορευτεον
—should be read interrogatively, I have re-
"If Poets are to be denominated from their metre, what name is to be given to him, who writes a Poem in all sorts of metre? You cannot call him an
—But the answer to this would surely be obvious: Εποποιον
, an Ιαμβοποιον
, &c. Is he, therefore, not to be called a Poet at all, because you cannot call him the Poet, or Maker, of this or that particular metre?""We cannot, it is true, call him any one of these, exclusively; we call him all these; he is the Poet of every metre, in which he composes; and, in our ideas, the more a Poet, in proportion to the number of the different measures, of which he shews himself a master."
—I must also remark, that, in this way of understanding the passage, the word, ὁμοἰως
, is not accounted for, nor fairly rendered, I think, either in the version of
I have, also, rejected the reading of ΟΥ ποιοιτο την μιμησιν
; because it appears to me, that the phrase will not admit of the sense, in which it is rendered, of not imitating at all. It is observed by ποιεισθαι την μιμησιν
, is never used by Aristotle as equivalent to μιμείσθαι
only, but always where he is speaking of the means, or manner, by, or in, which, the imitation is made. Thus, ch. i.—ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ την μιμησιν ΕΝ ΡΥΘΜΩΙ και ΛΟΓΩΙ και ΑΡΜΟΝΙΑΙ.
—Again—ΔΙΑ ΤΡΙΜΕΤΡΩΝ κ. τ. αλ. ΠΟΙΟΙΤΟ την μιμησιν.
And, at the end, EN ΟΙΣ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ την μιμησιν
—"the different means, by which they form or execute their imitation."
Thus, too, ch. xxiv. ἐι γαρ τις ΕΝ ΑΛΛΩΙ ΤΙΝΙ ΜΕΤΡΩΙ διηγηματικην μιμησιν ΠΟΙΟΙTO.
—ch. vi. EN ΤΟΥΤΟΙΣ [sc. μελοποιίᾳ και λεξει] ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ την μίμησιν.
So ibid. with a participle—ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΕΣ ΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΑΙ την μιμησιν
—as in the passage before us, άπαντα τα μετρα ΜΙΓΝΥΩΝ ΠΟΙΟΙΤΟ την μιμησιν.
—The construction and the sense are the same, when the same mode of expression is applied to other subjects; as, cap. iv.—τας μαθησεις ΠΟΙΕΙΤΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΜΙΜΗΣΕΩΣ
—And, ΔΙΑ ΤΩΝ ΚΟΙΝΩΝ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ τας πίστις και τες λόγες
i. e. "to argue through the medium of common and popular truths."
—I do not know of any instance, in which ποιείσθαι την μιμησιν
is used in any other way, or put simply for μιμείσθαι
. I cannot, for example, conceive, that Aristotle, instead of, το τε γαρ ΜΙΜΕΙΣΘΑΙ συμφυτον τοις ἀνθρωποις,
(cap. iv.) would have written—το τε γαρ ΠΟΙΕΙΣΘΑΙ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ συμφυτον, &c.
It appears to me, that, whether the phrase be used positively, or negatively, some imitation is equally implied, and this sentence—τις άπαντα τα μετρα μιγνύων ΟΥ ποιοιτο ΤΗΝ μιμησιν
—I should by no means think it accurate to translate—"If any one, mixing all sorts of metre, should not imitate;"
but, (to construe literally for the sake of clearness,) "if any one should not make THE, (or, which is the same thing, HIS) imitation by mixing all sorts of metre."
This, I confess, appears clearly to me to be the fair English of that Greek; but as this certainly cannot be the meaning of Aristotle here, I must abandon the reading which gives it, and content myself with following that explanation, which is encumbered with the fewest difficulties.
"Similiter verò etiam fi quis omnia metrorum genera uno in opere permifcens, imitationem inftituerit, (quemadmodum Chæremon, &c.) non ftatim Poetæ titulo, ob carmen, fed ob imitationem, infigniendus."
See also ὁμοιως
, has thus its proper force. So has, ἐκ ΗΔΗ, ΚΑΙ ποιητην προσαγορευτεον.
As if Aristotle had said—"Such a writer we might, certainly, on the first glance, call, a versifier—a metre-maker—
I must, however, be again permitted to declare my doubt, as to the integrity of the text.
ἐποποιον
, ἐλεγειοποιον
, &c. but we should not immediately (ΚΑΙ ποιητην προσαγορευτεον
.”
From some curious fragments of this Poet preserved, or, rather, half-preserved, in Athenæus, his genius appears to have been of a gay and voluptuous cast, and to have delighted in minute description of pleasurable objects. In the lines quoted by Athenæus from his Tragedy of ἀκριβης ώσπερ λογογραφος
; and of that class of Poets, whom he calls ἀναγνωστικοι
; that is, whose productions, as we commonly express it, read better than they act; are more adapted to the closet, than to the stage.
The ancient Poets, both Greek and Roman, were often, I believe, indebted, for their descriptive ideas, to Painting, or Sculpture. This passage of Chæremon is certainly very picturesque, and was, probably, suggested by some painting on the same subject. ἐπικαταφορῶ ἐπι τα άνθη
δραμα πολυμετρον
, we must understand, that even the dialogue was in various metres; for in the choral parts this would have been no innovation.
Polygnotus and Pauson are also mentioned by Aristotle in his 8th book De Rep. cap. v. where, speaking of Painting with a view to education, he says, that "young men should not be permitted to contemplate the works of PAUSON, but those only of POLYGNOTUS, and of other artists who excelled in moral expression."
Δει μη τα ΠΑΥΣΩΝΟΣ θεωρειν της νεως, άλλα τα ΠΟΛΥΓΝΩΤΟΥ, και ἐι τις ἄλλο των γραφεων των ἀγαλματοποιων ἐτιν ἡθικΘ.
"licentious and indecent paintings or statues,"
such as would endanger the morals of youth: but the exception that follows is curious;—"Unless,"
he adds, "in the temples of some DEITIES OF THAT CHARACTER, whose legal and established worship consists in ludicrous and wanton rites."
μηθεν μητε άγαλμα μητε γραφην είναι ΤΟΙΟΥΤΩΝ ΠΡΑΞΕΩΝ ΜΙΜΗΣΙΝ· ἐν με σταρα τισι ΘΕΟΙΣ ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΙΣ, όις και των τωθασμον ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ νομ
While I am upon this subject, I cannot forbear adding a singular passage of Euripides, where Hippolytus, vindicating himself, and asserting his chastity, says, with a naïveté that, I fear, would hardly be received with decent gravity by a modern audience;—
Λεχους γαρ, ἐις τοδ᾽ ἡμερας, ἁγνον δεμας.
Ουκ οἰδα ΠΡΑΞΙΝ ΤΗΝΔΕ, πλην λόγῳ κλύων,
ΓΡΑΦΗΙ ΤΕ ΛΕΥΣΣΩΝ· οὐδε ταυτα γαρ σκοπειν
Προθυμα ειμι, ΠΑΡΘΕΝΟΝ ΨΥΧΗΝ ἐχων
The Pauson mentioned by Aristotle was probably the same painter, whose poverty only is recorded by Suidas, and of whose wit we have a curious specimen in Ælian.
"Παυτων πτωχοτερα,"
was proverbial.
OF DIONYSIUs, too, very little is known. That he excelled in natural representation and exact resemblance—in exhibiting men, such as he saw them, without ideal grace on the one hand, or exaggerated deformity on the other is known, I believe, only from this passage of Aristotle. Dacier says this account is confirmed by Ælian; but I think he is mistaken. It appears to me, that the μεγεθα
of which Ælian speaks, as the only difference between the paintings of Polygnotus and those of Dionysius, is literal, not figurative, magnitude.
μεν Πολυγνατία ἐγραφε τα μεγάλα, και ἐν τους ΤΕΛΕΙΟΙΣ ειργάζετο τα άλλα τα δε το
Διονυσίες, ΠΛΗΝ ΤΟΥ ΜΕΓΕΘΟΥΣ, την τα Πολύγιωτα τέχνην ἐμιμείτο εις την ἀκριβειαv, παθθ,
και ήθθ, και σχηματων χρησιν, ίματίων λεπτοτητας, και τα λοιπά.
μεγεθ
, it would, I think, be sufficiently fixed by what follows—ἐν ΤΕΛΕΙΟΙΣ
. i. e. justâ staturâ
, as rightly rendered by "visoit a la perfection,"
is nothing to the purpose.
ἐἰς ἀκριβειαν
, the expre-
"The painter has no other means of giving an idea of the dignity of the mind, but by that external appearance which grandeur of thought does generally, though not always, impress on the countenance; and by that correspondence of figure to sentiment and situation, which all men wish, but cannot command."
It seems, therefore, doubtful, whether Aristotle and Ælian speak of the same person. There must, in all probability, have been more painters than one, of that name; which was so common, that the writers so called, alone, furnished ίσχυν ἐχοντα και τονον
,] but in a manner which appeared forced and laboured, [εκβεβιασμενον
,] and which he opposes to the freedom and facility of Nicomachus, who seems to have been the "Nec fuit alius in eâ arte velocior."
—
What Aristotle says of these three styles of picturesque imitation, is easily applied to modern times. The productions, indeed, of these ancient artists, were perishable and of short duration;—At "genus immortale manet:"
these specific characters have subsisted, and probably will subsist, in every period of the art. For the name of Polygnotus, it is obvious enough to substitute that of RAPHAEL, or other masters of the higher Italian schools. "When a man,"
says "When a man enters into that awful gallery at Hampton-court,
βελτιονας καθ ἡμας
of Aristotle. "Michael Angelo,"
says the same author, "no where saw such living figures as he cut in marble."
—The Flemish and Dutch schools will supply plenty of substitutes for the Dionysii of ancient painting—those, who, like Protogenes, "in picturâ verum esse, non verisimile, volunt."
"took his figures too much from the people before him."
As for the Pausons, the buffoons of the art, they are to be seen in the windows of every print-shop. We must not, however, confound with these "Tom Browns of the mob,"
as των ΦΑΥΛΩΝ
. His "worse than they are"
—XEΙΡΟΥΣ ἐκαζε
. And if any man can look at this
Thus PLATO, in the very language of Aristotle,—τα περι της ρυθμες και πασαν μεσικην ἐσι τροπων μιμηματα ΒΕΛΤΙΟΝΩΝ και ΧΕΙΡΟΝΩΝ ΑΝΘΡΩΠΩΝ
. A modern reader, that is, a person who reads an antient author with modern ideas, might be inclined to to ask, how men are to be represented as better, or worse, than they are, or how, indeed, represented at all, in a harpsichord lesson, or a solo for a German flute? But the same reader, supposing him in any degree conversant with music, would surely be at no loss to conceive, that it admits of the difference of serious and comic expression; and admits of it in various degrees, from the highest elevation and dignity of style, down to the coarse and vulgar jollity of the gavot, or the hornpipe. Now the meaning of Aristotle, put into modern musical language, amounts, I apprehend, to no more than that. Suppose, then, the music, in these different styles, to be accompanied by words, relating the actions, or imitating the speech, of low, or elevated characters; we might say, that the music was expressive of such actions, or characters; the antients would have said, that it imitated them. On the contrary, suppose this music merely instrumental, we should, in general, only say, that it was grand, and sublime, or comic, mean, vulgar, &c. But the antients, from the close, and almost inseparable connection of
It may be worth while to remark, that the character Aristotle gives of the diction of Cleophon—that it was of the common and familiar kind, without Poetic elevation
The only Poet of this name, of whom, I believe, any account is given, is recorded as a Tragic PoetCLEOPHON
. He gives the names of some of his Tragedies.Marδροβαλῳ
, read, ΜανθρΑθελει
.ἐπι Μανδραβέλε χωρει το πραγμα
("worse and worse, like the affairs of Mandrabulus"—
)
See "Carmen ingeniosum, et leporis ac venustatis plenissimum."
The first three lines may serve as a specimen:—
Δείπνα μοι ἐννεπε, Μεσα, πολυτροφα και μάλα πολλα
Ανδρα μοι ἐννεπε, Μέσα, πολύτροπον, ὡς μάλα πολλα
. Ηλθον γαρ κακεισε, πολυς δε μοι ἐσπετο λαθ
. Τῳ δ' αρα τεσσερακοντα μελαιναι ΧΥΤΡΑΙ ἑποντος.
Τῳ δ αρα τεσσερακοντα μέλαιναι νηες ἐποντο
.
Μητε συ τονδ , ἀγαθα περ ἐων, ἀποαιρεο ΚΟΥΡΗΝ,
Μητε συ, ΠΗΛΕΙΔΗ.
ΠΗΛΟΣ
, mud, or clay; and, probably, to the trade of the speaker, in the word κερην
; or, perhaps, to the instrument of his art, which we may suppose the actor of the Parody to have brandished at his adversary.—But I do not mean to take to myself the honour of this illustration of an Attic joke. It is to be found in the Poetics of J. C. Scaliger.—See
The conjecture of την ΔΕΙλιαδα
, (which might be rendered, The Poltroniad
,) was certainly ingenious, but, I think, unnecessary. Κρητες
, Λάκωνες
, Λημνιαι
.—See
The expression, in this passage, is too general, and too little is known of the examples mentioned in it, to admit of perfect satisfaction, with respect to any thing farther than its general meaning; i. e. that both Dithyrambic and Nomic Poetry admitted the same differences in the objects of their imitation. For so, I think, the sense requires us to understand"Hoc differre Nomos à Dithyrambis, quod illis personas graves, his leves imitarentur."
p. 273.
The construction of the Greek I understand to be this:—μιμησαιτο ἂν τις, ὡς Τιμοθεού και Φιλοξενο [sc. ἐμιμησαντο] Περσας και Κυκλωπας
. I am astonished, that any commentators should have taken either of the compositions here mentioned for dramas; an idea totally repugnant to the plain sense of the whole passage, and to the evident purpose for which these examples are cited. With respect to the Περσαι
, the passage of Pausanias may be regarded as decisive;—Πυλαδε ἀδοντο Τιμόθεει ΝΟΜΟΝ, τε Μιλησία, ΠΕΡΣΑΣ
μελος
—a term appropriated to Lyric Poetry.—του ΚΥΚΛΩΠΑ ἐργασατο, των ἑαυτε ΜΕΛΩΝ το καλλισον
.
I mentioned, in the conclusion of NOTE 1. a problem of Aristotle, from which it appears, that the Dithyrambic Poetry was not originally imitative, but became so by degrees. It is the 15th of the Harmonic Problems, Sect. 19. It is there said, that the Dithyrambs, after they became imitative, laid aside the antistrophical form, (i. e. the division into corresponding stanzasΑντισροφΘ-ΙΣΗ, ΟΜΟΙΑ
. ἐπειδαν μιμητικοι ἐγενοντο, ἐκετι ἔχωσιν ἀντιτροφες, προτερον δε ἐιχχον
.ἐλευθερο
] who could not sing in the style of artists, and professors: [ἀγωνιστικως οἶδειν
:] the words were, therefore, set to the simplest kind of melody,Διὸ ἀπλοτερα ἐποιωντο αυτοις τα μέλη δε ἀντιτροφο ἀπλεν· ἀριθμθ γαρ ἐτι και ἐνι μετρειται
: i. e. (if I understand it rightly,) it consists of a number of parts that have one common measure.τη μιμησει ήκολέθει ΑΕΙ ΕΤΕΡΑ γινόμενα
.ἀγωνισαι
, or masters of the art, who contended with each other in trials of skill, and who were, of course, to exert all their imitative powers. The symmetry of strophe and antistrophe, and the simplicity of air regularly repeated, were ill adapted to this purpose, which required length, variety, and frequent changes of metre, melody, rhythm, mode, genus, &c."ἀγωνισωνῶν ἤδη μιμείσθαι δύναμενων και διατείνεσθαι, ἡ ώδη ἐγίνετο μακρα και πολυείδης."
καθαπερ ἐν τα ΡΗΜΑΤΑ, και τα ΜΕΛΗ τη μιμησει ήκολέθει, ἀει ἐτερα γινομενα
. — He adds, μάλλον γαρ του μέλει άναγκη μιμείσθαι ή τοις ρημασι
—by which, I suppose, he means, that in this union of poetical and musical imitation in the Nomes, the musical imitation was considered as the principal and most essential object."for, in the time of the old Poets,"
he says, "the Dithyrambic ode was an orderly and regular composition."
παρα γε τοις ἀρχαιοις ΤΕΤΑΓΜΕΝΟΣ ΗΝ Ο ΔΙΘΥΡΑΜΒΟΣ
. What he means by τεταγμεν
is sufficiently explained in the first paragraph of the same section.
Plutarch, too, in the Dialogue Περι Μεσικης, speaks exactly the same language. Timotheus and Philoxenus are there repeatedly stigmatized as corrupters of the good old music; and the ладаρειο
and Σιμονίδειο τροπο
, is opposed to the Φιλοξενεις
,
The manner, in which Aristotle, in this Problem, speaks of the Nomes, when compared with his expressions relative to the Dithyrambics, rather leads one to suppose, that the former were not, even originally, composed in the antistrophic formΔια τι οι μεν Νομοι ἐκ ἐν ἀντισροφοις ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝΤΟ —and, οι Νόμοι άγωνιεων ΗΣΑΝ
.
I will just add, that this Problem of Aristotle throws light upon a passage in his Rhetoric, which has embarrassed his commentators. He there [lib. iii. cap. 9.] compares the diction that is divided into periods, to the Antistrophic Odes "of the old Poets:"
but, the λεξις ειρομενη
, in which the sentence has no other unity than that which copulatives give itτου συνδεσμῳ μιαν
.ἡ οὐδεν ἐχει τελθε καθ' άντην, ἂν μη το πράγμα λεγόμενον τέλεια θα
. The periodic diction, as opposed to this, he calls ἐναναπνευς
. [§ 3-]-Ille rudis, inconditè fundit quantum patel, et id quod dicit SPIRITU, non ARTE, determinat.
"illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens"
αναβολαι
in Dithyrambic Poetry; meaning, I think, evidently, the long, irregular, protracted Odes of the more modern Dithyrambic Poets; such as those, of which he speaks in the Problem. For the word, Αναβολη
, here, does not, I believe, signify exordium, proæmium, as usually understood, but was, probably, the name by which these ὠδαι μακραι και πολυειδεις
It may safely be pronounced, that the original here, either is not as Aristotle left it, or, was carelessly and ambiguously written. As the ambiguity, however, does not affect the general sense of the passage, it is scarcely worth while to engage in a minute discussion of the comparative merits of the two different constructions, which have been adopted by different commentators and translators. The learned reader knows, or may see, what has been said on both sides. I have preferred that construction, which has always appeared to me to result most obviously and naturally from the words of the original.—ἐν τοις αυτοις, και τα αυτα μιμεισθαι ἐσιν, ότε μεν ΑΠΑΓΓΕΛΛΟΝΤΑ ( ἑτερον τι γιγνομενον, ώσπερ Ομηρου ποιει, ὡς τον αυτον, και μη μεταβαλλοντα,) η παντας ὡς ΠΡΑΤΤΟΝΤΑΣ και ἐνεργεντας τις μιμεμένες
.
In the other, and most usual way of taking this passage, the mixture of mere narration, and dramatic imitation, in the Epic species, is expressed by the words, ότε μεν ἀπαγγελλοντα, ἕτερον τε γιγνομενον
. But it seems not likely, that Aristotle would thus oppose the word ἀπαγγελλοντα
, to ἕτερον τε γιγνομενον
; because the term, ἀπαγγελια
, is constantly applied by him, throughout the treatise, to the narrative species in general: it is opposed, not to the dramatic part of the Epic, but to the drama itself. Απαγγελια
and διηγησις
, are used by him as synonymous terms, and are both applied to the whole of the Homeric, or dramatic, Epic Poem.και & δὲ ΑΠΑΓΓΕΛΙΑΣ
. So, ch. xxiii, and xxiv. passim.ΕΤΕΡΟΝ τι γιγνομενου
—seem evidently opposed to ὡς ΤΟΝ ΑΥΤΟΝ και μη μεταβαλλοντα
, and should, therefore, be joined with them, not with ἀπαγγελλοντα
.—Lastly, in this way of understanding the passage, Aristotle divides the different manners of imitation, as he might naturally be expected to divide them, into those which characterize the two great and principal species, of which he means to treat—the NARRATIVE and the DRAMATIC. The two different modes of the former, i, e. the pure narrative, and the dramatic narrative, are, with more propriety than in the other construction, (in bis view of the subject, at least,) flung into a subdivision.
In either construction, however, Aristotle agrees with Plato in enumerating three kinds of Poetry, the purely dramatic, the purely narrative, and the mixed.
I was glad to find myself supported here by the judgment of the accurate In UN MODO, per via di narratione, e questo, ò ponendo se steslo alle volte il Poeta in persona d'altri, come få Homero, over conservando sempre la propria persona non mutata mai. Nel ALTRO MODO poi, introducendo persone à trattare et negotiare, come se le stesse persone che sono imitate, fuffero.
With respect to the imitation here expressly allowed by Aristotle to subsist even in mere narration, without the intermixture of any thing dramatic, see Diff. I. p. 26. I agree perfectly with
Gr. Σπουδαιοι
, and its opposite, Φαυλος
, are words of considerable latitude. They, each of them, comprehend a number of different, though related, ideas, for which we have not, that I know of, any common word. Propriety itself, therefore, requires of a translator that, which, at first view, seems contrary to propriety—that he should render each of those words differently in different places. To have translated σπεδαίες
here, "good,"
or "virtuous,"
as it may generally be translated, would only have been giving an English word with a Greek idea, which none but readers of Greek would have affixed to it.
The Greeks appear to have applied the word, ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ
, to whatever was, on any account, ἀξιων σπεδης
—whatever was respectable, important, admirable, serious, valuable, &c. as opposed to ΦΑΥΛΟΝ
, which was applied, not to vice only, but to whatever was contemptible, trifling, light, ordinary, ridiculous—or, as we say in familiar English, good for nothing.
Εναρετο
, but by ΣΟΦΟΣ
, and ΕΥΔΟΚΙΜΟΣ
. See also the article, Φαυλα
. Φαυλού
, not only the general word, Kax
, but, ΕΥΤΕΛΗΣ
, ΑΠΛΟΥΣ
, ΚΑΤΑΓΕΛΑΣΤΟΣ
. And φαυλον, το κακον, και το ευτελες, και το μικρον, και ΟΥΔΑΜΙΝΟΝ
—Angl. "good for nothing."
μετρίας και ΦΑΥΛΑΣ λάβων πλήγας
—"no bad blows."
σπεδαίο
may be rendered by "good;"
sometimes by "serious, earnest,"
&c.—Sometimes, as in this passage, and in the definition of Tragedy, by "elevated,"
"important,"
&c.les gens les plus considerables
. persone grave:—attione grave et magnifica
. honestos
, præstantes
, &c.
Some kind of virtue, in the extended sense given to the word ΑΡΕΤΗ
by the ancient writers on morals, was, indeed, always implied in the epithet Σπεδαι
; but it included such good qualities, and endowments, as we do not usually call virtues; or, at least, such as we never include in our idea of a virtuous man: as, wisdom, courage, eloquence, &c.το δε ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΝ είναι, εστι το ΤΑΣ ΑΡΕΤΑΣ ἐχειν
."all laudable habits."
—των ἐξεων τας ΕΠΑΙΝΕΤΑΣ, ΑΡΕΤΑΣ λεγομεν
."Virtus autem, quæ est per se ipsa laudabilis,"
&c.
The subject of Criticism is necessarily connected, in some degree, with that of Ethics; and unless we understand well the moral language of any writer, we cannot be competent judges of his criticism.
Ποιεμενοι τα ὀνοματα σημειον
.—The participle, ποιεμενοι
, should be applied, I think, to all the Dorians—not confined, as in Dacier's translation, to those of Peloponnesus. See
Aristotle begins by saying expressly, that the Dorians, in general, laid claim to both Tragedy and Comedy, on account of the term ΔΡΑΜΑ
, which was a Doric word:—∆ΙΟ
(i. e. from the term Δραματα
, just before mentioned,) ἀντιποιενται της τε Τραγωδίας και της Κωμωδίας ΟΙ ΔΩΡΙΕΙΣ
—He then mentions the peculiar claims of the Megarians to Comedy, and of the Dorians of Peloponnesus
ποιεμένοι
, to shew, how these people concurred in arguing from the etymology of the words themselves; all of them, from the word δραμα
, as it was common to Tragedy and Comedy, and they, who laid claim to Comedy, both from that, and also from the derivation of the word Κωμωδια
.
The construction, in this way, is, I confess, somewhat parenthetical and embarrassed; but the reader, who is accustomed to the style of Aristotle, will not, I believe, consider this as affording alone any sufficient presumption against the explanation here given.
Θηρίων τε μορφας των ΑΤΙΜΟΤΑΤΩΝ
.—This reading is strongly supported by the arguments of Victorius, the authority of MSS, and the sense and purport of the passage itself, which seems to require instances of mean, or disgusting, rather than of terrible, objects. Thus too Plutarch, in the passages referred to by Victorius, which undoubtedly allude to this of Aristotle.—Γεγραμμένην ΣΑΥΡΑΝ η ΠΙΘΗΚΟΝ, ἰδοντες ήδομεθα και θαυμαζομεν, ουχ ὡς καλον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ὁμοιον ἐσιᾳ γαρ ἐ δυναται καλον γενέσθαι ΤΟ ΑΙΣΧΡΟΝ
κ. τ. αλ. And presently after—και ΝΟΣΩΔΗ μεν ΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ, και ΥΠΟΥΛΟΝ,
ὡς ἀτερπες θεαμα, φευγομεν
κ. τ. αλ.—See also his
To the same purpose, in his "Επει δε το ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ τε ήδυ, και το θαυμάζειν, και τα τοιαυτα, ἀναγκη ήδεα ειναι, το τε μεμιμημενον, ώσπερ ΓΡΑΦΙΚΗ, και ΑΝΔΡΙΑΝΤΟΠΟΙΪΑ, και ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗ, και παν ὁ ἀν ἐυ μεμιμημενον , καν μη ή ήδὺ το μιμημα γαρ ἐπι τετῳ χαιρει, άλλα συλλογισμού ἐστι, ὅτι ΤΟΥΤΟ ΕΚΕΙΝΟ· ώστε ΜΑΝΘΑΝΕΙΝ τι συμβαινει."
το τε ΜΙΜΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ
: otherwise, μεμιμημενον
must here be taken actively, which, though not unusual, is in this place, I think, improbable, because the same participle immediately follows, in the passive sense."And as it is by nature delightful to LEARN, to ADMIRE, and the like, hence we necessarily receive pleasure from imitative arts, as PAINTING, SCULPTURE, and POETRY, and from whatever is well imitated, even though the original may be disagreeable; for our pleasure does not arise from the beauty of the thing itself, but from the inference the discovery, that 'THIS IS THAT,' &c. so that we seem to LEARN something."
—Μανθανειν
to learn, to know, i. e. merely to recognize, discover, &c. See "Aristotle tells us, that imitation pleases because it affords matter for a rea-
"Methinkes this translating,"
says Don Quixote, "is just like looking upon the wrong side of arras hangings; that although the pictures be seene, yet they are full of thred-ends, that darken them, and they are not seene with the plainnesse and smoothnesse as on the other side."
soner to enquire into the truth or falsehood of imitation,"
&c."Dacier's late excellent translation of Aristotle,"
in the Paral. between Poet. and Paint, just before the passage above quoted.συλλογίζεσθαι
is no more than that rapid, habitual, and imperceptible act of the mind, that "raisonnement aussi prompt que le coup d'œil,"
(as it is well paraphrased by
The fullest illustration of this passage is to be found in another work of Aristotle, his μαθησις ΤΑΧEIA
—the exercise of our understandings in discovering the meaning, by a quick and easy perception of some quality or qualities common to the thing expressed, and the thing intended—to a mirror, for example, and to the theatre, when the latter is is called metaphorically, "The mirror of human life."
In the ὅτι ἡδυ το μανθανειν
. i. e. to say, this is such a tune, or song, &c. And indeed the pleasure afforded by recognition, is no where, perhaps, more visibly illustrated, than in the raptures and rhythmical agitation of a popular
I must add, as somewhat amusing, that Plato makes use of this principle to prove a dog to be a philosophical animal: "for, (he argues,)
το φιλομαθες και φιλοσοφον, τ'αυτον
, the love of knowing, and the love of wisdom, are one and the same thing. Now dogs are delighted with knowing, simply, and disinterestedly; they fawn upon every one whom they know, and bark at the approach of every stranger;ἐχεινΘ
"This is he."
Ον μεν ίδη ΑΓΝΩΤΑ, χαλεπαίνει, οὐδεν δη κακον προτιεπονθως· ὃν δ'αν ΓΝΩΡΙΜΟΝ, ἀσπαζεται, καν μηδεν πωποτε ὑπ' άντε ἀγαθον πεπονθοι. Άλλα μην κομψον γε φαίνεται το παθθ άντε της φύσεως, και ΩΣ ΑΛΗΘΩΣ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΟΝ
...
The philosophy of Aristotle here, though undoubtedly true, as far as it goes, will, I am afraid, to those who examine it, hardly appear to be perfectly satisfactory, or to reach the bottom of the subject. It is however to be considered, that what he has said, seems applicable chiefly to rude and unskilful spectators, and should, perhaps, be considered as a description of the effect of a picture or a statue upon children, and the multitude, who are little accustomed to view works of imitative art. And even with respect to them, the principle seems scarcely applicable but to portraits, and individual resemblances, such as may not be instantly recognized. When we look at a picture of that kind, we may not discover, till after a comparison of, at least, a few moments, that it is an imitation of this or that person; but, that it is an imitation of a man, we see at once and where there is not even a momentary ignorance, or doubt, I do not see how any information can be said to be acquired by the spectator, nor how, on the philosopher's
I say, on Aristotle's own principles, because, in the passage above referred to, where he explains himself more fully in applying the principle to metaphor, he expressly allows, that this pleasure of recognition, is not afforded by proper or common words, since they instantly suggest their meaning and cannot be mistaken.τα δε κυρία ΙΣΜΕΝ
.—"The Stagirite having told us what a natural pleasure we derive from INFORMATION, and having told us that, in the subject of words, exotic words want that pleasure from being obscure, and common words from being too well known,"
adds, &c. ἐν γαλαξι και σπαργάνοις
—according to the quaint expression of Τέτο βας - Εκεινο ἱππο - Τέτο δενδρου
.
Among Aristotle's illustrations of this physical principle of the pleasure of self-information, as it might be called, there are two short passages, in particular, which seem to be so explicit with regard to the nature of that pleasure, that I will venture to add to the length of this note by a transcript and translation of them both. They will, I think, satisfy the learned reader that I have not, in the foregoing remarks, misrepresented the philosopher's meaning. After having applied the principle to metaphor, he applies it in like manner to the enthymemes, or arguments, of the orator.
"Διο ἐτε τα ἐπιπολαια των ἐνθυμηματων ευδοκιμει (ἐπιπολαια γαρ λέγομεν τα παντι δηλα, και ῾Α ΜΗΔΕΝ ΔΕΙ ΖΗΤΗΣΑΙ·) ἐτε όσα ειρημενα ἀγνοκμενα ἐστι᾿ ἀλλ᾿ ὅσων, ἡ ἁμα λεγομενων ἡ γνωσις γινεται, και ει μη προτερον ὑπηρχεν, μικρον ύστερίζει ἡ διανοια γίνεται γαρ ῾ΟΙΟΝ ΜΑΘΗΣΙΣ· ἐκεινως δε, οὐδετερον."
οὐδετερον
i. e. neither while we hear them, nor as soon as we have heard them.
"For the same reason, we are pleased, neither with superficial arguments, (by which we mean such as are obvious to every one, and require no thought or search in the hearer;) nor with such as we do not understand when we have heard them; but, with those, which the mind apprehends, either while we hear them, (though not at first,) or in the moment after they are delivered:—for by these, we, in a manner, LEARN something: by the others, we learn nothing in either of these ways."
The other passage, in which the nature of the pleasure that Aristotle means is still more expressly marked, is this:
"Παντων δε των συλλογισμων θορυβειται μαλιστα τα τοιαυτα όσα ἀρχομενα ΠΡΟΟΡΩΣΙ, μη τῳ ἐπιπολης ἐἶναι ἁμα γαρ και ΑΥΤΟΙ ΕΦ ΕΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΧΑΙΡΟΥΣΙ προαισθανομενοι και ὅσων τοσετον ὑστεριζεσιν, ὡσθ άμα ειρημενων γνωρίζειν."
"Of all arguments, those are most applauded
θορυβειν
is used, sometimes for the uproar of approbation, and sometimes for that of dislike.
Επι βραχυ
:—literally, "for a short time."
AS PLATO, κατα βραχυ
, for a moment—en passant
. Quoi qu'ils ne soient pas tous egalement propres à apprendre,
—is, surely, wide of Aristotle's purpose. None of the versions, that I have seen, seem to give the exact idea, except that of "Quamquam minor BREVIORQUE ad hos perveniat voluptas."
Δια την ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΝ
—"neatness"—"finishing,"
&c. In the following passages of PLATO, it is opposed to a slight sketch:—και αυτων τετων [sc. δικαιοσυνης, σωφροσυνης, &c.] ἐχ ΥΠΟΓΡΑΦΗΝ δει, ώσπερ νυν θεασασθαι, άλλα την τελεωτάτην ΑΠΕΡΓΑΣΙΑΝ μη παριέναι
ἀπεργαζεσθαι
, is opposed to ὑπογραφειν
.
Μορια
—parts. The following passage will ascertain the sense of the word in this place, and justify my version. Explaining the
Mep
was used, Aristotle says, ἔτι, εις το διαιρεθειη ἀν, ἄνευ τε Ποσε, και ταυτα ΜΟΡΙΑ λεγεται τετε διο τα ΕΙΔΗ, το ΓΕΝΟΥΣ φασιν είναι ΜΟΡΙΑ
.—τε Αισχρε ἐστι το Γελοιον ΜΟΡΙΟΝ
—"a part, or species, of the ridiculous."
It is obvious to remark here, that Aristotle, in this deduction of the art from the mimetic and musical instincts, includes verse in his idea of Poetry, which he, at least, considered as imperfect without it. All that he drops, elsewhere, to the disparagement of metre, must be understood only comparatively... An eminent writer has adjusted this matter... in his "the origin and first application of Poetry among all nations,"
will furnish the best comment I can give, upon the passage which is the subject of this note.
"Poetry is every where of the most early growth, preceding every other sort of composition; and being destined for the ear, that is, to be either sung, or at least recited, it adapts itself, even in its first rude essays, to that sense of measure, and proportion in sounds, which is so natural to us. The hearer's attention is the sooner gained by this means, his entertainment quickened, and his admiration of the performer's art excited. Men are ambi-
tious of pleasing, and ingenious in refining upon what they observe will please. So that musical cadences and harmonious sounds, which nature dictated, are farther softened and improved by art, till Poetry become as ravishing to the ear, as the images, it presents, are to the imagination. In process of time, what was at first the extemporaneous production of genius or passion, under the conduct of a natural ear, becomes the labour of the closet, and is conducted by artificial rules; yet still, with a secret reference to the sense of hearing, and to that acceptation which melodious sounds meet with in the recital of expressive words."
The scraps that have been preserved of this Poem, the Μεσαων θεράπων και ἐκηβολε Απολλωνα,
ΤΟΝΔ᾽ ἐτ᾿ ἀν σκαπτηρα θεοι θεσαν, ἐτ᾿ ἀροτηρα,
Ουτ᾿ ἄλλως τι σοφον πασης δ ήμαρτανε τέχνης.
Πολλ᾿ ἡπιστατο ἐργα, κακως δ ήπιστατο παντα.
Whenever Aristotle speaks of COMEDY
, we must remember, that he speaks of the Old, or Middle Comedy, which was no other than what we should call farce, and to which his definition of Comedy was adapted: μιμησις φαυλοτέρων
; that is, as he explains himself, "an imitation of RIDICULOUS characters."
A Poem, which, as far we can form any idea of it, celebrated the blunders and absurdities of an idiot, cannot well be conceived to have been analogous to any thing, that would now be denominated a Comedy. It seems to verge to the very bottom of the dramatic scale; "jusq' au bouffon; celui-ci sera l'extrême de la Comedie, le
plus bas degré de l'echelle, opposé au terrible qui est à l'autre bout."
Ὅσον ἐγινετο φανερον αυτης
—literally, "so much of it as was manifest."
I doubt of the reading: but, taking it as it stands, I have given what appears to me to offer itself as the most natural and simple meaning of the expression, if not the only one that it will reasonably bear.
The words are, ΤΑ το χορό
. Aristotle would hardly have expressed himself thus, had he meant, as ΤΑ τε χορε
, the choral part, is opposed to ΤΑ άπο σκηνης
, the dialogue, συνεστειλε τες χορός, ΑΠΟΤΑΔΗΝ ΟΝΤΑΣ
: "he contracted the chorusses, which were immoderately long."
This is confirmed by one of Aristotle's Problems, referred to by Victorius. The Problem is, Δια τι οι περι Φρυνίχον ἦσαν μαλλον μελοποιοι
; (meaning, I suppose, more Musicians than the dramatic Poets of his own time:) The answer is, ή, δια το πολλαπλασια είναι τοτε τα μέλη ἐν ταις των μετρων τραγωδίαις
;πολλ. είναι τοτε τα μέλη των μέτρων ἐν τ. Τ.
Perhaps, too, we should read, των ΤΡΙΜΕΤΡΩΝ
. But, even taking it as it stands, it may sufficiently answer our purpose, as it shews clearly enough how much the Lyric parts of Tragedy, before the time of Æschylus, wanted contraction.
The prolixity of the Tragic Chorus, we know, was sometimes trying to the patience of an Athenian audience. This is pleasantly glanced at by Aristophanes in his "found themselves hungry, and were tired with the Tragic Chorus, they might fly home and eat their dinners, and fly back again, when the Chorus was over."
ΧΟΡ. Ουδεν ἐς᾿ ἀμεινον, ἐδ᾽ ἡδιον, φυσαι πτερα.
Αυτιχ, ύμων των θεατων ἐι τις ὴν ὑποπτερο,
Ειτα, πανων, τοις χοροισι των Τραγῳδων ήχθετο,
Εκπετομενοι ἐν ἑτα ἠρισησεν, ἐλθων ὀικαδε,
Κατ᾿ ἀν, ἐμπλησθεις, ἐφ ἡμας ἀυθις κατεπτατο.
—Και τον λογον πρωταγωνισην παρεσκευασε.
Victorius, and others, have supposed Aristotle to mean the Prologue. But it seems to be
πρωταγωνισην
, used as merely synonymous to πρωτο
; as signifying first only, not principal. Nor is it easy to discover any reason, why Aristotle should have recourse here to an unusual and ambiguous expression, when, presently after, in speaking of the improvements of Comedy [cap. v.], he makes use of the proper and established term, προλογ
. There seem to be no words in the Greek language, of which the sense is more clearly fixed, than that of πρωταγωνισης—πρωταγωνιζειν
. They occur frequently, and always, as far as I know, in the same sense, of principal—primas agere
, &c. To this sense, therefore, I thought it necessary to adhere.
But I confess I cannot be satisfied with either of the explanations which have been given of the word ΛΟΓΟΣ
. It appears strange to say, that Æschylus first introduced two actors, and then to add, as a distinct improvement, that he also first introduced a principal part or character:—unless we are to understand, what seems not very probable, that the two actors even of Æschylus himself were, at first, personages of equal dignity and importance in the drama... and that, afterwards, he was the first who corrected this error... and reduced the drama to unity of action by a proper subordination of characters. But, admitting this sense to be without difficulty, the expression of it, I think, is not. Λόγος
, for a part in the drama, role, personnage
, (as
The difficulties which attend both the expression and the sense, in each of these interpretations, have almost convinced me, that the very construction of the words has been mistaken; and that the meaning is, "he made the discourse, or dialogue, the principal part of Tragedy."
This is well connected with what precedes, and agreeable to the known history of the Tragic drama, in which, originally, the Chorus was the essential, and the Episodes, or dra-
"abridged the Chorus, and made the Episodic part the principal."
Λόγος
, here, may well be understood to mean what Aristotle elsewhere calls λεξις
; the speaking, or recitative, part of Tragedy, whether delivered by one or more actors, as opposed to the μέλη
, or Lyric part.Παρεσκευασε
, reddidit, effecit
, &c. as... ευσεβεστερες τε και σωφρονεςέρες της συνοντας παρεσκευασεν
"magis pios et temperatos reddidit."
ὅταν ἡ ἐλεεινα δεινα δεη παρασκευαζαν.
i. e. to make things piteous, terrible, &c. as in "Quando occorre d'havere à far parere le cose, à miserabili, atroci,"
&c.πρωταγωνισης
as an adjective be an objection, it is one to which the other explanations are equally liable. On the whole, I have not scrupled to prefer this sense in my version.
To adjust exactly the rival claims of Æschylus and Sophocles with respect to the oψις
, or decoration, of the Tragic stage, would be a desperate undertaking. Some accounts are so liberal to Æschylus, as scarce to leave his successors any room for farther improvements. They give him "paintings, machinery, altars, tombs, trumpets, ghosts, and furies:"
—to which others add a very sin-
"exhibition of drunken men."
—την δε σκηνην ἐκοσμησε, και την όψιν των θεωμενων κατεπληξε τη λαμπρότητι - ΓΡΑΦΑΙΣ και μηχαναίς, βωμοις τε και τάφοις, σαλπιγξιν, ειδωλοις, ἔριννυσι.
πρωτου ἐκεινΘ----παρηγαγε την των ΜΕΘΥΟΝΤΩΝ ΟΨΙΝ ἐς τραγωδιαν.
"Jason and his retinue drunk!"
The passage given by "scenam fecit."
"Primus Agatharcus Athenis, Æfchylo docente Tragediam, ſcenam fecit."
"imagines ædificiorum in scenarum picturis"
are mentioned. But all this is far outweighed by the testimony of Aristotle, who here explicitly attributes the introduction of painted Scenery to Sophocles.
—Οιψε ἀπεσεμνωθη
:—and to "late,"
we might add, imperfectly. For, what Horace says of the Roman Tragedy, is, in some measure, though perhaps not equally, applicable to the Greek:
in longum tamen ævum Manferunt, hodieque manent veftigia ruris.
In particular, something of this sort—of what the French call mesquin
—is almost constantly to be found in the short dialogue of the Greek Tragedies; in that part, I mean, which the eye, when we turn over any Tragedy, easily distinguishes from the rest, by its being carried on in a regular alternation of single verses. In this "close fighting"
of the dialogue, as VERSIBUS ALTERNIS opprobria rustica fundunt,
"un petit vernis de familiarité ;"
Σκηπτρῳ ταχ άρα σον καθαιμάξω καρα.
"Soon shall thy head this sceptre stain with blood."
Unfairly dignified by "Prends garde qu'une mort prompte ne punisse ton audace."
Even Sophocles, who gave the Tragic tone, in general, its proper pitch, between the ογκος
of Æfchylus, and the ίσχνοτης
of Euripides,-- ὡς παρελαβον την τέχνην παρα σε το πρωτον ἐνθος Οιδεσαν ὑπο κομπασματων και ρηματων ἐπαχθων ΙΣΧΝΑΝΑ μεν πρωτιστον άυτην, και το βαρθ ἀφειλον
Τι φης; τιν ειρηκας λογον;
—Neoptolemus replies, "Would you have me tell you the same thing two or three times over?"
Δις τ'αυτα βέλει και τρις ἀναπολειν μ ἐπη;
ὧν σοι φρασω τονδ᾽ ἐστιν ἐχι θαπτεον.
Συ δ' ἀντακεσον τετον ὡς τεθαψεται.
"M. One thing I'll tell you—he shall not be buried. T. And I'll tell another thing—he shall be buried."
—Certainly this approaches
"Sophocles seemed to have been assisted, in writing his Tragedies, by a mastiff-dog."
Κνων τις ἐδοκει συμποιειν Μολοττικο
.
These may be reckoned among the passages, in which the spirit of Sophocles, according to the observation of a great critic, σβεννυται άλογως πολλακις, και πίπτει άτυχεστατα
.ΑΡΩΣΙΜΟΙ γαρ χάτερων εισιν ΓΥΑΙ.
The prejudiced admirers of the antients are very angry at the least insinuation that they had any idea of our barbarous Tragi-Comedy. But after all, it cannot be dissembled, that, if they had not the name, they had the thing, or something very nearly approaching to it. If that be Tragi-Comedy, which is partly serious and partly comical, I do not know why we should scruple to say, that the
The learned reader will understand me to allude particularly to the scene, in which the domestic describes the behaviour of Hercules; and to the speech of Hercules himself, which follows.ἀδηφαγια
. The following extravagant description of his eating, preserved by Πρωτον μεν, ἀικ᾿ ἐσθοντ᾽ ἴδης νιν, ἀποθανοις. Βρεμει μεν ὁ φαρυγξ ἐνδοῦ, ἀραβει δ' ὰ γναθθ, Ψοφει δ᾽ ὁ γομφίο, τετριγε δ᾽ ὁ κυνοδων, Σίζει δε ταις ρίνεσσι, ΚΙΝΕΙ Δ' ΟΥΑΤΑ Των τετραποδων ἧττον
...
ἐτι σωφρονως ἔδεξατο
Τα προστυχοντα ξενια
Αλλ ἐι τι μη φερομεν, ΩΤΡΥΝΕΝ φερεια
Ἕως ἐθερμην᾿ ἀυτον ἀμφιβασα φλοξ
—crowns himself with myrtle, and sings, ΑΜΟΥΣ ΥΛΑΚΤΩΝ
—and all this, alone. "Cette description,"
says "est si burlesque, qu'on diroit d'un crocheteur qui est de confrairie ."
πανέργον ΚΛΩΠΑ και ΛΗΙΣΤΗΝ τινα.
The speech of Hercules, φιλοσοφεντου ἐν μεθῃ
, as the scholiast observes, (v. 776,) "philosophizing in his cups,"
is still more curious. It is, indeed, full of the φλοξ όνε
, and completely justifies the attendant's description. Nothing can be more jolly. It is in the true spirit of a modern drinking song; recommending it to the servant to uncloud his brow, enjoy the present hour, think nothing of the morrow, and drown his cares in love and wine:
ΟΥΤΟΣ τι σεμνον και πεφροντικού βλέπεις;
"You, fellow!"
—Mr. Potter's translation.
If any man can read this, without supposing it to have set the audience in a roar, I certainly cannot demonstrate that he is mistaken. I can only say, that I think he must be a very grave man himself, and must forget that the Athenians were not a very grave people. The zeal of "tout cela à fait penser à quelques critiques modernes que cette piece etoit une Tragicomedie; chimere inconnu aux anciens. Cette piece est du gout des autres Tragedies antiques."
τραγωδια παίζεσα
.δε γέλως
, fays this writer, ἐχθρα τραγωδίας
. Neither Euripides, nor Sophocles, seem to have held this as an inviolable maxim.
I will only mention one more instance of this Tragi-comic mixture, and that from Sophocles. The dialogue between Minerva and Ulysses, in the first scene of the Τι δρας, Αθανα; μηδαμως σφ' ἐξω καλει.
"What are you about, Minerva?—by no means call him out."
Ου σιγ άνεξη, μηδε δείλιαν ἀρεις;
"Will you not be silent, and lay aside your fears!"
ΜΗ, ΠΡΟΣ ΘΕΩΝ-ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδον ἀρκειτω μένων.
"Don't call him out, for heaven's sake: let him stay within."
Μενοιμ᾿ ἀν ΗΘΕΛΟΝ Δ᾽ ΑΝ ΕΚΤΟΣ ΩΝ ΤΥΧΕΙΝ.
"J'avoue,"
says "que ce trait n'est pas à la louange d'Ulyfle, ni de Sophocle."
(Tome iii.)
It appears, indeed, to me, that we may plainly trace in the Greek Tragedy, with all its improvements, and all its beauties, pretty strong marks of its popular and Tragi-comic origin. For, Τρα-
γῳδια
, we are told, was, originally, the only dramatic appellationτραγωδία, το παλαιον, ἦν όνομα κοινον και προς την Κωμωδίαν ύτερον δε, το μεν κοινον όνομα ἔσχεν ἡ Τραγωδία δε Κωμωδία, ίδιον
."Scenical representations, being then intended, not, as in our days, for the entertainment of the better sort but on certain great solemnities, indifferently for the diversion of the whole city, it became necessary to consult the taste of the multitude, as well as of those, 'quibus est equus, et pater, et res.'"
της ποιήσεως ΔΗΜΟΤΕΡΠΕΣΤΑΤΟΝ τε και ψυχαγωγικωτατον
.
When we speak of the Greek Tragedies as correct and perfect models, we seem merely to conform to the established language of prejudice, and content ourselves with echoing, without reflection or examination, what has been said before us. "raised to its height by Sophocles and Euripides, and no room left for further excellence or emulation."
ἐσχε την ἑαυτης φυσιν
...Πότερον πότε κρείττον ἐν ποιημασι και λόγοις -- μεγεθα ἐν ἐνιοις διημαρτημενον, ής το συμμέτρον μεν ἐν τοις κατορθωμασιν, ύγιες δὲ παντη και ἀδιαπτωτο.
ἐγιες παντῃ και ἀδιαπτωτον
is, surely, by no means the character of the Greek Tragedians. They who think it worth searching for must lay aside Sophocles, and Shakspeare. In the French Theatre, perhaps, they may find it; but they must be content, I fear, to take with it, the συμμετρον ἐν τους κατορθώμασι
..."the labour and delay of the file"
only can effect, they too often want. Of Shakspeare, however, compared with the Greek Poets, it may justly, I think, be pronounced, that he has much more, both of this want, and of that abundance.
As the Trochaic measure was still occasionally admitted, even in the improved and serious Greek Tragedy, and, in particular, occurs very frequently in the Tragedies of Euripides, it is natural to suppose, that a still more frequent use of it would be one of the characteristics of the fatyric drama, which seems to have been only
Compare
It has been thought strange, that Aristotle should introduce here the mention of hexameters, when he has been speaking only of Trochaic and Iambic verse, and is accounting for the adoption of the latter, in preference, not to the hexameter, but to the Trochaic tetrameter: and it has, therefore, been doubted, whether we should not read τετραμετρα
σατυρικον - τροχερον όρχης ικωτερον
κορδακικωτερον
λεκτικóν
. It was therefore entirely out of the question, when a metre proper for the general dialogue of Tragedy was to be sought for: but the bexameter was not so; and it might, without absurdity, be asked by an objector, as Castelvetro and Piccolomini have observed, why that species of verse was not adopted; especially as the Tragic Poets were the successors of the Epic, or Heroic, and Homer, according to Plato, was "the first of Tragic Poets"σεμνον
, it was at the same time, λεκτικον
. He allows, however, that it was not so remote from the rhythm of common speech, but that it might be casually produced, like the Iambic, though it rarely happened. He even goes so far, as to allow, in his concluding chapter, that Tragedy "might adopt the Epic metre."
By λεκτικη άρμονια
, Aristotle means what Aristoxenus calls ΜΕΛΟΣ λογωδες
Αρμονια
, here, is equivalent to μελθ
...ἁρμονια
here, in that lax and general sense, in which we commonly apply it to the rhythm of speech, when we talk of the harmony of a verse or a period. He speaks with his usual accuracy. Speech, as well as Music, has its melody and its rhythm; and these, in speech animated by passion, are so modified, as to approach, more or less perceptibly, to musical melody and rhythm.
The mistakes, into which some commentators have been led by annexing to the term Επεισοδιον
, as applied by Aristotle to Tragedy, the modern and Epic idea of a digression, "hors-d'œuvre, intermede, morceau d'attache", have been well pointed out by Le Bossu, ἐπεισοδια
to be, in any sense, added, united, &c.-but insists that they constitute that action,
ἐπασοδιον
, "terme trompeur;" for, in this application of it, all sight of its etymological sense is lost. By all that I can gather from an attentive comparison of all the passages in which Aristotle uses the word, there appears to me no reason to suppose, that he any where meant to apply it indiscriminately to all the incidents of a fable; and it is for this reason that I have no where ventured to render it by the word incident, which would have been too general. Le Bossu's definition is," Les Episodes sont les parties necessaires de l'action etendues avec des circonstances vraisemblables." -The death of Cato, for example, in the Tragedy of Addison, answers to this definition. But would Aristotle have called that an Episode? I can scarce think it. The most I can conceive is, that he might have applied the term ἐπεισοδια
to the particular circumstances and detail of the action, which were the additions of the Poet's fancy. Le Bossu mentions, as an instance, the escape of Orestes by means of the ablution, in the ἡ σωτηρια
) that Aristotle so denominates; this was an essential circumstance, and is expressly included by him in that general sketch of the plot, into which the ἐπεισοδια
were afterwards to be worked: and one of these Episodes was the detail of the manner in which the escape was effected, δια της καθάρσεως
. - See NOTE 143.
The word ἐπεισοδιον
is, I think, used by Aristotle only in two senses: 1. The technical sense, in which it is clearly defined to mean, all that part, or, rather, those parts, of a Tragedy, that are included between entire choral odes.καθόλε λογώ
, as Aristotle calls it, of his drama, have conducted the action to its catastrophe by different means.
The word ἐπεισοδιον
, then, appears to me never to be used by Aristotle but in its proper and derivative sense, of something more or less adventitious or accessory-something inserted, superadded, introduced, at pleasure, by the Poet. But the Epic Poem, from its extent of plan, and the variety requisite to its purpose, admits, and requires, subordinate actions of greater length and slighter relation to the principal action of the fable, than is consistent with the shorter compass, closer unity, and different end, of Tragedy. As the Episodes of Epic Poetry, therefore, had more distinctness, entireness, and projection from the subject, if I may so express myself, than those of Tragedy, this, as it was the most obvious, became in time almost the only, application of the term; till, at length, from the frequent abuse of this Epic privilege of variety,
μεταβαλλαν τον ἀκεοντα
, scarce any other idea was annexed to the word Episode, than that of digression, bors-d'œuvre, something foreign to the subject, or connected with it only by the slightest thread. Hence, too, in modern language, the word, I think, is applied only to entire actions of this additional, or digressive kind; not to the minuter circumstances or incidents which form the detail of an action. Thus, we call the whole story of Dido, in the ἐπεισοδια
. And so much, as to his use of this term, in general. Whether these remarks are well or ill founded, will best appear, when we come to apply them to the particular passages in which the word occurs. In that now before us, it is used, I think, in the second of the two senses I mentioned; and its best comment seems to be another passage, cap. xxiv. where the critic observes the advantage which the Epic Poem has in the variety of its Episodes, and assigns the want of that variety, as one common cause of ill success in Tragic writing: –το γαρ ΟΜΟΙΟΝ ταχυ πληρεν ἐκπιπτειν ποια τας τραγωδίας
.
It has been asserted by some writers of eminence, that Aristotle here speaks, not of what is laughable or ludicrous, in general, but only of the ridiculous, in that particular sense of the word, in which it is distinguished from the merely risible, and implies
γελοιον
, which he uses, is as general as possible, and answers exactly to our word laughable. And it is in this general sense, justified, I think, by common usage, that I have used the word ridiculous in my version. For though in a philosophical speculation the distinction above-mentioned may be necessary for clearness, and is undoubtedly well founded, yet, in common language, the word ridiculous is never used with this nice appropriation, but applied, like its Latin original, to whatever excites laughter.
But it is objected, that, if Aristotle means the laughable in general, his account of the matter is false; because "men laugh at that, in which there is neither fault nor turpitude of any kind."ΑΙΣΧΡΟΝ
, was a word of wide extent, and seems manifestly used here by Aristotle in its utmost latitude; comprehending every thing that is, in any degree, ugly or deformed, from atrocious villainy, the highest moral ugliness, to a ridiculous cast of features in an ugly face. It is the opposite to ΚΑΛΟΝ
, which was used in a correspondent latitude of application. - The objections, which have been made to this passage, have chiefly, I think, been owing to this, that the objectors have not been sufficiently aware of the extensive signification in which the Greeks used the words, καλον, αισχρον, –ἀρετη, κακια σπεδαιον, φαυλον-άμαρτημα
, &c. We trans-
αισχρον
here in the restrained sense of moral turpitude, has been, that those writers, who have so taken it, have been obliged to deny, that γελοιον
means laughable, because the laughable in general could not truly be defined, "a species of moral turpitude."
It plainly was not Aristotle's design here to enter into an accurate inquiry about the nature of laughter, and the distinction of risible and ridiculous objects. This he had perhaps done, in that part of this mutilated treatise, which related to Comedy, and to which he himself refers in his Rhetoric.μιμησις φαυλοτερων
, "an imitation of bad characters;" that is, as he immediately limits the sense of the general term φαυλον
, of ridiculous, or laughable, characters. Such, he continues, are properly denominated φαυλοι, κακοι
, bad, &c. because the laughable (γελοιον
) is one species of the αισχρον
, taken in its most general sense. "But to what species, or class," it was obvious to ask, "does it belong?"-To that class, it is answered, of things αισχρα
, which are neither destructive nor painful: for these, exciting terror or pity, are the property of Tragedy. And he asserts, I think, plainly, that the laughable in general, το γελοιον
, i. e. every thing that excites laughter, is ἁμαρτημα ΤΙ και αισχα ἀνωδυνον και φθαρτικον
-is, in some respect or other, faulty, wrong, deformed, but neither painful nor pernicious. What follows, about a ridiculous face, is, I think, clearly, not an illustration merely, as Dr. Campbell understands it to be, but an instance.αισχρον
; (προσωπον αισχρον
) which he would hardly have done, had he just
αισχρον
and αισχ
, as Dr. Campbell and Dr. Beattie contend that he bas used them, in a moral sense only.
But it is objected "We can never suppose that Aristotle would have called distorted features 'a certain fault or slip.'" To call them a slip, would indeed found strangely; because that expression conveys the idea of something morally wrong. But when we say, that a very long nose, or a wide mouth, is a fault in a face, we use a very common expression; the word fault having, I think, the same latitude of application as the Greek word ἀμαρτημα
.
It must be observed, however, that all Aristotle says is, that these two characters, deformity of some sort, and the absence of pain, or hurt, are to be found in every object of laughter: he neither says, nor implies, the converse that every thing so qualified is laughable. With respect to one of these characters the absence of pain or harm-there can be no doubt. It is only saying that we cannot laugh at that which shocks us. As to the other general character, deformity, ugliness, something wrong, &c. (ἁμαρτημα ΤΙ και αισχα
) it seems to me, that these expressions, taken in that large sense, in which Aristotle plainly means to use them, amount to much the same as those used by modern philosophers to characterize the risible in general; such as, "incongruity, incongruous association, striking unsuitableness," "disproportion, inconsistence and dissonance of circumstances in the same object"ἁμαρτημα Τι και -αισχρον ΤΙ και ΔΙΕΣΤΡΑΜΜΕΝΟΝ
.
Aristotle's account, then, of the γελοíον
, appears to be right, as far as it goes. It might, indeed, be objected to, as too general, had he given it as the result of an exact and particular analysis of the subject. But this, as I have already observed, was not his purpose in this place.
It is farther objected by Dr. Campbell, that to speak of laughter in general, "would have been foreign to Aristotle's purpose:" because, "laughter is not his theme, but Comedy; and laughter only so far as Comedy is concerned with it. Now the concern of Comedy reaches no farther than that kind of ridicule which relates to manners."το γελοιον
) is frequently used by Plato, as synonymous to Comedy, and substituted for it; as pity is also for Tragedy.ἐπι το γελοιοτερον ἐσχηματισο
.
The original is, δι ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝΟΙ αυτης ποιηται μνημονευονται
: the only fair translation of which, I think, is, "they who are called its Poets."
But as it seems not easy to find any reasonable meaning ΟΛΙΓΟΙ ΜΕΝ ΟΙ ΑΥΤΗΣ ποιηται
.—But this Greek, όλιγοι οι ποιηται
, is, I fear, what the critics call, πονηρκ κομματα
. I will venture to mention another conjecture that has occurred to me. The learned reader will dispose of it as he pleases. It seems not improbable that Aristotle wrote, Ηδη δε σχηματα τινα αυτης ἐχεσης ΟΙΑ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, ΟΙ αυτης, &c.
i. e. "When it had acquired a certain form, such as we say,"
alluding to what he had said of Homer's suggesting, by his Τα της κωμωδίας ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ πρωτο ὑπεδειξεν, ἐ ψογον, άλλα ΤΟ ΓΕΛΟΙΟΝ δραματοποιησας,
σχηματα
) of Tragedy and Comedy being ἐντιμοτερα
, in higher credit and esteem, than those of the old satirical and encomiastic poems which preceded them: for this seems to accord with what he here says, that Comedy was neglected till it attained something of this its proper form, and aimed at its proper object, the ridiculous. The reader will see the connection : Ἡ δε κωμῳδια, δια το ΜΗ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ ἐξ ἀρχης, ἐλαθεν. ——ΗΔΗ ΔΕ ΣΧΗΜΑΤΑ τίνα αυτης ἐχεσης ὉΙΑ ΛΕΓΟΜΕΝ, ΟΙ αυτης ποιηται μνημονευονται
.—This differs from the present reading only by the insertion of a single letter, Δ
, which might easily have been omitted, from its resemblance to the Α
that follows.
We are not, I think, to look for a sense of the word Προλογο
, as here applied to Comedy, different from that, in which it is applied, ch. xii. [Transl. Part II. Sect. 10.]
to Tragedy. In both, it was that introductory part of the drama, the business of which was, to give the spectator, either directly, in its very outlet, or, more obliquely, in the course of it, so much information relative to the subject of the piece, as would enable him to follow the action without confusion. ὁ δες ώσπερ εις την χειρα την άρχην, ποιει ἔχομενον ἀκολεθειν τῷ λόγῳ.
και οι Τραγικοι δηλεσι περι το δραμα, καν μη ευθυς, ώσπερ Ευριπίδης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ΤΩΙ ΠΡΟΛΟΓΩ γε ΠΟΥ δηλοι, ώσπερ και Σοφοκλης ---ΚΑΙ Ἡ ΚΩΜΩΔΙΑ ΩΣΑΥΤΩΣ
Έμοι πατηρ ἦν Πολυβο
, seems an interpolation; for those words are not in any part of the προλογ
of the Παραβασις
.—See παραβ.
and
Χορικον
, and Επεισοδίον
, and to have begun and ended with those choral songs, which were then esteemed the essential part of Tragedy. But, afterwards, these scanty fables, μικροι μυθοι
, as Aristotle calls them, were drawn out to their proper size , not only by introducing a greater variety of episodic incidents , but by prefixing to the first choral song, (or to the first speech of the entire chorus, according to Aristotle's account of the Parode, cap. xii.) the introductory part called Προλογού
, and adding, after the last, the concluding part called Έξοδος
. The case was probably the same with Comedy. The Phallic songs, from which it received its birth, were, I suppose, regarded originally as the essential part of the Comic drama, in the same manner as the Bacchic hymns were of the Tragic. Aristotle plainly speaks of Comedy, as having gradually received similar additions and improvements to those of Tragedy ; and, among these, that of the Προλογά
. That such an introductory part, or act, which should be, as Aristotle expresses it, δειγμα λογε
, and ὁδοποιησις τῳ ἐπιοντι
, was indeed still more necessary to Comedy than to Tragedy, is obvious from the very nature of the former drama.
The nature and office of the Greek prologue, and its two different manners, are, I observe, very exactly expressed by Terence in the conclusion of his separate prologue to the "In agendo partem oftendent."
I ventured, in a former note, to say, that the Greek Tragedy appeared to me to have retained, with all its improvements, some traces of its origin. Something of this may be perceived, I think, in the very opening of many of the Greek dramas: but especially in those of Euripides, whose inartificial prologues of explanatory narration, addressed directly to the spectators, remind us of the state of Tragedy previous to the introduction of the dialogue ; when it consisted only of a story told between the acts, (if I may so speak,) of the Dithyrambic Chorus, which was then the main body and substance of the entertainment. When I read the opening of the
ΗΚΩ, νεκρων κευθμωνα και σκοτε πύλας
Διπων, ἐν᾿ Αδης χωρις ᾠκισται θεων,
ΠΟΛΥΔΩΡΟΣ, Εκαβης παις γεγως της Κίσσέως
Πριαμέτε πατρα κ. τ. αλ.
ΤΑΔΕ μεν Περσων των διχομενων
Ελλαδ᾽ ἐις άναν πιστα καλείται.
ΑΥΤΟΣ ὧδ᾽ ἐληλυθα
Ο ΠΑΣΙ ΚΛΕΙΝΟΣ ΟΙΔΙΠΟΥΣ ΚΑΛΟΥΜΕΝΟΣ
This sort of direct explanation was afterwards, with much more propriety, taken from the persons of the drama, and consigned to the actors in a detached prologue, such as those of Plautus and Terence: a practice, which, if we did not know the attachment of Ben Jonson to every thing antient, we might suspect he meant to ridicule, by the pleasant use he has made of it in the prologue to his puppet-shew of Hero and Leander, in the
The next, and the last step, in the history of Prologues, was again to leave the argument, as it had been left by Sophocles, to the oblique information and gradual development of the action itself, and to make the separate prologue subservient to other purposes, unconnected with the subject of the drama. The worst of these purposes, and the greatest possible abuse of the term, is to be found in what is called the Prologue of the French Opera ; which is wholly composed of two ingredients, almost equally disgusting to a just poetical, or moral taste—allegory and adulation.
"Il n'y avoit rien de feint,"
is surprising. The slightest inspection of
Μυθες ποιειν
, is clearly to invent plots or subjects; and whatever is invented, or feigned, is, in Aristotle's language, καθολε
, or general, as opposed to a strictly historical plot, which is καθ ἐκαστον
, particular. ἀφεμενα της ιαμβικης ίδεας, καθολα ποιειν λογες μυθες
, I understand to be no more than the development of the shorter expression which preceded, μυθες ποιειν
. He does not say, that Crates was the first Poet, but only the first Athenian Poet, who invented such comic subjects. The distinction seems clearly marked: το μεν ἐν ἐξ ἀρχης ἐκ ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑΣ ἦλθε : ΤΩΝ ΔΕ ΑΘΗΝΗΣΙ, Κρατης πρωτο κ. τ. αλλ.
.
Of the corruption of this passage I have no doubt. It has been proposed to eject the words, μετα λογε
. My suspicion rather falls upon the word μετρε
; which, as it adds nothing but embarrassment to the sense, (λογο
, speech, or words, being a general term, and including metre, as in ch. i.) I have omitted. It appears to me, likewise, that the only meaning, which can reasonably be given to the expression, μεχρι ΜΟΝΟΥ μετρα
, is—as far as metre alone; i. e. "without considering the other means of imitation, melody and rhythm."
And, accordingly, some commentators, by μετρον ῾ΑΠΛΟΥΝ
, understand verse alone, without music. But had this been Aristotle's meaning, he would probably have used the appropriated and clear word, $\psi u\lambda ov$
. The proper and obvious sense of μετρον άπλεν
, is, a simple, or single, kind of metre. Απλη—ΜΟΝΟΕΙΔΗΣ
—Απλεν—ΑΣΥΝΘΕΤΟΝ
. άπλιν
is opposed by Aristotle to πεπλεγμενον
, cap. x. et passim: and to διπλων
, cap. xiii, & xxi .ἐι γαρ τις ἐν ἀλλῳ τινι μετρῳ διηγηματικην μιμησιν ποιοιτο, ἐν ΠΟΛΛΟΙΣ, ἀπρεπες ἂν φαινοιτο.
μετρον άπλεν
, the exclusion of melody and rhythm, appears the more probable, because he sufficiently expresses this presently afterwards, when he says, that some of the parts of Tragedy were peculiar to it. Now these parts are no other than the decoration, (oψις
), and the
On the whole, it seems not improbable, that the passage originally stood in some such way as this: Ἡ μεν ἐν Εποποϊία τη Τραγω δια μέχρι μονα ΤΟΥ μετα λογε μιμησιΝ ἐἶναι σπεδαιων ἠκολεθησεν.
It seems to have been taken for granted, without any foundation, by "a single revolution of the sun,"
but was "indefinite (
like that of the Epic Poem. This evidently cannot be applied, without absurdity, to the time of representation. Yet so it is applied by Dacier in his note on this passage, p. 70.
ἀορις
)"
But it appears farther, I think, from what is said, and plainly said, in this chapter, that, after all we have heard so often about this famous unity of time, the rule receives not the least support from Aristotle's authority. Every one, who knows how much stress has been laid by modern critics on the three dramatic unities, and happens not to be well acquainted with Aristotle's treatise on Poetry, would, I suppose, naturally take it for granted, that they are all explicitly laid down, and enforced by him, as essential and indispensable laws, in that famous code of dramatic criticism. But the fact is, that, of these three rules, the only one that can be called important—that of the
Of the two other unities, that of "Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine its action within the limits of a single revolution of the sun, or nearly so."
ότιμαλισα πειραται ύπο μιαν περίοδον ήλιε ειναι, μικρον ἐξαλλάττειν.
cap. v. μια περιοδου ήλιε
, to mean only an artificial day. But I own I could never yet perceive any good reason, why we should not permit Aristotle to mean what he seems, in plain terms, to say. If he meant only twelve hours, why did he prefer an expression so ambiguous, to say the least of it, as μιαν περιοδον ήλιε
, to the clear and obvious expression of μιαν ΗΜΕΡΑΝ
? —But, to wave this question, the utmost, which the most strenuous advocates for the unity of time can make of this passage, is this—that the Poet should endeavour, as far as possible, to confine the supposed time of the action to that of a single day, or nearly so. Now it seems allowed, that none of the Greek Tragedies extant could have taken up, in the representation, more than three or four hours. What Aristotle, therefore, here says, is so far from being a rule for the unity of time, that, on the contrary, it is saying as plainly as possible, that, in his view, it was no duty incumbent on the dramatic Poet even to aim at the observance of such a rule: for, had he thought otherwise, his mode of expression would, surely, have been very different. He would have proposed the strict unity of time—the exact coincidence of the actual time of representation with the supposed time of the action—as the point of perfection, at which the Poet was to aim: he would have said, "Tragedy endeavours, as far as possible, to confine its action within the time of representation, or nearly so."
It is certain, indeed, that the nature of the drama, strictly and rigorously considered, would require, I will not say, to the perfection, but to the closeness, of its imitation, the exact coincidence here mentioned ; and it is on this foundation only, that any rule at all relative to time could be necessary, and that the dramatic Poet could, with any reason, be denied the privilege of the Epic. All I contend for is, that Aristotle has no where required such a coincidence ; that he has not even mentioned it; much less has he, either here, or in any other part of his work, enjoined it as a rule. His rule is, as generally understood, "confine your action, as nearly as you can, to a single day;"
—or, as I think, in conformity to his plain words, it should be understood—"to a single revolution of the sun, or twenty-four hours."
"Il tempo firetto è quello, che i veditori poffono à fuo agio dimorare ſedendo in theatro; il quale io non veggo che poſſa paſſare il giro del fole, fi come dice Ariftotele, cio è, hore dodici: conciofia cofa che per le neceffità del corpo, come è, mangiare, bere, diporre i fuperflui pesi del ventre et della vefica, dormire, et per altre neceflità, non pofla il popolo continuare oltre il predetto termino cofi fatta dimora in theatro."
—p. 109.
It may, perhaps, be objected, that Aristotle has not delivered this in the form of a rule ; that he only refers to fact, and to the usual practice of the dramatic Poets of his time. "Tragedy endeavours,"
&c. But, surely, to mention the general practice of Poets with seeming approbation, or, at least, without a word to the contrary, is, in fact, to erect that practice, (as he has done on many other occasions throughout his treatise,) into a rule. It is sufficient for my purpose, that, at least, he has given no other rule. Moreover, what he here says of the practice of the Greek dramatists, seems somewhat adverse to the language of those modern critics, who so often appeal, if I mistake not, to that very practice, for the support of their rigorous unity of time. For, if his expression does not prove, that he thought the rule of a single revolution of the sun the only rule which the Poets ought to observe, it surely proves, because it actually says, that he thought it the only rule, which, in general, they did observe.
But what says "Une Tragedie, pour être parfaite, ne doit occuper ni plus, ni moins de tems, pour l'action, que pour la representation; car elle est alors dans toute la vraisemblance. Les Tragiques Grecs L'ONT TOUJOURS PRATIQUE."
What he adds, it seems not very easy to comprehend: "Et ils s'en font fait une loi si indispensable, que pour ne la pas violer, ils ont quelquefois violentè leurs incidens, d'une maniere que je ne conseillerois pas de suivre:"
i. e. in plain English, (for I can make nothing else of it,) "they have so scrupulously adhered to the rule, that, sometimes, for the sake of observing it, they have been obliged to break it."
p. 118.
I believe, every reader, who, in perusing the Greek Tragedians, has taken the pains to examine this matter, must be sensible, that what Dacier so confidently asserts, of their constant adherence to this rule, is palpably false. I shall only mention one remarkable instance of the utter neglect of it, and that in SOPHOCLES ; who, in this, as in other respects, is usually regarded, I think, as the most correct and regular of the three Greek Poets whose Tragedies are in our hands. In his
It is surprising, that so strange a phrase as ειδων --- δρωντων
—formis---agentibus
—should have passed as genuine with any Greek scholar. It is still more so, that the obvious opposition of δρωντων
to ἀπαγγελια
, and the no less obvious absurdity of opposing narration to pity and terror, (δι' ἀπαγγελιας, ΑΛΛΑ δ᾽ ἐλεου και φοβου
) should have escaped the notice of any commentator.—I should write the passage thus; still considering it as imperfect:—χωρις ἐκαστου των ειδων ἐν τοις μοριοις * * * [forte ΔΙΑ] δρωντων και ου δι' ἀπαγγελιας
* * * * ἀλλα δι' ἐλεου και φοβου, κ. τ. αλ.
Thus the word δρωντων
will retain its proper sense, and the active imitation of the drama, which Aristotle every where makes its characteristic distinction, as opposed to the Epic, will be, as we might expect to find it, in a formal and exact definition of Tragedy, distinctly marked.
I will just observe, farther, that this mode of expression—δρωντων ΚΑΙ ΟΥ δι' ἀπ.
is familiar to Aristotle. Here however it may be justified by the necessity of marking clearly the distinction between Dramatic and Epic Poetry. In other instances, as, ἑτερως και μη τον αυτον τροπον.
cap. i. ὡς τον αυτον και μη μεταβαλλοντα.
cap. iii. ειδως και μη ἀγνοων.
Eth. Nic. v. 8. it seems hardly to admit of the same excuse. In the Poets we are less surprised to find it frequent. ἐπει με κατ᾿ ἀισαν ἐνεικεσας, ἐδ᾽ ὑπερ αισαν.
γνωτα, κ'ουκ ἀγνωτα μοι Προσηλθεθ' ίμειροντες.
If any man, in reading the ancients, can persuade himself to take such things for beauties, there is certainly no harm in it. The fact I take to be, that composition, even that of Poetry, was not yet so far improved and refined, as perfectly to exclude the inaccuracies and redundancies of popular and familiar speech.
Δι' ἐλεου και φοβου περαινουσα την των τοιουτων παθηματων καθαρσιν.
A history of the controversies which this obscure passage has excited among critics and commentators, and an exact statement and examination of the various explanations which have been given of it,
One is, that this purgation, or moderation, of the passions, is merely the effect of having them frequently excited, and of being familiarized with the occasions of them, in Tragic fiction; just as the passions of pity and terror are actually purged, or reduced to moderation, in a surgeon, a physician, or a soldier, by their being accustomed to those terrible or piteous objects that occasion them.
The other interpretation attributes the effect to the moral lesson and example of the drama: Tragedy purges the passions by the striking pictures it sets before us of the dreadful calamities occasioned by the unrestrained indulgence of them; by giving useful warnings, and preparing us to bear the ills of life with patience.
One, or the other, or both, of these meanings, have, I think, been attributed to Aristotle by the best commentators and critics. For the first, the reader may see Mr. Harris's Disc. on Music, Painting, &c. ch. v. note.—Heinf. De Trag. Const. cap. ii. p. 22, 23. and Castelvetro, p. 117, 118. For the second, "servaient only to obscure the passage,"
and that the true sense was not to be found in any of them, proceeds to give us, as that true sense, and as his own discovery, exactly what had been said before him.
Let us first see what Aristotle says. He says, that Tragedy, by the means of pity and terror, effects the purgation (καθαρσιν
) of such passions: i. e. of pity and terror and other passions of the same kind: for pity and terror seem clearly meant, by the expression, to be included in the effect.
The first of the two explanations seems far more admissible. I believe it made a part of his idea, but I doubt whether it was the whole of it. What was precisely his meaning, and the whole of his meaning, will never, I fear, be the subject of a perfect, Stoical καταληψις
to any man. There is, however, one passage in Aristotle's works, which throws some little light upon this; enough, at least, to keep us from false interpretations, if not to lead us to the true. It is in the seventh chapter of his eighth book De Republica. The Abbé Batteux is the only commentator I know of, who has paid a proper attention to this passage; but as I do not perfectly agree with him, either as to the translation he has given, or the use he makes of it, I shall produce so much of the original as appears to be of any importance to our present purpose, and subjoin a translation, with some necessary remarks.
The object of Aristotle, in the chapter referred to, is, to examine what kinds of Music (i. e. of melody and rhythm,) are proper to be used in the education of youth. He mentions and approves a division, made by some philosophical writers of that time, of the different kinds of melodies, into Moral, Active, and Enthusiastic: τα μεν ΗΘΙΚΑ, τα δε ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚΑ, τα δ' ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑ.
By the first of these we are to understand a manly, grave, and simple
πρακτικα
is less clear; but I suppose it means a more complicated and imitative sort of melody, adapted to express human actions; for, in the 49th of the Harmonic Problems [Sect. 19.] it is said of the Hypo-Phrygian mode, that it had ἠθος πρακτικον
, and was, on that account, used only in the dialogue and action of the drama, never in the choral part.
κατα δε την ὑποδωριστι και ὑποφρυγιστι, ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝ—ὁ ουν οικειον εστι χορω· εστι γαρ ὁ χορος κηδευτης ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟΣ.
κ. τ. λ.—The whole Problem, though mutilated, is curious, and throws some little glimmering of light upon the Greek drama, as far as Music is concerned.
πρακτικον
, is applied, in this treatise, to the Iambic measure.
το μεν [i. e. the Trochaic tetrameter,] ὀρχηστικον το δε, [the Iambic verse,] ΠΡΑΚΤΙΚON.
Whence Horace's, "natum rebus agendis." A. P. 83.
ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ ἐνεκα
: with respect to which he says—τι δε λεγομεν την καθαρσιν, νυν μεν, άπλως παλιν δε, ΕΝ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, ἐρουμεν σαφεστερον
: "What I mean by Καθαρσις
, or purgation, I shall now explain only in a short and general way; but hereafter, in the books concerning Poetry, more explicitly and clearly."—And this, I suppose, he had done, in that part of this treatise which is lost.—He then proceeds thus:
Φανερον, ότι χρηστεον μεν πασαις ταις ἁρμονιαις, ου τον αυτον δε τροπον πασαις χρηστεον· άλλα προς μεν την παιδειαν, ταις ἠθικωταταις· προς δε ἀκροασιν [f. ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ], ἐτερων χειρουργουντων, και ταις πρακτικαις, και ταις ἐνθουσιαστικαις. ὁ γαρ περι ἐνιας συμβαινει παθος ψυχας ἰσχυρως, τουτο ἐν πασαις ὑπαρχει, τῳ δε ήττον διαφερει και τῳ μαλλον. οἷον, ΕΛΕΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΟΒΟΣ. ἐτι δ᾽ ἐνθουσιασμος· και γαρ ὑπο ταυτης της κινησεως κατακωχιμοι τινες εισιν. ἐκ δε των ἱερων μελων ὁρωμεν τουτους, όταν χρησωνται τοις ἐξοργιαζουσι την ψυχην μελεσι, καθισταμενους, ώσπερ ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑΣ τυχοντας και ΚΑΘΑΡΣΕΩΣ. ταυτο δη τουτο ἀναγκαιον πασχειν και τας ἐλεημονας, και τους φοβητικους, και τους όλως παθητικους· τους δ᾽ ἄλλους, καθ᾽ όσον ἐπιβαλλει των τοιουτων ἐκαστῳ,
[παθηματα
Aristotle does not mean passions, but sufferings, or calamities; and that the sense of δι' ἐλεου και φοβου περαινουσα την των τοιουτων παθηματων καθαρσιν
, is—effecting, or endeavouring to effect, "the removal of such calamities," (i. e. as are represented in Tragedy,) "by means of exciting the passions of pity and terror." But the sense, both of καθαρσις
, and of παθηματα
, is fixed, beyond dispute, by the passage I have quoted, where pity, terror, and other passions, are clearly mentioned as the objects of the καθαρσις
, or purgation. The Professor also asserts, that the word, which Aristotle uniformly uses to express the passions, is παθη
, and that by παθηματα
is always meant, sufferings, or calamities." This is a mistake. Παθη
is continually used by Aristotle in the sense of sufferings; and παθηματα
sometimes, though less frequently, in the sense of passions. So, Rhet. II. 22. p. 574. C. και περι των ήθων, και ΠΑΘΗΜΑΤΩΝ
—"concerning manners and passions." See also, Moral. Eudem. II. 2. p. 205. B. where παθη
and παθηματα
are used synonymously. Many other instances, I make no doubt, are to be found in Aristotle's works. I should add, that I take my account of this explanation, and the arguments by which it is supported, from the
In this passage, for ἀκροασιν
I have no doubt that we should read καθαρσιν
. The similitude of the words is sufficient to account for the mistake of the transcriber; and the purport of the whole passage seems to require the correction. For Aristotle is here showing, in what manner the three different kinds of melody were to be applied to the different purposes, which he had just enumerated: προς ΜΕΝ την ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ, ταις ήθικ.
προς ΔΕ την ΚΑΘΑΡΣΙΝ,—ταις πρακτικαις,
&c. The opposition is clear. And so, afterwards, a third purpose is mentioned—προς ΑΝΑΠΑΥΣΙΝ.
[p. 459.] The words immediately following, ἐτερων χειρουργουντων
, probably contributed to this mistake. They allude to his doctrine, in the preceding chapter, that boys should not be allowed to practice or perform, themselves, any but the simplest kind of Music, and upon the sim-
δεομενα χειρουργικης ἐπιστημης.
[p. 457.] But this was not the character either of the active and enthusiastic melodies, of which he here speaks, or of the instrument used in the accompaniment of them
Αυλος
. See ibid. p. 459 and 457. And above, p. 148, note.
I shall now give what I think a fair and literal version of the passage.—
"It is manifest then, that all the different kinds of melodies are to be made use of; not all, however, for the same purpose. For education, the most moral kind should be used: for PURGATION, both the active, and the enthusiastic; performed, however, by others. For those passions, which in some minds are violent, exist, more or less, in all; such as PITY, for example, and TERROR: and, again, enthusiasm; for with this passion some men are subject to be possessed: but when the sacred melodies, intended to compose the mind after the celebration of the orgic rites, have been performed, we see those men become calm and sedate, as if they had undergone a kind of purgation, or cure. And the case must necessarily be the same with those who are particularly liable to be moved by PITY, or TERROR, or any other passion; and with other men, as far as they are under the influence of any such passion; all of them experiencing a sort of PURGATION, and PLEASURABLE RELIEF."
From this passage, though far enough, I am sensible, from being perfectly clear and explicit, two things, at least, may, I think, be confidently deduced. 1. That whatever be the meaning of the term καθαρσις
, or purgation, here, must also be its meaning in the treatise on Poetry; since to that work Aristotle refers for a fuller explanation of it. The only difference is, that here, the term is applied to the effect of imitative Music; there, to that of imitative Poetry; of that species of it, however, which depended, we know, upon Music, for a very considerable part of
προς καθαρσιν
; and he says, that men, agitated by enthusiasm, were purged or relieved from that enthusiasm by the ἱερα μελη
, which were plainly enthusiastic melodies; i. e. such as imitated, or expressed, that passion, and were intended to calm the mind, which had been violently agitated and inflamed; not, as M. Batteux understands, by the sudden opposition of Doric, grave, and moral strains, [p. 280, 1.] but by pleasurable indulgence of the same passion in imitative Music: κουφιζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονης.
These melodies were, probably, such as those of Ὁμολογουμενως ΠΟΙΕΙ ΤΑΣ ΨΥΧΑΣ ΕΝΘΟΥΣΙΑΣΤΙΚΑΣ.
Indeed, from the manner, in which the Music of Olympus is spoken of by —τους νομους τους ἁρμονικους ἐξενεγκεν [sc. Olympus.] εις την Ελλάδα, οἷς νυν χρωνται οἱ Έλληνες ἐν ταις ἑορταις των θεων.
Plut. de Mus. p. 2076. ed. H. S. See also Plato in the Minos, p. 318. ed. Serr. where he says of the melodies of Marsyas and Olympus, that they are, ΘΕΙΟΤΑΤΑ, και μονα ΚΙΝΕΙ.
—See
With respect to this καθαρσις
itself, Aristotle by no means gives us in this passage, nor, indeed, professes to give us, a full and satisfactory explanation of it. Some light, however, he has flung upon it by the expressions, ἰατρεια
, and κουφιζεσθαι μεθ᾽ ἡδονης
, which he uses as synonymous to καθαρσις
: "Purgation, cure, pleasurable relief." The Abbé Batteux understands Aristotle to mean no more by this, than that the passions of terror or pity, which, when excited by real objects, are simply painful, or, at least, have a predominant mixture of pain, are, by imitation, and the consciousness of fiction, purged or purified from this alloy of the disagreeable and painful,
"Que les objets désagréables plaisent quand ils sont imités, même lorsqu'ils le font dans la plus grande verité. En appliquant ce principe à la Tragedie, il s'ensuit, que c'est l'imitation qui est la cause du plaisir qu'elle produit, et non la nature des objets imités, puisque ces objets sont par eux-mêmes désagréables. C'est donc l'imitation qui ôte à la terreur et à la pitié l'accessoire désagréable qu'elles ont dans la realité: c'est l'imitation qui opere la purgation Tragique, en mettant les malheurs imités à la place des malheurs réels, et en séparant par ce moyen ce que la pitié et la terreur ont d'agréable, comme emotions, d'avec ce qu'elles ont de désagréable, quand elles font jointes à l'idée de malheurs réels."
καθαρσις
in the passage adduced, said any thing directly pointing to such effect, yet, I think, the whole turn and cast of his expression is such, as leads one naturally to conclude, that it was his meaning. The phrase, κουφιζεσθαι μεθ' ήδονης
, does indeed appear to express the present effect only; but I can scarce conceive, that he would have
καθαρσις
, and still less, ΙΑΤΡΕΙΑ
, without a view to something beyond the pleasurable relief or vent of the moment; especially, in a chapter, where he is professedly enumerating and examining the uses of music
ου μιας ἐνεκεν ΩΦΕΛΕΙΑΣ τη μουσικη χρησθαι δειν.
—Ubi supra.
ἐλεημονας, φοβητικους, παθητικους
, confirm this idea; being all words expressive of habitual excess, requiring correction and moderation
κατακωχιμοι
; and in the expression—ὁ γαρ περι ἐνιας συμβαινει παθος ψυχας ΙΣΧΥΡΩΣ.
But, what still more strongly opposes the Abbé Batteux's idea, is, that Aristotle is here, as Heinsius and others have well observed, evidently combating the doctrine of ΤΡΕΦΕΙ γαρ ταυτα
, he says, in his figurative language, ΑΡΔΟΥΣΑ, δεον ΑΥΧΜΕΙΝ.
De Repub. lib. x. p. 606. D.
Δοιμεν δε γε που ἂν και τοις προσταταις αυτης — λογον περι αυτης ειπειν, ὡς ου μονον ΗΔΕΙΑ άλλα και ΩΦΕΛΙΜΗ προς τας πολιτειας και τον βιον τον ἀνθρωπινον ἐστι, και ευμενως ἀνεσομεθα, κερδανουμεν γαρ που, ἐαν μη μονον ήδεια φανη, άλλα ΚΑΙ ΩΦΕΛΙΜΗ.
Ibid.
ἀπολαυειν ἀναγκη ἀπο των ἀλλοτριων εις τα οικεια· ΘΡΕΨΑΝΤΑ γαρ ἐν ἐκεινοις ΙΣΧΥΡΟΝ ΤΟ ΕΛΕΕΙΝΟΝ, ου ραδιον ἐν τοις
But though the Abbé Batteux's idea of this purgation appears to me by no means to be the whole, it must, I think, be admitted as a part, and an essential part, of Aristotle's meaning. For the effect depends, not merely, as some commentators seem to suppose
The passions of savages, or of men in the first rude stages of civilization, are ferocious and painful. They pity, or they fear,
Such appears to me, on the whole, to be the most probable explanation of Aristotle's meaning: I must, at least, confess it to be the only reasonable meaning, that I am able to discover. How far it is true, and founded on solid observation, is another question, which I willingly submit to the philosophical and thinking part of my readers.
I cannot omit to observe, that the short explanation given by
A passage of very tantalizing brevity. By δια μετρων ΜΟΝΟΝ
, are we to understand, according to the obvious and literal meaning of the expression, that in some parts of Tragedy the verse was merely recited, spoken, as in modern Tragedy? —This contradicts what, by many writers, has been considered as a fact thoroughly established, that the Greek Tragedy was accompanied by musical instruments, and was therefore strictly musical, throughout: —for as to the dreams of the "impossible to understand what the ancients have said about their theatrical declamation, without supposing this,"
would it not be better to say, at once, that we do not understand it, than to explain it into impossibilities?
As for the systematic
If, then, the Greek Tragedy had a musical accompaniment throughout, it must have been sung throughout. But here, Aristotle says, as plainly as words can say it, that in some parts of Tragedy, "metre only" was employed: —δια ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ἐνια ΜΟΝΟΝ
: that is, as it is necessarily implied, without the two other ήδυσματα
, or seasonings, of Tragic language, just mentioned, melody and rhythm. Λεγω δε ήδυσμενον μεν λογον, τον ἐχοντα ῥυθμον, και άρμονιαν, και μετρον.
Το δε, χωρις των ειδων, το δια ΜΕΤΡΩΝ ΕΝΙΑ ΜΟΝΟΝ περαινεσθαι.
Some commentators, I know, endeavour to evade the force of this expression, by saying, that Aristotle means, by δια μετρων μονον
, only the noted declamation, which, being a sort of recitative, was not regarded as strictly musical, nor denominated μελος
.
λέξις
, Speech, is applied by him afterwards in a similar manner; ΛΕΞΙΣ όλα ΧΟΡΟΥ.
λεγεσθαι
is also by Τα μεν λεγεσθαι παρα την κρουσιν, τα δε ᾳδεσθαι.
λεξις
or λεγεσθαι
, in this comparative way, to such kind of singing as most resembles speech, and another, to say roundly, that some parts of Tragedy made use of metre, or verse, only; and that too, immediately after having fixed the exclusive sense of μονον
, by enumerating the three ήδυσματα
of Tragic diction, which he asserts to be separately used in different parts, i. e. ῥυθμου, άρμονια, μετρον
, — RHYTHM, MELODY, and METRE. ῥυθμον, και άρμονιαν, και ΜΕΛΟΣ.
On comparing this passage with Aristotle's other enumerations of the three means of imitation in cap. i. especially at the end of it, where Tragedy is mentioned as using all those means, κατα μερος . . . ῥυθμῳ, και μέλει
(which is synonymous to άρμονια
elsewhere,) και ΜΕΤΡΩΙ
,—one, I think, can entertain any degree of doubt, as to the truth of και ΜΕΤΡΟΝ.
μετρων
here be taken in the loose and comparative sense contended for, when, in the very words immediately preceding, it is carefully limited to its strict and proper sense, by being expressly discriminated from melody, as well as from rhythm?
But after all, the fact, that the Greek Tragedy was sung throughout, though often asserted, has not yet been proved; nor do I think that it can be proved; at least, by any passage of ancient authors, that I have seen adduced to prove it. The
"bout à l'autre,"like our operas.
"Il ne paroit pas qu'on puisse douter que ces cantiques ne se chantassent; mais de cela même je crois pouvoir conclurre, que tout le reste se chantoit, quoique differemment: car le bon sens, et ce que les anciens nous disent, nous conduit à penser que leur recitation etoit partout de même nature, et qu'elle ne se bigarroit point, tantôt d'une simple declamation, et tantôt d'un chant musical."By the same presumptive mode of arguing, the Abbé might also have proved,
A thorough discussion of all the passages of ancient authors, that throw any light upon this question, relative to the dramatic representations of the Greeks, would draw me much too far beyond my bounds. I must content myself with pointing out (for I think it has not been observed,) the stubborn difficulty which this passage of Aristotle appears to me to throw in the way of the common opinion upon this subject; and with hazarding a merely hypothetical conjecture, that, if, as Aristotle seems plainly to say, some part of the Greek Tragedy was spoken, like our Tragic declamation, without any musical accompaniment, it was, most probably, that part of the dialogue, which, as I have before observed, in NOTE 33, is, in every Tragedy, easily distinguished from the rest, by its being carried on in a sort of quick repartee of verse to verse.
But what, again, are we to understand by—και παλιν ἐτερα δια μελους
?—Are we to repeat μονον
, and understand Melody alone, without the two other ήδυσματα
, Rhythm and Metre? This cannot be. For though we may strip the Tragic language of melody and of rhythm, or, in other words, of Music, we cannot strip it of metre. The ancients most certainly did not admit prose into their Tragedies; and as little can we conceive them to have set prose to Music. μελους
here, Music, including rhythm. This sense of the word is certainly warrantable; but it can hardly be the sense here: for, surely, an instance, in which all the three ήδυσματα
were used, (as they must be, if metre be indispensable, and μελος
imply rhythm and melody,) would be but a strange illustration of the ΧΩΡΙΣ ἐκαστου των ειδων
κ. τ. αλ.
I do not see what remains, but, that we take μελος
here in its most restrained sense, as distinct from rhythm, or time, and synonymous to άρμονια
; that sense, in which Aristotle had used it before, in his first chapter.
ήδύσματα
of Tragic speech or language: λέγω δε ήδυσμενον μεν ΛΟΓΟΝ τον ἐχοντα ῥυθμον
, &c. — Words, therefore, are equally implied in all these ήδυσματα
, and, consequently, Music alone i. e. instrumental Music, is here entirely out of the question.
ῥυθμῳ και ΜΕΛΕΙ και μετρῳ
, answering to his first division, ῥυθμῳ και λογῳ και ΑΡΜΟΝΙΑ
. The word ΜΕΛΟΣ
, it may be useful to observe, occurs in three different musical senses. 1. Sometimes, as here, and in the Greek writers on Music, in the same sense as άρμονια
i. e. melody, abstracted from rhythm, or time. Thus, Aristides Quintilianus, p. 32,
μελωδια
, &c. 2. Sometimes, for air, or measured melody; as in the definition of Bacchius, p. 19. (Ed. Meib.) 3. Sometimes it is used as equivalent to song, including melody, rhythm, and words. Thus Plato — το ΜΕΛΟΣ ἐκ τριων ἐστι συγκειμενον, λόγου τε, και άρμονιας, και ῥυθμου. Rep. iii. p. 398. D. In another place, however, he uses it in the first and narrowest sense, for mere melody: ΜΕΛΟΣ δ'αυ ΚΑΙ ῥυθμον ἀνευ ῥηματων
, De Leg. ii. p. 669. This third, and fullest sense of the word is what μελος τέλειον
. p. 6.
"The melody of ancient declamation,"
&c. —
Whether the monologues, or long speeches—the μακραι ῥησεις
, as τα μεν [sc. των ἰαμβειων] ΛΕΓΕΣΘΑΙ παρα την κρουσιν
) ᾳδεσθαι
, which is opposed to it, must of course imply, not mere singing as opposed to speech, but a more musical and measured melody.
I have ventured to depart from the common interpretation, by understanding the word δυναμις
, here, to mean, not the power, and effect, of the Melopæia itself, but the power, i. e. the meaning, of the term. Aristotle is here, as usual, explaining the terms he had made use of. It was directly to his purpose to say, as a reason for omitting a definition in this instance, that the meaning of the word was well known; but not at all to his purpose, to say—"I need not explain the word, because the power and effect of the thing signified by it, (that is, of Music,) is well known."
"après bien des recherches,"
he discovers one principal cause to have been this—that they had very musical ears; but he does not dis-
In the
γνωμηby
καθολου ἀποφανσις. [Lib. ii. cap. xxi. p. 572.] Thus below, in this chapter, for,
ἀποφαινονται γνωμην, his first expression, we have,
καθολου ἀποφαινονται. — This has been loosely and inaccurately rendered in all the translations I have seen, except those of
οὐκ ὀλιγοι
, "not a few," be tortured into, "all," or, "almost all?" Yet so ὡς εἰπειν
, to be applied? to οὐκ ὀλιγοι
, or, to ειδεσι
? In the midst of these difficulties, all I could do was to make my version consistent with itself; faithful to the original, I could not make it, without making it nonsensical. Those commentators, who apply the ὡς εἰπειν
to the word ειδεσι
, seem favoured by ch. xii. where, speaking of the same essential parts of Tragedy, Aristotle says—οἷς μεν ΩΣ ΕΙΔΕΣΙ δει χρησθαι
.
See Ethic. Nicom. I. 5, 7, 8. ed. Wilk. & Mag. Moral. I. 4, p. 149, 150, ed. Duval.
This receives illustration from what Aristotle presently after says, of "the rhetorical manner prevailing in the Poets of his time:" οἱ δε νυν, ῥητορικως.
cap. vi: and from his observation, at the close of cap. xxiv. [Transl. Part III. Sect. 6.] that "the manners and sentiments are only obscured by too splendid a diction."
What he has here said of the recent Tragedies of his time, may perhaps be said, in general, of our modern Tragedies, compared with those of ἦθος
, is the peculiar province of Comedy, and is seldom to be found in Tragedy, except in that stage of its progress, when it is not yet thoroughly and distinctly separated from Comedy;
Illud (ἦθος) Comœdiæ, hoc (παθος) Tragœdiæ, simile.
Quintil. p. 302, ed. Gib. ἦθος
, than the Tragedies of "Addison,"
says "speaks the language of Poets, and Shakspeare, of men. The composition refers us only to the writer; we pronounce the name of Cato, but we think on Addison."
I see not the smallest reason for the substitution of ἀγαθων
, for ἀγαθα
, which is the reading, we are told, of all the MSS. What Aristotle had said before of ότι κρειττους εικαζε
—seems not to afford the slightest ground for alteration here. [See Mr. Winstanley's ed. p. 281.] Painters are compared in very different points of view, in these two passages: there, as imitating good or bad, serious or ridiculous, elevated or low, objects: here, only as expressing, or not expressing, manners. It was directly to Aristotle's purpose to say, that ἀγαθος ήθογραφος
)—not at all to his purpose, (besides the awkwardness of the expression itself,) to say, that he was a "manner-painter of good men:" (ἀγαθων ήθογραφος
).
— άπλουν
, says και ἀποιητον, το ἦθος.
Sect. 28. And see Longinus, Sect. 9, where he very justly calls the κωμῳδια τις ήθολογουμενη
.
I hope I shall not much shock even the most conscientious adherents to the established inaccuracy and authentic blunders of ancient manuscripts, by having ventured to adopt here the transposition first proposed, I believe, by "Ed é da sapere, che di sotto si truovano in luogo non convenevole queste parole, παραπλησιον . . . εικονα. Le quali parole debbono seguitare prossimamente dopo πραγματων,"
&c. παραπλησιον γαρ ἐστι—κ. τ. αλλ.—γραφεας, εικονα
,—first, where it stands in all the editions, and then, where I have placed it, immediately after the words—ἐχουσα δε μυθον και συστασιν πραγματων
.
πραγματων
, but after ἀναγνωρισεις
, in the next sentence. See his note, in Goulston's ed. or the Ox. ed. 1780.
Aristotle argues here upon a principle rather rhetorical and popular, than philosophical—that, which infers superior worth from superior difficulty and rarity: —το χαλεπώτερον και σπανιώτερον, μείζον
, (sc. αγαθον
,) as he lays it down in his Rhetoric, lib. i. cap. vii. p. 529.
"A man shall ever see, that when ages grow to civility and elegancy, men come to build stately SOONER than to garden finely; as if gardening were the greater perfection."
The truth, however, of the fact here asserted by Aristotle, appears, not only from the earlier dramatic Poets of every nation, but from the defects of plots in general, whether Dramatic or Epic; and from the rarity of those dramatic fables, for which the Poet has trusted entirely to his own invention, without recourse to history, or novels, or the productions of other dramatists.
"En general, il y a plus de pieces bien dialoguées, que de pieces bien conduites. Le Génie qui dispose les incidens, paroit plus rare que celui qui trouve les vrais discours. Combien de belles scènes dans Moliere!—On compte ses dénouemens heureux. On seroit tenté de croire qu'une drame devroit être l'ouvrage de deux hommes de génie, l'un qui arrangeât, et l'autre qui fit parler."
—Diderot, de la Poes. Dram. p. 288.
Aristotle is not here defining Διανοἰα
, as his expression, τουτο δε ΕΣΤΙ
, seems, at first view, to imply: he is only explaining the subservience of the sentiments to the manners; he is shewing why they are next in rank and importance to the manners; namely, because manners or characters, are, in great part at least, manifested by the sentiments.
"Aristote suit
Ὅπερ, ἐπι των λόγων, της πολιτικής και ῥητορικης ἔργον ἐστιν.
— I have not seen the words, ἐπι των λογων
, satisfactorily explained. I cannot agree with those commentators, who by λογοι
, here, understand, oratory, prose eloquence, as opposed to Poetry: a sense, indeed, very common, in Aristotle and other writers; but if we adopt it here, how follows—ὁι ΓΑΡ ἀρχαιοι πολιτικώς ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝ λέγοντας
? for here, Aristotle evidently speaks of Poets; not of orators, as Dacier renders it. The passage, then, fairly translated, would stand thus:—"which, (i. e. the choice of proper sentiments,) in ORATORY, is the business of the political and rhetorical arts: FOR the antient Tragic Poets made their characters speak politically," &c. Nothing can well be more incoherent. Επι των λόγων
, means, I think, in the ηθος
or character, and in which the Poet was, of course, to draw his διανοια
, or thoughts, principally at least, from different sources; not from the stores of civil wisdom, or rhetorical art, but from those of Religion, Ethics, Mythology, and Poetry. The word λογοι
, is clearly used in the same sense, in a passage that presently follows:—διοπερ ἐκ ἐχεσιν ήθη ἐνιοι των ΛΟΓΩΝ
—"some of the speeches, or the dialogue."
Οι μεν γαρ άρχαιοι ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΣ ἐποιουν λεγοντας, οι δε νυν, ῥητορικως.
— So, Rhet. lib. ii. cap. xxii. p. 573, ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩι συλλογισμῳ
—a Civil or Oratorical syllogism, as opposed to the strict dialectic syllogism: a distinction which he presently after expresses by, ἀκριβεστερον
, and ΜΑΛΑΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ, συλλογίζεσθαι
[ibid.] And thus, here, the same term, πολιτικως
, is used, to distinguish the popular, and less laboured, though more solid, eloquence of the Senate or the Forum, from the studied and declamatory composition of the professed rhetoricians. A similar use of the word occurs in the passage quoted in NOTE 229, from the Euagoras of Isocrates, where, ὀνομασι ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΟΙΣ
, is plainly synonymous with ὀνομασι ΚΥΡΙΟΙΣ
. See also Dion. Halicarn. De Struct. Orat. p. 4. ed. Upton, and Faber's note.
That Aristotle, however, by Politics (ἡ πολιτικη
), means only, as Dacier asserts, "l'usage commun, le langage ordinaire des peuples,"
cannot, surely, be admitted. The force and extent of the term is well known"CIVILIS SCIENTIA,"
"idem quod SAPIENTIA est."
It comprehended all the necessary knowledge of the Πολιτικά
, the vir civilis
, the public man. It included, of course, eloquence, or the faculty of public speaking, but that, of a kind very different from the "umbratile genus,"
as Cicero calls it, of the rhetorical schools"Illud quidem nemo non fateatur necesse est, iis qui se ad agendum comparent, utiliorem longè Euripidem fore. Namque is, et in sermone—magis accedit oratorio generi, et sententiis densus; et in iis quæ à sapientibus tradita sunt, penè ipsis par, et in dicendo ac respondendo cuilibet eorum qui fuerunt IN FORO DISERTI comparandus."
That Dacier, with so precise and clear an expression before his eyes, as, ΕΠΟΙΟΥΝ λεγοντας
, should understand this of the antient orators, and roundly pronounce Victorius to be mistaken in applying it to the Poets, seems perfectly unaccountable. I do not see in this passage any foundation for the refinement of Castelvetro, Dacier, and other commentators, who refer the ἐνοντα
to the political science, and the ἁρμοττοντα
to rhetoric. The word ἁρμοττοντα
, has, I think, the same sense as in cap. xv. and means, such sentiments, or thoughts, as, being adapted to the person speaking, are expressive of the manners: for it is in this view, as I before remarked, that Aristotle is here considering the Sentiments, or Διανοια
. Τα ἐνοντα
, as Victorius has observed, is equivalent to τα ὑπαρχοντα
; and it was clearly the business of rhetoric (ῥητορικης ἔργον
,) to teach both the ὑπαρχοντα
and the ἁρμοττοντα
. See Rhet. lib. ii. cap. xxii. p. 573, E. and lib. iii. cap. vii. p. 590, D. ed. Duval.
The reading I have followed is, I think, fully authorised, by MSS. and by common sense. See Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 282.—The Abbé Batteux has given the passage thus, from a MS. (No. 2117,) in the King of France's library. Ἔστι δε ήθος μεν το τοιοῦτον, ὃ δηλοι την προαιρεσιν, ὁποια τις ἐσιν· διοπερ ἐκ ἐχεσιν ἠθη ἐνιοι των λογων, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐστι δηλον ὅτι προαιρειται η φευγει ὁ λεγων.
The common reading stands thus:—Ἔστι δε ήθη μεν το τοιουτον, ὃ δηλοι την προαιρεσιν, ὁποια τις ἐσιν, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐστι δηλον, προαιρειται, η φευγει ὁ λέγων· διοπερ ἐκ ἐχεσιν ήθη ἐνιοι των λογων.
— Which is thus rendered by Mr. Harris: "MANNERS OF CHARACTER is that which discovers WHAT THE DETERMINATION [of a speaker] will be, in matters, where IT IS NOT YET MANIFEST, whether he chuses to do a thing, or to avoid it."
ηθος
, in any play, after the first discovery of the speaker's character. In the ηθος
, no sentiments that mark his character, in any thing he says during the rest of the play?
την προαιρεσιν ὑποια τις ἐστιν
, are not, I think, rendered with Mr. Harris's usual accuracy, "what the determination of a speaker will be." Προαιρεσις
, here, is not particular determination, but that habitual and general propensity which is the cause of particular determinations.ηθος
at all in any part of that drama: for the προαιρεσις
or propensity of the Miser is completely known to every reader or spectator from the very title of the piece. I know, indeed, that Le Bossu, and others, have given a meaning to this passage, by making Aristotle say, what he certainly does not say—viz. when it is not yet manifest "ex indicio dicentis," what the will, or choice, of the speaker is. But if the common reading were right, we might, surely, expect to find the words, ἐν οἷς ἐκ ἐστι δηλον
, &c. subjoined in other places where he defines the ηθος
. Yet we have nothing like it in cap. xv. initio; nor in the second book of his Rhetoric, where he says only, ηθος δ᾽ ἐχεσιν λογοι, ἐν ὁσοις δηλη ἡ προαιρεσις
: nor in other passages of the same work, relative to the same subject. Piccolomini's translation agrees with mine, and is expressed with his usual accuracy. "—Ma il costume nel parlar' é quello, il quale mostra fuora, è apparir fà il volere, et l'elettion di chi parla. Peroche alcuni parlari si truovano, li quali non hanno costume; come ch' in essi non appaia, et non si manifesti, quello, che elegga, ò fugga, con la sua volontà, chi parla."
See Harris, Philol. Inq. Part II. ch. v. These definitions must be understood wholly to refer to the wants, and expectations, of the spectator. He must want nothing before the beginning, nor expect any thing after the end. Nothing, however, is more common than both these defects; than perplexed beginnings, and unsatisfactory conclusions. Henry Fielding, we are told, used "to execrate the man who invented fifth acts."
δουναι
, as Aristotle well expresses it, ὥσπερ ἐις την χειρα, την ἀρχην
—"to put the beginning fairly into the spectator's hand." The spectator, and even the reader, of a new Comedy, is generally employed, during the first scenes, in guessing an ænigma; and when, at length, he comprehends what is going forward, his attention, interest, and sympathy, are disturbed and distracted, by looking back, to understand what he should have understood at first. Hence the advantage which the Tragic Poet, from the notoriety of his subjects, generally possesses over the Comic; and which is so pleasantly described in the fragment preserved by Athenæus from Antiphanes or Aristophanes:—
Μακαριον ἐστιν ἡ Τραγῳδια
Ποιημα κατα παντ· ἐιγε πρωτον οι λογοι
Υπο των θεατων εισιν ἐγνωρισμενοι
Πριν και τιν ἐιπειν, ὡς ὑπομνησαι μονον
Δει τον ποιητην. Οιδιπουν γαρ ἀν γε φω,
Τα δ άλλα παντ᾿ ἰσασιν· ὁ πατηρ Λαϊος,
Μητηρ Ιοκαστη· θυγατερες, παιδες, τινες –
Τι πεισεθ' ἐτω, τι πεποιηκεν—ἂν παλιν
Ειπη τις Αλκμαιωνα, και τα παιδια
Παντ᾽ ἐυθυς ἐιρηκεν ὅτι μανεις ἀπεκτονε
Την μητερα. —
Ἡμιν δε ταυτ᾿ ἐκ ἐστιν· άλλα παντα δει
Ευρειν, ὀνοματα καινα, τα διῳκημενα
Προτερον, τα νυν παροντα, την καταστροφην,
Την ἐσβολην· ἂν ἐν τι τετων παραλιπη
Χρεμης τις, ή Φειδων τις, ἐκσυριττεται,
ΠΗΛΕΙ δε ταυτ᾿ ἐξεστι και ΤΕΥΚΡΩΙ ποιον.
Scilicet Tragedia
Felix poema est: nam principio cognitum
Argumentum omne spectatori est, antequam
Verbum hiscat aliquis: nomen tantum dicere
Poetræ satis est. Oedipum præscripsero,
Jam reliqua per se norunt; pater est Laïus,
Jocasta mater; tum qui nati et filiæ,
Quid fecit, quid patietur. Si promiserit
Alemæona alius, ipsi dicent pueruli,
"Hic ille est qui interfecit matrem insaniens."—
At nobis ista non licent, sed omnia
Sunt invenienda, nomina imprimis nova,
Res antegestæ, res præsentes, exitus,
Initia. Ex illis siqua pars defecerit,
Exsibilatur Phido, sive ille est Chremes;
Illa alia facere Peleo et Teucro licet.
When the middle of a drama is not sufficiently connected with what precedes, that is, in Aristotle's language, when it is not, ἀυτο μετ᾿ άλλο
, a new plot seems to begin: a fault not uncommon in double and complicated fables. If, on the other hand, it wants the μετ' ἐκεινο ἑτερον
, the piece seems finished before its time. The Sampson Agonistes of Milton, according to Dr. Johnson, is deficient in both requisites of a true, Aristotelic middle. Its "intermediate parts have neither cause nor consequence, neither hasten nor retard the catastrophe."
μετ' ἐκεινο ἑτερον πεφυκεν ἐιναι
,) would put even the most attentive spectator into the situation of Shakspeare's drowsy tinker:
Spectatores, Fabula hæc est acta: vos plausum date.
Spectatores, quod futurum est intus, hic memorabimus.
Hæc Casina hujus reperietur filia esse è proxumo;
Eaque nubet Euthynico nostro herili filio.Ne expectetis dum exeant huc: intus despondebitur;
Intus transigetur, si quid est quod restat.
"Le spectateur en effet seroit-il content s'il ignoroit le sort de Jocaste, d'Oedipe, et de sa famille?"
"Oedipus,"
"is fully acquainted with his fate at the end of the fourth act. Voila donc la piece finie."
"Il faut aussi prendre garde que la catastrophe achéve pleinement le Poeme dramatique; c'est à dire, qu'il ne reste rien aprés, ou de ce que les spectateurs doivent sçavoir, ou qu'ils vueillent entendre; car s'ils ont raison de demander, Qu'est devenu quelque personnage interessé dans les grandes intrigues du Theatre, ou s'ils ont juste sujet de sçavoir, Quels font les sentimens de quelq'un des principaux acteurs aprés le dernier evenement qui fait cette catastrophe, la piece n'est pas finie, il y manque encore un dernier trait'."
τελευτη
, or end—that, after which, άλλο οὐδεν ΠΕΦΥΚΕΝ ἐιναι
.
Αλλα τοδε γε οιμαι σε φαναι ἀν δειν, παντα λογον ΩΣΠΕΡ ΖΩΟΝ συνεσταναι, σωμα τι ἐχοντα αυτον αὑτου ὡστε μητε ΑΚΕΦΑΛΟΝ ειναι μητε ΑΠΟΥΝ, άλλα ΜΕΣΑ τε εχειν, και ΑΚΡΑ, πρεποντα άλληλοις και τω ὍΛΩ.
Plato, in Phædro, p. 264, ed. Ser.
There is something singular, something, at least, not quite consonant to modern ideas, in the great stress which the antients appear to have laid upon size, as a necessary constituent of beauty in the human form. They seem, indeed, to have despised every thing that was not large; and to have estimated beauty, not by measure only, but by weight also. "Magnanimity,"
"consists in greatness of soul, as beauty also consists in greatness of body. Little men may be called
άστειοι
, and συμμετροι
, pretty, and well-shaped, but not ΚΑΛΟΙ
, handsome, or beautiful."
—ΘΗΛΕΙΩΝ δε ἀρετη, σωματος μεν, καλλος και ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ.
Rhet. i. cap. v. Homer seldom omits size in his descriptions of this kind.
Ἔσκε δε πατρος ἐμοιο γυνη Φοινίσσ᾽ ἐνι οικῳ,
Καλη τε ΜΕΓΑΛΗ τε, και ἀγλαα ἔργ᾽ ειδυῖα.ἐπει περιεσσι γυναικων
Ειδός τε, ΜΕΓΕΘΟΣ τε, ἰδε φρενας ἔνδον ἐἴσας.
Αμβροτα δωρα δίδου, ἱνα μιν θησαιατ᾿ Αχαιοἰ
Καλλει μεν οι πρωτα προσωπα τε καλα καθηρεν
Αμβροσιῳ, οἱῳ περ ἐϋστεφανος Κυθέρεια
Χριεται, ἐυτ᾿ ἂν ἴῃ Χαριτων χορον ἱμεροεντα·
Και μιν ΜΑΚΡΟΤΕΡΗΝ ΚΑΙ ΠΑΣΣΟΝΑ θηκεν ιδεσθαι.
Ἡρη δ αυτῃσιν περι πασεων δωκε γυναικων
Ειδος και πινυτην, ΜΗΚΟΣ δ᾽ ἐπορ᾿ Αρτεμις άγνη.Ἑιλετο δε κληιδ᾽ ἐυκαμπεα ΧΕΙΡΙ ΠΑΧΕΙΗ.
Od. Φ. 6. —which Ernestus, who allows, that, "manu crassâ, non benè convenit feminæ pulchræ et reginæ,"
would fain soften down into the main potelée
of the French.
"cui validissima quæque forma, etiam in fæminis, placet;"
"id amplius atque augustius ratus:"
and, indeed, these ideas of the antients relative to beauty, both male and female, seem to have been owing, in part, at least, to their ideas of that majesty and dignity, which they considered as essential attributes of their divinities, and which imply superior size and strength. To tell a lady that she was taller and stouter than most of her sex, was a great compliment: it was comparing her to a goddess. It seems, then, that Shakspeare, in the quarrel between Helena and Hermia in his
Now I perceive that she hath made compare
Between our statures; she hath urged her height,
And with her personage, her tall personage,
Her height, forsooth, she hath prevail'd with him.
Why will you suffer her to flout me thus?
Let me come to her.
You minimus of hind'ring knot-grass made,
You bead, you acorn!
I am by no means perfectly satisfied of the integrity of this passage; but no better comment can, I think, be given upon it, as it stands, than that of Beni.
"Non priora [i. e. quæ valdè pusilla,] quia eorum spectatio [
θεωρια
] momento penè temporis fiat, ac propterea spectatio ipsa confundatur; quod est, tantâ celeritate comprehendantur ac veluti absorbeantur partes omnes, ut non liceat partem à parte, ut caput à thorace, internoscere, atque adeo partes conferre mutuò, symmetriamque et proportionem agnoscere et æstimare. Non posteriora, [i. e. valdè magna,] quia, è contrario, in tam ingenti mole ac magnitudine, partium multitudo cognitionem impediat, quæ non possit simul [ἅμα
] haberi: dum enim spectatur una, propter distantiam deperit et evanescit [οἴχεται
] cognitio alterius; ita ut unum et totum non appareat animal."
The reader may, after this, be amused with seeing what strange work Lord Shaftesbury has made with this passage in his explanatory translation of it.
ΕΥΣΥΝΟΠΤΟΝ
—No words furnish a more striking proof of the richness, compression, force, and convenience, of the Greek language, than those which Aristotle here uses; ευσυνοπτον, ἐυμνημονευτον, συνδηλον
. The reader needs only see to what a feeble length of periphrastic wire-drawing a translator is reduced, if he would give their full value: "Easily comprehended by the eye."
"Que l'œil puisse comprendre et mesurer aisement et tout d'un coup."
"Qui puisse être saisi d'un même coup d'œil."
"Un tout ensemble où la vue ne s'égare point."
Of the same kind are the words, ἐυεπακολουθητον
—"such as the understanding can easily follow and keep up with"εὐανάπνευστος
, of a period, "that does not put one out of breath"
The supposition of a hundred Tragedies performed in concurrence seems merely to be a sort of hyperbolical fling at the known intemperance of the Athenian people with respect to theatrical exhibitions; and Dacier has rightly, I think, accounted for this exuberantia orationis
, as Victorius calls itQuis enim non intelligit hanc (i. e.
ἐκατον Τραγωδιας
) exuberantiam orationis esse?"S'il falloit jouer cent Tragedies en un jour."
"Si centum Tragœdiæ, verbi gratiâ, totis illis spectaculorum diebus recitandæ proponerentur;"
ὥσπερ ποτε και άλλοτε ΦΑΣΙ
. Thus much, however, as to the limited length of these performances, we may easily conceive; that when, to gratify the immoderate fondness of the Athenians for the drama, an uncommon number of Tragedies were exhibited in concurrence, and the contending Poets were apt to encroach upon the patience of the audience, by lengthening out their pieces in order to shew off themselves, or their actors
Mr. Hume, in his "in all productions, as well as in the Epic and Tragic, a certain unity is required,"
"that the unity of action which is to be found in biography or history, differs from that of Epic Poetry, not in kind, but in degree."
περι ἐνα
,) has no unity, no relation of cause and effect, &c. to connect the incidents;
"requires a stricter and closer unity in the fable;"
"because Hercules was one, so also must be the fable, of which he was the subject,"
This chapter, in which Aristotle considers so particularly the unity of fable, as distinct from its totality, led me once to think it probable, that the word μιας
was originally in the definition of Tragedy, cap. vi. as we find it afterwards in cap. xxiii. περι ΜΙΑΝ πραξιν όλην και τελειαν
. But perhaps the supposition is unnecessary, and unity may be sufficiently implied in the words τελειας και όλης
: ΟΛΟΤΗΤΟΣ
, as he elsewhere says, ΕΝΟΤΗΤΟΣ ΤΙΝΟΣ ΟΥΣΗΣ
.
Ἢτοι δια τέχνην, Ἢ ΔΙΑ ΦΥΣΙΝ
. It appears from this, as well as from other passages of Aristotle's treatise, that in the midst of all the coldness of philosophical investigation and analysis, he never lost sight of the difference between that spontaneous operation of genius and feeling in the Poet, which produces poetic beauty, and the slow and cautious process of calm examination and inquiry in the Critic, whose business it is to discover its principles. It is not every philosophical critic that avoids this error. Nothing is more common, than to suppose that to have been produced by art and reflection, about which, when produced, art and reflection have been employed. Thus languages, we are told, must have been originally formed by art, because they cannot be analysed without art:
Οδυσσειαν γαρ ποιων, ἐκ ἐποιησεν ἅπαντα όσα αυτῳ συνεβη—ΑΛΛΑ περι μιαν πραξιν, οἱαν λεγομεν την Οδυσσειαν, ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΑΝ.
So the text stands. "Non cecinit omnia----sed quæ circa unam solam actionem, qualem Odysseam dicimus, constituerunt."
ΑΛΛ' Ἃ
, and ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ
; but does injustice, I think, to his own reading, by his construction and his version: πέρι μιαν πραξιν συνεστησεν
: "circa unam actionem-MANSIT."
ἀλλα περι μιαν πραξιν, οἱαν λεγομεν, την Οδυσσειαν συνεστησεν· ὁμοἰως δε και την Ιλιαδα.
[fc. συνεστησεν
]. "Sed circa unam actionem, qualem dicimus, Odysseam constituit; pariterque Iliadem."
συνεστησαν
with the plural neuter, ἅ
, is avoided; and the word συνεστησεν
retains its proper and usual sense, as applied, throughout, by Aristotle, to the composition, or construction, of the Fable. So, cap. ix. συστησαντες τον μύθον
. cap. xvii. and xxiii. τους μύθους συνισταναι
ἀλλ' ἅ
, besides its support from MSS. answers better to the ἅπαντα όσα
, which precedes: οὐκ ἐποιησεν ΑΠΑΝΤΑ όσα αυτῳ συνεβη—ΑΛΛ' Ἃ περι μ. π. &c.
But, if ἀλλ' ἅ
be retained, the passage, I think, should stand thus:—ἀλλ' ἅ περι μιαν πραξιν, [sc. ἐστι,] οἱαν λεγομεν την Οδυσσειαν, ΣΥΝΕΣΤΗΣΕΝ.
"quelle cose accolfe, ch'al corpo d'una attione, la qual chiamiamo Odissea, servissero:"
"Il a rapproché tout ce qui tenoit à une seule action."
συνεστησεν περι μιαν πραξιν
: i. e. composed his fable of those circumstances only, which relate to one action. Thus, immediately after—τα ΜΕΡΗ ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΑΙ των πραγματων
. Unwilling to make alterations that do not appear absolutely necessary, I have followed this last reading though with some remaining partiality to my first conjecture. That the sense would be clearer, and the construction less elliptical and embarrassed, is certain. But I am afraid this is but a questionable proof of corruption in the writings of Aristotle.ἀλλα περι μιαν πραξιν, όταν λεγομεν την Οδύσσειαν, συνετήσιν
. His version is "Verum circa unam actionem,, qualem dicimus Odysseam mansit."
"Verum quæ circa unam actionem, qualem Odysseam vocamus, constituit."
"Quæ circa unam, autem, actionem coagmentasse inquit Homerum."
"Quare verè dici potest, ipsum complexum fuisse, quæ circa illam actionem."
ἅ
into ἀλλα
, which he had adopted in his text.
Destroyed, if any part be taken away, (ἀφαιρεμενου
) — disturbed or changed, if it be transposed (μετατιθεμενου
). In the first case it will be no longer a whole; in the last, not the same whole. This seems the meaning, as it is well rendered by M. Batteux:
"Que les parties en soient tellement liées entre elles, qu'une seule transposée, ou retranchée, ce ne soit plus un tout, ou le même tout."
διαφερεσθαι
right. It is rendered by Goulston, "diversum reddatur, et moveatur, totum."
"diverso----e mutato,"
διαφερεσθαι
—i. e. to be made different, or changed. At least I have not found any instance of it in Aristotle's writings. If we retain διαφερεσθαι
, it must, I think, be taken in the sense of ΔΙΑΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ
, spoiled, or destroyed. So in his Topics, ΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ το ΟΛΟΝ
. vol. i. p. 258. B. ed. Duval.
Compare cap. xv. Χρη δε και ἐν τοις ήθεσιν. κ. τ. αλ.
—[Transl. Part II. Sect. 15. p. 93.] The expression, δυνατα κατα το ἀναγκαιον
, "possible---according to necessity," appears strange at the first glance: but in fiction, events may be supposed to happen, as in real life they do happen, not only probably, but necessarily; that is, not only as they were likely to happen, but as, morally speaking, they could not "Puisque la fonction du vraissemblable dans la Tragedie, est d'empêcher l'esprit de s'appercevoir de la feinte, le vraissemblable qui le trompe le mieux est le plus parfait, et c'est celui qui devient necessaire. Un caractere etant supposé, il y a des effets qu'il doit necessairement produire, et d'autres qu'il peut produire, ou ne produire pas."
"La perfection est de faire agir les personnages, de maniere qu'ils n'ayent pas pu agir autrement, leur caractere supposé,"
Ἱσορια ΤΙΣ
—"a sort of history." It is singular, that almost all the translators should have neglected a word so important as the pronoun τις
in this passage. May we not infer from this expression, that if Aristotle had been asked, whether an Epic imitation in prose would be a Poem, or not, he would have allowed it to be, ποιημα ΤΙ
, a kind of Poem, as having the essence of Poetry, invention and imitation? See NOTE V. P. 153.
Σπουδαιότερον
. It means no more than, in plain English, a better thing. The word occurs frequently in Aristotle's works, in this general sense. So, Rhet. I. vii. p. 528, B. και ὧν αἱ ἐπισημαι καλλιους σπουδαιότεραι, και τα πραγματα καλλιω και σπουδαιότερα.
—And, ibid. I. ix. p. 531, E. Και αἱ των φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων (superior by nature) ἀρεται καλλιους, και τα ἐργα· οἱον ἀνδρος [sc. σπουδαιοτεραι αἱ ἀρεται, &c.] γυναικ.
—See, also, Ethic. Nicom. lib. vi. cap. vii. p. 78, C. ἀτοπον γαρ εἴ τις την ἐπισημην πολιτικην -- ΣΠΟΥΔΑΙΟΤΑΤΗΝ οἴεται εἶναι, εἴ μη το ΑΡΙΣΤΟΝ των ἐν τῷ κοσμῳ ἀνθρωπος ἐστι.
Dacier translates the word, "morale;" Batteux, "instructive;" but this is rather giving the reason why it is σπουδαιότερον
, or, a superior thing.
Ιαμβοποιοι
. Strictly, the writers of the ψογοι
or satirical invectives that preceded Comedy. [See cap. iv. Transl. Part I. Sect. 6.] But I believe Aristotle meant here to include, at least, the authors of the first rude Comedy, "of the Iambic form—" της ιαμβικης ιδεας
. See cap. v. Transl. Part I. Sect. 8.
It appears, that the Poem called Ιαμβοι
, whatever it was, was represented, or acted, as well as Tragedy and the Epic: for, in his seventh book De Rep. cap. xvii. the philosopher forbids boys to be spectators of Iambi and Comedies:—τους δε νεωτέρους οὔτ' ΙΑΜΒΩΝ, οὔτε κωμῳδίας ΘΕΑΤΑΣ νομοθετητεον, πριν η κ. τ. ἀλ.
p. 448, E.
This must be restricted to those extraordinary actions and events, of public and elevated personages, which usually make the subject of Tragedy. The best comment I have seen, or that, I think, can be given, on this passage, is that of Piccolomini"La Tragedie ne s'est point sous-divisée" (as Comedy, he observes, had been,) "en Tragedie reelle, et Tragedie de pure imagination. Je crois en trouver la raison dans la nature de l'esprit humain. Il n'y a que la vraissemblance dont il puisse être touché. Or il n'est pas vraissemblable que des faits aussi grands que ceux de la Tragedie, des faits qui n'arrivent que dans les maisons des rois, ou dans le sein des empires, soient absolument inconnus. Si donc le Poete invente tout son sujet, jusq' aux noms, l'esprit du spectateur se revolte; tout lui paroit incroyable, et la piece manque fon effet, faute de vraissemblance. Mais comme la Comedie ne touche que la vie commune et ses ridicules, le spectateur peut supposer et suppose en effet, en se laissant aller à l'enchantement du spectacle, que le sujet qu'on lui présente est un fait réel, quoiqu' il ne le connoisse pas. Il n'en seroit pas de même, si le sujet comique avoit du merveilleux."
So Plato, almost in the same words:—ἐννοησας ότι τον ποιητην δεοι, εἴπερ μέλλοι ποιητης εἶναι, ποιειν ΜΥΘΟΥΣ, ἀλλ' οὐ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ.
— Phædon, p. 61, ed. Serr.
The original, as it stands, (for I doubt of its integrity,) is very ambiguous and obscure. The sense I wished to give it, is this: "Nor will he be the less a Poet, though he should found his Poem upon fact: for nothing hinders, but that some real events may be such, as to admit of Poetic probability; and he who gives them this probability, and makes them such, as Poetry requires, is so far entitled to the name of Poet, or Inventor."
κἂν άρα συμβῃ γενομενα ποιειν, κ. τ. αλ.
—he says, "ad ea solùm dramata referendum, quorum hypothesis ab historiâ est; ut Persarum Æschyli: fabulæ verò totius
συνθεσις
ab ingenio Poetæ."συμβῃ
, I was afterwards glad to find supported by the opinion of Victorius. The expression—ἂν ΣΥΜΒΗι γενομενα ποιειν
,— "if he should εἶναι
, also, is on the same side: "may be," does not suit the sense above given, which requires, "may become"—may be made such by the Poet; not, "may be such," in themselves, which is the obvious meaning of τοιαῦτα ΕΙΝΑΙ
. Farther; Aristotle has just told us, that probability is the Poet's province, and yet, at the same time, that Tragedies were usually founded, and should, in general, be founded, on historical fact. Now it would, surely, be rather strange, after all this, to say, "nothing hinders, but that some real events may be made to have poetic probability:" οὐδεν ΚΩΛΥΕΙ τοιαῦτα εἶναι οἷα ἂν εἴκοτα γενεσθαι, κ. τ. αλ.
But, to the interpretation which I have preferred, these expressions are all exactly suitable, and the meaning and connection of the whole seems to be this:—Aristotle had been opposing Poetry to fact: he had said expressly, that the γενομενα
were the peculiar province of the historian; the οἷα ἂν γενοιτο
, and the εἰκος
, of the
γενομενα
; and therefore, according to your own doctrine, not proper for Poetry, nor the work of a Poet." —To this Aristotle answers, that, though the object of the Poet be not truth, yet his invented probabilities may coincide with truth: and real events, even of the Tragic and extraordinary kind, may have happened as probably and naturally as he has supposed them to happen. He is still, therefore, no less a Poet; not only as having actually invented the incidents, but as having invented them with true Poetic probability. And thus Victorius:—"Non omnes eos qui fortuitò incidant in res quæ exitum jam habuerint, in culpâ esse; quia fieri possit, ut res aliquæ factæ, ita factæ sint, ut verisimile fit illas factas esse; et esse denique ejusmodi, ut effici potuerint; quo nomine (inquit,) ille Poeta eorum aliquo modo est: officium enim Poetæ est, verisimile sectari, et ea quæ effici possunt sumere: quod in illis rebus illo modo factis non desideratur. Retinet igitur, hâc de causâ, nomen Poetæ."
Why, of simple fables—ἁπλων μυθων
? as if the fault here noticed were peculiar to the simple fable; that is, as the term is defined in the following chapter, the fable that is without revolution or discovery. But surely this could not be Aristotle's meaning. Something, I am persuaded, is wrong: but I have no probable conjecture to offer; unless it may be thought probable, that ΑΠΑΝΤΩΝ
, abbreviated perhaps by the transcriber, might be mistaken for ΑΠΛΩΝ
. What Dacier says in his note is ingenious and true; but by no means, I think, fully accounts for Aristotle's expression, which implies more, than that these unconnected Episodes, "se rencontrent plus ordinairement dans les fables simples."
"An valet quicquam ad eum (scrupulum) evellendum, quod Tragedia simplex suâ sponte non valdè elegans est; cui si accesserit hoc vitium, meritò deterrima vocari potest?"
That actors, as well as Poets, contended for the prize in these Tragic games, or ἀγωνες
, might be sufficiently proved by a single passage in the Ethics of Aristotle, where, explaining the difference between προαίρεσις
, and βούλησις
, he says, "we may will, or desire, things not at all in our own power to effect ; as, that such a particular actor may gain the prize :" — ὑποκριτην τινα νικαν, ἢ ἀθλητην
Αγωνισται — ΟΙ ΥΠΟΚΡΙΤΑΙ
, ἐχει μεῖζον δύνανται ΝΥΝ των ποιητων αι ὑποκριται
: "the actors, now, have greater power—are more regarded, and of more importance to the success of the dramas—than the Poets." A revolution somewhat similar is recorded by Plutarch to have happened between the later Dithyrambic Poets and their αυληται
, or flute-players : — το γαρ παλαιον, ἐως εις Μελανιππίδην τον των διθυραμβων ποιητην, συμβεβηκει, τες ΑΥΛΗΤΑΣ παρα των ποιητων λαμβανειν της μισθες, ΠΡΩΤΑΓΩΝΙΣΤΟΥΣΗΣ δηλονότι ΤΗΣ ΠΟΙΗΣΕΩΣ, των δ' αυλητων ΥΠΗΡΕΤΟΥΝΤΩΝ τοις διδασκαλοις· ὑστερον δε [i. e. when, as he says, the music of the flute became more complicated, refined, and difficult,] και τετο διεφθαρη
The effect which this influence of the players might have, in lengthening and disuniting the action, according to Aristotle's complaint here, may be easily imagined. Castelvetro observes, with great probability, of these ill-connected ἐπεισοδια
, "Et, peraventura, queste digressioni fatte per compiacere i rappresentatori, riguardavano più à quello che i rappresentatori sapevano bene contrafare, che alla materia naturale della favola ; accioche essi mostraffero quello che valessero, in quello dove erano piu esercitati, et percio piu agevolmente ottenessero la vittoria."
ὑποκριται
of the Greek Opera—that of setting aside, whenever they please, both the Poet, and the composer, by the introduction of such songs, from other operas, as they think most favourable to the display of their peculiar talents.
"Suum igitur quisque,"
"noscat ingenium, acremque se et bonorum et vitiorum suorum judicem præbeat; ne scenici plus quàm nos videantur habere prudentiæ: illi enim, non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui voce freti sunt, Epigonos, Medumque; qui gestu, Menalippam, Clytæmnestram semper Rutilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam; non sæpe Æsopus Ajacem. Ergo histrio hoc videbit in scenâ, non videbit vir sapiens in vita?"
The influence of modern actors upon the productions of the Poet, is, perhaps, not less than that of the antient ; but it seems to be exerted most frequently in a contrary way, though one full as likely to spoil the ἐφεξης
of the piece—that of lopping. The distress of a Poet on such occasions is represented with true comic force by Mr. Sheridan in his
I cannot agree with the commentators, who render παρα την δυναμιν
, supra id quod ferat
:—referring δυναμιν
to the fable itself. I think it means ultra vires
, beyond the powers of the Poets. And so the Abbé Batteux—"audelà de fa portée."
The greater the length of the fable, the greater, evidently, is the difficulty of filling it up with consistent probability ; without violating that close connection of incidents, and unity of action, which the rules of Aristotle, and the nature of the drama, require.
Ταυτα δε γινεται μαλιστα τοιαυτα, και μαλλον όταν γενηται παρα την δόξαν δι' ἀλληλα.
—This is certainly corrupt ; nor does it seem easy to form any probable conjecture, how it stood, as Aristotle left it. Whether the words, και μαλλον
, be right or not, they serve, as the text at present stands, only to embarrass a passage, which, if we omit them, seems clear enough, both in construction and meaning. In this I perfectly agree with the last Oxford editor
The connection and drift of the whole passage seems to me to be this. Aristotle is here recommending the close connection of incidents, arising probably or necessarily from each other, in a new point of view—as being of great importance, not only to the unity of fable, but to the principal object of Tragedy, the production of terror and pity. For events are best adapted to this purpose, most striking and affecting, when they happen, not only παρα την δόξαν
, but παρα την δόξαν ΔΙ' ΑΛΛΗΛΑ
: when the wonder arises, not only from their happening unexpectedly, but from their being the consequences of events from which no one could have expected them to follow. Thus connected, as cause and effect, they will be more surprising, and consequently more affecting, more terrible or piteousἀπο τε αυτοματο και της τύχης — εἰκη — ΜΕΤ᾿ ἀλληλα
only, not ΔΙ' ἀλληλα
, according to the distinc-
περιπετεια
in the next chapters.Διαφερει πολύ, κ. τ. αλ.
In Plutarch, thus : — και το Μιτιος τε Αργειε, κατα στασιν ἀναιρεθεντος, ἀνδριαντα χαλκουν ἐν ἀγορᾳ, θεας οὔσης, ἐμπεσειν τῳ κτειναντι τον Μίτιον, και ἀνελειν.
It is high time to discard the technical jargon of ἁπλοι
, and πεπλεγμενοι
, by simple, and complicated.
Ἀνευ περιπέτειας ἢ ἀναγνωρισμεως ἡ μεταβασις γινεται.
—Μεταβασις
, is the change of fortune which constitutes the catastrophe of the piece. This, which is common to all Tragedy, must not be confounded with the Περιπετεια
, which, however important, is not essential. Le Bossu, Dacier, and others, by not attending to this distinction, have introduced much confusion into one of the clearest parts of Aristotle's work. Thus, Dacier says—"Il appelle fable simple, celle ou il n'y a ni changement d'etat, ni reconnoissance, et dont le denouement n'est qu'un simple passage de l'agitation et du trouble au repos et à la tranquillité."
μεταβασις
to signify the mere passage, progress, or suite, of the piece"Non si prende
μετάβασις
in questo luogo per mutatione, come credono alcuni, ma per lo processo dell' attione dal principio al fine."μεταβασις
, such a change of fortune as is common to every Tragedy. Ἔστι δε ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγῳδίας, το μεν, δεσις, το δε, λυσις.
λέγω δε δεσιν μεν εἶναι την ἀπ᾿ ἀρχης μεχρι τουτου του μερους ὃ ἔσχατον ἐστιν, ἐξ οὗ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΙΝΕΙ εις ευτυχίαν· λυσιν δε, την ἀπο της ἀρχης ΤΗΣ ΜΕΤΑΒΑΣΕΩΣ μέχρι τέλους.
Mr. Harris, in his μεταβασις
, or change, which Aristotle makes essential to all Tragedy, with that particular kind of change which he denominates περιπετεια
: for he uses, repeatedly, the word revolution, (his translation of περιπετεια
,) to express what Aristotle means by μετάβασις, μεταβαινειν, μεταβαλλειν
. He speaks of μεταβασις
; I do not see that they have, in his sense of περιπετεια
. In neither of those Tragedies can it, I think, be said, that the catastrophe is produced by a sudden change, to the reverse of what is expected, by the spectator, from the circumstances of the action. At least, with respect to
The Abbé Batteux gives, I think very properly, the "La fable simple, qui n' a ni revolution subite, ni reconnoissance; qui commence, continue, s'acheve, sans secousses, ni retours inattendus. Ainsi Polieucte reçoit le baptême, son zele lui fait renverser les autels des payens, il est arrêté, jugé, mis à mort: c'est une fable simple."
συνεχης και μιας
, are not put to characterize the simple fable, as Victorius well observes, but refer merely to that unity and continuity of action, which had been established as necessary to Tragedy in general.
Ἔστι δε περιπετεια μεν, ἡ εις το ἐναντιον των πραττομενων μεταβολη, καθαπερ εἴρηται.
The sense of these words has not, I think, been exactly given in any translation I have yet seen, except that of the accurate and judicious Piccolomini: "La Peripetia intendo io essere una mutation di fortuna, che (fatta nel modo che si é detto,) accaschi al contrario di quello che dalle cose ordite aspettar si potesse."
τα πραττομενα
) have an effect the very reverse of what is expected from them." That this is the meaning, appears plainly from the instance immediately subjoined: ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Οιδιπόδι, ἐλθων ΩΣ ΕΥΦΡΑΝΩΝ τον Οιδίπουν, και ἀπαλλάξων του προς την μητερα φοβου, δηλωσας ὃστις ἦν ΤΟΥΝΑΝΤΙΟΝ ΕΠΟΙΗΣΕ.
As the words—ἡ εις το ἐναντιον των πρατ. μετ.
are rendered by Dacier, and others "changement de fortune en une fortune contraire" — they express nothing but what is common to Tragedy in general; and περιπετεια
is confounded with μεταβασις
. [See last NOTE.] But, it is well observed by Piccolomini, "Non s'hà, parimente, da intendere, quando diciamo la peripetia esser mutation di fortuna, ogni forte di mutatione da una conditione et stato di fortuna ad un' altro; non potendo esser Tragedia alcuna in cui qualche così fatta mutatione non si ritrovi."
περιπετεια
is entirely omitted in the definition; its being surprising, and contrary to expectation. This, it is true,
Περιπέτειαι δε λεγονται τα ΠΑΡ' ΕΛΠΙΔΑ συμβεβηκοτα παντα, και όντως παρα ΤΡΑΓΙΚΟΙΣ ἐτι καλουνται.
μεταβολη, ΠΑΡΑ ΤΗΝ ΔΟΞΑΝ, καθαπερ εἴρηται
: alluding to the latter part of cap. ix. But, as I now understand the passage, this idea is sufficiently implied. The words, καθαπερ εἴρηται
, have puzzled and divided the commentators, by their obscurity of reference. Upon the whole I am inclined to think, they point to what he had said cap. ix. [Transl. Part II. Sect. 7.] which, as I before observed, [NOTE 80,] seems manifestly to be a preparation for this chapter; and in which the words, παρα την δοξαν δ' ἀλληλα
—"events that are unexpected consequences of each other"—answer to the definition of περιπετεια
, as here explained.
That this is the meaning of Aristotle's words, I have no doubt. But, perhaps, even the words themselves have been inaccurately rendered, and πραττομενων
should be constructed, not with μεταβολη
, but with ἐναντιον
: εις το ἐναντιον των πραττομενων
: i. e. in contrarium eorum quæ aguntur
. This was suggested to me by the literal version which the accurate Mr. Harris has given of the words in his Philol. Inq. p. 148.—"A REVOLUTION is, as has been already said, a change into the reverse of what is doing."
Ἐλθων ὡς εὐφρανων τον Οιδίπουν, και ἀπαλλάξων του προς την μητέρα φοβου.
Alluding, probably, to the very words of the messenger in Sophocles:
Τι δητ ἔγωγ' οὐ ΤΟΥΔΕ ΤΟΥ ΦΟΒΟΥ σε, άναξ,
Ἐπείπερ ΕΥΝΟΥΣ ΗΛΘΟΝ, ΕΞΕΛΥΣΑΜΗΝ;
Δυο μεν οὖν του μυθου μερη ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΥΤΑ ἐστι, περιπέτεια και ἀναγνωρισις.
"Circa hæc." About what? What are we to understand by ταυτα
? — Victorius says, τα πραττομενα
; and Dacier, after him, "Qui regardent le sujet." I cannot be satisfied with this. Τα πραττομενα
, the subject, the action, are sufficiently expressed by the word μυθου
. Would Aristotle have said, "These are two parts of the fable relative to the fable?" I have, therefore, neglected the word περι
in my translation, in conformity to the probable conjecture of Madius. Every reader sees how easily it might get into the text from the word περιπετεια
which presently follows. I rather think, however, that, retaining περι
, we should read, περι Τ' ΑΥΤΑ
: "circa easdem res;"—to point out the close connection of these two parts of the fable, as things of the same kind, and counterparts, as it were, to each other, co-operating to the same effect—the production of terror, pity, surprise, &c. And thus they are afterwards mentioned together, as constituting one species of Tragedy: ἡ μεν γαρ, πεπλεγμενη, ἧς το όλον ἐστι ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΓΝΩΡΙΣΙΣ.
[cap. xviii. Transl. Part II. Sect. 19.] The same mode of expression occurs in the Ethics ad Nicom. lib. iv. cap. 13. ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑ ΑΥΤΑ δε σχεδον ΕΣΤΙ και ἡ ἀλαζονειας μεσότης
: "in iisdem vertitur." That is, as appears from the context, the virtue, of which he is there speaking, was of the same kind, or class, with that, which was the subject of the foregoing chapter. Both were among the ἀρεται ὁμιλητικαι
. So, in the conclusion of the subsequent
τρεις οὖν αἱ εἴρημεναι ἐν τῷ βιῳ μεσοτητες ΕΙΣΙ δε πασαι ΠΕΡΙ λογων τινων και πραξεων κοινωνιαν.
It seems hardly reconcilable with philosophical accuracy, to use such an expression as ΠΑΘΟΣ ἐστι ΠΡΑΞΙΣ
—defining the suffering to BE the action that causes the suffering. In his Metaphysics he puts it thus : — τα μεγεθη των συμφορων και λυπηρων ΠΑΘΗ λεγεται.
This word, παθος
, in the sense here used, is very embarrassing to a translator. The word passion, in this sense, of suffering, is, with us, appropriated to a subject, from which it cannot, without a sort of profanation, be transferred to any other. The French, however, have done this without scruple, though the word, when so applied, must be explained before it can be understood. Upon the whole, I could find no single words that seemed to me to answer so nearly to παθος
, and its adjective, παθητικην
, in the sense in which they are used here, and in cap. xviii. as desastre
, is explained in the "Wherein I spoke of most
παθη
] by flood, and field."
Ἐν τῷ φανερῳ θανατοι.
—A plain passage, which the commentators seem to have taken great pains to perplex with difficulties of their own invention. The plain meaning of the expression is, ἐν ὀφθαλμοις φαινομενου ΤΟΥ ΠΑΘΟΥΣ
, as it is expressed in the Rhetoric, lib. ii. cap. viii. p. 560. Aristotle is here only explaining the term παθος
; not laying down a rule, nor deciding concerning the propriety, or impropriety, of such exhibitions. Nothing is more evidently absurd, than the attempts of Dacier and other French critics to transfer the delicacy of their theatre to that of the antients. The scrupulous delicacy of French Tragedy was, I believe, as unknown to the Athenian stage, as its rigid and strutting dignity. A single passage, and that, from the most polished of the three Greek Tragic Poets whose works are extant, may sufficiently prove this; I mean the description of Oedipus tearing out his own eyes, in Sophocles.
Τοιαυτ᾿ ἐφυμνων, πολλακις τε κοὐχ᾿ ἀπαξ
Ἤρασσ᾿, ἐπαιρων βλέφαρα φοινίαι δ᾿ ὁμοῦ
Γλῆναι γενει᾿ ἐτεγγον· οὐδ᾿ ἀνιεσαν
Φονα μύδωσας σταγονας· ἀλλ᾿ ὁμοῦ μελας
Ὄμβρος χαλάζης αιματος ἐτεγγετο.
αιματοεις
. i. e. contracted, ἀιματους
.
"Thus oft exclaiming, he his eyelids raised,
And rent the orbs of sight; the bleeding balls
Imbath'd his cheeks, nor ceased the gushing drops,
But rain'd a shower of black and streaming gore."
"de ne pas ensanglanter le Theatre,"
was not much more strictly observed here by Sophocles, than it was by Shakspeare in his ἐν φανερῳ
, upon the stage.
I cannot quit this instance from Sophocles, without diverting the reader, (for I am persuaded it will divert him,) with Pere Brumoy's apology, or, rather, with the joint apology of him, M. Dacier, and Boileau. "Le grand CORNEILLE et ses successeurs Tragiques, ont crû que ce seroit une chose horrible d'exposer Oedipe aveugle et sanglant aux yeux des spectateurs. M. Dacier leur repond trés-bien par ces vers de DESPREAUX, Art Poet. chant ii."
"Il n'est point de serpent, ni de monstre odieux,
Qui par l'art imité ne puisse plaire aux yeux.
D'un pinceau delicat l'artifice agréable
Du plus affreux objet fait un objet AIMABLE!
Ainsi pour nous CHARMER, la Tragédie en pleurs
D'Oedipe tout sanglant fit parler les douleurs."
"that the antients thought bodily pains and wounds, &c. (
περιωδυνίαι και τρωσεις
) proper objects to be repre-
Μέλαινα τ' ἄκρω τις παρέρρωγεν ποδα Αιμορραγης φλεψ.
The Greek says ἴδια δε, τα ἀπο σκηνης ΚΑΙ κομμοι
. Here, the κομμος
, and the τα ἀπο σκηνης
, are represented as distinct things. But in the definition afterwards, Κομμος
appears to be the name given to the joint lamentation of the chorus and the actors. Κομμος δε, θρηνος κοινος χορου και ἀπο σκηνης
. Victorius states this difficulty, but without giving any satisfactory solution.
κομμος
was the name appropriated to that part of the Χορικον
which joined or alternated with one or more of the — ἀπο σκηνης
— i. e. the actors; so that by, Κομμος δε, θρηνοι κοινά χορου και ἀπο σκηνης
, we are to understand only, that Κομμος
was that θρηνος
or lamentation of the chorus, in which the actors, alternately, took part; as if the Greek had been thus : — θρηνοι χορου ῾ΟΥ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΥΣΙΝ οἱ ἀπο σκηνης
. And so, τα ἀπο σκηνης ΚΑΙ κομμοι
would only mean, the κομμοι
of the chorus with the ἀπο σκηνης
— that is, mixed with the lamentation of the actors, or persons of the drama.
But it seems more for the credit of our philosophical critic, to give up the first of these passages as corrupt, and to adhere to the plain sense of the definition. I have, therefore, taken no notice of the words, τα ἀπο σκηνης
, in my version. Nothing is lost by the suppression. The sense of the word κομμος
is left, like that of the other terms, to be fixed by its definition.
I confess myself not satisfied as to the meaning of this expression, ΟΛΩΝ χορικων μελων
. I have therefore adhered to the fair and literal translation of the words. But what is an entire choral ode or song? Is it that, which is in the regular lyric form, in strophe and antistrophe? So it seems most natural to understand it. But a difficulty meets us. For when the Παροδος
, as it often, and indeed almost always, happens, is not such a regular Antistrophic OdeΠαροδῳ
of the παροδος
and the first Antistrophic Ode? It cannot make a part of the Προλογος
, for that ends with the Παροδῳ
. The Exode is out of the question. There remains only the Episode; and to that it cannot belong, consist-
Επεισοδιον
, because it will not be, according to this sense of ὅλων
, "between entire choral Odes." If we take entire to mean, all choral, i. e. not broken and interrupted by the ἀπο σκηνης
, or the persons of the drama, we shall still be embarrassed with the same difficulty: for, whenever the παροδος
is not, in this sense, entire, which is frequently the case, the part between that and the first entire Ode, will be without a name.
Shall we, then, with some commentators, suppose Aristotle by ὅλων χορικων μέλων
, to have meant only, ὅλου χορου μελων
— i. e. melodies sung by the whole chorus?"Inter plenos choricos cantus; qui scil. ab universo fiebant choro."
Vict. "Pleni integrique cantus."
So Piccol. "Intieri canti."
ὅλου χορου
, which he presently after uses, was so obvious.ὅλων
in their translations.
From an accurate and philosophical writer, one would naturally expect a chapter of definitions to be clear. But whoever expects it here will certainly be disappointed. Almost every definition, to be perfectly intelligible, wants other definitions, which are not given, and which the obscure and imperfect information to be found in other antient authors will not enable us to supply.
Παροδος μεν πρωτη ΛΕΞΙΣ ὁλου χορου.
—Though λεξις
, in its proper signification, is mere speech, yet it appears to have been occasionally extended to such melody as imitated speech, and to have answered nearly to the modern term, λεξις
, either in its literal sense of mere speaking, or in a sense absolutely synonymous with μελος
, as Dacier does.
"Inter plenos choricos cantus; qui scil. ab universo fiebant choro."
Vict. "Pleni integrique cantus."
So Piccol. "Intieri canti."
Heinsius, Dacier, and Batteux, avoid the difficulty by omitting the word ὁλων
in their translations.λεξις
without any reason; and, that the Παροδος
could not be mere speech, or declamation, such as that of our stage, seems evident enough from the expression, λεξις ὉΛΟΥ χορου
. A number may sing together, in a kind of measured recitative, or simple chanting; but they cannot well speak together, without intolerable confusion. This would be that very χορος διαλεκτικος
, which Demetrius mentions as a thing absurd and unheard ofμη τις ειη χορος διαλεκτικος
.
There is a singular passage in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which affords, I think, a strong confirmation, both of the sense which I have here given to the word λεξις
, and of the propriety of its application in that sense to the choral Παροδος
. In the 11th section of his treatise De Struct. Orat. in order to shew, how little prosody was regarded by the composers of the Tragic melodies, he criticises the melody of the following lines from the
Σίγα, σιγα, λευκον ίχνος ἀρβυλης
Τιθείτε, μη κτυπειτε
Αποπροβατ᾿ ἐκεισ᾿, ἀποπροθι κοιτας.
ΜΕΛΟΣ
, and yet represents it as said by Electra: Ευριπίδου ΜΕΛΟΣ, ὁ πεποιηκε την Ηλεκτραν ΛΕΓΟΥΣΑΝ προς τον χορον.
—2. That the melody, to which these words were set, was the simplest possible; a kind of
Σίγα, σίγα, λευκον
—and in other words too, the same tone, as this author clearly informs us, was frequently repeatedἘν γαρ δη τουτοις, το, Σίγα, σίγα, λευκον, ἐφ' ἝΝΟΣ ΦΘΟΓΓΟΥ ΜΕΛΩΔΕΙΤΑΙ.
3dly, This very melody was probably that of the Παροδος
of this Tragedy. Dionysius, indeed, gives these words to Electra; but in all the editions of Euripides which I have seen, the two first lines are given to the chorus; with more propriety, I think, if we attend to what goes before. Electra had just said to the chorus, on their coming in while Orestes was sleeping;
Ω φίλταται γυναικες, ἡσυχῳ ποδι
Χωρείτε, μη ψοφιτε, μηδ' ἔσω κτυπα
πρωτην λεξιν ὁλου χορου
; being all in the regular choral form of Strophe and Antistrophe, and, in all probability, set throughout to melody of the same kind.
Perhaps the whole chorus might not begin to sing, till the third Strophe, Ποτνια, ποτνια νυξ.
—If,
Αἰ, αἰ, Δρομαδες ὡς—κ. τ. αλ.
But, the very application of the word παροδος
, which properly signifies the entry, or arrival of the chorus, to the πρωτη λεξις
, or first speech of the whole chorus, shews, I think, sufficiently, the close connection of the two things—ἡ μεν ΕΙΣΟΔΟΣ του χορου, ΠΑΡΟΔΟΣ.
οὑτω καλειται ἡ πρωτη των χορων ἐπι την σκηνην εισοδος.
But, it may, perhaps, be objected to the distinction I understand here between λεξις
and μελος
, that it will expose us to the very difficulty mentioned in the last Note: it will make Aristotle's enumeration of the parts into which Tragedy is divided, incomplete; because, if we admit it, the part between the Παροδος
and the first Στασιμον
or regular Ode, will want a name. For, if any thing, it must be Επεισοδιον
; but this, it may be said, it cannot be, because it will not be, according to Aristotle's definition, μεταξυ χορικων ΜΕΛΩΝ
; the Parode being not μελος
, but λεξις
.—It seems a sufficient answer to this objection, to observe, that λεξις
, here, is not opposed to μελος
in general, but only to a particular species of μελος
. Strictly speaking, the simplest chant, or even such recitative, as approaches the nearest to common speech, is yet as much μελος
, melody, music, as the most refined Opera song. It is called λεξις
, only comparatively. Nay, the word μελος
is sometimes, in a wider sense, applied even to speech itself. And so, above, we have λεκτικη ἉΡΜΟΝΙΑ
.
χορικων ΜΕΛΩΝ
, may be supposed, without any inconsistence, to include, what, afterwards, in the particular definition of παροδος
, where distinction was necessary, he denominates λεξις
.
It must be owned, that Aristotle's parsimonious brevity has left some confusion in this subject; but, in the illustrations of his commentators, it is "confusion worse confounded." And this has arisen from their applying to the Greek drama, without the slightest foundation, the Roman division into five acts. It is now, I believe, pretty well understood, that such an idea is totally inapplicable to the Greek TragedyΠρολογος
, the Επεισόδιον
, and the Εξοδος
; not upon the number of choral odes, which is different in different dramas. In the μεταξυ ὁλων χορικων μελων
, begins in the Προλογος
, and before the Παροδος
, which, according to Brumoy, must be the second ode. Another ode he is obliged to admit in the middle of his last act; contrary to Aristotle's definition of Εξοδος
.—Dacier makes the prologue of the Ὁρα τις ἀρ ἦν; κ. τ. αλ.
) as I doubt not it is, there will then be four such intervals, and, consequently, six acts. He repeats the same mistakes in dividing the Εἰπερ ἐγω μαντις εἰμι
, (v. 1096,) come in the middle of an act
The expression, ΠΡΩΤΗ λεξις ὁλου χορου
, seems to imply, that other choral parts, beside the Parode, were also λεξις
; i. e. were sung by the whole chorus in the same sort of chanting and simple melody. But who will undertake to distinguish these parts, and to tell us, exactly, what was Air, and what Recitative? what was sung by the whole choir, and what was, à voce sola
?Εἰπερ ΕΓΩ μάντις ειμι
, just referred to, &c.—Neither can we say, what at first view, indeed, seems probable, that whatever appears in the regular Lyric form of Strophe and Antistrophe, was air, as opposed to recitative, or mere chant: for in some Tragedies the Παροδος
itself is in this regular Lyric form; as, in the
The scholiast upon the Παροδος
was sung by the chorus, "as they entered upon the stage." — Παροδος δε, ἐστιν ᾠδη χορου βαδίζοντος, ἀδομενη ἅμα τῇ εισοδῳ, ὡς το—Σιγα, σίγα
, &c. And, indeed, in the example he here gives from the
Αἰδ᾿ οὖν ΠΑΡΕΙΣΙ τοις ἐμοις θρηνημασι
Φίλαι συνῳδοι.
Τύριον οἶδμα λιπουσ'
—v. 212, (not, Καδμεα ἔμολε
—v. 651, as Dacier makes it,) is the true Parode, as, indeed, it is expressly called by the author of the Greek argument prefixed to the
ὄχλος γαρ, ὡς ταραγμος εισῆλθεν πόλιν,
ΧΩΡΕΙ [is coming] γυναικων προς δομους τυραννικους.
Σίγα· ΠΟΡΕΥΟΝΤΑΙ γαρ ΩΔΕ δη τινες
Χρονῳ παλαιοι
Παροδος
immediately follows, v. 117. In the ΧΟ. —ΕΜΟΛΟΝ τι νεον ; &c.
Ουπω----παρεισιν
.
The Parode is not less distinctly marked in the Χο. Ἔκλυον φωναν κ. τ. ἀλ.
in the
When the attendant spirit, in
This Παροδος
, or entry of the chorus, probably made one of the most splendid and popular parts of the ΟΨΙΣ
, or shew, of the antient Tragedy. It is mentioned by Aristotle, in his Παροδος
even of their comic stageκαι κωμῳδοις χορηγων, ἐν τῇ ΠΑΡΟΔΩΙ πορφυραν εισφερων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεις.
— ὥσπερ των χορων
Οὐ παντες ἀδουσ᾿, ἀλλ᾿ ἀφωνοι δυο τίνες
ἢ τρεις παρεστηκασι, ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ΕΣΧΑΤΟΙ,
Ἐις τον ἀριθμον —και τοῦθ᾿ ὁμοιως πως ἔχει
Χωραν κατεχομεν, ζωσι δ᾿ οἷς ἔστιν βιος.
As in a chorus
All do not sing, but, in the hindmost ranks,
Some two or three stand mute to make a number,
So is it here;—we serve to fill a place;
They only live, who have the means of living.
Στασιμον δε, μελος χορου το ἀνευ ἀναπαιστου και τροχαιου.
If we are to understand this strictly, as expressing the exclusion of those feet from the regular odes, I cannot perceive it to be true. Dacier, therefore, understands only, that those feet were very rarely used in those Odes, compared with the Παροδος
, which he calls "premier chant du chœur;" in which, he says, and very truly, that they prevail. "Ces deux pieds----regnent,"
&c. p. 179. It is possible that Aristotle might mean this; but it is not what he says. He says, "that μελος
—that lyric part, of the chorus, which is without anapæsts and trochees." I rather think, he means only those Odes, the regular stanzas of which are not broken and interrupted κατα συστημα
, (according to the metrical language,) like the Parodos, as I take it to be, of the Ἀκτις ἀελίου
—v. 100—that of the Τι χρη
—v. 136, and of the Παροδος
. For, in the Παροδος
itself, the general prevalence of the anapæstic measure must be evident to every one who turns over the Greek Tragedians.
Κομμου Ἡγειτο γυναικων μυρια πληθυς, μετα ΚΟΜΜΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΟΛΟΛΥΓΗΣ
ἀπο σκηνης
, is commonly used by Aristotle to denote the actors, as distinguished from the chorus; because, as Jul. Pollux tells us, ΣΚΗΝΗ μεν ΥΠΟΚΡΙΤΩΝ ἴδιον, ἡ δε ὀρχηστρα του χορου
χορω μεν ἀναρμοστα, τοις δε ἀπο σκηνης οἰκειότερα
.—So, Prob. xxx. and Prob. xv. τα ἀπο σκηνης
, (the dialogue,) is opposed to τα του χορου
the chorus. I was much surprised, therefore, to find the meaning of this phrase so widely mistaken, in the late Camb. edit. where ἀπο σκηνης
is thus explained: "id est, ἀτεχνως—ad choragi munus, non Poetæ, pertinens
An example of the Κομμος
, pointed out by Victorius, may be found in the "dans le cours des actes,"
as Dacier rightly observes. We have an example of this between Tecmessa and the chorus, in the Ἰω, μοι μοι—
. Another occurs very early in the θρηνοι κοινοι
&c. But this, in fact, seems no objection, because the lamentation of Iphigenia is broken off abruptly, as Mr. Markland has well observed, at v. 235, by the arrival of the shepherd. I consider it, therefore, only as an unfinished Κομμος
. But, that it answers to that idea, appears, I think, from the whole cast of it; from the frequent occurrence of the interjections, φευ, φευ, ἐ, ἐ, αἰ, αἰ οἰ μοι
, &c. and of the very word, θρηνος
, throughout, and, from the answer of the chorus:
Ω ὁμωαι, δυσθρηνητοις
Ως θρηνοις ἔγκειμαι.
Χορ. —ΑΝΤΙΨΑΛΜΟΥΣ ᾠδας
Ὕμνον τ᾿ Ασιηταν σοι
Βαρβαρον ἰαχαν
Δεσποινα γ᾿ ἐξαυδασω,
Ταν ἐν ΘΡΗΝΟΙΣΙ μουσαν
Νέκυσί μέλεον"Mortuis miseram."
μελεος
. See Il. 4. 795—μελεα αἰνη
—useless, unavailing praise. So, in Virgil— "inani munere."
Æn. vi. 886. And, Æn. xi. 51. Nos juvenem exanimum—vano mæsti comitamur honore.
Μελεος—ΜΑΤΑΙΟΣ.
ΜΕΛΕΗ δε οἱ ἔπλετο φωνη.
"Vanus ei erat clamor."
To thee thy faithful train
The Asiatic hymn will raise,
A doleful, a barbaric strain,
Responsive to thy lays,
And steep in tears the mournful song,
Notes which to the dead belong;
Dismal notes attun'd to woe
By Pluto in the realms below.—
Literally, "for this is neither terrible, nor piteous, but shocking." οὐ γαρ φοβερον, οὐδε ἐλεεινον τουτο, ἀλλα μιαρον ἐστιν.
—But we certainly must not understand Aristotle to assert, that no pity is
Ἐλεος μεν, περι τον ἀναξιον
" un così fatto caso non hà, nè del terrible, (per dir così,) nè del compassionevole; ma più tosto hà dell' abominevole, et dello scellerato."
"quello affetto dell' odio et dell' abomitione, sopravanza in modo l'affetto del timore, et quel della compassione, che gli ricuopre, et gli asconde, et supera, in modo che quasi non si fan sentire."
Μιαρον
Shocking, disgusting, &c. because contrary to our established ideas of justice, and to every moral sentiment of our nature. History, indeed, must represent facts as they are; without any regard to the sentiments they may excite"Cum historia vera successus rerum minime pro meritis virtutum et scelerum narret; corrigit eam Poesis, et exitus et fortunas, secundum merita, et ex lege Nemeseos, exhibet."
Οὐ φοβερον, οὐδε ἐλεεινον τουτο, ἀλλα μιαρον.
Fontenelle says, in perfect conformity with Aristotle, "Plus le heros est aimé, plus il est convenable de le rendre heureux à la fin. Il ne faut point renvoyer le spectateur avec la douleur de plaindre la destinée d'un homme vertueux."
ἐπιεικης
, he here means a character of consummate virtue, whose misfortunes were not drawn upon him by any fault of his own. This is evident from what follows. The sense of the word is sufficiently fixed by its opposite, ΣΦΟΔΡΑ πονηρον
, as well as by the equivalent expression, ἀρετῃ ΔΙΑΦΕΡΩΝ και δικαιοσυνη
, in his description of the proper character for Tragedyἐπιεικεια
, the reader may consult Eth. Nicom. V. 10. ed. Wilk.βελτιονος μᾶλλον ἢ χειρονος
.
Οὐτε γαρ ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ
—Without entering into a long discussion of all that has been urged by the commentators in favour of the different senses they have assigned to the word φιλανθρωπον
here, I shall only say, that, upon the most attentive comparison of this passage with another, in cap. xviii. where the term again occurs, it appears to me, that the full meaning of it is, gratifying to philanthropy; pleasing by its conformity to our natural sense of justice, by its moral tendency . Indeed this seems to follow from the word μιαρον
, to which φιλανθρωπον
is opposed. The representation of a good man (ἐπιεικης
) made miserable is μιαρον
—disgusting,
σφοδρα πονηρος
) punished by calamity, is φιλανθρωπον
; —that is, pleasing to the spectator, on the same principle, from its opposite tendency.
A singular, but somewhat similar, use is made of the same word in Plutarch's dialogue περι Μεσικης ; where, speaking of the wicked innovations of the more modern musicians, Timotheus, Philoxenus, &c. he says of them φιλοκαινοι γεγονασι, τον ΦΙΛΑΝΘΡΩΠΟΝ και θεματικον ΝΥΝ ΟΝΟΜΑΖΟΜΕΝΟΝ διωξαντες
. M. Burette's note upon this is perfectly unsatisfactory. I believe we should read—ΤΟ φιλανθρωπον και ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΟΝ κ. τ. αλ.
—i. e. "being lovers of novelty, they affect what is now termed the pleasing and theatrical style". The Theatre, we know, was considered by the purists of that time, as the great source of corruption in Music. The reader may see how Plutarch rails, on this subject, p. 2081, and 2089 ; where he laments—παντας τες μεσικης άπτομενες προς την ΘΕΑΤΡΙΚΗΝ προσκεχωρηκεναι μεσαν
. It appears, from his expression, ΝΥΝ ὀνομαζομενον
, that this was a new and fashionable use of the word φιλανθρωπον
; which, from the sense of pleasing to natural benevolence, (as in the passage of Aristotle,) seems to have been extended to signify, what was pleasing, and grateful, to the popular taste, in general ; in opposition to those more chaste and severe productions of the artist, which aimed only at the gratification of the critical, and the learned. And, indeed, no sort of philanthropy is more common, in all times, and in every art, than that of accommodation to the public taste.
Thus, in the Rhetoric, it is recommended to the Orator, as one method of exciting terror in his hearers, τες ΟΜΟΙΟΥΣ δεικνυναι πασχοντας, ἢ πεπονθότας
ὁμοιος
, may be seen in the passages of his Rhetoric referred to in the margin"Un crime atroce, un horreur de scelerat, revolte le spectateur, et par cette revolte même, le rassure contre la crainte; parcequ'il se sent aussi eloigné du malheur, qu'il l'est du crime."
"Riputando, per il più, gl' uomini se stessi buoni, o almeno non cattivi, ed in somma, non degni di male; e, per conseguente, dissimili à quelle persone inique, in cui veggon' il male, et in questo differenti da esse, che elle lo meritano, ed essi non lo meritano: non vengon' à dubitar di cadere in tai mali, et, conseguentemente, non ne nasce timore in loro."
Μητε δια κακιαν και μοχθηρίαν μεταβαλλων εις την δυστυχιαν, άλλα δι' ἁμαρτίαν τινα
— Thus, in the Ethic. Nicom. V. 10. p. 69. he uses μοχθηρια
, and κακια
, as synonymous: and, VII. 9; where he says of μοχθηρια
, that it is ΣΥΝΕΧΗΣ πονηρια
—a vitious character, disposition, habit, &c. It also implies deliberate choice and intention, (— όταν δε ἐκ προαιρέσεως, μοχθηρία
, V. 8.) in opposition to ἁμαρτια
, which excludes προαιρεσις
, and is ἄνευ ΚΑΚΙΑΣ
.
To understand rightly what the philosopher says in this part of his work on Poetry, and especially his application of his doctrine to such characters as Oedipus and Thyestes, we ought carefully to take his own sense of his own words. For want of this, Dacier"Dans Sophocle, Oedipe voyant arriver les enfans qu'il a eu de sa mere, il leur tend les bras et leur dit: approchez, embrassez votre ----- Il n'acheve pas, et le sublime est dans la reticence."
άδικος μεν οὐκ ἐστι, άδικει δε
. Brumoy translates "approchez, et embraßez votre ----- frere,"
&c. — Sophocles wrote—δευρ᾿ ἰτ᾿, ἔλθετε Ως τας ἀδελφας τασδε τας ἐμας χέρας.
ἁμαρτια
. Dacier's "involontaire" includes both ἀκουσιον
, and ἀπροβουλευτον
, which Aristotle dis-
ἁμαρτηματα
being not involuntary, but only, not ἐκ προαιρέσεως
. See the whole cap. x, of lib. 5, as above. One passage, in cap. ix. of lib. 7, will particularly illustrate Aristotle's examples. O ΑΚΡΑΤΕΙΣ
ΑΔΙΚΟΙ μεν οὐκ εἰσι
κακοι, μοχθηροι
, of bad dispositions, &c.) ΑΔΙΚΟΥΣΙ δε
δια παθους
, as he says elsewhereὁ μεν ἀκρατης, ειδως ότι φαυλα, πραττει δια παθος.
VII. 2. p. 86.
Ἐπι των σκηνων και των ἀγωνων
i. e. merely, in the representation. There seems to be no more foundation for the distinction which Dacier here supposes, between σκηνη
, and ἀγων
, than for the same distinction between ἀγων
, and ὑποκριται
, in the similar expression, ἀγωνος και ὑποκριτων
, in cap. vi.
More, however, it has been observed, with respect to the emotion of pity, than that of terror. And so, Quintilian. "In affec-
As proofs of this, I am tempted to produce two passages of this Poet, which I could never read without shuddering. In that scene between Medea and Jason, in which, previous to the execution of her horrid vengeance, she deludes him with feigned reconciliation and submission, when Jason, addressing the children, says,
Ιδοιμι δ᾿ ὑμας εὐτραφεις ἡβης τελος
Μολοντας, ἐχθρων των ἐμων ὑπερτερος.
"O may I see you blooming in the prime
"Of manhood, and to every virtue train'd,
"Superior to my foes!"
Οὐδεν—τεκνων τωνδ᾿ ἐννουμενη περι.
Ἐτικτον αυτους —ΖΗΝ Δ᾿ ΟΤ᾿ ΕΞΗΥΧΟΥ ΤΕΚΝΑ, ΕΙΣΗΛΘΕ Μ᾿ ΟΙΚΤΟΣ, ΕΙ ΓΕΝΗΣΕΤΑΙ ΤΑΔΕ!
"I am their mother:—when thy wish was breath'd
"That they might live, a piteous thought arose,
"If that might be!"
Κατείδες οἷον ἁ ταλαιν᾿ ἑων πεπλων
Ἔβαλεν, ἔδειξε, μαζον ἐν φοναις;
Mark'd you not, how my mother, e'er I struck her,
Withdrew her robe, and to our view expos'd
The breast that nourish'd us!
ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΣ, ἡ --ΣΥΣΤΑΣΙΝ ἐχουσα
. . . . That construction "which has a double construction." Can this be as the author left it? I cannot but suspect the first συστασις
to be an interpolation. Without it, all will go on well. —Ἡ μεν οὖν—καλλιστη Τραγῳδια ἐκ ταυτης της συστάσεως ἐστι. Δευτερα δε, [sc. Τραγῳδια,] ἡ πρωτη λεγομενη ὑπο τινων ἐστι· ἡ διπλην τε την συστασιν ἐχουσα, και τελευτωσα
&c.
TE
, here, is neglected by most of the commentators and translators, who, accordingly, of two distinct things make one only; understanding Aristotle, by his διπλη συστασις
, to mean only a fable that has a double catastrophe, ending oppositely to opposite characters. But the expression is, "that has διπλην ΤΕ την συστασιν. ΚΑΙ τελευτωσα κ. τ. αλ.
We must not, however, confound this double construction with duplicity of action, and what we call double plots. I believe Castelvetro, who did not let the te
escape him, has explained it rightly. "Dice, che questa constitutione di favola è doppia, percioche ha due maniere di persone, l'una di buone, o di mezzane, et l'altra di scelerate."
"That constitution of an Epic tale, which is reckoned the first by some, is in reality but the second in point of excellence, namely, that which, like the Odyssey, has a double set of characters, one virtuous, and one vitious, and wherein the action also ends contrarywise to the virtuous and vitious agents, so that the former terminate in prosperity, and the latter in adversity."
διπλης συστασεως
. Unity of action, indeed, upon Aristotle's
What is the proper pleasure to be expected from Tragedy, we have already been told, and we are told again, more plainly, if possible, in the next chapter. It is—ἡ ἀπο ἐλεου και φοβου ἩΔΟΝΗ
: "the pleasure that arises from pity and terror". The double fable Aristotle seems to have considered as not giving this pleasure, or at least, as giving it weakly and imperfectly, because all the unhappiness of the catastrophe falls on the odious characters, the σφοδρα πονηρος
. In the room of this pleasure, which Tragedy ought to give, the double fable substitutes that of a satisfactory conclusion; a catastrophe accommodated to the wishes of the spectator. But this, says Aristotle, is a pleasure that rather belongs to Comedy than to Tragedy: ΜΑΛΛΟΝ της κωμῳδιας οἰκεια
. For he is not here rejecting this double plan, but only shewing why it is not, as some held it to be, the best, πρωτη
. Such Tragedies, he says, afford a pleasure of the same kind, at least, with that which Comedy affords; though Comedy indeed goes farther; for there, all must end well; enemies, as inveterate as Orestes and Ægisthus, must shake hands
If we understand the passage in this way, it will not, I think, be necessary to suppose, what, I own, I was once much inclined to suppose with Heinsius, that the text is defective; and that, after the word θεώταις
, Aristotle had, originally, mentioned the third and worst kind of fable, terminating in a happy event to all the characters; to which, and not to the second species, what follows about Comedy was meant to be applied . Very specious reasons might certainly be produced in support of such a conjecture, if it were necessary. But we have no encouragement from MSS. to suspect any omission, and the passage, as here explained, seems to have little, or no, difficulty. The chief objection is, that what is here said of Comedy is not applicable to the double Tragic fable, in which there is no reconciliation of enemies, &c. But it was not, I think, intended to be so closely applicable. All that Aristotle meant must have been, to shew, that the pleasure arising from his second species of fable, differed only in degree from that of Comedy; that the circumstance of ending satisfactorily was common to both το δε δραμα ΚΩΜΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ ἔχει την κατατροφην
.
Chaucer's Monk had the true Aristotelic idea of Tragedy:
Tragedie is to sayn a certain storie,
As olde bookes maken us memorie,
Of him that stood in gret prosperitee,
And is yfallen out of high degree
In to miserie, and endeth wretchedly.
θεαται ΑΣΘΕΝΕΙΣ
:
Ho! quod the knight, good sire, no more of this:
That ye han said is right ynough ywis,
And mochel more; for litel hevinesse
Is right ynough to mochel folk, I gesse.
I say for me, it is a gret disese, [uneasiness]
Wher as men have ben in gret welth and ese,
To heren of hir sodein fall, alas!
And the contrary is joye and gret solas,
As whan a man hath ben in poure estat,
And climbeth up, and wexeth fortunat,
And ther abideth in prosperitee:
Swiche thing is gladsom, as it thinketh me,
And of swiche thing were goodly for to telle.
One would think, that commentators on Aristotle might find enough in this work to satisfy the keenest appetite for difficulties, without any assistance from their own invention. Yet here, they have contrived to perplex one of the plainest passages that can be found. Nothing can well be clearer than Aristotle's expression: —οἱ δε ΜΗ ΤΟ ΦΟΒΕΡΟΝ, δια της όψεως, άλλα ΤΟ ΤΕΡΑΤΩΔΕΣ ΜΟΝΟΝ, παρασκευαζοντες
. — He is not, as some critics have supposed, examining here three different ways of raising terror, but
ὄψις
, the spectacle, scenes, dresses, &c. As for those Poets, he continues, who make use of the ὄψις
, for the purpose of exciting, not terror, but wonder only, they are out of the question; this "has nothing to do with Tragedy," &c. If Aristotle, by τερατωδες
, had meant only, as has been understood, a monstrous degree of the terrible "mostruoso, soprano spavento," as Castelvetro calls it, he surely would not have used so strong an expression as—ΟΥΔΕΝ τῇ Τραγῳδίᾳ ΚΟΙΝΩΝΟΥΣΙΝ
. He does not here exclude even the τερατωδες
, absolutely, and in general; but the mere τερατωδες
; τερατωδες ΜΟΝΟΝ
—"only the wonderful;" and that, δια της όψεως
. The marvellous and supernatural, may, we know, in the hands of a Poet of genius, be made a powerful instrument of Tragic terror. Aristotle would hardly, I imagine, have censured a drama like that of
The difficulty, indeed, of managing the visible τερατωδες
, so as to produce any serious effect, is sufficiently great. We have, I think, but one dramatic Poet who could walk, though others may have dared to walk, "within that circle". The decoration of the μυγμοι
, and their ὠγμοι
, their snorings, their screams, and their torches, may very well be conceived to have put women and children in a real fright; but whether it produced any sympathetic, illusive, and pleasurable, terror—the only terror in question—I should much doubt. Yet Dacier, very gravely, produces this story of children fainting away, and women miscarrying, with the fright, as an example of Tragic terror excited by the ὄψις
.
Λυσσα
, or Madness, in the Λυσσα
herself; and the emendation of Reiske seems probable; —ἑκατογκεφαλοις ὄφεων ἰαχημασι
. "centicipitibus serpentum sibilis". Even so, I can scarce imagine an Athenian audience to have received this exhibition with countenances perfectly Tragic. The arrival of old
If such a dramatic entertainment as our τερατωδες μονον δια της όψεως παρασκευαζομενον
, would accurately enough express the ἡδονην οἰκειαν
of the pantomime. But, what would the philosopher have said to a species of the drama, of which the ὄψις
, which he places at the very bottom of his scale [cap. vi.], is the very soul—ἀρχη και οἷον ψυχη
: and where the σκεύοποιος
, or the carpenter, takes the lead of the Poet? —To do it justice, however, it has its Μυθος
, its fable, such as it is, with its beginning, its middle, and its end; though a spectator may be often puzzled to make, as we commonly say, head or tail of its plot. It has also its δεσεις
and its λυσεις
, its περιπετειαι
and ἀναγνωρισεις
, revolutions, and discove-
ἡ εἰς το ἐναντιον των ὉΡΩΜΕΝΩΝ μεταβολη
. And with respect to discoveries, the pantomime may be characterized as Aristotle characterizes the Odyssey, — ἀναγνωρισεις γαρ διολου
— "it abounds throughout with discoveries"; for the poor hero is perpetually discovered, and very seldom εἰς φιλίαν
. Then there are Παθη
too, disasters — the πραξεις ὀδυνηραι
at least, which, to the upper gallery, make the merriest part of the entertainment. An essential character, the clown, is even appropriated to this purpose of suffering, and his clothes well wadded for the reception of blows, kicks, and falls. But Aristotle little foresaw, I suppose, when he wrote his first chapter, that a species of drama without words would one day be invented: still less, probably, could he have imagined, what to the antients would have appeared the strangest part of this business, that, though accompanied throughout by δια σχηματιζομενων ΡΥΘΜΩΝ
; the gestures of the actors in pantomime, being not at all regulated by the measures of the music, or only occasionally, and accidentally, according to the ear, and inclination, of the performer.
After having established, that the terrible and piteous should arise from the circumstances of the action itself, Aristotle proceeds to examine what are the circumstances that will produce the highest degree of terror and pity, within the proper limits; that is, so as to avoid what he calls the μιαρον
, the shocking, and disgusting . And this, perhaps, led him here to use the words δεινα
, and οικτρα
, as being, if I mistake not, rather stronger than φοβερα
, and ελεεινα
. For the subject of this chapter seems, in short, to be, the proper management of the Παθη
or disastrous incidents: "Comment,"
"on doit se conduire dans les actions atroces," p. 236.
Εν ταις φιλιαις.
—For the wide sense in which Aristotle here uses the word φιλια
, see Ethic. Nicom. VIII. 1, and 7, ed. Ox. 1716, and the passage quoted in NOTE 276.
Αυτον δε ευρισκειν δει, και τοις παραδεδομενοις χρησθαι καλως.
The expression is too short and general to be clear. It is fairly capable of not less than three different meanings. Ευρισκειν
, may mean, to invent a subject from pure imagination, as Agatho invented his ΑΝΘΟΣ
"Le Poete doit inventer lui-même, en se servant comme il faut des fables receuës."
γελοιον
) to suppose subjects of pure invention absolutely prohibited. But this is delivered as a permission, not as a precept; and he would hardly have enforced a permission by such an expression as he here uses—ευρισκειν $\Delta$EI$
. Again—αυτον ΕΥΡΙΣΚΕΙΝ
, (against Dacier's explanation,) seems plainly opposed to τοις παραδεδομενοις ΧΡΗΣΘΑI
—"to use old subjects properly, and to invent or find out new subjects: not new incidents for an old subject".
ατεχνοι
, and the εντεχνοι
. The ατεχνοι
are the external proofs; witnesses, the torture, writings, and all such proofs as are ready provided to the pleader's hand—οσα μη δι ημων πεπορισται, αλλα προυπηρχεν
. The εντεχνοι
he defines to be those argumentative proofs which depend on the art and invention of the orator himself. He then concludes—ωστε δει τουτων, τοις μεν ΧΡΗΣΑΣΘΑΙ, τα δε ΕΥΡΕΙΝ
: — "of these proofs, the first sort we have only to make a proper use of; the other we must invent".
All this is not a little παρα ταυτα ουκ εστιν αλλως
. And to prove this, he enumerates all the ways possible; which, at last, turn out to be four. Hence the text has been supposed defective. Perhaps there is no occasion to suppose this. That, at least, there is no accidental omission of a fourth case, (that of purposing without executing,) seems pretty clear from the expression, ΕΤΙ δε τριτον παρα ταυτα
: "there is still a third way beside these". It would have been rather strange, if, immediately after this, he had proceeded to mention a fourth way.—Taking then the passage as perfect, we must understand, I think, by ουκ ΕΣΤΙΝ αλλως
, not—there is no other way possible—but, there is no other non licet aliter
—it must not be done in any other way. For, he proceeds, there are but four ways possible; but of all these, (τουτων δε
—i. e. these four possible ways,) that of being "ready to execute, knowingly, and yet not executing," is the worst, and not to be enumerated by a critic among those ways which a Poet may be allowed to use.
In the 13th chapter (Transl. Sect. 12.) Aristotle had pronounced that to be the best constituted Tragedy, which terminates unhappily; and had represented that species, which gratifies, by its catastrophe, the sympathetic wishes of the audience, as inferior, and affording a kind of pleasure rather appropriated to Comedy. Yet here, he appears to give the preference to a plan calculated to afford that very pleasure in the highest degree. This seeming inconsistence has given the commentators much trouble. It is rather surprising, that Dacier should have perceived what had escaped the superior acuteness of the Italian annotators, viz. that Aristotle is not, in this chapter, inquiring what is the best constitution of a Tragic fable in general, but, what is the best method of managing the most disastrous and atrocious incidents of Tragic story, so as to produce the highest possible degree of Tragical emotion in the spectator, without producing horror and disgust.
With this view of the subject, the reader, perhaps, will not see much difficulty in reconciling Aristotle to himself. He might surely say, without inconsistence, "Tragedy, to be perfect, should terminate unhappily. Yet there may be particular exceptions to this general rule. The end of Tragedy is, to excite terror and pity; and that end is most effectually answered, when those emotions are not only excited in the course of the drama, (as they undoubt-
τραγικον
to be confounded with the μιαρον
: and I allow, that where the circumstances of the traditional story, from which the Poet takes his plot, are such, as leave him only the alternative, either of disgusting and shocking the spectator, or of gratifying his wishes, the latter is clearly to be preferred; and the διπλη συστασις
, the double fable, to which I assigned only the second place
Nothing seems more just, or more accurately expressed, than Aristotle's idea of the end of Tragedy; that it is, "to give that pleasure which arises from pity and terror through imitation:" — την απο ελεου και φοβου δια μιμησεως ηδονην παρασκευαζειν
cap. xiv. (Transl. P. II. Sect. 13.). But the Greek Tragedians will be thought, I believe, by most modern readers, to have sometimes pushed this principle rather too far, and to have excited a degree of horror, which even the charms of imitation cannot well be conceived to have softened into pleasurable emotion; and it appears to me, that Aristotle himself inclined to this opinion, and that he intended this chapter as a lesson of caution to the Poets against this excess. He seems plainly to have considered the actual murder of a mother, a son, a brother, and the like, as incidents rather too horrible to be exhibited in any way. If the deed must be done, let it, he says, if possible—if the story will permit it—be done ignorantly. But it will be still better, if you can avoid doing it, entirely; if you can contrive to make the expectation, combined with the atrociousness of the event expected, answer your purpose, by raising as much anxiety, commiseration, and terror in the spectator, as may consist with that pleasure which is the end of Tragedy, and then relieving him at last, by prevention at the very moment of execution.
ει αδελφος αδελφον, η παις πατερα, η μητηρ υιον, η μητερα, αποκτανῃ, Η ΜΕΛΛΗι ταυτα δρᾳν
— "When a brother kills, or is going to kill," &c.. For this purpose, not only the expectation must be such, that the action shall appear imminent and inevitable, but the action itself expected must be such, as, had it taken place, would have been dreadful, "intolerable," &c. — τι των ΑΝΗΚΕΣΤΩΝ
"Addit verò Aristoteles—τι των ανηκέτων: grave enim atroxque factum illud in Tragediis esse oportet, quod aliquis patraturus fermè fuerit, quia maximum affert auditoribus terrorem, qui proprius Tragediæ est, et admirationem incredibilem. Aiunt enim, Quid si mactasset?—quàm parum ab fuit à cæde!"
παθη
. By these means, the emotion of terror is brought as near as possible to that which would arise from the actual perpetration
If the purport of this chapter has been here rightly explained, the reader will see how Aristotle has been misrepresented by many modern critics, who have understood him to recommend the "Parla di essa Aristotele nella Poetica, dove trattando de' modi di ben comporre la favola, da per esempio dell' ottimo il Cresfonte d'Euripide, in cui l'atrocità veniva dalla ricognizione impedita."
"Aristote, dans sa Poetique immortelle, ne balance pas à dire, que la reconnoissance de Merope et de son fils, etoit le moment le plus interessant de toute la scene Grecque. Il donnoit à ce coup de Theatre la preference sur tous les autres."
Plutarch's account of the effect of this Σκοπει δε την εν τῃ Τραγῳδιᾳ ΜΕΡΟΠΗΝ, επι τον υιον αυτον, ως φονεα του υιου, πελεκυν αραμενην, και λεγουσαν—Ὅσιωτεραν δη τηνδ᾿ εγω διδωμι σοι Πληγην—οσον εν τῳ θεατρῳ κινημα ποιει, συνεξορθιαζουσα φοβῳ και δεει μη φθασῃ τον επιλαμβανομενον γεροντα, και τρωσῃ το μειρακιον.
[Περι Σαρκοφ. p. 1837, ed. H. St.] For other fragments of this Tragedy, the reader may see the Ox. Euripides.
Good, in the usual sense of moral goodness; the only sense which χρηστα
, applied to manners, will bear, and which, even though the word would admit of other senses, would here be fixed, beyond a doubt, by the plain, unequivocal expression of the whole passage. Dacier admires and follows the nonsense of Le Bossu, who makes χρηστα ηθη
mean "deux sortes de bonté dans les mœurs; l'une que l'on peut appeller morale, et qui est propre à la vertu: et l'autre est la poetique, à laquelle les hommes les plus vicieux ont autant de part que les gens de bien."
"a fine and copious commentary on this part of Aristotle's Poetics?"
ηθος
will be χρηστον
, if the προαιρεσις
is χρηστη
, and the contrary: — φαυλον μεν, [sc. ηθος εξει,] εαν φαυλην [sc. προαιρεσιν ποιῃ φανεραν,] χρηστον δε, εαν χρηστην
. See, now, Dacier's version of this: "Il y a des mœurs dans un discours, ou dans une action, lorsque l'un et l'autre font connoitre l'inclination ou la resolution telle qu'elle est, mauvaise si elle est mauvaise, bonne si elle est bonne."
The best comment I have seen on this passage is that of Heinsius, (cap. xiv.) which I shall therefore give entire. "Cæterum, in moribus, quatuor tenenda esse docet Aristoteles; quorum primum est, ut sint boni. Quod est exponendum pluribus. Inter ea quæ quam maximè in Tragœdiâ reprehendebat PLATO, vel præcipuum hoc erat;—quod nimirum varia, non uniformis, sit illius imitatio; et occasione oblatâ, probos juxta improbosque imitetur; nonnunquam autem improbos tantum: quo facillimè animum decipi humanum, qui dum solum respicit decorum, quod propositum est illi, bonorum sæpe, et malorum, discrimen non agnoscit, et, ut ipse Poeta, utrosque mores imitatur; quo nihil magis in republicâ perniciosum excogitari potest . Quippe ratione istâ scholam vitiorum, non virtutum, fieri theatrum; et quidem quanto magis hanc in partem inclinamus omnes. Præterea, interpretes Platonis—alium admitti ab eo negant Poetam, quam qui Actiones imitetur; cætera enim delectare quidem, non autem docere; plerumque vero mores vitiare ac corrumpere, ideoque nocere magis quam prodesse. Huic ut occurreret Philosophus, primum hoc de moribus præceptum esse voluit, probi ut essent; tales enim esse in Tragœdiâ non modo posse, quod negabat Plato, sed et, quantum ratio poematis permitteret, debere . Confirmant hoc exempla tragicorum; qui sine ullâ lege hanc tamen legem sunt secuti. Etiam posteriores critici, qui nonnullas veterum hoc nomine notârunt, quod aut omnes, aut plerasque, pessime moratas haberent personas. Qualis est, ex. grat. Euripidæ Orestes; in quo, præter Pyladen, improbi omnium sunt mores. Neque enim hæc mens Aristotelis, aut non alios quam optimè moratos, esse inducendos, aut, si alii inducantur, quos fuisse improbos constat, probos iis tribuendos esse mores: sed, ut, quantum ratio permittit, plures optime morati in eodem inducantur dramate. Quamvis enim et utrique requiruntur, et tam horum quam illorum ratione constet decorum, probos tanto esse præferendos, quanto plus conducunt cum spectantur."
Χρηστος
does not imply a character of high and exemplary virtue. It seems to answer to our popular expression, πονηρια, ΜΟΧΘΗΡΙA
, as it is expressed in a passage that should be compared with this . 3. That the rule, even with respect to such characters, is not absolute; as is evident from Aristotle's expression, when he gives an example of the violation of it, παραδειγμα πονηριας ΜΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΑΙΟΝ
: and, again, in cap. xxv. οταν ΜΗ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ΟΥΣΗΣ, κ. τ. αλ.
. 4. That what he presently adds, εστι δε εν εκαστῳ γενει
, is a necessary modification of the precept, and shows, that he did not mean to exclude comparative badness of manners, but meant only—as good as may be, consistently with the observance of the other requisites mentioned—the αρμοττον
, and the ομοιον
.
ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ
(hurtful, pernicious,) for μοχθηρα
, or πονηρα
, in his enumeration of the greatest faults of Poetry at the end of cap. xxv. that, however he might differ from Plato as to the hurtful tendency of Tragedy, and of imitative Poetry in general, he so far at least agreed with him, as to admit the danger of those poetical, embellished, and flattering, exhibitions of vice, in which, as "L'auteur, pour faire parler chacun selon son caractere, est forcé de mettre dans la bouche des mechants leurs maximes, et leurs principes, revetus de tout l'eclat des beaux vers, et debités d'un ton imposant et sententieux, pour l'instruction du parterre."
"En achevant de relire ce recueil, je crois voir pourquoi l'interêt, tout foible qu'il est, m'en est si agréable, et le fera, je pense, à tout lecteur d'un bon naturel. C'est qu'au moins ce foible interêt est pur et sans melange de peine; qu'il n'est point excité par des noirceurs, par des crimes, ni melé du tourment de haïr. Je ne sçaurois concevoir quel plaisir on peut prendre à imaginer et composer le personnage d'un scelerat, à se mettre à sa place tandis qu'on le représente, a lui prèter l'éclat le plus imposant. Je plains beaucoup les auteurs de tant de Tragédies pleines d'horreurs, lesquels passent leur vie à faire agir et parler des gens qu'on ne peut écouter ni voir sans souffrir," &c.
"Aristote,"
"ne parle pas içi des femmes en général, mais seulement de celles que les Poetes ont mises sur le Théâtre, telles que Medée, Clytemneitre," &c.
Γυνη, ανδρος ελεημονεστερον και αριδακρυ μαλλον· ετι δε φθονερωτερον τε και μεμψιμοιροτερον, και ΦΙΛΟΛΟΙΔΟΡΟΝ μαλλον, και ΠΛΗΚΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ. ετι δε και δυσθυμον μαλλον και δυσελπι, και ΑΝΑΙΔΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΨΕΥΔΕΣΤΕΡΟΝ, ευαπατητοτερον τε, και μνημονικωτερον· ετι δε, ΑΓΡΥΠΝΟΤΕΡΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΟΚΝΗΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ και ολως ακινητοτερον κ. τ. αλ.
To make the reader amends for the pain which this cool and serious invective of the philosopher and the naturalist may have given him, I cannot resist the temptation of presenting him with a specimen of more sportive satire on this subject, in a very pleasant fragment, preserved by Athenæus, from a Comedy of Eubulus.
Ω Ζευ πολυτιμητ᾿, ει κακως εγω ποτε
Ερω γυναικας, νη $\Delta$ι᾿ απολοιμην αρα.
Παντων αριστον κτηματων. ειδ᾿ εγενετο
Κακη γυνη Μηδεια, Πηνελοπεια δε
Μεγα πραγμα. —ερει τις ως Κλυταιμνηστρα κακη;
Αλκηστιν αντεθηκα χρηστην. —αλλ᾿ ισως
Φαιδραν ερει κακως τις· αλλα, νη $\Delta$ια,
Χρηστη τις ην μεντοι ----τις; —οιμοι, δειλαιος·
Ταχεως γε μ᾿ αι ΧΡΗΣΤΑΙ ΓΥΝΑΙΚΕΣ επελιπον.
Τωνδ᾿ αυ ΠΟΝΗΡΩΝ ετι λεγειν πολλας εχω.
If ever against woman-kind I rail,
Great Jupiter confound me!—for of all
The good things of this world, they are the best.
Medea, you will say, was bad:—agreed;
But, what a jewel was Penelope!
Urge you the wicked Clytemnestra?—I,
Oppose the good Alcestis. If you tell me
Of Phædra, I remind you of the good,
—Stay, let me see the good—Alas! how soon
My memory fails me there; while, of the bad,
Examples in abundance still occur.—
The words, ώσπερ ἐιρηται
, are embarrassing; for the difference here spoken of had not been mentioned before, as the expression, in its most obvious sense, implies. The only meaning I can find is
ἁρμοττον
and the ὁμοιον
, propriety, and resemblance, might easily be confounded; the ὁμοιον
being indeed only the ἁρμοττον
in another point of view. The violence and fierceness of Medea, for example, which form her historical, or traditional character, and, therefore, the likeness of the Poet's picture, may be said to be ἁρμοττοντα
, proper or suitable, with respect to the individual, though ἀπρεπη και μη άρμοττοντα
, improper and unsuitable, to the general character of the sex. And thus "la terza conditione che assegna Aristotele à i costumi, la qual consiste in esser simile, non differisce della seconda, posta nell' esser convenevoli, in altro, se non che la conditione del con- venevole riguarda l'universale; com' à dire, che quel costume convenga ad un principe, quello ad un suddito, quello à l'uomo &c. senza considerar questa particolar persona, ò quella: et la conditione del simile riguarda il particolare; come à dire, qual costume convenga di porre in uno che habbia da rappresentar' Achille; qual in quello che habbia da representare Oreste,"
Indeed, Aristotle would hardly have thought of admonishing the reader not to confound the two things, had he not seen that they were liable to be confounded. He would not have remarked, that they were different, had they been perfectly, and obviously, distinct. I think then, that the words, ώσπερ ἐιρηται
, must refer only to the ἁρμοττον
, and the meaning must be, that, to make the manners like, is a different thing not only from making them good, but even from making them proper, in such a way as had been said—in that sense, in which the word ἁρμοττοντα
had just been used, and explained by his instance. But if we understand the passage thus, there should be no stop after ποιησαι
"— essendo cosi fatta conditione diversa dall' esser' i costumi formati buoni, et ancora convenevoli nel modo che già fi é detto."
ὁμοιον
too different from the χρησον
, and, as a general precept, incompatible with it. And so indeed he seems to have apprehended himself, by what he presently after says about the μιμησις βελτιονων
, and his rule, that the Poet, in imitation of the painter, should exhibit his characters as much better than they were, or are supposed to have been, as is consistent with the preservation of the likeness
Τεταρτον δε, το όμαλον κ'αν γαρ ἀνωμαλος τις ή, ὁ την μιμησιν παρέχων και τοιουτον ἠθος ὑποτιθεις, όμως όμαλως ἀνωμαλον δει ειναι.
----"having been not at all understood, have kept his interpreters from seeing the true sense and scope of the precept. For they have been explained of such characters as that of Tigellius in Horace; which, however proper for satyr, or for farcical Comedy, are of too fantastic and whimsical a nature to be admitted into Tragedy; of which Aristotle must there be chiefly understood to speak, and to which Horace, in this place, alone confines himself. 'Tis true, indeed, it may be said, that 'though a whimsical or fantastic character be improper for Tragedy, an irresolute one is not. Nothing is finer than a struggle between different passions; and it is perfectly
ὁμαλον
, but may be so managed, by the Poet's skill, as to become consistent with the basis or foundation of her character, that is, to be ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον
. And that this, in fact, was the meaning of the critic, is plain from the similar example to his own rule, given in the case of Iphigenia: which he specifies (how justly, will be considered hereafter) as an instance of the ἀνωμαλε
, irregular, or ununiform, character, ill-expressed, or made inconsistent. So that the genuine sense of the precept is, 'Let the manners be uniform; or, if ununiform, yet consistently so, or uniformly ununiform:' exactly copied, according to the reading here given, by Horace. Whereas in the other way, it stands thus: 'Let your characters be uniform, or unchanged; or, if you paint an ununiform character (such as Tigellius) let it be ununiform all the way; i. e. such an irregular character to the end of the play, as it was at the beginning; which is, in effect, to say, let it be uniform:' which apparently destroys the latter part of the precept, and makes it an unmeaning tautology with the former.'"
1. I cannot think, that such change, irresolution, and temporary inconsistence as arises from "conflicting passions," comes under the meaning of Aristotle's ΗΘΟΣ ἀνωμάλον
. Ηθος
, is the prevailing disposition, the habitual προαιρεσις
, or settled character. "Electra," it is said, "torn with sundry conflicting passions, is most apparently, and in the properest sense of the word, ununiform." Not so, I think, in Aristotle's sense of the word ἀνωμαλον
, expressly applied by him here to ήθη
, or manners. The irregularities of conduct, or of sentiment and speech, arising from passion, seem to be a distinct thing from such as imply a change of the fixed, prevailing, or characteristic manners of the person. When such passionate ununiformity as that above described in Electra, is so managed by the Poet's skill, "as to become consistent with the basis or foundation of her character," that character is not, then, I think, as the ingenious critic considers it to be, ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον
, i. e. (as it is expressed in the beginning of the following note, p. 127.) "an ununiform character justly sustained, or, uniformly ununiform:" it is not, if I understand Aristotle rightly, ἀνωμαλον
at all, in his sense;
2. The very expression, —κ'αν γαρ ΑΝΩΜΑΛΟΣ ΤΙΣ ή, ὁ την μιμησιν παρέχων και ΤΟΙΟΥΤΟΝ ΗΘΟΣ ὑποτιθεις
, seems plainly to indicate an ununiform character, such as he explains by the ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον
that follows. — ἀνωμαλά ΤΙΣ
an anomalous PERSON: i. e. a person of inconsistent manners, or character. This expression seems hardly applicable, without violence, to such casual and merely apparent inconsistence, as arises from conflicting passions, and is reconcilable with "the basis or foundation of a character."
3. "The genuine sense of the precept," we are told, "is, Let the manners be uniform; or, if ununiform, yet consistently so, or uniformly ununiform." But, consistently, and uniformly, seem to present different ideas. Aristotle's word, ὁμαλως
, presents only the latter of these:—uniformly that is, more literally, equally*, evenly, &c. it does not, I think, answer at all to consistently, in the sense in which it is evidently applied, in this explanation, to what is not incongruous—not unaccountable, &cεικοτως
, or ευλογως
, or some other such word appropriated to that meaning; not ὁμαλως
, which is never, as far as I know, used in the sense of consistentlyἔδεν ῾ΟΜΑΛΟΝ
. And so, "Vixit INÆQUALIS" —ἀνωμαλ
, in sat. 7. lib. ii. of PRISCUS, another character of the same stamp, "VERTUMNIS, quotquot funt, natus iniquis." 2. 14.
ὁμαλως ἀνωμαλον
to mean "uniform all the way, i. e. such an irregular character to the end of the play, as it was at the beginning," this, "is, in effect to say, let it be uniform; which apparently destroys the latter part of the precept, and makes it an unmeaning tautology with the former." The first part of the precept, I think, is, Let the manners be uniform; or, as we say, of a piece. Now to this an objector might say,—"This cannot be an indispensable rule; uniformity cannot be essentially requisite to the manners: for, what, if the Poet should take for the subject of his imita- tion a person whose manners are not uniform?" —The answer, or "second part of the precept," is, "then, that want of uniformity must be such as constitutes the very character itself; for this falls within the rule; the 'very inconsistency' of the character (to use the ingenious critic's own words,) being, in this case, 'of the essence of its uniformity.'" I confess I do not here perceive any thing that can properly be called tautology; for though the philosopher says, indeed, in the second part of the precept no more than he meant to say in the first; yet he plainly apprehended it was more than he might be understood to say, and therefore he subjoined this necessary explanationὁμαλως άνωμαλθ
) en même tems. Parceque le caractere, qui dans la pluf-part des hommes ressemble au soleil, dont l'égalité confiste à paroitre tojours le même, en d'autres ressemble à la lune, dont l'égalité n'est qu' à changer quatre fois de faces en un mois! "
Δακρυσεν γελασασα
."
I shall only add to this note the following passage from the commentary of Victorius, which appears to me to explain well, in few words, the meaning, and the spirit, of Aristotle's precept. "Studens ostendere quantopere hoc præceptum cuftodiendura fit, affirmat, si quis fortè varius diſſimiliſque sibi inductus semel fit, eum, talem in omni facto totius fabulæ fervandum esse, ut æquabilitas à Poetâ custodiatur in naturâ illâ inæquabili ostendenda: quod non fieret, fi aliquis levis, nec in eodem proposito permanens, inductus, paulò pofteà firmus et obftinati animi ungeretur. Si morum igitur inæqualitas naturæque inconstantia constanter servanda est, quanto magis natura indoleſque stabilis par sibi ac jugis ad extremum servari debet."
Mr. Potter, in the introduction to his translation of the Orestes, says of this passage, that it " may be considered as a mysterious oracular sentence, which wants an expounder." I can only say, that I think the commentators would have reason to congratulate themselves, if no sentence of this mangled work wanted an expo- sitor more than this. Whether we read ἀναγκαιον
, or ἀναγκαιε
; an unnecessary example of bad manners, or an example of unnecessary badness of manners; the sense seems evidently the same: and that Aristotle could not mean, what the excellent translator of Æschylus and Euripides seems to think he might mean—to "excuse the Poet upon the necessity"—sufficiently appears from
μη ἀναγκης ἐσης
. Mr. Potter complains of " the little light which the passage derives from the connexion:" I think without reason. For as the other examples given are examples of the violation of his other precepts, relative to propriety, and uniformity, of manners, the connection plainly indicates this to be an example of the similar violation of his first rule—that the manners should be good. So far, then, seems to be clear. In what particular view Aristotle thought the badness of the character not necessary, may be, indeed, less clear. I should suppose him to mean, that the historical, or traditional, character of Menelaus, and the observance of the ὁμοιον
, by no means obliged Euripides to paint him in such colours. With respect to the plea, that it was necessary, because "the drama could not," otherwise, " have been worked up to this terrible height of Tragic distress," Aristotle's answer would, perhaps, have been similar to that which he makes upon another occasion:—i. e. the Poet should not, originally, have so constructed his plan, as to bring upon himself the necessity of committing so great a fault : —ἐξ ἀρχης γαρ ἐ δει συνισασα θαι τοικτες
. [ sc. μυθες
]. cap. xxiv.
"How does this appear, independently of the name of this great critic? Iphigenia is drawn indeed at first, fearful and suppliant: and surely with the greatest observance of nature. The account of her destination to the altar was sudden, and without the least preparation: and, as Lucretius well observes, in commenting her case, NUBENDI TEMPORE IN IPSO; when
Εθρέψας Ελλαδι μέγα φαβ / Θανεσα δ᾽ ἐκ ἀναινομαι.
Once the bright star of Greece / But I submit to die.
"This, I take to be not only a full vindication of the consistency of Iphigenia's character, but as delicate a stroke of nature as is, perhaps, to be found in any writer."
If all I knew of the Tragedy in question was from this ingenious defence, I should certainly acquit Euripides. I cannot acquit him, or can only partially acquit him, when I read the Tragedy itself. The fact perhaps is, that the question, whether the critic's censure be just or not, cannot possibly be decided by any general statement of the case. That Iphigenia, so circumstanced as she is here, and very justly, described to be, might at first be timid and suppliant, and, at last, meet death with resolution, and this, without any inconsistence, or duplicity of character, will hardly be disputed. But the question is, whether Euripides has actually so drawn this timidity, and this resolution, as to preserve the unity of character. To determine this fairly, we must, at last, have recourse to the detail of the Poet's execution, and the actual impression which, on the whole, it leaves upon the reader's mind. All depends here upon degree and manner. A single nuance in the colouring, a flight depression or elevation of tone, in the suppliant, or the heroine, may be sufficient to determine the impression this way, or that. What this impression was upon Aristotle's mind, it may be observed that he has marked very precisely and clearly by the expression, ΟΥΔΕΝ ΕΟΙΚΕΝ Ἡ ἹΚΕΤΕΥΟΥΣΑ ΤΗ ΥΣΤΕΡΗ
:—"the supplicating Iphigenia is NOTHING LIKE the Iphigenia of the conclusion." The expression, I think, does not imply, that he thought the mere circumstance of her supplicating at first for life, and recanting afterwards, was, of itself, necessarily inconsistent, but, that the manner in which she supplicated was such, as to make her, in that part, appear to be a different character, another person, from what she appears to
My own opinion I confess to be, that though the considerations suggested in this ingenious defence of Euripides may prove the censure of Aristotle to be too strongly, or, at least, too generally, expressed, yet they do not prove it to be without foundation. I say, too generally, because perhaps there is but one passage in the speech of the suppliant Iphigenia, to which the ΟΥΔΕΝ ἐοικεν
is fairly applicable, in its full force. Her speech, Ει μεν του Ορφέως
, &c. v. 1211, which, on the whole, is highly pathetic, ends with these unhappy lines:
μαινεται δ᾽ ὡς ἐυχεται / Θανειν ΚΑΚΩΣ ΖΗΝ ΚΡΕΙΣΣΟΝ Η ΘΑΝΕΙΝ ΚΑΛΩΣ.
"of his senses is he reft, Who hath a wish to die for life, though ill, Excells whate'er there is of good in death."
— δίδωμι σωμα τ' εμον Ἑλλαδι. / Θυετ , ἐκπορθειτε Τροιαν ταυτα γαρ μνημεια με, / Δια μακρε, και παιδες ἐτοι, και γαμοι, και δοξ᾿ ἐμη.
Σφαγαισιν ἀνοσιοισευ Ανοσια πατρο
. From the end of this monostrophic lamentation to her heroic speech v. 1368, there are, I think, but 35 lines. For Greece I give my life. / "Slay me, demolish Troy: for these shall be / Long time my monuments, my children these, / My nuptials, and my glory."
οὐδεν εοικεν ἡ ΟΥΤΩΣ ἱκετευκσα
, &c. quoting, or referring to, the verses, I think there could have been no objection to the justice of his criticism.
" Non é maraviglia, se Ifigenia, quantunque per naturalezza del sesso, timida, ed amorosa della vita, finchè la poteva sperare; poi resa forte dalla necessità, madre spesso anche delle virtù morali, come anima generosamente educata, disprezza la morte, e cangia l'amor della vita in compiacenza di gloria. Il che alla giornata anche osserviamo in persone di nascita e d'animo vile, che condotte alla morte, arditamente l'abbracciano, quantunque al primo avviso costernate rimanessero; perchè l'idea della necessità non avea usata ancor la fua forza."
τα δ᾽ ΑΔΥΝΑΘ᾽ ἡμιν καρτερειν ἐ ραδιον. / Αλλα και σε τεθ᾽ ὁραν χρη, μη διαβληθης σρατῳ, / ΚΑΙ ΠΛΕΟΝ ΠΡΑΞΩΜΕΝ ΟΥΔΕΝ.- / Αλλ' ΑΜΗΧΑΝΟΝ-δίδωμι σωμα τεμον Ελλαδι
, &c. v. 1372.
ἀγχινοια
of Aristotle
εν τω Οιδ. τε Σοφ.
—inclusively, to be certainly out of its proper placeφανερον ἐν ὅτι ΚΑΙ τας λύσεις
, &c. that "the development also," &c. i. e. as well as the other incidents of the fable, just mentioned. Most of the versions neglect the word και
, which is important, and greatly helps the connection. This digression, however, though not unrelated, is but flightly and obliquely related, to his present subject; and seems introduced rather ἀπο μηχανης
, and in violation of his own rule—τετο μετα τατο ἡ ἀναγκαιον ἐικο
. It interrupts the connection, and obscures the purport, of the chapter; and though we allow it to be where the author placed it, we may fairly question, whether he has placed it where it should be.
Απο μηχανης
. — It appears from Jul. Pollux, lib. iv. cap. 19. that the term, μηχανη
, was not applied indiscriminately to the machinery of the play-house in general, but was appropriated to that particular machine, in which Gods and Heroes made their appearance in the air. Μηχανη δε, θεους δεικνυσι και ήρωας τους ἐν ἀερι
. I hope it was something better than the Μηχανη
of the French opera, so pleasantly described by "Les chars des Dieux et des Déesses sont composés de quatre solives encadrées et suspendues à une grosse corde en forme d’escarpolette; entre ces solives est une planche en travers, sur laquelle le Dieu s’assaye, et sur le devant pend un morceau de grosse toile barbouillée, qui sert de nuage à ce magnifique char. On voit vers le bas de la machine l’illumination de deux ou trois chandelles puantes et mal mouchées, qui, tandis que le personnage se démene et crie en branlant dans son escarpolette, l’enfume tout à son aise. Encens digne de la divinité."
The account of the machinery of a Greek Theatre, in the chapter of
Και ἐν ΤΗΙ ΙΛΙΑΔΙ τα περι τον ἀποπλουν
. It has been disputed, whether Aristotle here speaks of the Iliad of
Ἡ ΙΛΙΑΣ, as
Ιλιας, only; for he says,
ΕΝ τη Ιλιάδι ΤΑ ΠΕΡΙ τον ἀποπλουνi. e. "the circumstances, or incidents, relative to the return of the Greeks, in [the Tragedy of] The Iliad." — So, cap. xxiv.
ἐν τῇ Οδυσσεια — τα περι την ἐκθεσιν. — Indeed,
Η Οδύσσεια, η, Ἡ ΕΚΘΕΣΙΣ. As to the Tragedy of
Supposing, then, the text not to be defective, we cannot, I think, avoid understanding
λυσις, is not, properly,
λυσις μυθουin that sense, in which
λυσιςof a Tragedy. For, that he intended to censure the "
ministeria Deorum," so necessary to the Epic Poem, and so frequent in the great model of all Epic Poems, cannot be imagined without absurdity, and is by no means necessarily implied, as
Such appears to me to be the only meaning, and the best apology, which the passage will bear, taking for granted the integrity of the original. But of this, I confess, I doubt.
ΜΙΚΡΑto be omitted;
την ΜΙΚΡΑΝ Ιλιάδα— and,
ἐκ της ΜΙΚΡΑΣ Ιλιάδοςcap. xxiii. See
Ραθυμους
: — indolent — Ραθυμα, ΜΗ ΠΟΝΗΤΙΚΟΣ ἀλλ᾿ ΕΚΛΥΤΟΣ
. It is improperly rendered, "timide
," by mansueto
," by the Italian translators.
The original is — Ουτω και τον ποιητην, μιμουμενον και ὀργιλους και ῥαθυμους, και τ'αλλα τα τοιαυτα ἐχοντας ἐπι των ἠθων, ἐπιεικειας ποιειν παραδειγμα η σκληροτητα δει: οἷον τον Αχίλλεα Αγαθων και Όμηρος
. — A passage that has much perplexed and divided the commentators. Of all the explanations which this perplexity has produced, that of ῥαθυμους
into the sense of, "encherir sur ὀργιλος."
Επιεικεια
, he wrenches from the obvious and proper sense in which it is continually used by "Il faut tout de même, qu’un Poete qui veut imiter un homme colere et emporté, ou quelqu’ autre caractere semblable, se remette bien plus devant les yeux ce que la colere doit faire vraisemblablement (i. e.
&c.
ἐπιεικειας
) que ce qu’elle a fait (i. e. σκληροτητα
!) et c’est ainsi,"
I may venture to leave all this to the learned reader’s rejection,
ΚΑΙ ὀργ. ΚΑΙ ῥαθ.
evidently marks different characters; not, as
ἐπιεικειας η σκληροτητα
, was elliptical, and μαλλον
to be understood. But in spite of the "Attica venustas
," I am much more inclined to suspect an omission of the word. η
, as indeed every reader, I believe, would at first naturally understand it, in the disjunctive sense of, μαλλον η
, even in this treatise.
φυσιολογον ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η ποιητην
.
cap. ix. ΜΑΛΛΟΝ των μύθων η των μέτρων
. —
cap. xxiv. προαιρείσθαι τε άδυνατα και εικοτα, ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Η δύνατα και άπίθανα
.
ἐπιεικεια
and σκληροτης
from their usual and proper signification, afford a clear and consistent meaning. Επιεικεια
is used, I think, here, as it is in cap. xiii. in the general sense of ἐπιεικης
is plainly used as synonymous with χρηστος
. For, defining the word χρηστοφιλια
, he says — οἷ οι δε και ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙΣ άνδρες, [fc. φίλοι εισι] ΧΡΗΣΤΟΦΙΛΟΣ
.Σκληροτης
plainly relates only to his first instance, of the ὀργιλος
, the angry character, of which it seems to express the extreme degree. In the
ΑΓΡΙΟΙ και ΣΚΛΗΡΟΙ, as synonymous, or very nearly so. A passage of
θυμοειδες, or irascible nature, he says, it may produce the
ἀγριον: —
και όρθως μεν τραφεν, ἀνδρειον ἂν ειη ΜΑΛΛΟΝ Δ' ΕΠΙΤΑΘΕΝ ΤΟΥ ΔΕΟΝΤΟΣ, ΣΚΛΗΡΟΤΕΡΟΝ τε και χαλεπον γεγνοιτ' ἀν, ὡς το εικος. — And just before —
ΑΓΡΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ τε και ΣΚΛΗΡΟΤΗΤΟΣ, και αὖ μαλακιας τε και ἡμεροτητος.
The sense of the passage, then, will be, that, in order to reconcile the first precept, of the χρηστον
, with the third, of the ὁμοιον
, the character should be brought as near to a good one, as is consistent with the circumstance of likeness. Thus, if such a character as that of παραδειγμα ἐπιεικειας
, but rather so than otherwise; — ΜΑΛΛΟΝ η σκληροτητα
. και ὀργιλους, και ῥαθυμους
, &c. — whereas it appears plainly, from what has been said of the force of σκληροτης
, that the words, ἐπιεικειας ποιειν παραδ. η σκληρ.
can be applied only to the ὀργιλοι
; for as to the ῥαθυμους
, such a character may, indeed, be flattered into the ἐπιεικης
, but cannot well, by any distortion, be made to appear σκληρος
. "Loin de charger encore le defaut, il le rapprochera de la vertu"
Still, however, what every one, I believe, naturally expects at the first reading of this passage, as it now stands, is, that after having mentioned two instances of faulty characters, the ὀργιλοι
, and the ῥαθυμοι
, ἐπιεικεια
, and σκληροτης
,) both of which, as we have seen, can be made to relate only to his first instance, the ὀργιλος
; so that all the rest, between the words ὀργιλους
, and ἐπιεικειας
, must be parenthetical. The harshness and embarrassment of such a construction, led me formerly to suspect an error in one of the words, ἐπιεικειας
, or σκληροτητα
; and a conjecture was suggested to me by a passage in the
σκληροτητα; for the
ἐπιεικειαwould answer well enough as a softening, or improvement, of
ῥαθυμια; as an indolent man, who concerns himself about nothing, and cares only for his own ease, is often spoken of as a quiet, good kind of man. Instead of
σκληροτητα, then, I thought it not improbable, that
ἁπλοτητα. The passage of
Ληπτεον δε-----ἑκαστον, ἐκ των παρακολουθουντων αει, κατα το ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΟΝ· οἷον, ΤΟΝ ΟΡΓΙΛΟΝ και τον μανικον, ῾ΑΠΛΟΥΝ και τον αυθαδη, μεγαλοπρεπη και σεμνον· κ. τ. αλλ. The whole passage is much to the purpose of this place; and is, plainly, not more applicable to the Rhetorician, with respect to the hero of his oration, than it is to the Poet, with respect to the hero of his poem. A passage of
Εγω δ’ ἐν ἀνδρως εὐσεβεστάτου τραφεις, Χειρωνος, ἔμαθον τους τροπους ῾ΑΠΛΟΥΣ ἔχειν. Και τοις Ατρείδαις, ἢν μεν ἡγωνται καλως, Πεισομεθ᾽. — ὅταν δε μη καλως, οὐ πεισομεθ'.
τροπες άπλες, is very well fixed by the two subsequent lines, and by the expression,
ἐλευθεραν φυσιν, in the verse that follows them.
Ἥκιστά γε, ὦ Σωκρατες, ἀλλ᾿ ῾ΑΠΛΟΥΣΤΑΤΟΣ. And, again,
ὡς ὁ μεν Αχιλλευς εἴη ἀληθης τε και ῾ΑΠΛΟΥΣ· ὁ δε Οδυσσευς πολυτροπος τε και ψευδης.
Διογένες Λαερτιάδη, πολυμηχαν᾿ Οδυσσευ, Χρη μεν δη τον μυθον ἀπηλεγεως ἀποειπειν, Ἧι περ δη φρονεω τε, και ὡς τετελεσμενον ἐσται· Εχθρα γαρ μοι κεινος ὁμως ἀΐδαο πυλησιν, Ὡς χ᾿ ἑτερον μεν κευθει ἐνι φρεσιν, ἀλλο δε βαζει.
The sense, then, of the passage before us, according to this conjecture, would be this: — If the Poet choose for the subject of his imitation a passionate, or an indolent man, he should give to the former the cast of plain sincerity, and honest frankness; and to the other, (the ῥαθυμος
) that of moderation, gentleness,
Επιεικής — ΠΡΑΟΣ, ΜΕΤΡΙΟΣ
. — σκληροτης
, as applicable to the unsoftened and unflattered character of η
to its most obvious, disjunctive, sense, prevent me from a total rejection of this idea.
The word παραδειγμα
, here, is taken by most of the commentators
summum exemplar
." Of
ὡστε ἔχειν ἐν αυτῳ νοσηματα δυο ἐναντιω ἀλληλοιν, ἀνελευθερίαν μετα φιλοχρηματίας, και αὖ ὑπερηφανιαν θεων τε και ἀνθρωπων.
"So that he united in himself two vices the most opposite to each other; avaricious meanness on the one hand, and, on the other, an insolent contempt both of Gods and men."p. 174, ed. Massey.
"A boisterous, rapacious, mercenary, cruel, and unrelenting brute; and the reader pities none of his calamities, and is pleased with none of his successes!"
παραδειγμα ἐπιεικειας. But for a juster account of this matter, and for the best illustration of this passage of
Here are two readings: τας παρα τα ἐξ ἀναγκης ἀκολουθουσας ἀισθησεις τη ποιητικη
: and, τα παρα τας ἐξ ἀναγκης
, &c. but in both, the object, and general sense of the passage, seem to be the same, though in both, the expression, it must be confessed, is sufficiently embarrassed and obscure. I have preferred the latter, (which is that of ἡ μεν ἀφη και γευσις ΑΚΟΛΟΥΘΕΙ πασιν ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ
. "Tactus et gustus animalia omnia necessario comitantur
." Tom. i. p. 63. ed. Duval.
The senses that belong to, accompany, or are connected with, Poetry, are, plainly, the sight, and the hearing, as relative to the Οψις
, or Spectacle, in the whole extent of that term, and to the Μελοποιία
or Music. When these are said to be ἐξ ἀναγκης ἀκολουθουσαι τη ποιητικη
, it cannot be meant that the parts relative to them are essential to the Tragic Poem, like the fable, manners, &c.
Οψις
;
ἥκιστα οἰκειον της ποιητικης
, yet, in another view, ΕΞ ΑΝΑΓΚΗΣ ἀν εἴη τι μοριον της Τραγωδίας ὁ της Οψεως κοσμος
.
The drift of the precept is obvious. The decoration should be such as to agree with the rules just laid down for the manners.
ἁρμοττοντα, ὁμοια
— probability, nature, and the costume, must be observed. Even the μιμησις βελτιονων
, the improved imitation, has here, too, its obvious application. The squalid hair, and ragged dress, of Σκέψαι μου ΠΙΝΑΡΑΝ ΚΟΜΑΝ, Και ΤΡΥΧΗ ΤΑΔ' ἐμων πεπλων.
Eurip. Electra, 184.
σκληροτης
of
The rule extends, also, to the
ἠθη, the
πρεπον, &c. to the depraved taste of what he calls the
Φορτικοιspectators.
ἀγωνες), indeed, of which he speaks in these passages, seem to have been merely musical. But the known influence of the same popular audience in the dramatic contests, and the caution given by
῾Αι πιστεως ἐνεκα
. Well explained by
Ει δ'αγε δη και ΣΗΜΑ ἀριφραδες άλλο τι δείξω,
Ὀφρα με ἐυ γνωτον, ΠΙΣΤΩΘΗΤΟΝ τ᾽ ἐνι θυμῳ,
ΟΥΛΗΝ, &c.
"To give you firmer faith, now trust your eye:
"Lo! the broad scar indented on my thigh."
Other instances of signs thus used, not for the purpose of accidental discovery, but as confirmations of a voluntary discovery previously made, may easily be found. Thus, in the
η γαρ συ κεινος;— he answers —
Τηνδε προσβλεψασ᾽ ἐμε Σφραγίδα πατρος, ἐκμαθ᾽ ἐι σαφη λεγω.
Εκ περιπετειας
. — "Non valet hic περιπετεια, mutationem illam ingentem fortunarum, sed, ἐκ περιπετειας, significat, casu, fortuito, et quia ita cecidit."
— Περιπετεια
, and Ευμενης
: τυχη το πλειον συνεργῳ χρωμενου, οὐκ ΕΚ ΠΕΡΙΠΕΤΕΙΑΣ, ἀλλα δια της ἀγχίνοιας. κ. τ. λ.
ἐκ περιπετειας
, seems not to be of very common occurrence. περιπετεια
in the dramatic sense, translates — "quæ e mutationibus in contrarium oriuntur;"
which, indeed, is the obvious meaning of the expression, if not understood adverbially. But it cannot be περιπετεια
. Indeed, it was neither the consequence, nor the cause, of any reverse of fortune.
I have sometimes suspected that ἐκ ΠΡΟΠΕΤΕΙΑΣ
, by which all ambiguity would have been avoided. But, perhaps, after all, the phrase had no ambiguity to Greek ears, and the passage may be right as it stands.
Δευτεραι δε, αι πεποιημεναι ὑπο του ποιητου, διο ἀτεχνοι
. — The expression, πεποιημεναι ὑπο του ποιητου
, must necessarily, I think, be understood emphatically, and must mean, not merely "Chiama Aristotele questa seconda spetie di riconoscimento, fatto dal Poeta e cosi lo chiama, non perche in tutte le spetie il Poeta non sia quello che li riconoscimenti, siccome le altre parti dell' attione e della favola ponga e formi coi versi suoi; ma ha dato à questa spetie più ch' all' altre questo nome, perche in essa, non fondandosi il Poeta, nè nello stesso connettimento delle cose, e nella stessa favola, nè in segno alcuno che la persona stessa, che s'ha da riconoscere, gli offerisca inanzi; egli, per questo, come libero divenuto, à suo mero (quasi) arbitrio, reca, finge, e pone in bocca della persona à voglia sua, quella occasione di riconoscimento che più gli piace,"
&c. [p. 230.] — Yet, as this sense is rather inferred from the explanation subjoined, (ταυτα γὰρ αυτος λεγει ῾Α ΒΟΥΛΕΤΑΙ Ὁ ΠΟΙΗΤΗΣ, ἀλλ' οὐχ Ὁ ΜΥΘΟΣ
) than expressed by the words themselves, I am much inclined to suppose some omission in the text.
The other reading, ΟΥΚ ἀτεχνοι
, is very plausibly supported by the
Των δε πιστεων, αι μεν ἀτεχνοι εισιν κ. τ. λ.In that passage,
ἀτεχνα, is opposed to
ENTEXNA, and means, such things as are foreign to the orator's art. Here, the word means, not foreign to the Poet's art, but only — requiring little, or no art, or ingenuity of invention, in the Poet.
πεποιημεναι ὑπο του Π.seems hardly reconcilable with this reading. For can we conceive that
ΔΙΟ οὐκ ἀτεχνοι.
I must observe, however, that though these two readings are diametrically opposite, ἀτεχνοι
- οὐκ ἀτεχνοι
— yet, it is some comfort, that whichever we adopt, the general sense of the passage
ἀτεχνοι
, in the rhetorical sense: as they require very little invention, compared with those which arise from the action itself, they may, in this view, be denominated, ἀτεχνοι
. In either reading, therefore,
The Greek is — ἀνεγνωρισε την ἀδελφην, ἀνεγνωρισθεις ὑπ᾿ ἐκεινης
: — this, as ἀναγνωρισας την ἀδελφην, ἀνεγνωρισθη ὑπ᾿ ἐκεινης
: which would also have been clearer, and not have given occasion to the commentators to suppose, that the discovery of ΟΙΟΝ Ορ. ΑΝΕΓΝΩΡΙΣΕ την ἀδελφην
, leads very naturally to that idea. But it is easy to see, upon the least reflection, that the discovery of ἀναγνωρισις
in the same drama. [See cap. xi. at the end. Transl. Part II. Sect. 9.] — But this whole passage, I may say, this whole chapter, has undoubtedly been most miserably mangled in transcription.
The reading which ἐκεινος δε * * * * ταυτα γὰρ αυτος λέγει ἃ βέλεται ὁ ποιητης, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὁ μυθος
. — But four Medicean manuscripts, and, it seems, all those in the King of ἐκεινου δε αυτος λέγει, κ. τ. λ.
ταυτα γὰρ
: — he gives them in his text, and translates them in his commentary. He rejects only the supplement, δια σημείων
.
ἐκεινος δε
, — had expressed the means of the discovery, and by them denominated this species, as he has all the others: — δια σημειων
— δια μνημης
— ἐκ συλλογισμου
—. But how the vacancy was filled, it is impossible to determine; and it is of the less consequence to determine, as we are in possession of the Tragedy itself. — Δια σημείων
, which δια τεκμηρίων
, as
In point of meaning, it is indifferent by which of these appellations these discoveries were distinguished; τεκμηριον
being, according to
σημειον.
Τουτων δε ( . . των σημείων,) το μεν ἀναγκαιον, τεκμηριον.
Σημειονis a sign, or token:
Τεκμηριον, a certain, decisive sign, such as puts an end to all doubt, according to the derivation of the word given by
ἔχεις τι τωνδε μοι ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΟΝ ;
῾Αδ᾽ ἐιδον αυτος, ταδε φρασω ΤΕΚΜΗΡΙΑ.
ΣΑΦΗ ΣΗΜΕΙΑis used, v. 892, as equivalent to
τεκμήριονwhich occurs afterwards, v. 910.
It is, indeed, some objection to δια σημειων
, in this passage of δια σημείων ΤΑΥΤΑ γὰρ αυτος ΛΕΓΕΙ ἃ βέλεται
, &c. Σημειον
, in the first species of discovery, is used for visible, external proofs: here, it would be used for verbal, argumentative proofs; as it is used, continually, in this treatise. And it may also be observed, that πεποιημενα ΣΗΜΕΙΑ
.
Εξην γαρ ἂν ἐνια και ἐνεγκαν
. In the sense which I have given to this obscure sentence, the only sense that I thought could fairly be extracted from the words, I am glad to find myself supported by the judgment of "Quare propè dictum peccatum est: (ὅ ἐγγυς της ειρημενης ἁμαρτιας ἐστιν.) quia si illa quibus usus est Orestes non omninò signa fuerunt; neque enim ostendi potuerunt; — propè tamen illa accesserunt; atque ita propè ut quædam ex ipsis illius prorsus generis fuerint, quamvis ita ipsis ille usus non sit.
&c. Ενια
, because all the proofs of
Ἡ της κερκιδος φωνη
— ἱστῳ ποικίλμασι ΣΤΟΜΑΤΙ χρησαμένη
, in the language of that most curious of all Poets, φωνη
, κερκιδες
, it seems, were a very vocal sort of things, nothing like the shuttles of "these degenerate days." Every one recollects the "arguto pectine"
of Κερκίδας ὀρθρολαλοισι ΧΕΛΙΔΟΣΙΝ εικελοφωνους
— And, Κερκίδα δ' εὐποἰητον ΑΗΔΟΝΑ
— .
That this was a distinct Poem from the Κυπρια
mentioned afterwards in cap. xxiii. seems clear from this single circumstance, observed by
τα Κυπρια ἐπη, — is mentioned there by
ὁ τα Κυπριακα ποιησας.
τοις Κυπριοις, whether the title of it was
See Od. VIII. 521. There is another discovery of the same kind in the 4th book, where
ὅστε μοι ὑπνον ἀπεχθαιρει και ἐδωδην
Μνωσμενῳ· ἐπει οὔτις Αχαιων τοσσ᾿ ἐμογησεν
Ὁσσ᾽ Ὀδυσευς ἐμογησε και ήρατο — τῳ δ᾽ ἀρ ἔμελλε
Αυτῳ κηδε᾽ ἐσεσθαι, ἐμοι δ᾽ ἀχος ἀιεν ἀλαστον
Κεινου, ὅπως δη δηρον ἀποιχεται· οὐδε τι ίδμεν,
Ζωει ὅγ᾽, η τεθνηκεν. . . . . . . .
Οδυρονται νυ που αυτον
Λαέρτης θ' ὁ γερων, και ἐχέφρων Πηνελοπεια,
Τηλεμαχος θ᾽, ὃν ἐλειπε νεον γεγαωτ᾽ ἐνι οἴκῳ.
Ὡς φατο — τῳ δ' ἀρα πατρος ὑφ' ἵμερον ὦρσε γοοιο.
Δακρυ δ᾽ ἀπο βλεφαρων χαμάδις βαλε, πατρος ἀκουσας,
Χλαιναν πορφυρεην ἀντ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῖν ἀνασχων
Αμφοτέρησι χερσι· νοησε δε μιν Μενελαος.
That the title, Αλκινοου
, or Αλκινου ἀπολογος
, was understood to refer chiefly to the long narration of
Απολογος Αλκίνου· ἐπι των φλυαρούντων, και μακρον ἀποτεινοντων λογον. —
ἐπι μακρων ῥησεων.
Αλκινου ἀπολογοςcompressed into an abridgment of thirty verses.
Παραδειγμα ὁ Αλκινου ἀπολογος, ὅτι προς την Πηνελοπην ἐν τριακοντα ἐπεσι πεποἰηται.
Αλκινου Απολογος) must at least have extended to those four books. But the passage which is the subject of this note, seems to prove that it extended still farther; for here we are referred to the eighth book under that title; though the speech, the
μακρα ῥησιςof
Αλκινου ἀπολογΟΙ, only to the eighth book. The fact seems to be, that the titles, by which the different parts of
Καλυψους Αντρον, and
Σχεδια, or
Τα περι την σχεδιαν: and the last book three,
Νέκυιαν—
Τα ἐν Λαερτου— and,
Σπονδαι.
Αλκινου Απολογος, is not, I apprehend, to be considered as appropriated to any one book, but, probably, comprehended five books — from the eighth to the twelfth, inclusively;
ΑΛΚΙΝΟΥ ἀπολογ.— the "story OF ALCINOUS" — seems rather to imply. And the different parts of this long Episode were, again, subdistinguished by other titles; such as,
Κυκλωπια, Νέκυια, Τα Κιρκης, &c. Indeed, the title,
Αλκινου Απολογοι, though prefixed only to the eighth book, seems evidently extended beyond that book by the title subjoined as its equivalent,
η, τα του Οδυσσεως παρα Αλκινῳ. But how the word
ἀπολογοςgot into the plural number here, I do not well understand. This circumstance, however, together with the idea of its being confined to this single book, has, I think, led
Here is much obscurity and confusion. One thing, however, seems clear; that ἐκ συλλογισμου
, cannot mean as some interpreters have understood it to mean, "by reasoning or inference in the mind of the person who makes the discovery;" because this is common to all the modes of discovery. When τεκμηρια
of ἐκ συλλογισμου
, however obscure in other respects, this at least seems clearly enough expressed, that the persons are discovered by their own reasoning, or inference; that is, by something which it leads them to say.
But, the difficulty is, that Τεταρτη δε, ἡ ἐκ συλλογισμο᾽ οἷον, ἐν Χοηφόροις, [al. Χλοηφοροις] ὅτι, ὁμοια τις ἐληλυθεν ὅμοιος δε οὐθεις ἀλλ᾿ ἢ Ορεστης· οὗτος ἀρα ἐληλυθεν.
"Itaque primum exemplum sic intelligendum crediderim, ut Electra agnita sit, non Orestes: ita, nimirum, ut cum Orestes eo modo ratiocinantem audiret puellam, dum Orestem sibi similem diceret, inde Electram agnoscat."Pauli Benii, in Ar. Poet. Comment. p. 348.
But we may say, farther, that this supposition seems to be favoured by the Tragedy of σαινομαι δ᾽ ὑπ᾿ ἐλπιδος
[v. 192.] and she is so far from discovering ὑφασμα
— the vest, or veil. This is justly remarked by "No discovery is from hence raised: but the mind of Electra is deeply struck; the reasons and conjectures, and so is finely prepared for the discovery which soon follows."
Notes on the "Tout cela (i. e. the hair, &c.) ne fait que la rendre plus inquiete: Elle demeure donc dans ce trouble jusqu' à ce qu' Oreste paroisse à ses yeux. Il se montre tout à coup, et se fait reconnoitre pour son frere, en lui présentant un voile qu'elle a tissu elle-meme."
This I take to be the true ἀναγνωρισις
of this drama; and it belongs
δια σημειων
; if not even to the worst sort of that class, where the sign is produced πιστεως ἐνεκα
, — by way of proof. Indeed, even admitting that "Questo riconoscimento non è della quarta specie, ma della prima; nato, non da sillogismo, ma da segno: posciache Elettra, preso per segno d'Oreste la capigliatura, sopra tal segno, quasi sopra mezzo termine, fabrica il sillogismo che ella fa in se stessa, argomentando, che colui fusse Oreste: havendo io già detto, ch' in ogni riconoscimento suol intervenir sillogismo ed argomentatione dentro all'animo della persona riconoscente."
p. 236.
I know not whether it be worth while to remark a mere resemblance of expression, but a very close one, in Μη πατερ᾿ ἀντίθεον ΔΙΖΗΜΕΝΟΣ, ΑΥΤΟΣ ΟΛΩΜΑΙ.
With respect to the title of the drama, Οδυσσευς Ψευδαγγελος
, if I have not given it its only possible sense, I have, surely, given it its most natural and obvious sense: —
"Ulisse di cui sono recate false novelle;"though
"Hæc enim ita incerta sunt, ut stultum esse videatur aliquid ipsorum affirmare."
Ψευδοδυσσευςwould rather have been used; as
Ψευδηράκλης,
Αναγνωριεντα . . τε θεατρου
: I see no other construction, as the text stands. And so "Spectatores ita accepisse illam vocem, tanquam si ipsi, rei illius auxilio, ipsum agnituri essent."
συνθετος) — or how, indeed, it was a discovery at all — what the precise paralogism was, &c. I confess myself totally unable, from the short, perplexed, and probably corrupt words of the text, to make out. The reader may see, however, a great variety of different conjectures in the commentators; and I believe when he has read them all he will find himself just where he was. For my part, I leave this bow of
Ω φίλοι, οὐ μεν ἐγω τανυω — λαβετω δε και άλλος.
ἀναγνωρισις
distinct from any of the preceding. This appears, 1. From his examples, which are very different from all those before produced, and not reducible, I think, to any of his classes. The discovery of
πεποιημένων σημείων
, refer, as it is generally understood, to the second sort of discoveries exclusively, it is not easy to see how it can be true, that the fifth and best sort of discoveries, that ἐκ πραγματων
, is the only one that is effected without invented signs, bracelets, &c. for, on this supposition, the same may evidently be said of the third and fourth classes, those by memory, and by inference, which are expressly distinguished from the two first classes.
This inconsistence is not, I think, to be removed, but by understanding the words πεποιημενα σημεια
, here, to be used in a wider sense, as including the third and fourth species, and, in general, all discoveries that have any degree of the defect which πεποιημεναι ὑπο του ποιητου
, used in describing the second species, as opposed to what he calls, ἐξ ἀυτων πραγματων
;ἐξ ἀυτων πραγματων
, is more fully expressed, cap. x. where he says of the discovery and revolution, that they should arise ἐξ ἀυτης της συστασεως του μυθου ώστε ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΠΡΟΓΕΓΕΝΗΜΕΝΩΝ συμβαινειν, ἢ ἐξ ἀναγκης ἢ κατα το εικος, γίγνεσθαι ταυτα
. Transl. Part II. Sect. 8.
Any incident, or single action, of that combination of actions that compose a fable, is said, I think, to be ἐξ αυτων πραγματων
, when it is prepared in the texture of the plot, and appears to follow so naturally and of course (κατα το ἀναγκαιον ἢ το ἐικος
) from the incidents which precede it, that the spectator does not see how it could have been otherwise."Puisque la fonction du vraisemblable dans la Tragedie, est d’empecher de s’appercevoir de la feinte, le vraisemblable qui trompe le mieux est le plus parfait, et c’est celui qui devient necessaire."
ἐξ ἀυτων πραγματων
, which are not thus gradually prepared, but have, more or less, the appearance of expedients brought in to answer the purpose of the moment; which suggest the idea of occasional and easy contrivance; which, though not, perhaps, improbable, yet have not such a degree of probability, as answers fully the purpose of dramatic illusion, by acting upon the mind of the spectator as necessity, and keeping his attention rivetted to the action, without suffering him, as it were, to turn his eyes a moment from it, to the resources of the Poet’s invention.
Now the third and fourth sorts of discovery appear, when we examine them, to be of this kind. They are not prepared and brought on gradually by the previous circumstances of the fable, as in the examples given from the
πεποιημενα(
ὑπο του ποιητου); and they are, also, in the proper and logical sense of the word,
σημεια; the tears, in the one case, and the illative reflection, or exclamation, in the other, being tokens, by which the persons are recognized. And thus, what
ἀνευ των πεποιημενων σημείων και περιδεραιων: by
περιδεραια, meaning the first class of discoveries, and under
πεποιημενα σημειαcomprehending the three other classes.
He has, plainly, arranged his modes of discovery, as he had before arranged the modes of managing the παθη
, or disastrous incidents, of Tragedy (cap. xiv.) — in the order of their comparative excellence; beginning with the worst, and proceeding gradually to the best. When he tells us, that the discoveries by inference are the next best, he evidently considers them, as not being, strictly at least, ἐξ ἀυτων πραγματων
; and so far, I think, is intelligible: but, in what respect they are better than the preceding species, δια μνημης
, he has not told us. The discovery by recollection may, perhaps, in this respect be regarded as less ἐξ ἀυτων πραγματων
, more of the "Poet’s making," as it seems to require the introduction of something accidental and extraneous, such as the picture in his first instance, and the Bard and his performance, in the second; circumstances, which have more the appearance of expedients than the reflection of
But it is time to release the reader, and myself, from the embarrassments of one of the most corrupt, confused, and ambiguous chapters of this mutilated and disfigured work.
Ὁ μη ὁρωντα τον θεατην ἐλανθανεν
. — λανθανει
, applied just before to the Poet, seems to fix the same application of ἐλανθανε
here. The opposition, as he has observed, is strongly marked: — it escaped the Poet; ἐπι ΔΕ της ΣΚΗΝΗΣ
, &c.
ὁ μη, ὁρωντα, ΩΣ τον θεατην, ἐλανθανεν ΑΝ
. "La qual contrarietà non sarebbe potuto essere celata a Carcino, se avesse riguardata la sua Tragedia non come Poeta, ma come veditore."
Τοις σχήμασι συναπεργαζομενον ποιειν
. — The same expression occurs in the Rhetoric III. 8. ἀναγκη τους συναπεργαζομενους σχήμασι, και φωναις, και ἐσθητι, και όλως τη ὑποκρισει, ἐλεεινοτερους ειναι
. But there, this is mentioned only as the means, by which the Orator may excite greater emotion in the hearer, immediately: here, as the means, by which the Poet may excite a stronger emotion, a greater reality of imagination and feeling, and a more perfect alienation of person, if I may venture so to call it, in himself, immediately; in order to produce afterwards a correspondent effect upon the spectator, by the force and truth of his imitation.
"I have often observed,"
says the admirable author of the
"that on mimicking the looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frighted, or daring men, I have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose appearance I endeavoured to imitate; nay, I am convinced it is hard to avoid it, though one strove to separate the passion from its correspondent gestures."I believe, however, it is hardly possible to put on the bodily appearance of any passion,
A singular instance of the practice of this rule of σχημασι συναπεργαζομενον ποιειν
— in a sister art, is given in the following curious account, from
"Il ne pouvoit comprendre qu’il y eut des peintres qui travaillassent à des ouvrages considérables avec si peu d’application, que pendant leur travail ils ne laisassent pas de s’entretenir avec leurs amis. Il les regardoit comme des ouvriers qui n’avoient que la pratique, et nulle intelligence de l’art; etant persuadé qu’un Peintre, pour bien réüssir, doit entrer dans une parfaite connoissance des affections de l’esprit et des passions de l’ame; qu’il doit les sentir en lui même, et s’il faut ainsi dire, faire les memes actions et souffrir les mêmes mouvemens qu’il veut représenter: ce qui ne se peut au milieu des distractions. Aussi on l’entendoit quelquefois parler en travaillant, avec une voix languissante et pleine de douleur, ou tenir des discours agréables et joyeux, selon les divers sentimens qu’il avoit intention d’exprimer. Mais pour cela, il s’enfermoit dans un lieu fort retiré, pour n’être pas apperçu dans ces differens états, ni par ses eléves, ni par ceux de sa famille; parcequ’il lui étoit arrivé quelquefois, que des gens qui l’avoient vû dans ces transports, l’avoient soupçonné de folie. Lorsque dans sa jeunesse il travailloit au Tableau, du Martyre de S. André qui est à S. Gregoire, Annibal Carrache étant allé pour le voir, il le surprit comme il étoit dans une action de colére et menaçante. Après l’avoir observé quelque temps, il connut qu’il representoit un soldat qui menace le S. Apôtre. Alors ne pouvant plus se tenir caché, il s’approcha du Dominiquin, et en l’embrassant, lui avoüa qu’il avoit dans ce moment-là beaucoup appris de lui."
I will just observe, farther, that this precept, or rather counsel, of ὑπεκρινοντο γαρ αυτοι Τραγῳδιας οι ποιηται το πρωτον
. — Rhet. III. 1. But, indeed, I am so far from seeing any thing strange or improbable in this advice, that, on the contrary, if it be liable to any objection at all, it is, perhaps, rather to that of being unnecessary: for I scarce believe, that any Poet of genius, antient or modern, ever yet composed a Tragedy without practising involuntarily, in some degree or other, what the critic here recommends. No dramatic Poetry, I think, can be less chargeable with the μανικον
, than that of the French. Yet "Il recommande que l’on soit présent à l’action que l’on veut peindre, que l’on se penetre soi-meme des sentimens que l’on doit exprimer, et qu’on imite, en composant, l’action des personnages qu’on met sur la scene: méthode qui contribue réellement à donner au style plus de chaleur et de vérité."
[
ΟΣΑ ΔΥΝΑΤΟΝ, at least,
σχημασι συναπεργασασθαι. We must, for once, divest ourselves of modern ideas, and think, not of a spruce Poet of "these degenerate days," shut up in his study, with his pen in his hand, and his writing-table before him — but of
"Philochorus refert, in insulâ Salamine speluncam esse tetram et horridam, quam nos vidimus, in quâ Euripides Tragedias fcriptitarit."— Aul. Gell. xv. 20.
Πιθανωτατοι γαρ ἀπο της αυτης φυσεως δι ἐν παθεσιν εισι
. — Nothing, I think, can be more forced and improbable, than the sense given to the words, ἀπο της αυτης φυσεως
, by "eorum qui pari naturâ ingenioque præditi, &c."
"De deux hommes qui seront d’un égal genie, celui qui se mettra dans la passion sera toujours plus persuasif."
If the text be right, the only sense I see is that given by "propter similitudinem ejusdem naturæ:"
i. e. "from natural sympathy." — But I am much disposed to suspect, that we should read, ἀπ᾿ ΑΥΤΗΣ ΤΗΣ φυσεως
— ab ipsa naturâ
; — Ipsa naturâ comparatum est, ut, &c.
A similar, but contrary, transposition, of the same words, occurred at the end of the second chapter: ἐν ἀυτῃ δε τη διαφορα
— plainly, as ΤΗ ΑΥΤΗ
. And, indeed, this sense is so obvious, that
Χειμαινει ὁ χειμαζομενος, και χαλεπαινει ὁ ὀργιζομενος ἀληθινωτατα
. I have given that sense of this passage, in which all the commentators I have seen are perfectly agreed. But I cannot dissemble a difficulty which has always occurred to me in this interpretation, though, to my surprise, I have not found it any where taken notice of. I mean, that it gives a transitive sense to the verbs, χειμαινει
, and χαλεπαινει
.
With respect, particularly, to the verb χαλεπαινειν
, (for the other occurs but seldom,) the difficulty from the general, if not the constant, use of it, as a verb neuter, seems not easily to be overcome. This use of it, by
This difficulty has sometimes led me to suspect, that the passage may possibly, after all, admit of a different sense; and that χειμαινει
) so naturally, (ἀληθινωτατα
,) as he who is really agitated, (χειμαζομενος
,) or expresses anger (χαλεπαινει
) so naturally, as he who is really angry (ὀργιζομενος
.)" — Thus, the forms, χειμαινει
, χαλεπαινει
, will retain their neuter signification, referring to the Poet’s expression of the passion in his composition; as, χειμαζομενου
, and ὀργιζομενου
, refer to the internal feeling of the passion, which he has excited in his own mind. Χειμαζεσθαι
— to be violently agitated in mind: — Χειμαινειν
— to express that agitation by words or actions: ὀργιζεσθαι
— to be angry: χαλεπαινειν
— to express that anger by words or actions.
It will, perhaps, be objected, that χαλεπαινειν
, used as a verb neuter, appears to be synonymous with ὀργιζεσθαι
. That it may be often so, I will not take upon me to deny: but numerous instances may certainly be produced, where it is not so — where it clearly denotes something beyond the mere internal passion. In this line of Ζευς, ὅτε δη ῥ' ἀνδρεσσι ΚΟΤΕΣΣΑΜΕΝΟΣ ΧΑΛΕΠΗΝΗΙ.
Il. Π. 386. — "iratus sæviat;"
— where the anger of κοτεσσάμενος
but χαλεπήνη
goes on to the external demonstration of it, ὅτε λαβροτατον χεει ὑδωρ
. [v. 385]χειμαινοντος
, i. e. when it is winter. An instance, which, as far as it goes, is in favour of the sense I would give to the word here.
So, too, Od. Τ. v. 83.
Μη πως τοι δεσποινα κοτεσσάμενη ΧΑΛΕΠΗΝΗ
— which, in vulgar language, would be fairly rendered, "lest your mistress should be angry, and scold."
Thus, again, Il. Ο. 256, of ὁ δ᾽ ἐπεγρομενος ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕ ΡΙΠΤΑΖΩΝ ΚΑΤΑ ΔΩΜΑ ΘΕΟΥΣ.
In the very passage adduced to exemplify the transitive use of this verb, Il. Τ. 183, it appears to have the same sense: for the words, ὅτε τις προτερου χαλεπηνη
, allude to Και γαρ ἐγων Αχιλευς τε μαχεσσαμεθ᾽, εἵνεκα κουρης, Αντιβίοις ΕΠΕΕΣΣΙΝ· ἐγω δ᾽ ΗΡΧΟΝ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΩΝ.
Χαλεπαινειν
is here, I think, put as synonymous with μαχεσθαι ἔπεεσσιν
. Ω μοι, ἀναιδείην
, &c. [v. 149.]
I shall add only an instance or two more. In the first book of Plato’s Repub. ἐλεεισθαι οὖν ἡμας πολυ μαλλον εικός ἐστι παρ᾽ ὑμων των δεινων, ἢ ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ
— i. e. "we deserve rather to be pitied by you wise men, than to be scolded at." In the passage quoted NOTE 22, p. 188, ὃν μεν ἂν ἴδῃ ἀγνωτα, ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΕΙ· — ὃν δ᾽ ἂν γνωριμον, ΑΣΠΑΖΕΤΑΙ
: "fawns on those he knows, and barks at strangers." In the
Αισθομενος δε ποτε Λαμπροκλεα, τον πρεσβύτατον υἱον ἑαυτου, προς την μητερα ΧΑΛΕΠΑΙΝΟΝΤΑ: i.e. "when he had heard him speaking angrily to his mother." It seems, then, that the passage will fairly admit of the meaning I have proposed, And whether that meaning would
χειμαινειν, or
χαλεπαινειν,
ἀληθινωτατα.
ἀληθινωτατα, its most natural and obvious construction, with the verbs,
χειμαινειand
χαλεπαινει. As the passage is commonly understood, it must be joined with the participles.
Such are my objections to the sense hitherto given to this passage, and my reasons for thinking, that its meaning may have been mistaken. I abandon them, without reserve, to the judgment of the learned reader: in my own, it is impossible for me to confide, when I reflect, that the whole band of commentators, who have preceded me, have acquiesced, without doubt or scruple, in that interpretation which to me appears so unsatisfactory.
Εὐφυὲς ἡ ποιητική ἐστιν. Εὐφυΐα—ΟΞΥΤΗΣ.
Hefychius. See also Casaub. upon Athenaeus, p. 454, and Suidas, voc. Εὐφυᾶ
, and Εὐφυΐα
, where the passage he quotes from Alex. Aphrod. shews what was the common idea of εὐφυΐα
, though its propriety is disputed. The εὐφυεῖς
were generally understood to be ὁι ῥᾳδίως μανθάνοντες, ὁμοἰως δὲ ἔχοντες πρὸς πάντα τὰ μαθήματα
, &c. The passage seems to allude to Ethic. Nicom. III. 5. p. 113. ed. Wilk.
No epithet can be more exactly adapted to the εὐφυής
, than that of εὔπλαστος
, which follows; a man of quick, mimetic parts, who can turn himself, as we say, to every thing with equal facility, and mould himself, without effort, to every form. But the word had considerable latitude, and would have been applied by the antients, to the genius of a Shakspeare, the talents of a Foote, or the docility of a school-boyἀνθρώποις ΤΟΙΣ ΕΥΦΥΕΣΙ καλομένοις, καὶ ΤΑ ΓΕΛΟΙΑ ΛΕΓΟΥΣΙ ΚΑΙ ΠΟΙΟΥΣΙ
, Athen. 260. — Παρὰ τῶν ΕΥΦΥΩΝ
, says Isocrates, speaking of scholars, δεῖ μέγαν λαμβάνειν μισθὸν ὅτι ΠΟΛΛΑ ΜΑΝΘΑΝΟΥΣΙ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν ἈΦΥΩΝ, ὅτι πολλοὺς κόπους παρέχουσι.
— An admirable inscription for a school door.
μανικοῦ.
— My translation here will, I fear, be thought too paraphrastical. But this is one among many passages, that have occurred, where I have found it impossible to give, at the same time, word for word, and idea for idea. This, indeed, is the great misfortune of translation; for what Mr. Harris has observed is too true, that μανικοῦ
, wanted no explanation to Greek readers, to whom, from the writings of Plato, in particular, it was familiar to consider enthusiasm of every kind, as a species of madnessΕΝΘΕΟΝ γὰρ ἡ ποἰησις
, III. 7. ed. Duval. I cannot help just reminding the reader of the admirable humour with which Horace ridicules the poetical abuse of this idea, in his Art of Poetry, v. 295-304."il faut avoir un genie excellent, ou etre FURIEUX?"
Nor could I, without danger of confounding the philosopher's distinction, have rendered εὐφυΐα
by the single word "inflammatio animorum"
which Aristotle meant to express by the other word, μανικοῦ
.
I must not omit, that this whole passage receives considerable illustration from another, in the Problems, pointed out by Mr. Winstanley in his edition, p. 292Ὅσοις δὲ λίαν
, &c. — to ἐκτατικοἰ
, &c. The reading, ἐκρατικοἰ
, instead of ἐξεταστικοἰ
, if it stood in need of any confirmation, would be confirmed by this single passage beyond all doubt.μανικοῦ
among the Tragic Poets, it would, in all probability, have been Æschylus. It is pleasant to observe the appearance which the wild invention and ferocious sublimity of his PROMETHEUS, had to the eye of a French critic, of admirable good sense, indeed, but, καρδίᾳ νήφοντος
. "Je crois,"
says Fontenelle, "Il me semble,"
says this agreeable writer, "qu'il ne faudroit donner dans le sublime, qu' à son corps defendant."
[Preface to his Hist. des Oracles.] No wonder then, that he could not relish Æschylus.
We must allow him much merit;—but he never "rolled his eye" in the "fine phrensy" of the Poet; he knew little of "the tricks" of "strong imagination." The character given of him by Lord Kaims appears to me perfectly exact and just; that
I have often wondered, what it was that could attach Mr. Gray so strongly to a Poet whose genius was so little analogous to his own"it was certainly no loss to the English stage, that Agrippina was
but we have been told it by the same critic who has pronounced, also, that the BARD of Gray, only "endeavours at sublimity;" who saw in the juvenile Poems of Milton "no promise of Paradise Lost;" and who has admitted, with seeming complacence, into the catalogue of English POETS, such names as Blackmore, Yalden, and Pomfret— "Alcandrumque Haliumque Noemonaque Prytanimque!"
Here is a confusion of various readings, none of them, I think, free from suspicion. How the sense given to the passage by Victorius, and almost all the commentators, is fairly to be obtained from any of them, I confess, I never could see. I follow the common, and, in my opinion, the least suspicious, reading— τούς τε λόγους τοὺς πεποιημένους
—. And I understand Aristotle to speak of subjects, either wholly invented by the Poet, like the Λόγος
—the general story, or argument. (Λόγος — Η ΤΟΥ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΟΣ ΥΠΟΘΕΣΙΣ.
Hefychius.)— ΚΑΙ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν
, because, I suppose, such arguments were commonly drawn up by others, probably in the Διδασκαλίαι
, and, perhaps, prefixed to the copies of the play. But here, Aristotle— "poetam etiam ipsum hoc facere jubet, quod novum erat, et inusitatum:"
—as the force of ΚΑΙ ΑΥΤΟΝ
seems rightly explained by Victoriusτοὺς δὴ λόγους
, which, according to VICTORIUS has MS. authority, would, perhaps, be preferable.
This seems to shew plainly, that by λόγους πεποιημένους
the critic means only such subjects as were of the Poet's own inventionπεποιημένον ὄνομα
, cap. xxi. "a word of the Poet's invention." πεποιημένα σημεῖα... πεποιημέναι ἀναγνωρίσεις
, cap. xvi. and, πεποιημένα ὀνόματα
, cap. ix. "names invented by the Poet.""on remet les noms."
But this, certainly, is not what Aristotle says; and it is too trifling, surely, to be what he means"jam nomina imponi jubet, non tam illa fingendo, quam reddendo."
That this is the meaning, will appear, I think, still more clearly from the 9th chapter, with which this passage should be compared. What is here said of the method to be pursued by συστήσαντες γὰρ τὸν μῦθον διὰ τῶν εἰκότων, ΟΥΤΩ ΤΑ ΤΥΧΟΝΤΑ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΑ ΕΠΙΤΙΘΕΑΣΙ
γελοῖον τοῦτο ζητεῖν
. And he immediately adds, that it is the invention or making of his fable, (not of his verse only,) that truly constitutes the Poet.
. See NOTE 37. Here are two instances given by Aristotle of what he means by ἐπεισόδια
in dramatic Poetry. They confirm, I think, what was said in that note. That Orestes should be taken, by some means or other, and should, by some means or other, be saved, were essential parts of the Poet's fable. These were not episodes, in Aristotle's view; for he expressly includes them both in that general sketch of the story, which is previous to the intertexture of the episodes: ἐλθὼν δὲ καὶ ΛΗΦΘΕΙΣ
—and, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἡ ΣΩΤΗΡΙΑ
.
The episodes are the circumstances by which the Poet chose to effect this capture, and this escape; i.e. the madness of Orestes, and the ablution of the statue; or rather, these facts drawn out into some particularity of descriptive narration, so as to form distinct, though subordinate, parts of the action; for this, perhaps, made a part of Aristotle's idea of ἐπεισόδιον
.—And the ἀγγέλου
, v. 1327, &c. From the very observation, that these episodes should be properly related to the subject, and from what he adds of the difference of dramatic and epic episodes in point of length, it clearly appears, that, as I observed in the note referred to, the word is not applied to Tragedy in a different sense from that in which it is applied to the Epic Poem"parties neceffaires de l'action,"
according to Le Bossu's definition, lib. ii. ch. 6.
Ἡ δ' ἐποποιΐα τούτοις μηκύνεται.
—Compare cap. xxiv. Ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι, κ. τ. ἀλ.
—to, ἐπεισοδίοις.
Μικρός
, (instead of μακρός
,) has now the support of a manuscript. See, ed. Ox. 1780, with the learned editor of which I perfectly agree. Λόγος
is plainly used here in the same sense as before, for the general argument, or summary, of the Poem: whereas, if we read μακρός
, it can mean only the entire story at full length, with all its episodes. Farther; the epitome of the Odyssey which
Homer himself has given us a still more general outline of the Poem in two lines and a half; —σύνοψιν πάσης τῆς Ὀδυσσείας
, as the scholiast has observed upon it:
Φῆν, κακὰ πολλὰ παθόντ', ὀλέσαντ' ἀπὸ πάντας ἑταίρους,
Ἄγνωστον πάντεσσιν, ἐεικοστῷ ἐνιαυτῷ,
Οἴκαδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι.
Od. B. 174.
—where, ὀλέσαντ' ἀπὸ πάντας ἑταίρους
, is equivalent to Aristotle's μόνου ὄντος
.
ΠΑΡΑΦΥΛΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΥ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος
—The same idea is thus expressed by Virgil:
nec Teucris addita Juno
Usquam aberit.
Æn. VI. 90.
—upon which passage the reader will find an excellent and useful note in the best of all editions of this Poet, that of Heyne. Horace comes still nearer to the word παραφυλάττεσθαι
:
Incontinentis nec Tityi jecur
Relinquit ales, nequitiæ ADDITUS
CUSTOS.
Lib. III. Ode iv.
Ἀναγνωρίσας τινάς, αὐτοῖς ἐπιθεμενΘ-.
This is all very strange, and, probably, very corrupt; as may appear, merely from the awkward and cacophonous repetition of the pronoun— ΑΥΤΟΣ ἀφικνεῖται ---- ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ἐπιθέμενος, ΑΥΤΟΣ μὲν ἐσώθη.
And what is, ἀναγνωρίσας τινάς
?—Certainly, not what one expects. Ulysses, we know, was discovered by the nurse, and discovered himself to Eumæus, and the herdsman, and to Telemachus; but I do not recollect that he discovers any one. Castelvetro saw this; and he says, that οἰκείων
is to be understood; and that the signification of the word ἀναγνωρίσας
here must be observed, which is, not that Ulysses discovered any of his friends, but that he made himself known to them. But we have no authority, that I know of, for this use of ἀναγνωρίζειν
with an accusative case. Piccolomini, too, understands this passage as Castelvetro did— "datofi à conoscere ad alcuni."
And the Abbé Batteux— "se fait reconnoitre,"
&c.
But what, again, is, αὐτοῖς ἐπιθέμενος
?—Does αὐτοῖς
refer to the friends, or to the enemies, of Ulysses?—Is ἐπιθέμενος
, deceiving, imposing on, as it is rendered by Victorius, and others after him, or, as others understand it, attacking? for it will bear either of these senses. I have preferred the latter as most obvious, and, on the whole, most to the purpose. Ἐπιτιθέμενοι
is used by Aristotle in this sense, Rhet. II. 5. It generally, I believe, implies an attack more or less insidious, such as that of Ulysses upon the suitors. The scholiast upon Homer, Od. Υ. 156, observes, that a day of ἵνα τῶν ἀνδρῶν περὶ τὴν ἑορτὴν καταγινομένων, εὔκαιρον ἔχῃ τὸ ΕΠΙΤΙΘΕΣΘΑΙ ΤΟΙΣ ΜΝΗΣΤΗΡΣΙ.
Aristotle is here, as usual, very short and dry in the information he bestows upon us concerning this δέσις
and λύσις
. I wish he had given us a definition of their meanings, instead of a mere designation of their places. One would suspect, on the first view, from the mention of a change εἰς εὐτυχίαν
only, (in which reading all the MSS. I think, agree,) from his instance, (if it be the same Tragedy as he before cited, cap. xi.) and from the common acceptation of the word λύσις
itself, that he was speaking only of those Tragedies in which the principal characters are extricated from the difficulties they were involved in, and the end is happy.
And, indeed, the way in which Le Bossu, and others after him, explain this nœud
and denouement
, leads naturally to this idea, and seems hardly consistent with their allowing, as they do, that the denouement may be either calamitous or prosperousnœud
, or δέσις
, by "obstacles à vaincre"
— "efforts contraires— i. e. aux efforts du heros pour l'execution de son dessein."
—
The truth is, that the obstacles of the δέσις
, or the knot, are those which are presented to the mind of the spectator; the difficulty overcome is that of seeing how the piece will terminate. And thus, indeed, the Abbé Batteux more accurately expresses himself elsewhere:— "Le nœud dans le Cinna est, de sçavoir si Cinna tuera Auguste,"
&c."autant de temps que l'esprit du lecteur est suspendu sur l'évenement de ces efforts contraires,"
&c. ch. xiii. Dacier, too, talks in the same equivocal language. See his notes, 1, 2, and 3.λύσις
is, to the spectator, the solution of the problem, "How will all this end?" And we may add, the more difficult the problem, the greater the pleasure of the solution.
It may be objected, that this is applicable only to those Tragedies, the subjects of which are totally unknown to the spectator; and it may be asked, "Where is the problem to be solved, in those dramas, which we have repeatedly seen and read, and of which we are perfectly acquainted with the catastrophe, and every incident that leads to it?" To this I can only answer, that it is a fact, and certainly a curious fact, that it makes little difference, or none at all, in the sympathetic interest which a spectator feels during the course of the action, whether he knows, or does not know, beforehand, how the piece will end.
The term λύσις
, therefore, is as applicable to the calamitous catastrophe of the Oedipus, as to the satisfactory conclusion of the Iphigenia in Tauris. For Aristotle expressly gives these parts, Ἔστι δὲ ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγῳδίας, τὸ μὲν, δέσις, τὸ δὲ, λύσις.
Castelvetro has guessed, with some ingenuity, the subject and plot of this Tragedy, from Hyginus, Fab. 45. See Goulston's supplemental version, which is taken from him. It seems, however, very improbable, that a Tragedy should be denominated from a person who had no other share in the action, than that it passed under his roof. Dacier understands this to be the Lynceus mentioned before, cap. xi. All I see is, that his application of the word, παιδίον
, to Lynceus the husband of Hypermestra, cannot be admitted. The diminutive παιδίον
, is, I believe, never used but to signify a child. In this respect, certainly, Castelvetro's conjecture has greatly the advantage; as it has, also, in the explanation of αἰτιάσεως τοῦ θανάτου
, which, in Dacier, is terribly forced. See his version.
It is incumbent on a commentator to state, as clearly as he can, the difficulties of his author, whether he be able to remove them, or not. This has not been done with respect to this passage, in any of the comments that I have seen.
Aristotle says, Τραγῳδιας δε ειδη εισι τεσσαρα τοσαυτα ΓΑΡ και τα μερη ελεχθη.
"There are four species of Tragedy; for so many also are the parts which have been mentioned." This is saying, as expressly as words can say it, that the four different species of Tragedy correspond to, and, of course, arise from, four different parts already mentioned. Now what are those parts? Four parts of quantity have indeed been mentioned; (cap. xii.) but these are quite out of the question. If we have recourse to what are called the parts of quality, these are six; and if, with Dacier, we reduce them to four, by throwing out the decoration and the music, the four that remain, i. e. fable, manners, sentiments, and diction, will furnish out, among them, only one of the species of Tragedy enumerated—that which is denominated ηθικη
. These, then, cannot be the four parts pointed at as the foundation of the four species. There remain only the parts which Aristotle calls μερη ΜΥΘΟΥ
: the parts, not of Tragedy, but of one of the essential parts of Tragedy—the Fable. These he enumerated in the 11th chapter, and to these, the commentators, in general, are agreed in understanding Aristotle to allude.
But the difficulty here is, that he refers to four parts mentioned, and here are only three—i. e. περιπετεια, αναγνωρισις
, (which he expressly calls δυο μυθα μερη
,) and, thirdly, παθος
: ΤΡΙΤΟΝ δὲ, παθός
. There is no mention of ηθος
, to furnish his third species, the moral Tragedy; nor, indeed, was it, by any means, to be expected there, where he is professedly enumerating the parts of the Fable. Παθη
, in the sense in which the word is there used, may, unquestionably, be considered as parts of the Fable; ηθη
, or manners, cannot.
Παθος
, in its usual sense, of passion, is a part, not of the μυθος
, but of the διανοια
. (See cap. xix. Transl. Part II. Sect. 22.) But, in the sense defined cap. xi. (Transl. Part II. Sect. 9.) it is an action—ΠΡΑΞΙΣ φθαρτικη
, &c. and, therefore, part of the plot, or συνθεσις πραγματων
, as much as the revolution, and discovery.
The Abbé Batteux thinks the ethic species is tacitly implied, as the opposite, or negative, of the pathetic. The three parts of the fable, περιπετεια, αναγνωρισις, παθος
, give, directly, only two species of Tragedy; the two first constituting, (one, or both of them,) the complicated, (πεπλεγμενην
,) and the third, the pathetic, or disastrous, Tragedy. The two other species are only the negatives of these. If the fable is without revolution or discovery, the Tragedy is simple, as opposed to complicated;
ΑΝΕΥ περιπετειας η αναγνωρισμου
, as he says above, in defining the simple fable. Cap. x.
παθη
, or disasters, it is ηθικη
, as opposed to παθητικη
.
η γαρ ΑΠΛΗΝ η ΠΕΠΛΕΓΜΕΝΗΝ, η ΗΘΙΚΗΝ η ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΗΝ, δει ειναι
; and, also, by the frequent opposition of παθος
and ηθος
, παθητικον
and ηθικον
, in antient writers
παθος
is not taken in the dramatic sense, of blood shed, disasters, &c. but in the usual sense of passion. But as this sense is, in fact, involved in the former, (for we can scarce conceive a disastrous, or, as we call it, a deep, Tragedy, that is not also highly pathetic, or passionate,) this is not, perhaps, any material objection.τοσαυτα γαρ και τα μερη ΕΛΕΧΘΗ
; which seem to refer clearly to four parts that had been all expressly mentioned. But, if we should suppose Aristotle here to consider that as said, which was only implied, and as explained, which was only hinted, we should, perhaps, take no liberty that is not warranted by the magisterial and elliptic brevity of his general style, and even by similar instances in his writings
καθαπερ ειρηται
, in cap. 2. see NOTE 83. And the, ωσπερ ειρηται
, cap. xv. see NOTE 110.—An embarrassment of enumeration somewhat similar to that of this passage has occurred in μερη της διανοιας
. see NOTE 105.
But even this will not entirely remove the difficulty, while, by the parts alluded to, we understand Aristotle to mean only the μερη μυθου
of the 11th chapter: because, as I before observed, ηθος
could be neither mentioned, nor implied, as a part of the fable. Perhaps, therefore, he meant to use the word μερη
in a general sense, as he clearly does use it, cap. xxiv. και τα ΜΕΡΗ, εξω μελ. και οψεως, τ'αυτα και ΓΑΡ περιπετειων δει
, κ. τ. αλ.—where the και ΓΑΡ
shews, that the parts he had just mentioned included both the six constituent parts of Tragedy, and the three parts of the fable which he enumerates. If we understand μερη
in this way, the meaning will only be, that so many different parts, (of one kind or other,) have been mentioned (ελεχθη
,) from which these species may be deduced: these are, the three μερη μυθου
, which furnish the complicated, the simple, and the pathetic, species; and the second of the essential parts of Tragedy, ηθος
, which, though indeed it be a part of every Tragedy, admits, according to Aristotle's own account, of more or less, and, when predominant, may be characteristic of another species, the ethic, or moral Tragedy, naturally enough opposed to the pathetic.
I confess I see no other possible consistent sense that can be given to this passage, as we now read it: for four parts are here mentioned and four parts cannot be made out, if we confine ourselves to the μερη ΜΥΘΟΥ
in cap. xi.
Dacier seems to have perceived this; and his explanation agrees so far with mine, that he, also, makes "la peripetie, la reconnoifance, la paffion, et les mœurs,"
the four parts that produce the four forts of Tragedy. But when, in order to reduce the seven parts, (i. e. fable, manners, diction, sentiments, discovery, revolution, disasters,) to the four which he wants, he rejects three, i. e. fable, diction, and sentiments, because they are common to all Tragedy, he makes a distinction for which there seems to be no foundation; the manners being equally included by Aristotle among those parts which are expressly ΠΑΣΗΣ τραγωδιας μερη
.
ανευ δε ηθων γενοιτ' αν (sc. Τραγωδια)
το ολον Διανοια
:—another, of which the language may be the most striking character—ης το ολον η Λεξις
; and he himself speaks of a fort of Tragedy that might very well be denominated, η Οπτικη
,
ης το ολον εστιν η Μελοποιϊα
. But Aristotle's business was not to enumerate all the different species which want of taste or judgment might produce, but those only which were considered as legitimate, and such as sound criticism would approve. Hence, he has recourse, for the formation of the four regular and authorised species, only to the two first and most important of the six constituent parts of Tragedy—the FABLE, and the MANNERS.
But after all, when we have made the best we can of the text in this passage, we must allow, I believe, that it is more for the credit of Aristotle to suppose it faulty. And that it is so, I am the rather inclined to think, as one difficulty still remains. The expression—"there are four forts of Tragedy; FOR so many parts have been mentioned"—seems clearly to imply, not merely, that those four forts are deducible, in some way or other, from those parts, but, as I at first observed, that they, respectively, arise from those parts, each of which produces its correspondent species of Tragedy. But this, as we have seen, is by no means the case. Of the four parts, only παθος
, and ηθος
, produce directly their correspondent species, the παθητικη
, and the ηθικη
. The other two parts,
περιπετεια
, and αναγνωρισις
, denominate one species from their presence, (the πεπλεγμενη
,) and another, (the απλη
,) from their absence.
"Videant studiosi hujus libri, an intelligi debeant, et tanquam
So Victorius; and the observation seems just and important.απο κοινου
repeti, et hic et infra, verba illa quæ in explicatione fabulæ implexæ posuit: intelligo, inquam, hæc ης το ολον εστι περιπετεια και αναγνωρισις
: et quod præterea utroque loco convenit, inde sumptum, [i. e. παθη η ηθη
] ut, quemadmodum inquit in describendâ illâ perplexa—ης το ολον εστι περιπετεια και αναγνωρισις
,—ita, in pathetica,—ης το ολον εστι παθη
; et in moratâ, ης το ολον εστιν ηθη
."
By ηθικη
, I cannot think, that the mere absence of παθη
is meant, as M. Batteux supposes, or, as Dacier and others take it, the mere moral tendency of the example.
"La fable morale, opposée à la Pathetique, doit être celle où il n'y a point de sang repandu; telles font le Cinna de Corneille, et la Berenice de Racine."
—Principes de la Lit. iii. p. 85.τραγῳδια ηθικη
to be, in the most obvious and usual sense of the word, that kind of Tragedy, ης το ολον εστιν ηθη
—of which the manners are the predominant part; which seems sufficiently to imply the absence of that violent perturbation, deep distress, and terrible catastrophe, which distinguish the pathetic species. This obvious sense of ηθικη
is confirmed by Aristotle's exemplification in cap. xxiv. For there, he plainly opposes it to the παθητικον
of the Iliad, and applies it to the Odyssey;
ηθικον
, and παθητικον
, are mentioned, as being, each of them, accommodated to
-- αγωνιστικη δε, [sc. λεξις] η υποκριτικωτατη· ταυτης δε δυο ειδη· η μεν γαρ, ΗΘΙΚΗ, η δε, ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΗ.
διο και οι υποκριται τα ΤΟΙΑΥΤΑ ΤΩΝ ΔΡΑΜΑΤΩΝ διωκουσι, και οι ποιηται τους τοιουτους. [sc. υποκριτας.]
Rhet. III. 12.ηθικη
nothing more than a moral lesson and a virtuous example were intended. Yet this idea is by no means excluded by the other; and Victorius seems to have rightly adjusted this matter. "Animadvertendum autem Tragoediam illam vocari moratam, quæ non solùm accuratè mores exprimit, sed eos etiam inducit probos; quod ipse significavit suprà, ubi de moribus differuit; primum enim præcepit ut
χρηστα ηθη
fingerentur."
If it be objected, that, the delineation of manners being the peculiar province of Comedy, this account of the Τραγῳδια ηθικη
confounds the limits of these two opposite species of the drama; we may answer, that the moral, or rather mannered Tragedy, (for we seem to want a word here,) though allowed by Aristotle, was certainly not that which he himself considered as the best, or the most Tragic: yet, that even this was sufficiently distinguished from Comedy by the kind of manners which it imitated. They were to be, if possible, good, (χρηστα
,)—at all events they were to be, on the whole, serious σπουδαια
: whereas the object of Comedy, with respect to manners, as to every thing else, was the ridiculous. We must remember too, that, as I have before observed, the two dramas were by no means, in Aristotle's time, so rigorously separated as they now are. There were, then, but two dramatic muses, the muse of Tragedy, and the muse of Farce. Yet there is something between a flood of tears and a broad laugh; and as Farce obstinately refused to put any degree of restraint upon her muscles, Tragedy, who, as we have seen, was so accommodating, as even, occasionally, to approach to the very laugh of Farce, frequently
Το δε τεταρτον, οιον, αι τε Φορκιδες, και Προμηθευς, και οσα εν αδου
. The enumeration of these species in cap. xxiv. leaves no room to doubt the omission of the word ΑΠΛΟΥΝ
here. Το δε τεταρτον, απλουν, οιον
, &c.
The commentators have been much puzzled to discover, why all those Tragedies, that have for their subject τα εν αδου
, should be of the simple construction, and I have, indeed, been sometimes strongly inclined to believe, that the words, και οσα εν αδου
, were out of their place, and belonged to the second species; thus: η δε Παθητικη, οιον, οι τε Αιαντες, και οι Ιξιονες, και οσα εν αδου
. Why such subjects should belong to the disastrous class, no one can want a reason; and the words follow naturally, and pertinently, in this view, after the instance of Ixion. I have been surprised not to find so obvious a conjecture in any of the comments. Piccolomini, indeed, glances at it:—"Non sò vedere, perchè più tosto in essempio delle Tragedie pathetiche, che delle semplici, non le habbia poste; havendo riguardo in ciò alle punition, e supplicii dell' inferno."
p. 255. And it is very singular, that Dacier's note (N° 10.) is exactly such, as if he had himself made this conjecture; of which, however, he says nothing. But, after all, it is obvious enough, as Beni has observed, that, in these infernal Tragedies, no περιπετειαι
, no sudden reverse of circumstances, could well have place.
The comment of that acute Italian upon this passage, is the best I have seen, and will, perhaps, satisfy the reader, that no such conjecture is wanted. "Clausula hæc sit;—ex istiusmodi fabulis exemplum duxisse Aristotelem ad illustrandam simplicem fabulam, quòd cum illi [sc. Tantalus, Sisyphus, &c.] in eas pœnas atque tormenta, non à prosperitate, quemadmodum Oedipus et alii plerique, devolverentur, sed ab initio ad finem usque illis jactarentur, peripetia aberat quàm longissimè. Imò verò, non modò repentè fortunæ commutatio haud fiebat, quod est proprium peripetiæ, verum etiam mutatio in decursu toto fiebat levissima ac propè nulla; ita ut ab initio ad finem usque, mira simplicitate flueret fabula. Ex quo fiebat, ut commodiùs ex aliis, in quibus repentè vulnera, cruciatus, et cædes contingebant, patheticæ duceretur exemplum, quàm ex iis, quibus nullus repentè cruciatus infligebatur, et tamen simplicitas de quâ dicebam mirificè apparebat."
—Benii Comment. P. 372.
As to the reading itself, εν αδου
, it seems to be sufficiently confirmed even by a collation of blunders; for the MSS. exhibit, εν αιδοι—εν αιδ—εν αιδες—εν αδου
. Victorius seems to doubt, I know not why, whether there existed any such Tragedies. The Σισυφος Πετροκυλιστης
of Æschylus must, clearly, have been of this kind; and probably his Ψυχαγωγοι
. His Prometheus may be conceived to come the nearest of any Greek Tragedy extant to a specimen of this kind of drama.—Dacier has very properly reminded us here of what Aristotle had said, cap. xiii. of the old Poets—that τους τυχοντας μυθους απηριθμουν
—i. e. they took, as we say, any subject that came uppermost.
Πολυ παρα την υποληψιν αποβαινει
:—literally, "it turns out very differently from what was expected, or supposed, by the Poet."
υποληψις
, the view, and expectation of the Poet, when he crowds so many incidents into his piece, is, that he shall make it interesting and pleasing by its variety. But the contrary happens. The necessity of not exceeding the usual length, and time of representation, reduces the proposed variety to a confused and huddled mass of incidents, not long enough dwelt on, or sufficiently detailed, to be either interesting, or clear. His Poem will be καταπεπλεγμενου τη ποικιλια
, as the critic well expresses it in another passage that should be compared with this.
πολυ παρα την υποληψιν αποβαινει
; or, as the ingenious author of the Analysis of Beauty has expressed the same idea, in a chapter which affords no bad illustration of this passage from a sister art, "variety, when overdone, is a check upon itself."
Such appears to me to be the meaning of this passage, which, I think, has not been fully seen by any of the commentators.
This passage affords a good specimen of the distressing ambiguity that prevails so remarkably throughout this work. It fairly admits of two different constructions, and two different senses. It may be thus: οσοι περσιν Ιλιου ολην εποιησαν και μη κατα μερος, (ωσπερ Ευριπιδης Νιοβην, η Μηδειαν, και μη ωσπερ Αισχυλος,) εκπιπτουσιν
κ. τ. αλ. Or thus: οσοι περσιν Ιλιου ολην εποιησαν, και μη κατα μερος (ωσπερ Ευρ. Ν. η Μ. [sc. κατα μερος εποιησε,] και μη ωσπερ Αισχ. [sc. ολην εποιησε.]) εκπιπ.
κ. τ. αλ.—In the first of these ways, the censure will fall on Euripides; in the other, on Æschylus. Victorius contends for the first, but his reasons, though plausible, seem not decisive. The whole, as he observes, turns upon this—whether the ωσπερ
refers to the whole sentence—ολην εποιησαν και μη κατα μερος
,—or, only to the words immediately preceding, i. e. κατα μερος
. On the whole, the last construction, I think, offers itself most naturally; and it seems rather favoured, too, by the similar application of μη ωσπερ
, to the Poet censured, presently after; where, speaking of the Chorus, he says it should συναγωνιζεσθαι, ΜΗ ΩΣΠΕΡ παρ Ευριπιδη, αλλ' ΩΣΠΕΡ παρα Σοφοκλει
.—But this, after all, is one of those passages, where the "æquato examine lances"
are so nicely balanced, that a commentator might continue in suspense for ever, if the necessity of going on did not oblige him to turn the scale by a touch of his own hand.
Those annotators who make the words, Εν δε ταις περιπετειαις
—the beginning of a separate precept relative to the use of the wonderful, have the natural construction of the text, and the uniform reading of all the MSS. against them. The natural and obvious construction, surely, is, εν τουτῳ μονῳ· εν ΔΕ ταις περ.
κ. τ. αλ. And this is also confirmed by the mention of Agatho again, presently afterwards. All the MSS. too, it seems, give θαυμαστως
, which can never be forced into the sense of "per admirabile."
θαυμαστως
so used, I could wish he had produced them.στοχαζεται
, and βουλεται
—in order to make this refer exclusively to Agatho, seems unnecessary. Στοχαζονται
refers, very naturally, to Agatho in conjunction with the other Poets just mentioned, whose mistake, and whose failure, were the same.
I have ventured to render this passage in a manner somewhat different from any translator or commentator that I have seen. Τραγικον γαρ τουτο, και φιλανθρωπον
. The question is, to what τουτο
refers? The commentators are divided. It appears to me, that it refers to the purpose, at which these Poets are said to have aimed; and the τουτο
, which follows, explains the τραγικον και φιλανθρωπον
.—τουτο ΓΑΡ
—"for this (i. e. which they aim at,) is both Tragic and Moral." The reader will see how exactly what
φιλανθρωπον
, in cap. xiii. [See NOTE 94.] where, ελεεινον και φοβερον
, is plainly equivalent to τραγικον
here. The difficulty was, to reconcile these two effects. Aristotle's expression, στοχαζονται ΘΑΥΜΑΣΤΩΣ
—"surprisingly well"—implies this difficulty, and, that he does not speak of the practice as perfectly agreeable to his own theory of the Tragic drama. In the subjects here instanced, there was the φιλανθρωπον
, because the αδικια
and πονηρια
were punished: and, at the same time, the τραγικον
, though not amounting to what the critic required, was not wanting, because there was the unexpected reverse of fortune, a calamitous event, παθη
, &c.
ου τραγικον, ΑΠΑΘΕΣ γαρ
, cap xiv. "not Tragic, because it exhibits no disastrous event." Transl. Part II. Sect. 14.ο μεταξυ
, &c. Transl. Part II. Sect. 11.
This appears to me to be the sense of the passage; and it leads me strongly to suspect, that, instead of εν τοις ΑΠΛΟΙΣ πραγμασι
, we should read—εν τοις ΔΙΠΛΟΙΣ πρ.
How easily the mistake might happen, is obvious to the eye. My reasons are these: 1. The φιλανθρωπον
—moral tendency—poetical justice, &c. was the very characteristic of the double fable, (διπλη συστασις
) and the very reason, probably, why the Platonic critics, as well as the good-natured audiences, preferred it as the best plan. 2. The instances here given seem to accord exactly with this idea. They are plainly examples of the διπλη συστασις
, not of the simple fable—i. e. the fable without revolution or discovery. The expression, τραγικον
γαρ τουτο και φιλανθρωπον
, implies, that the Tragic and Moral were aimed at, and effected, by these Poets, both in the περιπετειαι
, and in the other actions mentioned, whatever they were—εν τοις περιπ. και εν τοις πραγμασι
: and, consequently, his subsequent examples of the τραγικον και φιλανθρωπον
must equally accord with both. But, if we read απλοις
, this will not be the case; for those examples are such as necessarily imply revolutions, and a sudden and unexpected turn of events, which suit very well with ΔΙΠΛΟΙΣ πραγμασι
, but are incompatible with απλοις
; the simple fable being defined by this very circumstance, that it is ανευ περιπετειας
, &c. (cap. x.)
Ταχ᾿ ἂν τις εικαι αυτο τετ᾿ είναι λεγοἰ,
Βροτοισι πολλα τυγχανειν ἐκ ἐἰκ εικοτα.
See Rhet. II. 24, p. 581, ed. Duval.—And Bayle’s Art. AGATHON, note [F], who mentions a similar maxim of St. Bernard’s: "Ordinatissimum est, minus interdum ordinatè fieri."
"Il est tout à fait de l’ordre, que de tems en tems il se fasse quelque chose contre l’ordre."
This general, and, if I may call it so, possible sort of probability, may be termed, the probability of romance; and these lines of Agatho furnish a good apologetical motto for the novel writer. It might be prefixed, perhaps, without impropriety, even to the best productions of the kind—to a
"Si la nature ne combinoit jamais des evenemens d’une maniere extraordinaire, tout ce que le Poete imagineroit au-delà de la simple et froide uniformité des choses communes, seroit incroyable. Mais il n’en est pas ainsi. Que fait donc le Poete? —Ou il s’empare de ces combinaisons extraordinaires, ou il en imagine de semblables. Mais au lieu que la liaison des événemens nous échappe souvent dans la nature, et que, faute de connoitre l’ensemble des choses, nous ne voyons qu’une concomitance fatale dans les faits; le Poet veut lui qu’il regne dans toute la texture de son ouvrage une liaison apparente et sensible; en sorte qu’il est moins vrai, et plus vraisemblable que l’historien."
ἐκ δίκειον χορῳ· ἐστι γαρ ὁ χορού ΚΗΔΕΥΤΗΣ ΑΠΡΑΚΤΟΣ· ἐννοιαν γαρ μονον παρέχεται δις παρεστι
.
In this view, it was as natural to say—the Chorus should be regarded as a person of the drama, and a sharer in the action: a sharer, that is, not by the active part, but by the warm interest, which it takes, and expresses, in that action. However, the word ἀπρακτα
must not be taken in its strictest sense. We find the Chorus, in the Greek Tragedies, frequently contributing, in some little degree, to the progress of the action, by active offices of friendly attention and assistance; as, for example, in the
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ
, we should read, ΑΙΔΟΜΕΝΑ
: an emendation so obvious, that it occurred to me the first time I ever read the passage. But I afterwards found, that it had occurred, long ago, to Madius; a circumstance, which, to my great astonishment, has been passed over in utter silence by all the subsequent commentators that I have seen.
The words of Madius are—"Mendum igitur in verbis omnino esse censeo; ac primum in voce
—I can attribute it only to some inadvertence, or mistake, that Mr. Winstanley, in his note, p. 294, has omitted to take notice of this most material part of Madius's comment on the passage. The emendation is confirmed by the διδομενα
, quæ in locum vocis ᾠδομενα
irrepsit: nam verbum δειν
, quod paulò post ponitur, aperte indicat, locum, ut nos fecimus, castigandum."ᾠδεσι
, and ᾠδειν
, which follow; by the extreme facility of the mistake, and by the difficulty of giving any reasonable explanation of the other reading. Διδόμενα
, says Victorius, "quia magistratus eos (sc. choros) dabat."
But he μελη
is understood; and though we read, often, of the magistrate's giving a Chorus, (δεναι χορον
,) that is, furnishing the expence of the choral dresses, &c. we no where read, I believe, of their giving the Choral Odes.
Και ἐν τοις πραγμασιν
. The alteration of Heinsius, δραμασιν
, appears to me, not only to be unnecessary, but to pervert Aristotle's meaning. Τα πραγματα
, here, are, I think, the things themselves—the circumstances and incidents of the action or fable, as opposed to Διανοια
, the sentiments, or thoughts, and to ὅσα ὑπο τε ΛΟΓΟΥ
κ. τ. αλ
. He had referred to the rhetorical treatises for what concerns the διανοια
; he goes on, (after a short explanation of διανοια
and its various branches,)—"But it is plain, that, not only for the διανοἰα
, or sentiments, but also for the things themselves, (ΚΑΙ ἐν τοις πραγμασιν
,) how they are to be made terrible, piteous, &c. the Poet should draw from the same sources, and may be referred to the same treatises."—Thus, for example, in the second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric, he may learn what sort of things, persons, and events, are proper to raise terror, or pity, the peculiar objects of Tragic imitation.
"la difference entre les choses que traitent les Orateurs, et celles que traitent les Poetes."
For the rest, my idea of this passage accords with that of Dacier, (note 3); but he does not appear to have seen the force of the expression, ΚΑΙ ἐν τοις πραγ
. Indeed, he entirely drops the conjunction, which is here of great πραγμασιν
, and to point its opposition to διανοια
:—Τα μεν ἐν περι την ΔΙΑΝΟΙΑΝ ἐν τοις ῥητ. κεισθω δηλον δε, ότι ΚΑΙ ἐν τοις ΠΡΑΓΜΑΣΙΝ ἀπο των αυτων ειδων δει χρησθαι
.
In Goulston’s version, which follows Castelvetro, this opposition is rightly expressed; but in what follows, Aristotle's meaning is, I think, mistaken: for the difference he is shewing, (πλην τοσέτον διαφερει
, &c.) is not, I apprehend, the difference between the things and the sentiments, in Tragedy, but, between the things themselves only, considered in different views, as the subject of the Orator, or of the Poet. These commentators understand the expressions, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
, and, τα λεγοντα
, of the dramatic speech, and speaker.
Απο των αυτων ειδων δει χρησθαι
.—The expression, χρησθαι ΑΠΟ
, is, I believe, uncommon. It seems rightly explained by Victorius—"to borrow from:" "quasi utendum illinc sumere atque mutuari."
Ανευ διδασκαλίας
. "Senza che si dica e che s'insegni che fian tali."
—Piccolomini:—I believe, very exactly. The reader may compare Rhet. I. 2. p. 514, B.—and III. 1. p. 584, B. and, (διδασκαλικη
,) I. 2. p. 515, A.
The truth of what the philosopher here observes, may appear from this single consideration. Suppose two Tragedies written by two Poets on the same subject, and of which the plot and princi-
Ει φαινοιτο ήδεα
.—That ήδεα
is wrong, I have no doubt. For if we admit it, we must take it, as Victorius does, for a single instance; as if Aristotle had said, "aut jucundæ, aut tristes, aut atroces, &c,---: quamvis enim nunc unum horum ponat, i. e. jucunda, reliqua tamen audienda sunt."
—But how improbable it is, that he should not chuse his single instance, if he meant to give one, out of those which had just been mentioned? that he should not rather have said, ἐι φαινοιτο ἐλεεινα, δεινα
, than ήδεα
, jucunda
; which, besides, is evidently not at all to his purpose.
I cannot, therefore, help thinking it something more than probable, that Aristotle wrote this, φαινοιτο ΗΔΗ
τοιαυτα
—that is, ἐλεεινα, δεινα
, &c.) "If they appear τοιαυτα
is understood with φαινεσθαι
just before:—τα μεν δει φαινεσθαι
(τοιαυτα
) άνευ διδασκαλίας
.
The same conjecture had, I find, occurred, long ago, to Castelvetro, but, which I think somewhat singular, has not been taken φαινοιτο ήδεα
: "coloro, li quali non riconoscono che qui sia errore, assegnino à queste parole, se possono, senso degno e conveniente ad Aristotele. Adunque io crederei che non fosse male à leggere
[p. 406.] The reader may see a very different explanation of this whole passage in the Abbé Batteux’s notes; but an explanation which cannot, in my opinion, be reconciled to the text. His censure of Dacier and others, that they have rendered this chapter ήδη
, in luogo d' ήδεα
, e'l senso sarebbe convenevole.""à contresens,"
seems to me to recoil upon himself.
Τα σχηματα της λεξεως
—. Dacier, Batteux, and indeed almost all the commentators, seem to take σχηματα
, here, for the gestures, modifications of countenance, and tones of voice, that accompany speech.
But, first, I much doubt whether the Greek will fairly admit of such a sense. Aristotle says, σχηματα ΛΕΞΕΩΣ
, figures, or forms, of the διον, ΤΙ εντολη και ΤΙ ευχη
, &c. i. e. "avec quel ton et quel geste on ordonne,"
as M. Batteux
"Σχηματα vocat habitus quosdam, conformationesque oris, frontis, oculorum, vultus, gesticulationis manuum,"
&c. Robortelli, p. 227.τι ΕΝΤΟΛΗΣ ΕΥΧΗΣ
, &c.άξιον σπεδης
,) can fall upon the Poetry, (εις την ποιητικην
,) in consequence of the Poet's ignorance of these matters, or of his not knowing them technically. A remark, surely, very unnecessary, if mere action and pronunciation were intended by σχηματα
.—But, 4. The thing seems evident from the instance given of a criticism of this kind. Protagoras plainly charged Homer with ignorance, or inaccuracy, with respect to these σχηματα λεξεως
, whatever they were. Now, according to the common explanation, the criticism could fall only on Homer's pronunciation or action: but, of this, Protagoras knew nothing; all he appears to have meant, is, that Homer had made an improper use of the imperative mood; that is, had used one σχημα λεξεως
, where he should have used another.
But what, then, are we to understand by these σχηματα λεξεως
?—The learned reader will immediately see, that, as Victorius has observed, they are not to be confounded with those σχηματα λεξεως
, of which we hear so much from Cicero, Quintilian, Dion. Hal. &c. those "figuræ verborum,"
which are opposed to the σχηματα διανοἰας
, the figuræ mentis, sententiarum
, &c. Indeed, no such division of σχηματα
is, I believe, to be found in Aristotle. It seems to have been the invention of the later Rhetoricians; and how little they were agreed, as to the number and the species of these σχηματα
, the propriety of the division itself, and even the precise sense of the word σχημα
, may be seen in Quintilian IX. 1.—The σχηματα λεξεως
of Aristotle, in this place, are plainly such, as would have been denominated by later writers, σχηματα διανοἰας
—figures of the thought or sense. Indeed we find them actually enumerated among the figures of that class. See Dionys. Halicarn. de Struct. &c. Sect. 8.—So Quintilian: "Figuras quoque mentis, quæ
σχηματα διανοιας
dicuntur, res eadem recipit omnes, in quas nonnulli diviserunt species dictorum, (i. e. of jokes, bons mots.) Nam et interrogamus, et dubitamus, et affirmamus, et minamur, et optamus."
I see, therefore, not the least reason, why the expression σχημα λέξεως
should not be rendered here, exactly as in the other passages above referred to, "figura orationis"
—form, or configuration, of speech. For λέξις
, it must be observed, is here used, not in the particular sense of diction, or style and manner of expression, (as it is used Rhet. III. 8.) but in the general sense of λογ
, speech, as we find it used in the beginning of the next chapter.
But though I cannot admit, that σχηματα
means "configurationes oris,"
&c. or, should be so rendered, yet I certainly admit, that Aristotle appears plainly to consider these different forms of speech, or sentences, with a view to action, or delivery; and, possibly, the observation of Victorius may be well founded, that—"vocatæ hæ figuræ ita videntur, quia aliter atque aliter vultus, totumque corpus, cum variantur illa, conformantur; ut meritò hâc de causâ,
—I find the same thing in the following passage of Aristides Quintilianus, which seems evidently to allude to this very part of Aristotle's treatise, and may be thought to afford some illustration.—σχηματα
, figuræ, ipsæ appellatæ sint."Περι δε της των ΣΧΗΜΑΤΩΝ φυσεως, δις προσαγειν χρη τα νοηματα, πολλα λέγειν δειν ήγομαι. ΙΚΑΝΗ ΓΑΡ Ἡ ὙΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΣ ΤΑΥΤΑ ΔΗΛΩΣΑΙ. Και γαρ τατων ἐκασον [i. e. each of these
. I rather suspect, we should read σχηματα διανοἰας
, or νοηματων
,] συςέλλει πως, ὡς αι παραιτησεις, ἀνιησιν, ὡς ἁι συγχωρησεις, την διανοιαν και ήτοι μικροπρεπεις, ὡς ἀι διορθωσεις, μεγαλειες, ὡς αι γνωμολογίαι και ἀφηγησεις, ἀπεργαζονται. ὧν ἐκασε την ἐνεργειαν ΕΚ ΤΩΝ ΤΥΠΩΝ ΑΡΙΣΤ᾿ ΑΝ ΔΙΑΓΝΟΙΗΜΕΝ, ΩΝ [leg. forte ΟΥΣ] ΕΚΑΣΤΟΝ, ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΝ ΤΗΣ ΥΠΟΚΡΙΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙΡΟΝ, ΤΟΙΣ ΣΩΜΑΣΙΝ ΕΝΤΙΘΗΣΙ· ΠΑΡ Ὁ ΚΑΙ ΣΧΗΜΑΣΙΝ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΣΥΝΕΒΗ ΚΛΗΘΗΝΑΙΠΡΟΑΓΕΙΝ
, in the beginning of this passage; in the sense of ἐκφερειν, προφερειν
, &c. Meibomius
σχηματων
, "gestuum,"
which cannot be the meaning; for by the τετων ἐκασον
, and the exemplification which follows, (παραιτησεις, συγχωρησεις
, &c.), and, indeed, by all the rest of the passage, it is clear, that he speaks of the configurations of the speech or sentence, of which he goes on to describe the different effects, first on the mind, and, ultimately, on the action, of the speaker. The version should, therefore, have been thus:—"De figurarum natura quibus animi notiones proferenda,"
&c. Or, if προσαγαν
be right, the meaning, I think, must be—"to which those νοηματα
are to be referred under which they are to be classed." See the passage above, from Quintilian, and that of Dion. Hal. Sect. 8. which is much to the purpose.
Why Aristotle should dismiss this subject, as of much more concern, to the Actor, than to the Poet, requires no explanation. There could scarce, indeed, be any other occasion for the study of these σχηματα
, but in order to learn, or to teach, in what manner, with what variations of tone, countenance, and gesture, propriety required them to be pronounced. At the same time, it will not appear strange that he should mention them, if we recollect, that the Poets themselves were, at first, actors also, in their own pieces, and, afterwards, no doubt, instructed their actors; and hence perhaps, after all—not, as is commonly understood, from the moral teaching of the drama itself—the well known phrases, διδασκειν τραγῳδιαν
, docere fabulam
, &c.
δίδασκειν τραγωδιαν
, &c. supported by Heyne: "
—In Epicteti Enchir. cap. xvii.Διδασκαλ
est poeta, qui fabulam committit, in theatrum producit; quia eam actores docet."
Nor was this practice peculiar to antient times. We know with what eagerness and animation Voltaire taught his Tragedies, almost to his latest hour. During his last visit to Paris, where he died, "Il n'y vit rien, ne songea à y rien voir; il n'y vécut que pour des Comediens, qu'il fatiguoit, en voulant leur donner des leçons de declamation"
.
Τε την τοιαυτην ἐχοντα ᾿ΑΡΧΙΤΕΚΤΟΝΙΚΗΝ
.—For this word, see Eth. Nicom. I. 1, 2. Thus, here, it seems to mean that master art, which teaches the principles of elocution, the art of public speaking, in general.
διανοιαν άφεις, προς τ'ενομα διελέχθη
, as Diog. Laertius says of him. He seems, indeed, to have been the inventor of these σχηματα λεξεως
. At least the same writer says, διειλε τον λόγον ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ἐις τεσσαρα ΕΥΧΩΛΗΝ, ΕΡΩΤΗΣΙΝ, ΑΠΟΚΡΙΣΙΝ, ΕΝΤΟΛΗΝ· (δι δε, εις ἑπτα κ. τ. αλ.) ὡς και πυθμένας είπε λογων
:—"the foundations of speech".
την καλάμένην ΤΥΛΗΝ, ἐφ᾿ ἧς τα φορτια βασαζεσι, ἐυρεν, ὡς φησιν Αρισοτέλης.
D. Laert. IX. 53.σχηματα λεξεως
, and undertook to teach, at the price of a hundred minæ, the art of Belial—"to make the worse appear the better reason:"—τον ήττον λογον κρειττον ποιειν
.
"If a cobler,"
says Socrates in the Meno of Plato, "or a taylor, should return the shoes, or the clothes, he undertook to mend, in a worse condition than that, in which he received them, he would soon lose his business, and be starved for want of work. But it is not so with the sophists. PROTAGORAS was able to carry on, for forty years together, without detection, and with great credit, the trade of spoiling all those who became his disciples, and sending them back much worse than he found them."
Λεξις
), upon which he bestows three chapters. His subject plainly required him to speak of the Περι μεν ἐν Τραγωδίας, κ. τ. αλο
Dacier, who discharged, with as much fidelity as any commentator ever did, the duty of seeing nothing amiss in his author, has zealously defended the propriety of this grammatical chapter: but all he says amounts, I think, to little more than this—that the chapter should be there, because it is there.
ΛΟΓΟΣ
.—Mr. Harris, in the Hermes, p. 19, has rendered the word, λογος
, where the entire Iliad is comprehended under that term. Had I here rendered λογος
by
The word λογος
here plainly answers—not to "Oration or
as composed of several sentences; but, it is a general term, comprehending both these, and applicable, like the Latin word oratio
, or the English, λογος
to these two words—καλος ίππος
. He says, ἐν ΤΩ ΛΟΓΩ
, (in hac oratione
,) καλος ίππος
. It was what he calls a merely significant λογος
, as distinguished from an assertive λογος
, or proposition, such as, καλΟΣ ΕΣΤΙΝ ίππος
.
I was unable to find any English word, that would express λογος
adequately, and clearly. And it seems somewhat remarkable, that the Greek language, rich and copious as it is, should not afford—at least I am not aware that it does—any single word perfectly synonymous to our word, Λογος
, as I have observed, is too wide; it serves equally to express a single sentence, or a whole speech, or even less than a sentence. It is applied by Aristotle to a combination of two words—a substantive and an adjective, without a verb—and, to the Iliad. Περιοδος
was only one particular kind, or form, of sentence. Κωλον
did not necessarily contain a complete sense, or thought, which is essential to our word, sentence.
Τοποις
.—Clearly right; nor can I conceive, what should have induced any critic to suspect this reading. See Dionys. Halicarn. Sect. 14. his curious and accurate analysis of articulation: and Aristides Quintil. p. 89, ed. Meib.—where, in describing the formation of the letters, these expressions occur:—ἐκ των περι τους όδοντας ΤΟΠΩΝ
—and, ἐκ μεσου του φωνητικου ΤΟΠΟΥ
. See, also, Hermes, III. 2, p. 322.—ΤΟΝΟΙΣ
, which had occurred to Mr. Winstanley, ὀξυτητι και βαρύτητι
. Thus, Rhet. III. 1. τοις ΤΟΝΟΙΣ, ΟΙΟΝ ὀξεια και βαρεια, και μεση
.
Οξύτητι, βαρύτητι, και τω μεσω
.—All the commentators seem agreed, that by τῷ μέσῳ
is meant the circumflex. Mr. Foster, in his Essay on Accent, &c. expresses some degree of doubt about this; and, I confess, it appears to me to be somewhat more than doubtful. Certainly, the only obvious and proper sense of the word mean, or middle, thus applied to the pitch of sound, is, that which is between ὀξυ
and βαρυ
; not, that which is compounded of the two, as the circumflex is always represented to be. At least the expression, in this latter sense, would not be very accurate and philosophical. A circumflexed syllable is described to be, a syllable that has both ἀμφοτερας τας τασεις
, as it is expressed by Dion. Halicarn. Sect. 11. The voice first rises, and then falls, on the same syllable. A man would be thought to speak very strangely, who should describe any object painted half white and half black, by saying, that it was of a colour between black and white.
But, farther, I observe, that in other passages of Aristotle's works, where he speaks of accents, the word μεσον
no where occurs. Indeed, he uses neither this, nor any other word, to denote the circumflex accent. He mentions only ὀξυ
, and βαρύ
, acute, and grave. See De Soph. Elench. p. 284, C.—288, A.—304, A.—306, A. ed. Duval. In the last of these passages especially, his expression is remarkable: ἐι παρα προσῳδιαν όξειαν, Ἡ ΒΑΡΕΙΑ προσωδια λυσις· ἐι δε παρα βαρειαν, Ἡ ΟΞΕΙΑ
. That is—"If the sophism supposes the acute accent, the answer is—it is the grave accent; and vice versa." "Semper enim Aristoteles
βαρειαν
vocat την περισπωμένην."οὐ
, (οὗ
(βαρυτερον
.—This, I confess, much increases my doubt with respect to the word μεσῳ
in the passage before us. For, had that been Aristotle's term for the circumflex accent, as the common explanation supposes, we probably should have found the expression in some of the passages referred to; at least, in that last mentioned.
I cannot, surely, be misunderstood, as meaning to infer, from these passages, that the flexure itself of the voice upon a single syllable, which was afterwards denominated by Grammarians, περισπωμενη
, was unknown to Aristotle and the earlier writers. The thing, undoubtedly, has always existed, and must exist, more μεσον
has a different, and its usual and proper, meaning; Τροπος της φωνης πόσες λέγομεν είναι; ---- Τρεις· όξυν, ΜΕΣΟΝ, βαρυν.
p. 10. ed. Meib. meaning, by μεσον
, the Phrygian mode or key, which was between the Dorian and the Lydian, as D is between C and E.—So Arist. Quintil. p. 25. τουτων, ὁ μεν δωριος, προς τα βαρύτερα της φωνης ἐνεργηματα χρησιμος· ὁ δε λυδιος, προς τα όξυτερα· ὁ δε φρυγιος, προς τα ΜΕΣΑ.
But, farther, it appears to be so used by Aristotle himself, in a similar passage of his Rhetoric. In the beginning of the third book, speaking of oratorical action or delivery, (ὑποκρισις
) as far as it relates to the voice, he says, ἐσι δε άυτη μεν ἐν τη φωνη, πως αυτη δει χρησθαι προς ἐκασον παθος· διοι, ποτε μεγαλη, και ποτε μικρα, και ποτε μεση· και πως τοις τονοις, διον, ὀξειᾳ, και βαρειᾳ, και ΜΕΣΗ
. Now, even supposing this to relate to accents, it seems, that μεσῃ
, here, should naturally have the same meaning, with respect to ὀξειᾳ
, and βαρειᾳ
, as it has when applied immediately before to μεγαλῃ
and μικρᾳ
, where it plainly means the medium between loud and soft.—But I think the passage clearly does not relate to the mere syllabic accent: for he is there professedly speaking of the accommodation of the voice to the expression of different passions; he must therefore mean such variation of tone or pitch, as depends upon the speaker's choice; not that of the accentual acuteness and gravity; for this is always spoken of as a fixed and invariable thing. "Nam voces, ut chordæ, sunt intentæ, quæ ad quemque tactum respondeant, acuta, gravis; cita, tarda; magna, parva; quas tamen inter omnes est sua quoque in genere mediocris."
That is, as it seems rightly explained by Dr. Pearce, every one of these differences of voice, high and low, loud and soft, &c. has its medium—μεσον
.
To this passage of Cicero, I shall add one from Quintilian to the same purpose, and which affords a still clearer commentary upon that in the Rhetoric of Aristotle. "Utendi voce multiplex ratio. Nam præter illam differentiam quæ est tripartita, acuta, gravis, flexa, tum intentis, tum remissis—tum elatis, tum inferioribus modis, opus est,— spatiis quoque lentioribus aut citatioribus. Sed iis ipsis MEDIA interjacent multa."
intentis
and remissis
(loud and soft) expresses his μεγαλη και μικρα
; that of, elatis
, et inferioribus modis
, (acuter, or graver, tones or pitches,) his ὀξεια και βαρεια
; and that of spatiis lentioribus
, &c. (quicker or slower times) his ῥυθμοις τισι
, &c. And, that Quintilian did not understand, by ὀξειᾳ
and βαρειᾳ
, the acute and grave syllabic accent, is clear from his expressly saying, that there are those three differences besides that of the different accents—"præter illam differentiam,"
&c.—Lastly, the "media interjacent multa,"
plainly alludes to the μεση
of Aristotle.
The following passage, from the clear and accurate musical treatise of Euclid, will serve to illustrate, at the same time, both the terms of Aristotle, τονοις
προσωδίαι
, not τονοι
. See the passages above referred to, in the treatise De Soph. Elench. And, in this work, cap. xxv.μεση
. Enumerating the different accep- τονος
, one of which is τασις
, tension or pitch, his instance of that sense of the word, is, ὁ δε, ὡς τασις, τονου λεγεται, καθ' ὁ φαμεν ὀξυτονειν τινα, ἢ βαρυτονειν, ἢ ΜΕΣΩ, ΤΩΙ ΤΗΣ ΦΩΝΗΣ ΤΟΝΩΙ κεχρησθαι
: i. e. a middling pitch of voice.
On the whole, then, I see no reason why we should not understand the word μέσῳ
to be used in the same sense in the passage which is the subject of this note. For though, indeed, Aristotle is there speaking of single letters, and therefore can only mean syllabic accents or tones, yet it is plain, that these accents must have admitted of the distinction of high, low, and intermediate, even in single words, when of more than two syllables; μεγαλοπρεπεστατα
, for example—having one acute syllable, as Dion. Halic. Sect. 11. says, among many grave—ἐν πολλοῖς βαρειαις
. He will hear plainly, if he has any ear, that the acute syllable is only the acutest; and that the grave syllables are of different degrees of elevation, and some of them of course, μεσαι
—intermediate, between the most acute and the most grave.
But whatever sense of the word μέσῳ
we adopt, there is a difficulty, in this passage, which I must leave as I find it. The mention of tone or pitch of voice here, seems to me to be strangely misplaced. Accent, or tone, belongs to syllables, not to letters, of which Aristotle is here speaking. The vowels, indeed, may be acute or grave; but as syllables making a part of words, not as letters, separately considered, as they here are. Besides; the other differences mentioned are fixed, essential differences. Of these letters, he says, some are formed in this manner, and others, in that: some are aspirated, and others smooth—some long, others short. But, can it be said, with any propriety, that some are acute, and
I do, indeed, understand very well, that a conjunction, "neither hinders nor constitutes—neither gives nor takes away—the meaning of the sentence in which it stands."
But how this can be regarded as a definition of a conjunction, I do not understand. To define a thing only by what it does not do, (for it is here given as a separate and complete definition,) is hardly reconcileable with Aristotle's logical accuracy. ἐαν ἀποφασει διαιρη το γενος
i. e. if the specific difference be expressed by a negation. He excepts the definition of mere privations, (as blindness,) which can be defined no otherwise. Sect. 7.
I must, again, confess, that what follows, about the situation of the conjunction in different parts of a sentence, has not been καθ' αυτον
, which M. Batteux, after Castelvetro, renders, "by its nature:"
—"à moins que par elle-même elle ne soit faite pour être au commencement."
But this sense cannot be admitted; nor, I think, any other, than—"by itself—alone."
This Mr. Winstanley explains by ἄνευ ἀνταποδοσεως
: but I cannot see how his translation—"modo eas conjunctiones excipias quæ in initio periodi,
&c. accords with Aristotle's words—καθ' αυτους
, —ritè stare non possunt,"ὴν μη άρμοττῃ ἐν ἀρχῃ λογου τίθεναι καθ' αυτον
i. e. "unless they are such as should be placed in the beginning, by themselves." To make these words correspond to Mr. Winstanley's version, another negative seems wanting.
ΛΟΓΟΥ ἀρχην
;) or, how the other marks the end of it, because it follows the word to which it belongs. In the very sentence before us, for example, Αρθρον δε ἐστι φωνη άσημα Ἡ λογου άρχην ἢ τελος, ἢ διορισμον, δηλοι
—in what sense does the subjunctive article, Ἡ
, mark the end of the sentence—τελος λογου
? "L'article subjonctif,"
says Dacier, "est celui qui marque la fin du discours: c'est-à-dire, qu'il suit la chose qu'il designe, comme, qui, lequel."
—It is easy to explain things in this manner.
For my part, I see not what is to be made of this, unless we may understand Aristotle to mean only that power of the article, διορισμα
, and is, indeed, given by Mr. Harris as one example of the definitive or ascertaining power of the article.
The second definition of the article, (—φωνη άσημα —— to συντίθεσθαι
) I have omitted. It is the first definition of the conjunction repeated verbatim. It may, indeed, be true of both; but if so, it must inevitably follow, I think, either that the two things must be the same, or, that the words are not truly a definition of either. Yet this passes smoothly with all the commentators I have seen, except Madius and Piccolomini.
"perochè nei nomi doppij [ò ver composti] non usiamo le parti d'essi, secondo che, da per se prese, hanno significatione: come, (per essempio) in questo nome Theodoro, quella parte (doro) non é significante."
Ου ΠΡΟΣΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ το ποτε
. See Hermes, I. 6, note (d), p. 96. Aristotle has given a fuller definition of the verb, in the book περι Ἑρμ. cap. iii.
Ἡ δε, κατα τα ὑποκριτικα
— sc. σχηματα
: meaning the σχηματα λεξεως
mentioned just before, cap. xix. with which these modes plainly coincide; for the πτώσεις ῥηματων
here mentioned are no other than the Ἐγκλισεις
, modes, or moods, of the Grammarians. — [See Hermes, I. 8, p. 144, and particularly the notes there.] Και κατα ποιας ἐγκλισεις, ὡς δη τινες ΠΤΩΣΕΙΣ ΡΗΜΑΤΙΚΑΣ καλεσι.
διαφοραι χρονων
, are immediately after mentioned by him, as not included in that term. But Aristotle, in the περι ἐρμην. expressly mentions the tenses also, as πτωσεις ῥηματων
. See cap. iii. Sect. 5.
Ου γαρ άπας λογος ἐκ ῥηματων και ὀνοματων συγκειται· διον, ὁ του ἀνθρωπου ὁρισμος· ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδεχεται άνευ ῥηματων είναι λογον.
This is very ambiguously expressed. We are left to make out, as well as we can, whether the "definition of man," is referred to as an instance of a sentence without a verb, or of a sentence with both noun and verb. The construction seems, indeed, to lead more naturally to the latter interpretation. But the other, I think, is more to Aristotle's purpose, (for, an example of a sentence with both noun and verb, it was hardly necessary to produce,) and is confirmed by the following passage in his book περι Ἑρμηνειας:
Αναγκη δε παντα λογον ἀποφαντικον
(every assertive sentence or speech) ἐκ ῥηματος είναι, ἢ ἐκ πτωσεως ῥηματος· και γαρ ὁ του ἀνθρωπου λογος
(i. e. ὁρισμος
, definition; for so λογος
is continually used by Aristotle,) ἐαν μη το, ἐστιν, ἢ, ην, ἢ, ἐσται, ἢ τι τοιουτον ΠΡΟΣΤΕΘΗι, ουπω λογος ἀποφαντικος
. ζωον πεζον διπουν
.
However, this sense would be so much more clearly expressed, if the words — διον, ὁ του ἀνθρωπου ὁρισμος
followed, instead of preceding, the words ἀλλ' ἐνδεχεται άνευ ῥηματων είναι λογον
, that I should hardly doubt of their being misplaced, if this sort of embarrassment were less frequent than it is in Aristotle's writings. This whole passage receives much illustration from that part of the treatise περι ἐρμ. to which I have referred. ουκ η ευχης λογος ου, ἀλλ᾽ οὔτε ἀληθης, οὔτε ψευδης.
Οι μεν ουν άλλοι [λογοι], ἀφεισθωσαν· ρητορικης γαρ, ἢ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ, οικειοτερα ἡ σκεψις· ὁ δε ἀποφαντικος της νυν θεωριας.
βαδίζει Κλεων
is. But I rather believe, that Aristotle did not intend this as an instance of such a sentence, but merely as an explanation of the σημαινει
, and καθ' άυτα σημαινει τι
, that precede. "It is not," says he, "essential to what I call λογος
, oratio
, that it should contain both a noun and a verb, i. e. that it should be a complete proposition: but some significant part it must have; significant, I mean, as a whole word, separately taken, as δωρον
in the compound name Θεοδωρος
, which has, indeed, a meaning, but not καθ' αυτο κεχωρισμενον
— by itself as a word in the sentence."
That this is the meaning, seems probable from the chapter in which λογος
is defined in the book περι Ερμηνειας. For there, as soon as he has given the definition, (Λογου δε ἐσι φωνη σημαντικη ἧς των μερων τι σημαντικον ἐσι ΚΕΧΩΡΙΣΜΕΝΟΝ
,) he immediately proceeds to explain the expressions; declaring what fort of significant part he means. "Significant," he says, "as the word ανθρωπος
is; that is, κεχωρισμενον
, by itself; not as, υς
in μυς
,) or, even as a word making part of a compound word." ΜΕΡΟΣ μεντοι άει τι σημαινον ἐξει· διον ἐν τῷ, Βαδίζει Κλεων, ὁ Κλεων.
τῳ συνεχει
, as equivalent to συνδεσμῳ
) and VIII. 6, p. 931, C.
μεγαριζοντων
— "ceux qui disent de grandes choses"
: and cites Hesychius Μεγαριζοντες — μεγαλα λεγοντες
. But this is too distant from the present reading, Μεγαλιωτων
. Mr. Winstanley's conjecture — μεγαλειων, ως
, διον
, when he gives an instance; never, as far as I recollect, ὡς
.
I have sometimes thought it not very improbable, that the passage might originally have stood thus: των μεγαλΑ ΔιώΚΟΝτων
: i. e. of those who affect, aim at, are fond of, grandeur and pomp of expression; who love hard words, as we say. Nothing more common than this sense of διωκειν
. They who are versed in emendatory criticism, and the theory of transcriptive blunders, know it to have been one source of corruption in antient manuscripts, that "upo notias kai seton,"
μεγαλ...ωτων
.
If a commentator, harrassed by obscurity and perplexity, can now and then relieve his labour by treating a passage of desperate corruption as a riddle, and can amuse himself by guessing the meaning, when he cannot inform his readers by discovering it, who will envy him this harmless privilege? I have here hazarded my guess with others; but I give it for what it is. None of us, I believe, have yet deprived our successors of the same amusement. The riddle, probably, still remains, and will remain, till the arrival of those "codices expectandi"
of which the critics talk so much; those precious manuscripts, that are always to be waited for, and never to be expected.
Κυριον
. I have translated this, κυριον
here is plainly opposed, not to μεταφορα
only, but to all the other species of words just enumerated: not to what is figurative only, as the Latin proprium
is, but to whatever is unusual. This appears indeed from κυρια όνοματα
of Aristotle. The expression must even include all those words, which, though originally metaphorical, are, as Mr. Harris says, "so naturalized" by common use, "that ceasing to be metaphors, they are become, (as it were,) the proper words." κυριον
by
The same clear opposition of κυριον
to whatever is uncommon in speech appears throughout the next chapter, where γλωττα, μεταφορα
, &c. are all said to be ΠΑΡΑ το κυριον
, and included under one common term of ξενικα
. See also Rhet. III. 2. p. 585, A.
κυριον
here meant only native, in opposition to foreign, (γλωττα
) as some commentators have supposed, it would be arrant trifling to observe, that the same word might be, at the same time, γλωττα
and κυριον
, i. e. foreign and native, to different nations. For it could not possibly be otherwise; as Robortelli observes, p. 246, and calls the observation, which he explains as Aristotle's, "magnoperè adnotandum, et PULCHRUM SCITU."
Dacier follows him: "Cela ne sçauroit être autrement, le même mot qui est etranger pour celui qui l'emprunte, ne peut qu'être propre pour celui qui le prête."
But, if it must be so, why does Aristotle say it είναι δυνατον
? — The truth is, that a foreign word is not necessarily a common word, in his sense of κυριον
, among the people to whom it is native; it may, or may not, be so; it cannot, indeed, be to them γλωττα
, but it may be a metaphorical word, or a word of any of the other species enumerated as ΠΑΡΑ το κυριον
. — Aristotle seems to have added this observation on purpose to prevent the very mistake which these expositors have made — to prevent κύριον
from being taken merely as the opposite to γλωττα
.
Το γαρ μύριον, πολυ ἐστι.
— Here, I may venture, I believe, for once, to adopt the positive tone of emendatory criticism. Legendum omnino,
πολυ ΤΙ.
The sense, indeed, no one can mistake: but the text, as it stands, does not express that sense. It says only, "for a thousand is many, which he now uses instead of many." There can be no doubt, that Aristotle added ΤΙ
here, as in all the other instances, ἐσταναι ΤΙ — ὠφελεων ΤΙ.
το γαρ Παντες άντι του Πόλλοι, κατα μεταφοραν, είρηται· το γαρ Παν, ΠΟΛΥ ΤΙ.
ταμειν
, ἀρυσαι
would have been the proper word, and το φάναι, τον μεν πτωχευοντα, ευχεσθαι· τον δε ευχομενον, πτωχευειν· ὅτι ἀμφω αιτησεις.
Dacier has entirely omitted the passage, and substituted another from the Rhet. III. 11. p. 597, B. — Not, however, that he did not understand the passage; it was an inviolable rule with him always to understand his author: but only, it seems, because the example could not conveniently be expressed in French — "il ne peut être traduit en nôtre langue."
Castelvetro gives a very pleasant illustration. He does not pretend to see how ταμειν
and ἀρυσαι
are put for each other in the Greek examples: but he says, that, to draw, and to cut off, might be thus metaphorically put for each other; if, for example, we should say, "Take this pruning hook, and draw some branches from the olive-tree: or, Take this pail, and cut off some water from the fountain." "Prendi quella falce, e attigni de' rami dell' ulivo; o vero, Prendi quella secchia, e taglia dell acqua del fonte."
p. 453.
μεταφορα
being clearly used by Aristotle in its most general sense, including all the tropes — all the ways in which a word is transferred to a meaning different from its proper meaning. See Cic. Or. cap. xxvii. Of the four species of μεταφοραι
here mentioned, only the two last seem to answer to our
The difference between these two sorts of metaphors, as far as I am able to comprehend it, appears to me to be only this. Each of them is founded on some resemblance; but in the first, the resemblance perceived is between the two things themselves; in the other, between the relations which they, respectively, bear to two other things. Those are metaphors ἀπ᾿ ἐιδους ἐπι ειδους
, where the likeness is perceived, as Aristotle elsewhere expresses it, "by the genus;" that is, where the common quality, which constitutes the likeness, immediately occurs, and it is, therefore, sufficient simply to substitute the one word for the other. Those are metaphors κατ᾿ ἀναλογιαν
, where the resemblance is not thus perceived by the common quality, but by the common relation, of the two ἡ γαρ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΙΑ ἴσότης ἐτι λογου, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΤΕΤΤΑΡΣΙΝ ΕΛΑΧΙΣΤΟΙΣ.
i. e. "Analogy, or proportion, is equality of ratio, or relation, and requires four terms at least." όταν γαρ ἐιπῃ [Όμηρος] το γήρας ΚΑΛΑΜΗΝ, ἐποιησε μαθησιν και γνῶσιν δια του γένους· ΑΜΦΩ γαρ ΑΠΗΝΘΗΚΟΤΑ.
ἐποιησε μαθησιν
, see NOTE 22.
In this idea of the analogical metaphor I have the concurrence of Piccolomini. "La metafora di proportione è quella, che sopra la somiglianza dei rispetti che hanno l'une cose con l'altre, sarà fondata;"
&c. See his annotations, p. 305, and his clear and useful, though prolix, Parafrase della Retor. d'Arift. tom. iii. p. 52, &c. In the rest of his explanation he does not satisfy me.
Και ἐνιοτε προστιθεασιν ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λεγει προς ὁ ἐστι.
— No words can well be more obscure and perplexing. Taking them as they are, they seem to admit, fairly, of only one sense — that which Victorius gives them. "Et quandoque apponunt, pro quo dicit ad quod est."
That is, as he explains this literal and obscure version, they add, "ad quod refertur illud nomen quod omittunt, et pro quo aliud vocabulum usurpant." Προστιθεασι, προς ὁ ἐστι [sc. τουτο] ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λεγει
: i. e. they add, to the substituted word (
My objection to this sense of the passage is, that it seems to confound the analogical metaphor with that from species to species, in which one word is simply put in the room of the other, as καλαμη
is used in the passage of Homer, referred to by Aristotle as an example of that fort of metaphor: ἀπ᾿ ἐιδους ἐπι ειδους
but that it is so, seems sufficiently clear from his expressions, ἐποιησε μαθησιν δια του ΓΕΝΟΥΣ
— and, ΑΜΦΩ γαρ ἀπηνθηκοτα
, which answers to άμφω γαρ άφελειν τι ἐστι
, here.
Αλλ' ἐμπης καλαμην γε σ' οἴομαι ἐισοροωντα / Γινώσκειν.
For if, "sometimes," ἐνιοτε
, this addition is made, it is implied, that not only sometimes, but generally, and for the most part, the analogical metaphor is used in the same manner as that ἀπ' ἐιδους
&c. and cup is merely called shield, and old age, evening. But, if I understand the matter rightly, it is essential to this kind of metaphor to express two terms, at least, of the four which constitute the analogy; i. e. to express with the metaphorical word, either the thing to which the proper word belongs, (as,
And the philosopher himself seems to have said this, (for I confess the passage is not perfectly clear,) in the following words: ΑΙΕΙ γαρ ΕΚ ΔΥΟΙΝ λεγονται [sc. ἐικονες, comparisons], ΩΣΠΕΡ Ἡ ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ· διον, ἡ ἀσπις, φαμεν, ἐστι ΦΙΑΛΗ ΑΡΕΟΣ, και, τοξον, ΦΟΡΜΙΓΞ ΑΧΟΡΔΟΣ· ουτω μεν ουν λεγουσιν, ΟΥΧ ΑΠΛΟΥΝ το
"capitis nives"
δημε ροπαλον — λημη του Πειραιεως — ὁδου των λόγων
, &c. ἡνιοχοι νηων — ἐπαρουραι ἀρουρης — ποιμενα λαων — σπέρμα πυρος
a seed of fire, for a spark. (Od. ε. 490.) &c. See the Life of Homer, commonly attributed to Dion. Halic. and given in vol. v. of the ed. of Homer by Ernestus, p. 162.metaphora à specie
&c. may be stated analogically thus, "old age, we may say, is to man, what stubble is to corn," &c. And, on the other hand, converting an analogical metaphor into a metaphor from species to species, we may say, evening and old age are, both of them, ends of certain portions of time. — It was, perhaps, the vicinity of these two species of metaphor, and their convertibility, that induced later writers to drop the distinction, though they made many other distinctions which Aristotle did not. Thus Homer uses the analogical metaphor in the following line: Ουδ' ἐνηρες ἐρετμα, τα τε πτερα νηυσι πέλονται
, "Oars, which are the wings of ships." "nimis durum."
I think, then, that Aristotle meant to say, and, in some way or other, had said, "And sometimes," (ἐνιοτε
,) now and then, for the sake of clearness, "they add the proper word, (the word, ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ
for which, the metaphorical word is put,) to, or besides, the προς ὁ ἐστι
— i. e. that to which the proper word relates." They not only call the shield, the cup of Mars, but they mention shield also, and say, the shield is the cup of Mars: or, taking the other instance, old age is the evening of life. Thus all will follow naturally: ΚΑΙ ἐνιοτε
— And, sometimes, they add the proper term, &c. Ένιοις δε, ουκ ἐστιν όνομα — ἀναλογον.
— But, in some analogical metaphors, there is no proper term; in that case, therefore, the meta- ουδεν ήττον, ὁμοιως
[i. e. ἀναλογως
, as Castelvetro rightly explains it,] λεχθησεται
. Thus, in the metaphor exemplified, of sowing, applied to the sun, we may say the sun
It will, undoubtedly, be objected, that the sense I would give the words προστιθεασι
&c. cannot be fairly obtained from them as they now stand: and I confess it cannot; unless we might be allowed to render the words thus, taking προς
as a repetition of the preposition in προστιθεασιν
: "they add the word, for which they use, or say, the metaphorical word, (ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λΕΓΕΙ
,) το ὁ ΕΣΤΙ
To what it is — to the word which is used: they add the word that should be to the word that is." But this appears to me so harsh and improbable a construction, that I would rather suppose the passage to be defective. Perhaps it might originally be thus: — Και ἐνιοτε προστιθ. ἀνθ᾿ ὁυ λέγει, ΠΑΡΑ [το] προς ὁ ἐστι
— i. e. besides adding the thing to which the proper term relates. παρα προς
, unusually put together, and not understanding the relative sense of προς ὁ
, might reject the first as redundant.προστιθεασιν
, with the singular, λέγει
. Goulston renders "apponit;"
and I am surprised that no MS. should exhibit προστίθησιν
. That λέγει
is right, is highly probable, from the singular verb ἐρει
, repeatedly used here, and the ἐποι
, afterwards: ἐι την ἀσπίδα ΕΙΠΟΙ κ. τ. αλλ.
Φιαλην Αρεως
. The φιαλη
seems to have been a large, expanded, (ἐκπεταλον
,) kind of vessel, like a ewer. See Il. 4. 270, and the notes. Hesych. v. Αμφιθετο. — It had also, sometimes, an ὀμφαλος
, or umbo
. See Athen. p. 501. It had probably, therefore, some resemblance to a shield, which makes the metaphor appear less strange; as Piccolomini has remarked, p. 306: who also observes, very well, that this kind of metaphor is then most clear and perfect, when the resemblance of relation is aided by some degree of resemblance between the things themselves and that here, for example, if lance were used instead of shield, the metaphor would be spoiled, though the common relation would still subsist.
This seems to have been a favourite instance of this sort of metaphor; for it occurs several times in the Rhetoric. See III. 4, p. 588, and 11, p. 596, E. In the former of these passages Aristotle says, that an analogical metaphor ought to admit of inversion: thus, says he, if we may call the cup the shield of Bacchus, we may, with equal propriety, call the shield the cup of Mars. But Demetrius observes, alluding to that passage of the Rhetoric, that this is not the case of every such metaphor: ἐπει την ὑπωρειαν μεν της ἴδης, ποδα ἐξην ἐιπειν τον ποιητην, τον δε του ἀνθρωπου ποδα, ἐκετι ὑπωρειαν ἐιπειν.
Δυσμας βιου
. — Victorius has pointed out this expression in Plato's sixth book De Legibus, where the Athenian says, ἡμεις δ᾽ ἐν δυσμαις του βιου, οι δε, ὡς προς ἡμας, νεοι
: probably alluding, in Plato's usual manner, to the very passage of Empedocles. ἐπι δυσμαις ἐσμεν
: where, as the metaphor was sufficiently explained by the subject of the conversation, the word βιου
is not added.
Victorius remarks, also, the βιου ΔΥΝΤΟΣ αυγαις
of Æschylus, Agamem. v. 1123. The rest of that passage is very obscure; άτε και δορι πτωσιΜΟΥΣ / Ξυνανυτει, βιου δυντος αυγαις.
i. e. "such as destroys, dispatches (as we say,) those who fall by the spear, in the last gleams of setting life."
Βλεψαι προς ΑΥΓΑΣ βουλεται τας ήλιου, / Ως οὐποτ᾿ ἀυθις, άλλα νυν πανυστατον, / Ακτινα, κυκλονθ᾿, ήλιου προσοψεται.
or, in the finest picture of the kind, I think, that Poetry affords, —
oculisque errantibus, alto / Quæsivit cælo lucem, ingemuitque reperta.
— The poetical reader, I believe, will pardon me, if I wander so much farther from my subject, as to take occasion, from these beautiful passages, to point out three lines of Petrarch, which shew, "Se lamentar augelli,"
&c. written after the death of Laura, he imagines himself to hear her voice, in his solitude, consoling him for his loss, in these lines: —
Di me non pianger tu; ch' i miei di fersi / Morendo eterni; e, NEL ETERNO LUME, / Quando mostrai di chiuder gli occhi, APERSI! —
Όνομα κειμενον
. — Κειμενον
, here, is equivalent to κυριον
; a word established by common usage. Ετι, ἐι ΜΗ ΚΕΙΜΕΝΟΙΣ όνομασι χρηται, διον Πλατων, ὀφρυοσκιον, τον ὀφθαλμον· παν γαρ ἀσαφες το ΜΗ ΕΙΩΘΟΣ.
—
Σπειρων θεοκτισταν φλογα
. — Part of an Iambic verse, and probably from some Tragic Poet. The commentators quote Virgil's "Spargebat lumine terras."
This, however, is not exactly applicable, because spargere
does not, I think, appear to have been the proper, specific word, for sowing, as σπειρειν
was. The passage of Lucretius is more apposite: —
Sol etiam summo de vertice dissupat omnes / Ardorem in partes, et lumine CONSERIT arva.
Every reader will recollect Milton's beautiful application of this metaphor to the stars: —
And sow'd with stars the heav'n, thick as a field. —
— and to the dew-drops, metaphorized into pearls,
Jam sole infuso, jam rebus luce retectis.
— a sketch which Thomson has finely filled up, and finished: —
young day pours in apace, / And opens all the lawny prospect wide: / The dripping rock, the mountain's misty top, / Swell on the sight, and brighten with the dawn; / Blue, thro' the dusk, the smoaking currents shine.
In his hymn, he has taken up the metaphor in a sublimer tone: —
Great source of day! best image here below / Of thy Creator, ever POURING wide, / From world to world, the vital ocean round!
— To which I cannot restrain myself from adding a fine passage of the same kind in the hymn of Dionysius to the sun: —
᾿Ακτινα πολυστρεφον ἀμπλεκων, / ᾿Αιγλας πολυδερκεα ΠΑΓΑΝ / Περι γαιαν άπασαν ἑλισσων. / ΠΟΤΑΜΟΙ δε σεθεν ΠΥΡΟΣ ΑΜΒΡΟΤΟΥ / Τικτουσιν ἐπηρατον άμεραν.
πολυκερδέα, a reading of a French MS.; and he translates it,
"une riche source."He should have said, "a cunning source;" for I do not believe there is good authority for any other sense of
πολυκερδης. — See
Φιαλην ἀοινον
. This emendation of Victorius, (instead of ἀλλα οινου
, the reading of all the editions and MSS.) seems confirmed, beyond all doubt, by Rhet. III. 6, p. 590, A. and 11, p. 597, A.
Metaphors, from their nature, are in danger of being obscure, or forced, though it is essential to their beauty and effect, that they should be clear and apposite. For this purpose, a metaphor may be guarded in various ways. φιαλη ΑΡΕΩΣ
, or φιαλη ΑΟΙΝΟΣ
; or, if that be not sufficient for perspicuity — that is, if the meaning be not sufficiently pointed out by the manner, or circumstances, in which the expression is introduced, we may join these, (φιαλη Αρεως ἀοινος
,) or even add to either of them the proper word itself.
There is a fine instance of this negative mode of explaining a metaphor, in Isaiah, li. 21. "Thou drunken, but not with wine."
ἀχορδον
, in his metaphorical expression for a bow — φορμιγξ άχορδος
. πτερωτοις άρμασι
of Euripides; "winged chariots." Here we have a double metaphor,
It should be remembered, that these negative epithets are very common in the Greek Poets. Victorius points out many instances: κωμον ἀναυλοτατον
, θιασον ἀβακχευτον
, μηνυτηρα ἀφθεγκτον
, ἀπτεροις πωτημασιν
,
Κοσμος
the ornament, or ornamental word. That it was purposely passed over by him is hardly credible. This is, most probably, one of the lamentable διαβρωματα
that Strabo talks of. κοσμος
. Castelvetro says, the word admits, here, of five different senses, which he sets up, like nine-pins, for the pleasure of knocking them all down. — The only reasonable account of the matter seems to be that given by Dacier from Victorius. It seems clear enough, κοσμος
, is included, at least, under what he calls ὀικειον
in the Rhetoric. For he says, at the end of the next chapter (cap. xxii.) speaking of those species of words that are used in prose, that they are these three, το κύριον
, και μεταφορα
, και ΚΟΣΜΟΣ
: and in the Rhetoric, after referring to the very enumeration of words in this chapter, and setting aside such as he calls poetical, (i. e. γλωτται, διπλα ὀνοματα
, &c.) he says, το δε κυριον, και το ΟΙΚΕΙΟΝ, και μεταφοραι, μοναι χρησιμοι προς την των ψίλων λόγων λεξιν· παντες γαρ μεταφοραις διαλεγονται, και τοις ΟΙΚΕΙΟΙΣ, και τοις κυρίοις
.
And these ὀικεια ὀνοματα
, again, seem plainly synonymous with ἐπιθετα
, mentioned presently after: — δει δε και τα ἐπιθετα και τας μεταφ. κ. τ. λ.
— By ὀικεια
and ἐπιθετα
, Aristotle seems to have expressed the genus, of which, κοσμος
, the ornamental or embellishing epithet, was a species. But as he has not, by any means, explained himself fully, nor given any definition either of ὀικειον
or ἐπιθετον
, the mist which he has left upon this subject must remain. I shall only remark, that the word κοσμος
is once, (and I think but once,) used by him in his Rhetoric, apparently in the same sense as in this chapter. For, speaking of the propriety of diction, and its correspondence to the subject, he observes, that "an ornament should not be applied to a mean word; for this," says he, "has the appearance of burlesque; which is the case with Cleophon, who has used expressions of this sort as ridiculous, as it would be to talk of an "AUGUST fig-tree." μητ' ἐπι τῷ ἐυτελει ὀνοματι ἐπῃ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ· ἐι δε μη, κωμωδια φαινεται· διον ποιει Κλεοφων· ὁμοιως γαρ ἐνια ἐλεγε, και ἐι ἐιπειεν ἀν, ΠΟΤΝΙΑ ΣΥΚΗ.
κοσμος
here, and the example by which he explains it, seem to prove, that κοσμος
, in the treatise on Poetry, means such an epithet as embellishes or elevates the thing to which it is applied. For I do not imagine that the term includes what the Grammarians call perpetual epithets, such as "humida vina,"
γαλα λευκον
, &c. because Aristotle expressly says, that the κοσμος
is used in common speech: now these
It may be objected, as it has been objected by Piccolomini (p. 337), that, as an epithet may, at the same time, be a foreign word, a metaphorical, an extended, or of any of the other sorts, it could not be enumerated by Aristotle as a distinct species of words among the rest. But the truth is, that he is not there enumerating so many distinct species of words, which exclude each other, but only a number of distinct properties of words, several of which may subsist together in the same word. Thus, an extended word may, manifestly, be, at the same time, a metaphorical, or a foreign word, or both: a metaphorical word may be, also, an invented, extended, altered word, &c. But none of these words can be, at the same time, κυρια
, common words; and the only exclusive distinction that Aristotle intended, is between the common word, and the others; all of which are words, on some account or other, uncommon.
The defects of the passage have been fully pointed out by almost all the annotators. See Mr. Winstanley's note, p. 300, ed. Ox. 1780. — But we have lately been told, that all the commentators have entirely mistaken the sense of the passage, and supposed it, without reason, to be imperfect, merely because they did not see, ν
and ρ
, are not masculine; yet, if we examine the nature of the things denoted by words of those terminations, we shall find, it seems, that they are masculine, though the words themselves are regarded as feminine. "Non enim omnia quæ desinunt in
ν
et ρ
sunt masculina; nisi ad sensum earum rerum quas denotant respicias, qui mas est, licet ipsa nomina fæminina habeantur."Μητηρ
, for example, ends in ρ
. Did Aristotle's philosophy lead him to consider a mother as of the masculine gender?
Λεξεως ἀρετη
i. e. of diction, or language, in general; not, "elocutionis Poeticae,"
as Goulston and others render it. For Aristotle gives the same definition of the excellence of oratorical diction, in his Rhetoric; ἀρετην
) and proper elevation, even of prose elocution. ταπεινη
, is clear from his own explanation.
Still, it is obvious to ask, why the philosopher, when his subject was the excellence of poetic diction, should thus set out with a general definition, instead of giving us, at once, the definition of the species. The reason, I suppose, was, that he conceived the poetic to differ from the rhetorical language, only in the degree of elevation above ordinary speech; and to define degrees is not easy. Nor, indeed, was even this difference common to all Poetry. If the diction of the Dithyrambic and other Lyric kinds, and the Heroic, with their pompous apparatus of compound epithets, foreign and antiquated words, and boldness of metaphor, rose far above the highest elevation of prose diction; on the other hand, that of Tragedy, we know, frequently descended, in its lowest parts, even below what Aristotle assigns as the proper level of rhetorical speech, to a style differing from common speech in no other circumstance but that of metre. μη ταπεινη
; for he translates, not the words only, but the ideas, of his author, into French: "La vertu de l'expression consiste dans la netteté et dans LA NOBLESSE."
ἐυτελες ὀνομα
, there, agrees with what is said of him here. See the ch. of the Rhet. last referred to. "Homere emploie quelquefois les mots les plus vils, et il les releve aussitôt par des epithetes magnifiques."
Διος ὑφορβος
— "divine swineherd" — has not, to our ears, a much better effect than ποτνια συκη
. The only reasonable way of defending Homer, is, surely, to content ourselves with saying, in general, that the expression could not have the same incongruous appearance in Homer's time; as, in that case, he certainly would not have used it. At least, this would be a better apology, than to assert, with Boileau, that συβωτης
is one of the finest words in the Greek language. "Il n'y a peut-être pas dans le Grec deux plus beaux mots que
— Le Bossu, the admired Le Bossu, apologizes in a different way. The passage is a morsel of such rare and exquisite absurdity, that I cannot withhold it from the reader. συβώτης
& βουκολος
.""Nous trouvons de grandes baſſesses dans les termes de chaudrons & de marmites, dans le sang, dans les graisses, dans les intestins & autres parties des animaux; parceque tout cela n'est plus que dans nos cuisines & dans nos boucheries, & que ces choses nous font bondir le cœur. Et nous ne prenons pas garde, que tout cela, au temps d'Homere et de Virgile, etoit au goût du S. Esprit même, qui n'a jamais pû l'avoir mauvais; que Dieu avoit très-soigneusement ordonné toutes ces choses à Moise,"
&c.
Και πως ἐγω Σθενελου φαγοιμ αν ῥημα τι / Εις όξος ἐμβαπτομενον ἢ λευκους άλας.
"Ut modicus autem atque opportunus ejus usus illustrat orationem, ita, frequens et obscurat et tædio complet; continuus verò in allegoriam et ænigma exit."
—
Τα ὑπαρχοντα
must, by no means, be joined with ἀδυνατα
. It evidently means here, in a sense very usual, things that actually exist—i. e. are true. As, Rhet. II. 25, λυεται δε και τα σημεια, κ᾿αν ὑπαρχοντα
: where, ὑπαρχοντα
is synonymous with ἀληθες
, in lib. i. cap. ii. p. 517—λυτον δε, κ᾿αν ΑΛΗΘΕΣ
.
The passage is accurately and closely rendered by Piccolomini. "La forma e l'effentia dell' enigma confifte in quefto, che nel dir cofe, che VERAMENTE SIANO, fi congiungbino infieme cofe ch appaiano impoffibili à ftar infieme."
—And this is an exact definition of an ænigma—such an ænigma, at least, as Aristotle means. But in the other way of constructing the passage, which is that of Castelvetro, and some other interpreters, it is no definition at all. For if the essence of a riddle consists merely in "putting together things that are incompatible and impossible," —τα ὑπαρχοντα ἀδυνατα συναψαι
del colpo non accorto, / Andava combattendo, ed era morto.
Κατα μεν ουν την των ὀνοματων συνθεσιν.
— Heinsius την των ΚΥΡΙΩΝ ὀνοματων
. But the κυριον όνομα
, as I have already observed, is, throughout, opposed by Aristotle, not to μεταφορα
only, but to all the other words. He would hardly, therefore, have used it here in a different sense, as opposed to metaphor only. ΑΛΛΩΝ ὀνοματων
more probable. But perhaps no word is wanting. Aristotle had used the expression, ἀδυνατα ΣΥΝΑΨΑΙ
—"to put together things impossible." This might lead to suppose, that an ænigma might be made by the mere συνθεσις ὀνοματων
—by a certain arrangement or construction of the words only. Therefore he adds—"this cannot be done by the mere arrangement of the words; by the metaphorical use of them it may." κατα την των ΟΝΟΜΑΤΩΝ ΣΥΝΘΕΣΙΝ
, and, κατα ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑΝ
, seem opposed:—"by construction—by metaphor." If he had written κατα την των ΑΛΛΩΝ (or ΚΥΡΙΩΝ) ὀνομ. συνθ.
he would probably have written also—κατα δε την των μεταφορΩΝ (sc. συνθεσιν.)
As this sense seems sufficiently clear, supposes no defect in the text, and, after all, coincides, in the main, with that of Heinsius, (for we must necessarily understand, an arrangement of words not metaphorical—) I have adopted it in my translation, after Dacier, and Batteux.
ἐν τῷ ἀινιγματι τῳ ευδοκιμουντι
—. I wish it may ευδοκιμειν
with a modern reader. In Athenæus another line appears:
Ανδρ᾿ ἐιδον πυρι χαλκον ἐπ᾿ ἀνερι κολλησαντα, / Ουτω συγκολλως ὡστε συναιμα ποιειν.
But Casaubon seems right in supposing this pentameter to have been a modern addition; for it is not found, I believe, in any more antient writer. Even in Plutarch, I observe, that the hexameter not only appears by itself, as in Aristotle, but is plainly given as the whole. See his Symposium, p. 267, ed. H. St. It appears from that passage to have been the production of a lady, Eumetis. I doubt whether, in these "degenerate days," it would have gained her a prize in the Lady's Diary. The Greeks were fond of these puzzles. The reader may find some curious specimens of this sort of wit in Athenæus, X. 448, &c.
"Du tems d'Homere c'étoit une grande merveille qu'un homme pût aſſujettir ſon diſcours à des meſures, à des fillabes longues et breves, & faire en même tems quelque choſe de raiſonnable. On donnoit donc aux Poetes des licences infinies, & on ſe tenoit encore trop heureux d'avoir des vers. Homère pouvoit parler dans un ſeul vers cinq langues
But, could this ingenious and sensible writer seriously suppose, that the language of Homer's poems had at all the same effect to a hearer, or reader, of his time, that an English poem would now have, if composed of all the provincial dialects of Great Britain? —We are always told, how Homer enriched his language by "visiting all the principal nations of Greece, and learning the peculiarities of their speech." Λέξει δε ποικίλῃ κεχρημενος, τους ἀπο πασης διαλέκτου των Ἑλληνων χαρακτηρας ἐγκαταμιξεν, ἐξ ὧν δηλος ἐστι, πασαν μεν Ἑλλαδα ἐπελθων και παν ἐθνος.
This account makes the language of Homer no other than the kainisma
which Quintilian reprobates, among the vitia orationis
: "Kainisma quoque appellatur quædam mista ex variâ ratione linguarum oratio; ut si Atticis Dorica, Ionica, Æolica etiam dicta confundas. Cui simile vitium est apud nos, si quis sublimia humilibus, vetera novis, poetica vulgaribus misceat."
"a party-colour'd dress / Of patch'd and piebald languages. / It had an odd promiscuous tone, / As if he'd talk'd three parts in one
With such an idea of Homer's language, Fontenelle might well add—"Cette étrange confusion de langues, cet assemblage bisarre de mots tout défigurés, etoit la langue des dieux; du moins il est bien ſûr que ce n'etoit pas celle des hommes."
—And, indeed, I firmly believe with Lord Monboddo, that "fuch a mongrel dialect was never written by any man;" and that "Homer wrote, either the language that was ſpoken in the country where he was born and educated, or that was used by the poets that had written before him, and was the eſtabliſhed language of Poetry."
Ιαμβοποιησας ἐν ἀυτη τη λεξει.
— Two senses have been given to the word ἰαμβοποιησας
; both of them, I think, far from satisfactory. Some render it—making Iambic verses: "Iambis usus est."
[Vict.] But, is it likely, that Euclid, meaning to ridicule Homer's hexameters, should do it in Iambic verse?—Besides that the lines themselves, such as we find them, have not the least air of Iambics, but fall easily enough, with a little help, into hexameters. In this I perfectly agree with Dacier; though I see no reason to suppose with him, that Euclid had composed—"un ouvrage en vers heroiques."
"ſe moque de lui."
[Dac.] A meaning that, undoubtedly, suits the passage better; whether it suits the word itself I much doubt, but will not venture to decide. As Aristotle uses ἰαμβοποιος
, ἰαμβος
, or satiric poem, he may possibly have used the verb, Ιαμβοποιειν
, here, in the correspondent sense of making a satire upon, or burlesquing:—ἰαμβοποἰησας ἐν ἀυτη τη λεξει
—having ridiculed him "in that fort of diction," in the following manner, &c.
As this sense appears to me, on the whole, far more eligible than the other, I have followed it: for I see no third sense that can, with any shew of probability, be extracted from the present text. But that it is defective, and that ἰαμβοποιησας
is an error, I have very little doubt. If conjecture might be indulged, I should be inclined to suppose, that what Aristotle had said was this; "that it is an easy matter to versify, even in common speech, (ἐν αυτη τη λεξει
,) μαλιστα γαρ λεκτικον
, &c."veritate deſperatâ, nihil amplius curæ de hac re fufcipere volui."
It is some comfort however, as M. Batteux has observed, that both the objection of Euclid, and Aristotle's answer, are clear enough, independently of the examples.
I ought to mention, that Castelvetro has explained this passage, without supposing the text wrong, in a manner different from any ἰαμβοποιειν
he understands neither satirizing, nor making Iambic verses; but, making Iambic feet instead of spondees, in hexameter verse. And the sense he gives the whole passage is this: "It would be a very easy thing to write heroic verse, if this liberty of extension were allowed; for then, a Poet might put Iambic feet in the room of Spondees, and commit no fault, because the short syllables might be lengthened at pleasure." And the lines that follow he supposes to be examples of such defective hexameters.
There is somewhat ingenious in this explanation, as there is in many others of this acute writer: but it has likewise the fault, which many of his explanations have; that of being by no means reconcileable with the original.—See his comment. p. 481.
Το μεν ουν ΦΑΙΝΕΣΘΑΙ πως χρωμενον, κ. τ. ἀλ.
—The force, both of φαινεσθαι
, which I understand to be emphatic here, and of πως
, seems perfectly well explained by Castelvetro. "Non ſo perchè alcuni vogliano rimuovere di queſto teſto, πως, eſſendoci ſtato poſto per dimostrare, che allora il vitio ſi ſcopre, e'l riſo ſi muove, quando fi comincia in alcun modo a riconoſcere, che il poeta ha uſata a ſtudio, e ricercata queſta maniera di parole."
p. 482. So, too, Piccolomini's translation—"l'eſſer veduto---uſar coſi fatto modo di locutione."
—For πως
, I once suspected we should read ΑΠΡΈπως
; as presently after—χρωμενοι ἀπρεπως
. But I believe πως
is right:—aliquo modo
.
Όσον διαφερει.
Not "quantum excellat,"
as Goulston and others translate; but, "what a difference the proper use of such words makes"—"how different the effect is." As, above, cap. x. ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ γαρ πολυ
—"it makes a great difference:" and, cap. xviii. τι ΔΙΑΦΕΡΕΙ
.—Nothing more common than this use of the word. The difference here expressed, is, plainly, between the ἁρμοττον
, and the ἀπρεπως
, in the use of such words: χρωμενα ΑΠΡΕΠΩΣ τα άυτα ἐν ἀπεργασαιτο ΤΟ ΔΕ ΑΡΜΟΤΤΟΝ όσον διαφερει κ. τ. λ.
Εντιθεμενων των ὀνοματων ἐις το μετρον
:—literally, "the words being put into the metre:" i. e. as Victorius and others explain it, "taking care, that, in changing the words, you do it "falvo metro."
"
In short, it appears to me, that nothing tolerable can be made of the phrase, ἐις το μετρον
, taken in this sense. If it might be taken, as some have taken it, adverbially, for μετρίως
—to a moderate degree—all would be well. μετρον
having been just before used in the sense of moderation: το δε μετρον, κοινον άπαντων
, &c. If the article το
were omitted, the adverbial sense would be less improbable; but, εις ΤΟ μετρον
, can only, I think, mean into the metre. Still, however, I incline to think this was Aristotle's meaning, and that he probably wrote ἐις το ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ
. A single letter makes all the difference. The word μετριον
, as far as that may add any probability to my conjecture, occurs in that part of the Rhetoric where he is treating of the very same subject—the proper and moderate use of metaphors, epithets, and other tropical and ornamental words, in oratory. Thus, III. 2, p. 586, speaking of epithets and diminutives, he says, ευλαβείσθαι δε δει, και παρατηρειν ἐν ἀμφοιν ΤΟ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΝ.
And again, of epithets—δει στοχαζεσθαι ΤΟΥ ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ.
p. 587. As this was the only satisfactory sense I could make of the words, I have ventured to give it in my version.
Κυριου ειωθοτος.
As κυριον
, in Aristotle's sense, is common, the addition of ειωθοτος
, (ἐσθιει
, which he here calls κυριον ειωθοτος
, was not strictly κυριον
, κυριον
, at all, to the same word in this line of Homer: Τους άμα σοι παντας πυρ ἐσθιει.
κυριον
, therefore, in Aristotle's enumeration, was opposed μεταφορα
, as well as to γλωττα
, and the rest of the poetical words, the application of it here, to a word that was evidently metaphorical in its original use, might seem inconsistent: the word ἐιωθοτος
was therefore, probably, added, to obviate, in his short way, this objection.
I cannot guess what induced Dacier to render γλωτταν
, here, by "mot metaphorique;"
or Castelvetro to assert, that Aristotle calls θοιναται
a foreign word, only on account of the boldness of the metaphor. By γλωττα
, I think, we are to understand, any word that belongs either to another language, or another dialect of the same language, and that is not naturalized by common and popular γλωτται
when first introduced, and for a considerable time afterwards; but have now, for many years, ceased to be considered as foreign words. Such words in the Greek language Aristotle, I apprehend, did not com- γλωτται
, as not being strange, uncommon, ξενικα
. This is evident from a passage in his Rhetoric: αι μεν ουν ΓΛΩΤΤΑΙ, ΑΓΝΩΤΕΣ· τα δε ΚΥΡΙΑ, ΙΣΜΕΝ.
There is, however, one sort of poetic words not distinctly provided for in Aristotle's enumeration; I mean, obsolete words. Yet these make so considerable a part of the privileged language of verse, that we can hardly suppose him to have overlooked them. Γλωτται
seems the only class to which they can possibly be referred: yet his definition of γλωττα
is, "a word, ᾗ χρωνται ΕΤΕΡΟΙ
;" which is not applicable to an obsolete word, used by nobody. Perhaps he did not think it worth while to distinguish between words belonging to another language, or dialect, and words that once belonged to the native language, but which, having long fallen into disuse, have, when occasionally revived, the effect of foreign words.
Φαγεδαινα ἡ με σαρκας ἐσθιει ποδα.
— We should read, probably, for the sake of the metre, either φαγεδαινα γ' ἡ
, as it is corrected in the Oxford Euripides, or, which seems still better, φαγεδαινα δη
, which is Du Pauw's emendation. And σαρκας
, for the same reason, must have been altered to σαρκα
, in the verse of Euripides, as, I see, it is given in the Oxford edition.
Had Aristotle told us no more about these two lines, than that one of them was of Æschylus, and the other of Euripides, what critic would not have confidently given the θοιναται
to Æschylus?
Νυν δε μ’ εων ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε και ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ και ΑΚΙΚΥΣ.
Νυν δε μ’ εων ΜΙΚΡΟΣ τε και ΑΣΘΕΝΙΚΟΣ και ΑΕΙΔΗΣ.
Among these substituted terms, that μικρὸς
answers to ὀλίγος
is clear enough; but how ἀειδὴς
answers to ἄκικυς
, it is not easy to make out. This difficulty struck me, long before I had seen the comment of Victorius, who makes the same remark;
"Aristotelem, ordinem Homericorum verborum in immutatione eorum non servasse; atque id fecisse, ut metrum servaret; et, quum inquit, ἀσθενικ, quod secundum apud ipsum est, tertium apud poetam exprimere voluisse."
ἄκικυς
be the true reading, the commentators must, probably, have been misled by taking it for granted, that the substituted words must necessarily correspond, in order, as well as meaning, to the original words. But it is easy to see, that ἀειδὴς
, ἄκικυς
, which is ἀσθενικὸς
does exactly answer to it. Ἀκικυς — ΑΣΘΕΝΗΣ, ἀδύνατος.
Hefych.—But my difficulty goes still farther. I do not see how ἀειδὴς
can correspond, in meaning, to ὀυτιδανὸς
. I once thought it should be ΑΕΙΚΗΣ
. Ουτιδανά — ὀυδενὸς ἄξια.
Hefych. Αεικελίας — ἐυτελεῖς, ΟΥΔΕΝΟΣ ΑΞΙΟΥΣ
: and, ΑΕΙΚΕΣ — ΕΥΚΑΤΑΦΡΟΝΗΤΟΝ.
Id. So Suidas; Αεικελιος — ὁ ἐυκαταφρόνητος.
But, notwithstanding the authority of lexicographers, and the common derivation of the two words, εἰκής
and ἀεικέλιος
, I question whether the former is ever used by Homer in the sense of ὀυτιδανός
, ἀεικέλιος
is. Ἀεικὴς
seems always to mean, indignus
, Ἀεικέλιον
seems to be used sometimes in that sense, and sometimes in the contemptuous sense, as in the line of Homer which Aristotle next produces. The only passages that I have found in Homer, where ἀεικὴς
will admit well of this sense, are Od. Ν. 199, and Od. Ω. 249, in the expressions, ἀεικέα ἕσσο
, and, ἀεικέα ἕσσαι
: yet even there, it is not necessary to render it "meanly clad;"
it may be, as in other places,
With respect to the word ὀυτιδανὸς
, Hesychius gives ἀσθενὴς
as one of its meanings;
ἀσθενικὸς
might well enough answer to it here, were it not for the stronger claim of the word ἄκικυς
;
ἀειδὴς
, instead of ἄκικυς
;
ἀειδὴς
might be the reading of Aristotle's copy—the precious copy ἐκ νάρθηκος
, of which we hear so much; and he might mean to exemplify his proposed experiment of substituting common, for poetical, expression, only in the two first words; repeating the last, ἀειδὴς
, merely to complete his verse. But whatever becomes of this conjecture, one thing I cannot help just observing—that this reading, ἀειδὴς
, is favoured by the preceding lines in Homer. Polyphemus says—
Ἀλλ’ ἀιεί τινα φῶτα ΜΕΓΑΝ καὶ ΚΑΛΟΝ ἐδέγμην
Ἔνθαδ’ ἐλεύσεσθαι, μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ΑΛΚΗΝ.
Νῦν δέ μ’, ἐὼν ΟΛΙΓΟΣ τε καὶ ΟΥΤΙΔΑΝΟΣ καὶ ΑΚΙΚΥΣ, &c.
Od. IX. 513.
ἄκικυς
; for ὀυτιδανὸς
, though it may very well be opposed to μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν
, cannot be, with any propriety, opposed to καλὸν
. Whereas, if ἀειδὴς
be substituted for ἄκικυς
, all will answer exactly; ὀλίγος
, to μέγαν
, ὀυτιδανός
, to μεγάλην ἐπιειμένον ἀλκήν
, and ἀειδὴς
, to καλὸν
.
In these examples, it is not always easy to ascertain the particular class, to which Aristotle would have referred the words which he changes. We learn, however, that all these Homeric words were ξενικά
, κύρια
—
Well translated, though very freely, by M. Batteux. "C'est la seule chose qu'on ne puisse emprunter d'ailleurs. C'est la production du génie, le coup-d'œil d'un esprit qui voit les rapports."
Compare Rhet. III. 2, p. 585, D. and 11, p. 595, E. where it is observed, that, καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ, τὸ ΟΜΟΙΟΝ, ΚΑΙ ΕΝ ΠΟΛΥ ΔΙΕΧΟΥΣΙ, θεωρεῖν, ἐυστοχον.
—See Mr. Harris's Philol. Inq. p. 186, 187, where all these passages are quoted and translated.
—Χρησιμωτάτη ἡ διπλῆ λέξις τοῖς διθυράμβοις· ὁυτοι γὰρ ψοφώδεις· ἀι δὲ γλῶτται, τοῖς ἐποποιοῖς· σεμνὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀυθάδες· ἡ μεταφορὰ δὲ, τοῖς ἰαμβείοις.
Rhet. III. 3, p. 587.
This, as I have already observed, is the only passage in these three chapters concerning the diction, that strictly relates to the subject—the diction of Tragedy, as distinguished from that of the Epic, and other species.
"the use of strong images, metaphors, and figures;"
that "it cannot, indeed, be truly impassioned without them;"
and that "while it discards unmeaning epithets, it should be liberal of those, that add force and vigour to the sentiment."
Nor is all this in any degree incompatible with such imitation, such improved imitation, of common speech, (ΟΤΙ ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ λέξιν μιμεῖσθαι
,) as Aristotle attributes to Tragic diction, which he does not require to be confined to common and ordinary expression, (κύρια
,) but expressly allows it to use also metaphors, and epithets: τὸ κύριον, καὶ ΜΕΤΑΦΟΡΑ, καὶ ΚΟΣΜΟΣ.
cap. xxii.
ἀργὰ μέρη
, its comparatively "idle parts,"
as well as the Epic Poem;
"bethink him"
—
—if ought on this vain earth
Still holds too firm an union with his soul,
Estranging it from peace—
—he answers,
I had a Queen:—
Bear with my weakness, Druid!—This tough breast
Must heave a sigh—for she is unreveng'd.
And can I taste true peace, she unreveng'd?
—So chaste, so lov'd a queen!—ah, Evelina,
Hang not thus weeping on the feeble arm
That could not save thy mother.—
The reader will find some excellent observations on this subject in Dr. Beattie's Essay on Poetry, &c. Part II. chap. i. Sect. 1, p. 224, &c. and Sect. 3, p. 267, 268, where a charming example of simple Tragic language is given from "translated it into the finical style."
But we see plainly, that he is by much too good a Poet to succeed well in spoiling good Poetry.
λέξις γελοἰα
of its satyric origin, conveyed in the suitable vehicle of the dancing tetrameters.
ἀπεσεμνώθη
,) Homer was the model; and ÆSCHYLUS, with a conception naturally sublime, and the λέξις γελοἰα
, which he took so much pains to avoid, came round and met him, in the shape of bombast, at the very moment when he thought himself at the greatest distance from it. There could not well be any thing in the theatrical cart of Thespis more laughable, than to call smoke "the brother of fire,"
and dust, the "brother of mud."
Πυρὸς κάσιν.
Sept. contra Theb. v. 500 [v. 494].—κάσις πηλοῦ----κόνις.
Agam. 503 [v. 494].—The commentators are very amusing, when they admire this, and tell us, it is the same thing as the beautiful expression of χρυσέας τέκνον ἐλπίδος
, applied to the Oracle, in the Oedipus of Sophocles, [v. 161], the παμφόρου γαίας τέκνα
of Aeschylus, applied to flowers [Pers. 620.] or the "Sylvae filia nobilis,"
of Horace. [See Burton's Pentalogia, and Stanley's notes on Æfchylus.] De Pauw, indeed, finds fault; but he is equally diverting in another way. His note upon κάσις πηλοῦ
, is—"Inepte: pulvis ille est ipsum lutum arefactum et comminutum: oculati vident statim."
—It is to be observed, that both these metaphors of Æschylus are in the dialogue part. Dante has a riddling metaphorical expression of the same kind, but much more poetical. He calls a hoar frost, the sister of snow.
Quando la brina in su la terra assempra
L'imagine di sua sorella bianca.
SOPHOCLES reduced the general language of his dialogue to a more equable and sober dignity, but still, Homer, we know, was his great model;
Ὅμηρον μὲν, Σοφοκλέα ἐπικὸν, Σοφοκλέα δὲ, Ὅμηρον τραγικόν.
Suidas, v. POLEMON. Diog. Laert. IV. 20. τὸ πᾶν Ὁμηρικῶς ὠνόμαζε.
Ἀκόλουθος Vitæ Sophoclis.
Namque is, (Euripides,) et in sermone (quod ipsum reprehendunt quibus gravitas et cothurnus et sonus Sophoclis videtur esse sublimior,) magis accedit oratorio generi.
δεῖ λανθάνειν ποιοῦντας, καὶ μὴ δοκεῖν λέγειν πεπλασμένως, ἀλλὰ πεφυκότως· τοῦτο γὰρ πιθανόν· ἐκεῖνο δὲ, τοὐναντίον ... καὶ ὁῖον ἡ Θεοδώρου φωνὴ πέπονθε πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ὑποκριτῶν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ, τοῦ λέγοντος ἔοικεν εἶναι, αἱ δ’ ἀλλότριαι.
Rhet. III. 2. p. 585. B.
"The best way to conceal artifice, and make your language appear easy and natural, is, by forming it, chiefly, of the words and phrases of customary speech, properly selected; as EURIPIDES does, who first set the example."
κλέπτεται δ’ εὖ, ἐάν τις ἐκ τῆς εἰωθυίας διαλέκτου ἐκλέγων συντιθῇ· ὅπερ Εὐριπίδης ποιεῖ, ΚΑΙ ΥΠΕΔΕΙΞΕ ΠΡΩΤΟΣ.
Rhet. III. 2. p. 585. B.
A passage, that precedes this, deserves to be given entire, from its close connection with the subject of this part of the treatise on Poetry, and the curious, though short, sketch it contains of the history of Tragic diction.
"As the Poets appeared to owe their reputation to their language, which never failed to be admired, however foolish and absurd the matter it conveyed; on this account, even prose diction was, at first, poetical, like that of Gorgias. And even now, they, who use such language, are looked upon, by illiterate people, as the finest speakers; which is far from being true; for oratorical diction, and poetical diction, are different things. And as a proof of this, we see what has actually happened: for now, even among the Poets themselves, those who write Tragedy no longer make use of that sort of language; but, as they had exchanged the Trochaic verse for the Iambic, because this, of all metres, approaches the nearest to common speech; so now, they have also discarded all those words and phrases, so remote from common speech, with which the earlier Tragic Poets used to embellish their diction, and which are still employed by those who write Hexameters. It would be ridiculous, therefore, to imitate the Poets in a language, which they themselves have abandoned as improper."
ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ ποιηταὶ, λέγοντες εὐήθη, διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν· διὰ τοῦτο, ποιητικὴ πρώτη ἐγένετο λέξις, ὁῖον ἡ Γοργίου· καὶ νῦν ἔτι οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοὺς τοιούτους οἴονται διαλέγεσθαι κάλλιστα. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ἑτέρα λόγου καὶ ποιήσεως λέξις ἐστί. Δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ συμβαῖνον· οὐδὲ γὰρ οἱ τὰς Τραγῳδίας ποιοῦντες ἔτι χρῶνται τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον· ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐκ τετραμμέτρων εἰς τὸ ἰαμβεῖον μετέβησαν, διὰ τὸ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο τῶν μέτρων ὁμοιότατον εἶναι τῶν άλλων· ὁὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀφήκασιν, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς δ’ οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμουν, καὶ ἔτι νῦν οἱ τὰ ἑξάμετρα ποιοῦντες, ἀφήκασι. [The repetition of ἀφήκασι, here, has much the appearance of error. I suspect we should read thus: ὁὕτω καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὅσα παρὰ τὴν διάλεκτόν ἐστιν, οἷς Τ’ οἱ πρῶτον ἐκόσμουν καὶ —ποιοῦντες, ἀφήκασι.] διὸ γελοῖον μιμεῖσθαι τούτους, οἳ αὐτοὶ οὐκ ἔτι χρῶνται ἐκείνῳ τῷ τρόπῳ.
Rhet. III. 1. p. 584.
The Abbé Batteux, by understanding ἰαμβείοις
here to mean Iambic, or satirical, Poems, has, unluckily, thrown away the only passage in these three chapters, that was strictly to Aristotle's purpose. He has, also, with Dacier, misrepresented his meaning, by rendering—"ne peut recevoir que ce qui est employé dans la conversation."
We are, undoubtedly, to understand, ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ἁρμόττει
, as before: for that Aristotle did not mean absolutely to
Ἤδη καὶ ταύτῃ.
already even in the first operation of his genius—the very choice of his subject, and formation of his plan. Such appears to me to be the force of ἤδη
in this passage, which, I think, is injured by those commentators who punctuate—ὥσπερ ἔιπομεν ἤδη
"as we have already said."
Νῦν δὲ, ἓν μέρος ἀπολαβὼν, ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται ΑΥΤΩΝ πολλοῖς.
—i. e. as the commentators explain it, of the other parts of the war. But, what should we think of this English—"Selecting one part of the war, he introduces many episodes of them?"
If Aristotle meant the other parts of the war, ἀυτῶν
must, surely, be wrong: if ἀυτῶν
be right, I confess I cannot see what he meant. I wish we had manuscript authority for the ἀυτοῦ
of Heinsius, which is adopted and explained by Le Bossu, II. 5, and 6.—But a learned friend has suggested to me a conjecture still more probable; that Aristotle wrote ΑΛΛΩΝ. Νῦν δὲ, ἝΝ μέρος ἀπολαβὼν, ἐπεισοδίοις κέχρηται ΑΛΛΩΝ [sc. μερῶν] πολλοῖς.
"Selecting one part only of the war, he has, from other parts, introduced many Episodes,"
&c.
To the authors usually referred to on the subject of these Poems, it may now be useful to add Heyne, Excursu primo ad Æn. II. p. 228, 229—a very learned and curious dissertation concerning the writers on the Trojan war.
Ὃις ἅπασιν Ὁμηρος κέχρηται, ΚΑΙ πρῶτος, ΚΑΙ ἱκανῶς.
—Vell. Paterculus, I. 5.
Victorius, and other commentators, have, I think, done some injustice to the force of Aristotle's expression here, by taking the adverb, ἱκανῶς
, too literally. They render it "ita ut satis putari debeat."
(Vict.)—"accurate satis."
(Goulston.) &c. This gives the word, indeed, but falls short of the meaning, which
"Gran lode è quella, che è data da Aristotele ad Homero, che egli sia stato il primo, che abbia usate tutte e quattro le spetie dell' Epopea, &c. e le habbia usate bene & perfettamente."
And his translation is—"Le quali cose tutte Homero usò, e primiero, e perfettamente."
Undoubtedly, the literal meaning of ἱκανῶς
is, ἱκανὸς
and ἱκανῶς
, as the Italians use the word Ἱκανήν· ἀρκέσαν, ΠΟΛΛΗΝ.
Hefych.
If we knew certainly, how many Tragedies were performed at one hearing, (ἐις μίαν ἀκρόασιν
,) we should know, with equal certainty, to what length Aristotle thought the Epic Poem ought to be reduced, in order to be perfectly, or sufficiently, ευσύνοπτον
. But, unfortunately, the premises here are not less obscure than the conclusion; the information to be picked up in antient authors, relative to the Tragic contests and the Tetralogia, being extremely imperfect and unsatisfactory. Let us however try, what little glimmering of light may be thrown upon this subject, from those authors, or from the nature of the thing itself.
The general principle, upon which Aristotle here fixes the length of an Epic Poem, is the same with that, upon which he
"that it should be such as to admit of our comprehending, at one view, the beginning and the end. And this,"
he goes on, "would be the case, were it reduced from its antient length, so as not to exceed that of such a number of Tragedies, as are performed successively at one hearing."
Here then is a rule, which, at the time he wrote it, was as clear and determinate, as if he had expressly said, that an Epic Poem ought not to exceed a certain number of verses. But, as an ingenious friend has suggested to me, "he probably chose to put his rule in the way he has put it, rather than in this latter way, as wishing to convey an intimation, that the length of an Epic Poem should be such, as would admit of its being fairly recited, or read, in a single day."
It seems to have been a commonly received opinion, that the four dramas of each Poet, which composed the Tetralogia, were always performed at one hearing—in one day
Ἐκείνοι [sc. Tragici] τέτρασι δράμασιν ἠγωνίζοντο, Διονυσίοις, Ληναίοις, Παναθηναίοις, Χύτροις, ὧν τὸ τέταρτον ἦν σατυρικόν· τὰ δὲ τέτταρα δράματα ἐκαλεῖτο Τετραλογία.
"Quot Athenis Liberalia agitabantur, tot fabulas di-
ὧν τὸ ΤΕΤΑΡΤΟΝ ἦν σατυρικόν
), is to say, pretty plainly, that all the satyric pieces were performed together at the fourth and last festival, the Χύτροι
. And so indeed some commentators seem to have understood it
Chytris] Genus hoc certaminis satyrici fuit, ut ex Laertii verbis apparet, in quo, dramate satyrorum proprio certaretur.
Dio. Laert. ed. Meib. III. 56, note 205.
Dacier tells us, very gravely, that twelve, and sometimes sixteen, Tragedies were performed in one day:
"dont la representation dure dix ou douze jours de suite, en y comprenant la nuit, jusqu' à ce que les spectateurs & les acteurs las de se succéder éternellement, en allant boire, manger, dormir, & continuer la piece, ou assister au spectacle, sans que rien y soit interrompu, se retirent enfin tous, comme de concert."
Brumoy, Theatre des Grecs, I. 53.
"at one hearing,"
and to the same audience, (for that is implied,) amounted to twelve, we may venture at once to reject as the most palpable impossibility. Shall we then suppose eight, the next lowest number possible, on the supposition, that the four dramas of the Tetralogia were exhibited in one day? The representation of eight Tragedies, we may venture to say, could not possibly take up less time than sixteen hours. Let any man conceive himself sitting in a Theatre, and hearing Tragedy after Tragedy, from six o'clock in the morning till ten at night, and then pronounce as to the probability of even this supposition. If we reject this number, and still adhere to the common notion of these exhibitions, we shall be reduced to a single Tetralogia; in which case there can have been no rival exhibition on the same day. It seems therefore impossible to adjust this matter in any reasonable way, without supposing, that the four dramas of the Tetralogia were exhibited on different festivals: a supposition, I think, fairly deducible from the passage of Diog. Laertius above quoted. A supposition too, which seems to be rendered more probable from the very nature of rival exhibitions; as each contending Poet would then produce his drama at the same hearing, each hearing would be a distinct day of contest, and there would be, at each contest, a sufficient ground of judgment upon the comparative merits of each performance. This idea will allow us to assign about twelve hours, as the utmost time taken up by the whole exhibition of the day; and the great difference of length, which we observe in the Greek Tra-
But, if we admit this, we must of course admit, that he meant to include the Poems of Homer in the number of those which he regarded as too long. And that he did so mean, however unwilling Dacier and other commentators are to allow it,
ἀρχαίων
he understands the Poets before Homer's time, yet, by his explanation of Aristotle's rule, plainly supposes Homer to be glanced at; for he makes the time, allowed by the critic for the recitation of an Epic Poem, to be only eight hours. P. 250.
"L'Iliade, l'Odyssée, & l'Eneïde, font entierement conformes à la regle d'Aristote: elles peuvent être leuës chacune dans un seul jour."
P. 415. "in a shorter compass"
—ἐν ἐλάττονι μήκει
.
μακρότερον Ἰλιάδος
, is well known. ευσύνοπτον
: which, it may be urged, implies, that he thought it πως ευσύνοπτον
as Homer had managed it, and therefore not too long. But the contradiction here is merely apparent. The ευσύνοπτον
admits of degrees; and all that Aristotle appears to mean, in the passage before us, is, that the Poems of Homer would have been more ευσύνοπτα
, and, in that respect, more perfect, had they been shorter.
But, to return once more to the dramatic exhibitions—the time of twelve hours seems to be the very utmost that can reasonably be allowed, and is more, I believe, than will readily be allowed, without considering the particular character of the Athenians, and the circumstances attending these theatrical exhibitions. The intemperate fondness of that people for these amusements is well known; and Aristotle himself gives us a pretty strong picture of it, when he says, though only in the way of hyperbolical supposition, "if A HUNDRED Tragedies were to be exhibited in concurrence*."
ἄσιτοι θεωροῦντες
, but eat, and drank, and regaled themselves with cakes, and nuts, and wine, during the performance, like an English audience at Sadler's Wells, or Bartholomew Fair.
In the whole theatrical system of the antients, and every thing relating to it, all seems to have been proportionably vast, extravagant, and gigantic. Their immense theatres, their colossal dresses, the stilts, buskins, or heroic pattens, on which the actor was mounted,
à priori
, or, at least, a strong presumption, that the Greek Tragedy must have been, in many respects, a simple, unequal, imperfect thing, just such as, in fact, and prejudice apart, we
Περιττὴ γὰρ καὶ ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν ἄλλων.
—περιττὴ
is rendered, by almost all the commentators, eximia, præstantior
, "præstantiorem esse [hanc poesin] inter cæteras, et altiorem locum tenere."
How this can be reconciled with the critic's decided preference of Tragedy in the last chapter, I do not see. I believe Dacier is right, in giving to περιττὴ
, in this passage, the sense of, la plus excessive de toutes.
περιττὴ τῶν ἄλλων
—καὶ
should be otherwise placed καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
.
καὶ
, which Dacier, and other translators, have been forced to neglect? The only fair version of the passage, as we now read it, is this:—"for the narrative imitation ALSO, is more abundant, &c. ΚΑΙ ἡ διηγ. μιμ. "
— of which I can make no reasonable sense. Farther, some word seems wanting, to express in what the Epic is περιττὴ
; and this Dacier found himself obliged to supply in his translation and note: en cela la plus excessive—.
I cannot, therefore, help suspecting, that τούτοις [sc. ξενικοῖς ὀνόμασι]
, or rather ταύτῃ
, has been omitted; and that we should read thus—περιττὴ γὰρ, καὶ ΤΑΥΤΗι, ἡ διηγηματικὴ μίμησις τῶν
"In this respect too"
—alluding to the several other respects mentioned in this chapter, in which the Epic imitation was περιττὴ τῶν ἄλλων
: as, in the time of its action, and the length of the Poem itself; in its Episodes, and the variety and μεγαλοπρέπεια
arising from them, and from the admission of contemporary events; in the degree, also, to which it admits of the wonderful, and even the incredible. This, also, agrees perfectly with what he had said, cap. xxii. καὶ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἡρωικοῖς ΑΠΑΝΤΑ χρήσιμα τὰ εἰρημένα.
ΚΑΙ ΤΑΥΤΗι θεσπεσία ἂν φανείη Ὅμηρος παρὰ τὴς άλλους.
Κινητικά.
The scruple of Victorius, who proposed to read κινητά
, from a doubt, whether κινητικὰ
would admit of a passive sense, seems to have been ill-founded. The passage in Plutarch, De primo frigido, referred to by Goulston in his note, is this: ὡς βραδεῖα καὶ ΣΤΑΣΙΜΟΣ [ἀντίκειται] πρὸς ὀξυρροπὸν καὶ ΚΙΝΗΤΙΚΟΝ.
P. 1755, ed. H. S. But the word is used in the same sense by Aristotle himself, in the 50th of the Harmonic Problems, p. 770, where κινητικὰ
is applied to the acuter sound of a concord, on account of the velocity of its vibrations, and opposed to ἠρεμαῖον
, by which he characterizes the graver sound.
Πρακτικόν.
— See NOTE 45, P. 234.
The reader may compare Plato's account of Homer, De Rep. lib. iii. p. 393, ed. Serr. p. 178, ed. Massey.
Δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς Τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστὸν· μᾶλλον δ’ ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιΐᾳ τὸ ἄλογον, δι’ ὃ συμβαίνει μάλιστα τὸ θαυμαζον, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἐις τὸν πράττοντα.
Such is the reading which I have followed. The sense, which I have given it, accords very nearly, if not exactly, with that given by Victorius and Goulston, and adopted by Dacier and M. Batteux
"Mais encore plus dans l'Epopée, qui va en cela jusqu' au deraisonnable; car, comme dans l'Epopée on ne voit pas les personnes qui agissent, tout ce qui passe les bornes de la raison est très propre à y produire l'admirable & le merveilleux."
Dacier. —"L'Epopée, pour étonner encore plus, va jusqu' à l'incroyable; parce que ce qui se fait chez elle n'est point jugé par les yeux."
—Batteux.
ΑΛΟΓΟΝ
, instead of ἀνάλογον
—by reasons of considerable cogency: viz. the difficulty, or, rather, the impossibility, of making any satisfactory sense of τὸ ἀνάλογον
, as the rest of the passage stands;
ἀνάλογον
be right, it can be understood no otherwise, I believe, than adverbially—ἀναλόγως
—"Ma, se si conviene fare la maraviglia nella Tragedia, molto più si conviene, ed élicito, à farla nell' epopea secondo proportione. Quasi dica—se in una attione ristretta al termino d'un giorno, & allo spatio d'un palco, [of a stage,] si fa maraviglia, che sia d'un grado, si dovrà fare in attione che sia, pogniamo, di trentafette giorni, e avenuta in mare & in terra, quale è l'attione compresa nell' Odissea, secondo proportione, di trenta & sette gradi:—&, τὸ ἀνάλογον, è detto averbialmente, come se fosse, ἀναλόγως. "
p. 549. I know not how the reader will relish this Rule of Three explanation.
ἄλογον
, and even expressly called γελοῖον
, τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾳ ΑΛΟΓΑ
, &c.
But, though I think the sense of the passage, thus read, and thus explained, is, in itself, unexceptionable, yet I can by no means rely with perfect confidence upon the reading from which it is obtained. All the manuscripts, it seems, give, with one consent, ΑΝΑΛΟΓΟΝ
. This circumstance, in a passage not free, in other respects, from suspicion, should be sufficient to prevent our admitting the emendation of Victorius, however probable, without some reserve—"expectandi codices."
I should perhaps, therefore, have done better, had I omitted the doubtful part of the passage—the words, τὸ ἀνάλογον, δι’ ὃ μάλιστα συμβαίνει τὸ θαυμαστόν
: for the omission will leave a clear and complete sense; and, moreover, a sense, in which the only meaning that can well be given to the words omitted, seems, in fact, to be implied. Δεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ποιεῖν τὸ θαυμαστόν· μᾶλλον δ’ ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιΐᾳ, — διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν ἐις τὸν πράττοντα.
"The surprising is necessary in Tragedy: but the Epic Poem admits of it to a greater degree, because, there, the action is not seen."
The passage is this:
Λαοῖσιν δ’ ἀνένευε καρήατι δῖος Ἀχιλλεὺς,
Οὐδ’ ἔα ἵεμεναι ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι πικρὰ βέλεμνα,
Μή τις κῦδος ἄροιτο βαλὼν, ὁ δὲ δεύτερος ἔλθοι.
Il. 22. 205.
In the words, δεὶ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν προσθεῖναι
, inclusively, the text seems evidently mangled beyond all hope of conjectural restoration. This ulcus insanabile
I presume not to touch, either as commentator, or as translator. I can make nothing consistent of it myself: I have seen nothing consistent made of it by others.
The words, τοῦτο δὲ ἐστι ψεῦδος
, are ambiguous. Victorius doubts, whether they mean, "this posterior fact is false,"
(the τοδὶ γίνεται
,) or, "this conclusion is false"
—namely, εἰ τὸ ὕστερον ἐστι, καὶ τὸ πρότερον εἶναι.
What follows, had it been tolerably clear, would, probably, have fixed the sense of ψεῦδος
. As this is not the case, I have given it that sense which appears to me most obvious; and I think I am warranted by the very same expression used in the same sense, in the Rhetoric, II. 23, p. 579, A, where, ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο ψεῦδος
, clearly means,
But the most important question is, in what manner Aristotle meant to apply this logical paralogism to Homer's management of fiction. None of the commentators, whom I have seen, appear to me to have given any satisfactory explanation.
παρ’ ἑπόμενον
, à consequenti
, here alluded to, the reader will find clearly explained in several parts of the philosopher's other works.
ἀνάγκη ΚΑΙ τὸν θερμὸν πυρέττειν.
These are some of Aristotle's own explanatory instances. Now, he tells us here, that Homer's art of lying—ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ
—consists in imposing his marvellous fictions upon the reader's imagination by a sort of poetic sophism, similar to this logical sophism. And this is all he says. He has left us to make out the similitude as well as we can. No writer, I believe, ever paid more frequent compliments of this kind to the sagacity of his readers.
Dacier, with other commentators, seems to understand nothing more, than that artful intermixture of historical, or acknowledged, truth, which, by throwing the mind, as it were, into a posture of belief and conviction, has its effect even upon what we know to be feigned, and makes the false pass glibly with the true. But I cannot think, that this comes up to Aristotle's meaning, nor that his observation, here, amounts only to that of Strabo:—ἐκ μηδενὸς ἀληθὲς ἀνάπτειν καινὴν τερατολογίαν, οὐχ Ὁμηρικόν, κ. τ. λ.
παρ’ ἑπόμενον
, is applicable to the intermixture—the mere juxtaposition, of fact and fiction.
The similitude of the logical and poetic sophism appears to me to be this. It is not merely, that, where there is a mixture of history
ἀδύνατα, ἄλογα, ψευδῆ
—those marvellous and incredible fictions, which, otherwise managed, we should have rejected: that is, their improbability, or impossibility, would have so forced themselves upon our notice, as to destroy, or disturb, even the slight and willing illusion of the moment.
Whenever, says the philosopher, supposing such a thing to be, it would certainly be followed by such effects; if we see those effects, we are disposed to infer the existence of that cause. And thus, in Poetry, and all fiction, this is the logic of that temporary imposition on which depends our pleasure. The reader of a play, or a novel, does not, indeed, syllogize, and say to himself "Such beings as are here supposed, had they existed, must have acted and spoken exactly in this manner; therefore, I believe they have existed:"
—but he feels the truth of the premises, and he consents to feel the truth of the conclusion; he does not revolt from the imagination of such beings. Every thing follows so naturally, and, even, as it seems, so necessarily, that the probability and truth of nature, in the consequences, steals, in a manner, from our view, even the impossibility of the cause, and flings an air of truth over the whole. With respect to fact, indeed, all is equally
ψεῦδος
; for if the causes exist not, neither can the effects. But the consequent lies are so told, as to impose on us, for the moment, the belief of the antecedent, or fundamental fiction.
"probable fiction is similar to reasoning rightly from a false principle,"
p. 13, of his works, Sect. 9.
For instances of this art, no reader can be at a loss. He will find them, not only in almost all the "speciosa miracula"
of Homer, but even in the wilder and more absurd miracles of Ariosto; whose poem is, indeed, a striking example of the most improbable, and, in themselves, revolting lies,
Murder'd impossibility, to make
What cannot be, slight work.
I shall only add, without troubling the reader with any comment of mine, one passage of the Rhetoric, which may serve, both to illustrate the paralogism itself, here alluded to, and to confirm the application which I have given it. In that passage, Aristotle applies the paralogism παρ’ ἑπόμενον
, to the effect of oratorical elocution, in producing persuasion and conviction in the hearers. Πιθανοῖ δὲ τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἡ οἰκεία λέξις· ΠΑΡΑΛΟΓΙΖΕΤΑΙ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ, ὡς ἀληθῶς λεγόντων, ὅτι, ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, οὕτως ἔχουσιν· ὥστε οἴονται, εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ὡς ὁ λέγων, τὰ πράγματα, οὕτως ἔχειν.
διὰ γὰρ τὸ εἰδέναι κ. τ. λ.
"What the Orator says, is, likewise, rendered probable and credible by
The art here pointed out by Aristotle, as eminent in Homer's poetry, evidently extends to fiction in general; but, by ψεῦδη
, I understand him to allude, chiefly, to fictions of the extraordinary, marvellous, and improbable kind—such as require the utmost art and management of the Poet to make them pass. The connection of the whole passage, if I am not mistaken, shews this to be the author's meaning; the application of ψεῦδη
being fixed, both by the terms θαυμαστὸν
, and ἄλογον
, in what precedes, and by the ἀδύνατα καὶ εἰκότα
which follow, and which I take to be, or, at least, to include, those very ψευδῆ λεγόμενα ὡς δεῖ
, of which he had, immediately before, been speaking.
I much doubt of the integrity of the text. The sense I have given seems to be the only one, which the passage, as it now stands, will reasonably bear. Dacier, after Victorius, understands—"if the admission of one improbable circumstance be the means of giving more probability to the rest."
I do not well comprehend this: I am sure it is not what Aristotle has said. His words are, ἂν δὲ θῇ, καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογώτερον
i. e. "if he has introduced such a circumstance, or incident, and it (not the rest, the whole) has some appearance of probability,"
&c.
εὐλογώτερον
; to pass with some shew of probability; and, in this case, should be admitted, or tolerated, even though pushed to the ἄτοπον
, or absurd. This sense accords perfectly with what immediately follows, which is precisely an instance of such management; of absurdity, or, at least, improbability, (τὰ ἐν Ὀδυσσειᾳ ἄλογα
) veiled by the charms of poetry, and finding almost as ready an admission into the imagination of the reader, under the passport of the beauties by which it is accompanied, as if it were, in itself, ever so consonant to nature and experience.
With respect to the words ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄτοπον
—it seems necessary to adopt one or the other of the two manuscript readings ἐκδέχεσθαι
, or ἀποδέχεσθαι
. The former of these verbs Mr. Winstanley takes in the sense of ἀπείργειν, κωλύειν
, upon the authority of Suidas. But in the very passage adduced by that lexicographer, the immediate sense of ἐκδέχεσθαι
is, Γέρρα τε παρατεταγμένα ἦν, ἐις τὸ ΕΚΔΕΧΕΣΘΑΙ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων τοξεύματα.
i. e. to receive them;
and by receiving them to keep them off from their bodies. Arcere, here, is only what we may call the consequential meaning of the word. I do not see, that it may not, in this place, very well bear the sense of receiving, admitting, or, rather, tolerating: but of this I would not be understood to speak positively. This seems, at least, to be the sense, which the purport of the passage requires; and it refers, I think, not to the Poet himself, as some understand it, but to the audience, or the reader. When Aristotle has just said, ἂν δὲ θῇ
i. e. "but if he has introduced, or admitted it,"
how can he be understood to add, "he should admit it?"
Farther, the word ἀνεκτά
, (tolerabilia
), which, in the instance immediately subjoined, clearly relates to the hearer, or reader, seems sufficiently to
ἐκδέχεσθαι
, or ἀποδέχεσθαι
, here. Mr. Harris, in his Philol. Inquiries, p. 220, though he has not quoted, or translated, this particular passage, appears, pretty clearly, to allude to it, and to have understood the verb as here explained. He says, speaking of improbabilities in the drama—"'Tis true, indeed, did such plays exist,"
[ἂν δὲ θῇ
] "and were their other dramatic requisites good, these improbabilities might be endured, and the plays be still admired."
The version of Piccolomini agrees with mine:—"Ma se, ponendovisi poi qualche cosa, che in sè habbia del non ragionevole, si adornerà, & si tratterà, in maniera, ch'ella apparir possa ragionevole, potrà, in tal caso, trovarvi luogo."
p. 392.
In the language of Pindar,—
Καὶ πού τι καὶ βροτῶν φρένας,
ὑπὲρ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον,
δεδαιδαλμένοι ψεύδεσι ποικίλοις
ἐξαπατῶντι μῦθοι.
ΧΑΡΙΣ δ’, ἅπερ ἅπαντα τευ-
-χει τὰ μείλιχα θνατοῖς,
ἐπιφέροισα τιμὰν,
ΚΑΙ ΑΠΙΣΤΟΝ ἘΜΗΣΑΤΟ ΠΙΣΤΟΝ
ΕΜΜΕΝΑΙ.
Olymp. I.
"L'homme est de glace aux verités,
Il est de feu pour les mensonges."
La Fontaine, Fab. 174.
Sed quasi Poeta, tabulas cum cepit sibi,
Quærit quod nusquam est gentium, reperit tamen,
Facit illud verisimile quod mendacium est,
Nunc ego Poeta fiam.
Pseud. Act I. Sc. 4.
ἈΡΓΑ μέρη.
The expression is best explained, according to my idea of it, by Castelvetro.—"Dobbiamo intendere per parti otiose, quelle, nelle quali il poeta parla di sua persona, & con favella sua ci fa vedere quello che si fa: le quali perciò si domandano, μέρη ἀργὰ, che non sono in atto, ed operanti, come sono quelle, le quali sono rappresentate in palco, & quelle, nelle quali per gli poeti epopei sono introdotte le persone à favellare; le quali parti, perche paiono pressoche montare in palco, ed operare, si contrappongono alle parti otiose, e contengono, principalmente, le sententie, ed, accessoriamente, i costumi."
p. 578. Dacier's "parties foibles,"
in which he is followed by M. Batteux, presents a different, and, I think, a wrong idea.
It has been inquired, why Aristotle here passes over in silence the passionate parts of the Poem; to which a laboured and splendid diction seems as ill suited, as it is to the expression of manners and sentiments. This inquiry has produced another; whether he did, or did not, mean to include the passionate parts in διανοητικοῖς
. Madius contends that he did: Victorius, that he did not. I believe the latter is right. For if we take διάνοια
, here, in that wide sense which is given it in cap. xix. it will include "whatever is the object of speech;"
"every thing,"
as Mr. Harris has explained it, "for which men employ language."
μέρη διανοητικὰ
, here, comprehend those thoughts which express passion, they will also comprehend such as express manners, or character; from which Aristotle expressly distinguishes them: μήτε ἠθικοῖς, μήτε διανοητικοῖς.
But, whether he did, or did not, mean to include the passionate parts of the Poem, it seems true, and he would probably have allowed it, that such a diction as he here describes is improper for the expression of passion: nor is this at all inconsistent, as, on a superficial view, it may seem to be, with the following passage in his Rhetoric. —Τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα, τὰ ἐπίθετα, καὶ διπλᾶ πλείω, καὶ τὰ ξένα, μάλιστα ἁρμόττει λέγοντι ΠΑΘΗΤΙΚΩΣ· συγγνώμη γὰρ ὀργιζομένῳ, κακὸν φάναι "ὀυρανόμηκες," "πελώριον" εἰπεῖν, &c.
ΔΙΑΠΟΝΕΙΝ λέξει
, the ΛΙΑΝ ΛΑΜΠΡΑ λέξις
, of which the philosopher here speaks.—But, for an exact, though short, discussion of this subject, with its proper distinctions and limitations, I must refer the reader to an excellent note on v. 94, of Horace's Epistle to the Pisos.
ΑΠΟΚΡΥΠΤΕΙ γὰρ πάλιν ἡ λίαν λαμπρὰ λέξις τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς διανοἰας.
—In the same sense, in which ἐγκρύπτεται
is used, in a similar passage of Longinus, Sect. 15.—where, speaking of the effect of lively imagery, in stealing one's attention from argument, he says, Φύσει δέ πως, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἅπασιν, ἀεὶ τοῦ κρείττονος ἀκούομεν· ὅθεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ περιελκόμεθα ἐις τὸ κατὰ φαντασίαν ἐκπληκτικόν, ᾧ τὸ πραγματικὸν ΕΓΚΡΥΠΤΕΤΑΙ ΠΕΡΙΛΑΜΠΟΜΕΝΟΝ.
So also, Sect. 17.— ΑΠΕΚΡΥΨΕ τὸ σχῆμα τῷ ΦΩΤΙ ΑΥΤΩ.
—And again—διὰ ΛΑΜΠΡΟΤΗΤΑ τὴν τέχνην ΑΠΟΣΚΙΑΖΕΙ, καὶ ὁῖον ἐν ΚΑΤΑΚΑΛΥΨΕΙ τηρεῖ.
The following passage of the Rhetoric, concerning the mixture of the argumentative with the pathetic, will also help to illustrate that before us. Καὶ ὅταν πάθος ποιῇς, μὴ λέγε ἐνθύμημα· ἢ γὰρ ἐκκρούσει τὸ πάθος, ἢ μάτην εἰρημένον ἔσται, τὸ ἐνθύμημα· ἐκκρούουσι γὰρ αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλας, αἱ ἅμα καὶ, ἢ ΑΦΑΝΙΖΟΥΣΙΝ, ἢ ἀσθενεῖς ποιοῦσιν.
Rhet. III. 17. p. 604, E.
In the same manner the expression of Aristotle is well explained by Piccolomini, in his commentary, p. 394.
Λέξει ἢ καὶ γλώτταις—.
Heinf. [Heinsius] ΚΥΡΙΑι λέξει, ἢ καὶ γλώτταις.
The insertion seems necessary, but would, perhaps, be better thus: λέξει, Η ΚΥΡΙΑι, καὶ γλώτταις,
&c. Victorius and other commentators suppose κυρίᾳ
to be understood. But this I cannot conceive. Λέξις
appears clearly to be used here, as in cap. xxii. for diction in general, including, as in that chapter, every sort of words.
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ γὰρ ταῦτα τοῖς ποιηταῖς.
The same expression is made use of by Isocrates, in the following passage, to which I referred in NOTE 5, p. 158, and in which the privileges and advantages of the Poet are well set forth, and the importance of verse to the effect of even the best poetry, is strongly insisted on.
Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ποιηταῖς πολλοὶ ΔΕΔΟΝΤΑΙ κόσμοι. Καὶ γὰρ πλησιάζοντας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοὺς θεοὺς οἷόν τ’ αὐτοῖς ἐστι ποιῆσαι, καὶ διαλεγομένους, καὶ συναγωνιζομένους, οἷς ἂν βουληθῶσι· καὶ περὶ τούτων δηλῶσαι, μὴ μόνον τοῖς τεταγμένοις ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλὰ, τὰ μὲν, ξένοις, τὰ δὲ, καινοῖς, τὰ δὲ, μεταφοραῖς· καὶ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς εἴδεσι διαποικῖλαι τὴν ποἰησιν.
τεταγμένοις
, here, is equivalent to Aristotle's κυρίοις
; as, καινοῖς
, to his πεποιημένοις
, and ξένοις
, to his γλώτταις
.Τοῖς δὲ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οὐδὲν ἔξεστι τῶν τοιούτων· ἀλλ’ ἀποτόμως, καὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τοῖς πολιτικοῖς, καὶ τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τοῖς περὶ αὐτὰς τὰς πράξεις,
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις, οἱ μὲν μετὰ μέτρων καὶ ῥυθμῶν ἅπαντα ποιοῦσιν· οἱ δὲ οὐδενὸς τούτων κοινωνοῦσιν· ἃ τοσαύτην ἔχει χάριν, ὥς, ἂν καὶ τῇ λέξει, καὶ τοῖς ἐνθυμήμασιν, ἔχῃ κακῶς, ὅμως ταῖς γε εὐρυθμίαις καὶ ταῖς συμμετρίαις ψυχαγωγοῦσι τοὺς ἀκούοντας. Καταμάθοι δ’ ἄν τις ἐκεῖθεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῶν· ἢν γάρ τις τῶν ποιημάτων τῶν εὐδοκιμούντων τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα καὶ τὰς διανοἰας καταλίπῃ, τὸ δὲ ΜΕΤΡΟΝ διαλύσῃ, φανήσεται πολὺ καταδεεστέρα τῆς δόξης, ἧς νῦν ἔχομεν περὶ αὐτῶν.
This is one of those passages, which the commentators appear to me to have darkened by illustration. See, particularly, Dacier's note. His account of the difference between Poetry and all other arts, seems evidently false. What Aristotle says of Poetry—that it has two kinds of faults, essential, and incidental—is, at least, true of all other imitative arts. It is even true, as Beni has shewn, of Rhetoric and Logic.
"Nam Rhetorica & Dialectica suos egredi fines solent, & in alienos campos excurrere, perinde ferè ac nos de Poeticâ docemus. Temerè igitur Aristoteles, quod inter Poeticam & Politicam notavit discrimen, idem, inter Poeticam, rursus, ae ceteras artes, notasset: nam Rhetorica & Dialectica ejusdem videri possunt rectitudinis cum Poeticâ."
"the rightness of the poetic, and the rightness of the political art, are not the same, nor of any other art and the poetic art."
The plain meaning of which appears to me to be that which I have given—that the ὀρθότης
, or rectitude, of Poetry itself, is not to be confounded with that of Politics, nor of any
The allusion, here, to the severe objections of PLATO, who would allow of Poetry no farther than as it could be made to coincide with the views of his own strict and moral legislation, has been sufficiently pointed out.
ὀρθότης
, is often used by Plato; and, particularly, in this passage, which perhaps Aristotle had in his view—Καίτοι λέγουσι γε οἱ πλεῖστοι, μουσικῆς ΟΡΘΟΤΗΤΑ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς πορίζουσαν δύναμιν.
—An idea which he rejects with abhorrence. The word μουσική
here is used in its widest acceptation, including Poetry.
—Μὴ δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς ῥᾳδίως γε οὕτως ὑμᾶς ποτε παρ’ ἡμῖν ἐάσειν, σκηνάς τε πήξαντας κατ’ ἀγορὰν, καὶ καλλιφώνους ὑποκριτὰς εἰσαγομένους, μεῖζον φθεγγομένους ἡμῶν, ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμῖν δημηγορεῖν πρὸς παῖδάς τε καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ τὸν πάντα ὄχλον, τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντας ἐπιτηδευμάτων πέρι μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ἅπερ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ’, ὡς τὸ πολὺ, καὶ ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖστα. Σχεδὸν γάρ τοι κἂν μαινοἰμεθα τελέως ἡμεῖς τε καὶ ἅπασα ἡ πόλις, ἥτις ἐν ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέποι δρᾶν τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, πρὶν κρῖναι τὰς ἀρχὰς, εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εις τὸ μέσον, εἴτε μή. Νῦν οὖν, παῖδες μαλακῶν μουσῶν ἔκγονοι, ἐπιδείξαντες τοῖς ἄρχουσι πρῶτον τὰς ὑμετέρας παρὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ᾠδὰς, ἂν μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ γε, ἢ καὶ βελτίω, τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν φαίνηται λεγόμενα, δώσομεν ὑμῖν χορόν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὦ φίλοι, οὐκ ἂν ποτε δυναίμεθα.
—Οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ ὀρθότης ἐστὶ τῆς ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗΣ καὶ τῆς ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ.
In what is added—οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης καὶ ποιητικῆς
—Aristotle may, I think, be supposed to glance more particularly at that part of the tenth book of Plato's Republic, where he exposes the idle notion, current among the rhapsodists, that Homer was a perfect master of all arts and sciences. And with respect to the absurdity of this notion, Aristotle undoubtedly agreed with him. But there was danger, lest the credit of Homer should suffer from the manner in which Plato combated this idea. For those extravagant admirers of Homer not only asserted the fact, that he had an accurate knowledge of every art and science on which he touched, but they went farther, and maintained, that such accuracy was essential to a good Poet: Ἀνάγκη γὰρ,
they urged, τὸν ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν, εἰ μέλλει περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῇ, καλῶς ποιήσειν, εἰδότα ἄρα ποιεῖν, ἢ μὴ οἷόντε εἶναι ποιεῖν.
Now Plato, whose object here is to vindicate his rigid exclusion of all mimetic poetry, and that of Homer in particular, from his republic, confutes the fact, without confuting the general position. While he shews the pretensions of the Homerists to be false, he seems, at least, to allow, that they ought to be true. For he flings in no savings; he no where says, what Aristotle has here said for him—that the want of this supposed accurate knowledge of arts and sciences no way affects the character of Homer as a Poet. By denying that he had that knowledge, and, at the same time, not denying, or not expressly denying, that he ought to have it, he leaves the reader to understand, that he meant to detract, on this account, from his merit as an imitator. And this, indeed, is
"Poetical expression,"
says the philosopher [Plato], "is the copy of the Poet's own conceptions; the Poet's conception, of things, and things, of the standing archetype, as existing in the divine mind. Thus the Poet's expression is a copy at third hand, from the primary, original truth."
See
The original is— ΑΥΤΗΣ δὲ τῆς ποιητικῆς διττὴ ἡ ἁμαρτία.
The word αὐτῆς
appears to me to make strange confusion. For Aristotle is here distinguishing two sorts of faults in Poetry, essential and incidental; and his expression, presently after, for the former, is ΑΥΤΗΣ ἡ ἁμαρτία
— "a fault of the Poetry itself."
As the text stands, therefore, it is just as if he had said—"There are two faults of the Poetry itself: one, of the Poetry itself, and the other, incidental."
— Accordingly Dacier, Batteux, and almost all the translators, neglect the word αὐτῆς
. Possibly it might, originally, have stood thus : —οὐδὲ ἄλλης τέχνης, καὶ ποιητικῆς ἀυτῆς. Τῆς ΔΕ ποιητικῆς,
&c.
Εἰ μὲν γὰρ προείλετο μιμήσασθαι ἀδυναμίαν.
—So, the MSS. But ἀδυναμία
never, I believe, means ΚΑΤ’ ἀδυναμίαν
. The credit of the conjecture is due to Castelvetro. Still the phrase, μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν
, for ΠΑΡΑ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ
. Supposing the three first letters of the preposition to have been destroyed, the passage would stand thus—μιμήσασθαι * * ΑΔΥΝΑΜΙΝ
: which it was obvious enough for the transcriber to miscorrect into ἀδυναμίαν
. The phrase, προείλετο μιμήσασθαι παρὰ δύναμιν
, would be clear and unexceptionable. So, cap. ix. —παρὰ τὴν δύναμιν παρατείναντες μῦθον.
Victorius remarks, and, I think, justly, that Horace probably had his eye upon this passage, in the lines—
Sumite materiam vestris, qui scribitis, æquam
Viribus; et versate diu, quid ferre recusent,
Quid valeant, humeri.
... Cui lecta potenter erit res, &c.
—προαιρεῖσθαι
, he thinks, is expressed by "sumite materiam,"
and, "lecta res:"
and κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν
glanced at in the other expressions, but, particularly, in the adverb—"potenter."
Ἀδυναμία δὲ ἐστὶ ΣΤΕΡΗΣΙΣ ΔΥΝΑΜΕΩΣ.
No interpretation that I have seen, or been able to devise, of this whole ambiguous, perplexed, and, probably, mangled passage, is without its difficulties. All I could do was, to choose that, which, after the closest attention to the original, and to the best comments, appeared to me "minimis urgeri."
I will not attempt to drag the reader after me, through the detail of my own doubts and embarrassments. But lest my version, from that degree of closeness, to which, in all passages where the meaning is doubtful, I have thought it right to confine myself, should retain, in some degree, the ambiguity, or obscurity, of the original, some explanation may be necessary.
By the various expressions, μιμήσασθαι κατ’ ἀδυναμίαν — ἁμαρτία ἡ καθ’ αὑτὴν — αὐτῆς — καθ’ ἑαυτὴν,
and, above all, by ΚΑΚΟΜΙΜΗΤΩΣ ἔγραψε
, which seems to fix clearly the sense of the rest, Aristotle means, I think, to indicate all such faults as are incompatible with good imitation—that is, in his view, with good Poetry. All other faults he denominates, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
—ΕΛΑΤΤΟΝ γὰρ, εἰ μὴ ᾔδει,
&c. In this class he reckons, τὰ ἀδύνατα
—ἀδύνατα κατ’ ἰατρικὴν ἢ ἄλλην τέχνην.
The commentators are divided. I cannot be of their party, who adopt the first of these senses. I see not how impossibilities, or absurdities,
ἀδύνατα
here meant are not what he afterwards calls πιθανὰ ἀδύνατα
, probable impossibilities, but such as he denominates ἄλογα
, is plain from his instance; παράδειγμα, ἡ τοῦ Ἕκτορος δίωξις,
which he had, in the preceding chapter, expressly given as an instance of the ἄλογον
. See Transl. p. 118, 119.
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
—such as affected not the Poetry itself. We must, I think, understand— ἁμαρτήματα ἢ ἀδύνατα
—καθ’ ἑκάστην τέχνην
—
Aristotle then goes on, and applies his solution, founded on the foregoing distinction, to the worst species of such incidental faults—to things ἀδύνατα
. Take, he says, the worst: suppose the Poet to have represented something impossible, with respect to some particular art, as that of medicine, geography, &c. This, strictly speaking, is a fault; but it is a fault that may even be justified, (ὀρθῶς ἔχοι
,) if, by means of it, the Poet has answered, better than he could have done without it, the end of his own art, &c. Still, he continues, supposing this not to be the case, we are to consider, whether the fault, admitting it to be a fault, be τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκὸς
, &c. If the pursuit of Hector cannot be absolutely justified by the θαυμαστὸν
, the ἔκπληξις
which is produced by it, still it is not κακομιμήτως γεγραμμένον
; the Poetry is good, and the end of Poetry, the pleasure arising from the wonderful and the striking, is actually attained, though it be true, that it might have been attained without the fault in question.
By the expression, τὰ πρὸς ἀυτὴν τὴν τέχνην ἀδύνατα
, I understand—with respect to the art of which the Poet speaks; not, with respect to the art of Poetry itself: though I confess the latter sense to be that, which the words, ἀυτὴν τὴν τέχνην
, Ὀρθὴ δὲ ἐπιτίμησις, καὶ ΑΛΟΓΙΑ καὶ μοχθηρία.
Cap. penult. "things impossible to, (or, with respect to,) the art of Poetry itself?"
—The only reasonable meaning of the phrase is—things, which it is beyond the power of the art to represent or imitate; as it is beyond the power of painting to imitate sounds.
ἀδύνατα ΕΝ τῇ τέχνῃ
, in this sense : Κυβερνήτης ἄκρος, ἢ ἰατρὸς, τά τε ΑΔΥΝΑΤΑ ΕΝ ΤΗΙ ΤΕΧΝΗι, καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ, διαισθάνεται,
ἄλογον
, "deraisonnable tout ce qui est absurde?"
Is it not just as possible for Poetry to represent a horse flying, as a ship sailing? — The sense, which I have given, seems also supported by the antithetic expression that follows—τέλος τὸ ΑΥΤΗΣ
—" its own purpose;"
and still more by the clearer phrase which he presently after uses —τὴν ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ τέχνην
—" the art to which these things belong."
I must, however, repeat my confession, that no passage of this treatise appears to me to be of more desperate perplexity than this; nor is there any of the numerous and stubborn difficulties I have had to encounter, of which I wish to be understood to offer my solution with less confidence. Here, as in many other places, had I waited for perfect satisfaction, I might have stood still for ever:—
—ἐικέλοι ἀνδρὶ
Κείνῳ, ὃς ἐν τριοδοῖσι πολυτρίπτοισι κυρήσας
Ἕστη ἐφορμαίνων· κραδίη δέ οἱ ἄλλοτε λαιὴν,
Ἄλλοτε δεξιτερὴν ἐπιβάλλεται ἐις ὁδὸν ἐλθεῖν.
Παπταίνει δ’ ἑκατέρθε· νόος δέ οἱ ἠΰτε κῦμα
Εἰλεῖται, μάλα δ’ ὄψε μιῆς ὠρέξατο βουλῆς.
Τὸ γὰρ τέλος ΕΙΡΗΤΑΙ.
This reading has been questioned; but, I think, without sufficient reason. It may very well be understood to refer to all that Aristotle had said, or, at least, θαυμαστόν
, ch. xxiv. —ἔκπληξις
, cap. xiv. and xvi. &c. This is not the only instance in this treatise, of reference to something implied, as if it had been expressly said. See NOTE 150, p. 396, and note (g.)
Victorius illustrates ἐκπληκτικώτερον
by an apt quotation from Aristotle himself: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΣ ΘΑΥΜΑΣΙΟΤΗΣ εἶναι ΥΠΕΡΒΑΛΛΟΥΣΑ.
Μύθου ΤΕΛΟΣ, ἡδονὴν καὶ ΕΚΠΛΗΞΙΝ.
p. 25. ed. Caf.
Ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός.
—I cannot perceive, that this wants any emendation; much less, that it is, as Mr. Winstanley says, "nullo sensu."
He contends for the certainty of ΑΤΟΠΩΤΕΡΟΝ
—a reading, which Robortelli says he found in all the manuscripts he consulted. I would only ask, whether Aristotle can be conceived to have written such a sentence as this? "A fault in the Poetry itself is a more absurd thing than a fault in some other incidental matter; FOR it is a less fault,"
&c. Yet this, I think, is the plain English of the Greek—
Ἔτι, ἀτοπώτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἁμάρτημα τῶν κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός· ἔλαττον ΓΑΡ κ. τ. λ.
Victorius contends strongly, and, I think, with much better reason, for ποτέρων
. He says well—"Nam quæ adjunguntur videntur significare ita prorsus legi debere: duo enim genera peccatorum contraria inter se indicant. Utrorum igitur peccatorum id, cujus arguitur poeta, videndum esse præcipit: alterum enim eorum genus faciliorem excusationem habet."
p. 274.
Οὐκ ἀληθῆ.
— An ἐπιτίμησις
very frequent in the mouth of PLATO, to whom, undoubtedly, Aristotle here alludes. "The Poets ought not,"
says Plato, speaking of the representations of Hesiod and Homer, " to be permitted to tell us—ὡς θεοὶ θεοῖς πολεμοῦσί τε, καὶ ἐπιβουλεύουσι καὶ μάχονται· ΟΥΔΕ γὰρ ΑΛΗΘΗ."
—They ought not, λοιδορεῖν ἁπλῶς οὕτω τὰ ἐν ᾅδου, ἀλλὰ, μᾶλλον, ἐπαινεῖν ὡς ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ λέγοντας, οὔτ’ ὠφέλιμα τοῖς μέλλουσι μαχίμοις ἔσεσθαι.
So again, of Homer's account of the cruel treatment of the body of Hector by Achilles, and of his sacrificing twelve Trojan captives to the manes of Patroclus [Il. Ψ. 175.]: ξύμπαντα ταῦτα ΟΥ φήσομεν ΑΛΗΘΗ εἰρῆσθαι.
— And again, presently after—οὐθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, ΟΥΤ’ ΑΛΗΘΗ.
To all which objections, as appears from what follows, Aristotle's answer would have been—ὅτι οὕτω ΦΑΣΙΝ.
The difference here intended, between the two great Tragic Poets, seems to me to be rightly explained by Dacier in few words: "Sophocle tâchoit de rendre ses imitations parfaites, en suivant toujours bien plus ce qu' une belle nature etoit capable de faire, que ce qu'elle faisoit. Au lieu qu' Euripide ne travailoit qu' à les rendre semblables, en consultant davantage ce que cette même nature faisoit, que ce qu'elle etoit capable de faire."
p. 458. It is thus indeed, that, by comparing different passages, we shall find Aristotle clearly explain himself. What he here means by ἀληθῆ
, is sufficiently clear from the synonymous expressions, οἷοἰ εἰσι
—οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν
, in this chapter, and ὁμοἰους καθ' ἡμᾶς
—and, οἱ νῦν
, in chapter ii. where he explains the different objects of poetic imitation.
οἷα εἶναι δεῖ
—οἵους δεῖ
, here; τὸ βέλτιον
, and the παράδειγμα ὑπερέχον
, presently after;
καλλίους
, cap. xv.
βελτίονας καθ' ἡμᾶς — βελτίονας τῶν νῦν
, cap. ii. All these expressions correspond to the various expressions of,
The objection then, to which Aristotle here points out the best answer, I understand to be this—"Your imitation is not true; it is not an exact copy of such nature as we see about us."
The answer is—"No: but it is an improved copy. If I have not represented things as they are, I have represented them as they ought to be."
A very different explanation of this passage has been given by an eminent critic;
οὐκ ἀληθῆ
, and indeed the sense of the objection itself, are very different from what Dacier, and, I believe, all the commentators, have represented them to be. —The explanation is this:
"And this will further explain an essential difference, as we are told, between the two great rivals of the Greek stage. Sophocles, in return to such as objected a want of truth in his characters, used to plead, that he drew men such as they ought to be, Euripides such as they were.
—Again—after an illustration of this meaning, by a comparative examination of the Σοφοκλῆς ἔφη, αὐτὸς μὲν οἵους δεῖ ποιεῖν, Εὐριπίδης δὲ, οἷοἰ εἰσι.
The meaning of which is, Sophocles, from his more extended commerce with mankind, had enlarged and widened the narrow, partial conception, arising from the contemplation of particular characters, into a complete comprehension of the kind. Whereas the philosophic Euripides, having been mostly conversant in the academy, when he came to look into life, keeping his eye too intent on single, really existing personages, sunk the kind in the individual; and so painted his characters naturally indeed, and truly, with regard to the objects in view, but sometimes without that general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth.""Whether this representation of Sophocles be not more agreeable to truth, as collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large, than that of Euripides, the capable reader
From these two passages compared, it appears, I think, that by οἷα δεῖ εἶναι
—"general and universally striking likeness"
of "human nature at large:"
and this, I think, was the very objection made to Sophocles by the patrons of his rival.
According to the interpretation which I am taking the liberty to examine, Sophocles is made to answer the charge by denying its truth: for the answer, as here stated, will be this—You say, my representations are not true, and those of Euripides are true. I deny this. You use the term improperly. My representations are "agreeable to truth," because they are "collected from wide observation, i. e. from human nature at large;" those of Euripides are not agreeable to truth, because they are representations, not of the kind, but of individuals.
The answer, as I understand Aristotle, is very different. The charge is not denied, or explained away, but admitted and justified.
"this is not true"
—"this is neither true, nor as it ought to be,"
&c. are all admitted. ἙΤΕΡΩΣ, ὅτι οὕτω φασιν. —Ἴσως δὲ ΟΥ βέλτιον μὲν, ΑΛΛ’ οὕτως εἶχεν. —Οὐκ ἀληθὴς ΑΛΛ’ οἷα δεῖ.
Εἰ δὲ ΜΗΔΕΤΕΡΩΣ...
"If you would have men represented as they are—
Euripides does not appear to have been charged, by those objectors, with what may be termed οἷοἰ εἰσι
—you must, indeed, go to Euripides.
In short, the difference, which I understand to be here intended, between the two Poets, cannot be more exactly expressed, than it is by the ingenious commentator himself, in the beginning of the note to which I refer; where it is observed, [p. 253] that "truth may be followed too closely in works of imitation, as is evident in two respects. For, 1. the artist, when he would give a copy of nature, may confine himself too scrupulously to the exhibition of particulars, and so fail of representing the general idea of the kind. Or, 2. in applying himself to give the general idea, he may collect it from an enlarged view of real life, whereas it were still better taken from the nobler conception of it as subsisting only in the mind."
Now, if we apply the latter of these differences to the two Poets in question—if we say, "In applying himself to give the general idea, Euripides collected it from an enlarged view of real life; whereas Sophocles took it from the nobler conception of it, as subsisting only in the mind"
—this will express exactly what I take to be the sense of Aristotle.
To the support, which the common interpretation of this passage receives from Aristotle himself, may be added that which it receives, and, I believe, is generally acknowledged to receive, from the Tragedies themselves, which are extant, of the two Poets in question. That Euripides is, in general, liable to the censure of particular imitation—of "sinking the kind in the individual,"
I cannot say I have observed. But who can read this Poet without observing the examples, with which he every where abounds, of that very "general and universally striking likeness, which is demanded to the full exhibition of poetical truth?"
In Sophocles, we find more elevation, more dignity, more of that improved likeness, and ideal perfection, which the philosopher expresses by his οἷα δεῖ — πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον
, &c. In Euripides, we find more of the ἀληθὲς
, the ὅμοιον
, &c. —
κωμῳδία τις ἠθολογουμένη
, which Longinus attributes to the
The truth seems to be, that both in Poetry, and in Painting, if the sublime be aimed at, the Poet, and the Artist, must look up to the οἷα ΔΕΙ εἶναι
: their eyes may "glance from earth to heaven,"
and they may "body forth the form of things unknown."
But, if emotion and the pathetic be their object, they will, neither of them, attain their end, unless they submit to descend a little towards earth, and to copy with some closeness that nature which is before their eyes. We are told of Michael Angelo, that "his people are a superior order of beings;"
that "there is nothing about them, nothing in the air of their actions, or their attitudes, or the style and cast of their very limbs or features, that puts one in mind of their belonging to our own species."
"a dash of individuality is sometimes necessary to give an interest."
Ἀλλ’ ἔτυχεν, ὥσπερ Ξενοφάνης· ἀλλ’ ΦΑΣΙ τάδε.
Thus all the MSS. and editions. Victorius proposed—ἀλλ’ ΣΑΦΗ τάδε
: and supported his conjecture by the following fragment of Xenophanes, preserved in Sext. Empiricus, to which he supposes Aristotle to allude:
Καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν ΣΑΦΕΣ οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν, οὐδέ τις ἔσται
Εἰδὼς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε, καὶ ὅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων.
Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα ΤΥΧΟΙ τετελεσμένον εἰπὼν,
Αὐτὸς ὅμως οὐκ οἶδε, δόκος δ’ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέτυκται.
"Concerning the nature of the Gods, and of the universe, nothing ever has been, or ever can be, clearly known by man. For should we even chance to guess the truth, we cannot know it to be the truth. All is mere opinion."
Xenophanes is here introduced, probably, because he had written against the theology of HOMER and HESIOD.
Πάντα θεοῖς ἀνέθηκαν Ὅμηρός θ’ Ἡσίοδός τε,
Ὅσσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστὶ,
ΚΛΕΠΤΕΙΝ, ΜΟΙΧΕΥΕΙΝ τε, καὶ ΑΛΛΗΛΟΥΣ ΑΠΑΤΕΥΕΙΝ.
By alluding to those other verses, where he descants on the uncertainty and obscurity of all inquiries relative to the nature of the Gods, and asserts, that all, on that subject, is mere conjecture and opinion, Aristotle seems, slily enough, to have intended to make Xenophanes answer himself; and to excuse Homer's theology, even by the testimony of one who had been most forward to condemn it. "These may be opinions taken up at random, as Xenophanes says; and his representation of the Gods may be the true:—but, as he himself owns, these are matters not clearly known.
Ἀλλ’ οὐ σαφῆ τάδε.
—Homer was therefore right, as a Poet, in following popular tradition and belief."
Aristotle also alludes here, without doubt, to the objections of PLATO, De Repub. II. p. 150, &c. ed. Massey.
I cannot forbear to mention one curious maxim of Xenophanes about drinking, which we find in some pleasant elegiac lines preserved in Athenæus.
Οὐχ ὕβρις πίνειν δ’ ὁπόσον μεν ἔχων ἀφίκοιο
Οἴκαδ’ ΑΝΕΥ ΠΡΟΠΟΛΟΥ. —
μέθης δὲ, καὶ πολυοινίας τὸ παράπαν ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ ἀπέχεσθαι.
Till the age of 18, he allows no wine; for, to drink it at that time of life, he says, is "adding fire to fire, both in body and mind."
—πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ ὀχετεύειν, ἐις τε τὸ σῶμα, καὶ τὴν ψυχήν.
From 18 to 30, a moderate use of wine might be allowed:—οἴνου γεύεσθαί τε ΜΕΤΡΙΟΥ.
At 40, and after, it might be used in a jolly kind of way—ἐις παιδιάν—ὥστε
For wine, says he, was given to man, as—φάρμακον — ἐπίκουρον τῆς τοῦ ΓΗΡΩΣ αὐστηρότητος.
—
I believe Victorius is right in referring this to the accusation, or ἐπιτίμησις
, which Aristotle, at the end of the chapter, expresses by ὡς βλαβερά
. "Arbitror autem rationem hanc pertinere ad formam eam, quam vocavit, ὡς βλαβερά. Docet enim nunc, si poeta arguitur, quod personam aliquam induxerit, quæ quippiam dixerit aut fecerit, quod meritò reprehendi possit, aut speciem habeat nocendi, quomodo illud defendi purgarique debeat."
p. 278. It is true, the word βλαβερόν
does not here occur: but Aristotle uses other words, as synonymous, at the conclusion of the chapter; ἀλογία, μοχθηρία, πονηρία
: and here, the same thing is sufficiently indicated by the moral expressions, μὴ καλῶς
, and φαῦλον
. And though this solution cannot, that I see, be considered as arising from the application of any of the three principles laid down at the beginning of the chapter, yet it seems plainly connected, as I have observed in the notes on the translation, with what precedes.
Τὰ δὲ, πρὸς τὴν λέξιν ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν.
So, undoubtedly, the passage should be punctuated; not, as in some editions, very absurdly,
τὰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν λέξιν, ὁρῶντα δεῖ διαλύειν
: of which the fair, and only fair, translation would be—"Those objections, which relate to the diction, we must solve by looking at them!"
"Quæ verò ad dictionem pertinent, oportet intuentem solvere."
Ed. Cantab. 1785.
"his modis intuentem:"
and Heinsius has inserted οὕτως
in his text; on what authority, I know not. But the true construction certainly is, ὁρῶντα πρὸς τὴν λέξιν
—i. e. "by having an eye to, or, considering, the diction."
And so the passage was, long ago, well explained by Victorius; who was followed by Castelvetro, Piccolomini, and Beni. Dacier, though he translates rightly, mistakes the sense with those, whose translation is wrong. He supposes Aristotle here to be suggesting answers to objections against the diction.
"La diction a deux parties; car elle comprend ordinairement les pensées & l'expression."
p. 468, note 27.
Λέξις
, include the thoughts, διάνοιαν
; thus confounding Aristotle's clear distinction.
In this whole chapter, words are considered no farther, than as they afford the means of obviating objections against the sense.
The censure, here, is generally supposed to have fallen on the word ἀθρήσειε
, and the absurdity of making Agamemnon see the Trojan camp, and the Grecian fleet, by night, and when he was
Ἦτοι ὅτ’ ἐς πεδίον τὸ Τρωϊκὸν ἀθρήσειε,
Θαύμαζεν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τὰ καίετο Ἰλιόθι πρὸ,
Αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, ὅμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων.
Il. Χ. [Κ.] v. 11-13.
I can hardly think it possible for any man, of the least taste, to read these lines, and understand them to express merely the thoughts of Agamemnon. Mr. Pope, who has shewn so much taste in making the most of all Homer's picturesque descriptions,
ἀθρήσειε
is explained, "animo videret: secum circumspectaret. Κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται. Aristot. Poetic. cap. xxv."
All, in this description, seems clearly literal. The verb, ἀθρῆσαι
, is no where in Homer, I believe, applied to mental vision. Still
θαύμαζεν
applicable to mere thought, or recollection. And what, after all, is Agamemnon made to see? Only what he might easily see, even as he lay on his couch—the fires of the Trojan camp. Add to this, the sense still more evidently literal of what follows of his hearing the military music,
"Hears in the passing wind their music blow."
"the busy hum of men."
There are few descriptions in Homer, that, to me, appear more beautiful than this little military night-scene. Whatever may be supposed with respect to Agamemnon, we, who read, are made to see, and hear. But, take away the literal sense, and you take away, with it, the whole beauty of the passage. And, after all, what is the difficulty? Agamemnon, though retired to his tent, was kept awake by his anxiety. The enemy was not far off; and he apprehended the design of some nocturnal incursion.
Δυσμενέες δ’ ἄνδρες σχεδὸν εἴαται, οὐδέ τι ἴδμεν,
Μή πως καὶ διὰ νύκτα μενοινήσωσι μάχεσθαι.
Il. X. [K.] v. 100, 101.
ΕΣ πεδίον ἀθρήσειε—ΕΣ νῆας ἴδοι
—here imply. Nor is it at all improbable, that he might have these views as he lay upon his bed, through windows, or apertures, made perhaps for that very purpose. The commentators seem to have thought only of a modern officer, snugly shut up in a
"Trojanis temporibus, tentoria nondum erant lintea. Achivorum κλισίαι λύγι-
tibus lignisque constabant, vimine intertexto, humoque aggestâ;
adeoque tuguria potius."
Heyne ad Virgil. Æn. 1. Excurf. 16.
As I have given the passage from Homer, the reader may not be displeased to compare that sketch with a far more finished and exquisite night-piece, but of the same kind, by our own great Poet.
From camp to camp, through the foul womb of night,
The hum of either army stilly sounds,
That the fix'd centinels almost receive
The secret whispers of each other's watch:
Fire answers fire; and through their paly flames
Each battle sees the other's umber'd face:
Steed threatens steed, in high and boastful neighs,
Piercing the night's dull ear; and from the tents,
The armourers, accomplishing the knights,
With busy hammers closing rivets up,
Give dreadful note of preparation.
Henry V. Act iv. [Prologue]
Αὐλῶν συρίγγωνθ’ ὅμαδον.
Αὐλῶν συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν, ὅμαδόν τ’ ἀνθρώπων.
I cannot agree with those commentators who take the objection here to fall upon the word ἐνοπὴν
, which means, voice, "& ne se dit proprement,"
says Dacier, "que des hommes."
This would be a mere verbal objection; for the meaning is plain enough. But Aristotle, as I have already observed, is not here considering criticisms on the diction, but, such criticisms on the διάνοια
, or thoughts, as may be obviated by means of the diction.
Farther; he is here shewing, how objections may be removed by having recourse to metaphor—by saying, "the expression is
But Dacier's explanation makes the objection to be, not the impropriety of the literal sense, (for that was out of the question here), but only the impropriety, or harshness, of the metaphor; and the answer, according to him, is no other, than a denial of the charge, and a justification of the metaphor. And this will be equally the case, whether we take Aristotle's quotation as it stands—συρίγγων θ’ ὅμαδον
—or suppose him to mean, συρίγγων τ’ ἐνοπὴν
, as we read it in our editions: except, that the former would be much the bolder and harsher metaphor of the two.
So much then for, what the criticism was not. What it was, must always, I fear, in the present condition of the text, remain a problem. One conjecture only occurs to me, and that, such as I cannot take upon me to offer with any degree of confidence. Perhaps Aristotle had, originally, quoted, or meant, at least, to refer to, the whole verse, as we read it; and the censure might be pointed at the expression—ὍΜΑΔΟΝ τ’ ἀνθρώπων
. The proper and derivative sense of ὅμαδος
seems to be that of ψαμάθου ὍΜΑΔΟΣ
, occurs, for "a heap of sand."
Apollon. Rhodius uses the word in the same sense as, I. 347. IV. 198.
Ὅμαδος· (1.) ΑΘΡΟΙΣΙΣ, (2.) ΘΟΡΥΒΟΣ. (1.) ΟΧΛΟΣ, (2.) ΤΑΡΑΧΟΣ. ΣΤΡΑΤΟΣ, ἀπὸ τοῦ, ὁμοῦ.
— Perhaps, then, some hypercritic might take, or chuse to take, the word here in its primary sense, of multitude, and ask, how Agamemnon could, by night, perceive, and "wonder at,"
the multitude of men? θαύμαζεν—ὅμαδον ἀνθρώπων.
To this it would be a proper answer, to say—you mistake the meaning of the word ὅμαδον
: it is not used here in its proper sense, of a multitude, but, in its metaphorical sense, for the effect produced by the voices and the bustle of a multitude. The criticism, I confess, would be frivolous enough; yet not more so than many others, to which Aristotle has condescended to furnish answers. It will perhaps be thought a more solid objection to my conjecture, that the word, ὅμαδος
, seems to be constantly used by Homer in the secondary sense. So, Il. Μ. 471. —Β. 96. Od. Κ. 556: Κινυμένων δ’ ἑτάρων ΟΜΑΔΟΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΟΥΠΟΝ ΑΚΟΥΣΑΣ.
Nor can I say, that I have found any instance in Homer, of this word used in its primary sense. The other sense may, therefore, appear
Τὸ γὰρ ΠΑΝΤΕΣ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ΠΟΛΛΟΥ, κατὰ μεταφορὰν εἴρηται.
The word, πάντες
, does not occur in any of the preceding examples. But, says M. Batteux, it is virtually contained in the first example— ἌΛΛΟΙ μέν ῥα θεοἰ τε καὶ ἀνέρες,
&c. —for ἄλλοι
means ΠΑΝΤΕΣ ἄλλοι.
"Aristote traduit l'idée, & non le mot."
Dacier understands the passage in the same manner. This explanation appears to me forced and improbable. Aristotle says plainly, Τὸ πάντες εἴρηται
i. e. "the word
and I believe, with Victorius, Piccolomini, and Heinsius, that some corresponding example is lost, as the explanations of the other examples appear to be likewise.
πάντες
;"
ΔΙΔΟΜΕΝ δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι.
Καὶ τὸ περὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τὸ Ἀγαμέμνονθ’, ὅτι ΟΥΚ ΑΥΤΟΣ ὁ Ζεὺς εἶπεν, "δίδομεν δέ οἱ εὖχος ἀρέσθαι," ἀλλὰ ΤΩΙ ΕΝΥΠΝΙΩΙ ΕΝΕΤΕΛΛΕΤΟ διδόναι.
— De Soph. Elench. p. 284, ed. Duval. — This clearly confirms the common explanation, which makes Hippias substitute διδόμεν
, the infinitive, (for διδόμεναι
,) used imperatively, instead of δίδομεν
, the first person plural of the present tense.
"Ce qui est très different,"
says Dacier; "car alors le mensonge ne vient pas de Jupiter, il vient du songe."
— Dacier tells us also, that this hemistich, which does not appear in our copies of Homer, was altered, "par une fraude pieuse."
Τρώεσσι δὲ κήδε’ ἐφῆπται.
Il. B. 15. See Clarke's note.τὴν τοῦ ἐνυπνίου ΠΟΜΠΗΝ ὑπὸ Διὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι
.
Κομιδῇ ἄρα ὁ ΘΕΟΣ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀληθὲς, ἔν τε ἔργῳ, καὶ ἐν λόγῳ· καὶ οὔτε αὐτὸς μεθίσταται, οὔτε ἄλλους ἐξαπατᾷ, οὔτε κατὰ φαντασίας, οὔτε κατὰ λόγους, οὔτε κατὰ σημείων πομπὰς, οὔθ’ ὕπαρ, οὐδ’ ὄναρ.
Τὸ μὲν ΟΥ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
This correction, also, of Hippias, is somewhat more explicitly mentioned, De Soph. Elench. p. 284. The passage was censured as absurd, (ὡς ἀτόπως εἰρηκότα
) by those critics who read οὗ
.
Ἕστηκε ξύλον αὖον, ὅσον τ’ ὄργυι’, ὑπὲρ αἴης,
Ἢ δρυὸς, ἢ πεύκης, τὸ μὲν οὐ καταπύθεται ὄμβρῳ.
Il. Ψ. 327.
"dry,"
αὖον
, and then saying "where it was rotted by rain."
I cannot say I comprehend this. Are rottenness and dryness, as Beni very well asks, incompatible? — Nor is it clear, what construction, or what sense, was given to the passage, by those who read οὗ
, instead of οὐ
. — But the reader will hardly thank me for detaining him with a dissertation upon a rotten post.
Ζωρά τε τὰ πρὶν ΑΚΡΗΤΑ,
[διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους
: for so the verse is completed, in Simplicius and Athenæus.] This seems the best and most authentic reading, and Dacier's the most reasonable explanation. The meaning of the words, ζωρόν, ζωρότερον
, was matter of great dispute among the antients themselves. See Plutarch's Sympos. Prob. V. 4. — M. Batteux, taking it to mean ἄκρητα, ΚΕΚΡΑΤΟ.
But, that this word, whatever it was, meant unmixed, seems plain from the passage of Athenæus, p. 423, 424, about Theophrastus; who, it seems, in a treatise on drunkenness, adduced these very lines of Empedocles to prove, that the meaning of ζωρότερον
was, not pure wine, but wine mixed with water.
The expression, διαλλάττοντα κελεύθους
, seems to prove, as Dacier has explained it, that the second verse was not intended merely as explanatory repetition, in other terms, of the change described in the first, but as descriptive of a contrary change; an interpretation which is somewhat supported by the two following lines of the same Poet, on the same subject: —
Ἄλλοτε μὲν, φιλότητι συνερχόμεν’ εἰς ἓν ἅπαντα,
Ἄλλοτε δ’ αὖ, δίχ’ ἕκαστα φορεύμενα νείκεος ἔχθει.
ΜΑΘΟΝ ἀθάνατ’ εἶναι
— is well explained by Casaubon, upon Athenæus, p. 718, μαθον
, pro εἰώθεισαν, aut ἐπεφύκεισαν
: — "didicerant esse, pro erant, vel solebant, esse,"
&c. See also the verses just referred to, in the ΜΕΜΑΘΗΚΕ φύεσθαι.
Of διαίρεσις
and σύνθεσις
, and the ambiguity of punctuation, as a source of sophistical argumentation, more may be seen, if it be thought worth seeing, Rhet. II. 24, p. 580. De Soph. Elench. p. 284, 288, 303, ed. Duval.
Ἀμφιβολία.
i. e. such ambiguity, as does not depend on the different senses of single words, (which Aristotle calls ὁμωνυμία
,) but on the different senses, of which two or more words are capable, independently of their punctuation. See, De Soph. Elench. I. cap. iv. which clears up his distinctions, between διαίρεσις, ἀμφιβολία, ὁμωνυμία
, &c.
Upon v. 363 of Od. Ω. [v. 364] (—κερώντας αἴθοπα οἶνον—
) Eustathius says — τουτέστιν, ἐμβάλλοντας εἰς κρατῆρας
: and Gataker remarks, on
"τὸ κεραν, sive κερασαι, licet miscere proprie significet, usurpatur tamen simpliciter ἀντὶ τοῦ, ἐγχεῖν, καὶ διδόναι πιεῖν pro infundere, in calicem scil. sive cyathum, et bibendum porrigere."
—ΚΕΡΑΣΣΕ δὲ νέκταρ ἐρυθρόν.
Od. Ε. 93.
The Gods hardly drank nectar and water. But it is even applied to pure water itself:
Θυμῆρες ΚΕΡΑΣΑΣΑ κατὰ κρατός τε καὶ ὤμων.
i. e. pouring it over my head and shoulders. Od. Κ. 362.
I have adhered, without scruple, to the transposition mentioned in Mr. Winstanley's note;
Τὰ δὲ, κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως· οἷον, τὸν [forte, ΤΟ] κεκραμμένον, οἶνόν φασιν εἶναι· ὅθεν εἴρηται ὁ Γανυμήδης, "Διῒ οἰνοχοεύειν," πινόντων οἶνον. Εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν. Καὶ, Χαλκέας, τοὺς τὸν σίδηρον ἐργαζομένους· ὅθεν πεποἰηται, "Κνημὶς νεότευκτος κασσιτέροιο."
This differs from Mr. Winstanley's arrangement, only with respect to the words — εἴη δ’ ἂν τοῦτό γε
, &c. which appear to me to be-
ἔθος λέξεως
, as a distinct solution, would immediately say, that all the instances he gives might as well be defended κατὰ μεταφοράν
. I understand him to say — "though this example, indeed, may also be defended by metaphor."
The expression confirms this : — εἴη δ’ ἂν ΤΟΥΤΟ ΓΕ καὶ κατὰ μεταφοράν.
Besides, there seems to be a pretty plain reason, why this instance might be considered as a metaphor, and the others not so. Nectar was the wine of the Gods; and the resemblance was sufficiently obvious, to make the substitution of the one for the other an easy metaphor. With the other examples the case is different. Brass and iron are indeed, each of them, species of metals. But the common genus is too general to constitute that obvious resemblance which is requisite to a metaphor. Their likeness, to use the philosopher's own language, is not perceived by the genus. Oil and vinegar are both liquids; yet the substitution of the one for the other would make a very strange sort of metaphor; because they have no other resemblance to each other, but as liquids. Hence, Aristotle denominates such substitutions not metaphors, but customary modes of speech; both because the resemblance is not obvious enough for metaphor, and because, as the name implies, they are common and established expressions, (κύρια
,) however, in themselves, improper.
Dacier supposes the critics to have objected to the improba-
Οὐδὲ τότ’ Αἰνείαο δαΐφρονος ὄβριμον ἔγχος
Ῥῆξε σάκος· χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε, δῶρα θεοῖο·
Ἀλλὰ δύω μὲν ἔλασσε διὰ πτύχας, αἱ δ’ ἄρ’ ἔτι τρεῖς
Ἦσαν· ἐπεὶ πέντε πτύχας ἤλασε Κυλλοποδίων,
Τὰς δύο, χαλκείας, δύο δ’ ἔνδοθι, κασσιτέροιο,
Τὴν δὲ μίαν, χρυσῆν· τῇ ῥ’ ἔσχετο χάλκεον ἔγχος.
Il. Υ. 267, &c.
The shield was composed of five plates; the two first, of brass; the two innermost, next the body, (for that seems to be the sense of ἔνδοθι
κασσιτέροιο
ἔθος λέξεως
, iron. As, by the way, the same word clearly appears to mean in a similar passage, Il. H. 248. But, there, it is used with the preposition ἐν
.
Ἓξ δὲ διὰ πτύχας ἦλθε δαΐζων χαλκὸς ἀτειρὴς,
ΕΝ τῇ δ’ ἑβδομάτῃ ῥινῷ ΣΧΕΤΟ.
ΤΗΙ ῥ’ ἔσχετο
. Now this might mean, χρυσὸς γὰρ ἐρύκακε
—but, still more expressly, that the spear penetrated two of the plates, and that the three others remained unpierced. But the spear could not well be fixed, or fastened, in the plate of gold, which was the third, without piercing it. And thus the objection appears to have been rightly understood by Victorius and Goulston.
I may say with Victorius, "hic locus valde me torsit."
The words are these: — τὸ δὲ, ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται, ὧδί πως μάλιστ’ ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι κατὰ τὴν κατ’ ἀντικρύ.
— In this passage, as in many others, there is just glimpse enough of some meaning, to mock a commentator with the hopes of discovery, and to deprive him of the comfort of doing at once, what, after all his efforts, he will probably find himself obliged to do at last — of abandoning the passage as unintelligible. For my own part, I do not see one clear and satisfactory sense, that can be made of the words, without conjectural emendation; and if we open that door, we shall be, again, confounded by the number of different senses which ingenuity may propose, with equal pretensions to our acceptance.
Dacier translates thus: "Et le plus court moyen de se tirer de ces endroits, c'est de prendre le mot dans un sens tout contraire à celui qu'on lui donne ordinairement."
Piccolomini and Beni understand it thus: "How many senses a word admits of, may best be known by considering the significations opposed to it:"
a sense preferable, I think, at least, to any other that has been offered, because it certainly does receive some support from the 15th chapter of Aristotle's first book of Topics; where he treats of Homonymy, or equivocation, and points out different means, by which we may
But though this explanation of the passage must be allowed to give an Aristotelic meaning, yet I cannot think it a meaning that arises, fairly and clearly, from the text. In particular, the expression, ΚΑΤΑ τὴν [scil. σημασίαν for so it is supplied—] KAT’ ANTIKPY,
has, to me, a very suspicious appearance. I much doubt, whether Aristotle would have used the word ἀντικρύ
to denote contrariety of meaning, or any thing but local opposition. I believe he would have used ἐναντίον
, or ἀντικείμενον
; as he does constantly in those parts of his logical works, where he treats of contrariety, and of the opposite senses of words;
κατ’ ἀντικρύ
, once made use of in that sense. — However, as this interpretation seems to be the least exceptionable of any, and I see nothing better to propose, I have admitted it in my version: but I should certainly not accuse any reader of being very fastidious, if he preferred a blank to this, or any other meaning, that has been given to this dark saying. Emendatory conjectures, indeed, have occurred to me, as to others; but none of them plausible enough even to impose upon myself.
Αὐτοὶ ΚΑΤΑΨΗΦΙΣΑΜΕΝΟΙ.
— I cannot think this word so free from all difficulty as Mr. Winstanley does. He says, "Egregie dictum καταψηφισάμενοι, ut sensus sit: hi perinde ac judices quidam decernentes ratiocinantur,"
&c. But the question is, whether the word will admit that sense, or any other, than that of condemning, passing sentence against, &c. which is not to Aristotle's purpose in this place. The fair sense of καταψηφισάμενοι συλλογίζονται
, is, if I mistake not, "they argue, or form their conclusion, after, or, in consequence of, having condemned"
what? — We must necessarily understand them to have condemned, either the passage in question, or, the opinion of others about the sense of it. But
ἘΠΙΤΙΜΩΣΙΝ, ἂν ὑπεναντίον ᾖ τῇ αὑτῶν οἰήσει
, which follows. I think, therefore, that the proposed correction of Heinsius καταΣΟφισάμενοι
, must be allowed the praise, both of ingenuity and probability. In my version, however, I have contented myself with making the best I could of that reading which has the authority of all the manuscripts, and all the commentators, except Heinsius, on its side. — Victorius thinks the word will bear the sense of "cum sententiam tulerint;"
but he adds — "quamvis in præpositione, quæ verbo adjuncta est, vis insit contra alios id faciendi."
Δι’ ἁμάρτημα δὲ τὸ πρόβλημα εἰκός ἐστι.
"Metuo ne hic locus corruptus mancusve sit."
Victor. — To give these words any meaning that may not easily be controverted, is, I believe, impossible. I have made them say, what it seems to me most probable that the author meant to say: "So far is this criticism from proving Homer to be wrong, that it is, itself, probably, founded on a mistake."
Τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
M. Batteux proposes this arrangement:— Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν, τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν.
τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι, οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν
, belong to the second way of defending the impossible, by referring it to the βέλτιον — οἷα δεῖ εἶναι
, &c.
πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον
, with respect to beauty, grace, dignity of form, &c.: and it seems to be this kind of improvement, in painting, by which Aristotle, here and elsewhere, illustrates the μίμησις βελτίον
of poetry.
"Zeuxis plus membris corporis dedit, id amplius atque augustius ratus, atque (ut existimant,) HOMERUM secutus, cui validissima quæque forma, etiam in fæminis, placet."
Ἐπεὶ δὲ μίμησίς ἐστιν ἡ Τραγῳδία βελτιόνων δεῖ...
βέλτιον
for his famous picture of Helen, is well known. See Cic. de Invent. II. 1. Plin. Nat. Hist. XXXV. 9. Bayle, art. ZEUXIS.
I agree, therefore, perfectly with Mr. Winstanley, that the words, τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι οἵους Ζ. ἔγρ.
should be transposed: but I do not see, that any alteration, farther than the mere transposition, is necessary. I would read — Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον· [scil. δεῖ ἀνάγειν] τοιούτους δ’ εἶναι [scil. δεῖ] οἵους Ζεῦξις ἔγραφεν· τὸ γὰρ παράδειγμα δεῖ ὑπερέχειν.
Πρὸς ἃ φασί, τὰ ἄλογα
: [scil. δεῖ ἀνάγειν
: for so, I think, with Mr. Winstanley, the passage is to be understood; and so it is explained and translated by Castelvetro. The expression, ἃ φασί
, or οἷα φασί
, is used by Aristotle as synonymous with δόξα
, and οἷα δοκεῖ
. Thus, — οἷα ΦΑΣΙ καὶ ΔΟΚΕΙ
, at the beginning of this chapter: and afterwards — οὕτω φασιν
.
But it will not, I think, be found possible to give this passage a consistent sense, unless we understand him to mean, what, as the
"By general opinion we may excuse, not only the
As if he had written, πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον
, but even such things as are manifestly improbable, or absurd."πρὸς ἃ φασί, ΚΑΙ τὰ ἄλογα.
And thus Goulston has supplied: — "Ad ea quæ aiunt, [rediguntur hæc quæ dixi; et] illa, quæ sine ratione sunt."
Τὰ δ’ ὑπεναντία ὡς εἰρημένα—.
The words, ὡς εἰρημένα
, have distressed all the commentators; and no sense, which they have laboured to force upon the expression, is, to my apprehension, satisfactory. Heinsius corrected by transposition — Τὰ δ’ ὡς ὑπεναντία εἰρημένα
: "Ea, quæ tanquam subcontraria dicta videntur."
— An easier and more probable emendation, I think, would be — Τὰ δ’ ΥΠΕΝΑΝΤΙΩΣ εἰρημένα.
The word is, ὡσαύτως
: "simili modo,"
as all the commentators render it. I cannot say I have been able thoroughly to satisfy myself, as to the precise meaning of the expression, from any thing I have found in Aristotle's logical works.
"in the same manner,"
does not mean, "in the same sense,"
I confess I do not know what it means. I understand Aristotle to say, that, if the subject of the propositions, charged with being contradictory, be
And this meaning seems to be supported by the following passage from the treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας: — Καὶ ἔστω τοῦτο ΑΝΤΙΦΑΣΙΣ, (nempe) κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις αἱ ἀντικείμεναι. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι, τὴν ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ κατὰ ΤΟΥ ΑΥΤΟΥ, μὴ ὉΜΩΝΥΜΩΣ δέ.
ἔλεγχος μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀντίφασις τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς, ΜΗ ΟΝΟΜΑΤΟΣ, ΑΛΛΑ ΠΡΑΓΜΑΤΟΣ.
De Soph. Elench. p. 285, D."Affirmatio & negatio oppositæ, contradictionem faciunt. Oppositio est ejusdem, de eodem, non homonymè; nam accipi debent termini in oppositione, EODEM MODO AC SENSU."
All that follows—viz. ὥστε καὶ αὐτὸν, ἢ πρὸς ἃ αὐτὸς λέγει, ἢ ὃ ἂν φρόνιμος ὑποθῆται
is either so corrupt, or so darkly expressed, that I have only to confess myself unable even to guess what Aristotle meant to say.
ὑπεναντίας
and Glauco's answer, viz. the contradiction is only to the critic's erroneous opinion, and misconception, of the passage: ἀλόγως προϋπολαμβάνωσι.
"We must also consider the person who speaks, and whether the contradiction be to what he himself said, or to what any reasonable man would understand him to have said."
But, to wave other objections, which, no doubt, the learned reader will easily make for me, the verb, ὑποθέσθαι
, will, I believe, by no means bear this sense, of ὑπολαβεῖν
. At least, Aristotle seems always to use it in that of ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν
Accordingly, Goulston has given the word this sense in his version: — "videndumque, an eâ in re, quod prudens præceperit, secutus sit."
But, of what force this circumstance is, or how it is to be applied to obviate the charge of contradiction, I do not see.
Being therefore obliged to reject the only version, which seemed to me to offer any tolerable meaning, I have left a blank in my translation.
— Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης, μηθὲν χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης τῷ Αἰγειἤτε πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου.
— Such was the confused state in which Robortelli found the text, which he, very ingeniously and solidly, rectified thus:
— Ὅταν μὴ ἀνάγκης οὔσης μηθὲν, χρήσηται τῷ ἀλόγῳ, ὥσπερ Εὐριπίδης ΕΝ τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ τοῦ Μενελάου.
Some MSS. for Αἰγειἤτε
, give Αἰγεητη
, which, as Goulston has observed, suggests the true reading— ἐν τῷ ΑΙΓΕΙ, ΤΗι πονηρίᾳ...
&c.
By the ἐν τῷ Αἰγεῖ
, seems plainly to indicate a Tragedy so named; not a character only in a Tragedy of a different name. But this is no objection to Robortelli's reading, though it is to his explanation of it. See the fragments at the end of the Oxford Euripides, where several passages of the
This enumeration may seem, at the first view, to be deficient; for one of the objections was — Οὐκ ἀληθῆ
: — "the representation is not conformable to truth."
But this, perhaps, may be considered as falling under the charge of ἄλογον
. For he, who accuses a Poet of departing from nature, experience, and the οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστι
, says, in other words, it is improbable, incredible, absurd, &c. Or, when this objection was relative to truth of another sort—to theological truth, as violated by the poetic representations of the Gods, it then came, properly, under the βλαβερόν
; it was of immoral and pernicious tendency. And thus we find Plato objecting continually to the theology of Homer; sometimes, as not true— ΟΥΚ ΑΛΗΘΗ
τοῖς ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ
The objections answered by considerations drawn from the diction, (Sect. 5.) appear to be all reducible to one or other of these five sources.
Βλαβερά
: i. e. hurtful on account of their immoral tendency. So the word is used by Plato; to whose objections, and to the very language in which he expresses them, Aristotle so frequently alludes. Censuring the immoral tendency of some of Homer's
Οὔθ’ ὅσια ταῦτα, οὔτ’ ἀληθῆ· καὶ μὴν τοῖς γε ἀκούουσι ΒΛΑΒΕΡΑ.
The reason follows: πᾶς γὰρ ἑαυτῷ συγγνώμην ἕξει, κακῷ ὄντι, πεισθεὶς, ὡς ἄρα τοιαῦτα πράττουσί ΤΕ καὶ ἔπραττον "Οἱ θεῶν ἀγχίσποροι." Ὧν ἕνεκα, παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχέρειαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις, πονηρίας.
De Rep. III. p. 176, ed. Mass.
Compare the precept, cap. xv. about making the character as morally good as possible
μοχθηρία
, the villainy of a character, is overcharged, it brings with it its own antidote. Such characters as "There is always danger, lest wickedness, conjoined with abilities, should steal upon esteem, though it misses of approbation; but the character of Iago is so conducted, that he is, from the first scene to the last, hated and despised."
[Dr. Johnson. Note at the end of Othello.]—Not so, Shakspeare's βλαβερά
to no reader or spectator. They excite only pure and unmitigated disgust. Not all the art of the Poet, or the charms of Poetry, can cheat us into any degree of sympathy with them, even for the moment in which they are speaking. We feel, there, no such struggle between immoral approbation and moral indignation, as Dr. Johnson has described, in his observations upon the different effects produced on the spectator, by the villainy of Rowe's
"The character of Lothario seems to have been expanded by Richardson into Lovelace; but he has excelled his original in the moral effect of the fiction. Lothario, with gaiety which cannot be hated, and bravery which cannot be despised, retains too much of the spectator's kindness. It was in the power of Richardson alone to teach us at once esteem and detestation, to make virtuous resentment overpower all the benevolence which
— Παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα, τὴν κατὰ τέχνην.
Most of the commentators understand the art of Poetry itself. But, if I am right in the explanation I have given, NOTE 233, of the expression, πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν τέχνην
, the sense of the expression here must be the same.
εἶδος
, as he terms it, of objections relative to all faults κατὰ συμβεβηκός
, as opposed to those, which he distinguishes by the various expressions of, ἁμαρτίαι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν
, &c.
The other interpretation of the words is fairly liable, I think, to the following objections.
1. If we understand the poetic art itself to be meant, then the objection to faults κατὰ συμβεβηκός
— to impossibilities and inaccuracies with respect to other arts and sciences — will be entirely omitted in this enumeration. This is very improbable, considering how common a source of critical censure this was. For while, on the one hand, the extravagant admirers of Homer made no scruple to assert, that his Poems contained the principles of all arts and sciences; on the other, we know how eagerly the Zoilists caught at every apparent inaccuracy of this kind; and, particularly, with respect to his geography. One instance, at least, of this sort of cavil, we have in this chapter: the censure of the passage, Οἴη δ’ ἄμμορος
, Il. Σ. 489, fell on
2. By the manner in which Aristotle here mentions, first, the five sources of critical censures, and then, immediately, the twelve sources of λύσεις
or answers, it is plain, I think, that he means answers to those censures, and to all of them. But this cannot be the case, if we understand essential faults in the Poetry itself, or bad imitation: for this admits of no answer, but a direct denial of the fact. Whereas, if we understand incidental errors in other arts, all will be consistent; and every fault enumerated will find its answer in some of the λύσεις
, which had been pointed out in the preceding part of the chapter, and are referred to in this enumeration.
3. If the art here mentioned be the art of Poetry itself, and the faults against that art be, as I understand them to be, essential faults, faults which constitute bad Poetry, i. e. in Aristotle's view, bad imitation, this plainly implies, that the four other faults enumerated are not essential, but accidental faults; κατὰ συμβεβηκός
. But, that such faults as improbability, and immorality, (ἄλογα, βλαβερά
,) which had just before been singled out from the rest, as ὀρθαὶ ἐπιτιμήσεις
—as the most solid objections, and such as admitted of no excuse—that these should be considered by Aristotle as faults merely incidental, not to be objected to the Poetry itself, not affecting the merit of the imitation, καθ’ ΕΑΥΤΗΝ ἁμαρτίαι
, is what, as I have before said, I cannot easily conceive.
The expression itself— παρὰ τὴν ὀρθότητα τὴν κατὰ τέχνην
, is indeed ambiguous; and they, who prefer the sense which I have rejected, will perhaps think it favoured by the similar expression, clearly applied to faults against the art of Poetry itself, in the passage, — ποτέρων ἐστὶ τὸ ἁμάρτημα, τῶν ΚΑΤΑ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ, ἢ κατ’ ἄλλο συμβεβηκός.
The expressions, however, are not exactly the same. There, it is, κατὰ ΤΗΝ τέχνην
— "against the art:"
here, — κατὰ
— "contrary to the rectitude of art."
— But Aristotle had before used an expression, that seemed still more strongly to point at the art of Poetry: τὰ πρὸς ΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΕΧΝΗΝ ἀδύνατα
: which, however, it seems necessary, for the reasons given in NOTE 233, to understand in the same sense, which I have here given to κατὰ τέχνην
. But that passage, and indeed this whole chapter, is, in its present state, so full of obscurity and ambiguity, that every interpretation which can be given must necessarily be, in a great measure, conjectural and disputable. All I can venture to be confident of is, that my explanation of this passage is consistent with my explanation of the other; and that either both are right, or both are wrong.
How the different Λύσεις
or solutions proposed throughout the chapter are reducible to 12, and which are the 12 that Aristotle meant, are questions, which the defective state of the original renders it very difficult, if not impossible, to answer, with any certainty. And indeed the matter is of so little importance, that it is by no means worth while to enter into any examination of the various modes of reckoning, by which different expositors have endeavoured to solve the problem. Victorius, indeed, is so wise, as to give up the attempt. It will be very easy however, and therefore, I hope, not very foolish, just to enumerate all the λύσεις
, which actually have been mentioned in the chapter, in the order in which they occur, and then to examine, by way of experiment, whether they are any way reducible to twelve.
τυγχάνει τοῦ τέλους, τοῦ αὑτῆς.
— i. e. The end of Poetry is better answered, &c.κατὰ συμβεβηκός
— The fault is incidental.οἷα δεῖ
, (or, βέλτιον
) — It is what is best, or what should be.οἷα φασὶ
, (or, οἷα δοκεῖ
) — It is according to general opinion.οἷα ἦν, ἢ ἔστιν
(or, οὕτως εἶχεν
, or, ἀληθῆ
) — to truth.σκεπτέον εἰς τὸν πράττοντα, πρὸς ὅν, ὅτε
, &c.] — [Consider circumstances.]Γλώττῃ
— Defend, by the foreign sense of the word.Μεταφορᾷ
— by Metaphor.κατὰ Προσῳδίαν
— by Accent.Διαιρέσει
— by Punctuation.Ἀμφιβολίᾳ
— by Ambiguity.κατὰ τὸ ἔθος τῆς λέξεως
— by Customary speech.Ποσαχῶς ἂν σημήνειε
or, καθ’ ὁμωνυμίαν
— by the different senses of a word.Γλαύκωνος λύσις
] — [Glauco's answer.]εἰκὸς, καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι
] — [Probable, that many things should happen improbably.]Οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ αὐτὸ
, &c.] [The same thing is not spoken of, or, not in the same respect, &c.]
Here are, then, 16 different answers. Of these, it seems, upon the whole, most probable, that the 12 not enclosed in brackets, are the 12 which Aristotle means. My reason is, that in the beginning of the chapter, after laying down the three distinct considerations, of the different objects of imitation, the privileges of poetical language, and the distinction of essential and incidental faults, he immediately, and explicitly, refers to those three principles, as sources of all the answers. Ὥστε δεῖ τὰ ἐπιτιμήματα — ΕΚ ΤΟΥΤΩΝ ἐπισκοποῦντα ΛΥΕΙΝ.
Now it will be found, I believe, that the 12 answers above mentioned are drawn from those sources, and that the four remaining answers are not.
But why these four, which evidently are proposed as answers, and seem to be distinct answers, were not admitted in the concluding enumeration, it may not be easy to shew. Perhaps, Aristotle reckoned only as one solution, the two which he assigns to the same objection, with an ἢ
, or οὕτως τε καὶ
, &c. This would throw out Nos 14, and 15, which seem, indeed, to be mentioned only as a sort of secondary or subsidiary answers. As to Nos 6, and 16, he might consider them as one; both of them, in fact, saying the same thing, and nearly in the same words—i. e. "circumstances must be considered."
Still however, taking these together as one answer, that answer will be supernumerary; and how it is fairly to be got rid of, it is difficult to see: the more difficult, because it is the only λύσις
furnished by the whole chapter to the objection of immoral tendency, (βλαβερά
,) upon which so great stress is laid.
All that seems tolerably clear is, that the 12 answers intended in the recapitulation are those 12, which are deducible from the three principles laid down at the opening of the chapter. In this idea, which I had formed before I consulted any commentator, I was glad to find myself supported by Goulston, in his accurate analysis; where he makes the 12 answers to be those here assigned, and draws them from the three sources at the beginning of the chapter: viz. three from the first source, (Nos 3, 4, 5,) — seven from the second — the diction, (Nos 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13,) and two from the third source, (Nos 1 and 2.)
— Ἧττον ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ.
— The word φορτικόν
is used in a number of different, and sometimes nicely discriminated, senses, which cannot, all of them, be expressed by any single word in our lan-
ἦν δὲ καὶ θεατρικὸς, καὶ πολὺς ἐν τῷ γελοἰῳ διαφορῆσαι, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΙΣ ὀνόμασι κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων χρώμενος.
ὅτι ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ διαλέγωμαι
— i. e. (as the context shews,) with the extravagance of Tragic rant.ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΟΝ
.
Sometimes, applied to persons, it means Ἡ δὲ ἦν ΥΠΕΡΗΦΑΝΟΣ καὶ δεινῶς ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗ,
XII. 63.
Ὑπεροπτικὸς, ὑπέρφρων, βαρὺς, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐπαχθής.
Jul. Poll. VI. 5.ἀνελεύθερος, βάναυσος
, molestus
in this sense; for whatever is violent, overdone, laboured, affected, &c. Thus Cicero, in the following elegant passage of his Brutus: "Volo enim, ut in scenâ, sic etiam in foro, non eos modò laudari, qui celeri motu & difficili utantur, sed eos etiam quos statarios appellant, quorum sit illa simplex, in agendo, veritas, non MOLESTA."
i. e. μὴ φορτική.
cap. xxx. Again— "Latinè loquendi accurata, et sine MOLESTIA diligens, elegantia: i. e. without labour or affectation."
cap. xxxviii. Catullus, too, of an affected grin;
illa, quam videtis
Turpe incedere, mimicè ac MOLESTE
Ridentem, catuli ore Gallicani.
IV. [XLII.] 8.
"The ambitious man looks upon gain as a vulgar sort of pleasure,"
De Rep. IX. p. 254, ed. Mass. Jul. Pollux describes a species of dance called Μόθων
, as,
ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ ὄρχημα καὶ ναυτικὸν
— "a vulgar and sailor-like dance;"
the hornpipe, I suppose, of the Greeks.
ἰδὼν—ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΣ ὀρχησάμενον
: because he did not dance like a gentleman; a charge, which, according to Herodotus, seems indeed to have been pretty well founded; for he tells us, that Hippoclides got upon a table and danced upon his head.
Τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐρείσας ἐπὶ τὴν τράπεζαν, τοῖς ΣΚΕΛΕΣΙ ΕΧΕΙΡΟΝΟΜΗΣΕ.
Herod. VI. p. 238. ed. H. St.
But let us return to Aristotle. This last sense of the word φορτικόν
appears to me clearly to be that, in which it is here used by him. I cannot think, that by φορτική
, he intended to express, as Dacier, and the commentators before him, explain it, the trouble and expense of theatrical exhibition—the number of things wanted—actors, scenes, dresses, music, &c.
ἧττον φορτικὴ
i. e. "quæ paucioribus eget adjumentis extrinsecus sumptis,"
&c. Robortelli. "Men gravosa,"
in the same sense, Castelvetro. "Manco carca & manco bisognosa d’aiuto."
Piccol. — Beni follows Robortelli. Victorius renders— "importuna et molesta,"
but enters into no particular explanation. Dacier— "la moins chargée, & celle qui demande le moins d’aide & de secours."
"Φορτικός, grossier, digne des mercenaires. Aristote, Politic. VIII. c. 6. oppose le spectateur mercenaire & ignorant,
φορτικός
, au spectateur honnête; & le plaisir grossier, ἡδονὴ φορτική
, les danses grossieres, κινήσεις φορτικωτέρας
, au plaisir delicat, aux danses honnêtes."
Aristotle himself will here be his best commentator, in the passages to which M. Batteux refers. Some sorts of rhythm, he says, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΣ ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις
, (violent and vulgar,) αἱ δὲ, ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΙΩΤΕΡΑΣ.
"The performer there,"
he says, "aims only at the pleasure of the hearers,
καὶ ταύτης ΦΟΡΤΙΚΗΣ· διόπερ οὐ ΤΩΝ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩΝ κρίνομεν εἶναι τὴν ἐργασίαν,
("such performance does not become a gentleman,") ἀλλὰ ΘΗΤΙΚΩΤΕΡΑΝ
(the playing of a man who is paid for playing:) καὶ ΒΑΝΑΥΣΟΥΣ δὴ
(mechanics) συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι· πονηρὸς γὰρ ὁ σκοπὸς πρὸς ὃν ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος· ὁ γὰρ ΘΕΑΤΗΣ, ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ ὢν, μεταβάλλειν εἴωθε τὴν μουσικήν—."
"that it is a thing impossible, or, at least, very difficult, for those, who do not actually practise an art, to be good judges of it."
p. 456. It might be so in those days. Modern connoisseurs, both in Music and Painting, find no such difficulty.
θεατὴς διττὸς, ὁ μὲν ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΟΣ καὶ ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΣ, ὁ δὲ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΣ, ἐκ βαναύσων, καὶ θητῶν, καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων, συγκείμενος.
ΤΟ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΟΝ, φησὶν, ἐν λόγοις, καὶ θυμέλικον, καὶ ΒΑΝΑΥΣΟΝ, ὡς ἔστιν Ἀριστοφάνει, Μενάνδρῳ δὲ ἐδοκίμως. Καὶ γὰρ, ὁ μὲν ΑΠΑΙΔΕΥΤΟΣ καὶ ΙΔΙΩΤΗΣ οἷς ἐκεῖνος λέγει ἁλίσκεται, ὁ δὲ πεπαιδευμένος δυσχεραίνει.
The word occurs frequently in other parts of Aristotle's writings, and seems generally, if not always, to be used in the same sense.
βωμολόχοι — καὶ φορτικοἰ.
And I. 5, where he says, that, ΟΙ ΠΟΛΛΟΙ καὶ ΦΟΡΤΙΚΩΤΑΤΟΙ
, held the summum bonum to be pleasure. See also Rhet. III. 1. p 584, A.φορτική
, then, applied to Tragedy, I think it clear, that he means only—calculated for φορτικοὶ
spectators; adapted to the entertainment of popular audiences—to the taste, as we commonly
"It must be allowed, that stage-poetry, of all others, is more particularly levelled to please the populace."
ΦΟΡΤΟΣ
.
Ὡς γαρ ἐκ αισθανομένων, ἀν μη ΑΥΤΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΘΗΙ, πολλην κίνησιν κινενται
. This wound has been sufficiently probed. When I found, that the "medica manus"
of Mr. Toup had been tried upon it, I looked, at least, for the "salubres Ambrosiae succos, et odoriferam panaceam,"
if not for the precious ὠν μη ΑΥΛΟΣ ΠΡΟΣΗ
. I should be very sorry to do any injustice to the emendation of so masterly a Greek scholar; but I am obliged to confess, that I do not understand it.
As far as I can judge, from a comparison of the different senses of the word with its etymology, the common idea, which runs through and connects them all, is that of excess, or, perhaps, more exactly, of offensive, disgusting, or burdensome, by excess, of some kind or other.
ΦΟΡΤΟΣ
.
It is some comfort, however, that the general meaning of the passage seems liable to little or no difficulty; and, accordingly, in that, all the commentators, I think, are agreed, however widely they may differ as to the reading.
This is one of those antique curiosities, which we stare at, without knowing very well what to make of it. — Αν ΔΙΣΚΟΝ δεη μιμείσθαι
. We should think it very strange, if we were told of a flute-player having occasion to imitate a quoit. But we are not to understand this of a mere instrumental solo, but of a performer accompanying words sung by a Chorus, (as appears from the mention of the Αυλητης
, or Tibicen
, was not, it seems, a mere sedentary performer, like those of a modern orchestra. He accompanied the Chorus with his person, as well as with his instrument, and seems to have paraded about the stage, in a pompous dress; to have made a part of the ὄψις
, or show, and to have joined in all the turns, and returns, and various evolutions, of the choral dance. Hence the description of Horace:
Sic priscae motumque et luxuriam addidit arti
Tibicen, traxitque VAGUS per pulpita vestem.
Αυλητης
, mentions, among the rest, —και ΒΑΙΝΕΙΝ ἐν ῥυθμῳ
.
φαυλοι
or φορτικοι
performers. Such a performer might have occasion, or rather take occasion, to imitate the whirling or rolling of a disc, if the subject, for example, of the choral song chanced to be the story of
Κυλιόμενοι
. Dacier, in his note, translates this, "rolling themselves upon the ground." This would be φορτικον
indeed. Yet in this idea he follows Victorius; who enters into a discussion, of some length, to prove that κυλιομενοι
can mean nothing but rolling on the ground. Nor will he allow the difficulty of doing this while they were playing to be a sufficient objection. Certainly, the usual and proper sense of the word is on his side. But it was natural enough, surely, to apply to the motion imitating, the term proper to the motion imitated.
τα τ' όντα, τα τ' ἐσσομενα, προ τ' ἐοντα!
All this Lucian professes to prove; but, as might well be expected, some of his assertions are very lamely made out, others slurred over, or entirely neglected. The treatise, however, is, upon the whole, a curious piece; and, though far from sufficient to give a clear and complete idea of the pantomimic dance of the antients, yet it affords more information about it, than is to be found, I believe, any where else.
Έλκοντες τον Κορυφαιον
. — To imitate Scylla, — "naves in saxa trahentem,"
as Virgil has expressed it. But it is not easy to see, how the performer, at least while he was playing, could well spare a hand for this operation. This was even worse than what we call humouring a catch; when, for instance, a singer who is performing Purcell's "Fie, nay prithee, John" thinks it necessary to collar his neighbour.
Ἡ ὉΛΗ τέχνη
. Heinsius proposed, ἡ ΑΛΛΗ τεχνη
. But I believe the established reading to be right. The whole art—i. e. Tragedy, as represented; with all its constituent parts, and, as it was said before, άπαντα μιμεμενη
. For it might, as Aristotle presently observes, be read, or recited, like an Epic Poem; and, in that view, the comparison here made would not hold. Τεχνη
. . . the Tragic art: for so he uses the word, cap. i. not for the whole Poetic art, but for a single branch of it: ἐν ταις ειρημεναις ΤΕΧΝΑΙΣ
i. e. Epic Poetry, Tragedy, Comedy, &c. So too at the end of that chapter: τας διαφορας ΤΩΝ ΤΕΧΝΩΝ
. And, again, at the end of this chapter, (as I understand the passage,) της ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ἔργῳ
. See NOTE 277.
Θεατας ἐπιεικεις
: to which he opposes φαυλους
. The word ἐπιεικεις
seems rightly explained here by Dacier — "les honnêtes gens; c'est à dire, les gens qui ont eu une meilleure education." The passage, which he quotes from Plato, is much to the purpose of this chapter. Συγχωρω δη τόγε τοσετον και ἐγω τοις πολλοις, δειν την μεσικην ήδονη κρινεσθαι μη μεντοι των ἐπιτυχοντων άλλα σχεδον ἐκεινην είναι μεσαν καλλιστην, ἡτις ΤΟΥΣ ΒΕΛΤΙΣΤΟΥΣ, και ΙΚΑΝΩΣ ΠΕΠΑΙΔΕΥΜΕΝΟΥΣ τερπει
. — ἐπιεικης
in the same sense, τοιαυτα λεγειν και άκκειν, δια τῳ ΕΠΙΕΙΚΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΩι άρμοττει
.
Και διᾳδοντα
. There seems great reason to suspect this word. For, what is the force of the preposition here? Some commentators, without disputing the reading, neglect the preposition entirely, and render the word as if it were the simple participle, άδαντα
. Others understand, singing throughout: "qui continenter canit."
Goulst. But the proper sense of διᾳδειν
, would, I think, be — to sing dissonantly — to sing out of tune, — as, ΔΙΑφωνειν
. And so the word is actually used in the treatise Περι Κοσμα, in Aristotle's works, and opposed to ΣΥΝᾳδον
, as ΔΙΑφωνειν
is to ΣΥΜφωνειν
: — συμφερομενον, και διαφερομενόν συνᾳδον, και ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝ
. ᾠδοντα
. Considering how frequently Δ
and Λ
were confounded by transcribers, ΚΑΙ ΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ
might easily be blundered into ΚΑΙ ΔΙΑΙΔΟΝΤΑ
. One MS. reading is διαΔΙδοντα
; where the ΔΙ
, plainly enough, arose from the ΑΙ
.
The commentators understand from this passage, that there were two sorts of rhapsodists; one, of those who recited Epic Poetry, and another, of those who sung it. Whether this can be proved from other passages of antient authors, I know not. From this, it certainly cannot. Aristotle says, ΚΑΙ ῥαψωδεντα—ΚΑΙ διᾳδοντα
. Whatever the διαδων
was, he is here clearly distinguished from the ῥαψωδων
— the rhapsodist.
That the rhapsodists did not, in the strict and musical sense, at least, of the word, sing the verses of Homer, but recited or declaimed them only, we may pretty safely infer, from what is expressly said of Epic Poetry at the beginning of this work — that "it imitates by words only," without melody and rhythm — i. e. without music. This, indeed, will not prove that Epic Poetry was never sung, any more than what was said of Tragedy — that it imitates by words and music — will prove that it was never recited, or read. Yet the least, I think, that can be inferred from it, is, that Epic Poetry was, in general, and for the most part, recited or declaimed only; and, consequently, that the rhapsodists, properly so called, being the established performers of Epic Poetry, as the
The earliest Lyric Poet-Musicians, indeed, as we learn from Plutarch and Athenæus, used to sing even the hexameters of τον Τερπανδρον, ΚΙΘΑΡΩΔΙΚΩΝ ποιητην όντα νομων, [hymns,] κατα νομον ἐκασον, ΤΟΙΣ ΕΠΕΣΙ, τοις ἑαυτε, και ΤΟΙΣ ΟΜΗΡΟΥ, ΜΕΛΗ περιτιθέντα, ΑιΔΕΙΝ ἐν τοις ἀγωσιν
. ότι δε οι κιθαρωδικοι νομοι, ΟΙ ΠΑΛΑΙ, ἐξ ΕΠΩΝ συνισταντο, Τιμοθέου ἐδηλωσε
, &c. και μελωδηθηναι φησι, ἐ μονον τα Ὁμηρε, άλλα και Ἡσιοδε, και Αρχιλοχε
, &c." ΚΑΙ μελωδηθηναι
— "were even sung." p. 620.
It is not, however, at all improbable, that Homer might be sometimes sung, in Aristotle's time, and that this ῥαψῳδια
seems pretty clear.
ΠΕΡΙΕΡΓΑΖΕΣΘΑΙ σημείοις
. The και
which precedes the participle, ῥαψῳδεντα
, is omitted: and to produce his sense of διᾳδοντα
— qu'on peut même chanter, the Greek should be — ἐσι περιεργαζεσθαι----και διᾳΔΕΙΝ
.Ραψωδοι
and ὑποκριται
, are continually joined together, See Plato, in that entertaining dialogue, the Io, tom. I. p. 532, D. 535, E. and in a great many other places.
The passage of Aulus Gellius, to which I referred in my note on the translation, as a story, both curious in itself, and confirming what was there advanced, is this. "Histrio in terrâ Græciâ fuit famâ celebri: qui, gestûs et vocis claritudine & venustate, cæteris antestabat. Nomen fuisse aiunt POLUM. Tragœdias poetarum nobilium scitè atque asseveratè actitavit. Is Polus unicè amatum
The Greek, here, in either of the two readings warranted by manuscript authority, is unsatisfactory and suspicious, and the sense, consequently, uncertain. The reading of the old editions — δὶ ἧς τας ἡδονας ἐπιστανται ἐναργεστατα
: which Victorius renders — "per quam voluptates percipiunt evidentissime"
: ἐπιστανται
they perceive: — Who? — The spectators. To this mode of speaking, however, I should not object; because this ellipsis, of ὁἱ ἀνθρωποι
, is frequent in both the Greek and Latin writers. Thus, in the beginning of this chapter, κνωνται
. This answers to that very convenient idiom, of which the French make so much use, and which we so often find the want of on s'agite — on apperçoit
, &c.
ON
, is only a corruption of homme
; and on dit
, for example, was antiently written, "buom dit."
And thus the Italian writers use uom
. Thus Petrarch, Son. 190, &c. "Uom dice."
And thus the Germans use the word man
— man saght
— men say — See Menage's Offervaz fopra l' Aminta.
But, the verb, ἐπιστανται
, will, I apprehend, by no means bear the sense here forced upon it, of perceiving pleasure; or any sense, but that of understanding, or knowing. Were I, therefore, obliged to make some sense of this reading, it would be this: — "[quae efficiuntur] voluptates, norunt homines apertissime"
: — "the pleasures, which are produced through which, are clearly understood — well known to all." But this, I confess, is violent interpretation; and, in particular, I doubt whether the word ἐναργες
is ever used, by Aristotle at least, as merely synonymous to φανερον
; as evident to reason or understanding, and opposed to doubtful. It always means, I believe, evident, clear, visible, to the eye of imagination. Thus, cap. xvii. — Δει δε τες μυθες συνισταναι ότι μαλισα ΠΡΟ ΟΜΜΑΤΩΝ τιθέμενον· ὕτω γαρ ἐν ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΑΤΑ ΟΡΩΝ, ώσπερ ΠΑΡ ΑΥΤΟΙΣ ΓΙΓΝΟΜΕΝΟΣ ΤΟΙΣ ΠΡΑΤΤΟΜΕΝΟΙΣ
, &c. These words seem to furnish the best comment upon the passage in question, and will perhaps lead us to the most reasonable and least exceptionable interpretation of it; for perfect satisfaction is not, I think, to be expected, in the present condition of the text.
We ought, surely, at all events, to adhere to the proper and clear meaning of the adverb ἐναργεστατα
, as used in the passage just cited; where the word itself, and the explanatory expressions which accompany it, afford a pretty strong presumption, that Aristotle, here, meant to express the particular advantage which Tragedy receives from the ὄψις
, or, from actual representation,
δὲ ὡς
to the ὄψις
, and proposes this emendation: (scil. ὄψεως
) ΤΗΣ ΗΔΟΝΗΣ συνιστανται ΤΑ ἐναργεστατα
— "per quam, voluptatis pars evidentissima efficitur; quippe quae oculis subjecta est fidelibus."
But I cannot think that Aristotle would have written, δι' ΗΣ, ΤΗΣ ήδύνης
.και ἐτι, μικρον μερα την μεσικην και την όψιν ἐχει, δὲ ἡς ῾ΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΙ ΣΥΝΙΣΤΑΝΤΑΙ ἐναργεστατα
: that is, according to the only sense which I can find for it —
I give, here, what I apprehend to be the only fair sense of the verb, συνιστασθαι
; but it seems to be, by no means, the proper word in this place, and probably is not the word which Aristotle wrote. If any one MS. would offer me ΠΑΡιστανται
, I would readily accept it. Ælian, describing the effect of a trumpet, sounding suddenly, at the instant when a famous painting was exhibited, of a warrior in the act of rushing to the battle, says — ἁμα τε ἐν το μελθ ήκκετο τραχύ και φοβερου και οὐδεικνυτο ἡ γραφη, και ὁ στρατιωτης ἐβλεπετο, το μέλες ΕΝΑΡΓΕΣΤΕΡΑΝ την φαντασιαν τε ἐκβοηθεντα ἐτι και μαλλον ΠΑΡΑΣΤΗΣΑΝΤΟΣ
: i. e. ἡδοναι
, is not
εναργεσατα
. To express the other sense, Aristotle would probably have written, ἐπργεταται ὡς ἐι ενεργεσταται συνιστανται ήδοναι
.συνιστασθαι
used throughout the treatise.ἐναργες
; but that pleasure is heightened by the action being rendered so.
Upon the whole, however, I see no other meaning that can be obtained from the words, without still greater violence and improbability of interpretation. Dacier, Batteux, and Goulston, make the assertion — ὡι ήδοναι
, &c. relate to both music and decoration. But it is, surely, quite unwarrantable to give to — ἩΣ
, the sense of, δὶ ΩΝ
, or δ' 'AIN
. Besides that the music, however great the pleasure it may afford, cannot, I think, properly be considered as contributing to the ἐναργεια
, or as heightening the illusion, of Tragedy. Victorius, who read την μεσικην και ΤΑΣ ΟΨΕΙΣ
, very consistently made ἧς
refer to μεσικη
only: and Castelvetro very properly observes, that, if we read την όψω
— "le predette parole [. . δι ἧς ἀι ήδοναι, κ. τ. αλ.] havranno rispetto alla vista; & conteneranno la commendatione della detta vista, per la quale si constituisca il diletto più manifestamente che non si fa per le parole dell epopea."
p. 690. He appears, I think, to have understood the passage in the way I have proposed. But he mentions another reading, which I have not seen noticed anywhere else — ἐνΕργεστατα
. This had occurred to me, formerly, as a conjecture, before I had seen Castelvetro's commentary. But it gives much the same sense, and would remove no difficulty with respect to the passage itself — though, as I shall presently have occasion to observe, it might suit better with what follows. See NOTE 277.
Ειτα, και το ἐναργες ἐχει, και ἐν τῇ ἀναγνωσει, και ἐπι των ἐργων.
— It seems rather strange, that, immediately after mentioning the ἐναργες
of the ὄψις
, Aristotle should say — "Then, it has also the
&c. It was this which induced me to suspect, that for ἐναργες
,"ἐναργεστατα
, in the preceding passage, we should read — ἐνΕργεστατα
: "By means of which, [i. e. of the
But the objection is, perhaps, not of sufficient force to warrant a departure from the established reading of all the manuscripts, ὄψις
,] the pleasures we receive from Tragedy (those, of terror and pity excited by imitation, as he says cap. xiv.την ἀπο ἐλεος και φοβε δια μιμησεως ΗΔΟΝΗΝ
. ἐναργεστατα
: and we may, well enough, understand the author, as if he had said — "Then, farther, another advantage is, that Tragedy has this
ἐναργες
, not only on the stage, and on account of the Ὄψις
, but even in reading also."
That ἀναγνωσει
is right, (not ἀναγνωρισει
,) I cannot entertain a doubt. Nothing can be more evidently nonsensical than this distinction — "both in the discoveries, and in the incidents;"
as if a discovery were not an incident.
The expression, ἔπι των ἐργων
, for, δηλον ἐκ των ΕΡΓΩΝ
— from what happens in the performance of such music. And see ἐργα
is repeatedly used for musical performance; particularly, τα θαυμασια και περιττα ΤΩΝ ΕΡΓΩΝ
, "surprising and elaborate performance."
Dryden says of this passage — "It is one reason of Aristotle's, to prove that Tragedy is the more noble, because it turns in a shorter compass; the whole action being circumscribed within the space of four and twenty hours. He might prove as well, that a mushroom is to be preferred before a peach, because it shoots up in the compass of a night."
&c. If Aristotle had said, that Tragedy was the more noble, because a Poet could compose a Tragedy in much less time than an Epic Poem, the simile would have been justly applied. Dryden had, but just before, said, that "the effects of Tragedy are too violent to be lasting."
But he did not give himself time to see, that Tragedy owes this greater violence of effect to the shortness of its plan; that is, to its stricter unity, its more concentrated and unbroken interest, its "close accelerated plot;"
to that ἀθροον
, as Aristotle calls it, so essential to the purpose of Tragedy, which is, to give the pleasure of strong emotion. The Epic Poem is of too tedious a length, too various and episodic, to produce that effect in
But the case was, that Dryden, (who, as I have before had occasion to remark, appears to have taken his idea of Aristotle from French translation,) wrote this in the preface to his translation of "Though Tragedy be justly preferred above the other"
— i. e. the Epic Poem. Essay on Dram. Poesy.
Μυερον
. — Nothing is more diverting than the explanation which some commentators give of this word, and its application here. The Poem, it seems, is compared to the tail of a mouse, or a rat, which grows less and less towards the end: "versus extremum attenuata."
"Appaia una coda di topo."
Castelvetro — "Venga ella à far' apparentia di coda di sorcio, col suo fine angusta."
Piccol. μυερον
, and μειερον
, however their etymologies may appear to differ, have both the same meaning — that of Μεικρού σιχθώ
. . . ὁ κατα το τελοι ἐλλειπων χρονῳ
. [δολιχουρ
a long-tailed verse: ὁ κατα το τελώ πλεονάζων συλλαβη
.
In the Rhetoric, Aristotle applies μειρά
to a period that is too short, and disappoints the ear by ending abruptly. The passage is curious for its expression, and illustrates both the word itself, and its application, here, to a Poem, which disappoints the expectation of a reader in the same manner, by ending before its time.
Δει δε, και τα κωλα, και τας περιοδες, μητε ΜΕΙΟΥΡΟΥΣ είναι, μητε ΜΑΚΡΑΣ· το μεν γαρ ΜΙΚΡΟΝ [. .
μειερον
] προσπταίειν πολλάκις ποιει τον ἀκροατην· ἀναγκη γαρ, όταν, ἐτι ὁρμων ἐπι το πορρω, και το μετρον ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῳ ὁρε, ΑΝΤΙΣΠΑΣΘΗ παυσαμένε, ΟΙΟΝ, ΠΡΟΣΠΤΑΙΕΙΝ γίγνεσθαι, δια την ΑΝΤΙΚΡΟΥΣΙΝ.
Ακολεθέντα τῳ το μετρο μηκεί.
Almost all the commentators and translators understand μέτρον
, the standard measure, or length, of the Poem, as other commentators understand it, he, probably, would have rather said τῳ το ΜΗΚΟΥΣ ΜΕΤΡΩΝ
.μηκες όρθ
, cap. xxiv, and cap. vii. Μετρον
is so used in the passage given in the last note — το ΜΕΤΡΟΝ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῳ ὁρε
. If, however, "conformable to the usual length of Poems in that metre"
— of Poems in heroic verse. See what is said, cap. xxiv. about the adaptation of the hexameter to Epic Poetry: οὐδεις ΜΑΚΡΑΝ συστασιν ἐν ἀλλῳ πεποιηκεν τῳ ἡρωῳ.
— I cannot conceive that Aristotle meant to say, that the length of the Epic Poem was proportioned, or ought to be proportioned, to the length of the metre. Yet so the commentators. "Si — Poeta secutus fuerit longitudinem, quae instar videtur ejus carminis."
Vict. — "Si cum metri longitudine provebatur."
Goulst. &c. It was not the length of the hexameter which made it the fittest measure for heroic Poetry, but the nature of the feet of which it is composed; and on that account it was preferred, as στασιμωτατον και ὀγκωδεστατον των μετρων
. cap. xxiv.
The length of a verse is to be measured by the times (χρονοι
) which compose it. Now the hexameter is but τῳ τε μετρε μηκει
— were it longer by one third only than a Tragedy.
Ὑδαρη
— watery. Aristotle uses the same metaphor in the following passage of his second book De Republicâ, where, opposing the community of wives and children proposed by Plato, he very justly objects, that it would weaken the bond of social union, by diluting the social affections, and destroying—
Relations dear, and all the charities
Of father, son, and brother,
Εν δε τη πόλει, την ΦΙΛΙΑΝ ἀναγκαιον ὙΔΑΡΗ γινεσθαι, δια την κοινωνιαν την τοιαυτην, και ήκιστα λέγειν τον ἐμον, ἡ ὑιον, πατερα, ὑιον.
άμα φθεγγωνται τα τοιαδε ρήματα, το τε ΕΜΟΝ, και το ΟΥΚ ΕΜΟΝ
. Ωσπερ γαρ μικρον γλυκύ, εις πολυ ύδωρ μιχθεν, ἀναισθητον ποιει την κρασιν, ότω συμβαινει και την οικειοτητα, την προς άλληλες, την άπο των ὀνοματων τετων—κ . λ.
I stop there, because the passage is evidently defective, though the sense is plain.
Και, ἐτι, τῷ της τέχνης ἔργῳ.
The expression is ambiguous. It may mean, either the end, or business, of the Poetic art in general, or, that of Tragedy — of the Tragic art.τουτοις τε διαφέρει πασί, ΚΑΙ ΕΤΙ τῳ της τεχνης ἔργῳ
— shews the author to be speaking, here, of a distinct advantage. But, if we understand it to mean, that Tragedy answers the end of Poetry better than the Epic, this cannot be considered as an advantage distinct from those enumerated before, which are, plainly, such as contribute to the general end of Poetry — that of giving pleasure — of interesting, delighting, striking, &c. Whereas, if the peculiar end of Tragedy be superior to that of Epic Poetry, this, indeed, is an additional and separate advantage. Besides, the parenthetical insertion which immediately follows — δει ΓΑΡ, την τυχεσαν ήδονην ποιειν αυτας
(i. e. the Epic and Tragic Poems,) άλλα την ἐιρημενην
— plainly implies, that the τεχνης ἐργον
, of which he had been speaking, was that of affording the particular pleasure proper to the species. And thus, too, the word ἐργον
is used in other passages: τραγῳδιας ἐργον
,
The words, μαλλον το τέλες τυγχανεσα
, present a similar, but more embarrassing, ambiguity. Is τελ
, here, the end of Poetry, or the end of Tragedy? If we take it in the latter sense, Aristotle will say, that Tragedy is superior, both because its end — the peculiar effect which it purposes to produce — is superior to that of τελ
to mean the end of the poetic art,ἐι τυγχανοι το τέλος το άυτης
. . i. e. of Poetry in general. ἐναργεια
, its music, and its decorations — and, besides, (και ἐτι
) in the specific end at which it aims — it must, on the whole, be preferable to the Epic Poem, as answering more effectually the end of Poetry, by giving greater pleasure.
For, that this, in Aristotle's view, was the great end of the art, and of all its branches, appears, if I mistake not, evidently, from many other passages of this treatise, as well as from that now before us. Nor does he, any where, appear to me to give any countenance to an idea, which rational criticism has, now, pretty well exploded — that utility and instruction are the end of Poetry. That it may indeed be rendered, in some degree, useful and improving, few will deny; none, that it ought to be made so, if it can. But, that the chief end and purpose of Poetry is to instruct — that Homer wrote his Iliad on purpose to teach mankind the mischiefs of discord among chiefs, and his Odyssey, to prove to them the advantages of staying at home and taking care of their families — this is so manifestly absurd, that one is really astonished to see so many writers, one after the other, discoursing gravely in defence of it."La verité qui fert de fond à cette fiction, et qui avec elle compose la Fable, eft, Que l'absence d'une perfonne hors de chez soi, ou qui n'a point l'œil à ce qui s'y fait, y cause de grands defordres."
And again — "Ces grands noms de Rois, de Heros, d'Achille, d'Agamemnon, & d'Ulyffe, ne defignent pas moins les derniers Bour-geois,"
&c. — Du Poeme Ep. I. 10. Piccolomini, in particular, ποιητην πάντα στοχαζεσθαι ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΙΑΣ, ΟΥ ΔΙΔΑΣΚΑΛΙΑΣ
, τα μέγιστα, δις ΨΥΧΑΓΩΓΕΙ΄ ἡ Τραγῳδια, μυθε μερη ἐσιν
, ἐστι δε ἐχ αυτη ἀπο Τραγῳδιας ἩΔΟΝΗ.
γαρ πασαν δει ζητειν ἩΔΟΝΗΝ ἀπο Τραγῳδιας, άλλα ΤΗΝ ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ.
— Επει δε την ἀπο ἐλει και φοβε, δια μιμησεως, δει ἩΔΟΝΗΝ παρασκευαζειν τον ποιητην
ὶν, ώσπερ ζωον ἐν όλον, ποιῃ την ΟΙΚΕΙΑΝ ΗΔΟΝΗΝ.
την όψιν, δι ἧς ΑΙ ΗΔΟΝΑΙ, &c. cap. ult.
— δει γαρ ἐ την τυχεσαν ἩΔΟΝΗΝ ποιειν ΑΥΤΑΣ, άλλα την ειρημενην.
"Coloro, che vogliono, che la poesia fia trovata principalmente per giovare, o per giovare & per dilettare infieme, veggano che non s'oppongono all' autorità d'Aristotele, il quale, qui ed altrove, non par che le affegni altro, che diletto; e se pure le concede alcuno giovamento, gliele concede per accidente come è la purgatione dello spavento & della compassione per mezzo della Tragedia."
The peculiar end of Tragedy, he has expressly told us, is to afford that pleasure, which results from fictitious terror and pity: την άπο ἐλει και φοβε δια μιμησεως ήδονην.
— What he regarded as the peculiar end of Epic Poetry, I observe that he has no where distinctly said. But from what he has said, of the advantages which its plan affords, with respect to grandeur, and variety, and the admission of the wonderful and surprising, and also of the superior richness of its language,Διο και γλώττας
, &c. Transl. p. 113, and 117. "admiration, produced by a grandeur of design, and variety of important incidents, and sustained by all the energy and minute particularity of description."
This end, however, and these peculiar advantages, of the Epic plan, Aristotle has not, as I have before remarked, brought forward, to complete the comparison in this chapter: but he plainly, and, I think, justly, considered them as more than compensated by the closer interest, more perfect illusion, stronger emotion, deeper impression, and, in bis view, more useful tendency, of Tragedy. The Epic Poem loses in force of effect, what it gains in variety; in nature and passion, what it gains in grandeur and sublimity. The very necessity, and the merit, of its variety, and of the ἐπεισοδιων ἀνομοἰοις ἐπεισοδίοις
,
A strong proof of the superiority of Tragedy, and of the justness of Aristotle's decision, is, that every reader is most delighted with the Episodes of Epic Poetry; with those subordinate and more compressed actions, which give us the very pleasure of Tragedy — which interest and affect us by exciting pity and terror: with the meeting of
But though, of all the pleasures which Poetry, or Music, or Painting, can afford, the pleasure of emotion deserves to be esteemed the greatest, yet all those arts certainly afford considerable pleasures of other kinds; and, perhaps, to do full justice to the Epic Poem, we ought not to characterize it by any one particular and principal pleasure, but by that variety, which is peculiar to it, and which comprehends, in some degree or other, every sort of pleasure, that serious Poetry can give."the first praise of genius is due to the writer of an Epic Poem; as it requires an assemblage of all the powers which are singly sufficient for other compositions."
THE END.