RHETORIC1 is the counterpart of logic*2; since both are conversant with subjects of such a nature as it is the business of all to have a certain knowledge of, and which belong to no distinct science. 1. Rhetoric corresponds to Logic. Wherefore all 2 men in some way participate of both 3; since all, to a Aristotle appears to have contemplated a much greater variety of occasions for the exercise of his 'ρητορικὴ, than we consider proper to that ill-defined art, or habit, or faculty, vaguely called rhetoric. In fact, according to him, any man who attempts to persuade another, under whatever circumstances, and with whatever object, may be said to exercise ῥητορικὴ. Muretus explains the passage as conveying a censure on Plato, who extolled logic, but compared rhetoric to cookery— ὀψοποιητικη̃. He therefore would have it convey this ing, " Rhetoric is the counterpart, not of cookery, as Plato asserts, but of his own favourite science, dialectics." See also note 19, p. 23. Sir P. Sidney, arguing that all arts are but attempts to methodise natural subjects, says, that " the rhetorician and logician, considering what in nature will soonest prove and persuade, thereon give artificial rules, which are still compressed within the circle of a question, according to the proposed matter." Defense of Poetry. certain extent, attempt, as well to sift, as to maintain an argument; as well to defend themselves, as to impeach That we can reduce them to a system. 4. Now, of the multitude 5, some do this at random ; others, by reason of practice, from habit; but as it is possible either way, it is plain that the case will admit of our reducing these things to a system. For we are at liberty to speculate on the causes of the success, as well of those who from practice, as of those who on the spur of the moment, [attempt either to convince . or to persuade]. And every one will be antecedently prepared to acknowledge that an undertaking of this description is the business of art6.

3. Strictures on previous systems. Hitherto, however, such as have compiled systems of oratory have executed a very trifling part of it ; for the means of making credible alone come pro* ’Εξετάζειν καὶ ὐπέχειν, quà Logicians ; ἀπολογει̃σθαι καὶ κατηγορει̃ν, quà Rhetoricians : so that the faculties which form the basis of each of these arts appear to be natural to every man. Zeno elegantly illustrated the distinction between the two by a simile taken from the hand. The close power of Logic he compared to the fist, or hand compressed; the diffuse power of Rhetoric to the palm, or hand open. Cicero, Orator. The vulgar can give reasons to a certain degree, and can examine, after a manner, the reasons given them by others. And what is this but NATURAL LOGIC ? If therefore these efforts of theirs have an effect, and nothing happen without a cause, this effect must of necessity be derived from certain principles. The question then is, What these principles are; for if these can once be investigated, and then knowingly applied, we shall be enabled to do by rule what others do by hazard ; and in what we do, as much to excel the uninstructed reasoner, as a disciplined boxer surpasses an untaught rustic. Harris's Philosophical Arrang. ch. i. An effect is produced; sometimes indeed accidentally, and sometimes from the person's having been habituated to that which he attempts. Now if we can ascertain and methodise the causes of this his success, so as to insure the success of subsequent attempts, we shall have constructed something similar to an art: for, in some points, chance and art are not unlike; whence the verse of Agatho;—

LET us define rhetoric to be, " A faculty of considering 1. Definition of Rhetoric. all the possible means of persuasion on every subject ;” for this is the business of no one of the other arts, each of which is fit enough to inform or persuade respecting its own subject; medicine, for instance, on what conduces to health or sickness ; and geometry, on the subject of relations incidental to magnitudes ; and arithmetic, on the subject of numbers ; and in the same way the remaining arts and sciences. But rhetoric, as I may say, seems able to consider the means of persuasion on any given subject whatsoever. And hence I declare it to have for its province, as an art, no particular limited class of subjects. Now 2. Two classes of πιστεις —ἔντεχ­ νοι, ἄτεχ- VOL. of the means of effecting persuasion, some originate in the art, others independently of it. By inartificial up to moral certainty. Here then a fallacy is not so easily discoverable, even by the orator himself; and candour requires us not to brand as moral what after all may be merely mental imperfection in the speaker. I mean whatever are not furnished forth by our own means, but which are in existence already, as witnesses, torture, deeds, and all of this kind ; by artificial, such as may be got up by means of the system, and by our own talents. So that as regards these, we have to employ the one class, to discover the other.

8 Of means of persuading by speaking there are three species1: some consist in the character of the speaker ; others in the disposing the hearer a certain way; others in the thing itself which is said, by reason of its proving, or appearing to prove the point. 4. i. Character of the speaker. [Persuasion is effected by means of the moral character, when the speech shall have been spoken in such a way as to render the speaker worthy confidence : for we place confidence in the good to a wider extent, and with less hesitation, on all subjects generally ; but on points where no real accuracy exists, but there is room for doubt, we even entirely confide in them. This feeling, however, should arise by means of the speech, and not by reason of its having been preconceived that the speaker is a certain kind of man. For it is no true, as some treatise-mongers lay down in their systems, of the probity of the speaker, that it contributes nothing to persuasion ; but moral character nearly, I may say, carries with it the most sovereign 5. ii. Feelings of the auditor. ­ emcacy in making credible2. [Persuasion is effected through the medium of the hearers, when they shall have been brought to a state of excitement under the influence of the speech; for we do not, when influenced by pain or joy, or partiality or dislike, award our decisions in the same way ; about which means of persuasion alone, I declare that the I Πιστεις διὰ του̃ λόγου, or artificial, of three kinds, ἐν τω̃ ἠθει̃ του̃ λέγοντος—ἐν τῳ̃ τὸν ἀκροατὴς διαθει̃ναι πιος—ἐν αὐτῳ̃ τῳ̃ λόγῳ. In so high estimation did Menander hold the manner of an address, that he attributed the whole effect to it;—τρόπος ἔσθ’ o πειθων του̃ λέγοντος, οὐ, λόγος. And as Plutarch observes upon this line, Kat τρόπος μὲν οὕν Kai λόγος ἥ TPO'ΠΟΣ AIA' ΛΟ'ΓΟΥ. De Audiend. Poet. t. i. Op. Mor. p. 125. edit. Wyttenb. system-mongers of the present day busy themselves. On the subject of these, however, some light will be afforded, when I speak on the subject of the passions.

Men give credit from the force of what is said, 6. iii. The speech itself. when out of the means of persuasion which attach to each subject, we evince the truth, or that which appears so. Now as persuasion is effected by these 7. Rhetoric an offshoot of Dialectics and Politics. means, it is plain that it will be the privilege of him who is able to draw inferences syllogistically, and to take a full view of the subject of morals, and of the virtues, and thirdly of the passions, both what each of the passions is, of what nature it is, and from what causes it is engendered, and how : so that the fact is, that rhetoric is, as it were, a kind of off-shoot of logic, and of that department of moral philosophy which it is fair to call the science of social life 3. Whence rhetoric is invested with the costume of that science, as well as its professors, partly from inexperience, partly arrogance, and in part from other human causes ; because, as I stated at the outset, it is a sort of subordinate division of logic, and portraiture of it; neither of them being a science of any one definite Πολιτικὴ. For an explanation of this term-an enumeration of the various arts which he comprehends under it-and for an account of the estimation in which he holds it, see Ethics, lib. i. c. 2. 'Υποδύεται. So blind are men to this affectation of rhetoric and its professors, that he who, having had no occasion for the display of his persuasive powers, other than the ordinary course of affairs presents, would be accused of great arrogance were he to talk of having exercised rhetoric. Now Aristotle, so far from holding a person guilty of presumption for such an use of the term, would rather retort on the accuser the charge of ignorance of its true import. For with a view to invest their art, and of consequence themselves, with an air of dignity, the professors of rhetoric, said he, would have the world think (some of them, poor creatures, δι’ ἀπαιδευσιαν) that it was applicable exclusively to such cases as are of high concernment to society. This in part is true; rhetoric is παραφυὲς τη̃ς Πολιτει̃ας : but, as Majoragius observes, " Virgulta magnam quidem cum arboribus quibus adnascuntur habent similitudinem, et rerum naturam redolent. Sed tamen multo 8unt inferiora, neque tam uberes fructus ferunt.” So far prevalent is this notion to this very day, that we only apply this word by way of ridicule to persuasion on ordinary topics. subject, as to what may be its nature; but both being certain faculties for furnishing ourselves with arguments. Now on the subject of the powers of the two, and their mutual relation, nearly enough has been said.

8. Subdivision of πιστεις, ἐν αὐτω̃ τω̃ λόγῳ̃: i. Enthymem, ii. Example. With regard to means of persuading by proving, or appearing to prove your point, just as in logic one is induction, another syllogism, another apparent syllogism, so also is the case here in rhetoric; for its example is an induction, its enthymem a syllogism ; and enthymem I call rhetorical syllogism; rhetorical induction. Nowallorators effect their demonstrative proofs by allegation either of enthymems or examples, and, besides these, in no other way whatever. So that if it be incumbent on you to prove with regard to any thing or person in form of syllogism or induction, it cannot but be (as is evident from Analytics) that each of these will be essentially the same as each of the former (enthymem and induction. 9. Example. And what the difference is between example and enthymem is plain from the Topics, where, on the subject of syllogism and induction, it has been stated before, that the proving that such or such is the fact in many and similar cases, is called in the other art, Definition of Syllogism. induction; in this, example. But when, certain points having been granted, there results, by virtue of these, something else over and above these, by virtue of their existence, either as generals or particulars ; this process is, in that art, called syllogism : 10. Various styles of speaking. in this, enthymem5. Rhetoric, it is plain, enjoys each advantage ; for [with respect to it] the case, in this treatise, is the same as in the Methodica has been stated of logic ; the speeches of orators abounding, some in examples, others in enthymems ; and orators themselves being in the same way, some fond of example, others of enthymem. Reasonings, however, Or, each style of rhetoric has its peculiar advantage. Is 'ρητορεια, the words of an orator, modelled according to rhetoric, whose object it is to persuade; versus, λόγος, the words of a logician, modelled according to logic, whose object it is to convince. conducted through the medium of example, are not less calculated to persuade ; but those of which enthymem is the characteristic are rather applauded7. ut I will hereafter explain what is the cause of this, and how we are to use each species of proof: let us, at present, distinguish more clearly respecting these proofs themselves. Now forasmuch as that which 11. Rhetoric considere the πιθανὸν for a class, not an individual, carries persuasion with it, does so in reference to some one ; and either is, immediately on being enunciated, actually of a nature to persuade, and enforce belief; or [has its effect] from its appearing to prove through the medium of such [as compose the former class] ; and as no art considers particular cases; medicine for example, what is wholesome for the individuals, Socrates or Callias, but what is so for any person of such a constitution ; for this question comes within the province of art, but particulars are infinite, and cannot be known: so neither will rhetoric consider probability in reference to particular individuals; what, for instance, is probable to Socrates or Callias, but that which is so to persons such as they are; just in the same way as logic, for that art does not draw conclusions indiscriminately from any subjects; for some things there are which appear probable even to a madman; [yet you never would dream of arguing about them;] but it supplies itself from subjects and draws its supplies from subjects of deliberation. 12. Audience held to be άπλοι. which require reasoning, as does rhetoric from subjects which are usual matters of deliberation. Its business then is respecting points about which we deliberate, and have no art specially conversant, and before auditors of such abilities as are not able to take a connected view of reasonings, conducted through θορυβου̃νται. Twining, in his notes on the Poetic, quoting a subsequent passage of this Treatise, in which this word again occurs, (ii. 23,) translates it, " are applauded," and observes, that " the commentators strangely mistake the sense of this word here, and in lib. i. c. 2. They render it absurdly,­ vehementius percellunt—perturbant maxime. Whether an audience be pleased or displeased, to any great degree, noise is equally the consequence; and the word ϑορυβει̃ν is used, sometimes for the uproar of approbation, and sometimes for that of dislike .” many stages, nor to deduce an argument from remote principles. Now we deliberate on subjects which appear to admit of having themselves in either of two ways: for on questions which cannot, under any circumstances, past, present, or future, be otherwise; on these, I say, no one deliberates, at least not while he apprehends them to be such 8; for by such a deli- 13. Hence concludingἐκ συλλελο­ γισμένων πρότε­ being lengthy, and ἐξ ὰσυλλο­ γιστων μὲν δεομέ­ υων δὲ συλλο­ γισ μου̃, being unadmitted —are to be. avoided. beration nothing is gained. And you may draw your conclusions and inferences, sometimes from premises which you have arrived at by former syllogisms; and sometimes from propositions, not syllogistically deduced, but requiring such a process by reason of their not being probable at first sight; but of these processes, it is impossible that the former should not be hard to follow up, by reason of its prolixity (for your hearer is supposed to be a man of merely ordinary understanding), and the latter defective in persuasive efficacy, by reason of its not being deduced out of principles either acknowledged, or probable ; sothat it is necessary that both the enthymem and example should be conversant about points which generally speaking, admit of being otherwise, the example an- swering to induction, xmpand the enthymem to syllo- A man under a mistaken idea of the nature of the subject may possibly deliberate on a question, the nature of which is fixed and necessary. Still, however, as long as he remains under this impression, the subject relatively to him is of a contingent nature. Cicero gives a similar caution:—“ Haec nostra oratio multitudinis est auribus accommodanda, ad oblectandos animos, ad impellendos, ad ea probanda quae non aurificis statera, sed quadampopular! trutina examinantur." De Drat. lib. ii. We may further prove that this precept has its foundation in nature, by quoting the words of a celebrated modern writer, who, at least in penetration and knowledge of mankind, had few superiors: " The receipt to make a speaker, and an applauded one too, is short and easy. Take common sense quantum sufficit ; add a little application to the rules and orders of the House; throw obvious thoughts in a new light, and make up the whole with a large quantity of purity, correctness, and elegance of style. Take it for granted that by far the greatest part of mankind neither analyse nor search to the bottom; they are incapable of penetrating deeper than the surface. ” Lord Chesterfield's Letters. Igism,) and be deduced out of few, and frequently out of fewer intermediate propositions than the syllogism, in its original form, consisted of. For if any of these be known, it is not necessary to mention it; for the hearer of himself makes this addition. For example, in order to convey the information that Dorieus was conqueror in a contest where a chaplet is the prize; it suffices to say, that he conquered in the Olympic games : but as to the circumstance that, having conquered at Olympia, he got a chaplet, there is no necessity for adding it, because every one knows it.

But as the necessary premises out of which the 14. Enthymems are deduced either from εικότα or σημεια. syllogisms of rhetoric are formed are very few, (for the majority of questions about which decisions and consideration are exercised admit of being otherwise; because men deliberate and consider on the subjects of human conduct, and all conduct is of this contingent nature, nor is a single branch, I may say, of these subjects necessary,) and it cannot but be that you should deduce contingent conclusions from premises whose nature is such; and necessary ones, from necessary; ( this is evident to us from the Analytics:) I say, since this is the case, it is plAiD that the premises out of which enthymems are deduced, will be some of them necessary, but the greatest part contingent : enthymems are - educed from probabilities10 (εἰκότα) and signs (σημει̃). And thus it follows of necessity; that, of these, each In despair of finding adequate English expressions for the words εἰκὸς and σημει̃ον, I have acquiesced in the usual, but erroneous translation. At the risk of incurring the charge of prolixity, the following are given as the most popular ways of explaining this difficult subject. Dr. Whately considers this is a division of arguments according to the relation of the subject-matter of the premises to that of the conclusion." The εἰκὸς (or διότι of Aristotle) he takes to be an a priori ment, which may be employed to account for the fact supposed granted. The σημει̃ον (or on of Aristotle) and example, arguments which could not be so employed : vide Rhetoric, p. 116. Others, again, maintain that the σημει̃ον is an argument to prove past matters, the εἰκὸς to prove future. The majority of commentators, however, consider the εἰκὸς and σημεῖον as propositions in different matter : thus,­ respectively is identified with each of the former. 15. Definition of εἰκὸς. For probability is what usually happens, not abso-

1. An oration pre- supposes three things: 1st. a speaker: 2nd. a subject: 3rd. a hearer. 2. Hearers of three sorts. 1 i THE species of rhetoric are three in number, for of so many descriptions are the hearers of orations; because an oration is constituted of three things, of the speaker, and of the subject about which he speaks, and of the person to whom; and to him it is that the end of the speech has its reference ;I mean to the hearer.TheTiearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or a judge; and a judge either of things past or to come; one then acts as judge respecting what is yet to happen, as the member of a popular assembly; the other respecting what has already taken place, as the president of a court of justice; the other respecting the abilities of the 3. Hence three kinds of rhetoric; Deliberative, Judicial, Epideictic. Business orator, as the unconcerned hearer1. Thus, then, there will necessarily result three kinds of orations, the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative2. The business of deliberation is partly exhortation, partly. dissuasion ; for invariably those who in their individual capacities simply advise, and those who publicly harangue, effect one of these objects. The business of judicial rhetoric is partly accusation, partly defence; for the litigants must of course do one or the other of these things. Of demonstrative the business 4. Time is partly praise, partly blame. Moreover the Cf. lib. ii. c. 22, § 13: στοιχει̃ον δὲ λέλω καὶ τόπον ἐνθυ­ μήματος TO αὐτό : and lib. ii. c. 26, § 1 : τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ λέγω στοιχει̃ον Kai τόπον. I Both hearers are interested; but the ϧεωρὸς is a speculative, the κριτὴς a practical, auditor. Vide Quarterly Review, July, 1822, No. liv. vol. 27, p. 391. time proper to each of these respectively is, to the deliberative orator, the future; for in exhorting or dissuading, he advises respecting thingsfuture3. The time proper to a judicial pleader is the past;for it is ever on the subject of actions already that tEe one party accuses, and the other defends. To the demonstrative orator the present time is the most appropriate, for it is in reference to qualities actually possessed that all either praise or blame.Orators, however, do very frequently avail themselves of other times; as well by awakening a recollection of what has already happened, as by anticipating what is likely to happen. The end of each of these 5. and end peculiar to each. branches is different, and, as belonging to three subjects, is itself triple.*

The object of the deliberative orator is the expe-* dient and inexpedient; for he who recommends, advises you to adopt the better measure; but he who dissuades, diverts you from the worse; the other considerations either of justice and injustice, of honour or disgrace, he adjoins by the way, in addition to these two. The object of the judicial pleader is justice and injustice; but he also embraces by the way those oTher considerations. The object of those praise and blame is honour and disgrace ; and these also refer other considerations to tHese two.

But we may take as a sign that what I have stated 6. Proof of this from fact. is the particular object of each, the fact that there are times when they will not feel inclined even to raise a question about the other: the litigant, for example, will not always deny that the fact has taken place, or that it has hurt the other party; but he " Passion may be as much excited by the orator's reasonings on a future event, as on one past; and indeed the future, caeteris paribus, produces the greater effect on us, as that to which we are approaching, and what every moment gives us the added interest in, which it takes from the past. But then the past has the counterbalancing privilege of being susceptible of infinitely better testimony and evidence, from memory, present effects, etc.; memory, indeed, the great eye of the mind, unlike that of the body, sees all we have left behind, and nothing before it." Campbell, Phil. of Rhet. never, under any circumstances, would admit that he has been guilty of injustice toward him ; for then would there be no need of a judicial decision. In the same way the deliberative orator very often abandons the other considerations ; but as to the point that he is advising what is disadvantageous, or dissuading from what is useful, this will he never admit; but it frequently happens that (on a question of invasion) they do not trouble themselves to make out that the subjugating a neighbouring people is not inconsistent with justice. Just so those who praise and blame do not consider whether the person's conduct has been advantageous or disadvantageous ; nay, they, in many instances, set it down on the score of praise, that, overlooking his own interests, he wrought some deed of honour : thus they praise Achilles, because he came to aid the cause of his comrade Patroclus, with full knowledge that himself was fated to die ; it being in his power, [by withholding that aid,] to live. To him, however, a death such as this was the more honourable prize : but to live would have been advantageous.

7. The orator in each class must have κοι­ ναὶ προ­ τάσεις. From what has been said, it is plain that the orator must first be in possession of propositions on the subject of each of these divisions, separately; for the τεκμήρια, the probabilities and signs, are degrees of proof available to rhetoric generally. It is necessary because syllogism, in general, is made up of propositions, and the enthymem is a syllogism made up of the propositions which have been mentioned.

8. And as it cannot be that what is impossible should ever heretofore have been done or should ever be done hereafter, but what is possible, only: as again it cannot be that what has not happened, or that what is never about to happen, ever should, the one have been already done, the other be about to be done: it becomes necessary for the deliberative, judicial, and demonstrative orator to have propositions on the subject of possibility and impossibility; and on the questions, whether a fact has or has not happened, 9. will or will not take place. And further, since all, as well in praising as in blaming, as well in exhorting as in dissuading, as well in accusing as in defending, attempt to evince not only the points I have mentioned, but likewise to prove respecting this good or bad, this honourable or dishonourable, this just or unjust, that it is, moreover, either great or small, whether speaking of the things independently, or comparing them respectively one with another: as this is the case, it is plain that it will be necessary to have propositions respecting the degrees of great and small, of greater and less, as well general, as peculiar to each division: what good, for instance, is greater or less, what deviation from justice, or what conformity to it ; and so in the same way also respecting the other subjects. The points then have been stated, respecting which it will be absolutely necessary to get at propositions. We must, after this, make a distinction between each of these respectively ; the questions, for instance, about which deliberation is conversant; those, too, about which demonstrative rhetoric is concerned; and, thirdly, those about which judicial.

FIRST, then, we must ascertain what kind of good 1. The deliberative orator advises on subjects, or evil.it is respecting which the deliberative orator gives his advice; for we have seen that it is not about every kind, but about such as may or may not befall US1. Such however as either has or will have an 2. not necessary, existence of necessity; such, again, as it is impossible should exist or be produced; respecting every such description [of good or evil] there never is any de- This limitation was established in cap. ii. § 12. He developes this point more fully, Nich. Eth. iii. cap. 3. 3. nor on all that are contingent ; liberation: neither, in fact, is there about every one even of contingent subjects ; for of goods which may or may not accrue2, some exist naturally, others are produced by chance, on the subject of which it is not worth while to deliberate; but evidently [he is confined to subjects] about which men resolve; of which character are all such as are of a nature to be referred but where we apprehend a power of performance. to ourselves, and the first principle of whose creation is in our own power; for in deliberation we carry on our views thus far, viz. till we shall ascertain whether the achievement of the object be possible to us or not3.

4. Minute discussions here to be avoided, as not in the province of rhetoric, Now, to enumerate in accurate detail, and to divide into separate species, every subject about which men are wont to interest themselves; to enter moreover into minute distinctions conformable to the standard of truth to the very utmost that the subject admits it; these inquiries it is not necessary, on the present occasion, to institute, by reason that they belong not to the art of rhetoric, but to some art whose province is, in a more peculiar manner, intellect, and truth4; and because many speculations more than are proper to this art have already been assigned to 5. which is made up of the it. For that remark is true, which I have before made; that rhetoric is made up of the science of * Τω̃ν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι Kal μή. It may be well to remark of this expression, which has occurred so often already, . and will much more frequently in the sequel, that it is Aristotle's usual appellative for things contingent, things which may as well happen as not. He has himself defined it thus—λέγω

NEARLY every one individually, and all men in ge- 1. Happiness the general object. neral, have some object, at which directing every aim, they both choose and avoid; and this, to speak summarily, is happiness and its constituents. Let us then, for the sake of getting at a received standard, ascertain what happiness, generally speaking, is ; and what are its constituents; for on the subject of it, and what conduces to it, and of its opposites, exhortation or dissuasion is always conversant; and this, because we needs do the things which procure it or any of its constituents, or which render it greater from having been less, and refrain from doing the things which destroy or impede it, or produce its opposites.

Let happiness then be defined to be good fortune 3. Four definitions of it. in conjunction with virtue2,—or, independency of life, -or, the life which is most pleasant,accompanied by security,—or, abundance of property and slaves, with power to preserve and augment it; for mankind allow either one or more of these things to amount nearly to happiness. If then happiness be such as I 4. have described, is constituents must necessarily be— 1st, noble birth 3, many and excellent friends, wealth, a good and numerous offspring, a good old age ; and moreover personal excellencies ; as health, comeliness, strength, stature, ability in the games; character; The end of deliberation is τὰ συμφέροντα, of action f.ÚðaL/A-Ouίa. The first of these is the opinion of the Socratic school; the second, of the Stoics; the third, of the Epicureans; the last, the popular one. See a similar description, Hooker, v. § 76, p. 413. Of these, the first enumerated as far as " character " inclusive, may be considered δυνάμεις: the two next, " honour and good fortune," as τίμια: the last, namely, “ virtue and its constituents," as ἐπαιντὰ, according to the mode of philosophic division mentioned in the Ethics, lib. i. c. 12. —2nd, honour, good fortune;—3rd, virtue, and its constItuent . prudence, courage, justice, temperance. Thus furnished, one would be most independent, were both external and internal goods his own ; for besides Goods arc internal or external. these there are no others. But the internal goods are mental and personal; the external, noble birth, friends, wealth, and distinction. We deem, moreover, that power and good fortune ought to be present, for thus would life be most independent. Wherefore, let us ascertain what each of these advantages is.- 5. External. 1st. High birth. i. National. Noble birth then is, in the case of a nation or state, their being aborigines 4, or at least ancient possessors, and fo their first leaders to have been illustrious, and indeed for many to have been born from among them illustrious on the score of things which men emulate. ii. Individual. Considered in reference to individuals, noble birth is derivable from male or female ancestry, and legitimacy on both sides ; and, just as in the case of a state, to have had the first of their line well known on the score of virtue, wealth, or any other valued quality; and for many of their kindred to have been illustrious, as well men as women, as well young as old :— 6. Good offspring. i. Public. we cannot be at a loss for the constituents of a goodand numerous progeny., As referred to the commonwealth ; a good offspring will be, youth who are numerous and accomplished. Accomplished in respect to personal excellence, as stature, comeliness, strength, ability in : and as to that of the mind, temperance and courage; these all, in their two ii. Private. visions, are excellencies of the young. In reference to individuals, a good and numerous offspring consists in your own children being numerous, and they, as well male as female, such as I have described. The excellence of females in regard to person, is beauty and stature ; in regard to the mind, temperance and fondness for employment, without meanness: -and we ought, as well individually as collectively, It was the boast of the Athenians that they were αὐτόχθο­ νες; and in reference to this Cicero says of their state, " Quae vetustate ea est, ut ipsa ex sese snOB cives genuisse dicatur." Orat. pro L. Flacco. in respect both to men and women, to see that each of these qualities exists. Since all states among whom the regulations regarding women are bad (as is the case among the Lacedaemonians), enjoy scarcely the half of happiness.

The constituents of wealth are, plenty of money, 7. Wealth must be, the being master of lands and seats, with the possession moreove of personal property of live stock and slaves, such as are remarkable for number, stature, and comeliness; and all these should be secure, and respectable, and useful. The useful are of that de- L άσφα­ λη̃. ii. ἐλευ θέρια. iii. χρἡ­ σιμα. scription rather which are profitable; the respectable, which conduce to enjoyment. But by profitable I mean those out of which the rent arises; by those conducing to enjoyment, all out of which arises nothing (that's worth mentioning at least) beyond their mere use. The definition of security is the having possession there, and in such a manner, that the enjoyment of the property is one's own. The essentials of a property then exist, when the right of alienating is in one's hands: I understand by alienation either gift or sale. But, in a word, the being rich stands more in enjoyment than in possession; for the active employment and the use of such means is wealth.

Goodness of character is the apprehension of mankind, 8. Goodness of character. that you are a worthy person, or in possession of something of such a kind that all men aim at it, or at least the generality, or the good, or the welljudging. Honour is an evidence of your having a 9. Honour. character for beneficence; and those are honoured with justice, and in an eminent degree 5, whose beneficence has already been exercised: not but that he, too, is honoured who simply has the power to benefit. Beneficence relates either to the safety, and the causes, whatever they are, of the existence of its object, or to his wealth, or to any other goods whose acquisition is not easy, whether it be so generally, or at that place or time. For many meet with honour * Aristotle'a οἱ εὐεργετηκότες may be found beautifully enumerated in the book of Ecclesiasticus, chap. 44. in consequence of things apparently trifling; but then it is the manner or the time [of conferring the benefit] which is the reason. The constituent parts ofhonour are sacrifices,—monumental inscriptions, in metre or prose,—rewards,—consecrated pieces of ground6,— precedence,—public burial,—statues,—pensions from the state; those received among barbarians areprostration,—giving place7. The presents also usual among each people are, with them, respectively marks of honour; for a present is at once the gift of property, and a mark of honour. Wherefore it is that the avaricious are equally desirous of these, as the ambitious ; because they convey to both that which they desire, since at once it is a property, the object which the avaricious desire, and includes honour, the object of the ambitious.

10. Internal. 2nd. Health. The excellencies of the body are health ; and that in such a degree as for us to be exempt from sickness, while we have the free exercise of the body. For many are in a state of health, indeed, whom, like Herodicus8, no one would feel inclined to congratulate on the score of health, by reason of their depriving themselves of most, if not all, the enjoy- ments proper to man.

11. Beauty. Comeliness is different according to the several ages. Now the comeliness of a youth, is the having a body useful in enduring toils, whether those of the course, or of personal exertion, himself being pleasant withal to look upon with a view to delight. On which account those who practise the pentathlum are most comely, inasmuch as they are formed for violent Instanced in the compliment paid to the memory of Brasidas at Amphipolis, Thucyd. v. Hooker, v. § 34, p. 133 ; and § 47, p. 179. Here perhaps we may mention a remarkable compliment paid to fallen valour by the civil law; a father of three sons was entitled to considerable immunities, which continued to him even after their death, if they had fallen in battle : " Hi enim qui pro Republicâ ceciderunt in perpetuum per gloriam vivere intelliguntur." Instit. lib. ii. tit. xxv. § 1. Hooker, ii. p. 293. Herodicus was a physician, B. C. 440. exertion, and swiftness as well. But the comeliness of one who has attained life's prime, is a person adapted to the fatigues of war, with an'aspect to be looked upon with pleasure tempered by awe. That of the old consists in the body being capable of the fatigues which it needs must undergo, and exempt withal from pain, by reason that it has none of the afflictions by which an old age is disfigured. Strength 12. Strength is the capability of moving another at will: you move another, of course, either by dragging, or shoving, or lifting, or crushing him ; so that the man who is endowed with strength, is requisitely so for some, if not for all these purposes. Excellence of stature, 13. Stature. is the exceeding the generality in height, substance, and breadth, in such a ratio as not, by reason of that excess, to render one s motions 14. Gymnastic excellence. more tardy. Gymnastic excellence of person is made up of stature, strength, and speed; for the swift is also endued with strength : for he who is able to throw out his legs in a particular way, and move them rapidly, and in a forward direction, is fit for running ; but he who can crush and grapple with an adversary, is fit for wrestling ; while he who can send him forward by a blow, is the man for boxing : but if any be endued with the two latter qualifications, he is fit for a pancratiast; while he who has all three may contend in the pentathlum.

A good old age is an old age slow in approach, un- 15. Good old age. attended by pain ; for neither is it a good old age if one grows rapidly old ; nor if he does so slowly, indeed, but painfully: this blessing, however, is of the number both of the excellencies of the body and of fortune. For one who is neither unmolested by sickness, nor endued with strength, will not be exempt from sufferings ; and his days will be but few, and those not void of pain: nor without good fortune will he hold out at all. Indeed, independently both of strength and health there is means of long life ; for many, without the excellencies of the body, are long-lived. But accuracy of statement on these subjects makes nothing to our present purpose.

SINCE the expedient is the object proposed to the de- 1. The deliberative orator advises on " the means," therefore he must know the σνμφέ­ ρον. 2. liberative orator, and as all form their conclusions, not about the end itself, but about the means conducive to that end ; as moreover these are all things which are expedient in reference to human conduct (now every thing expedient is a good), we shall have to ascertain certain elementary propositions, on the subjects of the good and the expedient in general.

Let good, then, be defined to be, 1. Whatever is an object of choice independently, for its own sake; 2. and for the sake of which we choose something else. 3. What every thing aims at1, or every thing which has perception, or which has intelligence; or every thing would aim at, were it possessed of intelligence. 4. Whatever intelligence would award to each. 5. Whatever the intelligence conversant with every instance awards to each, that to each individual is his good. 6. That which being present, one is well disposed and independent. 7. Independency. 8. Whatever produces or preserves such advantages2; 9. and that on which they are consequent. 10. Whatever, too, has a tendency to prevent or destroy their opposites. Now, things are consequent in two ways; 3. Consequences are twofold. for either they may be consequent simultaneously or subsequently.—Knowledge, for instance, is a consequent on learning subsequently; life is so on health simultaneously. Again, things are productive in Things This principle, which he insists on even in his moral treatises, is peculiarly adapted for a test in rhetoric; where, if the subject be only reconciled to this standard of previous opinion, the end, persuasion, is forthwith answered. Hooker, v. § 65, p. 306. are ductive in three ways. three ways 3; first, in the way that the being healthy is productive of health, or as food is so of health, or as exercise is, because usually it does produce health.

4. Indisputable goods. These things being laid down, it must be of course that acquisitions of good, and the exemptions from evil, are good; for on the one is consequent the non-possession of evil simultaneously; on the other, the possession of good subsequently.

5. And the acquisition of a greater instead of a less good; of a less evil instead of a greater; for this becomes an acquisition of the one and an exemption from the other, in the ratio of the excess of the 6. greater above the less. The virtues also must of course be a good, for in reference to them are their possessors well-disposed4; they are also productive of goods, and bear on moral conduct: respecting each, however, severally what, and of what kind it is, 7. must be distinctly treated. It must be also that pleasure is a good, for all living things naturally desire it. Thus, too, things pleasant and honourable must needs be good; for the first are productive of pleasure ; while, of things honourable, some are pleasant, and the rest are by themselves objects of 8. choice on their own account, So that to speak of them severally, it must be that the following things are good.—Happiness; for it is both an object of choice by itself, and independent, and for the sake of it 9. we choose many things. Justice, courage, temperance, First, continuous; second, discrete; third, contingent. We may observe of Aristotle's several enumerations of εἶδη, that he usually refers a few instances of earliest rence to the respective definitions or axioms at the outset of the subject, by virtue of which they belong to the class to which he assigns them. Thus, in the enumeration of good here instituted, he refers to his general canons of good which have just been admitted; e. g. virtue may be classed among goods, by virtue of def. 5 and 7. It would be useful to pursue the comparison, if not through all the instances quoted, at least through the greater part of them ; since it will at once serve the purpose of impressing on the memory his leading examples, and of helping us to a fuller acquaintance with his theory. magnanimity, magnificence, and other habits of that 10. sort; for they are excellencies of —and health and comeliness, and things of that sort, for they are excellencies of the body, and productive of many things ; health, for instance, both of pleasure and of life ; and it seems, on this account, to be the very best possession, because it is the cause of two things, which the generality of men value most, viz. of pleasure and life:—Wealth because it is an excellence of 11. possession, and productive of many things A friend 12. and friendship; Tor a friend is an object of choice independently, and productive of many advantages. character; for they are pleas ant, and pro- 13. ductive of much; and there is usually consequent on them the actual possession of the qualities, on account of which the subject is honoured. Ability, in 14. speaking and acting; for all such powers are produce tive of good. Again, high genius, memory, readiness 15. in learning, quickness of thought, and all such qualities ; for these faculties are productive of good; and in the same way all the arts and sciences. And 16. life ; for were no other good consequent on it, of itself it is an object of choice. And that which is just \7. for it is a kind of general advantage. Such, then, are the things which are good, as it were confessedly.

But in the case of questionable goods, your reason- 18. Disputable goods. 19. ings will be deduced from these formulae,—that of which the contrary is an evil, is itself a good ; as is that of which the contrary is expedient to an enemy : for example, if your being cowards be above all things expedient to your enemies, it is plain, that to the citizens your courage will be above all things beneficial. And, in a word, whatever be the things 20. which the enemy desires and in which they rejoice, the contrary of those things appear beneficial; and hence was it well said ;— " Priam surely would exult," etc. II. a, 1. 255 5. See Otho's speech to the soldiers on Vitellius's usurpation after the murder of Galba:—Si Vitellio et satellitibus ejus eligendi facultas detur, quern nobis animum, quas mentes imprecentur; quid aliud quam seditionem et discordiam optabunt ? Tacit. Hist. i. 84. And yet this case does not always hold, though it does generally ; for there is no reason why the self- same things should not, at times, be expedient to two hostile parties ; from which comes the saying that evils bring men together6, when the same thing happens 21. to be injurious to both. That too is a good, which is not in excess ; but whatever exceeds what 22. it ought, is an evil. And that on account of which much toil or expense has been bestowed, for already will it have appeared to be a good ; and we already conceive of every such thing as of an end, and as an end of many efforts ; but the end is a good ; and on this principle rests the force of that appeal, “ It were in accordance forsooth with Priam's heartiest prayer;” II. β, I. 176. and of this, " Base indeed is it to remain so long;” II. β, 1. 298. and that of the proverb of " Breaking the pitcher at the very door." Vide Erasmi Adagia II. i. 75. 23. That too of which many are desirous, and which appears to be disputed for ; because that of which all are desirous, was laid down to be a good; the generality, however, have the appearance of being all. 24. And that which is recommended; because no one recommends that which is not good8. And that which your enemies and the bad recommend; for all, as it were, already acknowledge it when even they do who are ill affected; for solely on account of its being plainly such will these acknowledge it9: and in ex- So Shakspeare quotes the proverb, " Misery makes a man acquainted with strange bedfellows." A good which requires no qualification ; e. g. moral truths. To desire evil as evil, and feel pleasure in it as such, is perfectly unnatural. Hence St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Romans, ch. i. ver. 32, sums up the iniquity of the Gentile world in this one word; that not only did they in person commit the enormities, but " had pleasure in them that do them." Virgil therefore could not have praised AEneas more than when he makes Diomede say,- -Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus : experto credite, quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. An. actly the same way they are held to be but paltry characters land with these even their friends find fault, and all good men] with whom their enemy finds no fault: on which very principle the Corinthians conceived themselves to have been scandalized by Simonides introducing in his verses, " Troy finds no fault with the Corinthians 10.” And that is a good which any who are practically wise, 25. whether among men or women, have preferred ; instanced in Minerva's choice of Ulysses ; Theseus' of Helen ; and the Goddesses' of Paris11; and Homer's of Achilles. In a word, all objects of determined 26. choice are good. And men determinately choose to do both the things which have been mentioned, and those which are evil to foes and good to friends ; and those which are possible-these are varied in two ways ; such as may be done, and such as may easily 27. be done12 . Easy things are such as are done either without pain, or in a short time ; for difficulty is defined in reference either to the pain, or length of time. And men choose what is done as they wish ; and they wish what either is in no respect an evil, or in a less degree than it is good. This will occur in the case of unjust action, where the punishment either escapes notice or is trifling : and such actions as are 28. peculiar ; as no one has done ; or which are extraordinary, for thus is their value greater : and those things which have an adaptation to ourselves; of which kind are things belonging to us in respect of family, and power. Things too which men consider are wanting to the completion of something else ; for Glaucus the Lycian, who was of Corinthian descent, assisted the Trojans, consequently Simonides meant to praise them ; but from the known bias of this writer to " censure in disguise," (of which another instance may be found, lib. iii. ch. 2,) the Corinthians might very fairly suspect his purpose. Vide ii. c. 23, § 12, sub fin. περὶ 'Αλεξάνδρου, " ov ai θεαὶ προέκριναν.” J2 Vide c. xii. § ], εἴτε ἂν λαθεῑν πράξαντες, ἢ, μὴ λαθόντες, μὴ δου̃ναι δίκην, K. T. X. be they ever so trifling 13, they in no less degree determine 29. on putting them in execution : and things easily brought about; for they are possible, inasmuch as they are easy: but things easily brought about, are such as every one, or many, or our equals, or our inferiors, have succeeded in. Whatever gratines one's friends, or will be disliked by one's foes. Every thing, too, which they whom we admire deliberately set about. Things toward which men are well fitted by nature, and about which they have experience ; for they suppose they shall more easily succeed in them. Things too which no bad man does ; for they are the rather commendable. What people happen to be desirous of; for not only does it appear pleasant, but it is viewed in the more favourable 30. light 14. And men more particularly choose on deliberation the things in reference to which they severally are of a certain disposition ; the ambitious, for instance, if the object be victory ; the avaricious, if it be money ; and other characters in the same way.

On questions then of good and of expediency, we must deduce our means of persuading from hence.

1. The greater good must be discussed. BUT as the advocates of opposite measures, while they in many instances allow both to be expedient, dispute nevertheless on the question which is the more so; we shall have next to speak of greater good, 2. Definition of the excess and the exceeded. and what is in a higher degree expedient. Let excess, then, be defined to be, as much and yet more; the thing exceeded, however, to be that comprised So Horace ........ O ! si angulus ille Proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum ! If seen through the deceitful medium of desire. within the excess. Again, greater and more aFe terms relative always to some particular less thing: but great or small, much or little, have reference to the size of things generally. And that which is great exceeds; but that which is deficient is small; and of the terms much and little in the like manner.

Now as we call that good, which, independently, 3. Different στοι­ χεῑα of the greater good. for its own sake, and not on account of any thing else, is an object of choice ; that, too, which every thing desires ; and which, if invested with intelligence and practical wisdom, every thing would choose ; as also what is preservative or productive of, or on which such things are consequent; and as that, with a view to which we act, is the end ; and as an end is that for whose sake every thing else is done: but that is good to a man's self which has these affections in reference to himself: this being the case, it must be that plurality is a greater good than one or a few, provided that one or those few be enumerated in conjunction with it3; for it then exceeds them, and the within comprised one or few is exceeded. And if the 4. greatest individual of one species exceed the greatest individual of another, then also will the first species itself exceed the second. And, vice versa, wherever one species exceeds another, the greatest Greater, in reference to quantity continuous, or magnitude; more, in reference to quantity discrete, or multitude. The meaning of this passage appears to be this,-that while all terms designating quantity are relative, the grammatical degrees of comparison imply relation to certain objects then more immediately before us. Those who are puzzled by this doctrine of excess and defect, had better take Victorius's hint, and illustrate each remark by an example from numbers. This qualification is absolutely necessary to the truth of the position; for it may happen, if the plurality be not of things of the same species as the less number, that the less number is of higher value than the greater. Five guineas are " a greater good" than two, i. e. the greater number than the less, of things of the same species; yet it does not therefore follow that five farthings are better than two guineas, for there the less number is not, as in the first case it was, virtually enumerated in the greater. Compare Ethics, lib. i. c. vii. § 8. Or, as Lord Bacon expresses it, " That kind is altogether best, whose excellence or pre-eminence is best." individual of the exceeding, exceeds the greatest individuals of the exceeded species: for example, if the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman, then will also men, in general, be greater than women; and if men generally be greater than women, then will also the greatest man be greater than the greatest woman; for the excesses of species, and of the greatest individuals under them, have a common 5. ratio. When one thing is a consequence of another, but that other thing is not a consequence of it; (now, things are consequent, recollect, either simultaneously or subsequently, or virtually;) then is that of which the other is a consequence the greater good; because the enjoyment of the consequent is inherent in the enjoyment of the other. Things are consequent simultaneously, as life on health ; but it is not consequent on life: and subsequently, as knowledge on learning; virtually, as larceny on sacrilege; for the man who has committed sacrilege would be ready also 6. to steal. Things which exceed the same thing in a greater degree [than itself], are greater6; for of necessity 7. they exceed even the greater. T hings productive of a greater good are greater, for this would be by virtue of their being productive of something greater. That, too, the productive cause of which is greater, is likewise greater; for if that which is healthy, be preferable to, and a greater good than, that which is pleasant; then also will health be superior 8. to pleasure. As also that which, independently of any thing, is preferable, is superior to that which is not preferable independently: thus strength is above things conducing to health; for the latter are not sought on their own account, while the former is, 9. the which was assumed as a criterion of good. And should one object be an end, the other not an end ; As is the excess of the male above the female sex, so is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman; and conversely, as is the excess of the greatest man above the greatest woman, so is the excess of the male above the female sex. E. g. Eight exceeds two by six, which is also greater than the original number two. for the one is for the sake of something else, the other, for its own sake; thus is exercise inferior to a good habit of body 7. That too is a greater good which in 10. a less degree stands in need of any one or more things as accessions, for it is in a higher degree independent: now that is said less to need accessions, which needs such as either are fewer or more easily obtained. And whenever one thing does not exist, nor can possibly 11. be brought into existence independently of another, but that other can without it; then that which needs not the accession, is more independent, and thus shows itself to be a greater good. Again, if one be 12. a principle and the other not; and for the same reason, if one be a cause, the other not; since without a cause or principle, existence or production is impossible8. And of goods both proceeding from principles, that is the greater good which arises from the higher principle; as also that is the greater good which originates in the higher of two causes. And, vice versa, that of two principles which is the principle of the greater good, is greater ; and that of two causes which is the cause of the greater, is itself greater. It is evident then from what has been said, that it is 13. The same object may be made to appear the greater good in different ways. possible for a thing to appear the greater both ways ; for supposing this to be a principle, and the other not, it will appear the greater 9; as also will it, supposing it not to be a principle 10 while the other is; Man's will hath two several kinds of operation, the one natural or necessary, whereby it desireth simply whatsoever is good in itself, and shunneth as generally all things which hurt; the other deliberate, when we therefore embrace things as good, because the eye of understanding judgeth them good to that end which we simply desire. Thus in itself we desire health, physic only for health's sake; and in this sort special reason oftentimes causeth the will by choice to prefer one thing before another, etc. Hooker, v. § 48, p. 186. άρχὴ is the beginning of a thing, αἴτιον the cause; the latter consequently is prior to the former. In a plant, the seed is the ἀρχὴ, the vegetative power the αἴτιον. By the rule which states the principle to be superior to that which is not so. That is, supposing it to be an end; for, by a former rule, because the end, and not the principle, was above stated to be the greater. Just like the saying of Leodamus in impeaching Callistratus, " that the man who devised the deed was worse than he who executed it; for had he not devised it, the other could not have executed it:" and conversely, against Chabrias, he argued that " the agent was worse than the deviser; for had there not been an agent, it would not have been realized in action, because people devised plots on this very account, that others may 14. execute them." The more rare good is greater than the abundant11 ; thus gold is better than steel, notwithstanding that it is less useful; for the acquisition, by reason of its being more difficult, is greater. And in another view, the abundant is better than the rare, for the enjoy ment of ---It exceeds that of the other; for the idea of often exceeds that of seldom; whence 15. it is said, "Water12 is the best of things : and, in a word, the more difficult is superior to the easier acquisition, for it is more rare. In another point of view, the easier is above the more difficult; for it has 16. itself as we wish. That also is the greater good, the contrary of which is the greater evil; as is also that of which the deprivation is the greater loss. Virtue, too, is greater than what is not positive virtue, and vice than what is not positive vice; for the former 17. severally are ends, the latter are not ends. Causes, the productions of which are more becoming or more disgraceful, are themselves of greater importance. ends are superior to means: thus, by one nile the superiority is assigned to ends, and by another to principles. So that, whichever side you take, you will have something to allege. On this principle Aristotle argues in his Poetics for the superiority of the fable above the other five constituents of the drama, inferring its superior worth from its superior difficulty and rarity. " Quae rara, cara." Perrault, the French critic, misled possibly by this very passage, impotently ridiculed Pindar for the triteness of this idea: being ignorant that the poet alluded to the philosophy of Thales, who borrowed and taught the Phoenician doctrine, that water was the principle of all things. Vide Wharton on Pope, vol. i. p. 132. Also of whatever things the excellencies and deficiencies are of greater importance, of them are also the productions of greater importance: since results stand to each other in the same ratio, as their several causes and principles; and, vice versa, causes and principles, in the ratio of their several results. Things, 18. tile excess or which is preferable or more becoming, as accuracy of sight is preferable to that of smelling, for sight is preferable to smelling; and the being greatly attached to friends is more becoming than to be greatly attached to money13, so that attachment to friends is more becoming than fondness for money. And conversely, too, the excesses of better feelings are themselves better: and of the more becoming, themselves, more becoming: as, too, are those things of 19. which the desires are better or more becoming; tor the greater desire is of the greater object: and, for the same reason, the desires which fasten on the more excellent and becoming objects, are themselves more excellent and becoming. Again, where the sciences 20. are more grave or becoming, there the subject-matter also is more grave and becoming; for, as is the science, so is its truth; for each science takes cognisance of its peculiar truths: and analogous to this precedence of subjects is that also of the sciences, which recognise graver and more becoming subjects, above the rest; for the same reasons. And that which men of practical 21. wisdom, or every person, or the generality, or the majority, or the best of men have, or would have pronounced to be a greater good; that of course must be such, either absolutely, or so far at least as they decided conformably to their prudence. This, too, is a test available in common to the other questions about good; for their substance, quantity, and quality, have themselves so as science and prudence may direct; on this subject however we have treated. For that has been defined to be good which every To φιλέταιρον ει̉ναι καὶ τὸ φιλοχρήματον ; i. e. the being affected by these several feelings to such a degree, that they become a leading feature of the character; in which case, there is an ὑπερόχη, as it were, of the feelings. being, if fraught with prudence14, would choose; wherefore it is evident, that what prudence pronounces 22. good in a high degree is a greater good. Also that which belongs to the better men, either absolutely, or in respect of their being better; as courage is better than strength. Also what the better man would make the object of his choice, either absolutely or in respect of its being better; as, the suffering rather than the doing an injury, for this would he choose 23. who is more just. And that which conduces more to pleasure rather that what conduces less; because every being pursues pleasure, and is desirous of enjoying it for its own sake; now it is in reference to this, that the good and the end have been defined: that is said to conduce more to pleasure, which is conducive to it with less alloy of pain, and for a 24. greater length of time. That which is more becoming rather than what is less so; for the becoming either is that which tends to please, or is desirable on 25. its own account. Whatever things people prefer being the causes of to themselves or to their friends, those are greater goods; but whatever they would 26. least wish, are greater evils. Things whose duration is long, rather than those whose duration is short; and those which are more secure, rather than those which are less so: for there is an advantage in their enjoyment; of the former, in respect to time; of the latter, from their being at will: for the enjoyment of what is secure is more in their power whenever 27. they wish. And as are the terms arising from conjugates and similar inflections, so are the qualities they denote; for example, if courageously be an idea more noble and desirable than temperately, courage will also be something more noble than temperance, and the idea of a man's being courageous than of his 28. being temperate. What every one chooses is better than what some do not, as also is the choice of a majority better than that of a minority; for as that was supposed a good which all desire, so that is propor- Whence it follows that prudence is competent to decide on the nature of good. tionately greater which is more desired. That, too, which litigants or foes, judges, or arbitrators selected by judges, prefer, is better ; for in one case the decision is equivalent to that of all mankind; and in the other, men of authority and information actually do pronounce. And sometimes good is greater in which 29. all participate; tor not to participate in it is a disgrace : while at others, that is which none, or which few share with you; for it is more rare. Things 30. more commended, because more becoming; and in the same way things are better to which belongs the greater honour, because honour is as a kind of estimate of worth. Those things again are more heinous on which are imposed the greater punishments. Again, what is greater than things confessedly or apparently 31. great, is itself superior in greatness. And the same objects, when separated into their several constituents, have an air of superior greatness, for the excess of a plurality of objects is conspicuous. Whence the poet says that Meleager's wife persuaded him to rise up to the war by entering into detail:­ " She paints the horrors of a conquer'd town, The heroes slain, the palaces o'erthrown, The matrons ravish'd, the whole race enslaved15." Iliad ix. 705. Again, the condensing and accumulating of circumstances in the way Epicharmus used to do, is productive of effect, and that on the same principle as their separation; viz. because the condensing of them evinces great excess, and for the further reason, that it appears a principle and a cause of great results. But as that is greater which is more rare and difficult, 32. circumstances both of opportunity, and age, and place, and time, and strength, produce great effect. 15 Another striking instance of the effect produced by a detail of circumstances may be found in the Septem contra Thebas of Aeschylus, 302, ed. Bl.­

1. Reasons why the deliberative orator must know governments. THE means of greatest and most paramount importance with a view to being able to persuade and give advice in a becoming style, is the having made one's self master of all the forms of government; and the having clearly distinguished their several practices, and legal principles, and interests: for all men are persuaded by what is advantageous; but that which i. is preservative of the constitution, is absolute expediency1. 2. And further, the dictum of the ii. tative power of the state, is itself authoritative. But the authorities are distinguished according to the forms of government under which they exist; for Dr. Parr, quoting the following passage from the Politics,

LET us next speak of virtue and vice, and of the 1. The subjects of Epideictic oratory discussed. honourable and disgraceful; because these are the objects of the orator who praises or blames 1; and because it will happen that, in speaking of these subjects, we shall at the same time throw light on the means by which we may ourselves be conceived to be of a certain turn of character, which was stated to be the second means of effecting belief; since we shall be able, by the application of the same points, to render ourselves or others deserving belief on the score of moral excellence. But as there frequently 2. are instances, as well in sober earnest as without it, of praising not men or gods only, but even inanimate objects, and any animal whatever, as it may happen; we must here, in the same way as before, ascertain propositions on these subjects also. Let us then, so far as may serve for a specimen, discuss these subjects.

That then is honourable, which, while it is an 3. τὸ κα­ λὸν defined in I two ways. object of choice on its own account, is commendable also; or which, being good, is pleasant, simply because it is good. But if the honourable be this, virtue must necessarily be honourable; for, being good, it is commendable. And virtue, as it should 4. Perfect virtue and its constituent parts are honourable. seem, is a faculty tending to provide us with goods and preserve them to us; a faculty moreover capable of benefiting in many and important cases; of benefiting, in a word, every object in every respect2. I As praise is the proper reward of virtue, so are blame and disgrace proper to vice; in order that the world may be warned by the example of the one, and excited to emulate that of the other : ἀρετὰ γὰρ ἐπαινεομένη, δένδρον ὡς, ἀέξεται. Aristotle never omits an opportunity of inculcating this wholesome lesson, that the practice of virtue conduces to our true interest. Its necessity in bodies politic, as being emi- 5. The constituent parts of virtue are justice, courage, temperance, magnificence, magnanimity, liberality, 6. placability, prudence, wisdom ; and it must needs be, that those virtues are the highest which are the most beneficial to others, if at least virtue be (as it was defined) a faculty capable of benefiting on this account, men honour in the greatest degree the just and brave ; for justice and courage are useful to them, the one in war, and the other in peace3. Next is liberality ; for the liberal are profuse, and do not wrangle with people about money, the object which the rest of the world hanker after more than any 7. thing. Now justice is the virtue by which each has his own, as the law prescribes: injustice, however, is that habit by which some take the property of 8. others in contravention to law. Courage, that by which men are ready to achieve honourable exploits in the midst of danger, conformably to the direction of and in subservience to law4: cowardice, however, 9. is its contrary. But temperance is a virtue by which men carry themselves so, in respect to the pleasures of the body, as the law directs ; intemperance, 10. however, is its contrary. But liberality tends to benefit in pecuniary matters ; stinginess is its 11. contrary. Magnanimity is that virtue which is apt to confer important benefits; narrowness of soul nently τὸ ϭώζον τὴν πολιτείαν, is thus stated in another of his

IT will be for me next to speak of the number and 1. Judicial oratory considered in three 2. i. The motives. ii. The disposition of the agents. in. Thepersons injured. 3. Injustice defined. Division of law. i. General. ii. Particular. nature of the sources out of which the orator must construct his reasonings, touching accusation and defence. Now we must ascertain three points ; one, whatandhow many are the objects for the sake of which men act unjustly; the second, how themselves are disposed; the third, towards personsofwhat character and of what disposition they do so act.

Let us then, after defining the acting unjustly, speak in order of the rest. Let the acting unjustly be defined to be, the voluntary commission of hurt in contravention of law. Now law is either general or peculiar. The peculiar law I call that, by whose written enactments men direct their polity: the general, whatever unwritten rules appear to be recognised among all men. Men are voluntary agents in whatever they do wittingly, and without compulsion. Men, therefore, do not every thing on fixed principle, which they do wittingly: but whatever they do on fixed principle, that they do wittingly; because no one is ignorant of that which he chooses on principle. Now, the principles by whose motion men de- 4. Two I Rewards and punishments do always presuppose something willingly done well or ill; without which respect, though we may sometimes receive good or harm, yet then the one is only a benefit and not a reward, the other simply a hurt and not a punishment. From the sundry dispositions of man's will, which is the root of all his actions, there groweth variety in the sequel of rewards and punishments, which are by these and the like rules measured: Take away the will, and all acts are equal: That which we do not, and would do, is commonly accepted as done. Hooker, i. § 9, p. 239. causes of injustice. i. Depravity. ii. Incontinence. liberately choose to hurt and do evil in contravention of law, are depravity and moral weakness2; for if any are depraved either in one or more respects, it is in reference to that point, on which they are so depraved, that they are guilty of injustice. The illiberal man, for instance, on the subject of money; the intemperate, touching the pleasure of the body ; and the effeminate, respecting objects of ease; and the coward, respecting danger ; (for it is by reason of fear that men abandon their comrades in danger;) the ambitious man, on the score of honour; the hasty man, by reason of anger ; the man eager to excel, on account of victory; the vindictive, for the sake of revenge; a silly man, owing toTis being mistaken on points of right and wrong ; a man of effrontery, from his contempt of character. And in other characters in the same way each [goes wrong] respecting 5. his own particular weakness. But my meaning on these matters will be evident from what has been already said on the subject of the virtues, and from what hereafter will be stated on the subject of the passions. It merely remains for me to state on what account, how effected, and toward whom, men do commit injustice.

6. The motives of injustice proceed from First, then, let us distinctly enumerate the objects, which desiring, or which avoiding, we set about injustice3: because it evidently should be considered by the plaintiff how many, and what sort of those things, from a desire of which men wrong their neighbours, have an existence,on the side of his adversary; and by the defendant again, what, and Cf. James, chap. i. 15. How complete an insight into the nature of man does this disquisition display ; and how admirable a key is here afforded to all the operations of the human heart! This branch of knowledge has always been insisted on as essential to those employed in judicial investigations. — Thus, Bolingbroke, speaking of the education of lawyers, says, " They must pry into the secret recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with the whole moral world, that they may discover the abstract reason of all laws," etc. Stud. of Hist. p. 353: edit. 4to. what number of these things do not so exist. Now 7. the mofives of all human action. all men do all things either of themselves, or not of themselves. The things which they do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from necessity ; and the things done by necessity, they do either by compulsion, or by nature. So that all things whatsoever which men do not of themselves, they do either by chance, or from compulsion, or by nature. Again, the things which they do of themselves, and of which they are themselves the causes, some they do through custom, and others through natural desire ; and this partly through this desire influenced by reason, and in part through it devoid of reason. Now the act of 8. wishing is desire accompanied by reason, fixing on some good as its object; because no one wishes for any thing other than what he conceives to be a good. The desires devoid of reason, are anger and appetite. So that all things whatever which men do, they ne- These are seven in number: i. Chance. ii. Compulsion. iii. Nature. iv. Custom. v. Will. vi. Anger. vii. Appetite. 9. cessarily do from seven causes ; by chance, compulsion, nature, custom, will, anger, or appetite. But to carry on distinctions in reference to age, or habits, or whatever else enacts itself in conduct, were superfluous. For, granting that it happens to young men to be passionate, it is not by motion of their youth that they act thus, but by motion of anger and appetite: neither is it by motion either of wealth or poverty, simply, but (in the case of the poor) it is on account of their neediness that it happens that they cherish an appetite for wealth; and (in the case of the rich) on account of their having the means, that they risk an appetite for unnecessary pleasure ; and these persons will act neither by motion of their wealth nor of their poverty, but by motion of appetite. And in exactly the same way, the just and unjust, and all such as are said to act conformably to habits, will in reality act, under all circumstances, by motion of these principles ; for they on the impulse either of reason or of passion; but some from good manners and passions, others from the contrary. Still, however, it happens that on habits of this particular 10. character, principles of action the same in character are consequent; and on those of that kind, principles also of that kind. For on the temperate man perhaps forthwith, by motion of his temperance, are attendant good opinions and appetites respecting pleasures ; but on the intemperate, the contrary 11. on these same subjects. For which reason we must wave distinctions of such a kind; but we must consider, on what conditions4, what principles of conduct are wont to follow: for it is not ordained, (in the nature of things,) that, if a man be white or black, or tall or short, principles of this or that kind should be attendant on him; but if he be young or old, just or unjust, here some difference begins ; and so, in a word, in the case of all contingent circumstances whatever, which produce a difference in the tempers of men, for instance, a man's seeming to himself to be rich or poor, fortunate or unfortunate; in all these cases there will be some essential difference. Of this, however, we will speak hereafter; let 12. i. Chance. us now treat first of the remaining points. Things proceed from chance which are of such kind that their cause is not definite5, and are produced in the absence of any final motive, and that neither invariably, nor usually, nor in any prescribed order. My meaning on these subjects will be plain from the definition 13. ii. Nature. of chance. All those thingsexist naturallywhose cause is internal and ordinate; for they turn out, either invariably or generally, in the same way; since there is no need of an accurate inquiry on results contrary to nature, whether they be produced conformably to a certain nature, or any other cause. It would appear, 14. iii. Compulsion. too, that chance is the cause of such results. All He here first informs us that he shall not make his exclusion so rigid as he had above stated, but will admit youth and age, etc. to a particular consideration, as holding an important influence over character, though that influence ought philosophically to be referred to one of the seven above-mentioned principles; while every thing else which people choose to fix upon as a principle of conduct will, In examination, prove to be merely secondary, and to act mediately through one or other of the seven. Vide chap. v. § 17. things originate in compulsion which are produced through the instrumentality of the agents themselves, contrary to their inclination and reason. In habit 15. iv. Habit. originates every thing which men do because they have often done it before. From will proceed what- 16. v. Will. ever of the forementioned goods appear to be useful, either as an end or as conducing to the end, when it is by reason of such their usefulness that they are realized in action: for even the intemperate do some things which are useful; but not on account of their usefulness, but on account of pleasure. Through the medium 17. vi Anger. of anger and excited feeling arise acts of vengeance. Now, between revenge and punishment there is a difference ; for punishment is for the sake of the sufferer, but revenge for that of the person inflicting it, in order that he may be satiated6. On what subjects this excitement of feeling exists, will therefore be plain in my treatise of the passions. But all such things as Ap- 18. vii. Appetite. pear pleasant are produced in action on the impulse of appetite. But that which is familiar and has become habitual, is of the number of things pleasant; for many things there are, even among such as are not pleasant naturally, which, when men have been habituated to, they do with pleasure. So that, to These motives are briefly comprehended in one word, pleasure. speak in one word comprehending the whole, thing whatsoever which men do of their own proper motion, either is good, or apparently good; pleasant, or apparently pleasant. But as they act voluntarily in whatever they do of their own motion, and involuntarily in whatever they do not of their own motion; all things whatsoever in respect to which they act voluntarily, will be either good or apparently good; pleasant or apparently pleasant. For I also set down the getting quit either of evils or apparent evils, and the getting a less evil in exchange for a greater, in the class of goods; because they are in a certain way desirable things. And, among things pleasant, I likewise set down the getting quit of things bringing pain, or appearing to do so; or the getting things Revenge is a kind of wild justice. Bacon's Essays. ( BOOK 1. less so, in exchange for such as are so in greater degree.

19. What objects are pleasant, therefore, must be discussed. We have therefore to ascertain the number of things pleasant and of what kinds they are. Now on the subject of what is useful, something has been already said in my treating of deliberative rhetoric ; but on the subject of what is pleasant let us treat, beginning at this point. As to the definitions, you must deem them to be adequate [to my purpose] if they be found, on each subject, exempt from obscurity, though not accurately precise.

1. Immediate motives of injustice considered. Definition of pleasure. 2. Pain is ἔξτασις. LET it be laid down by us, that pleasure is a certain motion of the soul, and a settlement of it, at once rapidsand perceptible, into its own proper nature; and that pain is the contrary. If then pleasure be a thing'of this nature, it is plain that whatever is productive of the disposition I have described, is pleasant ; while every thing of a nature to destroy it, or produce a disposition the opposite to it, is painful.

3. A reversion to nature is pleasant. Generally speaking, therefore, it is necessary, both that the being in progress toward a state conformable to nature, should be pleasant; and that, in the highest degree, when those feelings, whose original is conformable to it, shall have recovered that their nature ; and habits, because that which is habitual becomes by that time natural, as it were; for, in a certain way, custom is like nature, because the idea of frequency is proximate to that of always; now nature belongs to the idea of always, custom to that of In all judicial questions a knowledge of the constituents of pleasure will be of essential service; for they all suppose some wrong done, and there is no man dotA a wrong for the wrong's sake, but thereby to purchase himself profit , or pleasure, or honour, or the like. Bacon's Essays. often. What is not compulsory, also, is pleasant; for 4. All freedom " from constraint. compulsion is contrary to nature. Wherefore acts of necessity are painful; and it has been truly remark- A " Every act of necessity is in its nature painful." It must be also that a state of sedulous attention, anxiety, the having the mind on the stretch, are painful, for they all are acts of necessity, and constrained, unless they have become habitual; but it is custom which, under such circumstances, renders them pleasant. The contraries of these must also be pleasant; wherefore, relaxation of mind, leisure, listlessness, amusements, and intervals of rest, rank in the class of things pleasant; for none of these has any thing to do with necessity. Every thing of 6. Appetites are pleasant. which there is an innate appetite, is pleasant; for appetite is a desire of what is pleasant. Now, of appetites, some are irrational, others attended by reason. I call all those irrational, which men desire, not from Irrational. any conception which they form: of this kind are all which are said to exist naturally, as those of the body; thirst or hunger, for instance, in the case of sustenance; and the appetite of sustenance in every kind. And the appetites connected with objects of taste, and of lust, and, in fact, objects of touch generally ; the appetite of fragrant odours, too, as connected with smelling, and hearing, and sight. Appetites Rational. attended by reason, are all those whatsoever which men exercise from a persuasion: for many things there are which they desire to behold, and possess, on hearsay and persuasion. Now, as the being 6. Hope and memory are pleasant. pleased stands in the perception of a certain affection, and as imagination is a kind of faint perception, there will attend on him who exercises either memory or hope, a kind of imagination of that which is the object of his memory or hope; but if so, it is plain that they who exercise memory or hope, certainly feel pleasure, since they have also a perception. So that every thing pleasant consists either in the 7. perception of present objects, or in the remembrance of those which have already been, or in the hope of such as are yet to be; for men exercise perception on present, memory on past, and hope on future objects. 8. Now the objects of memory are pleasant, not only such as at the moment while present were pleasant, but some even which were not pleasant, should their consequence subsequently be honourable and good ; and hence this saying, " But it is indeed pleasant for a man, when preserved, to remember his toils ;" and this, " For after his sufferings, a man who has suffered much, and much achieved, is gladdened at the recollection." But the reason of this is, that to be exempt from evil is 9. pleasant1. And all objects are pleasant in hope, which appear by their presence either to delight or benefit in a great degree ; or to benefit, without giving pain. In a word, whatever objects by their presence delight us, do so, generally speaking, as we hope for, or remember them. On which account, too, the feeling of anger is pleasant; just as Homer has remarked of anger in his poem, " That which with sweetness far greater than distilling honey as it drops for there is no one who feels anger where the object seems impracticable to his revenge ; nor with those far their superiors in power do men feel anger at all, or if they do, it is in a less degree. 10. There is also a kind of pleasure consequent on most appetites; for either in the recollection that they have enjoyed them, or in the hope that they shall enjoy them, men are affected and delighted by a certain pleasure: thus men possessed by fevers feel delight, amid their thirst, as well at the remembrance how they used to drink, as at the hope of drinking 11. yet again. Lovers, too, feel delight in conversing, writing, and composing something, ever about the object beloved ; because, in all those energies, they have a perception, as it were, of the object they love. Criterion of love. And this is in all cases a criterion of the commencement of love, when persons feel pleasure not only in the presence of the object, but are enamoured also of 12. Sorrow. it when absent, on memory; wherefore, even when Suave mari magno, turbantibus aequora ventis, Alterius procul e terra spectare dolorem, etc. Lucretius. pain arises at absence, nay in the midst of mourning, and the very dirge of death, there yet arises within us a certain pleasure. For the pain is felt because the object is not present; but the pleasure consists in remembering and seeing, as it were, both the person, and what he used to do, and the kind of character of which he was. Whence has it been said, and with probability enough, "Thus spake he, and excited within them all a desire of lamentation." Also the 13. Revenge. avenging one's self is pleasant2; for the getting of that is pleasant, the failing to get which is painful: now the angry do feel pain in an excessive degree if they be not avenged ; but in the hope of revenge they take pleasure. Again, to overcome is pleasant, not to the 14. Vietory. ambitious only, but even to all; for there arises an imagination of superiority, for which all, either in a faint or more violent degree, have an appetite. But 15.Hence, amusements. since to overcome is pleasant, it must follow of course, that amusements where there is field for rivalry, as those of music and disputations, are pleasant ; for it frequently occurs, in the course of these, that we overcome; also chess, ball, dice, and draughts. Again, it is the same with respect to amusements where a lively interest is taken3; for, of these, some become pleasant as accustomed to them; others are pleasant at first; for instance, hunting and every kind of sporting ; for where there is rivalry, there is also victory; on which principle the disputations of the bar and of the schools are pleasant to those who have become accustomed to them, and have abilities. Also honour and good character are most 16. Honour and character. pleasant, by reason that an idea arises, that one is such as is the good man ; and this in a greater degree should those people pronounce one such, who See book ii. chap. 2, § 1. If this rendering for the word ἐσπουδασμένη be not that which the Greek might first suggest, yet it is that which seems best to suit the context; for sporting and hunting do not very well accord with our ideas of grave and serious amusements, though exercised as they were by the Greeks, as mere preparatives for the labours of military duty, they might justly deserve serious attention. he think speaks truth: such are those immediately about one, rather than those who are more removed; familiar friends, and acquaintances, and one's fellow citizens, rather than those who are at a distance; the present, rather than a future generation ; a man of practical wisdom, rather than a mere ignoramus ; many, than a few; for it is more likely that these I have mentioned will adhere to the truth, than that the opposite characters will: since one has no anxiety about the honour or the opinions of such as one greatly despises, children and animals for instance, not at least for the sake of such opinion itself; but if one is anxious about it, then it is on account of 17. Friends. something else. A friend, too, ranks among things pleasant; for the affection of love is pleasant; since there is no lover of wine, who does not delight in wine: also the having affection felt toward one is pleasant; for there is in this case also an idea of one's being an excellent person, which all who have any sensibility to it are desirous of; now' the having affection felt for you is the being beloved yourself, 18. Being admired. on your own account. Also the being held in admiration is pleasant, on the very account of being honcured Flattery. by it. Flattery and the flatterer are pleasant; since the flatterer is a seeming admirer and a seeming 19. Habitual action. 20. Variety. friend4. To continue the same course of action is also pleasant; for what is habitual was laid down to be pleasant. To vary is also pleasant; for change is an approach to what is natural: for sameness produces an excess of a stated habit; whence it has been said, " In every thing change is pleasant5." For on this principle, whatever occurs at intervals of time is pleasant, whether persons or things; for It may be interesting to compare the grounds on which Dr. Johnson considered flattery pleasant with these of Aristotle. The Doctor's words are, " Flattery pleases very generally. In the first place, the flatterer may think what he says to be true; but, in the second place, whether he thinks so or not, he certainly thinks those whom he flatters of consequence enough to be flattered." Boswell's Life, A. D. 1775, Aet. 66, p. 86, vol. iii. Eurip. Orest. 234. it is a variation of present objects; and at the same time that which occurs merely at intervals possesses the merit of rarity. Also learning and admiration, 21. Learning : admiration. generally speaking, are pleasant; for under admiration exists a desire [to learn], so that what is admired is desired: and in the act of learning there is a settlement into a state conformable to nature. To benefit 22. To do good: to receive good. and to be benefited are also of the number of pleasant things ; for to be benefited, is to get what people desire ; but to benefit, is to possess and abound ; things, the both of which men desire. And because a tendency to beneficence is pleasant6, it is also pleasant to a man to set his neighbour on his legs again, and to put a finish to that which was deficient in some particular. But as the acquisition of knowledge 23. Imitation. is pleasant, and the feeling admiration, and such things; that, too, must necessarily be pleasant which has been expressed in imitation, as in painting, Painting Sculpture. Poetry. sculpture, and poetry: also, every thing is pleasant which has been correctly imitated, although the original object, of which it is the imitation, may not in itself be pleasant; for one does not feel pleasure on that account; but there is an inference that " this means that and thus it happens that we learn something. Also sudden revolutions7, and the being 24. Reverses. Narrow escapes. 25. Sumlarity and conformity to nature and ourselves. saved from danger narrowly; for all these are cases exciting admiration. Again, since that is pleasant which is conformable to nature, and things which are akin are respectively conformable to nature, every thing like and akin, speaking generally, is pleasant; This principle of pleasure has been thus developed by Hooker: " As to love them of whom we receive good things is a duty, because they satisfy our desires in that which else we should want; so to love them on whom we bestow is nature, because in them we behold the effects of our own virtue."—Ecc. Pol. v. § 63, p. 285. See also what is said towards the end of this chapter, of the love borne towards whatever is, in any sense, an ἔργον of own—as children, works of genius, etc.

LET us now state with what dispositions men commit 1. Πω̃ς ἔχοντες, or the agents of injustice, then act unjustly, when it seems possible that they shall escape detection. injustice, and towards whom they do so. As regards themselves then, it is when they think the thing is one possible to be done, and possible to themselves; and either that, in doing it, they shall escape detection, or, if they do not escape it, that they shall not suffer punishment, or that they shall indeed suffer a punishment, but that the damage thereby incurred will be less than the gain, either to themselves or those for whom they have a regard. Now the subject of things which appear possible, and those 2. which appear impossible, will be explained in the sequel; for these are points applicable in common to all kinds of rhetoric1. Now as to their own advantages, those men think they are in the highest degree likely to commit injustice with impunity, who are of The talented. ability in speaking, and men of the world, and such as have experienced many a forensic contest. If, to In one of the books which has unfortunately been lost. His definition of it is, αἰσχρὸν ἄνευ λυπηρου̃. They are, in fact, τόποι ii. 19. The erful. 3. too, they happen to have many friends. If they be rich2. And more particularly do they think they can get off, if they be themselves possessed of the forestated qualities; and if they be not themselves so qualified, yet if they have friends, or supporters, or associates of such talents, then also they think to get off; for these are the endowments, by aid of which men are able both to act, to escape detection, 4.If likely to escape detection. and avoid punishment5. Again, if they be friends, either of the injured party, or of the judge; because friends are off their guard against injustice, and are moreover appeased before prosecuting their revenge. But the judges gratify their friends, and either altogether let them off, or amerce them in a trifle. 5. Such as the opposites to the charge, etc. People likely to escape detection, are those the very opposite in character to the charge; as, a man of personal imbecility, on a charge of assault; or one poor and deformed, on a charge of adultery. Again, circumstances exceedingly palpable, and in the eyes of all the world; for these are unobserved, by reason 6. that no one would think of them at all. Acts, too, of such enormity and such a character that no one would presume; for in regard to these also men are off their guard: for it is against crimes which are He remarks, in his Politics, the general tendency to insubordination and disobedience to laws observable in the rich and

1. All injuries offend against either: COMMENCING from this point, let me mark in detail all acts which conform to, or which violate justice. Now right and wrong have been defined in reference to two kinds of law, and in a twofold way also in regard to those persons to whom they refer1. 2. i. The particular. ii. The general law. Law2, now, I understand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar, to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to itself, and that this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that law universal, which is conformable merely to dictates of nature ; for there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong3, which, in a certain degree, all I Vide Eth. Nich. v. 7. The description of Law given by Demosthenes is, perhaps, the most perfect and satisfactory that can either be found or conceived: 01 δὲ νόμοι τὸ δίκαιον feat τὸ καλὸν καὶ T6 συμΦέ­

1. Greater offences are those arising from greater principle. THOSE acts of injustice are greater in degree, which proceed from the greater principle of injustice1; and on this account the most trifling are the greatest; as the charge which Callistratus laid against Melenopus, that he had defrauded the builders of the temple in his accounts, to the amount of three half farthings of consecrated property; but in the case of justice, things are more or less just in a contrary ratio2. Now these criteria arise from the actions virtually exceeding; for he who stole three half farthings of consecrated money would cheat one in any thing. The degree of an act of injustice is decided then, sometimes on this principle, at others on that of the 2. Where the penalty is not equivalent. harm done. Those also are very flagrant, for which no punishment is an equivalent, but of which every one falls short; as also that which there is no means of healing ; for such a case is difficult and impracticable : also where the injured party can get no redress in court; for the evil is without cure, because 3. Where the injured party hath wronged himself in consequence. chastisement and a judicial sentence are a cure. If the party suffering, and who was wronged, hath grievously injured himself3; for then the man who did the wrong deserves punishment in a still greater degree; just as Sophocles said when pleading in behalf of Euctemon, who, on being insolently assaulted, slew himself; " that he would price the deed at no See Gibbon's Decline and Fall, c. 44, at note 188. Measure of Guilt, vol. viii. p. 98. So much for the standard of injustice; for it is evident that any man who is sufficiently depraved to cheat you for a farthing, would not scruple to do so for a larger sum. But in the contrary habit of the mind, a contrary ratio holds, in the case of conforming to rules of justice—τὰ ἐλάχιστα, ἐλάχιστα; for a man may be very honest in minor transactions, who would not scruple to cheat you if a greater temptation were thrown in his way. As in the case of Lucretia: her killing herself was an aggravation of the guilt of Tarquin. less cost than the sufferer had prized himself at." Crimes, too, of which the present criminal has alone 4. Where the offending was the first. been guilty, or he first, or very few besides. Also the being frequently guilty of the same enormity. Any thing too on account of which new prohibitory and penal statutes have been sought out, and introduced ; as at Argos they punish any one on whose account a law may have been enacted, and those on account of whom the prison was erected. That act 5. The more brutal. of injustice also is greater, which is of a more brutal character. That too which proceeds more immediately from malice aforethought. That too which, as they hear of, people are affected by dread, rather than compassion. And the rhetorical expedients for exaggeration are as follows;—“ he hath swept away or overleaped many principles of justice," as oaths, the plighting of his hand, pledges of fidelity, and marriage contracts ; for there is an excess by the ratio of many crimes. And its being on the very 6. Those done on the place of punishment. spot where criminals receive punishment; which they do who bear false witness; for where would he not be ready to act wrong, if at least he does so even in the judgment hall4? Those deeds too on which shame is most especially felt. Also if the party has injured him at whose hands he has been benefited: for he is guilty in more than one way, both in that he does him wrong, and in that he did not good to him. Also the man who has violated the unwritten 7. Violation of the unwritten principles of right; for it belongs to a man of superior excellence to be just unconstrainedly; now what is of written prescript is done of necessity, but not so what is unwritten. Taking it in another way, it is a feature of aggravation if it be in violation of written and written law. law; for you may say, the man who is unjust in matters where is room for apprehending punishment, and on which loss attends, surely would be likely to be A Among the aggravations of affrays by the law of England one is, " Where a respect for the particular place ought to restrain and regulate men's behaviour, more than in common ones; as in the king's court, and the like." Blackstone, b. iv. c. 11, § 5. unjust in respect of matters on which no loss is consequent. Thus, then, the greater and less degrees of injustice have been treated of.

1. ἄτεχνοι πίστεις. It comes next to the subject just treated of, for me to run over the proofs which are called inartificial; 2. Five in number. because these are peculiar to judicial oratory'. And they, are five in number, viz. laws, witnesses, deeds, torture, oaths.

3. L Laws. First, then, let me speak of Laws, in what way an orator, in exhorting or dissuading, and in accusing or defending, is to turn them to his purpose. 4. Argu-­ ments for the orator to whom the written law is opposed. Because it is plain, that it the written law be opposed to his case, he must avail himself of the universal law, and of topics of equity, as more absolutely just: and he must argue that, really "to act to the best of his judgment 2,” is to decline an implicit adherence to written prescript: he must insist, moreover, 5. 6. that equity remains for ever, and varies not at any time, neither does the universal law, for this is in conformity to nature ; but that the written law does frequently vary; whence it was said in the Antigone He here apologizes for his violation of the proposed arrangement, in treating of the ἀτέχναι πίστεις, before he has fully despatched the ἐντέχναι. In fact, the former class of πίστεις are so nearly confined to judicial, that their tion, though a little out of place, as an appendix to the subject of judicial rhetoric, is very appropriate. N ot, however, but that πίστεις of this class may be available in deliberative oratory; and indeed Aristotle himself seems to hint as much in using the words προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα (expressions peculiar to deliberation), as well as κατηγορυ̃ντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον, § 3. The judges were bound by oath, first, to an adherence to the laws, and in cases unrecognised by law, to exercise their best judgment, (γνώμη ἡ ὰρίστη :) this, as Aristotle here observes, left grounds for the appeal of an orator. 1 of Sophocles ; for she is defending herself because she acted in opposition to the law of Creon, but not in opposition to the universal law3, " for these are not of this or of the next day merely, but ever exist; their prescript would I, not for the sake of any one, —.” He must insist, also, that justice is some- 7. thing substantially true and expedient, but not so that mere seeming of justice, so that neither is the written law, for it does not the duty of law. And that the judge is, as it were, an assay-master, that he may distinguish between counterfeit and real ideas of justice. And that it is the part of a better 8. man to employ and abide by the unwritten law than the written. He should also observe, if the law 9. which stands in his way be at variance with any approved law, or be itself at variance with itself; thus sometimes one law directs that whatever men shall have covenanted should be valid; another forbids that they should covenant any thing contrary to the law. Observe, also, whether it be equivocal, so that you 10. may wrest it to your purpose, and discover to which construction either justice or expediency will best adjust itself: then let him avail himself of that law. And if the circumstances under which the law was 11. enacted be no longer remaining4, but the law itself is remaining, he should endeavour to make this clear, and battle against it on this ground. But should the 12. Argumenta for him on whose side is the written law. written law be in favour of his case, the orator then must state that " the best of one's judgment" is inserted, not for the sake of a judge's deciding contrary to the law, but in order that, if he be ignorant of what the law directs, he may not forswear himself. He should insist also, that no one chooses good in the abstract, but what is so to himself; and that there is no difference between a law not enacted and one not put in force. And he should observe that, in other arts, it advantages not for one to indulge himself in such over-wisdom; as, for example, in respect of a Already quoted in chap. 13, § 2. Vide the arguments adduced in favour of Catholic emancipation. physician; for there the errors of his physician do not so greatly hurt a mali, as the habituating himself to disobey him who has the direction of his health. And that the seeking to be wiser than the law, is the very thing which in well-approved laws is prohibited. And on the subject of laws let such be our distinctions.

13. 2nd. On witnesses, which are twofold. i. παλαι­ οὶ. ii. πρό­ σφατοι. But to the subject of Witnesses: witnesses are twofold, some ancient, others modern 5, and of these some are partners in the risk, others are uninvolved in it. I mean by ancient witnesses, both poets and all other illustrious persons whose decisions are open to the world; as, for example, the Athenians employed Homer as their witness in the matter of Salamis; and the people of Tenedos but recently employed Periander the Corinthian, against the people of Sigaeum; Cleophon, also, employed the Elegies of Solon against Critias, saying, that the family of old time was a dissolute one, for Solon would never otherwise have said, “Go, bid my Critias, with his yellow locks, to listen to his father." Such, then, are the witnesses on the subject of the 14. Witnesses of the future are soothsayers. Proverbs are witnesses. past. But, respecting the future, we have also soothsayers ; thus Themistocles insisted that they were to engage by sea, alleging the expression the wooden wall6. Moreover, proverbs also are testimonies, according to what has been stated above7; as, if one were going to advise another not top make an old man his friend, the proverb testifies to that point, " Never benefit an old man ;” also as to the taking off the children whose parents one has slain, "Foolish is he who having slain the father shall Πρόσφατοι seems to imply viva voce witnesses, those from whom oral testimony may be gained, and perhaps for that reason applied to signify modern in general. See Herodotus, Polymnia, 143. That is, according to his declaration that any known decisions of illustrious persons might be of service in proof. Now proverbs have the advantage of being universally known, and are acquiesced in by all as the decisions of men of prudence at least. Vater explains the passage differently: vide Animadv. leave the son behind8.” Modern witnesses are 15. Modern witnesses partake of the risk, all .those people of note who have passed an nion on any point; for these their opinions are useful to those who are debating on the same questions ; as Eubulus, for instance, in the trial against Chares, availed himself of that saying of Plato, in reference to Archibius, that the avowal of being wicked has gained ground in the city." Also those who participate the risk, should they appear to falsify. Witnesses, however, of this class, prove merely such 16. and only testify to the fact. points as these ; whether the fact has or has not taken place ; whether it be in existence or not; but as to the further question of its character, they are not at all witnesses ; on the questions, for instance, whether a thing be just or unjust, expedient or prejudicial, But witnesses who are at a distance are 17. very credible, even touching questions of this nature. But ancient witnesses are of supreme credibility10, Most ancient and most credible. Arguments for him who has no witnesses: because they are beyond the reach of corruption. But in reference to testimony the following may be adduced as confirmations of proof, by the orator, namely, who has no witnesses: it should be insisted that the judge ought to decide from probabilities, and that this is the spirit of his oath, “to the best of his judgment." Let him also say that it is impossible to lead probability astray on the score of money; and that probability never is detected bearing false testimony. But it must be urged by him and for him who has. who has witnesses, against him who has them not, that neither is probability amenable to trial; and that there would be no need at all of offering testimony, if it were enough to consider matters on the ground of reasonings only. And testimony is partly 18. Testimony is Vide Herodot. i. 155. Cyrus is apprehensive of constant annoyance if he should not enslave the Lydians:—ὁμοίως γάρ

THE materials, then, from which we must exhort 1. Discussion of the πίστις ἐν τω̃ ἤθει του̃ λέ­ γοντος. and dissuade, praise and blame, accuse and defend, the notions also and propositions, useful in order to render these points credible, are those [which we have discussed] : for respecting these questions, and out of these sources, are enthymems deduced, so that an orator, thus provided, may speak on each separate department of questions. But as rhetoric has in 2. view the coming to a decision (tor in deliberative oratory, the assembly arrive at decisions, and the sentence of a court of justice is ipso facto a decision) ; it is necessary to look not only to your speech, in what way that will be of a character to convince and persuade, but also to invest yourself with a certain kind of character, and the judge with a certain kind of feeling. For it is a point of great consequence, 3. particularly in deliberative! cases ; and, next to these, in judicial; as well that the speaker seem to be a man of a certain character, as that his audience conceive him to be of a certain disposition toward themselves; moreover it is of consequence if your audience chance to be themselves also disposed in a certain way. Those subjects about which deliberative oratory is concerned, least of all admit any thing like absolute certainty, for we can only form conjectures of what will be from what has been; and Aristotle has already told us, " that men lend a readier and more implicit belief to the good on all questions whatsoever; but on those whose nature precludes our arriving at certainty, but compels us to remain in doubt, we rely entirely on them." Book i. chap. ii. § 4. 4. Now, as to a speaker's appearing to be himself of a certain character, this point is more available in deliberations : but the disposing the auditor in a certain way, in judicial cases ; for things do not show themselves in the same light to persons affected by love and by hatred, nor to those under emotions of anger, as to those who are disposed to placability; but they appear either utterly different in character, or at least different in degree. For to a judge who is affected by love toward the party respecting whom he pronounces his decision, that party appears either not at all to be unjust, or to be so in a very trivial degree. To a judge, however, who is affected by hatred, the case has a contrary appearance. So also to a person who is eager and sanguine, the proposed object, if pleasant, takes the appearance, as well of being likely to accrue, as of being likely to prove really a good ; while by one who is indifferent and reluctant, the opposite view is taken.

5. Three requisites for the orator's gaining belief. i. φρόνη­ σις. ii. ἀρετή. iii. εὔνοια. 6. Now, there are three causes of a speaker's deserving belief; for so many in number are the qualities on account of which we lend our credit, independently of proof adduced; and these are prudence, moral excellence, and the having our interests at heart2; (for men are fallacious in what they allege or advise by reason, either of all, or some, of these causes; for either, from want of ability, they do not rightly apprehend the question; or, rightly apprehending it, from their depravity, they do not tell you what they think; or, being men both of ability and moral excellence, they have not your interests at heart, on which account it is possible they should not give you the best advice, though fully known what is best;) and besides these there is no other : it follows therefore, of course, that the speaker who appears to possess all these qualities, is considered by his audience 7. The as deserving credit 3. Now the means by which men See Pericles's defence of himself, Thucyd. ii. 60; and above, book i. chap. viii. § 6. A celebrated scholar of the present day, after having described the eloquence of Mr. Fox, as remarkably characterized may appear virtuous and prudent, are to be derived two first discussed before. from what has been laid down on the subject of the virtues ; for it is by help of the very same things, that an orator may invest himself, and any one else, in a certain character. The subject of feeling an in- 8. The latter to be known by the emotions, which must therefore be considered. terest, and of friendliness, must be discussed in ray treatise of the passions, commencing henceforth. Passions however are, all emotions whatsoever, on which pain and pleasure are consequent, by whose operation, undergoing a change, men differ in respect to their decisions : for instance, anger, pity, fear, and whatever other emotions are of such a nature, and those opposed to them. But it will be fitting to 9. The discussion is divided into three heads in every instance. i. ii. iii. divide what I have to say, respecting each, into three considerations; to consider, respecting anger, for example, how those who are susceptible of anger are affected; with whom they usually are angry; and on what occasions. For, granted that we be in possession of one, or even two of these points, and not of them all, it will be impossible for us to kindle anger in the breast; and in the case of the rest of the passions in a similar way. In the same way, then, as on the subjects treated of above I have separately drawn up the several propositions, so let me do in respect of these also, and make my distinctions according to the manner specified.

LET anger be defined to be " a desire accompanied 1. Anger defined. by pain of a revenge which presents itself, on by πίστις ἠθικὴ, proceeds thus—“Hac de causa, quos audienti mihi motus adhibere voluit, illi semper in animo oratoris impressi et inusti esse videbantur." Parr's Pref. to Bellenden, p. 12, edit. 1787. The definition, given more briefly in the Ethics, is " οι̃ς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη.” Eth. Nich. ii. 5. ῎Ορεξις ἀντιλυπήσεως. Eth. Nich. count of an apparent slight from persons acting toward one's self, or some of one's friends, unbecom- 2. Anger is felt against the individual, not the species. ingly." Now, if anger be this, it must be that he who is affected by anger, is so affected invariably towards some individual (for instance, towards Cleon), but not towards mankind2, generally: and this, because the individual has already wrought some indignity, either on himself or some of his friends, or in- Is attended with pleasure. tends doing so. It must be also that there is a sort of pleasure consequent on all anger, arising out of the hope of avenging one's self3; for the idea of attaining what one desires is pleasant; and no one is desirous of objects which appear impracticable to him; and he who is under the affection of anger is desirous of objects which appear practicable to him. Wherefore it has been happily remarked of anger, that it is, " Far, far too dear to every mortal breast, Sweet to the soul, as honey to the taste4.” Because a sort of pleasure is consequent on it, as well on this account, as because men linger in thought on compassing revenge. Now the phantasy which then arises excites a pleasure within us, as do the phanta- 3. We feel anger on account of a supposed slight. sies of dreams. But as a slight is the operation of an opinion conceived of an object which appears not worth consideration (for we esteem things absolutely bad, and those which are good, and what conduces to them, to be worth some consideration ; that however which is mere nothing, or absolutely trivial, we con- Three species of ὀλιγωρία. i. κατα­ φρόνησις. ii. ἐπηρε­ ασμός. iii. ὕβρις. 4. ceive worth none). There are three species of slight, contempt, vexatiousness, and contumely: for he who manifests contempt is guilty of a slight, since men contemn whatever they think worth nothing, and what is worth nothing, they slight. Again, he who is vexatious appears to contemn, for vexatiousness is a thwarting another's wishes, not that any thing may accrue to the person himself who so impedes, but in Compare lib. i. c. xi. § 9, οὑδεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῴ ἀδυ­ νάτῳ, K. T. λ. Compare book i. chap. xi. § 13 ; and also book i. chap. x. § 17. This is expressed in the Ethics, lib. iii. c. viii. Καὶ ol ἄνθρωποι δὴ ὀργιζόμενοι μὲν ἀλγου̃σι, τιμωρούμενοι δ᾽ ἥδονται. Pope's translation of Homer. order that something may not accrue to that other. Since, then, he slights not with a view to any advantage to himself, it is plain that he conceives you can neither hurt him, (for, if he did, he would be afraid, and would not be guilty of slight,) nor can benefit him in any respect worth mentioning, since he would otherwise hold you in consideration, in order to become your friend. He, too, who acts contume- 6. liously manifests slight; for contumely is the doing and saying those things about which the person who is the subject of this treatment, has feelings of delicacy, not with a view that any thing should accrue to himself, other than what arises to him in the act, but in order that he may be gratified; for they who requite an injury, do not act contumeliously, but take revenge. Now the cause of the pleasure felt by those 6. who act contumeliously, is that, by injuring, they conceive themselves to be more decidedly superior: on which account young men and the rich are given to contumely, for in manifesting the contumely, they conceive themselves superior. To contumely belongs the withholding of respect; but he who withholds respect, manifests slight; for that which is of no value, is held in no consideration, either good or bad. On which principle Achilles, in his anger, says, " He hath withheld from me respect, for he hath seized and possesses my prize himself, having taken it from me." And again, " Like some unregarded vagabond ;" as though he were, on this account, affected by anger. Now people think it becoming that they 7. should De looKea up to oy their interiors, whether in birth, power, or moral excellence, or generally speaking, in whatever respect one may happen to be It is an essential feature of vexatiousness, and in fact of every species of slight, that there is a total absence of any selfish motive on the part of him who offers it; the appearance of any such motive having actuated him, would be a salvo to the pride of him who is made the subject of such treatment; but to be exposed to an opinion that one is utterly beneath consideration (δόξα περὶ τὸ μηδενὸς ἄξιον φαινόμενον), is a reflection to which no person, actuated by the common feelings of our nature, ever can submit. much superior: thus the rich man thinks to be looked up to by the poor, in regard to money; also the man who has a faculty of speaking, by him who is destitute of it, in the case of speaking ; and he who thinks himself worthy to bear office, by him who deserves to be subject to rule. Whence it has been said, " Beware ! for dreadful is the wrath of kings:” and in another place, " 'Tis sure the mighty will revenge at last:” for they feel indignant by reason of their superiority. 8. Moreover [men think it becoming that they should be looked up to] by those at whose hands they think they ought to receive good; and these are such as they have benefited, or continue to benefit, whether in their own persons, or as instruments of any one, and whom any of their relatives have benefited, or wish, or did wish to benefit.

9. With what feelings, and how situated, men are angry. 1. From hence it is by this time manifest both under what affections as regards themselves, and with what objects, and for what reasons, men feel anger. For as regards themselves, it is when they happen to be aggrieved, since he who is aggrieved is anxious for something. Now a man [will feel thus aggrieved], as well on any person's clashing with him in regard to any object, directly; when he is thirsty, for example, in regard to drinking: as also should they not directly clash, yet will he appear to do the same thing; and if a person thwarts, or does not co-operate with one, and if a person annoys one in any respect, when thus circumstanced, one feels anger against all these. 10. On which account people who are ill, in poverty, love, thirst, in a word, who are under desire, and fail of success, these all are fretful and irritable, and particularly with those who slight their present condition: the sick man, for example, is annoyed by those who slight him in regard to his disease: the poor man too, with those who do so in regard to his poverty; and the warrior, in regard to war; the lover, in regard to love; and in other cases similarly, for each one has the way paved to the feeling anger in each case, by the passion which exists in his mind. Again, a man 11. is nettled should he happen to be expecting the very opposite of what results; for that pains one more deeply which falls out very unexpectedly; just in the same ratio as that which is very unexpected delights, should it be what one wishes for. On which account seasons, times, dispositions, and ages, which class of them are readily excited to anger, and when, and how, will be plain from this which I have said ; also it will be plain that they are then excited with greater readiness, when more immediately influenced by these circumstances. As then regards the persons themselves, under these dispositions it is that they are readily excited to anger.

2. But people feel anger towards those who laugh 12. Towards whom men feel anger. at them excessively, and gibe, and scoff at them, for these treat them with contumely ; with such also as hurt them in all particulars, of such a nature as are tokens of contumely: these of course must be such as neither are in requital for any thing, or beneficial to those who are the agents 6; for this is enough to make it appear to be an act solely of contumely: towards 13. those also who underrate and despise what themselves take a warm interest in; thus all those who are fond of philosophy, are angry if any one undervalues philosophy ; so, too, they who embrace the notion of an universal idea7, are nettled if a person despises the doctrine; and as regards other things in a similar manner. But all this will be felt much more keenly, 14. it these persons suspect that the qualities so underrated do not really belong to them, or not completely, or not firmly, or that they do not appear to belong to them ; since, if they conceive themselves to be very strong in the points on which they happen to be rallied, they do not regard its, and anger is felt to- Here also Aristotle maintains the absolute exclusion of any thing like self-interest as characteristic of this species of ὀλι­ γωρία. See note on the last chapter. Alluding to Plato's doctrine of ideas, which Aristotle himself so warmly controverted. See Eth. Nich. i. 6. See chap. iv. § 14, where he says, we are fond of those who praise us on points where we esteem ourselves weak. wards friends, in a greater degree than towards such 15. as are not friends; because people conceive it to be more fitting to receive good at their hands than not: 16. also towards those who have been in the habit of honouring or bestowing consideration on them, if, on the contrary, they do not keep on the same terms with them; because people conceive themselves despised bv them. for otherwise they would do as be- 17. fore. Towards those also who do not requite a kindness, or who do not return an equivalent, towards those also who thwart them, if they be inferiors; for these all appear to despise them, the latter as though they were their inferiors, the former as though the 18. kindness had been received] from inferiors. Men feel it also in a greater degree towards persons of no account, should they slight them; for anger is supposed to arise from a slight, and to exist towards persons whose conduct misbecame them ; now it becomes inferiors to make no manifestation of slight. 19. Towards friends, anger is felt if they do not or speak not well; and still more so if they do the contrary; also if they should not perceive us to be in want, just as the Plexippus of Antipho was angry with Meleager; for not to perceive this is a token of slight, since in regard to those for whom we feel 20. deference, this does not escape our notice: towards those also it is felt who exult in their misfortunes; and, in a word, towards such as are in good spirits amid their misfortunes ; for this marks either a foe, or one who manifests slight: towards those also who do not care if they give us pain; wherefore, men feel anger towards those who announce evil tidings10. 21. Against those also is anger felt who either readily listen to, or scrutinize our failings; for they resemble persons who slight us, or who are our enemies ; since a friend sympathizes with one, and all men, as their 22. peculiar failings are scrutinized, feel pain. More- Plexippus was a brother of Althaea, Meleager's mother, and a character in a play of Antipho's, now lost. . 10 And the first bringer of unwelcome news Hath but a losing office. Shakspeare. over men feel anger towards those who slight them wards those who slight them before persons of five descriptions. i. Whom they emulate. ii. Whom they admire. iii. By whom they wish to be admired. iv. Before whom they are sensible of delicate feelings. v. Before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. in the presence of five descriptions of persons, viz. in the presence of those whom they emulate, whom they admire, by whom they are desirous of being admired, in whose presence they are alive to delicacy of feeling, and before those who have a delicacy of feeling towards them; if before these any one should slight them, they feel anger more sensibly: with those also do men feel angry who slight them in such respects, as it is disgraceful for them not to stand up in defence of; in regard to parents, for instance, or children, wives, or persons in subjection: with those, too, who make no return of favours; for the slight then is contrary to what is becoming : and with those who play off sarcasms upon them when seriously engaged ; for sarcasm has an air of contempt: also with those who benefit others, if they do not also benefit them; since this also carries an air of contempt, the not thinking them worthy what all are worthy of. Also the letting a man escape our memory is a thing very apt to provoke anger; for example, the nearly forgetting even his name, since forgetfulness seems to be an indication of slight; because forgetfulness arises from disregard, and disregard is a kind of slight. Now, it has been told you against whom men feel anger, and under what dispositions, and why11. It evidently will be needful for an orator to work up his audience by his speech, into such a frame of mind as that under which men are prone to anger, and his adversary, too, as being obnoxious to that on account of which men feel anger, and as being such an one as people feel anger against. Vide this chapter, § 3.

1. As the feeling anger is the opposite of being appeased, and anger itself of placability, we must ascertain with what dispositions men are placable, towards whom they are thus affected, and by what 2. Placability defined. 3. Towards whom men are placable. 4. means they are appeased. Let placability, then, be defined to be " a subsiding and appeasement of anger1.” Now, if men feel anger towards those who slight them, and if slight be voluntary, it is plain that they are placable in regard to those who do no such thing, or who either do so, or appear to do so, involuntarily : towards those also who wish the contrary of what they do; and those who behave in the same way toward themselves also, for no one seems likely him- 5. The repentant. self to be guilty of slight towards himself. Men are thus disposed also towards such as acknowledge and repent of their guilt; for taking their feeling of pain for what they have done as a punishment, they are appeased :-there is proof of this in the case of chastising servants; for we chastise more violently those who contradict us, and deny their guilt; but towards such as acknowledge themselves to be justly punished, we cease from our wrath2; the reason of which is, that the denial of what is evident is a sort of impudence, and impudence is slight and contempt: therefore we are not alive to sense of shame, in regard to those whom we despise very 6. The humble. much. Men are thus disposed also towards those who humble themselves before them3, and do not This passion, different from all the others, supposes the previous existence of another in the mind, the emotions of which it may be said to allay more properly, than to be itself an emotion. Rochefoucault, Maxim 328. " A soft answer tumeth away wrath." See the instance of Ahab's humiliation of himself, (1 Kings xxi. 27,) and that of the Ninevites, (Jonah iii. 5, etc.,) to which we may add David. contradict their imputations; for they appear to acknowledge themselves inferior ; but inferiors fear us, and no one who fears is guilty of slight. But the fact that anger ceases towards such as humble themselves, even dogs evince by their not biting those who sit as suppliants. Placability is also felt 7. Those who are attentive to us. towards such as are earnestly attentive, where they are themselves attentive; for they think themselves regarded with attention, and not despised: towards such as [subsequently to their manifesting slight] 8. have gratified us in more important points, and with those who implore us, and deprecate our anger; for these are more humble: towards those also, who 9. are not given to contumely, nor to jeering one; and who do not manifest slight towards any one, or towards those alone who are not good men, and not towards such as we ourselves are. In a word, we 10. should consider the subject of placability, from the opposite of the doctrine of anger. Once more, it is Whom we fear. felt towards those whom men fear, or have a delicacy toward ; for so long as they are thus affected, they are not influenced by anger; since it is impossible to feel anger and fear at the same time. Again, 11. Towards the angry. people either do not feel anger at all, or feel it in a less degree, towards those who have themselves acted under the influences of anger ; for these appear to have acted, not from any motive of slight; for no one who is angry with you slights you ; since slight 12. is unattended by pain, anger, however, is so attended. Thus are they also disposed towards such as regard them with respect.

It is evident, also, that men are placable, when in a In what situations men are apt to be placable, and how affected. frame of mind contrary to the feeling of anger; thus in amusements, in mirth, in festivity, amid rejoicings, or a course of success and of gratification, or, in a word, when in a state of freedom from pain, and amid chastened pleasure and virtuous hope. Those, too, who have suffered some time to elapse, and are not fresh from the influence of anger; for time makes anger cease4. Also vengeance previously taken on 13. When Cleon was aware of this when he exclaimed against a ance has been taken. one object allays the anger felt against another, even if he be more violent. For which reason, Philocrates, when some one asked him " how it was, as the populace were enraged with him, that he did not make his defence," very justly said, " I will not do it yet.”— " But when will you ?"—" I will do it, when I see some one else criminated." For people, after they have exhausted their anger on some other object, become placable ; which happened in the case of Ergophilus; for the populace, though more indignant with him than with Callisthenes, yet acquitted him, because, on the day before, they had condemned Cal- 14. listhenes to death. Men are thus disposed if they have convicted the object, and if he have suffered a greater ill than they, with all their anger, would have themselves inflicted; for they think they have gotten, as it were, their revenge. Again, if they are aware that they are themselves unjust, and suffer de- 15. servingly5; because anger is not felt at what is just; for in that case men no longer conceive themselves sufferers contrary to what is becoming; but anger was defined to be such a feeling. On which account we should preface punishment with a sort of lecture; for thus even slaves feel less indignant at being pun- 16. When the object is insensible. ished. Moreover they are thus disposed, if they conceive that the sufferer will not perceive that he is punished by them, and in return for what they have have suffered; for anger is felt against individuals: second hearing of the Mitylenaeans;—θαυμάζω μὲν τω̃ν χρόνον

1. LET us discuss the characters towards whom men bear friendly feelings, and hatred, and the reasons why they do so; setting out with a definition of friendliness and the act of cherishing this feeling. 2. Definition of friendliness. Let the bearing friendly feeling, then, be defined to be "the wishing a person what we think good, for his sake and not for our own, and, as far as is in our power, the exerting ourselves to procure it." And a friend is he who entertains and meets a return of this feeling. And those people consider themselves friends who consider themselves to stand thus affected towards each other.

3. Towards whom we feel it. These considerations being laid down, of necessity it must be, that one who participates in another's joy at good fortune, and in his sorrow at what aggrieves him, not from any other motive, but simply for his sake, is his friend. For every one, when that happens which he wishes, rejoices; but when the contrary happens, all are grieved. So that the pain and pleasure men feel are an indication of their wishes. 4. Those, too, are friends, to whom the same things are become by this time good, and the same evil; those, too, who are friends and foes to the same persons, for these must necessarily desire similar objects. So that he who wishes for another what he does for 5. Benefactors. himself, appears to be a friend to that other. Men love also those who have benefited either themselves, or those for whom they have a regard; whether in important particulars, or with readiness2, and for their own sakes, or those whom they deem willing to 6. benefit them. Again, people love the friends of their friends, and such as cherish friendly feelings towards Thus the feeling discussed in the Ethics is called εὒνια ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι μὴ λανθάνουσα. Eth. Nich. vii. 2. Bis dat, qui cito date those for whom they do themselves; likewise those who are loved by such as are beloved by themselves; those also who are enemies to the same people, and 7, who hate those whom they hate themselves, and those who are hated by those who also are hated by themselves; for to all these the same objects seem good as to themselves; so that they wish for things which are good to them, both which were laid down to be characteristic of a friend. Moreover men love 8. those who benefit them in regard to money matters, and the security of life; on which account people The brave and liberal. 9. The just. honour the liberal and brave. They love also the just, of which character they esteem those who do not live at the cost of others, such are all who are supported by their bodily labour, and of these are husbandmen, and among the rest handicraftsmen Husbandmen. 10. in particular. They love also the temperate, for they are not unjust; and those who are disengaged from business, for the same reason. We love also 11. those of whom we wish to become the friends, should they appear to desire it also. Of this sort are those who are good in respect to moral excellence, and men of approved character, either among all men, or among the best men, or those who are held in admiration by ourselves, or who themselves admire us. Again, we love those who are pleasant companions 12. Companions, etc. for passing time, or spending a day with; of this description are the good-tempered, and such as are not fond of chiding those who err, and are not quarrelsome or contentious3. For all people of this sort are fond of dispute ; but such as are fond of dispute give us the idea of desiring the opposite of The character given by Clarendon of Sir Edward Herbert (afterwards Earl of Montgomery), one of the favourites of James I., seems to answer to Aristotle's description of a person likely to conciliate friendship:—“ He pretended to no other qualifications than to understand horses and dogs very well; which his master loved him the better for, (being at his first coming to England very jealous of those who had the reputation of great parts,) and to be believed honest and generous, which made him many friends, and left him no enemy." Clarendon's History, vol. i. p. 59. 13. what we do. Also those who have a happy turn in passing and taking a joke ; for both seem bent on the same things as their neighbours, being able both to endure being rallied and neatly rallying others 4. 14. Men love also those who praise their good qualities, and particularly such as they apprehend not to belong 15. Those neat in dress. to them: also those who are neat in their appearance, their dress, and their whole manner of living. Also 16. those who do not reproach them with errors, nor their own benefits; for both these descriptions of 17. The forgiving. people have an air of reproving them. People admire also those who forget old grievances ; and who do not treasure up grounds of quarrel, but are easily reconciled ; because of whatever disposition they show themselves towards others, people naturally think they 18. will prove to be of towards themselves also: as also those who do not talk scandal, nor inform themselves of the ills either of their neighbours or themselves, but of their good points only; for this is the con- 19. duct of a good man. We are friendly disposed also towards those who are not at cross purposes with us when angry, or seriously engaged; for all such people are fond of dispute: towards those also who comport themselves seriously towards us; thus, for instance, those who admire us, or consider us worthy 20. men, and take a pleasure in our society, and who are thus affected in regard particularly to points about which ourselves are desirous to be admired, or to ap- 21. pear excellent or agreeable : as also towards our equals, and those who have the same objects in view, supposing they do not clash with us5, and that their livelihood arise not from the same profession, for thus See Eth. Nich. iv. 8. So long as we are imitated at a respectful distance: Non ita certandi cupidus, quam propter amorem Quod te imitari aveo : Lucretius, iii. 5. our pride is flattered; but when this imitation has been so successfully continued as to resemble competition, our envy is quickly awakened. To this point Rochefoucault well observes,-“ Those who endeavour to imitate us we like much better than those who endeavour to equal us. Imitation is a sign of esteem, but competition of envy." Maxims, No. 113. arises an instance of the proverb, “ Potter hates potter6.” We stand thus affected towards those also 22. Those who imitate us. who are desirous of the same objects with ourselves, and which it is possible for us to participate in as well as them; otherwise the same collision takes place in this case: towards those also, in regard to 23. whom men have themselves in such a way as, while they do not hold them cheap, not to feel shame on mere matters of opinion. With this feeling do peo- 24. ple regard those also in respect to whom they feel shame about matters really shameful: and those before whom they are studious to stand approved, and by whom they wish to be emulated, yet without being envied, all these men either love as friends, or wish to become their friends; also those with whom 25. they would co-operate toward some good, were it not that greater ills are likely thereby to befall themselves: and such as regard with friendly feeling, the 26. Such as love the dead. absent equally with the present; on which account all love those who manifest this disposition in regard to the dead. Also men entirely love those who are particularly zealous for their friends and never abandon them ; for eminently beyond all the good, people love those who are good as friends. They also love 27. The sincere. those who do not dissemble towards them; of this class are such as mention their own failings; for it has been said already, that before friends we feel no shame about mere matters of opinion; if, then, he who is so ashamed has not the feelings of a friend, the man who is without such shame bears a resemblance to one who has friendly feelings. Also we love those who do not inspire us with fear, and before whom we feel confidence; for no one loves a person whom he fears7. But the species of friend- 28. Three sorts of friendship. 29. Causes of friendship : ship are companionship, intimacy, relationship, and the like. And the efficient causes of friendship are gratuitous benefits, the rendering a service unsolicited, and the not disclosing it after it has been ren- Two of a trade can ne'er agree. There is no fear in love; but perfect love casteth out fear. I John iv. 18. dered ; for thus done the favour appears to be solely for the sake of your friend himself, and from no other motive.

30. and of hatred. The subject of hatred, however, and of bearing it, may, it is plain, be considered by taking the contraries. But the efficient causes of hatred are anger, vexatiousness, calumny.

31. Six points of comparison between anger and hatred. 1. Now anger arises out of something which has reference to ourselves; hatred, however, even independently of any thing having reference to ourselves, since if we conceive a person to be of a certain description, we bear hatred towards him. 2. And our anger invariably has reference to individual objects, as to Callias or Socrates ; but hatred may be borne even to whole classes; for every one hates the character of a thief and an informer. 3. Again, the one feeling is to be remedied by time; the other is incurable. 4. Also the first is a desire of inflicting pain on its object, the last of doing him deadly harm; for the angry man wishes to be felt9, to him who bears hatred this matters not; and all things which give pain may be felt; but what does harm in the highest degree, is least capable of being felt, for instance, injustice and folly, for the presence of vice does not at all pain [him to whom it is present]. 5. And anger is attended by pain, hatred is not; for he who is affected by anger is pained, but he who is affected by Callias is attacked by Lucian in his dialogue, entitled Τιμὼν ἢ Μισάνθρωπος, where Mercury, taxing Plutus with not going to those who deserve riches, says, ’Αριστείδην καταλιπὼν Ιππονίκω καὶ καλλὶα προσή̣εις. p. 232, Scrip. Graec.; and several times in Aristophanes. So chap. iii. § 16. It was remarked that a man who is affected by anger does not consider that he has his revenge, unless the object perceive both at whose hands, and in return for what, he suffers. From this, as from many other of its distinctive characteristics, ANGER will be confessed to be a more generous passion than HATRED. To this purpose Lord Bacon well remarks, that " Some, when they take revenge, are desirous the party should know whence it cometh : this is the more generous; for the delight scemeth to be not so much in doing the hurt, as in making the party repent; but base and crafty cowards are like the arrow that flieth in the dark." Essays: Of Revenge. hatred is not. 6. The former, too, had many ills befallen the object of his anger, might be inclined to pity him; the latter would not, in any case; for the former wishes the object of his anger to suffer in his turn, the latter desires the extinction of the object of his hate10. Out of these heads, then, it is plain that 32. These heads the orator is to use. the orator may both prove those to be friends and enemies who really are such, and render such those who are not, and may do away the assertions of people on the subject, and may draw over those who hesitate whether an act was done from motives of anger or hatred, to whatsoever side he may fix on.

THE sort of things which men fear, and the persons 1. Fear defined. whom, and under what affections as regards themselves, will thus become plain. Now, let fear be defined to be " A sort of pain or agitation, arising out of an idea that an evil, capable either of destroying or giving pain, is impending on us." People do not fear every evil1; for example, a man does not fear lest he shall become unjust or stupid; but people fear all those evils whose effect is either a considerable degree of pain, or destruction, and these, provided they be not far removed, but give one the idea of being close at hand, so as to be on the eve of happening2; for they do not fear that which is very far Quern oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius ap. Cic. de Off. It is essential to that evil which is the object of fear, that it seem qualified to destroy or inflict pain. It must be in fact such an evil as anger would inflict, rather than which hatred would. This is the description of evil against which the brave man must arm himself, or, in the language of the Ethics, ὄσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα. ὄΕth. Nich. iii. 6. off: for all know that they shall die; but since the event is not near, they pay no attention to it.

2. Objects which occasion it. If then fear be this, it must follow that all those things are to be feared which appear to possess great power either of destroying, or of hurting, in points whose tendency is toward considerable pain. On which account even the symptoms of such things are alarming, for the evil appears to be at hand; since this in fact is danger, viz. “ the approach of what 3. Danger. excites fear." Of this description, however, are both the hatred and the anger of those who have it in their power to do us any harm3; for it is evident that they have both the will and the power, so that they are 4. Injustice. not far from doing it. Also injustice, possessed of power; for [it is evident that it does not want inclination to do harm] since it is from settled inclination 5. Insulted virtue. that the unjust man is unjust. Also insulted virtue, invested with power; for it is evident that, invariably, when it is insulted, it determines on a requital, 6. The fear of our enemies. and now it has the power of exacting one. The fear also of those who have the power of doing us any harm, is itself an object to be dreaded; for any one, in such circumstances, will of course be prepared against us.

7. But as men in general are depraved, and may be prevailed on by gain, and are timid amid dangers; it is, generally speaking, a fearful thing to be at the Accomplices. disposal of another. So that accomplices in any deed of guilt are to be feared, lest either they should 8. denounce you, or abandon you to trial. Also those who have the power to act unjustly, are always objects of fear to such as may be attacked by injustice ; for, in nine cases out of ten, a man when he has the power, perpetrates the injustice. Also those who Compare c. 19, § 19. See Dr. Johnson's motives for suppressing some of Savage's remarks on the great: " What was the result of Mr. S.'s inquiry, though he was not accustomed to conceal his discoveries, it may not be entirely safe to relate, because the persons whose characters he criticised are powerful ; AND POWER AND RESENTMENT ARE SELDOM STRANGERS," etc. Life of Savage, p. 336. have been wronged4, or who conceive themselves to The wronged. have been wronged; for they are ever on the watch for an opportunity [of retaliating]. Also those who have wronged others5, if possessed of power, are to be feared, from their apprehension of being retaliated on ; for cases of this kind were laid down to be such as to excite alarm. Those, too, who are rivals for 9. Rivals. the same objects, and which it is not possible should accrue to both, for people are ever at variance with those towards whom they stand on this footing. Those who are objects of fear to our superiors, are also objects of fear to ourselves; for much more will they be able to injure us, than our superiors: and for 10. the same reason [we needs must tear thosej whom our superiors fear6. Men dread those also who have already annihilated persons superior to themselves; and those who have attacked their inferiors; for, either they are already deserving fear, or they will become so by being aggrandized in power. And 11. among those who have been wronged, or are enemies, or opponents, it is not the passionate, and those who speak their minds freely, who are to be dreaded ; but The mild and dissembling, etc.: more to be feared than the hasty. the mild, the dissembling, and the insidious ; for they give us to doubt, whether they be not close upon us, so that they are never clearly known to be too far off to reach us. " It is too common for those who have unjustly suffered pain, to inflict it likewise in their turn with the same injustice, and to imagine that they have a right to treat others as they have themselves been treated." Ibid. p. 339. If the maxim of Tacitus be true—“ Proprium humani ingenii est odisse quern lreseris;" then surely Aristotle's position, that they are to be feared, will follow as a corollary from it ;- Quern metuunt oderunt, Quern oderunt, perisse expetunt. Ennius apud Cic. de Offic. Victorius, wishing to show that'this is not “ a distinction without a difference," remarks, that by φοβεροὐς, the term used in the former case, we are to understand persons evidently possessed of that which all the world knows to be dreadful: whereas, in the latter case, Aristotle alludes to persons, whose power not being quite so manifest, we fear only because we see those people fear it, whose means of resistance are superior to our own.

THE points about which men feel delicate, or are in- 1. sensible to such feelings, and towards whom, and with what dispositions, will be manifest from what follows. Now, let sense of shame be defined to be 2. Definition of shame; of impudence. " a kind of pain and agitation about evils present, past, or to come, which appear to tend to loss of character." And impudence to be, “ a sort of neglect and callousness about these points."

Now, if the sensibility defined be actually sensi- 3. The occasions when shame is felt. bility to shame, it must follow that a man is affected by it, on the occurrence of evils of a kind which appear to be disgraceful, either to himself, or those for Aristotle is here giving us the reasons why the two lastmentioned descriptions of persons are confident: those who never injured any, because it is natural to them to feel anger, which is in itself a source of confidence; and those who are well with heaven, from their reliance on the protection of the gods. The last case is beautifully exemplified in the confidence felt by Nicias in Sicily. whom he has a regard: and such are all results of depravity whatsoever; for example, the casting away one's shield, or the turning to flight, for this pro- Cowardice. 4. ceeds from cowardice; and the withholding a deposit from a person, for it is the result of injustice. And that cohabitation with those with whom we ought not, or where, or when we ought not, [is a source of Intemperance. 5. Meanness. shame;] for it is the result of intemperance: as is also the deriving gain from paltry, mean, or impracticable sources, as from the poor, for instance, or from the dead; whence also the proverb, " to pillage even from the dead:" for it is the result of a sordid 6. hankering after lucre, and of meanness. It is also a source of shame for a person, who has the means, not to contribute his aid in money matters, or to do so in a minor degree; and for one to be assisted by 7. those in less easy circumstances than himself; and for one to borrow himself, when his friend appears to be asking a loan ; and to ask a further loan, when he would recall a former; and the recalling a former loan when he asks another ; and the praising a thing to such a degree as to seem to ask for it; and the persisting no less, though often foiled; for these are 8. Adulation. all indications or meanness. And the praising a person in his presence is a token of adulation; and the praising a man's good points, while you slur over his failings ; or, when one is grieved, the exhibiting grief in an inordinate degree, and whatever other conduct is of a similar kind, [is a source of shame,] 9. because it manifests adulation. [It is also shameful] not to sustain toils which those who are advanced in years, or who live delicately, or who are of higher rank, or, in a word, which they sustain whose strength is inferior to your own; because all these 10. are indications of effeminacy: and so it is to be benefited by another, and that frequently; or, to re- Spartano cuidam respondit Pythia vates : Haud impunitum quondam fore, quod dubitaret Depositum retinere, etc. Juv. xiii. 139. See the account of the deposit left by a Milesian with Glaucus the son of Epicydes. Herodot. vi. 86. CHAP. VI. proach a person with his obligations to you; for they are all indications of a mean and abject spirit. Again, to talk about one's self, and to be one's own 11. Vani. ty. trumpeter ; and to assert that to be one s own which belongs to another; for these are indications of arrogance. In the same way, too, in the several other instances of moral depravity, both their results, their indications, and the like attendant circumstances, are all subjects of shame; for they are disgraceful, and make one ashamed. And to the afore-mentioned we 12. may add, the non-participation in those creditable qualities which either every body, or all our equals, or the greatest part of them, partake of. By equals I mean, fellow countrymen, citizens, those of the same age, relations; in a word, those with whom we are on an equality ; for [when a thing is so general] the non-participation in it begins to be disgraceful; for instance, the not having been educated2, at least in a certain degree, and so in the case of other deficiencies; but the disgrace of all these things becomes much greater, should they appear to be wanting by our own fault; for thus, they are more properly the result of depravity should one be himself the cause of what has attached to him. or does now. or is likely so to attach. Again, men are sensible to 13. feelings of shame, when they are suffering, have suffered, or are about to suffer any thing of such a nature, as tends to loss of respect, and disgrace: and these are all services consisting in the lending one's self either personally, or in any shameful action where there is an idea of suffering insult: and whatever administers to intemperance, whether it be voluntary, or not: and submission to violence, if invo- It was by a somewhat similar consideration that Dr. Johnson refuted the argument of those who opposed the education of the poor on the ground of its raising their ideas above their sphere of life. " If," said he, " a few only are educated, it is a distinction, and those few may be proud; if it be general, it ceases to be a distinction, and, of course, to be a ground of pride. And the contrary will be the result; for instead of its being ground of pride that a man has been educated, it will be matter of shame if he has not.” Boswell's Life. luntary; for such submission, without defending one's self, proceeds from an unmanly character, and from cowardice. These then, and the like to these, are the things about which men are sensible of shame.

14. Persons in whose presence men feel shame. Whom they esteem. 15. But as the sense of shame is an idea entertained of loss of character; and of this loss, in itself alone, without reference to its consequences ; and as no one regards the opinion, except for the sake of those who hold it; it must follow that a man is thus sensible in regard to those for whom he has an esteem. But he will have an esteem for those who admire him, and whom he does himself admire, and by whom he wishes to be admired, and in regard to whom he feels emulation, and whose opinion he does not hold cheap. 16. Admire. Now, people wish to be admired by, and do themselves admire, all those who possess any of those goods which are valued; or from whom they happen to be very much in want of getting something of which they have the disposal; for instance, those who 17. Their equals. are in love. But people have their emulation excited, in reference to their equals; and they hold in consideration the prudent, as being men who adhere to truth; of this description are men of education, and 18. Those with whom they must live. such as are advanced in years. Also actions done in the eyes of the world and in public [excite our shame], and hence the proverb, that " Shame dwells in the eyes." On this account, people are more sensible of shame before those with whom they are always likely to be present, and those who fix their attention on them, for both these are instances of being before the 19. The innocent. eyes of persons :-again, they are sensible of it before those who are not open to charges on the same points ; for their sentiments, it is evident, are the opposite of their own: before those also who do not make allowances for such as appear to be faulty; for errors which a man commits himself ,these he is said Οἱ. φρόνιμοι, more properly, men of the world. Such a character Cicero seems to have had in view, according to Victorius, when he says, " qui est versatus in rebus, vel usu, quern aetas denique affert, vel auditione et cogitatione, quae studio et diligentia praecurrit aetatem.” Cic. de Orat. ii. 30. not to take amiss in his neighbours; so that he evidently will take amiss such as he does not commit himself: and before those who are fond of divulging 20. Tattlers. what they know to the world; for whether a man does not think one's conduct faulty, or does not divulge it, makes no difference. But persons likely to divulge [what they know to one's discredit] are such as have been injured, from their being anxiously on the watch to retaliate ; and those who are slanderers generally; for if they speak ill even of those who are not culpable, much more will they of those who are: as are also those who are on the look-out for the errors of their neighbours, for instance, jesters, and the poets of the old comedy ; for these are in some sense slanderers, and fond of divulging. Again, [men are sensible of shame] before those with whom they never met with a repulse; for they are disposed towards them as admirers. On which account men have a sense of shame, even towards those who ask any thing for the first time, as having never yet forfeited their good opinion in any points. And of this description are both those who have lately sought to be our friends, for they have observed our excellent qualities; and hence, the reply of Euripides to the Syracusans is a good one4; and, of our old acquaintances, those who know no ill of us. And men are 21. sensible of shame not only about the things themselves which have been mentioned as delicate points, but even about the indications of them; for instance, not only about licentious conduct, but also about all indications of it; not only in doing what is disgraceful, but even in mentioning it5. And in the same 22. way they are sensible ot shame, not only before those who have been mentioned, but before those also who It appears that Euripides had been sent to Sicily as ambassador, but finding the Syracusans inclined to reject his proposals for a peace, he told them, " that they surely ought to have some respect for a people who held them in such high consideration, particularly as this was their first request." Quod factu foedum est, idem est et dictu turpe. Οὐ yap αὐδα̣̃ν ἔσθ’ a μηδὲ δρα̣̃ν καλόν. Soph'oc. (Ed. Tyr. 1409. Servants. 23. will be likely to disclose their conduct to them, as for instance, their servants or their friends. In brief, however, people are not at all sensible of shame before those whose opinions, in regard to their justness, they hold cheap; for no one feels shame before children and brutes: nor do men feel it about the same points when before acquaintances, as before strangers; but when before acquaintances they feel it on points really shameful6; but before strangers on matters merely sanctioned by custom.

24. How affected men feel shame. As regards themselves, men would be likely to be sensible of shame under these dispositions; first, if there should really exist any so affected towards themselves, as I described those to be, in regard to whom they feel shame. And these were either those whom they hold in admiration, or by whom themselves are held in admiration, or by whom they are desirous of being admired, or of whom they are petitioning something which they will not be likely to get, if not men When the world is looking on. of character. And if these be either actual spectators (just as, on the question of the allotment of Samos to colonists, Cydias introduced in his harangue to the ecclesia; for he put it to the Athenians to imagine that the Greeks were standing round as actual spectators, and not as mere future hearers, of the decree which they might pass); or should persons of this description be near, or be likely soon to be aware of their conduct: and on this account persons in misfortune, do not wish even to be seen by those who once deemed them happy; for they who thus deem of us 25. When discredit may attach. are admirers. And when they have attached to them what throws discredit on the conduct and the actions, either of themselves, or of their ancestors, or any others with whom in any way they are closely connected ; and, in one word, all in whose behalf they are sensible of shame ; and these are the above-mentioned, and those who stand in any relation to them, He told us above (chap. iv. § 23), that those people were usually regarded as friends " before whom we feel no delicacy on matters of mere opinion, though far from disregarding their opinions." whose tutors or advisers they have been 7. And if 26. With their equals. there be others, their equals, with whom they are at rivalry; for, from a feeling of shame, on account of persons of this description, men both do and leave undone very many things. Again, when people are 27. When openly disgraced. likely to be seen, and openly to be engaged before those who are privy [to their disgrace], they become in a higher degree susceptible of shame. And hence the poet Antiphon, just as he was going to be beaten on the rack by Dionysius, observing those who were about to be executed with him muffling themselves up as they went through the gate, said, "Why do you muffle yourselves up;—is it lest any of these present should see you to-morrow ? "

Thus much then on the subject of the sense of shame; but of insensibility to it, we shall evidently know enough from the contraries.

THE persons towards whom men feel gratitude, and 1. the occasions on which, and with what dispositions on their own part, will be plain to us, after we have defined gratuitous benevolence. Now, let gratuitous 2. Definition of χάρις. The Stoics had observed this feeling of carrying our views onward to posthumous glory; and found the love of glory the most difficult of all passions to eradicate:—διὸ καὶ ἔχατος

1. LET us explain the circumstances which excite pity; and the persons whom men pity; and, as regards 2. Definition of pity. themselves, with what dispositions. Now let pity be defined tb be1, "a sort of pain occasioned by an evil capable of hurting or destroying2, appearing to befall one who does not deserve it, which one may himself expect to endure3, or that some one connected with him will; and this when it appears near: for it evidently is necessary that a person likely to feel pity should be actually such as to deem that, either in his own person, or of some one connected with him, he may suffer some evil, and that an evil of such a description as has been stated in the definition, or one similar to it, or nearly equivalent to it. 3. Per On which account neither do those who are abso- Grieffor the calamity of another is PITY; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore it is called also compassion, and, in the phrase of the present time, a fellow-feeling: and therefore, for calamity arriving from great wickedness the best men have the least pity; and for the same calamity those men hate pity, that think themselves least obnoxious to the same. Hobbes's Leviathan. See Rochefoucault's Maxims, No. 342, where the above is quoted in the note. The evil in the case of pity is of the same character as was stated to be the object of fear. In fact, whatever when befalling another excites pity, in one's own case excites fear. Vid. chap. v. § 12. It is on this principle that, in the Poetics, describing the character best adapted to the purposes of tragedy, and in whose sufferings we shall be most likely to take an interest, he excludes an absolutely vicious character ;—ἀτραγω̣τότον γὰρ

1. Indignation opposed to pity. Definition of it. To pity is opposed, most directly, that feeling which men call indignation; for, to the feeling pain at undeserved misfortune, is opposed in a certain way the feeling pain at undeserved good fortune, and it originates in the same disposition; and these feelings 2. are both those of a virtuous disposition. For we ought to sympathize with, and to pity those who are undeservedly unfortunate; and to feel indignant at those who are undeservedly fortunate ; for whatever happens contrary to desert is unjust; and on this account we make indignation an attribute even of Witness the effect of Antony's display of the robe of Caesar stained with his blood. Julius Caesar. Illustrated in the effect produced by Polyxena's resignation and anxiety to preserve, even in death, the decorum of female delicacy :-

IT is plain also on what occasions, with whom, and 1. Envy. with what dispositions men feel envy, if in truth envy be " a sort of pain at apparent good fortune, Its definition. touching the above-mentioned goods 1, in the case of equals, not in order that any thing may happen to one's self, and simply on account of their [being thus fortunately for those who have, or seem to have equals, will be the people to be envious. I mean by 2. equals, those who are like in circumstances of birth, connexions, age, habits, character, and property. They, too, will be envious who fall but little short of Men likely to feel envy are: those within a little of the summit. 3. The ambitious. The wise. possessing all : hence those who are carrying on mighty projects, and those who are prosperous, are envious; for they think that every one is carrying off what belongs to them. Again, those who are remarkably esteemed on any account, and particularly on account of their wisdom or happiness. And those who are ambitious are more given to envy than those who are devoid of ambition. And those who make a show of wisdom, for they are ambitious on the score of wisdom. And, in a word, those who in any respect are ambitious of glory are given to envy in that respect. And the narrow-minded; for, to them, The narrowminded. 4. Objects which . cite envy. every thing appears of consequence.

The goods respecting which men feel envy have been told you ; for all those things whatsoever, about which men are eager for praise, and ambitious, whe- See § 7 and 8 of the last chapter, where he excludes moral excellence from the number of the goods which excite indignation ; and in justification of their exclusion in that place it may be observed, that the simple fact of their being possessed is proof of their being deserved. And their exclusion from the subjects of envy may be justified by the consideration that the envious will, in general, esteem moral excellence scarcely worth troubling themselves about. See the parable of the ewe lamb, addressed by Nathan to David. ther they be productions or acquisitions, and respecting which they are desirous of renown, and all cases of good luck; about all these nearly is envy felt; and particularly about such of them as the individuals are themselves desirous of, or think they ought themselves to possess, or those things in the possession of which they are themselves superior, or deficient in a trifling degree.

5. Men likely to be envied. Again, it is evident with whom men are envious ; for this has been already stated in connexion [with what has gone before; since men envy those who Equals. come near them in time, and place, and age, and character ; whence the saying, " kindred too is conscious Rivals. of envy 3." Men also envy those with whom they are at rivalry; for they are rivals of those above- mentioned ; but of those who existed ten thousand years back, or who may live ten thousand years hence, or who are already dead, of these no one is the rival; nor again of those who live at the Pillars of Hercules 4; nor of those of whom, in the opinions either of themselves or of others, they are greatly the inferiors ; nor again of those to whom they conceive themselves to be in a great degree superior; with the like indifference do they regard those fat all en- 6. gaged] in pursuits of this description. And as men are affected by ambition in regard to rivals, and competitors, and all, in a word, who are eager after the same objects, it must follow that they envy these in an especial manner; whence the saying, " potter 7. The successful, 8. Those whose success is a tacit reproach to us. envies potter." And those who either succeed with difficulty, or do not succeed at all, envy those who succeed quickly. Again, they envy those whose acquisitions and success are a reproach to themselves, and these are those who are near them, or their equals; for it becomes evident that they do themselves fail of success through their own fault, so that This apophthegm should seem to justify the caution of Cleobulus,—Κλεόβουλος ὁ Λίνδιος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπό τινος τίνα δει̃

HENCE likewise it will be evident both with what 1. 'Emulation. dispositions, and in regard to what objects, and of whom, persons are emulous. Because if emulation Its definition. be “a sort of pain at the apparent presence of goods which are held in honour, and which admit of one's gaining them himself, in the case of those naturally our equals; felt, not because they are present to another, but because they are not likewise present to one Is self," (on which very account emulation is a vir- It is a virtuous emotion. tuous feeling, and belongs to virtuous people, whereas envy is a depraved feeling, and belongs to persons who are depraved: for the one, by motion of his emu- The merely apparent presence of this description of goods is sufficient to excite emulation. The character of the goods which this passion has as its object is entirely different from that which excites envy and indignation. lation, sets himself to acquire the good; while the other, by motion of his envy, sets himself to cause Persons likely to feel emulation. the dispossession of his neighbour). It must be, then, that persons who deem themselves worthy of goods which they do not possess, are apt to feel emulation; since no one arrogates to himself that which appears The young and highspirited. impossible: and hence the young and the high-spirited are thus affected; and also those to whom belong goods of such a description as to be worth the attention of men in repute; these are wealth, number of friends, office, and whatever other goods are of this kind ; for men feel emulous of such goods ; as though, because they properly belong to such as are men of virtuous dispositions, it were matter of absolute right 2. Those whom others esteem. that themselves should be virtuous. Again, those are emulous whom others esteem worthy of such goods: and those again whose ancestors, or relations, or in- 3. Whose ancestry or relations are worthy. timate friends, or whose tribe or city is held in esteem about any point, such persons are apt to feel emulation on that point; for they think they belong properly to them, and that themselves are worthy of them.

4. Things which are objects of emulation. Virtues. Goods. Wealth, etc. But if those goods are matter of emulation which are held in esteem, it must of course follow that the virtues are of this description ; and whatever things have a tendency to aid and benefit others; since people honour virtuous people, and those who benefit them: likewise that all goods whatsoever, the enjoyment of which accrues to one's neighbours, are of this sort; for instance, wealth, and beauty, rather than health.

5. Persons who are objects of emulation. And it will also be evident who the persons are who are objects of emulation; since they who possess these, and the like goods, become objects of emulation ; these goods are such as have been mentioned, for example, courage, wisdom, sovereignty; for those who are sovereigns have a power of benefiting many. Generals, orators, all, in fact, who have abilities this 6. All whom men wish to resemble, way [are objects of emulation]. And those whom many wish to resemble, or who have many acquaintances, or many friends. Or those whom many admire, or whom they do themselves admire. And those on 7. or admire. whom are pronounced the praises and encomia of poets and panegyrists2. Persons, however, of a con- Contempt is the contrary to emulation. trary description, men despise; for contempt is the contrary of emulation ; and the despising of the being emulous. And it must be that persons so affected as to emulate certain persons, or to be themselves objects of emulation, are apt to feel contempt for those things and persons who possess evils the contraries of those goods which are the objects of emulation. On which account men frequently despise the fortunate, when their good fortune is unconnected with those goods which are held in esteem.

Of the means, then, by which the passions are excited in the breast, and are allayed, one of the sources out of which means of persuasion arise, of these we now have treated.

LET us next go over in detail the dispositions of 1. Characters of mankind. men; considering of what kind of a turn they are, in reference to their passions, habits, ages, and fortunes. This description of orators were justly said to be λογογρά­ φοι, (λόγους γραφεὶν;) indeed it appears from the third book, that epideictic orations in general were intended rather for perusal than recitation. Speaking of the style of epideictic orators, he remarks, τὸ ipyov αὐτη̃ς άνάγνιοσις, lib. iii. cap. xii. § 6. Viz. πίστις παθητικὴ, the third branch of πίστις ἐντέχνη. See book i. chap. ii. § 3, 4, 5. This discussion of the dispositions of persons, under a few of the most striking circumstances of life, was promised in the first book (chap. x. ἤθη, § 11). a " The word taken in its utmost extent, includes every thing that is habitual and characteristic; but it is often used in a limited sense, for the habitual temper or disposition." Twining. Probably " humour," in the sense in which it has been defined by Ben Jonson, comes nearer to ἦθος than any word in our language :— 2. Vary in their i. Passions. ii. Habits. I call anger, lust, and the like, by the name passions; a subject of which we have treated above. By the name habits, I designate virtues and vices : and of these we have treated above, both as to the points on which men form deliberate choice, and that to which ii. Ages. iv. Fortunes. they give birth in action. And the ages are youth, prime, and old age. By fortune I mean, high birth, and wealth, and abilities, and their opposites; and, in one word, good and bad fortune.

3. Character of the young. Ardent. Now the young are in their dispositions prone to desire, and of a character to effect what they desire. And they are in the highest degree apt to pursue the pleasures of love above all desires about which the body is concerned, and in these they are incontinent. Inconstant. 4. But they are prone to change, and fastidious in the objects of their desires. And they desire with earnestness, but speedily cease to desire; for their wishes are keen, without being durable; just like the hunger Irritable. and thirst of the sick. And they are passionate and irritable, and of a temperament to follow the impulse. 5. And they cannot overcome their anger; for by reason of their ambition they do not endure a slight, but Ambitious. become indignant, and fancy themselves injured: and they are ambitious indeed of honour, but more so of 6. victory; for youth is desirous of superiority, and victory is a sort of superiority. And of both these are they desirous in a higher degree than of gain; but least of all are they desirous of gain3, by reason of their having never yet experienced want; just according to the proverbial saying of Pittacus to Am- 7. Sanguine. phiaraus 4. And they do not view things in a bad When some one peculiar quality Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw All his affects, his spirits, and his powers, In their confluctions, all to run one way, This may be truly said to be a humour. Every Man out of his Humour : where see Whalley's note. Power pleases the violent and proud : wealth delights the placid and timorous. Youth therefore flies at power, and age grovels after riches. Johnson's Journey to the Hebrides, p. 344. It is not known what this saying of Pittacus was.. light, but in a good, by reason of their never having yet been witnesses of much depravity. And they Credulous. are credulous, from their never having yet been much imposed on. And they are sanguine in their 8. expectations ; for like those who are affected by wine, so the young are warmed by their nature ; and at the same time from their having never yet met with many repulses. Their life, too, for the most Their life is one of hope. part, is one of hope; for hope is of that which is yet to be, while memory is of that which is passed: but to the young that which is yet to be, is long; but that which has passed, is short; for in the early days of life they think they remember nothing, while they hope for every thing; and they are easily imposed on, for the reason which has been stated; because they soon cherish expectation. And they are brave 9. Rash. rather to an excess; tor they are irritable and sanguine, qualities, the one whereof cancels fear, and the other inspires courage; for while no one who is affected by anger ever is afraid, the being in hope of some good is a thing to give courage. And they are 10. Bashful. bashful; for they do not as yet conceive the honourable to be any thing distinct, but they have been educated only under the established usage of the state. And they are high-minded ; for they have not 11. Highspirited. as yet been humbled by the course of life, but are unexperienced in peremptory circumstances: again, high-mindedness is the deeming one's self worthy of much; and this belongs to persons of sanguine expectations. And they prefer succeeding in an hon- 12. With a sense of honour. curable sense than in points of expediency; for they live more in conformity to moral feeling than to mere calculations5; and calculation is of the expedient, moral excellence, however, of that which is honourable. Again, they are fond of friends and companions 13. Social. rather than ot their other compeers in age, by reason of their delighting in social intercourse, and of their not yet deciding on any thing in reference to what is Λογισμὸς is that one of the seven causes of human action which least affects the young. They usually act from ϑυμὸ or ἐπιθυμία. expedient; so that they do not decide on their friends 14. Their errors are on the side of excess. [upon that principle]. And all their errors are on the side of excess and too great earnestness, in contravention of Chilo's rule; for the young carry every thing to an excess; for their friendships are in excess, their hatreds are in excess, and they do every thing else with the same degree of earnestness ; they think also that they know every thing, and firmly asseverate that they do; for this is the cause of their 15. Their insults are mischievous not malicious. Prone to pity. pushing every thing to an excess. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of wantonness, and not of malice. They are likewise prone to pity, from their conceiving every one to be good, and more worthy than in fact he is6; for they measure others by the standard of their own guiltlessness ; so that they conceive them to be suffering what they do 16. Are gracefully facetious. not deserve. And they are fond of mirth, on which account they are also of a facetious turn7; for facetiousness is chastened forwardness of manner.

Such, then, is the disposition of the young.

1. Character of the old. BUT those who are advanced in life, and who have passed their prime, are of dispositions in most points Vide note a, chap. xiii. p. 154. Εὐτράπελοι. I know no word in our language of similar moral signification in which the metaphorical allusion to Τρέπω, the turn, or easy adaptation of manner, is preserved, unless indeed Minshew be correct in his etymology of Buxome, which, according to him, is derived from the German word booghsacm, i. FLEXILIS, and refers to the article pliant for further explanation. If this etymology be true, then Milton's expression, buxom, blythe, and debonnaire, though applied rather to female than manly grace, will convey a notion of what is here intended by Aristotle. But see Minshew, p. 106, edit. 1627. In the Ethics, b. 4, he compares εὐτραπλία to gracefulness of person; which, in conformity with the notions of most ancient writers, he seems to think only discoverable in motion, not in rest. Compare also " Crito, or a Dialogue on Beauty." the very opposite of these. Since by reason of their having lived many years, and having been deceived in a greater number of instances, and having mistaken, by reason, too, that the majority of human affairs are but worthless, they neither positively as- The old are doubtful. 2. severate any thing, and they err in every thing more on the side of defect than they ought. And they always " suppose," but never " know" certainly; and, questioning every thing, they always subjoin a “perhaps," or a "possibly." And they talk of every Indecisive. thing in this undecisive tone, asserting nothing decisively. And they are apt to view things in an 3. View things on the dark side. Suspicious. unfavourable light ; for a disposition thus to view things, is the judging of every thing on the worse side. Moreover they are apt to be suspicious from distrust, and they are distrustful from their experience. And on this account they neither love nor 4. Cautious. hate with great earnestness; but, conformably to the remark of Bias, they both love as though about to hate, and hate as though about to love. And they 5. Cowardly. are pusillanimous, from their having been humbled by the course of life ; for they raise their desires to nothing great or vast, but to things only which conduce to support of life. And they are illiberal; for 6. Illiberal. property is one of the necessaries; and they are at the same time aware, from their experience, of the difficulty of its acquisition, and of the ease with which it is lost. And they are timid and apprehen- 7. Timid. sive of every thing ; for their disposition is the reverse of that of the young; for they have been chilled by years, but the young are warm in their temperament; so that their age has paved the way to timidity; for fear is a certain kind of chill. And 8. Tenacious of life. they are attached to life, and particularly at its last closing day, from the circumstance that desire is of some object which is absent, and that men more especially desire that of which they stand in need. And 9. Selfish. they have self-love more than is fitting ; for this too is a kind of littleness of spirit. And they live in a greater degree than they ought by the standard of expediency, and not of what is honourable, by reason of their self-love: for what is expedient is good relatively, to one's self; but what is honourable is good 10. Despise appear- UnIes. absolutely. And they are insensible to shame, rather than liable to be affected by it; for on account of their not holding equally in esteem the honourable 11. Desponding. and the expedient, they despise appearances. Again, they are not easily inspired with hope, on account of their experience ; for the majority of things are but paltry; wherefore the generality turn out inferior to the expectation; and once more on account of their 12. Their life is one of memory. timidity they are apt to despond]. And they live more in memory than in hope; for the remnant of life is brief, but what has passed is considerable; and hope indeed is of what is to come; whereas memory is of things gone by: the very reason this, of their garrulity; for they never cease talking of that which has taken place, since they are delighted in awaken - 13. Weak in anger, but keen. ing the recollections of things. And their anger is keen, but faint. And their desires have, some, abandoned them, the others are faint; so that neither are they liable to the influence of desire, nor apt to act in conformity to it, but with a view to gain; on which account men of this age appear to be naturally temperate, for both their desires have relaxed, and Live from calculation. 14., Err on the side of malice. 15. Are apt to pity, they are enslaved to gain. And they live more by calculation than by moral feeling; for calculation is of expediency, but moral feeling is of virtue. And, in their trespasses, they trespass on the side of malice, not of wanton insolence. The old have moreover a tendency to pity, but not on the same principle with the young; for the latter are thus disposed from their love of human nature, the former from their from weakness. imbecility ; since they consider the endurance of every calamity at hand to them, and this was laid Querulous. down as a principle of pity . Whence they are que- Their principles of action are the very contraries of those which principally influence the young; ἔθος and λογισμός being the usual springs of action in the man of advanced life. The two leading principles of pity were stated to be, a conviction that the sufferer is undeserving what he suffers, and that you consider yourself liable to be placed in similar circumstances. It was on the former of these principles that the young were stated rulous, and neither facetious, nor fond of mirth ; for querulousness is the very reverse of fondness for mirth.

Such, then, are the dispositions of the young, and 16. How the orator must use these characters. of those in advanced life3. So that, as all welcome an address worded to their own disposition, and a speaker who resembles themselves, it is clear by employing his oration in what way the orator will appear of this description, as regards himself and what he says.

THOSE who are in their prime will, it is evident, be 1. Character of the matured. in a mean in point of disposition between these, subtracting the excesses of each: being neither rash in too great a degree, (for rashness is of this description, 1. e. in excess, nor too much given to fear, but keep- They are moderate. 2. ing themselves right in respect to both. Neither placing confidence in all, nor distrusting all, but judging rather in conformity to the truth. Neither living with a view solely to what is honourable, nor with a view only to expediency, but with a respect to both. And conformed neither to penurious parsimony, nor to extravagance, but to what is fitting. With the 3. same equality do they carry themselves also in respect to anger and to desire. And they are of a tempering Are spirited with coolness. coolness joined with spirit, and are spirited not to be apt to pity; because they take a favourable view of human nature. The old are equally liable to be affected by that passion, but it is on the latter principle ; for though they view human nature in an unfavourable light, yet have they so strong a sense of their own liability to suffering, that they are led to commiserate others. Compare chap. viii. § 7; and chap. xii. § 15. In the Rambler, No. 196, the change of sentiments usual as men advance from youth to age is beautifully traced; and the whole paper affords a striking illustration of the subject treated in this and the preceding chapter. out temperate coolness : for in the young and in elderly persons these qualities are separated; since the young are spirited, and of an intemperate rashness, while elderly persons are of a chastened spirit, and timid. And thus, in a word, whatever advantages youth and age have divided between them, the middle age possesses both ; and in whatever respects they are either in excess or defect, in all these it holds a mean and what is fitting.

4. Prime of life for the body and mind. But the body is in its prime from the age of thirty to five and thirty; and the mind about the age of forty-nine. Let thus much, then, have been said re- ' specting youth, and old and mature age, and the dispositions which they severally are of.

1. Character of men of high birth. BUT let us treat of the goods of fortune next in order, so many of them at least as influence the dispositions of men in any particular way.

2. Ambitious. Now it is the disposition of high birth, that its possessor is more ambitious than others; for all, when any possession is realized to them, are wont to ac- Contemptuous. cumulate upon it. But high birth is nobility of ancestry ; and it is apt to indulge in contempt even of those who are as good as its own ancestors ; because distinctions, in proportion as they are more remote, rather than recent, are held in greater esteem, and afford a ready plea for arrogance.

3. Distinction between the noble and generous. The generations of man But, noble, is an appellation referring to excellence of birth; whereas, generous refers to one's not degenerating from the nature [of his ancestry] ; which, generally speaking, is not the case with the noble, but the majority of them are ordinary persons. For there is a kind of richness of produce in the genera- tions of man, just as there is in that which arises from the land ; and at times, should the stock be good, compared to the soil. there arise in a family at intervals extraordinary persons ; and afterwards it again relaxes. And a family of brilliant talent run wild into dispositions bordering on madness1; as in the instances of the descendants of Alcibiades, and Dionysius the elder: and one of sedate wisdom, into stupidity and dulness; as in the instances of the descendants of Cimon, and Pericles, and Socrates.

ANY one, without any great penetration, may distin- 1. Character of the wealthy. Insolent. guish the dispositions consequent on wealth; for [its possessors] are insolent and overbearing, from being tainted in a certain way by the getting of their wealth. For they are affected as though they possessed every good; since wealth is a sort of standard of the worth of other things ; whence every thing seems to be purchaseable by it. And they 2. Fastidious. Purse- proud. are affectedly delicate and purse-proud; they are thus delicate on account of their luxurious lives, and the display they make of their prosperity. They are purse-proud, and violate the rules of good breeding2, Μανικώτερα. In connexion with this word it should be borne in mind, that the Greeks were accustomed to consider every kind of enthusiastic impetuosity as a species of madness. See Twining on the Poetics, note 140. Σόλοικοι, the inhabitants of Soli in Cilicia, whose corruptions of the Greek language became proverbial. The word was used also to designate those who were guilty of impropriety in conduct, as well as in expression. Massinger, in enumerating some instances of ill breeding, uses the expression. He ne'er observed you To twirl a dish about, you did not like of, All being pleasing to you; or to take A say of venison or stale fowl by your nose, Which is a solecism at another's table, etc. Unnatural Combat, act iii. sc. 1. See too Ben Jonson's Fox, vol. iii. p. 275. ing. from the circumstance that every one is wont to dwell upon that which is beloved and admired by him, and because they think that others are emulous of that, of which they are themselves. But at the same time they are thus affected reasonably enough ; for many are they who need the aid of men of property. Whence, too, that remark of Simonides addressed to the wife of Hiero respecting the wealthy and the wise ; for when she asked him, " whether it were better to have been born wealthy or wise," he replied, " wealthy; for," he said, " he used to see the wise hanging on at the doors of the wealthy." 3. Arrogant of place and power. And [it is a characteristic of the rich] that they esteem themselves worthy of being in office; for they consider themselves possessed of that on account of which they are entitled to be in office. And, in a word, the disposition of the rich is that of a fool amid prosperity.

4. Difference between the newly rich and those who have been so from of old. However, the dispositions of those who are but lately rich, and of those who have been so from of old, are different; inasmuch as those who have recently become rich have all these faults in a greater and a worse degree; for the having recently become rich is as it were an inexpertness in wealth. And they are guilty of offences, not of a malicious nature, but such as are either offences of contumely or intemperance ; for instance, in the case of assault or adultery. It is on this principle that Clytemnestra congratulates Cassandra on being the slave of an ancient family, rather than one recently advanced in the world:­

AND in the same way on the subject of power, the 1. Character of men in power resembles the rich ; but they are more ambitious, more manly. 2. 3. Less trifling. 4. Are dignified. most striking almost of its dispositions are evident; for of these power has some in common with wealth, and others which are better. For men in power are more ambitious and more manly in their dispositions than the wealthy; from their aiming at all duties whatsoever, which from their power they have the means of discharging. And they are less given to trifling, because, from a necessity of looking carefully to their power, they are constrained to a diligent attention. And they comport themselves with a dignity which is conciliatory rather than repulsive; for their claims for dignity render them more conspicuous ; on which account, they bear themselves moderately : but conciliatory dignity is a softened and graceful sedateness. And, if they do transgress the bounds of right, it is not in small points, but in those which are of importance, that they are guilty.

But good fortune, according to its constituents, is 5. Character of the fortunate. of the disposition of the states which have been described ; since those which appear to be the greatest instances of good fortune resolve themselves ultimately into these states: and, besides these, to the excellence of one's progeny, and to personal advantages. But men are usually more overbearing and 6. Overbearing. inconsiderate in consequence of prosperity. But one disposition, and that most excellent, is a concomitant of good fortune, viz. that the fortunate are lovers of the gods, and are disposed toward the deity with a Yet religious. sort of confidence, in consequence of the goods which have accrued to them from fortune.

The subject, then, of the dispositions as they conform to age and to fortune has been discussed; for from the opposites of my remarks the opposite subjects will be evident; the subject, for example, of the disposition of a poor, or unfortunate person, or of one out of power.

1. That there are certain κοινὰ εἴδη. BUT since the use of persuasive orations has a reference to the forming a decision (since on questions which we are acquainted with, and have decided on, there is no further need of an oration) ; and as this is their use, whether addressing his speech to a single individual, the speaker endeavours to exhort or dissuade (which they do who admonish or persuade; since that individual is in no less degree a judge; because the person [be he who he may], whomsoever we want to persuade is, once for all, a judge); and also if one be speaking against an adversary, or on any supposed question, it has equally [a reference to decision] ; (for one needs must employ a speech, and sweep away objections against which, as against an adversary, he directs his address); this is just as much the case in demonstrative oratory (since the speech commends itself to the listener just as though to a judge). But he alone is strictly a judge, who decides on the questions at issue in civil controversies : since both forensic questions, and those on which men deliberate, are agitated as to how they stand. But of dispositions, as they are affected by the constitutions of states, we have spoken above. So that the means will now have been distinctly unfolded, both how, and by the use of what things, we may render our addresses ethical.

2. But as there was, in each species of orations, a certain distinct end proposed; and as respecting all of them some ideas and propositions have been ascertained, out of which the deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial orators deduce their means of persuading ; and as, in addition to these, the means by which it is possible for us to render our speeches ethical, have been developed; it merely remains, that we go over Under the word πολιτικὸς, he seems, according to Victorius, to embrace judicial as well as deliberative questions. in detail the topics which are common to the three 3. They are four in number. i. The possible or impossible. 4. ii.Whether the fact has or has not taken place. iii. Whether it will or will not. 5. iv. The great and small. species of oratory : for it is necessary that every orator should connect with his speech the topics of possibility or impossibility; and for some it will be necessary to attempt to show that certain things will take place, and for others that they have taken place. And again, the topic of greatness is common to all oratory ; for every orator, whether he exhort or dissuade, praise or blame, accuse or defend, avails himself of amplification and diminution.

But of these common topics, amplification is most congenial to demonstrative oratory, as has been remarked ; possibility, as relating to the past, to judicial3; since on what has been its decision is made; but possibility, as relating to the future, is most congenial to deliberative.

FIRST, then, let us speak of things possible and those 1. First of the possible and impossible. The possible is of which the contrary ispossible. which are impossible.

If then it be possible that one contrary should exist, or be called into existence, the other contrary will also appear to be possible; for instance, if it be possible for a man to be convalescent, it also is possible for him to be sick; for the effective power of contraries, inasmuch as they are contraries, is the We may, if we please, consider this as the ἀπόδοσις of the sentence; and all the previous clauses as so many distinct parentheses-; as the author of the Analysis has done, p. 101. This discussion of possibility was promised in the course of what he said on judicial oratory, book i. chap. xii. § 2. 2. The like. 3. The more difficult. 4. The more excellent. same. If, of two similar things, the one be possible, the other which is similar will be possible also. If the more difficult be possible, so will also that which is easier. And if it be possible for a thing to be produced in a state of excellence or beauty, it also is possible for it to be produced under general circumstances ; for it is more difficult for a building to be 5. The beginning. made beautiful, than simply a building. And in whatever case the commencement is possible, the fulfilment also is possible1: for of things which are impossible, none either take place or begin to do so; for instance, it neither is the case, that the diameter of a square is commensurable with the side, neither The end. will it ever begin to be so. Also, wherever the fulfilment is possible, so is the commencement; since 6. The subsequent. every thing proceeds from a beginning. And if the subsequent in being or production be possible, so also is the antecedent: if, for example, it be possible that a man should be produced, so also is it that a child should, since it is antecedent in its production : again, if it be possible for a child, so is it also for a man to be produced; on the principle that the former is a 7. Things which we love. commencement. Things likewise are possible, of which there is a natural love or desire; for no one loves what is impossible, neither desires it, for the 8. Subjects of art or science. 9. most part at least. Also, any thing which is the subject of an art or science, is possible both to exist and to be produced. Likewise any thing whatsoever, the principle of whose production resides in those whom we can compel or persuade ; such are those whose superiors, or lords, or friends we are. lO.Where the parts are possible, so is the whole. And wherever the parts are possible, so also is the whole. Wherever again the whole is possible, so also are the parts, generally speaking : for if the latchet, the forepart, and the upperleather of the shoe admit of being brought into being, so also do the shoes themselves: and if the shoes, then also the latchet, Thus it is argued, that if all may receive the ἀρχὴ of regeneration, baptism; all may receive its τέλος, salvation. Baptism is expressly called by St. Basil, ἀρχὴ μοὶ ζωη̃ς TO βάπτισμα. De Spir. Sanct. c. 10. the forepart, and upperleauther2; also, if the genus be 11. If the genus, then the species; and vice versa, etc. 12. of the number of things possible, so also will be the species; and if the species, so also the genus: for example, if a vessel can be produced, so can a trireme; and if a trireme, so can a vessel. And if, of things which have a natural relation to each other, the one be possible, so is also the other; as if the double be possible, so also is the half; and if the half, so also is the double. And if a thing admits of 13. If without art, then with art. being brought into being without art or preparation, a fortiori it will admit of it by the help of art and attention. On which principle too it has been remarked by Agatho, " Yes, truly, in some things you must fare just as fortune goes ; other things there are which attach to us by necessity and art.” Also, if 14. If inferiors can do it, then can superiors. any thing be possible to persons who are worse, or our inferiors, or less prudent, much more will it also be possible to their opposites ; just as Isocrates said, that " it would be strange if Euthynus learnt it, and he were not able to find it out."

With regard, however, to things impossible, it is 15. Things impossible are the opposite. plain that they result from the contraries of the above-mentioned principles.

Questions as to the actual occurrence of any thing, 16. Secondly, a thing has taken place. are to be viewed under the following considerations. For, in the first place, if that which had a less natural tendency to occur, has occurred ; then may that have occurred which had a greater tendency. And if that 17. When its subsequent has happened. which is wont to take place subsequently, has taken place, that also has taken place which usually does primarily: if, for instance, a man has forgotten, then also must he at some time have learnt that [of which he is now forgetful]. Also, if a man was able and 18. If the agent was willing. willing, he achieved the deed; for all men when, being willing, they have power, proceed to act; for there is nothing in their way. If, moreover, a man was willing and had no external impediment. If, again, the act 19. And The admirers of Sterne will do well, on reading this passage, to borrow a hint from him, and consult the learned Albertus Rubenius upon it, or at least some one of the many great authorities mentioned chap. 19, vol. vi. of Tristram Shandy. under the influence of anger or desire. was possible, and he was under the influence of anger3. And if it was possible, and he [the person in question] was influenced by lust; for, generally speaking, men, if they have the power, execute that of which they are desirous; the bad from weakness of principle ; and the virtuous because they desire ob- 20. If he was on the eve of doing it, etc. 21. jects compatible with virtue. Also, if a man was on the point of bringing the thing into action and of doing it; since the probability is, that he who was on the eve of acting, did moreover really act. Also, if all those things have taken place which naturally occur, either as preparatory to, or on account of the occurrence in question; as for instance, if it has lightened, it has also thundered; and if he attempted it, he has also achieved it. And if all those things which naturally occur subsequently, and that on account of which the deed is done, have taken place, then has also the prior to them and that which is the cause taken place: if, for instance, it has thundered, it has also lightened; and if he acted, he also attempted. Of all this number there are some thus subsequent of necessity; others however merely generally.

22.Things which have not happened are to be inferred from the opposite. Thirdly, what will With regard, however, to the non-occurrence of things, the considerations applicable will be plain from the contraries of those above stated,

Also with regard to what will happen, matters will become evident from the same considerations; for that which is within the power and the wishes of any one will take place. Also things which are subjects of lust, anger, and reasonings, accompanied by power 4. 23. happen are subjects of the passions. On this account, too, if persons be on the onset or on the eve of doing any thing, it will be done: for, generally speaking, things which are on the point of taking place occur, rather than those which are not. 24. If the antecedents have happened. 25. Also, if all those things have preceded which naturally occur before; for instance, if it lowers, there is a probability that it will rain. Also, if that has happened which is on account of the thing in question, Compare chap. v. § 3, 4. Fulmen est ubi cum potestate habitat iracundia. Publius Syrus. it is probable that that will also happen ; for instance, if there be a foundation, it is probable that there will also be a house.

The subject of greatness and smallness in regard 26. Fourthly, of the great and small. to affairs, also of the degrees of greater and less, and of things great and small in general, is clear to us from what has been said. For, in the discussion of deliberative oratory, the doctrine of the greatness of goods has been stated, and respecting the greater and less in the abstract. So that as with respect to each class of speeches the proposed end is a good ; (for instance, the expedient,-the honourable,-and the just;) it is evident that by every orator, his means of amplification are to be arrived at through the medium of these. But to institute, besides this, a further inquiry into 27. the subject of greatness and of excess in the abstract, is to talk idly; since particular cases are more completely applicable to use than mere generalities.

On the subject, then, of what is possible and impossible,-and whether the fact has or has not occurred,-will or will not occur, and moreover on the subject of greatness and smallness in regard to affairs, let thus much have been said.

IT remains that I treat of the means of effecting 1. Example discussed. persuasion which are common to every class of subjects, since I have already treated of such as are peculiar. And these common means of persuasion are two in species, example and enthymem: for the sentiment is part of an enthymem. Let us then first 2. A species of inauction. treat of example; for the example is correspondent to induction; and induction is a principle.

But of examples there are two species; for one Two sorts. 1st. ing real instances. 2nd. Fabricating them. 3. This latter is subdivided into i. παρα­ ii. λόγος. Example. species of example is the quoting real matters of fact which have actually taken place; another is the fabricating them yourself: and of this method, one species is illustration, the other fable; like those of Aesop and the African legends. Again1, example is somewhat of this description, as if one were to assert that the state ought to set itself in order against the king, and not to allow him to make himself master of Egypt; and this, because aforetime Darius passed not into Greece, before that he had seized that country; but when he had seized it, he passed across; so that the present king, should he seize Egypt, will pass over; on which account he is not to be permitted.

4. Illustration. Illustration is of the nature of Socrates's discourses : for instance, were one to say that it is not fitting that magistrates chosen by lot should be in office; for it is just the same thing as though one were to pick out wrestlers by lot; not taking such as are able to contend, but those on whom the lot may fall: or as though men were to draw lots for that person of the crew whom it might befit to take the helm; as if it became the person on whom the lot fell, and not him who understood the art.

o. Fable. But fable is such as that of Stesichorus in opposition to Phalaris, and that of Aesop in behalf of the demagogue. For Stesichorus, when the citizens of Himera had chosen Phalaris general with absolute powers, and were on the eve of assigning him a body guard, after other things which he said, related to them a fable: " That a horse was sole master of a meadow; but that on a stages coming in and spoiling the pasture, in his wish to be avenged of the stag, he asked some man whether he should be able, in He here applies the generic term to the species first mentioned, viz. the citing actual matters of fact. Bentley seems to suspect this story as applying to Phalaris, " because," says he, " Conon, a writer in Julius Caesar's time, gives us the very same narrative; but, instead of Phalaris, he says it was Gelon that Stesichorus spoke of. And the circumstances of Gelon's history seem to countenance Conon; for Gelon was in great favour and esteem with the Himeraeans." CODon, Narrat. 42. Bent!. in Phalaris, p. 38. conjunction with him, to chastise the stag. The man said [that he would be able] if he would take the bit, and himself were to mount him with his darts. When, however, he had agreed to this, and the man was mounted, the horse, instead of being revenged, was himself already the slave of the man. And in the same way do you also (says he) look to it, lest, in your wish to avenge yourselves on your enemies, you suffer in the same way as the horse ; for already, through your choice of a commander with independent power, you have the bit in your mouths: but if you assign him a body guard, and permit him to mount into the saddle, you will become, from that moment forth, the slaves of Phalaris."

And Aesop, when pleading at Samoa in behalf of 6. a demagogue who was tried for his life, said, " That a fox in crossing a river was thrust out of her course into a drain, and that, being unable to get out, she was harassed for a long time, many horse leeches having got hold of her; but a hedgehog wandering by, when he saw her, taking compassion on her, asked whether he should pick off the horse leeches from her; that the fox however would not permit him; but on his asking why, she replied, ‘ Because these are indeed already filled from me, and now suck but a little blood; if, however, you should pick them off, others, who are hungry, coming up will drain off the little blood which remains. But (said he), Oh Samians, thus also does this man no longer injure you; for he is wealthy: should you, however, put him to death, others who are poor will come, who will exhaust you while they filch the public monev."

But fables are adapted to deliberative oratory, and 7. Fables are suited to the deliberative orator: possess this advantage; that to hit upon facts which have occurred in point is difficult; but with regard to fables it is comparatively easy. For an orator ought to construct them just as he does his illustrations, if he be able to discover the point of similitude, a thing which will be easy if he be of a philosophical 8. being easy. turn of mind3. Cases, then, in the shape of fables, are the easier to bring forward; but those are more availing with a view to deliberation, which are put upon the ground of facts; because, generally speaking, the future resembles the past4.

9. He who has not enthymemswill use examples as proofs, and put them first. He who has enthymems uses examples as testimonies, and puts them last. It will, moreover, be right for one who has not enthymems to employ his examples like positive proofs ; since the persuasive efficacy of your speech will be produced by them: but one who possesses [enthymems] should employ them like evidence, putting them forward after his enthymems, in way of a conclusion. Because, if they be put first, they bear resemblance to induction; and induction, except in few instances, is not proper to rhetoric; whereas when put in at the end, they resemble evidence; and a witness in every case influences belief. On which account, there is moreover a necessity imposed on him who puts them first of citing many; for him, however, who states them in conclusion even one is sufficient; for a credible witness, though but single, is serviceable.

The number, then, of the species of examples, how many they are, and how and when they are to be used, has been stated. He again remarks on the facility here ascribed to minds of a philosophical turn, when, in speaking of metaphors, he remarks, TO ὃμοιον Kal iv πολὺ διέχουσι ϑεωρει̃ν, εὐστόχου, lib. iii. cap. xi. § 5. This is the principle on which he has all along recommended example as more peculiarly available to the views of the deliberative orator. At the end of his illustrations of the subject of demonstrative rhetoric, after stating amplification to be more proper to it than either of the other common means of persuasion, he says, τὰ παραδείγματα τοι̃ς συμβουλευτικοι̃ς lie γὰρ τω̃ν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρί­ νομεν, lib. i. cap. ix. § 40. Neither, says he, (cap. iv. § 8,) ought the orator to rely on the result of his own observation.

ON the subject of the use of maxims, after it has 1. Maxim, γνώμη. been stated what a maxim is, it will most easily become clear both in what cases, on what occasions, and what persons it befits to avail themselves of the enunciation of maxims in their speeches.

Now the maxim is an assertion, and yet not re- 2. Its definition. specting particulars, as what kind of person Iphicrates was, but on some general subject; neither is it on every general subject 1, as, that what is straight is opposed to what is curved; but it is respecting as many subjects as moral conduct is concerned about, and as are objects of choice or avoidance in acting. So that, as the enthymem is a form of reasoning Conclusions of most enthymems are maxims. nearly [confined] to this description of subjects, both the conclusions of enthymems and their premises, after the syllogistic form has been done away, become maxims 2. Take an instance: “ A man who is Having told you that maxims are certain general propositions, he cautions you against supposing that every general proposition deserves this appellation. For example, mathematical truths are asserted in propositions, general enough it is true, which however do not come up to the notion which Aristotle would have you form of the γνώμη. I hardly know whether it be allowable to attempt an explanation of Aristotle from a popular comedy ; but those readers who remember the School for Scandal, may probably derive some illustration of this subject from the ' sentiments' there put in the mouth of Joseph Surface ; e. g. " The heart that is conscious of its own integrity, is ever slow to credit another's treachery." Act iv. scene 3. In other words, the maxim is to the enthymem what propositions are to syllogisms. Not to every enthymem does the γνώμη hold this relation, but to such only as are conversant with " the actions and passions of common life." Aristotle has not ventured to tell us that all enthymems relate to these subjects; he says only that " nearly" all of them are so conversant ; περὶ τοιούτων ἐστὶ σχεδόν. in his sound mind never ought to educate his children so as to be too highly skilled 3." Now this is a maxim: but if the reason, and the cause why he should not do so, be added, the whole [conjointly] will become an enthymem; thus, " for besides the indolence which they contract, they will attach to themselves the bitter jealousy of the citizens." Again, this : " There is not a man who in every respect is happy4:" and the following: "There is not one of all mankind who is free5," are maxims: and the last becomes an enthymem, if added to the following proposition, " for either he is the slave of money or of fortune."

3. Maxims are of four kinds. If, then, the maxim be what it has been described, there will necessarily be four kinds of maxims: for either they will be with the annexed reason, or with- 4. i. μετ' ἐρικόγου. ii. ἄνευ ἐπιλόγου. out it. Now the maxims which need proof are all such as assert any thing which contravenes received opinion, or is doubtful; but those which state nothing contrary to peopled notions do well enough] with- 5. out the addition of proof. And of these last it cannot but be that some will need no proof, from their having been previously known ; as, " The best thing for a man, as it seems to me at least, is health -because to nine-tenths of mankind this seems to be the case: and that others simultaneously with their being uttered become evident to such as turn their attention to them ; as, " There is no lover who does not always 6. Those μετ' ἐπι­ λόγου are either, Ist. part of an enthymem ; or 2nd. Enthymemoatic. love. And again, of those which have proof subjoined, some are a part of an enthymem, just as, " A man who is in his sound mind never ought," etc. Others are essentially enthymems, and not part of an enthymem ; the which obtain more than any other species. And these are all those in which the reason for what is asserted appears wrought in, as Euripides, Medea, 294. From a lost drama of Euripides, entitled Sthenoboea. Euripides, Hecuba, 864. I have ventured thus to render ἐπίλογος; for that such is Aristotle's meaning, is evident from his having himself used ἀπόδειξις, at the beginning of the section, to denote the same thing. in this maxim: " Being yourself a mortal, do not These last are most approved. cherish immortal wrath :” "-or the assertion that, " one ought not always to cherish wrath," is a maxim; that, however, which is added, viz. "because you are a mortal," states the reason why. Similar to which is the following: “ It is fitting that a mortal conceive mortal notions, not that a being destined to death should think of what is immortal 7."

From what has been said it has then become evi- 7. Maxims not evident must have the reason prefixed or subjoined. dent, as well how many the species of maxims are, as also to what kind of subjects they are severally adapted. For on subjects which may be questioned, or contravene received opinions, the orator must not use those without the reason annexed; but let him either, prefixing the reason, use the conclusion as a maxim, thus—“ For my part, as then it neither is good to be exposed to envy, nor to be indolent, I assert that it is not good to be educated ;" or, stating this [which here is the conclusion] first, subjoin that which was prefixed 8. Observing that on subjects which do not contravene received opinions, but are doubtful, that he annex the reason why as concisely as possible. And on subjects such as these the 8. With concise ness. apophthegms of the Lacedaemonians are very suitable, and sayings which have an air of mystery; as if one were to apply that which Stesichorus said before the Locrians, " that they ought not to be insolent, lest their cigalas should sing upon the ground 9." The employment of maxims becomes him who is 9. Maxims So also says Horace :— Quid aeternis minorem Consiliis animum fatigas? Od. ii. 11, 11. A notion, by the way, which Aristotle controverts elsewhere, Nich. Eth. x. 7. To state the rule in the words of Hobbes, it is this—“ A sentence not manifest ought to be either inferred or confirmed; inferred, (as in the text,) confirmed thus,-A wise man will not have his children over-learned, (prefixing what, in the former disposition, had been put last,) seeing too much learning both softens a man's mind, and procures him envy among his fellow-citizens," (and subjoining what before had been prefixed.) Meaning, lest their country should be so utterly devastated as that not a tree would remain for a cigala to sit upon. suit the old. rather advanced in life; and particularly as respects subjects about which each happens to be well informed 10. Since for one not so advanced in age to sport maxims is bad taste, just as it is for him to have recourse to fables: and the use of them on subjects about which one is ignorant is silly, and argues a want of education. There is a sufficient sign of the truth of this; for the boors of the country are of all other people most fond of hammering out maxims, 10. and set them forth with great volubility. Also the stating generally a maxim which is, in fact, not general, is most especially befitting in appeals to the feelings, and in the act of exciting indignation; and then either at the beginning, or after the proof. 11. Common ones are useful. Again, it is proper to avail ones self of maxims which are current and common, if they be of any service ; for from their being common they appear to be correct, as though every one acknowledged their truth11: this one, for instance, (if the orator be exhorting persons to face the hazard, though they have not sacrificed,) " One omen there is which is best, to defend one's country or to face it, though they be few in number,-" Mars is common;" and to cut off the children of their foes, what though they have done no injury,-" He is a fool who, after slaying the father, still spares the child12."

12. Old sayings. Some old sayings too are maxims; for example, the expression, " Next neighbour to an Athenian." 13. It is good to contravene a common maxim. It is also proper to quote maxims which even contravene the current sayings, (I mean by current sayings such as this, " Know thyself or this, " Too much of one thing is good for nothing;") whenever your moral character may be likely to show itself to greater advantage, or the thing spoken is said in an impas- A young man ought not to use maxims. On the principle,—Vox populi est vox Dei. So thought Lee's hero, Caesar Borgia, for he tells Machiavel in the tragedy, 'Tis not my way to lop, for then the tree May sprout again; but root him, and he lies Never to bluster. Act v. se. 2. sioned manner. The speaking in an impassioned manner is, as if one in a passion were to assert, " that it was a falsehood that one ought to know himself; at least, this man, had he known himself, would never have claimed to be your general 13." The moral character appears better [when we contradict a maxim] thus, "it does not become men, as some assert, to love as though they were about to hate, but to hate as though they were about to love." And we ought If. to give a manifestation of our moral principle by means of the diction we employ, otherwise to subjoin the reason; for instance, either stating the sentence thus, " we ought to love, not as they tell us, but as though always about to love, for the other is the part of an insidious manor thus, “ the common maxim does not please me; for it is the duty of the true friend at least to love as though he were always about to love." " Nor again [does this please me], that we ought to carry nothing to excess; since 'tis our duty to hate the wicked at least to the very extreme."

They contribute, too, a considerable aid to our 15. Maxims aid a speech. i. From gratifying the vanity of the audience. orations : first owing to the vanity of the audience ; for they feel a pleasure if one, speaking generally, happens to hit upon ideas which they hold on any particular point. My meaning, however, will be plain in this way, as also the manner in which we ought to catch at them; for the maxim, as has been stated, is an assertion universally, and men feel delighted when that is asserted universally, which they happen previously to have taken up as their opinion upon particulars. If, for instance, a man chanced to have bad neighbours or children, he would hail the man who should say, "nothing is more annoying than dwelling near people," or, " nothing is more silly than to beget children." The words probably of some panegyrist of Iphicrates, who, in the warmth of declamation, must have produced a very great effect by contradicting a maxim so generally received, and which bore an authority more than human, (e ccelo descendit γνω̃θι σεαυτὸν,) while at the same time he placed the merit of the general in a most striking light. For the original obscurity of Iphicrates, see book i. chap. vii § 32.

1. Enthymems. LET us speak generally of enthymems, in what way we ought to seek for them, and afterwards of the topics, (τόποι,) for the nature of the two is respectively different1. 2. It has been stated before, that the enthymem is a kind of syllogism, also in what way it is a syllogism, and in what respect it differs from the syllogism of 3. i. They must not be far- fetched. logic; tor we should make our conclusions without taking up our assumptions either many stages back, or all of them together: the one process from its length is obscure ; the other, from its stating what is plain, is waste of words.

And this is the reason why men of no education have more persuasive influence over the mob than See the argument founded on the distinction between them, chap. xxvi. § 1. men of high acquirements, as the poet says, " that the unlearned speak more in unison with the feelings of the mob;" for the latter address them in common and general points, the former, from the store of their information, in a manner which comes home to them. So that we are not to found our address on any thing ii. They must be on definite points. which may seem to the purpose, but on certain definite points; such, for example, as seem right to the judges, or those whose opinions they acknowledge; and the reason for this is, that it will appear to be the case either to all or most of them : moreover we iii. Our conclusions must be drawn both necessarily and contingently. should draw our conclusions not only from necessary, but also from contingent premises 3.

First, then, you ought to be aware that it is necessary, respecting every subject on which you have to speak and to draw conclusions, whether it be through the medium of the rhetorical SyllogiSM , or of any 4. We must know the facts of the case in every species of oratory. 5. Deliberative. other whatsoever, to be masters either of all or some of the facts inherent in it: for having none of them, you will not be able to draw your inferences from any thing5. My meaning is this : how shall we be able to give advice to the Athenians, whether they ought to go to war, without being informed what their forces are, whether naval or military, or both; and these in how great numbers; also what are their resources ; or their allies and enemies; and yet further, what former wars they have waged, and in what manner, and other points of this description: or how to eulo- 6. Epideictic. gize them, unless we be informed of the sea-fight at Salamis, or the battle at Marathon, or the exploits achieved by them in behalf of the Heraclidae, or some other such points; for it is on the real or apparent honourable traits attaching to each object that all orators found their panegyrics. And in the same 7. Euripides, Hippolytus, 989. We should allege not τεκμήρια alone, but εἲκοτα as well. Πολιτικὸς συλλογισμὸς means the syllogism peculiar to rhetoric. Victor, vide Animadv. Aristotle has himself given an outline of the kind of information which ought to be possessed with a view to speaking on five of the most important questions of deliberative oratory, book i. chap. 4. way it is -on their opppsites that they ground their reprehension, always looking out for any thing of that nature which either attaches, or appears to attach, to the subject; suppose [the case of a censure passed on the Athenians] because they subjected the Greeks to themselves, and reduced to a state of servitude the people of Aegina and Potidaea, who were their allies against the barbarian, and bore off the prize of highest worthy and every other transaction of this nature, and whatever other such error may attach to them.

Judicial. And in the same way those orators who accuse and defend, construct their accusations and defences on a 8. view of existing circumstances7: there is no difference in your pursuing this process, whether it be respecting Athenians or Lacedaemonians, men or gods. For in advising Achilles, or in praising or blaming him, in accusing and defending him, we must assume the traits which attach, or appear to attach, to his character; in order that from among their number we may, in so praising or blaming him, allege whatever things honourable or base attach to him; and in accusing or defending him, whatever things just or unjust; and in advising him, whatever is beneficial 9. or injurious. And in a similar manner respecting any business whatsoever; as, respecting justice, the question whether it be expedient [must be discussed] on the ground of what appertains to justice or ex- 10. pediency. So that as all men appear thus to construct their proofs, whether they draw their inferences with greater accuracy or remissness, (for they do not make their assumptions out of every subject, but from those circumstances which are inherent in each question,) and by reason that it is manifestly impossible otherwise to prove; it is evident, then, that it is necessary, as I said in the Topics, to be in pos- Herodotus, viii. 93. Having illustrated his meaning by two examples, taken respectively from subjects of deliberative and demonstrative rhetoric, he concludes with a third from the subjects recognised by judicial; it being his great object to keep awake in the memory of the reader the original grand division of questions. session of certain select propositions on points which may occur, and are most convenient: and [it is 11. The orator must seize the peculiar points. evident] that the orator should conduct his inquiry respecting questions which arise on the sudden in the same manner, not turning his view aside to indefinite points, but to the actual points of the case which the oration is concerning; and embracing in his sketch the greatest number he is able, and those coming the nearest to the point; for in proportion as he is master of the greater number of the things inherent in the case, by so much the easier will it be to effect proof; and in proportion as these are the nearer to the point, in the very same proportion will they be more peculiar, and less vague. By vague I mean, the praising 12. Achilles because he is a man, and one of the deified heroes, and made war against Troy ; for these are points attaching to a thousand others beside: so that such an orator no more praises Achilles than he does Diomed. But by peculiar I mean, those which befall no one else than to Achilles, for instance, the slaying Hector, the bravest of the Trojans ; and Cycnus, who, being himself invulnerable, prevented all the forces from landing ; and that he joined the expedition the youngest, and without being bound by an oath; and whatever other topics are of this description. One element of enthymems, then, is that The topic of selection. of selection ; and this is the first which partakes of the nature of topics.

And now let us state the elements of enthymems; 13. (but by pace and element of an enthymem I mean the same thing). First, however, let us treat of those 14. Two sorts of enthymems: δεικτικὰ. ἐλεκτικὰ. points concerning which it is necessary first to speak. For of enthymems there are two species; the one species are confirmative, that such is or is not the fact; and the other refutative: and they differ just as, in logic, the syllogism and the elenchus differ. And the confirmative enthymem is the deducing a 15. conclusion from acknowledged premises; the refuta- Cum pervestigare argumentum aliquod volumus, locos nosse debemus: sic enim appellatae sunt hae quasi sedes, e quibus argumenta promuntur. Cicero, Topic, cap. ii. tive, however, is the deducing an inference which is 16. not admitted. Now the general arguments nearly on each class of subjects necessary and useful to be known are in our possession; for propositions have been selected on each [branch of rhetoric] ; so that the topics out of which one must allege his enthymems, whether on questions of good or evil, just or unjust, honourable or dishonourable, select points moreover respecting the dispositions, the passions, and the habits, having been collected above, are likewise actually before us.

17. But let us, in a different manner, further make assumptions respecting all the classes of rhetoric, and putting a mark on them severally as we proceed, state both the refutative and confirmative elements, as well as those of apparent enthymems, which, however, are not really enthymems, for neither in truth are they [the elements of actual] syllogisms. When these points have been elucidated, we shall discuss the subject of starting objections to enthymems, and the means of their solution, from what sources we ought to adduce them.

1. i. Element,that of contraries. THERE is one element of confirmative enthymems, derivable from contraries; for we should consider, whether the contrary quality be inherent in the contrary subject; doing away the argument [grounded thereon] if it be not inherent; and if it be inherent, founding one thereon ourselves: for example, the argument that " Temperance is good, because intemperance is injurious:" or, as it is in the Messeniac oration, "If war be the cause of our present trou- An oration spoken by Alcidamas in behalf of the Messenians, referred to above, i. 13, § 3. See the Sophism. Hudibras, P. ii. c. ii. § 123. bles, of course we shall put ourselves right again with the return of peace." And, " If in truth it be not just to be angry with those who unwillingly do us harm; neither, if one on compulsion shall do good to any one, is it his duty to be grateful to him." And, " If to speak falsely is among men available to persuade; there is no anomaly in supposing, on the contrary, that many things which are true fail of being believed."

Another is derivable from conjugate inflections2; 2. ii. Of conjugate inflections. for the qualities must either be inherent consistently, or not at all; for example, the argument, that " the just is not in every case a good, for then also would that which is justly be well; now it is not, however, desirable to die justly3.

Another from relatives; for if to one party attach 3. iii. From relatives. the idea of his having acted honourably or justly, to the other also will attach that of having suffered [honourably, etc.]. Also, if to command be just, so also is the having executed [the command] ; for example, just as that farmer of the revenue, Diomedon 4, said of the revenues, " If it be not base for you to put them up for sale, neither is it for us to purchase them." And if the idea that he has suffered justly or honourably be on the side of the patient, so will it also be on that of the agent; and if on that of the agent, then also on that of the patient. There is, however, in this way of arguing, room for passing off some false reasoning 5: for if the person has justly suffered any thing, he indeed has justly been a sufferer, but perhaps not so at your hands. On which See book i. 7, § 27. Hobbes calls this cognomination, or affinity of words. See book i. 9, § 15. Cicero illustrates this " place " by a similar example: " Nam si Rhodiis turpe non est portorium locate, nec Hermacreonti quidem turpe est conducere." De Inven. lib. i. Upon this fallacy the reasoning of Oleon was grounded in the debate about the Mitylenaeans; and Dioclotus, in his reply, uniformly strives at exposing it, while he urges, that however they might merit death, the Athenians were not the people who should inflict it. Thucyd. lib. iii. account we should view the question separately,­ whether the patient deserve to suffer, and whether the agent have a right to inflict the suffering; that done, to employ the facts in whatever way may suit our purpose: for at times, considerations of this kind do not harmonize; just as in the Alcmaeon of Theodectus, " Did no man hate thy mother ?" In his reply he tells her, that it is fitting to consider the points taken separately ; and when Alphesiboea asks how, taking her up, he says, " That she indeed deserved death, they did decree; but at the same time that I ought not to be the slayer." And just so the trial respecting Demosthenes, and of the persons who slew Nicanor. For when they had been adjudged to have slain him justly, it appeared that he had also been justly put to death. Again, respecting the person who met his death at Thebes, respecting whom some one bade the question be decided, whether he were deserving death; as though it were not unjust to slay one who deserved to die.

4. iv. From comparisoil in three ways. i.a fortiori. Another element is derivable from the relations of greater and less6; for instance: " If not even the gods know every thing, hardly I should suppose do men for it is-to say, that if the quality be not inherent in that which would more naturally possess it; then it is evident, that in that which would less naturally possess it, it is not inherent.

ii. a minori. And the argument, that " he assaults his neighbours, who even does so to his father;" is derived from the element, if the less probability exist, so also does the greater; [which is available] in reference to whether of the two points it may be needful to prove, ' whether that it is or is not the fact.

5. iii. By parity of reasoning. And again, by parity of reasoning, when it is said, " And is thy father to be pitied in that he has lost his children, and is not in truth CEneus who has lost his noble offspring ? " and the argument, " If indeed Theseus committed no wrong, neither did Paris;" and, " If Tyndarus' sons did not act unjustly, neither did The argument a fortiori. Paris and this, ‟ Suppose Hector did slay Patroclus, Paris slew Achilles;" and this, " If other artists are not to be held cheap, neither are philosophers and, "If generals are not held cheap because they are frequently vanquished, neither are sophists;" and that, " If it behoves an individual to have a care for your glory, it also behoves you to regard that of Greece."

Another element arises from the consideration of 6. v. From respect of time. time, as Iphicrates urged in his oration against Harmodius, " that if before my doing it, I had claimed to have the honour of a statue, ye would have granted it; will ye not then grant it me now that I have achieved it ?-Do not, therefore, engage yourselves under promises, when about to receive; and, when you have experienced the benefit, withdraw them." And, on another occasion, in reference to the Thebans permitting Philip to pass through into Attica, the argument that, " if, before his aiding them against the Phocians, he had claimed a passage, they would have promised; it were then an absurd thing, if, because he threw himself on them, and had confidence in them, they should not let him march through8."

Another element is deduced from assertions made 7. vi. From retorting assertions respecting yourself retorted upon your adversary; and the term is of exceeding service, as is exemplified Under this head he considers both Time generally, and also Opportunity (καιρὸς), which, however, have been thus distinguished—Χρόνος ἐατὶν ἐν ὦ καιρὸς, καὶ Καιρὸς, ἐν ὦ χρόνος οὐ πολύς. Hippocrates, in Precept. 61. Καιρὸς again has been described as o προσφυὴς καὶ ἁρμόδιος έκάστῳ χρόνς. A striking instance of appeal to this topic occurs in Macbeth, act i. Lady Macbeth. then you were a man; Nor time, nor place, Did then adhere, and yet you would make both : They have made themselves, and that their fitness now Does unmake you. See also Thucyd. book i. 140; ii. 6. Demosthenes frequently employs this topic, as in Olynth. iii. 'iva χρόνον, ἢ τίνα καιρὸν, ὦ ἂνδρες Αθηναῖοι, του̃ πάροντος βέλτω ζητει̃τε. The force of the appeal thus made cannot be better illustrated than by the frequency of its employment. on your adversary. in the Teucer; one too it is of which Iphicrates availed himself against Aristophon, when he put the question home to him, whether he would betray the fleet for a bribe; and on his denying that he would, then said he, " Would you, who are Aristophon, not betray them, and shall I, who am Iphicrates ?" You ought, however, to be dealing with an opposite party, who appears in a greater degree to have been guilty of injustice; otherwise it would appear ridiculous, were any one laying an accusation against an Aristides, to allege this ; but it ought always to tend directly to the discredit of him who lays the impeachment ; for, generally speaking, the plaintiff presumes himself better than the defendant; this notion, then, it behoves us to refute. And generally it is absurd when one chides in another what he does himself, or would feel inclined to do ; or exhorts him to do what he does not himself, neither would be induced to do.

8. vii. From definition. Another place is from definitions9; as, " that the genius is nothing else than either the deity, or his production. And yet whoever conceives the existence of the production of a deity, must necessarily think at the same time that gods are in existence 10." And, as Iphicrates said, "that that man was most noble who was the best; for that there did not attach any nobility to Harmodius and Aristogiton before they had achieved some noble exploit." And his proof that himself was more nearly akin to them, by saying, " At any rate my deeds are more akin to those of Harmodius and Aristogiton, than yours are11." And, as was said in that speech about Paris, In addition to the instances of recourse to this topic quoted in the text, we may mention that of expediency in the speech of the Plataeans (Thucydides, iii. 56) ; and one used by Alcibiades in his speech at Sparta, vi. 89, πα̃ν TO ἐνατιούμενον τῳ̃ δυναϭτεύοντι, δη̃μος ὀνομασταὶ, K. T. λ. One of the arguments used by Socrates to prove his belief in the existence of gods; for if, as was granted, he held the existence of his attending spirit (τὸ δαιμόυιον), then necessarily must it either be itself a god, or at least a divine production. See Plato, Apolg. Socr. See the concluding chapter of Tacitus's Life of Agricola. " All will be free to acknowledge that the intemperate do not acquiesce in the enjoyment of a single person." And the reason on account of which Socrates refused to go to Archelaus, " because," said he, " it is a disgrace for one who has been treated well to be unable to make a retort on terms of equality, just as it would be for one who has been treated ill." For all these deduce their inferences about the points respecting which they speak, after having defined and ascertained the question.

Another element is deducible from the number of 9. viii. From the number of meanings of the term. 10. ix. From the division. senses in which a word may be taken, as in the Topics respecting the acceptations of the word rightly. Another from taking the different bearings of the case; as, " If all act unjustly for three objects, for the sake either of this, or this, or this, and from two of these motives it is impossible that he should have acted; but that he acted on the third, not even the accusers themselves allege."

Another from induction, as may be illustrated from 11. x. From induotion. the oration respecting Peparethus, to establish that women every where discern truly respecting their children; because first at Athens the mother made the matter clear to Mantias, the orator, when undertaking a suit against his son; and again at Thebes, when Ismenias and Stilbon were at issue on the point, the Dodonian woman proved the child to be the son of Ismenias; and on this account they considered Thessaliscus to be the son of Ismenias. And again, from the law of Theodectes, " If people do not give their own horses in charge to those who manage those of others amiss, nor [their ships] to those who overturn the ships of others; neither ought we, if in every case it happens in the same way, to employ those who but ill protect the safety of others, for our own protection." And, as Alcidamas asserted, that " all pay honour to the wise, at least the Parians. honoured Archilochus, what though he was a calumniator of them; and the Chians, Homer, who was not their citizen; the Mitylenaeans, Sappho, though she was a woman; and the Lacedaemonians, who of all people are the least attached to learning, made Chilon one of their senators; the Greeks of Italy also honoured Pythagoras, and the people of Lampsacus buried Anaxagoras, though a foreigner, and honour him even to this day; the Athenians again were prosperous while they abode by the laws of Solon, and the Lacedaemonians, while by those of Lycurgus ; also at Thebes, at the time that the magistrates were men of learning, the state enjoyed prosperity."

12. xi. From former decisions. Another element of enthymems is derivable from a former decision of the same, a similar, or opposite question; more especially indeed if all men so decide, and that uniformly ; and otherwise, [if not all,] but the majority ; or the wise, either all, or most of them ; or the good; or if the very judges themselves, or those whom they approve, or those in opposition to whom they cannot decide (as for instance those on whom they depend) ; or those contrary to whom it is not becoming to decide; for instance, a god, or a father, or teacher, [happen so to have decided]. Just on the principle of the appeal of Autocles to Mixidemides, " whether it beseemed the awful goddesses to render an account to the Areopagus, and not Mixidemides ?" Or, as Sappho insisted, "that to die was an evil, the gods having so decided; since [had it not been so] they would themselves have died;" or as Aristippus told Plato when he asserted something, as he thought, rather dogmatically, " Yet," said he, " our companion at least held no such thing," meaning Socrates. And Hegesippus, having first consulted the oracle at Olympia, put the question secondly at Delphi,-whether he [Apollo] was of the same opinion as his father; as though it were disgraceful to contradict a father. And of Helen, as Isocrates wrote12, that " she was worthy, since indeed Theseus judged her so." And of Paris, " whom the goddesses "Εγραψεν, because demonstrative orations were seldom composed for delivery, but rather, as we should say, for the closet, book iii. c. 12, § 6, ἡ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικὴ λέξις γραφικω­ τάτη, τὸ γὰρ ἔργον αὐτη̃ς ἀνάγνωσις. See note chap. xi. § 7. preferred 13;" and of Evagoras, as lacerates says, that must needs be virtuous, It since Conon, when unfortunately passing by every one else, came to Evagoras."

Another element arises from an enumeration of 13. xii. From the enumeration of parts. parts; as in the Topica, " what kind of motion the soul is; it is either of this, or that description." And an instance occurs in the Socrates of Theodectes: "Toward what temple bath he been guilty of impiety? whom of the gods which the ritual of our state acknowledges, hath he not honoured ? "

Another consists in, Since, in the generality of in- 14. xiii. From the consequents. stances, it happens that on the same circumstances somewhat is consequent whether good or evil, the exhortation or dissuasion by means of these consequences, the accusation or defence, the praising or blaming; for instance, on education is consequent envy, which is an evil; and the being wise, which is a good: [on the one hand then you may assert that] men should not seek to be educated, because it is not good to be envied; [on the other that] it is fitting to be educated, for it is good to be wise. In this topic 14, with the addition of that on possibility, and the other [universal means of proof], as they have been stated, consists the system of CaliDDus.

Another occurs, when we want to exhort or: dis- 15. xiv. From the dilemma. suade respecting two propositions, and those opposed to each other; and to avail ourselves of the forementioned argument in the case of both. The difference [between this and the element last mentioned] is, that in it the opposition is merely between any propositions which may happen, it here holds between contraries : for instance, a priestess was endeavouring to prevent her son from becoming a public speaker ; See book i. chap. vi. § 26; where, in stating that to be good which is an object of preference, he cites these two instances. It is, however, a mode of argument sometimes so falla. cious, that we may say with Ovid, careat successibus opto Quisquis ab eventu facta notanda putat. Phyllis Demoph. because, said she, " If on the one hand you speak what is just, men will hate you ; if what is unjust, the gods." [Here then it might be retorted], therefore you ought to become a public speaker; for, " if you speak what is just, the gods will love you; if what is unjust, men 15." And this is equivalent to the proverb " of buying dirt as well as salt." And the retortion is this, when on each of two contraries good and evil is consequent, they being respectively opposed.

16. xv. From the different motives of mankind. Another arises from the circumstance, that men do not approve the same things privately as before the world; but when in public, they praise beyond all things what is just and honourable ; but within themselves they prefer what is expedient: the orator should endeavour to infer whichever suits his purpose, for this element is of sovereign use in exposing anomalies of opinion.

17. xvi. From analogy. Another element is deducible from the analogy of results; as Iphicrates urged when they compelled his son to serve who was under the standard age, because he was tall, that " if they esteem great children as men, they assuredly will vote small men to be children." And Theodectes, in the oration respecting the law, asked, "Do ye make the mercenaries, such as Strabax and Charidemus, citizens on account of their virtue, and will ye not make exiles of those among the mercenaries who have committed these intolerable acts?"

18. xvii.From the similarity of consequents. Another arises out of the argument, that if the result be the same, the principle from which it arises will be the same; just as Xenophanes used to argue, that " they are equally guilty of impiety who assert that the gods were produced, as those who assert that they die; for in both cases it happens that in some period or other the gods do not exist." And generally See an instance of this mode of arguing used by Tiresias, Euripides, Phoenissae, 968. Of this kind is also the argument of Gamaliel: " If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but, if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it." Acts v. 38, 39. assuming that the result of each act is in every case identified with it. [Take this argument as an illustration] : "Ye are about to pronounce, not respecting Socrates, but respecting the pursuit in general, whether it be right to addict one's self to philosophy." And this, "that the giving earth and water is the being slaves." And "that the participating in the common peace is the performing of what is enjoined." Now we are to take whichever side may suit our purpose.

Another may be deduced from the circumstance, 19. xviii. From the inconsistency of men. that the same persons do not choose the same things subsequently as before, but contrariwise; as, for instance, this appeal :-" If, when in banishment, we fought that we might return ; shall we, now that we have returned, take to flight, in order that we may not fight16?" For one while they chose abiding in their country at the expense of fighting ; at another, the possibility of avoiding fighting at the expense of non-continuance in their native land.

Another element which may be resorted to is, the 20. xix. From assuming a possible end as the real one. assertion that a thing either exists or was produced, for the sake of that for which it might have existed or been produced; as if some one were to give a person any thing, in order that by taking it from him he may annoy him. Whence also it has been said, " To many, fortune, not bearing them good will, gives great good luck; but it is in order that they may receive the more conspicuous calamities 17." And this from the Meleager of Antiphon: " Not in order that they might slay the beast, but that they may become witnesses, before Greece, of Meleager's valour." And that insinuation in the Ajax of Theodectes, "that Diomede chose Ulysses, not as any compliment, but in order that his attendant might at the same time be his inferior." For it is very possible that he did so on this account.

Another, common both to the judicial and de- 21. xx. From consider- liberative orators, is the consideration of the motives From an Oration by Lysias. Evertêre domes totas optantibus ipsis Dii faciles. ing the motives. which stimulate or retard men, and the objects with a view to which they both act and avoid; for these are such as, if they be actually in existence, we needs must proceed to action; for instance, if the undertaking be possible, and easy, and beneficial, either to the person in question himself, or to his friends, or pernicious to his enemies, and entailing loss on them ; or if the loss be less than the object proposed 18. And it is upon these considerations that orators exhort, and on their opposites that they dissuade ; moreover they both defend and accuse upon the ground of these considerations; they rest their defences on those which are used to dissuade, and their accusations on those used to exhort 19. The whole system of Calippus, as well as that of Pamphilus, is nothing more than this element.

2. xxi. From that which is incredible yet true. Another is deducible from circumstances which appear to have taken place, but which are improbable, on the ground that they would not seem to be facts, had they not well nigh occurred or actually done so; and that they have a yet stronger claim to belief; for men apprehend as truths either facts or probabilities; if then it be passing belief, and not probable, it will be true 20; for at all events, it is not on account of its likelihood and plausibility that it has this appearance of being the case. Just as Androcles of the burgh Pithos, said in his impeachment Πρα̃γμα : by this word he designates the object of desire and pursuit. Victor. That is to say, those very same faculties which the deliberative orator would employ in exhorting a person to act, would, if existing in reference to one under accusation, be turned against him by the judicial speaker as circumstances confirmative of suspicion. And, vice versâ, the circumstances of difficulty attending the undertaking, which would be employed to dissuade from its attempt, might be alleged in defence of an individual under suspicion, as points of the case which render his guilt improbable. The argument may be formally stated thus : Men believe either what is actual fact, or probable; this is believed; this therefore is either fact, or probable; it is not probable, therefore it is fact. It is needless to observe that the slight possibility, that it may be neither one nor the other, is completely slurred over. of the law, when the multitude were tumultuous as he spoke, " The laws require some law to set them right, for the very fishes require salt;" and yet it is neither likely nor plausible that creatures bred in the brine of the sea should require salt. " Nay, the olive lees require oil," and yet it is a fact not to be credited, that the very things from which oil is produced should require oil."

Another element, REFUTATIVE, is the consideration 23. Refutative element. i. From consideration of contradictions. of contradictions; if there occur any contradiction under all the circumstances of time, conduct 21, sayings, and the like. And this independently, respecting your adversary, as " He tells you that he loves you, yet did he conspire with the thirty [tyrants] ;" or independently respecting yourself, " He tells you that I am litigious, but is not able to prove that I have brought any action into court;" or respecting both yourself and the adversary distinctly, " This man never lent any thing, but I have ransomed many of vou."

Another, applicable to those who have been calum- 24. ii. From explanation. mated, or who appear so, whether men or actions, is the explaining the cause of the mistaken notion; for there is some circumstance, on account of which it appears to be the case; for example, when a certain woman had come in contact with her son, she seemed from her embracing him to have had connexion with the youth; when, however, the circumstance which caused it had been stated, the charge was quashed. And as in the Ajax of Theodectes, Ulysses tells Ajax why, though he is braver than Ajax, he does not seem so.

Another is derived from the cause, if that be in 25. iii. By arguing from existence, arguing that the effect is also; and should it not exist, that neither does the effect. For cause, Thus M. Livius Salinator having at one period narrowly escaped conviction for embezzlement, afterwards, when he was made Censor, disfranchised all the tribes except that by whose vote he had been acquitted, " quod aut prius se injuste condemnassent; aut postea tantoe honores non recte tribuissent." Aur. Victor, de viris illus. cause to effect, and viceversA. and that of which it is the cause, exist conjointly, and nothing exists without a cause. Just as Leodamas in his defence, when Thrasybulus accused him, because he had been inscribed with infamy on a pillar in the Acropolis, but erased it in the time of the thirty tyrants, urged, " that it was not possible, because the thirty tyrants would put greater confidence in him, while his hatred toward the democracy remained inscribed in public."

26. iv. From observing whether the fact could have been done better. Another is, the observing whether the thing respecting which the party is deliberating, or acting, or has acted, did or does admit of being on another and better footing; since it will become evident that, if this be the case, he has not acted; since no one voluntarily, and of his own knowledge, deliberately chooses what is bad. This, however, involves a fallacy ; for in many cases it becomes clear [only] when too late, how it might have been managed better, whereas it was. before unknown.

27. v. From the anomaly of the present act to the past. Another, which occurs when any thing anomalous to former acts is about to be done, is the considering the both in connexion; just as Xenophanes advised the people of Elea, when they asked him whether they should sacrifice and sing a dirge to Leucothea22 or not, " if they conceived her to be a deity, not to sing a dirge; but if a human being, not to sacrifice."

28. vi. From errors before committed. Another element is, the accusing or defending on the ground of errors committed; for instance, in the Medea of Carcinus, some persons accuse her because she slew her children, [alleging] that at all events they were not forthcoming ; for, respecting the sending away her children, Medea was in fault: she, however, defends herself [alleging that, if any one], she would have murdered Jason, not her children; which in truth had she done, she would have erred in not doing the other. And this element and species of enthymem constitutes the whole of that system of Theodorus, which is first.

29. vii. From Another is deducible from the name; as Sophocles Ino, Cadmi filia, nonne Leucothea nominata a Graecis, Matuta habetur a nostris ? Cicero, Tusc. i. 12. says, " Steel in truth you are, and bear the name." the equivocation of the term. And as they are wont to say in their praises of the gods23; and as Conon used to call Thrasybulus, " rash in counsel," (θρασύβουλος) ; and Herodicus told Thrasymachus, " You are always rash in fight, (θρασύμαχος) ; and Polus, "You always are a colt," (Πω̃λος) ; and Draco the legislator, that " his laws were not those of a man, but of a dragon24; for they were harsh." And as the Hecuba of Euripides says of Venus, " The very name of the goddess rightly begins with folly25." And as Charemon says, "Pentheus, rightly named from the calamities20 awaiting him."

Refutative enthymems, however, are more in re- 30. Reasons why refutative enthymems are more in repute than confirmative. pute than the confirmative ; by reason of the refutative enthymem being a setting contraries briefly together ; and because things when put in contrast are more palpable to the auditor. Of all forms of reasoning, however, as well confirmative as refutative, those produce the greatest effect 27, which are of such a description that, on the commencement of their enunciation, men anticipate the conclusion, yet without their being superficial; for the hearers on their own parts, feel a pleasure 28, in having of themselves anti- Though he does not inform us what mode of praise this is to which he alludes, we may infer that it consisted in punning on their respective appellations as often as the case admitted it. In this solitary instance of all the tissue does our language admit of preserving the pun of the original; and this, while it will serve sufficiently to illustrate our author's meaning, will not leave him any great cause to regret that he has lost the force of the others. Folly, in Greek ἀφροσύνη. The tragedian seems to have strained the etymology of 'Αφροδίτη to suit his purpose. However, there are no liberties which punsters and theorists will not take. The words occur in the Troades, 990. Byron, speaking of love, says, " Begun in Folly, closed in Tears." Giaour. Πένθεα. θορυβου̃νται : respecting this word, see a note, book i. chap. 2. For the principles on which this pleasure arises, see b. i. 11, § 21, on the ground that the apprehension of them is facili- cipated it; and [next to these may we class] all those, by which the hearers are left behind, just so much as that they apprehend them simultaneously with their having been enunciated.

1. Fallacious enthymems. JUST as it is possible that [one form of reasoning] may be a syllogism, and that another, without really being such, may appear to be so ; even so it must needs be with respect to the enthymem also, that one description should really be enthymems, and another not, however they may appear to be; for the enthymem is a species of syllogism.

2. 1st. From the diction of two kinds. i. Asserting a conclusion not inferred. But the elements of these apparent enthymems are, one derivable from the diction: and of this, the first kind is, as in logic, the asserting your last proposition with all the air of a conclusion, although you have deduced no [legitimate] inference at all: thus, " So and so is assuredly not the case, necessarily, therefore, so and so is." And the expressing yourself in the course of your reasonings concisely and pointedly; for this kind of style is the very province of the enthymem, and this kind of fallacy is, it is probable, that which is [demonstrated] " the result of the style of the diction ;" but the stringing together the heads of many syllogisms, is a good expedient with a view to expressing yourself with all the air of syllogism in your style; thus, " that he preserved some, avenged others, emancipated the Greek people." For each of these propositions has been demonstrated from others ; and when they are put in conjunction, it appears that ii. Ambiguous terms, etc. something results ever from them. Another kind arises from similarity of names, as the assertion, that tated, and our admiration excited; and § 27 on the principle that TO σοφὀν δοκει̃ν ἡδύ. For our self-admiration is gratified by so easily perceiving the drift of the speaker. " the mouse is an excellent animal, being that from which the most esteemed of all rites have derived their name;" for of all rites, the mysteries are held in most esteem. Or, if any one in praising a dog, were to embrace in his panegyric the dog in the heavens, or Pan; because Pindar thus addresses him, " blessed being, whom the inhabitants of Olympus call the all-various dog of the mighty goddess." Or the arguing, that "it is a most disgraceful thing, that there should be not even a dog in the house; and therefore it is evident that a dog is honourable." And the assertion, that Mercury is "communicative" above all the gods, because Mercury alone is called " common." And the stating that λόγος, speech, is most excellent; because the good are worthy of λόγος, esteem, not of wealth: for the words (λόγου ἄξιον) are not used in a single sense.

Another [element of fallacy] is the asserting con- 3. 2nd.From division and composition. jointly what is true separately; or separately, what is true conjointly; for as it appears to be the same thing, what though in many instances it be not the same, the orator should practise whatever method is more available to his purpose. The saying of Euthydemus is neither more nor less than an instance of this; the declaration, for instance, that "he knew there was a galley in the Piraeus 1," for he knew each [separate fact of his assertion]. And to declare of one who knows the constituent letters, " that he knows the verse 2;" for the verse is the same thing. Again, the saying that " as twice so much is prejudicial, he denied that the one was wholesome; for it is absurd that two good things should constitute one that is noxious." Thus enunciated, it is adapted to refutation; but thus it is confirmative; "for two evils do not constitute one good," etc. But the whole topic I An instance of the flagrant absurdity which may arise from taking conjointly what is true only separately: Euthydemus knew there were galleys in existence, and he was in the Piraeus when he had this knowledge; he knew therefore that there were galleys in the Piraeus, i. e. he being in the Piraeus. Of this nature was the sneering recommendation of a Dictionary as a book of general information. is replete wih fallacy. Such again is the saying of Polycrates respecting Thrasybulus, that he had deposed thirty tyrants3;" for he takes them conjointly. Or, as in the Orestes of Theodectes, from distinct cases, "It is just that she who has slain her husband should die; as also that a son at least should avenge his father. Now, are not these the very things that have been done ?" for, taking the cases conjointly, perhaps it is no longer just. This may also come under the fallacy of omission, for it is not explained " by whom [she should be put to death]."

4. 3rd. From exaggeration. Another element is the doing away or establishing a point by exaggeration4: and this occurs when, without having shown that [the prisoner] has really committed the crime, [the accuser] proceeds to exaggerate it; for this fallacy causes it to appear (when the accused employs the exaggeration) that he has not done the deed; or, (supposing it be the accuser who gets into a passion,) that he has done it. Thus then there is no enthymem ; for the hearer is sophistically brought over to a belief either that [the accused] has or has not done it, without any proof having been adduced.

5. 4th. From a σημει̃ον. Another is the argument drawn from a sign5, for this also is illogical; as if one were to say, " Lovers are an advantage to states; for the love of Harmodius and Aristogiton deposed the tyrant Hipparchus." And if one were to say, " Dionysius is a robber, for he is a wicked man;" for this also is illogical, because not every wicked man is a thief, although every thief is a wicked man. The fallacy consists in this, that it leads you to suppose that Thrasybulus had destroyed thirty distinct tyrannies, whereas he had in fact only suppressed one, the power of which happened to be shared between thirty different individuals. This is the first of the fallacies which are independent of the diction, and may be termed, for the sake of distinction, real or material fallacies. Meaning of course the specific σημει̃ον, for no fallacy can result from the τεκμήριον, vide book i. chap. ii. § 16. This fallacy he has elsewhere denominated τὸ παρὰ τὴν ἃγνοιαν του̃ ἐλέγχου.

\ IT follows that I speak of the modes of disengaging 1. Solution of arguments two ways. Contradictory. one's self from arguments. They are either the meeting them with contradictory arguments, or starting an obj ection1. Now as to the meeting them with counter Compare lib. i. cap. xii. § 5, τὰ λίαν ἰν φανερῳ̃, κ. τ. X. There were some persons who charged Socrates with doing this, and thence concluded that he was a person dangerous to the State—ἒστι τις Σωκράτης, ἀνὴρ σοφὸς, τά τε μετέωρα φροντιστὴς, καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γη̄ν πάντα ἀναζητηκὼς, KA'I T'ON "HTTO Λ'ΟΓΟΝ KPE'ITTO ΠOIΩN. Plato Apol. Socr. § 2. Compare also the dialogue of the two λόγοι, in the Clouds of Aristophanes. Protagoras Abderites, Prodicus Ceius, Hippias Eleus, aliique multi docere Be profitebantur arrogantibus sane verbis, “ quemadmodum causa inferior, ita enim loquebantur, dicendo fieri superior posset” Cicero, Brut. c. vii. Τω̃ν ἄλλων τεχ­ νω̃ν οὐδεμία τἀναντία ϭυλλογίζεται, i. i. § 12. 'Αντισυλλογισμὸς is a syllogism, whose conclusion is con- mentA. Objections. arguments, it is evident that we may do it on the ground of the same topics [as were given for refutation]: for the arguments arise out of probabilities, 2. and many things which appear likely are opposed to each other.

3. Objections are fourfold. Objections, however, (as was stated in the Topics,) are started in four ways : 1. for either it may be from the same subject: 2. from a similar: 3. or an opposite [to that from which the adversary argues]: 4. 4. 1st. From the same source. or from points already decided. By deriving your objection from the same source, I mean that, supposing the enthymem were respecting love, " that it was a good feeling;" there would be a twofold i. Generally. ii. Particularly. jection ; tor it [might be started] asserting generally that " every want is bad:" or particularly, that " the proverbial expression Caunian loves2, would not have 5. 2nd.From a contrary. arisen had there not been some wicked loves. Again, an objection is alleged on the ground of a contrary fact; as, if the enthymem was this, " The good man benefits all his friends,, rand the obiection.l " But 6. 3rd. From a similar case. the bad man does not hurt all his." And on the ground of similar cases3; if the argument be, " Those who have been treated ill always hate;" [the objection,] that " those who have been treated well do not 7. 4th. From points decided. always love4." And again, the decisions of men of celebrity: thus, suppose one brought forward the argument, that "we ought to have some feeling for those who are intoxicated, because they err ignorantly5:" this objection [may be started], that "Pittacus tradictory of that adduced by your opponent: ἔνστασις is the showing that his reasonings are fallacious either in matter or form. Alluding to the loves of Byblis and her brother Caunus. See Ovid. Metaph. ix. 453. Or to use the English phrase, " by parity of reasoning." Victorius remarks, that "however at first sight this instance would seem to be one of ἔνστασις ἡ ὰπὸ του̃ εναντίου, it is not inapplicable to the present case, inasmuch as the injured stand to the injurers in a relation similar to that in which, the benefited stand to their benefactors. The question how far ἀγνόων may be considered a free agent, is discussed in the Nicomachaean Ethics, lib. iii. cap. i. 5; and Hooker, book i. is not therefore entitled to praise, otherwise he would not in his enactments have imposed higher fines, in case the party committed the error while intoxicated."

But as all reasonings [of the orator] are derived 8. Reasonings derived from four sources: i. Probability. ii. Example. iii. Τεκ­ μήριον. iv. ση­ μεῑον. from four sources, and these four are probability, example, proof positive (τεκμήριον), and signs; and as the reasonings drawn from what is usual, or appears to be so, are drawn from probabilities, while those drawn by inference from similarity of circumstances, whether in one or more instances, (when the speaker embracing what is general, then infers particulars,) exist by virtue of example; while those again which are inferred from what is necessary and fact, are founded on proof positive; and lastly, as those drawn from what does or does not hold good, whether universally or particularly, result from signs, [it being remembered] that probability is not what always, but what usually occurs;it is plain that it is, in, every case, possible to get rid of reasonings such as these by starting an objection. The solution is, how- 9. Solution of εἰκὸς sometimes fallacious: 10. and is of more service to defendant than plaintiff. ever, [sometimes] apparent, and not always real; for the objector does not do it away on the ground of its not being probable, but on that of its not being necessary6. Wherefore it always happens, that the defendant has the advantage of the accuser, by means of this piece of sophistry. For as the accuser constructs his proof by means of probabilities (the task of getting rid of the positive certainty being by no means the same [in point of difficulty], as that of getting rid of the probability of the charge); and as that which is merely probable, is invariably open to an objection ; (for it otherwise would not be a probability, but invariable and necessary;) and if this method of solution have been adopted, the judge supposes either that it does not amount to a probability, or at least that he ought not to decide, having been imposed upon in the way mentioned above; The orator must therefore show on which side the greater probability lies. " There are objections," said Dr. Johnson, " against a plenum, and objections against a vacuum; yet one of them must be right." Whately. because [in fact] he is not bound to pronounce on positive proofs alone, but also on probabilities, which is the spirit of the oath, " that he will decide to the best of his judgment; " wherefore that will not be a satisfactory objection which rests merely on the absence of proof positive, but it is further incumbent on the objector to get rid of the probability; this, however, will be the case, if the objection be proba- 11. ble in a higher degree; (and it may be so in two ways, either on the score of time, or of the nature of the case; and pre-eminently so, if in both these particulars ;) for if in the majority of instances it be as you state, then it is a greater probability.

12. Specific signs are refutable. Signs also, and the reasonings deduced from them, may be got rid of, even if they be facts, as was stated in the first Book; for it is clear to us from the Analytics that every sign is illogical.

13. Solution of examples. The same method of solution applies to reasonings grounded on example as to those on probabilities; for if we have a single instance in contravention, it has been answered7, [sufficiently to show] that it is not necessary; or that in the majority of instances, and those of more frequent occurrence, the case is otherwise. If, however, it be the case more frequently, and in the majority of instances, we must contend that the present is not the case in point, or that its application is not in point, or that it has some difference at all events.

14. τεκ­ μήρια irrefutable. except by assailing the premises. But proofs positive (τεκμήρια), and the reasonings grounded on them, we shall not be able to get rid of, at least not on the plea of inconclusiveness; this is clear to us from the Analytics : it remains for us to show that what is asserted is not the case8; if, however, it be clear both that it is true as a matter of fact, and that it is a proof positive of the point, from that moment it becomes irrefragable; for thenceforth it is plain from demonstration. That is to say, by a λύσις φαινομένη. As we cannot object to the form of the reasoning, our only resource is to attack the matter: to deny the premises.

AMPLIFICATION and extenuation are not elements of 1. Amplification and its opposite not τόποι, but enthymema. enthymems, (by topic and element I mean the same thing,) since the element and the topic is that under which many enthymems fall; whereas amplification and extenuation are [themselves] enthymems for showing that a thing is great or little, like those for showing that it is good or bad. lost or unjust. or falls under either of the other denominations. And 2. these are all the questions about which syllogisms and enthymems are conversant; so that unless each of these be a topic of an enthymem, amplification and extenuation are not.

Neither, again, are the topics which are available 3. Enthymems of refutation and confirmation are the same in kind. to solution of enthymems, at all different in species from those employed in their construction: for it is evident that he effects solution who either proves [something contrary], or states an objection, and they establish a counter proof of the contrary ; thus, " If one has argued that a fact has taken place, the other argues that it has not or " if one argues that it has not, the other insists that it has." So that this will not amount to a difference ; for both employ the same vehicles of proof, inasmuch as they each allege enthymems to show that it is, or is not the case.

But the objection is not an enthymem, but is, as 4. Objection is not an enthymemo Definition of ἔνστασις. was stated in the Topics, the stating some opinion from which it will appear that no legitimate inference has been arrived at, or that [the opponent] has assumed some false proposition.

Thus much, then, on the subject of examples, and 5. maxims, and enthymems1, and, in a word, all the In taking leave of a series of terms which have occurred hitherto so frequently, we may as well remark that examples, maxims, enthymems, etc. denote the particular modification of the proof, or the shape in which it is served up, without refer- means of persuasion which address themselves to the understanding, both the sources whence we may furnish ourselves plentifully with them, and the means by which we may effect their solution2. It remains for us to go over the subject of style and arrangement3. ence to its degree of validity: while probability, signs, τεκμήρια, etc. refer to its degree of validity, without regard to the shape or manner in which the proof is conveyed. I Having now despatched the first and most important of the three grand divisions of his work, viz. the subject of πίστις, it only remains to discuss the remaining two, λέξις and τάξις. In fact, having told the speaker what he is to say, he has now only to tell how he is to say it. The subjects of πίστις, and τάξις, it will be recollected, constitute the widest and most general arrangement of his work. See book iii. chap. i. § 1.

As there are three points which ought to be handled 1. Three points in a speech. πίστις. λέ ξις. τάξις. The two last to be treated. respecting a speech; one, as to the sources out of which will arise means of persuasion; a second, respecting the style; a third, how we ought to arrange the parts of a speech. On the subject of the means of persuasion much has been said, as well as to how many the sources are out of which [they arise], namely, that they are three; also, what is the nature of these sources, and why they are no more: for all those who decide, are persuaded either by being themselves impressed in a certain way, or from conceiving the speakers to be men of a certain character, or from the matter of fact having been proved1.

It has been stated also with respect to enthymems, whence we are to furnish ourselves with them; for [of those sources], some are elementary propositions, peculiar [to the several branches of rhetoric] ; others are places [of universal applicability]. It follows that 2. we treat of the subject of style; for the mere being in possession of what one ought to say is not enough; but it is moreover necessary that we deliver it as we ought; [and the doing this] contributes much to your speech's appearing to be of a certain character.

Now that by which its nature is first, was, con- 3. ὑπόκρι­ σις not yet handled. formably to nature, investigated the first; viz. whence these things derive their persuasive efficacy: next to this, was the disposition of them in the speaking: and thirdly, [arose an inquiry] of the greatest con- I See book i. chap. ii. § 3. sequence, but which never yet has been handled, on the subject of delivery; for it was introduced into tragedy and the public recitations at a late period, since at first the poets used themselves to sustain the dialogue in their tragedies. It is therefore plain that some such power exists in relation to rhetoric, as well as to poetry; which [as connected with the latter art! Glauco the Teian. and some others, have 4. It consisus in three things. μέγεθος. ὰρμονία. ρυθμός. treated of. And it depends on the voice, as to how we ought to manage it in reference to each several passion; when, for instance, we should employ a loud, when a low, and when a moderate pitch of voice; and on the manner in which we should employ its tones, viz. the acute, the grave, and the intermediate; and on certain rhythms in reference to each ; for the points, in reference to which they conduct their inquiries, are three, viz. the loudness of the voice, the fitness of its tones, and its rhythm. Now these proficients bear away nearly all the prizes in the disputations ; and as in the other contests the actors now produce a greater effect than the poets, so likewise do they in civil causes, owing to the depravity of 5. No art yet compiled on it. states. There is not yet however any system compiled respecting these points, (since even the subject of style was brought forward at a late period,) and, if rightly conceived of, it appears an ornament adapted to vulgar tastes5; but as the whole subject of rhetoric That the two departments of author and actor were united in the same person, is asserted also by Horace, Art. Poet. 277, and by Plutarch, έθεύσαιοτο TO. θέσπιν αὺτὸν ὑποκρινόμενου, ῶσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς αλαιοῖς. That ποκριτὴςcame to designate an actor from the cumstance of his sustaining the dialogue with the chorus, may be evinced by reference to the etymology of the word. Its successive meanings have been clearly traced in the Quarterly Review : " Qui respondet, ab ὑποκρίνεσθαιrespondere, Homer, Herodot. Histrio, quia primo tragoediae statu histrio Choro respondebat. Suidas, o ποκρινόμενος ῴορῴ- Simulator, quia histriones fietas partes tuebantur." No. xliv. Art 2, p. 326. Those for the prize in the tragic games. Φορτικόν.It appears from Twining's excellent illustrations of the meaning of thin word, that it is used to imply any thing extravagant, violent, overcharged, outré :---as applied to has reference to opinion, we should pay attention to it, not as to a subject of absolute propriety, but as one of necessity; for as to mere matter of justice, we ought not to inquire further on the subject of speeches than so as to avoid giving pain, at the same time that we do not delight; for the rule of right is, that the contest be carried on by means of the facts themselves; so that, except the proof, all the rest is superfluous6; but it is notwithstanding, as has been Its influence is great.6. stated, a point of great moment, in consequence of the weak judgment of the auditor. The subject of style, however, has some necessary though trifling claim on our attention in every system; for the expressing one's self in this or that way makes some difference with a view to exhibiting the subject clearly, not however to so great a degree [as is generally supposed] : all these points are however mere idea, and have a reference to the auditor; wherefore it is that no one teaches geometry in such a style.

This art then, be it introduced when it may7, will produce the same effect as that of acting. And some 7. to a small extent have already made an effort to treat of it; Thrasymachus, for instance, on the excitement of compassion. Again, the being qualified for de- Delivery is a gift of nature. livery is a gift of nature, and rather without the province of art; the subject of style, however, is clearly reducible to an art. Wherefore rewards are bestowed in turn on those who are proficients in this, just as there are on those rhetoricians [who claim] persons, it means troublesome, tiresome, etc., or insolent, overbearing, etc., synonymously with ἀνελεύθερος, βάναυσος, popular, low, vulgar, illiberal, etc. Athenaeus, in speaking of the rejection of Hippoclides, one of the suitors of Agarista, daughter of Clisthenes, king of Sicyon, attributes it to the disgust conceived by her father at him, ΦΟρΤΙΚΩΣ ὀρχησάμενον (see Herodot. vi. 129). Aristotle himself classes the φορτικοὶ. with the βωμολόχοι, (Eth. Nich. iv. 8,) and with the οἱ πολλοὶ (ibid. i. 5). It is in fact, (to adopt an expression of Pope's,) any thing levelled to please the populace. B. i. c. 1. § 10. οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεĩ, πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι on οὕτως ἔχει. 'Υπόκρισις : for he clearly foresees that from its obvious importance it must eventually become an adjunct of rhetoric, as it has already become of dramatic exhibitions. on the ground of delivery; for written orations influence more by means of their style than through the sentiment.

8. Poets first used recitation and delivery with success. Now the poets, as was natural, began to make a stir upon the subject at first; for words are imitations, and the voice, of all our parts, is the most imitative8; on which account also these arts were constructed, both that of recitation, and of acting, 9. Hence early rhetoricians adopted the florid poetical style. and of others too. But as the poets, though what they said was very frivolous, appeared to acquire their reputation by means of their style; on this account the first style [of rhetoric] was formed on that of poetry, witness the style of Gorgias; and even at the present time the majority of ignorant people fancy that such orators speak most delight- fully : this however is not the case, but the style of poetry and that of prose is distinct, and the result shows it; for not even the writers of tragedy themselves any longer employ the same turn of diction, But have gradually relinquished it, as the tragedians have also done. but just as they have passed from trochaic to iambic metre9, because the latter is most like prose of all the other metres ; so have they also relinquished all those terms which are foreign to the style of conversation, with which however the early writers used to embellish [their works], and which even at the present day are employed by those who write in heroic metre; wherefore it is ridiculous to imitate the tragedians, who in their own case no longer employ that turn of diction.

10. So that it is evident that we need not discuss with minuteness all points soever which it is possible to treat of under the head of style, but so many only as belong to such an art as we are speaking of: the other part of the subject has been spoken of in my treatise on Poetry. So that of course the poet, whose business was imitation, would immediately put in requisition these two most obvious sources of it. The trochaic metre occurs frequently in the plays of Aschylus, the most ancient of the tragedians extant, particularly in the Persae ; as also in those of Euripides, especially in the Phoenissae and Orestes; but in those of Sophocles, rarely, if (:.

LET this then have been discussed: and let excel- 1. Excellence of style defined to be the TO σαφές. lence of style be defined to consist in its being clear ; (a sign of this is this, that the diction, unless it make the sentiment clear, will not effect its purpose1;) and neither low, nor above the dignity of the subject, but in good taste; for the style of poetry indeed is not low, yet it is not becoming in prose.

Of nouns and verbs those which are in general use 2. Words that are κύρια duce perspicuity. produce the effect of clearness: to prevent its being low, and to give it ornament, there are other nouns which have been mentioned in the Poetics, for a departure [from ordinary acceptations] causes it to appear more dignified ; for men are affected in respect of style in the very same way as they are towards foreigners and citizens. On which account you 3. To elevate style we must use fixa, etc. should give your phrase a foreign air ; for men are admirers of things out of the way, and what is an ob- " Perspicuity consists in the using of proper terms for the ideas or thoughts which he would have pass from his own mind into that of another man. It is this that gives them an easy entrance; and it is with delight that men hearken to those whom they easily understand; whereas what is obscurely said, dying as it is spoken, is usually not only lost, but creates a prejudice in the hearer, as if he that spoke knew not what he said, or was afraid to have it understood." Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study, vol. iv. p. 601. As Aristotle proceeds henceforth to a complete analysis of the subject of style, he first considers it in reference to the single words of which it is made up (έξ ὧν συνέστηκε, § 5), which occupies him to the end of the fourth chapter. He then considers it as made up of whole sentences; the means of investing these with dignity, of adapting them to the subject, of constructing them to please the ear, and as addressed to the intellect; and concludes with enumerating their several elegancies. First, then, he considers the beauties of style as depending on single words. Should the epithet foreign, as applied to a quality of style, not be immediately apprehended, it may be well to recollect that it means the excellence opposed to the fault which we designate homeliness. ject of admiration is pleasant4. Now in the case of metrical compositions, there are many things which produce this effect, and there are very becoming, because both the subject and the person stand more apart [from ordinary life]; in prose, however, these helps are much fewer, for the subject is less exalted: since even in that art were a slave, or a mere youth, or [any one, in fact, in speaking] of mere trifles to express himself in terms of studied ornament, it would be rather unbecoming; but here too [as in poetry] the rule of good taste is, that your style be 4. We must conceal our art. lowered or raised according to the subject. On which account we must escape observation in doing this, and not appear to speak in a studied manner, but naturally, for the one is of a tendency to persuade, the other is the very reverse5; because people put themselves on their guard, as though against one who has a design upon them, just as they would against adulterated wine. [Let your style then be such] as was the case with the voice of Theodorus as compared with that of the other actors6; for it appeared to be that of the character which was speaking, theirs 5. however were foreign from the character. And the deceit is neatly passed off if one frame his nomenclature upon a selection from ordinary conversation ; the thing which Euripides does, and first gave the hint of.

Words to be but As however nouns and verbs are [the materials] of which the speech is made up, and as nouns admit This was asserted book i. chap. 11, § 23, 24. Ubicunque ars ostentatur, veritas abesse videtur. Quintil. Instit. x. 3. Artis est celare artem. Harris seems to have had this passage in view when he wrote the following: " 'Tis in writing as in acting; the best writers are like our late admired Garrick. And how did that able genius employ his art ? Not by a vain ostentation of any one of his powers, but by a latent use of them all in such an exhibition of nature, that, while we were present in a theatre, and only beholding an actor, we could not help thinking ourselves in Denmark with Hamlet, or in Bosworth Field with Richard." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 4. In this practice, Euripides stands remarkably opposed to his predecessor AEschylus. so many species as have been examined in the Poetics, sparingly employed. out of the number of these we must employ but sparingly, and in very few places, exotic and compound words, and those newly coined; where they may be employed I will state hereafter9: the reason [of the restriction] has been mentioned, viz. because they remove your style from that of common life] more than is consistent with good taste. Words however 6. Words κύρια, οἱ­ κεία, με­ ταφοραὶ, proper for prose. of ordinary use, and in their original acceptations10, and metaphors, are alone available in the style of prose: a proof [that this is the fact, is] that these are the only words which all persons employ; for every body carries on conversation by means of metaphors, and words in their primary sense, and those of ordinary use. Thus it is plain that, if one should have constructed his style well, it will be both of a foreign character, and that [the art of the orator] may still elude observation, and [the style itself] will have the Γλω̃ττα : " any word that belongs either to another language, or another dialect of the same language, and that is not naturalized by common and popular use." Twining. In the seventh chapter he says, that they may be used with effect when you would assume the language of high excitement: see § 11. Kupia are words in general use, opposed to γλω̃τται, outlandish expressions. Οἰκεία, words in their primary and literal acceptations, opposed to μεταφοραὶ, words transferred from their primary meaning to some analogous meaning. Many words are κύρια which yet are not οἰκεία. In fact, of the three divisions the οἰκεία are necessarily the fewest; since the proper and original designations of individual objects cannot extend to a number sufficiently great to answer all the purposes of language; the resources of which must therefore be augmented by metaphorical transfer. Even these words in time become so naturalized by common use as no longer to have any thing " of the effect of metaphor upon the hearer. On the contrary, like proper terms" (οἰκεία), " they suggest directly to his mind, without the intervention of any image, the ideas which the speaker proposed to convey by them." Philos. of Rhet. vol. i. p. 185, 186. From those sounds which we hear on small or on coarse occasions, we do not easily receive strong impressions, or delightful images; and words to which we are nearly strangers [terms of art, etc.], whenever they occur, draw that attention on themselves which they should transmit to things. Johnson's Life of Dryden, vol. vi. p. 395, edit. 1823. Vide the whole passage. p advantage of clearness; this however was laid down 7.Equivocal words suit the sophist, synonyms the poet. to be the perfection of rhetorical language. But of all nouns, those which are equivocal suit the purposes of the sophist, for by their help he effects his fallacies, while synonyms are of use to the poet; I mean these which are both synonyms and of common usage, as πορεύησθαι and βαδίζειν, for these two are both of common usage and synonymous to each other.

The nature then of each of these varieties, and how many species of metaphor there are, and also that this ornament is of the greatest effect, as well in poetry as prose, has been explained, (as I have ob- 8. Metaphors. Rules for. served above,) in the Poetics. In prose11 however we should bestow the greater attention on them, in proportion as an oration has to be made up of fewer adjuments than a metrical composition. Moreover the metaphor possesses in an especial manner [the beauties of] clearness and sweetness, with an air of being foreign12; and it is not possible to derive it from any other person13.

9. i. Must be κατ' ἀναλο­ ylay. You must however apply, in the case both of epithets and metaphors, such as are appropriate; and this will depend on their being constructed on principles of analogy, otherwise they will be sure to appear in bad taste ; because contraries show themselves to be such, particularly when set by each other. But you must consider, as a purple garment becomes a

1. Four causes of a frigid style. i. Compound words. FRIGIDITY1, as dependent on the style, consists in four points. In the use of compound words; like Lycophron2, where he says, "the many-faced heaven," and " the mighty-topped earth," and " the narrow-pathed shore." And as Gorgias used the expression, " a beggarly-mused flatterer," and " the strictly-bound-by-oath and fully-sworn men." Or like Alcidamas, [who talks of] " the soul replete with anger, and the visage waxing fire-coloured." Again, See Bentley on Phalaris, p. 156. Zanclaeans and Messenians. Having in the last chapter discussed the beauties of style as dependent on single words, he now proceeds to consider its defects, as they arise from the single words employed: see note on chap. ii. § 2. a This Lycophron was a sophist, and is not to be confounded with the poet who flourished under Ptolemy Philadelphus. " he supposed their zeal would be completion-working ;" and " he settled a completion-working persuasiveness of speech;" and " the azure-hued level of the main." For all these expressions, by reason of their being compounded, appear poetical3.

This, then, is one cause: also the employment of 2. ii. Use of foreign words. foreign idioms is one; as when Lycophron calls Xerxes, " prodigious hero," and Sciron, " baneful man 4;" or Alcidamas, when he says, " gambollings in poetry," and " nature's improbity," and " whetted by unrestrained rage of soul."

A third description of frigidity consists in the em- 3. iii. Epitheta too long, too frequent, or out of place. plyment of epithets either too long, out of place, or too frequent; for in poetry, indeed, it is becoming enough to say " white milk;" in prose, however, it is rather bad taste. Some also, should there be a superabundance of them, betray [the rhetorician's art], and make it evident that the whole is a mere made-up thing; this, however, you may occasionally avail yourself of, since it produces a departure from the ordinary style, and renders the diction foreign. Yet ought we to aim at the mean; for [the too free indulgence in the licence] does more harm than the speaking carelessly ; for the one has no beauty, the other has [positive] fault. Hence it is that the writings of Alcidamas appear frigid; for he employs epithets not as the seasoning, but as the food, with such profusion does he scatter them, and those both too long, and where the meaning is self-evident: thus, he does not say the sweat, but the moist sweat5:" nor to the Take the following specimen: " To so vast a height did the never-too-much-to-be-extolled reputation of this eximious man," etc. Sir Thomas Urquhart's Jewel. See also " The Rejected Addresses;" Art. " Address of the Editors of the Morning Post." The expression in the original alludes to Sinnis, a famous robber, whose peculiar method of torture it was to bind his victims to the boughs of trees forcibly bent together, and suddenly loosened, so that the violence of their reflex tore the limbs from their bodies. However a Σίννις ἀνὴρ was probably not more elegant in Greek, than the expression " a Turpin" is considered in English. Victorius thinks that Boccaccio, in his Decameron, has Isthmian games, but " to Isthmus' full assemblage nor does he speak of laws; but of " the laws, the sovereigns of states:" nor, of the race; but of " the soul's rapid impulse:" nor of a museum; but of " taking nature's museum with you:" and of " rueful care of the soul." Nor does he speak of favour; but of " the fabricator of a whole people's favour:" and of " a dispenser of the pleasure of his audience." [He would not tell you] of branches; but " amid the branches of the wood did he conceal it:" nor, that he covered his person; but " the nakedness of his person and of " desire the counter-rival of the soul (for this is at once a compound word and an epithet, so that it becomes poetry:) and of "such an illomen'd excess of improbity." Hence those who express themselves with this poetic air, produce by their want of taste both the ridiculous and the frigid, and from their loquacious prosing, become deficient in clearness ; for whenever one unnecessarily obtrudes any thing on an auditor who already apprehends him, putting an end to all perspicuity, he produces obscurity.

People, however, do employ compounds, when the Compound words suited to Dithyrambic poetry; exotic to epic; metaphors to the drama. subject is without a proper appellative, and the position is easily effected: for instance pastime;" but if it occur frequently, it is decidedly poetical. Wherefore a style characterized by compounds, is most available to the Dithyrambic poets; for such words are sonorous: exotic words are most useful to epic poets6; for they have something dignified and superb: metaphor however to iambic verse ; for [dramatists] now employ it, as has been already stated.

4. iv. Improper metaphors. Moreover, fourthly, frigidity originates in metaphor; for there are even metaphors which are unbecoming: some, from their being ridiculous7; for the writers of employed too profusely this poetical ornament. Comment, in Demet. Phal. May we not instance Milton's Hebraisms ? A striking instance of this occurs in two well-known lines, in which Winter is said, " To glaze the lakes, and bridle up the floods, And perriwig with wool the bald-pate woods." comedy employ metaphor: others, from their being too dignified, and having too great an air of tragedy8; and should they be far-fetched, they become indistinct; like Gorgias, [when he talks of] things as wan, and [again] as ruddy. " You have sown in shame, and reaped in ruin for this has too much the air of poetry. And as Alcidamas, [who calls] " philosophy the rampart of the laws;" and " the Odyssey a beautiful mirror of human life9." Again, introducing no such gambolling in poetry:" since all these expressions, for the reasons above-mentioned, are destitute of persuasive efficacy. But what Gorgias said on a swallow, when in its flight it had muted on him, was in the best style of tragedy; for he exclaimed, " Oh! fie Philomela;" for to a bird, indeed, the act was not unbecoming, to a young lady, however, it would have been. So that he reproached her neatly enough, speaking of her as what she had been, not as what she then was.

THE simile, too, is in fact metaphor; for the differ- 1. Simile: how it differs from a metaphor. ence is trifling: for when [the poet] says of Achilles, " Like a lion he leaped on them," it is a simile; but when he says, " A very lion he leaped on them," it is a metaphor: for since both are brave, [the poet,] Such was the language of the poet who, describing the footmen's flambeaux at the end of an opera, sung or said, Now blazed a thousand flaming suns, and bade Grim night retire. Harris, Philolog. Inq. However correct Mr. Harris's taste may be in considering this an elegant metaphor, it seems extraordinary that he should quote the passage thus: " According to Aristotle, the Odyssey of Homer was elegantly called by Alcidamas, καλὸν ἀνρωπίνου βίου κατόπτρον, etc." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 10. Surely Aristotle does not consider this as an elegant metaphor. 2. Is ful in prose. making the transfer, has spoken of Achilles as a lion. The simile is useful too in prose, though seldom, since it carries with it the air of poetry. And you must introduce them just as you would metaphors; for they are metaphors differing in that particular which has been stated1.

3. Instances of similes. The following are similes ; viz. that which Androtion employed against Idrieus,'that " he was like puppies loosed from their chain for they rushing at people bite them, and Idrieus, too, now that he was discharged, was a dangerous person. Again, as Theodamus, in a simile, compared Archidamus to Euxenus, without his knowledge of geometry; on the principles of similar ratios: for [conversely] Euxenus would be Archidamus, had [the latter] a knowledge of geometry. Also the instance which occurs in the Politeia of Plato, that those who spoil the dead are like young dogs, " which bite the stone, without touching the person who throws it." Also the [simile] which he employed against the populace, " that it was like a pilot, strong indeed, but rather deaf." And of the metres of poets, " they are like those in the prime of youth who are without beauty for the latter having lost their freshness, and the former their numerical arrangement, are no longer like the same thing. Also the simile of Pericles against the Samians, [who said] " they were like young children, who indeed accept the sop, but still cry:" and against the Boeotians, that " they were like holm-oaks; for these holm-oaks are cut down by their own means2, as were also the Boeotians, in their contests with each Viz. the insertion of the particle denoting similitude, 'ΩΣ λέων, instead of λέων ἐπόρουσεν. Victorius's conjecture as to the means whereby these trees destroy themselves appears rather forced. May there not be some allusion to the original of the lately discovered fable of Phaedrus; in which the trees, having been made to dispute about providing a handle for the woodman's axe, after seeing the fatal use lie makes of the present, acknowledge that they deserve that destruction which they had provided for themselves ? The Latin fabulist himself seems to think that his master, Aesop, had carried matters too far in making trees speak, since he deems it necessary to apologize : other." And what Demosthenes used before the populace, that " it is like those who are sea-sick when on board." So, too, Democritus likened the orators to nurses, " who, swallowing the sop themselves, besmear the infants with spittle." And in the same way Antisthenes likened Cephisidotus the slim to frankincense, for " in its consumption it spreads universal delight."

[ Thus the simile is metaphor], for it is free to you to enunciate all these both as metaphors and as similes. So that it is plain that as many as, when enunciated as metaphors, are approved, will also become similes; and [vice versâ] the similes, when without the note [of similitude, will become metaphors. But the metaphor, which is constructed on 4. Metaphors must admit of paying back the borrowed term. the principle of similar ratios, ought always to admit of paying back [the borrowed term3] ; as also in other cases, and in that of [metaphor], from species to species : for instance, if a cup be called " the shield of Bacchus," it is also proper to call a shield " the cup of Mars." Of these materials, then, is a discourse made up.

BUT purity in speaking your language is the found- 1. Purity of style depends on five points. ation of all style ; and this depends on five particulars. First, on the connective particles2, whether " Calumniari si quis autem voluerit, Quod arbores loquantur," etc. Phaed. Prol. lib. i. A metaphor is said ἀνταποδίδοσθαι, when it may be inverted: for instance, just as you would call a pilot, " the ruler of his vessel;" so may you call a ruler, " the pilot of the state." Ern. Lex. I Aristotle having in the last three chapters given us the necessary information respecting the materials of style, its single words, proceeds now to treat of the arrangement of those materials in whole sentences. One is surprised to find another great critic of antiquity 2. i. On the connective particles. one pay them back or not, just as they are of a nature to precede or follow, and as each requires ; thus, although and on my part, require yet and on his part [to follow them]. And it is necessary to make a return of the one to the other while it is yet recollected, and not to suspend them at too great intervals: neither should we [insert another] connective before making a return to the connective which already has a claim on us; for in very few instances is this appropriate. "But I, after he spoke to me, for Cleon came up beseeching me and putting it to me, went, taking them along with me:" for in these words many connectives are thrown in before the first connective has been paid back ; and if the interval between the words "I" and "went" be great, a want of clearness takes place. One source then of correct- 3. ii. In using terms distinct, and not vague. 4. iui. In terms not ambiguous. ness originates in the connectives. And a second, in the expressing yourself in the appropriate terms, and not in generals3. A third, in terms which are not ambiguous : this, however, only when you do not deliberately choose the opposite ; the very thing which they do, who, whilst they have nothing to say, yet affect to say something marvellous; for such persons, in their invention of somewhat to say, give vent to these terms, just as Empedocles did. For the circumlocution by its length imposes on people, and the auditors are affected in the very self-same way as the populace in transactions with soothsayers ; for when they utter their ambiguities, they yield assent as they go on; [as in the famous oracle], " Croesus having crossed the Halys will overthrow a mighty empire." And it is because the chance of mistake is less, that soothsayers express themselves in generals on their subject: for in "even and odd4" he will more frequently be right who cries [only generally] declaring it unnecessary to be very particular in this respect:— χρὴ δὲ Kai τοὺς συνδέσμους μὴ μάλα ἀνταποδίδοσθαι. ἀκριβω̃ς, otov τῴ μὲν, T6 δέ. Demet. Phal. περὶ ἑρμηνείας, § 53. a By τοῖς περιέχουσιν is meant, not circumlocutions, but the use of a general instead of a particular term, as ἐρυθρὸς in the place of φοῖνιξ, which of course much weakens the idea. Ludere par impar. Hor. Sat. lib. ii. 3, 248. either " even" or " odd,” than one who would [specify] the exact number; and so one who predicts simply that a thing will happen, than he who would subjoin when 5. On which account the soothsayers never add the further distinction of “when? All these errors then are similar; so that, unless it be with a view to some such end, they are to be avoided.

The fourth essential is the preserving the distinc- 5. iv. In the proper genders. tion which Protagoras marked out between the genders of nouns, viz. masculine, feminine, and neuter; for it will be necessary to make these correspond correctly. Thus, " She, having come and having conversed, departed."

The fifth consists in correctly quoting the plural, 6. v. In the proper numbers. dual, and singular numbers. “ They, coming up, commenced beating me."

In a word, the written style ought to be easily Four general rules. i. Style ought to be easy to read and to understand. ii. It must not depend on the punctuation. read and understood ; and in these requisites it is the same [as that of recitation]; the very qualities however these which numerous connectives do not possess : neither the compositions which it is not easy to point, as those of Heraclitus. For the pointing of Heraclitus' works is quite a task, from its being far from clear whether words refer to those which precede or those which follow them6. Fop example, in the beginning of his work, “Of reason existing always men are ignorant:" for it is not clear to which branch of the sentence we should point off the " always."

This moreover produces a solecism; the failure in. In an expression of more than one word we must in paying back the idea, if, [in the case of two words,] you do not bring each under an expression adapted to both7: for example, to the words " colour Hence the distinguishing superiority of the prophecies of our Saviour's coming; for in them not the simple fact alone, but the very period at which it should occur was specified. We can no where find a more striking instance of the want of clearness to which a neglect of these cautions gives rise, than in book ii. chap. 18, of the worthy Stagyrite's own work. Or, to take his own illustration, in speaking of the objects of different senses, be careful not to annex a verb which denotes the operation of one sense alone. This is well exposed use a verb applicable to all. iv. There must be no long parentheses. or sound," the expression "seeing" has not a common reference; whereas the expression " perceiving" has. Again, sentences become indistinct, if, delaying to thrust in many intermediate remarks, you do not put first and state [what naturally comes first]. For example, " For I intended, after I had conversed with him on this and that subject, and so on, to depart:" not, [stating it naturally thus,] "For I intended to depart;" and afterwards introducing, " after I had conversed on this and that, and so on."

1. Elevation produced by seven expedients. i. Using the definition in place of the noun. The reverse produces abruptness.

THE following expedients contribute to elevation of the style, viz.-the employing the definition instead of the noun; saying, for instance, not " a circle," but " a plane superficies, whose circumference is at all points equidistant from the centre." The reverse, however, viz. the use of the noun instead of the definition, contributes to abruptness.

2. ii. Avoiding either, if out of taste. 3. iii. Illustration by metaphor and epithets. 4. iv. By using the plural for the singular. 5. v. As- Again, [ the avoiding either, J if it be indelicate or unbecoming ; i. e. using the noun, if the indelicacy be in the definition ; or the definition, if it be in the noun.

Also, the illustration of the subject by metaphor and epithets, guarding, however, against what savours of poetry. And the putting what is but single as many, the thing which the poets do: though the haven be but one, yet they tell you of “ Grecian havens;”—and, " the letters' many-opening folds 1. ”

Also, the not bringing all your words under a in the Spectator:—“ I have known a hero compared to a thunderbolt, a lion, and the sea ; all and each of them proper metaphors for impetuosity, courage, or force. But by bad management it hath so happened, that the thunderbolt hath overflowed its banks; the lion hath been darted through the skies; and the billows have rolled out of the Libyan desert." No. 595. Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 727. common particle, but assigning to each its own: signing to each word a distinct particle. vi. Using connectives, but if abruptly without them. 7. vii. By negative qualities. " This woman, this my wife. And the expressing yourself with a connective ; but if abruptly, without a connective indeed, though not unconnectedly; for instance, " Having departed and having spoken to him;” or, " having departed, I spoke to him."

The precept of Antimachus, too, is of service, viz. the drawing your expressions from absent qualities 2, which he does in celebrating the hill Teumessus, [commencing,] " There is a certain little hill visited by the winds3;" for thus the subject is carried on to infinity. And this expedient holds good alike in the case of qualities which are good, and such as are bad ., just as the subject has them not, in whichever way it may be of service. Hence the poets deduce their expressions 5, the "stringless" and the lyreless melody;" for they build their epithets on privatives. And this expedient is also approved in analogical metaphors; for instance, the saying of " a trumpet," that it is a " lyreless harmony." How much may be made of a mere summary of negations, will readily be acknowledged by those who have read Rochester's poem on Nothing; and another in Latin on the same subject (if subject it may be called), by Passerat, a poet and critic of the sixteenth century, in France. This last is usually subjoined to Johnson's Life of Rochester. a These words, it will be observed, do not in themselves afford an instance of the precept here recommended; but, as it appears that the work of Antimachus was well known, they were probably intended as a hint at a passage in which an illustration was to be found. Of Aristotle's quotations in general, it may be remarked that, however naturally we might expect to meet with beautiful passages, in illustration of the several beauties of style which he successively discusses, they present but a series of allusions (now obscure and scarcely intelligible), to passages which were easily accessible to his audience, but which have been lost to us amid the general wreck of ancient literature. See Victorius's remark, cap. iii. § 3. * Whether in praising or blaming. It should be remembered that these negative epithets are very common to the Greek poets. Victorius points out many instances: as, κω̃μον ἀναυλότατον, Eurip. Phoen. 818; θίασον ἀβάκχευτον, Orest. 319; μηνυτη̃ρος ἄφθεγκτου, Aesch. Eumen. 245; ἀπτεροῑς πωτήμασ ιν, ibid. 250, etc. There is a fine instance of this negative mode of explaining a metaphor in Isaiah, li. 21.—" Thou drunken, but not with wine.” Twining.

1. What constitutes good taste in style is, that it be παθητικὴ, ἠθική : and both suitably to the subject- matter. STYLE will possess the quality of being in good taste, if it be expressive at once of feeling and character, and in proportion to the subject-matter. This proportion, however, is preserved, provided the style be neither careless on questions of dignity, nor dignified on such as are mean : neither to a mean word let ornament be superadded; otherwise it appears mere burlesque; as Cleophon uses to do; for he has expressed some things equally ridiculously, as though he were to say, " August fig-tree."

2. 3. παθη­ τικὴ renders the audience sympathetic. But [ the style expressive of feeling, supposing the case be one of assault, is the style of a man in a passion ; if, however, it be one of loathsomeness and impiety, the expressing yourself with disgust and painful caution ; if, however, the case demand praise, with exultation ; if pity, with submission ; and so on 4. in the other cases. And a style which is appropriate, moreover, invests the subject with persuasive efficacy. For the mind is cheated into a persuasion, that the orator is speaking with sincerity, because, under such circumstances, men stand affected in that manner. So that people suppose things to be even as the speaker states them, what though, in reality, they are 5. not: and the hearer has a kindred feeling with the orator, who expresses himself feelingly, even should he say nothing to the purpose; availing themselves of which, many bear down their hearers in the storm of passion.

6. ἠθικὴ -renders the speech appropriate to the audience. But moreover, this mode of showing by means of signs is expressive of character; because, on every condition and habit of life, is consequent a language suited to it. I use the expression condition, in reference to the stage of life ; as youth, manhood, or age; and [to the sex], as man, or woman; and [ to na- Might we borrow an expression from the language cf the painter, we should say, " in proper KEEPING with." tion], as Lacedaemonian, or Thessalian. [I mean] 7. by habits, those conformably to which one is of a certain character in life; for it is not according to every habit that the life assumes a certain character: if then one express himself in the language appropriate to the habit, he will produce the effect of being characteristic; for a rustic and a man of education, will express themselves neither in the same words, nor in the same manner. And the auditors are affected, in some way, by that feeling of which the declaimers avail themselves, till it nauseates ; [putting it to their audience thus], it who knows not ?"— “ all men know it." For the auditor acknowledges with a kind of confusion, that he participates [in that information] which all the rest of the world possess. The employment of them opportunely, or inoppor- 8. General rules. tunely, is, however, a consideration common to every species [of ornament]; but for every excess [in them], 9. We must correct ourselves as it were. there is that corrective which is in the mouth of every body ; for, of yourself, you should append a reproof on yourself; for it appears in reality [an ornament], at least since the use of it does not escape the notice of the speaker himself. Further, the speaker is not at 10. We must occasionally neglect the rules of art. once to employ every thing which is proportionate; for thus the hearer has the deceit passed off on him. I mean that, if the terms be harsh, he is not to employ a harsh tone and expression of countenance, and the other peculiarities [ of harshness] : if this caution be not observed, [our artifices] severally appear what they really are. But if he employ some and not others, without observation he produces the same effect. Still, if expressions of softness be uttered harshly, and such as are harsh with softness, they become divested of efficacy to persuade. But com- 11. We must not use compound words except when excited. pound words, and a plurality of epithets, and foreign idioms, are appropriate chiefly to one who speaks under the excitement of some passion ;-for with one, [for instance,] who is affected by anger, we have a fellow-feeling in his calling his wrongs heaven- measuring," or "prodigious :” they are so, too, when one is already master of his audience, and has wrought them up to enthusiasm, either by panegyric or invective, by [the excitement] of anger or friendly feeling ; the which Isocrates does in " The Panegyric," near the conclusion; "-the record and remembrance ;” and, " men who had the spirit-.” For the speaker, in a transport of enthusiasm, gives utterance to expressions such as these ; so that the audience also, being forsooth similarly affected themselves, readily welcome them. Wherefore they are adapted to poetry; for poetry is the language of enthusiasm.

It is, then, either in this way [that we are to employ poetical expressions], or in irony; as Gorgias was in the habit of doing; and [as Socrates does] in the Phaedrus [of Plato].

1. The style must have rhythm, but not metre. THE modelling of the diction should, however, be neither metrical nor without rhythm 1: for the first has no persuasive efficacy (since it appears to have been got up), and at the same time it also draws off [the attention]; for it causes one to fix his attention on the similarities of cadence, when they will recur again; just in the way that little children anticipate the crier ; (for when he demands,—“ Whom does this freedman choose as his patron ?" — [they exclaim, " Cleon:") that, however, which is without 2. rhythm, has no measure. The diction ought, however, to be measured, yet without metre; for what is destitute of measure is displeasing and indistinct. But by number all things are measured; and in modelling the diction, the number is rhythm 1, of which In pursuance of that systematic plan which we have remarked that Aristotle has adopted in considering the subject of style, he proceeds here to treat of it as addressed to the ear. " Rhythm differs from metre, inasmuch as rhythm is pro- the metres are certain divisions3. Hence the sentence 3. should possess rhythm, though not metre; for then it will become verse; and its very rhythm should be without preciseness. This, however, will be the case if, up to a certain point, it be preserved.

But of the rhythms, the heroic is stately, and not 4. Rhythms of various kinds. Heroic. Iambic. adapted to conversation, and deficient in varied cadence ; the iambic, however, is the very style of the multitude ; whence it is that persons in conversation give utterance to iambic lines, most of all metres. But fin a speech] there should be a degree of stateliness and departure from [the ordinary phrase]. Yet Trochaic. the trochaic metre is too ripping 4; and all tetrameters show it; for tetrameters are a kind of dancing rhythm 5. But the paean remains, which orators, com- Paean. mencing with T hrasymachus, began to employ; they were not, however, able to explain what it was. Yet the paean is the third, and comes next to those [rhythms] which have been mentioned; for it is as three to two. But of the former rhythms, the ratio Ratios of the rhythms. is] of the one, [the heroic,] as one to one; of the others, [the iambic and trochaic,] as two to one6. But portion applied to any motion whatever; metre is proportion, applied to the motion of words spoken." Harris. " The rhythm of a dactyl and anapaest is the same; the metre is different. The distinction is similar to that of permutations and combinations in arithmetic." Scale, Analysis of Greek Metres. Metre, in short, cannot exist independently of articulate sounds ; while rhythm may be heard in any proportionate succession of sounds; as in the ringing of hammers on an anvil, or the flapping of the wings of a bird. Metre is distinctly stated, in the Poetic, to be a species of rhythm. Harris also says, " All metre is rhythm, yet all rhythm is not metre." Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 2. Twining illustrates it by the following line :— " Jolly mortals, fill your glasses; noble deeds are done by wine." Κορδακικώτερος—namby-pamby : κόρδαξ was a species of immodest, lascivious dance. As the Greeks considered a long syllable as equivalent to two times, and a short only to one, two short syllables were of course equivalent to one long; so that, in either of the feet of which heroic metre is composed, a ratio of equality exists; (for instance, in the dactyl, ̄ : ̆̆ ̆ : : 2 : 1 and 1; or, in the spondee, ̄ : ̄ : : 2 :2.) The same observation will explain the 5. The paean is to be retained. next to these ratios ranks that of whole and half;; and this is the paean. The others then are to be abandoned for the reasons stated, and because they are resolvable into verse: the paean is, however, to be retained; since out of that only rhythm, of all which have been mentioned, it is not possible to construct any metre; so that [in employing it] most of all rhythms, an orator will elude detection 8. At present, indeed, the orators employ one paean, [as well in concluding] as on opening; the conclusion, however, ought to differ from the opening [of a 6. Two sorts of paean. The first suited to the opening. The second to the conelusion. speech]. And there are two species of paeans, opposed to each other; whereof the one is adapted to the opening, (just, in fact, as they employ it;) this is that one of which the long syllable is first, and the three short ones at the end, [as in the word] Δᾱλο̆γένε̆ς, and Χρῡσε̆οκο̆μᾰ. The other, however, contrariwise, is that whereof the three short syllables are first, and the long at the end, [as in the conclusion of the line]— ratio of the iambus, ( ̆ : ̄ : 1 : 2,) and the trochee ( ̄ :: : 2 : 1). Now the paean ( ̆ ̆ ̆ : ̄ : : 3 : 2) holds a mean ratio between that of the heroic metre on the one hand, and that of the iambic and trochaic respectively on the other; the ratio of the former being merely that of equality, while the ratio of the latter was too much in excess. ̔Ημιόλιος—sesquiduplex—a whole and half besides ;— " Necesse—partem pedis aut oequalem esse alteri parti; aut altero tanto, aut sesqui esse majorem. Ita fit aequalis, dactylus; duplex, iambus; sesquiplex, paeon.”—Cicero, Orate c. 56. Though the illustrations already given have been perhaps too prolix, I cannot forbear transcribing the following passage from Harris, in illustration of the whole subject:—“ The rhythm of the heroic foot is one to one, which constitutes, in music, what we call common time; and in musical vibration, what we call the unison. The rhythm of the iambic is one to two, which constitutes, in music, what we call triple time; and in musical vibration, what we call the octave. The rhythm next to these, is that of two to three, or else its equivalent, three to two; a rhythm compounded of the two former times united; and which constitutes, in musical vibration, what we call the fifth. 'Twas here then they discovered the foot they wanted; that foot which, being neither the heroic nor the iambic, was yet so far connected with them, as to contain virtually within itself the rhythms of them both.”—Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 2.

This [paean] makes a good conclusion; whereas the short syllable, owing to its being incomplete, renders the sentence mutilated. But it is right to break off with a long syllable, for your conclusion to be clearly marked, not by means of the amanuensis, nor merely by annotations on the margin, but by means of the rhythm.

That, then, the diction should be conformable to rhythm, and not deficient in it, the particular rhythms too which will render it so conformable, and these under what arrangement, have been stated.

THE style must needs be either continuous, and united 1. Style is of two sorts, εἰρομένη, κατε­ στραμ­ μένη. 2. i. εἰρο­ μένη, έ,or uninterrupted. by means of connectives, just like the protracted odes of the dithyrambic poets 2; or reflex, and like the antistrophic odes of the old poets.

Now the continuous style is the old style, as, " This is the exposition of the historical research of Herodotus, of Thurium 3," etc. For formerly indeed every I Style is here considered as addressed to the intellect of the auditor. AlEtis εἰρομένη, in which the sentence has no other unity than that which copulatives give it, nor any other measure than the completion of the sense, and the necessity of taking breath ; or, as Cicero in few words so admirably describes it, " illa sine intervallis loquacitas perennis et profluens." This Aristotle compares to what he calls the ἀναβολαὶ in dithyrambic poetry; meaning, I think, evidently the long, irregular, protracted odes of the more modern dithyrambic poets: for the word ἀναβολὴ, here, does not, I believe, signify exordium, prooemium, as usually understood, but was, probably, the name by which ὠδαὶ μακραὶ καὶ πολυειδεῑς were distinguished,' etc. -Twining, note 17. Herodotus, though a native of Halicarnassus, went latterly as a colonist to Thurium. tion of it. one employed it, but now very few. I call that continuous, which in itself has no termination, should not the circumstance under narration have been terminated. But it is unpleasant, from its being indefinite; for all like to descry the end. Wherefore it is that racers pant and faint away just at the turn ; for before, while they have the goal in view before them, they do not tire. The continuous style, then, is this.

3. Reflex style in periods, But the reflex is that which consists of periods. I call a period a form of words which has independently in itself a beginning and ending, and a length easily taken in at a glance. A diction of this description is pleasing, and easily conveys information : now is pleasing. it is pleasing from its being the opposite of that which is indefinite4; and because the hearer all along supposes that he is securing something, from the circumstance that something is constantly finished off for him; but the not foreseeing nor despatching any Easily remembered. thing is unpleasant: and it easily conveys information, because it is easily remembered; this, however, is the case, because the diction which consists of periods has number, which of all things is most easily recollected. And hence every one remembers verse better than prose; for it has numbers by which it is 4. The period must finish with the sense. measured. The period ought also to be terminated with the sense, and not to be interrupted like this verse of Sophocles,- 4 "While other sentences are indefinite, and (like a geometrical right line) may be produced indefinitely, the period (like a circular line) is always circumscribed, returns and terminates at a given point. In other words, while other sentences, by the help of common copulatives, have a sort of boundless effusion, the constituent parts of a period have a sort of reflex union, in which union the sentence is so far complete, as neither to require, nor even to admit a further extension. Readers find a pleasure in this grateful circuit, which leads them so agreeably to an acquisition of knowledge." Harris, Philolog. Inq. P. ii. c. 4. He quotes the commencement of his own Hermes and Philosophical Arrangements, with the opening of Cicero's Offices, Demosthenes' Oration concerning the Crown, and that of the Panegyric by Isocrates, (whom he calls the father of periods,) as instances of periodical style. " This is Calydon, land of the territory of Pelops 5.” For by dividing it is possible to understand the contrary [of the fact], as in the case of the instance cited, that Calydon is in Peloponnesus.

A period either consists of clauses, or is simple. 5. A period is either in clauses or simple. But the period consisting of clauses is a mode of speech perfect and distinct, and easily pronounced at a breath; not, however, at the point of division, like the fore-mentioned period, but altogether. And a clause is one subdivision of it. By a simple period, I mean one consisting of a single clause.

But neither the clauses nor the periods ought to 6. They must not be curtailed. be either curtailed or prolix ; for their brevity often causes the hearer to feel a hitch ; since it needs must be, if while he is yet [in thought] hastening onward, that limit of termination which he conceives within himself happens to be thrown back by the speakers ceasing, that a kind of hitch, as it were, occurs, owing to the impulse backward. Those, however, which Nor prolix. are prolix cause the hearer to be left behind; just as they who make the turn too far on the outside of the goal, for they don't keep up with those walking with them 6; and in a similar way, periods which are prolix grow into an oration, and are something like a desultory ode. So that that occurs which Democritus, the Chian, joked Melanippides about, viz. that he produced desultory odes instead of anti strophes. "A man in framing a nuisance for others, frames one for himself; and long tedious odes are the greatest nuisance to him who produces them ; ” for it is appropriate enough to hold such language as this respecting the framers of prolix clauses. But those which are brief in their clauses do not, in fact, become periods ; therefore they draw on the hearer by fits and starts. This line is found quoted by Lucian, as taken from a drama of Euripides, no longer extant, entitled Meleager. Probably an English sergeant would have illustrated this by a column wheeling into line. See the note on § 1 of this chapter. A neat parody this on Hesiod, Opp. et D. v. 263.

1. Elegancies and approved beauties of style. BUT as a detail of these subjects has been given, we must state whence the elegancies and approved beauties [of style] are derived. Now the power of inventing them belongs, either to the man of high natural genius, or to one of talent chastened by discipline; but to exhibit the sources of them is the business of this system; wherefore, let us treat of, and fully enumerate them.

2. The fundamental principle is μάθη­ σις. And let this be our fundamental principle: for the receiving information with ease, is naturally pleasing to all 1; and nouns are significant of something ; so that all those nouns whatsoever which produce knowledge in the mind, are most pleasing. Now, the foreign expressions are unintelligible; and words of Metaphor produces this, common use we already understand. But the metaphor in the highest degree produces this effect [of giving pleasure]; for when the poet calls old age " stubble,” he produces in us a knowledge and in- See this principle of pleasure stated in book i. c. 11, § 23. Again, (book ii. c. 24, § 30,) refutative enthymems are preferred to confirmative on the same principle,—διὰ τὸ συναγωγὴν ἐναντίων εἶναι iv ΜΙΚρΩ. formation by means of a common genus 2; for both are past their prime. Now, the similes of the poets 3. and similes. also produce the same effect; on which account, should they be neatly managed, an elegance strikes you. For the simile, as has been remarked before3, is metaphor with the difference of the addition [of a particle denoting similitude]; on which account it is less pleasing, because more at length: and it does not assert that " this is that;" the mind therefore does not at all require it4.

It cannot but be, then, both that the style and the 4. Words which produce rapid μά­ θησις are elegant. arguments which render the act of information rapid, are elegant; on which account, neither are superficial arguments held in approbation; (for, by superficial, I mean such as are obvious to every one, and which require no search;) nor those which, when stated, are not understood 5:but all those whatsoever which are apprehended, either simultaneously with their being uttered, (supposing even that no previous knowledge of them existed,) or by which the intellect is a little left behind; for there accrues, as it were, a piece of information ; in the two former cases, however, none.

As far, then, as respects the meaning of what is 5. The expression must be antithetical. said, reasonings of this description are approved; but as to the expression, if they be worded (in figure) antithetically6; as, "deeming the common peace of " By the genus; that is, where the common quality which constitutes the likeness immediately occurs," etc. Twining. This metaphor, according to the distinction of the Poetic, would be called ἀπ’ εἰδου̃ς ἐπὶ εἶδος—from one species of things decayed to another. in the fourth chapter of this book. For the mind, hurrying on to obtain further information respecting the object in question, without pausing to ascertain what it is like or equal to, desires only to know what it really is. See chap. 4, § 1. The case with these two descriptions of argument is the same as with the γλὤτται and κύρια ὀνόματα respectively. With this passage compare book ii. c. 24, § 30. The consideration of ἀστεα having been ranged under the heads of their διύνοια and ις, he proceeds here to subdivide his discussion of λέξις, in reference to its whole sentences, 6. the rest, a very war to their individual interests here "war" is opposed to " peace;" and (in single words) if they possess metaphor, and this neither far- fetched, for it will be difficult to view it in connexion ; nor superficial, for it produces no effect: and, moreover, if they place the object before your eyes ; for it needs must be, that one sees more clearly what is actually in the course of being done, than what is about Three things to be aimed at: metaphor, antithesis, personification. 7. Metaphors are fourfold: analogical ones the best. to be. We ought then to aim at three things, metaphor, antithesis, and personification 7.

But of metaphor, which is fourfold, that species is in the highest degree approved which is constructed on similar ratios; just as Pericles said, that the youth which had perished in the war, had so vanished from the city, as if one were to take the spring from the year9." And Leptines, speaking of the Lacedaemonians, " that he would do all in his power to prevent Greece from being deprived of an eye." And Cephisodotus, when Chares was eager to present the accounts about the Olynthiac war, grew nettled, and said, " Now that he has got the populace with their necks in a halter, he is endeavouring to present his accounts." Again, when he once was exhorting the Athenians, as they were going for provisions, to go to Eu boea for them, he said, " the decree of Miltiades should go forth to the expedition." And Iphicrates, when the Athenians had made a league with Epidaurus and the neighbourhood of the coast, was indignant, and exclaimed that, " of themselves they had (i. e. its figure, σχήμα,) or its single words, (i. e. what is usually called trope). From the variety of words by which ἐνέργεια has been rendered, " personification " has been selected, as approaching the nearest to the correspondent expression, πρὸ ὀμμάτων. The effect is produced by representing inanimate objects as the agents in any thing: thus, " pontem indignatus Araxes." See the next chapter. A metaphorical word is a word transferred from its proper sense, either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from one species to another, or in the way of analogy. Poet. xxi. transl. by Twining. See chap. 2, § 14, seq. See book i. 7, § 34. Herodotus puts a similar expression in the mouth of Gelon, book vii. 162. cut off the very provision of the war." And Pitho- Various instances of approved metaphors. laus called [the state yacht] Paralus, " the mace of the populace;" and Sestus, " the corn-chest of the Piraeus." And Pericles bade them away with Aegina, ‘‘the eye-sore of the Piraeus.” And Mcerocles said, " that he was no more a knave than the other," namo ing some good sort of man; " since that person indeed played the rogue at the rate of thirty per cent., himself however merely at ten per cent. usury 10.” And that iambic verse of Anaxandrides on his daughters, who were long in getting married: " The virgins have forfeited the nuptial recognisance 11” And that saying of Polyeuctus about one Speusippus, who was struck by apoplexy, " that he was unable to keep quiet, bound as he was by fortune in a complete pillory of a disease." Cephisodotus, too, used to call the triremes, " painted corn-mills:” as did the Cynic Diogenes the taverns, " the public tables 12 of Athens." Aesion, too, used the expression, "pouring out the city into Sicily," (for this is metaphorical, and sets the object before the eyes,) " so that all Greece exclaimed and this too is in a certain way a metaphor, and personifies. And as Cephisodotus bade them be The highest rate of interest (τόκος) permitted among the Greeks appears to have been one third of the principal (ἐπίτριτος); the lowest rate which was usual was one tenth merely of the principal (ἐπιδέκατος): so that Moerocles was less a villain than this in the same ratio in which ten per cent. was less usurious than three and thirty. The metaphor, however, is stated by some as resulting from the comparison of the ratio of character to the ratio of usury; and by others, from the application of the general word, πονηρεύεσθαι, to the transactions of usurers in particular. It will be observed, that in translating ἐπίτριτος, the round numbers have been taken. Addison, too, classes certain of his fair readers (though certainly differently circumstanced from the daughters of Anaxandrides) under the metaphorical appellation of " demurrers,” borrowed from the English legal nomenclature. See Spectator, No. 89. φειδίτια, the public tables of Lacedaemon, remarkable for their plainness and frugality: so that, in saying that the only φειδίτια of Athens were its taverns, Diogenes conveyed a most bitter sarcasm against the manners of its citizens. on their guard, " lest they rendered their very popular assemblies so many rows;" just as Isocrates, also, [ used the expression] of persons “ making a row in the general convention." And as in the funeral speech [of Lycias], " there was reason for Greece to shear her locks over the grave of those who fell at Salamis, since her liberty had been buried jointly with their valour:" for had he said that " there was reason she should weep, her liberty having been buried with them;" it would indeed have been a metaphor, and have given personification; but the words, "their valour," “ her liberty," convey a kind of antithesis. And, as Iphicrates said, " The path of my arguments is through the midst of the actions of Chares:" the metaphor here is on similar ratios, and the expression, " through the midst," produces personification. Also the saying, " that he challenged dangers to be his allies against dangers," is both a personification and a metaphor. And Lycoleon, pleading for Chabrias, said, " [What, not pardon him] out of a respect for the suppliancy13 of his brazen statue:" for in the then crisis it was a metaphor, but not always; but the personification [was perpetual] ; for pending his trial the statue acts as suppliant, the inanimate as an animated object,—" that memento of the exploits of the state." Again, " Making it their study, by every means, to think meanly;" [this is metaphorical,] since study is with a view to advance [not to diminish]. And the expression that “ God has kindled the intellect as a light in the soul for both in a certain sense illuminate.—“ For we put no period to our wars, but put them off;" since both putting off, and a peace of Chabrias seems to have been the first who ordered his troops to assume a kneeling position in receiving the charge of an enemy: at the time when he adopted this manoeuvre, he headed some Athenian troops auxiliary to the Boeotians, and completely succeeded in repulsing the forces of Agesilaus. This improvement in tactics seems to have been so favourably received, that statues were decreed him to be erected in the

BUT it must be stated what we mean by the expres- 1. Personification re-, presents the object as animated. 2. sion, “ setting forth to the eyes, and in doing what this effect results. I mean, then, that those expressions which represent the object as in action, do all of them produce the setting before the eyes: for instance, the saying of “ a good man," that he is " a cube 1,” is a metaphor; for both are perfect; but this does not personify: whereas the speaking of one as " having his prime yet blooming," is a personification. And this, “—but you just as a thing let loose," is a personification. And [in the line] " Then the Greeks springing forth with their feet 2;—” the expression, " springing," is both a personification and a metaphor, for it expresses rapidity. Again, as Homer has in We cannot forbear adding to this long catalogue the metaphor used by Herodotus, in speaking of the scheme for the defence of Peloponnesus, at the time of the Persian invasion, by throwing a wall across the Isthmus : his words are, , that even many cloaks of walls would be insufficient;—εl καὶ πολλοὶ τειχέων ΚΙΩΝΕΣ ἦσαν κ.τ.λ. Book vii. c. 139. See the expression, Eth. Nich. book i. c. 10. a See Eurip. Iph. in Aul. 80. many places employed it, the putting inanimate 3. Metaphors produce it. things as animate, by means of a metaphor; and in all from their producing personification, they are approved; as in these instances3: " Back to the plain still roll'd the shameless stone." Again, " The arrow fleω.” And, " Eager to wing its way." And, " Deep fix'd in earth, eager their blood to drain." And, " Right through his breast th' impetuous weapon sped." For in all these instances, the objects, from their being animated, appear personified; for the expressions, shamelessness, and eagerness, and the rest, are personifications. These, however, has he appended by means of the metaphor from analogy : for as the stone is to Sisyphus, so is he who is insensible of shame, to the object in regard to which he is so 4. And similes. insensible. He does this, too, in his approved similes, in the case of inanimate objects ; as, " The waves behind impel the waves before, Wide rolling, foaming high, and tumbling to the shore4." for he produces every thing in life and action. But personification is an imitation [of nature ]. 5. Metaphors to produce it must be appropriate, yet not obvious. But it is fitting to draw your metaphors, as has been stated, from terms which are appropriate and not obvious; just as in philosophy, also, it is the privilege of one who conjectures happily, to discern the point of similitude6; as when Archytas observes, " that an arbitrator and an altar are the same," since These passages severally stand as follows: (1.) Od. xi. 597. (2.) 11. xiii. 587. (3.) Il. iv. 126. (4.) 11. xi. 573. (5.) 11. xv. 542. Pope's translation, Il. xiii. (of the original), line 799. And, if an imitation, necessarily pleasing. See this principle of pleasure stated, book i. c. 11, § 23. In speaking of the fable, he attributed this faculty of catching such features of resemblance as, without immediately striking, are yet appropriate (οἴκεια μὴ Φάνερα), to those of a philosophic turn of mind :—τὸ ὅμοιον ὁᾃόρᾃν, ὄπερ ᾃῥᾃόν ῥἐστιν ἐκ ΦιλοσοΦίας. Lib. ii. cap. 20, § 7. to both does the party who has been wronged fly for refuge. Or if one were to say, " that an anchor and a pot-hanger were the same;" for both are somewhat the same, but they differ in the circumstance of suspending from above and below. Again, the expression, " the states have been levelled" is the same in objects widely differing, equality both in power and in superficies.

Also the greatest number of elegancies arise from 6. They deceive the hearers agreeably. metaphor, and from additionally deceiving the hearer7; for the point becomes more clear that he has learnt something, from the meaning being the opposite [of what it was supposed], and the mind seems to say, " How true is this ! I however was wrong." And the elegancies of proverbial expressions arise from one's meaning not what he says; for instance, the words of Stesichorus, that " the grasshoppers shall chirp on the ground 8." Also ideas neatly put enigmatically, are for the same reason pleasing; for there is an acquisition of knowledge, and a metaphor is introduced. Again, that embellishment which Paradoxes. Theodorus calls, " saying out-of-the-way things;" this, however, occurs when the sentiment is paradoxical, and (as he has it) does not square with previous opinion 9; just on the same principle as in jokes, words submitted to a slight change. An effect which Jests which are trap' ὐπό­ νοtav. those jests also produce, which depend on the change Besides the ornament of metaphor, by leading the hearer, throughout the sentence, to expect something very different from what you really mean, and undeceiving him only by the last word; e. g. " Quid hinc abest nisi reset virtus!" Cic. de Orate ii. 70. Here you expect a panegyric; the last word converts the whole into reproach. Of this description, too, are the following lines of Pope :— " Here thou, great Anna ! whom three realms obey, Dost sometimes counsel take, and sometimes tea !" Rape of the Lock, iii. 7. The precept may be further illustrated by Porson's insidious commendation of Blackmore's poetry:—" He will be read when Homer and Milton are forgotten,-but not till then." Already quoted, ii. 21, § 8. Probably the English word humour would best designate this quaintness of Theodorus. of a letter, for they deceive [the hearer's anticipation] : it happens also in metre; for it terminates not in the way in which the hearer supposed; thus, fστειχε δ' ε̃χων ύπὸ ποσσὶ χίμετλα !! He proceeded wearing under his feet-chilblains 10. Whereas the hearer was imagining that " sandals (πέδιλα), would be the word11. This, however, as soon as it is uttered, ought to be clear. But these changes of a letter cause the speaker to say, not what the word expresses, but what its inversion signifies : as in the jest of Theodorus, on Nicon the lyrist, " Thee did a Thracian —" (θράττη) ; for what he pretends to say is, " It annoys (θράττει) you 12," and deceives the audience ; wherefore to one who has caught it, the joke is pleasing; since if one is not aware that he is a Thracian. it will not appear to 7. Puns. be a beauty. Again, the expression, you wish him περσαι [i. e. either to side with Persia-to ruin him. Both meanings, however, should be in point, and so also in the case of the elegancies; thus the saying, " The sovereignty (ἀρχὴ) of the sea, was not the beginning (ἀρχὴ) of evils to the Athenians; since it was a gain to them." Or, as Isocrates says, " that its sovereignty (ἀρχὴ) was to the city a beginning See note 1, at p. 88, of Carrington's translation of Aristophanes' Plutus; where a similar surprise arises from the use of ἔπινες instead of εκρίνης. This is sometimes aptly enough termed παρἀ προσδοκίαν, baffling the expectation. Nicon, it seems, was the son of a Thracian slave; and Theodorus, conveniently mistaking the word θράττΗ for θράττΕΙ, takes an opportunity of taunting him with his low birth. θράττω, probably contracted from ταράττω. Vid. Blomfield in Aeschyl. Prom. Vinct. 649. There are on record two excellent replies to taunts of this nature; one made by Mnestheus, son of Iphicrates, who declared that he esteemed his mother above his father,—" Nam Pater, quantum in se fuit, Thracem me genuit: contra ea, mater Atheniensem (Corn. Nep. Iphic. 3;) where it should be observed, that Rutgersius, for contra ea mater, proposes to read cum Thraca mater. The other is attributed to Timotheus, who having the condition of his mother as a Thracian slave thrown out against him as a reproach, replied, " But to her I owe it that I am Conon's son." Athenaeus, lib. xii. (ἀρχὴ) of evils." For in either acceptation, that is stated which one did not imagine he would say; and that it is true, is acknowledged. For to assert that a beginning is a beginning, shows no great wisdom; but he repeats [the word ἀpχὴ], not in this sense, but differently ; and he does not repeat the same ἀρχὴ which he first said, but in a different sense. And in all these cases, if one introduce the term 8. appropriately under an equivocation or metaphor, then there is wit; for instance, there is no bearing Baring 13: here the speaker denies the correspondence of signification, but appropriately enough, if [tbe person alluded to] be disagreeable." Again, " You cannot become more a stranger [ξένος], than becomes you as a guest [ξένος]," or not in a greater degree than you ought, which is the same; and " it becomes not a stranger [ξένος] always to be a guest [ξένος]." For the meanings here also are different. The same, too, is that commended saying of Anaxandrides, " It is honourable to die before doing aught worthy death;" for it is the same as saying, " It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy to suffer death;" or, " It is worthy a man to die when he is not worthy [the punishment] of death; or, when he has not committed acts worthy that punishment." Now the form of the diction of these sentences is the 9. same; but in proportion as [the idea happens to be enunciated in fewer words and with antithesis, in the same proportion is it more approved. And the reason is, that the information becomes by means of the antithesis, fuller; by means of brevity, more rapid. Such sentiments ought always to have either some 10. There should be some person to whom they must apply. one of whom they are said, or happiness of expression (if what you say [would appear] earnest, and not mere idle remark) ; for it is possible to have one of those qualities without the other: for instance, " You ought to die without having committed an error;" [the sentiment is just enough], but [the expression] is not elegant: " A deserving man should So, too, the Latins, Lepidus non lepidus. marry a deserving woman;" but this is not elegant14; but if it possess both qualities at the same time, as " It is worthy a man to die while he is not worthy of suffering death." But in proportion as a sentence possesses the greater number of these ornaments, in the same proportion does it appear more elegant; if, for instance, the words be metaphors, and metaphors of such a species, and if there be antithesis, and equipoise of clauses, and if it have personification.

11. Similes are a sort of metaphor. Similes also, as has been uniformly stated in the foregoing, are in some way approved metaphors; for they always are expressed in two terms, like the analogical metaphor; thus, " the shield," we say, " is the cup of Mars the bow, " a stringless lyre." Thus, then, persons express the metaphor not unaccompanied ; whereas the calling a bow, " a lyre;" or a shield " a cup," is without accompanying explan- 12. ation 16. And on this principle men construct their similes ; for instance, that of a flute-player to an ape, and of a near-sighted person to a sputtering 13. lamp; for both contract themselves. But the excellence will exist when there is a metaphor; for you may represent by a simile the shield as " the cup of Mars," and a ruin as " the rags of a house ;" and the saying of Niceratus, that, " he was himself a Philoctetes bitten by Pratys," as Thrasymachus drew the simile when he saw Niceratus, who had been beaten by Pratys in a contest of rhapsodists 17, with his hair As far as the expression is concerned, this instance seems to possess the necessary elegance; but it is deficient in the second requisite, viz. τὸ πρὸς ov λέγεται. The metaphor constructed on similar ratios (κατ' ἀναλο­ γίαν) is here alluded to: see chap. 10, § 7. In the Poetic, he says that, in the case of the analogical metaphor, " sometimes the proper term is also introduced, besides its relative term and this, with a view to guard the metaphor from any incidental harshness or obscurity: with such an adjunct, the metaphor ceases to be ἁπλου̃ς : e. g. φιάλη Ἄρεος–thus expressed, the metaphor is ου̃χ ἁπλου̃ς; but if stated simply φιάλη, it is ἁπλου̃ς. See Twining, notes 184, 189, on the Poetic. With a view to elucidate the simile of Thrasymachus, it long and disordered, and his person still neglected. In which points, if they be not neatly managed, the poets most frequently get hissed off, even should they in other respects stand high. I mean when the poet replies [to his particle of similitude thus], "Like parsley he has crooked legs."—"Like Philammon on the bench, struggling with the ball" [or, with Corycus]. And all such expressions are similes ; but that similes are metaphors has frequently been stated.

Proverbs also are metaphors from species to spe- 14. And proverbs also. cies: thus if any one, as though likely to experience a benefit, should himself introduce a measure and afterwards suffer loss from it, then one exclaims, " As the Carpathian fetched the hare 18 !" for both parties have experienced the thing in point. Now the sources whence these elegancies are deduced, and the cause why [they are pleasing], has nearly been told you.

Again, hyperboles which are recognised are meta- 15. So too are hyperboles. phors; as that about a person with a black eye: " You would have thought him a basket of mulberries for the part beneath the eye is somewhat suffused with blood: but this is greatly forced. But the [simile with the expression of similitude] just as, so and so, is hyperbole, differing merely in the diction. " Like Philammon on the bench struggling with the ball," [becomes hyperbole thus;] " You would have thought he was Philammon struggling with the ball." " Like parsley he has crooked legs," [thus arranged becomes an hyperbole;] "I thought not that he had legs, but parsley stalks, so crooked were they." But hyperboles suit with the 16. amen ot the young, or they evince a vehemence ot has been conjectured that the story of Philoctetes might have been the subject of this rhapsodical declamation. The island of Carpathus being destitute of hares, one of the inhabitants brought over some of these animals, which proved so fatally prolific as to consume all the crops in the island; and the Carpathians became more anxious to extirpate them than they had ever been for their introduction. temper; (on which account the angry most frequently utter them; [thus Achilles in his wrath exclaims,] Though bribes were heap'd on bribes, in number more Than dust in fields, or sands along the shore, Atrides' daughter never shall be led, An ill-match'd consort to Achilles' bed; Like golden Venus though she charm'd the heart, Or vied with Pallas in the works of art 19. POPE.

The Attic rhetoricians, too, particularly employ this figure;) on which account for a man in advanced life to utter them is bad taste.

1. Different styles are suitable to each sort of oratory. NEITHER ought it to escape us, that to each kind of rhetoric is adapted a peculiar style; for neither are the style which is adapted to writing and that of disputation the same, nor the style of deliberative and that of judicial rhetoric. But it is necessary to be acquainted with both [the first and the second] : for the one consists in knowing the purity of language ; the other in the not being obliged to sit mute, if one wish to communicate any thing to others; the very predicament in which they who know not how to 2. The written style is most precise ; that of disputation most declamatory, and is of two kinds, ἠθικὴ, παθητι­ κή. write are placed. But the style of writing is the most precise: that of disputation partakes more of declamation ; and of it there are two species, the one conveys the impress of character, the other of feeling. And hence actors choose this description of drama, and the poets this sort [ of actors]. But poets fit for perusal are carried about with us, like Choeremon, for he is as nicely finished as a rhetorician ; and, of the Dithyrambic poets, Licymnius.

Thus also, on comparing speeches together, those Iliad, ix. 385—388. adapted to writing appear jejune when delivered at disputations ; while those of the declaimers, excellent as they were when delivered, seem mere common- place in the closet; and the reason is, that in disputation [these things are appropriate enough. On which Declamatory compositions when read appear ridiculous. account, compositions framed for declamation, inasmuch as, when abridged of their declamation, they do not produce their effect, appear ridiculous: thus, the omission of connectives, and frequent repetitions, in a written style are justly exploded ; yet in the style of disputation even the rhetoricians employ them, for they are adapted to declamation. Yet it is necessary 3. in repeating the same thing to vary the expression ; which indeed opens a way, as it were, to declamation: [e. g.] " This is he who robbed you ; this is he who defrauded you ; this is he who at last endeavoured to betray you." Just as Philemon the actor used to do in the " Gerontomania " of Anaxandrides, when Rhadamanthus and Palamedes speak; and in the opening scene of the " Devotees " [in the recurrence of] the word I. For if one does not give these passages with declamation, it becomes [a case in point with the proverb] " Stiff as one carrying a beam." And so also 4. where connectives are wanting, "I came, I met, I besought him;" for you needs must give it with declamation, and not, as though simply saying one thing, enunciate it with the same manner and tone. There is, moreover, a certain peculiarity which omissions of connectives possess; for it strikes one that, in an equal length of time, many things have been stated ; for the connective makes many, one ; so that if it be taken away, it is evident that on the contrary one will be many. It possesses, then, amplification ; " I came, I conversed with, I besought," being many,— " he seems to overlook all I have said, all I now say." Homer is desirous of producing this effect in the lines: " Three ships with Nireus sought the Trojan shore, Nireus, whom Agläe to Charopus bore, Nireus, in faultless shape 1," etc. POPE. I Iliad, ii. 671. For of whom a great deal is said, that man must needs be spoken of frequently; and therefore if one be spoken of frequently, it appears that a great deal has been said of him. So that the poet mentioning him only once, by help of this sophism amplifies the character, and has excited a recollection of him, though he no where subsequently mentions him.

5. Deliberative style like sketching, and not accurate. Judicial style more precise. Now the deliberative style is exactly like sketching ; for in proportion as the crowd is larger, the view is taken from a greater distance ; on which account, in the one as well as in the other, productions of an exquisite finish are superfluous, and look worse than others. But the judicial is a thing of greater nicety: and in a still higher degree where it is before a single judge ; for least of all is this within the reach of rhetorical artifice ; since the peculiar points of the case are more easily concentrated to the view, than what is merely external: and the heat of disputation is out of the question, so that the decision is fair and clear. And on this account the same speakers are not approved in all these kinds; but where there is most of declamation, there least of all is accuracy: this, however, is the case where power of voice is requisite, and particularly if a considerable power.

Epideictie style more suited to writing. The judicial next. 6. Conclusion of the second division, scil.λέξις. The demonstrative style, however, is most adapted to writing ; for its purpose is perusal: second to it [in this adaptation] is the judicial.

But to draw any further distinctions on the subject of style, that it ought to be pleasing and magnificent, is superfluous: for why should it be such rather than temperate and liberal, or if there be any other moral virtue ? For that the foregoing rules will cause it to be pleasing is manifest, if indeed excellence of style has been correctly defined:—for with a view to what must it be, [according to our definition,] " clear and not mean, but-in good taste?" For should it become prosing, it is no longer clear, neither if it should be too concise. But it is plain that the mean is appropriate. And the foregoing precepts will cause its being pleasing, should the ordinary expressions have been judiciously blended with the foreign, and should rhythm [not be wanting], and the persuasive influence resulting from good taste.

The subject of style has then been treated 2, as well generally, respecting all the species of rhetoric, as particularly, respecting each. But it yet remains to treat of arrangement.

THE parts of a speech are two; for it is necessary to 1. Two parts of a speech. state the case about which it is, and to prove it. Wherefore for one, after stating, not to prove it, or to proceed to prove it without a previous statement, is out of the question: for whoever proves, proves something; and he who makes a previous statement, makes such statement with a view to subsequently proving it. And of these parts, the one is the state- 2. Statement. Proof. 3. Divisions made by other writers censured. ment, the other the proof; just as though one were to make a division into problem and demonstration. But the divisions which they now usually make are ridiculous; for narration is a kind of peculiarity to judicial speeches alone; for how can there, in demonstrative and deliberative speeches, be any narration such as they speak of, or any reply, confutation of an adversary, or any peroration of points selected for display of character ?

But exordium, contrast of argument, and recapitulation 2, do then only occur in deliberative speeches a Thus ends the second branch of the grand division of the work;—πίστις—λέξις—τάξις. See the last note on book ii. I That is, to adopt the language of mathematicians, the statement corresponds to their problem, the proof to their demonstration. It will readily be observed that πίστις is here used in a sense different from that which it has hitherto preserved. Est et illud repetendi genus quod seme! proposita iterat et dividit:— when an altercation happens ; for, considered as accusation and defence, they frequently [admit these branches, but not in their character of a piece of Peroration not always necessary. advice. But the peroration, moreover, is not an essential of every judicial; for instance, if the speech be a short one, or the case easy to be remembered. For it is usual to detract only from what is prolix. The necessary divisions, then, are the statement and the proofs.

4. Enumeration of certain of them. The essential divisions then are these; but the greatest number are, exordium, statement, proof, peroration. The confutation of an adversary belongs to the proof; and the contrast of arguments is an amplification of one's own, so as to be a kind of branch of the proof; for one who does this proves something : but not so either exordium or peroration ; but [the latter refreshes the recollection.

5. No farther distinctions to be drawn. But should one draw distinctions with regard to these, that will be the case which the followers of Theodorus used to do, there will be a narration distinct from post-narration, and prae-narration, together with refutation, and post-refutation. But the writer should affix a title only after marking out a distinct species and difference4, otherwise it becomes mere emptiness and trifling; just like Licymnius, who in his treatise gives the titles, irruption-digressionramifications, etc. Iphitus et Pelias mecum; quorum Iphitus aevo Jam gravior, Pelias et vulnere tardus Ulixi. Aeneid, ii. 435. 'ΕΠΑΝΟΔΟΣ dicitur Graecb, nostri regressionem vocant. Quintil. ix. 3, 36-apud Em. Lex. Techn. It should be carefully borne in mind, that Aristotle admits only these two branches as essential to every speech. His reasons for superadding exordium and peroration will be developed in the sequel. Without such a restraint, a rhetorician may go on ad infinitum drawing distinctions where no difference exists.

Now the exordium is the commencement of the 1. The exordium resembles the prologue and the prelude. Prooemium of epideictic oratory resembles the prelude, and connected with the piece by the ἐνὀό­ σιμον. As the Helen of Isocrates. speech; which in poetry is the prologue, and in the performances on the pipe, the prelude: for these are all commencements, and, as it were, an opening of the way for what is to succeed.

The prelude, then, corresponds to the exordium of demonstrative speeches; for the performers on the pipe, using as a prelude any piece whatever which they are able to execute with skill, connect the whole by an inserted passage: and so in demonstrative speeches ought we to write; for the speaker ought, after stating whatever he lists straightway to employ the insertion, and link it [to the body of the speech]. Which indeed all do, having as their model the exordium of the Helen of Isocrates: for there exists no very near connexion between Helen and the artifices of sophists2. At the same time, if the exordium be out of the way of the subject, there is this advantage, that the whole speech is not of one uniform character. But the exordia of demonstrative 2. The exordium may be derived from either of the three sorts of oratory. speeches are derived from praise, or from blame, (like Gorgias in the Olympic oration,-" Men worthy, O Greeks, of admiration among many;" for he is eulogizing those who instituted the general assemblies : Isocrates, however, blames them, " because they distinguish by prizes the excellencies of person, while for those who are wise they propose no reward ;") and thirdly, from suggesting advice ; for in- 3. stance, " -because it is fitting to honour the good," on that account [the orator] himself also speaks the praises of Aristides, or such characters as neither enjoy reputation, nor are worthless, but as many as, though they be excellent persons, are obscure; just There is, in demonstrative rhetoric, no limitation as to the source whence the exordium is to be derived. In a reprehension of which this exordium is employed. as was Paris, the son of Priam: for thus the orator 4. conveys advice. Again [we may borrow demonstrative exordia] from those proper to judicial rhetoric, i. e. from appeals to the auditor, in case the speech be respecting any thing revolting to opinion, or difficult, or already noised abroad among many, so as to obtain his pardon : as Choerilus begins, " Now after every thing has become public."

The exordia, then, of demonstrative rhetoric arise from these sources,-from praise, blame, exhortation, dissuasion, and appeals to the hearers. The inserted connective clauses may be either foreign or appropriate to the subject.

5. The exordium of judicial oratory resembles the prologue of a play. 6. It must therefore declare the object of the speech. With regard to the exordia of judicial rhetoric, we must assume that they are equivalent to the opening scenes of dramas, and the exordia of epic poems ; for the commencement of dithyrambic poetry resembles demonstrative exordia,—"on account of thee, thy gifts, thy spoils." But in the drama, and in epic poetry, the commencement is an intimation of the subject, that the hearer may foresee what the story is about, and that his mind may not be in suspense ; for whatever is indeterminate bewilders us. He then who puts, as it were, into the hand the beginning of the clue, causes him who holds it to follow on the story. On this account we have,­ " Sing, muse, the wrath," etc. " The man, O muse, resound," etc. " This too declare; from Asia's coasts afar, How upon Europe burst the mighty war." And the tragedians give some insight into the plot of the drama, if not forthwith, as Euripides does, yet they give it some where at least in the opening scene ; just as also does Sophocles Polybus was my father3!" And comedy in the same way. The most necessary business of the exordium, and this is peculiar to it, is to throw some light on the end for the sake of which the speech is made. For which very reason, if this be evident, and the case a brief one Oedipus Tyr. 774. we need not employ an exordium. The other species 7. Other exordia are an antidote to weariness. i. ἰατρεύ­ ματα. Refutation of calumny or its opposite iflatesto the speaker and adversary. Different use of it when plaintiff. or defendant. which speakers employ are correctives, and general,4: these are, however, deduced from 1. the speaker himself ; 2. his hearer; 3. the subject; 4. and from the adversary. Every thing whatsoever which refers to the doing away or the casting an aspersion of character, has a relation to one's self or the adversary. But these things are not done exactly in the same way: for by one speaking on a defence, whatever tends to aspersion of character should be put first; but by one who is laying an accusation, in his peroration. And the reason why is not indistinct; for it is necessary that one who is making a defence, when he is about to introduce himself, should sweep away every stumbling block ; so that the prepossession against you must first be removed: by him, however, who raises the unfavourable impression, let it be raised in winding up, in order that the judges may the rather recollect it.

The correctives, however, which refer to the hearer, ii. ἐκ τοῡ ἀκροατοῡ, excitement of the hearer; attracting his attention, or the reverse. are drawn out of conciliating his good will, and inflaming him with anger, and occasionally from attracting his attention, or the reverse ; for it is not at all times convenient to render him attentive, for which reason many endeavour to induce them to laughter. But all these will conduce to tractability [on thejudge's part], if one wishes it, as does also the showing one's self a person of character; for to such do people the rather give heed. But men are attentive to objects of importance, of a peculiar description, or deserving admiration, or pleasing. Hence we ought to throw in a hint that the speech is concerning subjects of this nature. But if you would have them not attentive, hint that the matter is trifling, concerns them not, or is disgusting. But it ought not to escape our 8. All these points however observation, that the whole of this is foreign to the subject; for they are addressed to a hearer of sorry 'Ιατρεύματα, a sort of antidotes to ennui and listlessness of the auditory, which are literally so general (κοινὰ) as not only to be unlimited to the exordia of either branch of rhetoric, but as to admit of being introduced at will into any part of the speech. See § 9. are extraneous to the subject. taste, and one who lends an ear to points foreign to the subject; for if the hearer be not of this character, there is no need of exordium, except so far as to state the matter summarily, that, like a body, it may have a head.

9. Awakening the attention is common to all parts of a speech. Again, the business of exciting attention is common to all the divisions of a speech, wherever it may be necessary; for the audience relax their attention any where rather than at the beginning. For which reason it is ridiculous to range this head at the beginning, when more particularly every one is at the summit of attention. So that, whenever it is convenient, we may use the formulary, "Lend me your whole attention, for the question does not affect me any more than yourselves;" and this one,-" for I will relate to you a thing so strange, so wonderful, as you never yet heard." But this is just what Prodicus says he used to do,—" whenever the audience 10. happen to nod, to insert, by the bye, a display of his penteconta-drachmial demonstration 5." But that these things are referred to the hearer not in his proper capacity as such, is evident; for all create unfavourable impressions or do them away in their exordia : as, " O king, I confess indeed, that not with haste," etc.6: and again, " Why such long preludes7."

Those who have the worst side employ exordia. They, too, employ exordia who have, or appear to have, the worse case; for it is better to pause any where than on the case itself. On which account servants tell not what is asked them, but all the circumstances, and make long preambles.

11. But the means out of which we must conciliate have been stated, and each other point of that nature8: and, as it is well remarked by the poet, " Grant that I may reach the Phoeacians a friend and object of their compassion;" we ought, therefore, to aim at Prodicus professed to teach a mode of reasoning with universal success in all descriptions of cases : the premium on initiation being fifty drachms, he called it Πεντηκοντάδραχμον. Plato in Cratyl. Sophocles, Antig. 223. Euripides, Iph. in Taur. 1162. See book ii. chap. 1, § 5. these two objects. And in demonstrative orations, A compliment to be paid to the audience. you should cause the hearer to suppose that he is praised simultaneously with the subject, either in his own person or his family, or in his maxims of conduct, or at least somehow or other. For true it is, as Socrates remarks, that " To praise Athenians before an Athenian audience is no difficult thing, however it may be in the presence of Lacedaemonians9."

But the exordia of deliberative rhetoric are derived Exordia of deliberative oratory wanted only in four cases. i..On account of the speaker. ii. On account of the adversary. iii. To impress the hearer with the value of the case. iT. For the sake of embellishment. from those of judicial: but this species has them naturally least of all the three; for indeed the audience are aware of the subject; and the case needs no exordium except 1. on account of the speaker himself; 2. or his opponent; or 3. if the audience conceive of the importance of the matter otherwise than he could wish, thinking it either too serious or too trifling: with a view to which objects respectively there is a necessity for either exciting or doing away a prejudice, or for amplification or diminution. On account of these things there is need of exordium; 4. or otherwise for the sake of ornament; since without it a speech appears hastily got up. Of this sort was the panegyric of Gorgias on the Eleans; for without any thing like the preluding display of gesture and attitude in the Gymnasium, he begins forthwith,—" O Elis, city blest by fortune!"

TOUCHING the subject of an imputation cast upon 1. Topics to refute aspersions. you, one means of removing it will be the recurring to those topics, by means of which one might do away This sentiment has been already quoted, book i. chap. 9, § 30, in illustration of the rule Σκοπει̃ν παρ' οἷς o ἔπαινος. The remark of Socrates may be found in Plato's Menexenus, but differently expressed. i. moving unfavourable impressions. any surmises prejudicial to him; for it matters not whether they be entertained in consequence of the allegations of any one or not. So that this topic is universally applicable.

2. ii. Contradicting the point. Another mode is, the confronting it like a point under litigation, [arguing] either that it is not the case, or is not hurtful, or not to the particular individual ; or that it is not of such importance, or not unjust, or not considerable, or not disgraceful, or of no consequence ; for in points of this description the question originates: just as Iphicrates argued against Nausicrates; for he pleaded, that he did what the prosecutor alleged, and indeed hurt him, but yet did not act unjustly. Or confessedly acting unjustly he may offer some equivalent: e. g. though hurtful, yet was it honourable ; though painful, yet was it beneficial ; by some other such expedient.

3. iii. By extenuation and excuse. Another method is, the arguing that the action is merely a fault, or an error or that it was necessary ; such as the plea of Socrates, " that he trembled, not as the calumniator alleged, that he might appear an old man, but of necessity; since his eighty years of age did not overtake him of his own choice." And you may attempt a commutation of motives; e. g. " that he did not wish to hurt, but to do this or that, and not what the accuser insinuated; but that it so happened that hurt was sustained. But that it were fair enough to hate him, had he acted purposely with a view to this taking place."

4. iv. By recrimination of the accuser. Another mode is, the considering whether the prosecutor has either now or formerly, in his own person, or in that of his connexions, been involved in the charge. Another, whether others, whom they o. v. By comparison with others. themselves acknowledge not liable to the imputation, be also comprehended; for instance, if he acknowledge an adulterer to be exempt from the charge, 6. vi. By ascertaining whether the surely then also is this or that person. Another consists in ascertaining whether he has cast any false imputations on others ; or whether, like the party in For the distinctions between ὰμαρτήματα and ἁτυχήματα, see book i. chap. 15, § 16. the present case, any other has calumniated persons, accuser has been proved a calumniator before. 7. vii. By raising a counter prejudice. 8. viii. If the affair has been already decided. or whether, without direct imputation, any ever were suspected who have yet appeared innocent. Another, in raising a counter prejudice against the calumniator ; for it is absurd, if, while the man is himself void of credit, his words obtain it. Another, in inquiring whether a decision has been already made; just as Euripides did in reply to Hygiaenon, who, in an action of Antidosis, accused him as being an impious person, inasmuch as exhorting to perjury he wrote,—" The tongue hath sworn, but the mind is unsworn 2;" for Euripides argued, "that by bringing into court the decisions of the Dionysiac contest he acted unjustly; for there he had given, or would give an account, should he wish to impeach him." Another, in impeaching calumny itself, as to how 9. ix. By declaiming against calumny itself. x. Citing the presumptive signs: a topic useful to both. great an evil it is; and this because it produces decisions foreign to the point, and that it relies not on the strength of its case.

But the citing presumptive signs is a topic common to both parties: thus, in the Teucer, Ulysses insinuates that " he is of kin to Priam; for [his mother] Hesione was Priam's sister." He, however, replies on the ground that, " Telamon, his father, was the enemy of Priam, and that he did not denounce the spies."

Another, peculiar to an accuser, is, for one after 10. xi. Praising a little to blame much. This suits the accuser. bestowing short praise to censure at great length, putting forward great virtues briefly, or very many [which are not relevant], then to censure in one point which bears home upon the case. Such methods are the most crafty and malignant; for they attempt injury by means of one's virtues, by blending them with a man's failings.

But it is a resource common to the calumniator xii. By assuming the motives which suit your purpose. and one who meets a calumny, that, as it is possible for the same action to have been done from many motives, by the calumniator, indeed, facts should be taken in a bad sense, as he makes his selection of motives on the worse side; while by the respondent Hippolytus, 612. it should be made on the better. Take, for instance, the fact that Diomede chose Ulysses: one will say it was, "because he conceived Ulysses to be the bravest;" the other, that " it was not, but because he alone could not become a rival, such a poltroon was he."

Thus much, then, on the subject of imputations.

1. The narration in epideictic oratory is not continuous but disjointed. IN demonstrative speeches the narration is not given in continuity, but in scattered portions ; for one must go over the actions out of which the speech arises: for a speech is a kind of compound, having one portion, indeed, independent of art, [since the speaker is not at all the cause of the actions themselves,] and another portion originating in art; and this last is either the showing that it is fact should it be incredible, or such either in character or degree, or in show- 2. ing all these points at once. Owing to this, there are times when one ought not to narrate every fact successively ; because this mode of exposition is difficult to remember. From some, then, establish the character for courage, from others for wisdom, and from others for justice. The one style of narration is too simple ; the other has the grace of variety, and is not 3. so void of elegance. But you have only to awaken the recollection of facts well known; on which account, many subjects will stand in no need of narration : supposing, for instance, you would praise Achilles, because all are acquainted with his actions ; but you must employ them at once. But in praising Critias, an orator must narrate; for not many are acquainted with his exploits.

4. In judicial, the narration must But now people tell us, ridiculously enough, that the narration should be rapid. And yet I would say, as did one to a baker, who inquired whether he should knead his bread hard or soft," — " What," make the subject clear, said he, " is it then impossible to knead it properly ? And so here [in rhetoric a mean is to be observed]. For one should not narrate at too great length, just as he should not make too long an exordium, nor state his proofs [too fully]. For neither in this case does propriety consist either in rapidity or conciseness, but in a mean betwixt both: and this is the stating just so much as will make the matter clear, or as will cause one to conceive that it has taken place, or that the party has inflicted hurt, or committed injustice, or that the case is of that importance which the speaker wishes to establish; and to the opposite party the opposite points will avail. And 5. and bias the audience in favour of the orator. an orator should narrate, by the bye, such incidents as conduce to his own excellence: thus, " I all along used to instruct them in what was just, bidding them not to abandon their children,"—or, to the villany of the other party;- " -but he replied to me, that wherever he might be he should have other children." Which, Herodotus says, was the reply of the Egyptians on their revolting. Or whatever is pleasing to the judges.

In the case of a defendant, the matter will be more 6. The defendant's narration is brief; brief; the points for dispute being, either that it has not taken place, or is not hurtful, or not unjust, or not of such importance. So that on acknowledged points he need not pause, unless they conduce in some degree to the objects suggested; e. g. if the fact be acknowledged, but its injustice disputed. Moreover, you should mention as already done those 7. things which, in the course of being done, failed of producing pity or horror. The story of Alcinous is an instance, which is despatched to Penelope in sixty verses. And as Phäyllus does in the circle, and the opening scene of the CEneus. The narra- 8. and conveys an impress of character. i. By tion should also convey a notion of the character: this will be secured, if we know what gives rise to the moral character. One source is the manifestation of deliberate choice; and of what kind is moral See Herodotus, ii. 30. ing moral purpose. character we ascertain from knowing of what kind this is; and of what kind the deliberate choice is, from being acquainted with its proposed end. Hence the doctrines of mathematics have no display of character, for neither have they deliberate choice; and this for that they have not the influence of motive 2: but the Socratic discourses have this display!, for 9. ii. By narration of the concomitant circumstances. iii. By speaking with feeling. they treat concerning subjects of this kind. But those things convey a notion of character, which is consequent upon the several characters 3; e. g. " Whilst saying this he began to hasten off for this manifests a hardihood and rusticity of character. And be cautious not to speak coldly as from the understanding merely, as orators do now-a-days, but as though from the deliberate choice 4. " I, for I wished and deliberately preferred this; and if I profit nothing by it, then it is the more honourable:" for the one is characteristic of a prudent, the other of a good man : since [the proposed end] of the prudent consists in pursuing the expedient; of a good man, in pursuing what is honourable. And should any circumstance be incredible, you must subjoin the reason; as Sophocles does. He furnishes an example in the Antigone, that she mourned more for her brother than for a husband or children; for these, if lost, might again be hers. " But father now and mother both being lost, A brother's name can ne'er be hail'd again6." * See the next chapter, § 8. Using, in fact, the σημει̃ον of the action as an evidence of the thought, or taking the result of the feeling for the feeling itself; as Pericles does when alluding to the morose looks of the Lacedaemonians, a process which, though ingenious, yet often leads to a fallacy. Which is will regulated by the understanding. See Nich. Eth. book iii. chap. 2, 3, etc. That is, the prudent speak from the dictates of the understanding solely, the good on the impulse of deliberate choice. Sophocles, Antigone, 911. See the speech of the wife of Intaphemes to Darius, on asking the life of a brother in preference to those of her husband or children:—Ὠ βασιλευ̃, ἀνὴρ

1. Proof in judicial oratory: four points. i. The fact. ii. The mischief. iii. The degree. PROOF should be demonstrative; and the points of dispute being four, you must demonstrate by producing proof respecting the particular point at issue: thus, if the adversary question the fact, you must at the trial produce proof of this point above the rest; should it be that he did no harm, then of that point; and so should he urge that the action is not of the importance supposed, or that it was done justly: [and it must be done in the latter cases] exactly in the same way as if the inquiry were respecting the * See the Trachiniae of Sophocles, verse 869, where part of the Chorus conjecture, from the dejected looks of the nurse as she approaches, that some calamity is about to be announced. An instance of this occurs in the statement of finance which Pericles laid before the Athenians, to substantiate the hopes which he had held out to them. Thucyd. ii. 13. See the Antigone, 635, etc. ter of fact. And let it not escape us that in this sin- 2. iv. The moral character of the action. 3. gle inquiry, it must needs be that one party is guilty 1: for it is not ignorance which is to blame, as though any were to dispute on a point of justice. So that, in this inquiry, the circumstance should be employed ; but not in the other [three].

But, in demonstrative rhetoric, amplification, for In epideictic the proof is made by amplification. the most part, will constitute the proof, because the facts are honourable and useful; for the actions should be taken on credit 2, since, even on these subjects, a speaker on very rare occasions does adduce proof, if either the action be passing belief, or if another have the credit of it3.

But, in deliberative speeches, the orator may either 4. In deliberative we must observe the fallacies of the adversary, for these are a part of our proof. contend that the circumstances will not take place, or that what he directs will indeed take place, but that it is not just, or not beneficial, or not in such a degree. And it will be well for him to observe whether any falsehood appears in the extraneous observations of his adversary ; for these appear as so many convincing proofs, that he is false in the case of the other more important statements.

And example is best adapted to deliberative rhe- 5. Example best suited to it. toric; while enthymem is more peculiar to judicial4. For the former is relative to the future; so that out of what has been heretofore, we needs must adduce examples: the latter respects what is or is not matter of fact, to which belong more especially demonstration and necessity; for the circumstances of the past involve a necessity. The speaker ought not, 6. How enthymems are to be used. Not in a series. however, to bring forward his enthymems in a continued series, but to blend them by the way; should he not do this, they prove an injury one to the other, He states the same doctrine in the Nich. Eth. v. 2:-

BUT respecting interrogation, it is the happiest time 1. Interrogation. When to be employed. i. When an absurdity will result. for employing it when an admission has been made in such a way, that a single further question being put, an absurdity occurs: thus Pericles asked Lampon respecting the initiation to the rites of [Ceres] the protectress ; and on his saying, " That it was not possible for him, an uninitiated person, to hear it," -he asked Whether he knew himself?" when See book ii. chap. 21, § 2. he said he did, [Pericles subjoined,] ,,And how do you know who are uninitiated ? ”

2. ii. When your conclusion will be established by it. Next to this is the crisis, when [of two points] one is clear, and it is manifest to the party putting the question, that his adversary will concede the other; for one ought, after having ascertained by inquiry the one proposition, not to interrogate further respecting the point which is clear, but state the conclusion. Just as Socrates, when Meletus denied that he believed in the gods, asked " Whether he asserted the being of any demon ?" When he allowed that he had, Socrates asked, " Whether these demons were not either sons of the gods, or something of divine nature?" And when he allowed it, " Is there, then," said he, " one who thinks that sons of the gods exist, and not the gods themselves ? "

3. iii. When the opponent must Contradict himself. 4. iv. When we reduce our opponent to sophistical answers. Caution as to interrogations.

Again, when one is likely to exhibit the adversary as speaking contradictions, or somewhat revolting to general opinion.

Fourthly, when he may not be able to rid himself of the question otherwise than by a sophistical answer : for if he answer in this way, that it is, and is not, or partly is, and partly is not,—or, one way it is, another way is not; the hearers hoot him off, being at a loss for his meaning.

Under any other circumstances do not attempt interrogation ; for should the party interrogated start an objection to the question, you appear to have been overcome : since it is not possible to put many questions by reason of the imbecility of the hearer. On which account we ought, as much as possible, to compress even our enthymems.

5. How to answer an equivocal question. i. By distinction. ii. By anticipation. But one must give his answers to equivocal questions with a distinction1, and not concisely; and to what seems a contradiction, by directly offering an explanation in the reply, before the interrogator can put the next succeeding question, or draw the inference he aims at; for it is no difficult thing to See the answer of our Saviour to the captious question of the Pharisees,—“ What thinkest thou ? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Caesar, or not ?" Matt. xxii. 17—22. foresee on what the speech turns. Be this, however, and the means of answering, clear to us from the Topics. And as to a party drawing his conclusion, 6. iii. By explanation. if his question produce that conclusion, you are to assign the cause : as Sophocles, when questioned by Pisander, "Whether it had been his opinion, as it had of the other commissioners, to establish the four hundred," acknowledged that it had.—“But how," rejoined the other, " seemed it not to you to be wrong ?" He said it did. " Did you not, then, do that which was wrong?" “Yes, forsooth," replied he, " for I had no better alternative." And as the Lacedaemonian, when called to an account respecting his ephorship, on having the question put, " Whether the rest appeared to him to have perished justly," said they did. " Then," retorted the other, " did you not enact the same things as they ? " And when he acknowledged that he had, " Would not you also," asked the other, "justly perish?" "No, indeed," said he, " for they did this on a bribe; I did not, but merely from judgment." Wherefore one ought not No question to be put after the conclusion. after the conclusion to put a further question, nor to put, interrogatively, the conclusion itself, unless the truth lies abundantly on our side.

But with respect to Ridicule, inasmuch as it seems 7. Ridicule, how to be used. to possess a kind of use in disputation2, and as "one ought," says Gorgias, " to mar the grave earnestness of our adversary by ridicule, and his ridicule by sober earnestness," making the remark justly enough,-it has been stated in the Poetic how many species of ridicule there are; whereof, some befit the gentleman, others do not: so that each must see to it that he take that which befits himself. But the playing a man off is more gentlemanly than buffoonery; for the former produces the ridicule for his own sake, the buffoon for that of another. " Ridiculum acri Fortius et melius plerumque secat res." HOR. Sat. i. 10, 14. See book i. chap. 11, § 29.

1. Peroration consists of four things. i. ii. iii. iv. i. We must incline the hearers favourably. THE peroration is composed of four things:—of getting the hearer favourable to one's self, and ill-disposed towards the adversary; and of amplification and extenuation; and of placing the hearer under the influence of the passions; and of awakening his recollection.

For after showing yourself to be on the right side, and your adversary on the wrong, it naturally follows to praise and blame, and to give the last finish. And one of two things the speaker ought to aim at, either to show that he is good relatively to them, [the audience,] or is so absolutely; and that the other party is bad, either relatively to them, or absolutely. And the elements, out of which one ought to get up persons as of such characters, have been stated; both whence one should establish them as bad, and whence 2. ii. We must amplify and diminish. as good. Next to this, these points having been already shown, it follows naturally to amplify or diminish: for the facts must needs be acknowledged, if one be about to state their quantity; for the increase of bodies is from substances previously existing. But the elements, out of which one must amplify and diminish, are above set forth.

3. ii. We must excite the hearers. Next to this, the facts being clear both as to their nature and degree, it follows that we excite the hearer to passion; such as are, pity, terror, anger, hatred, envy, emulation, and contentiousness: the elements of these also have been stated above.

4. iv. We must awaken the memory. So that it merely remains to awaken a recollection of what has been before stated. And this we are to do here, in the way in which some erroneous teachers say we should in the exordium: for in order that the facts may be readily perceived, they bid us state them frequently. Now there [in the exordium] indeed we ought to state the case at full, in order that it may not be unknown to the hearer upon what the trial turns; here, however, [in the peroration,] merely the means by which it has been proved, and that summarily.

The commencement of the peroration will be, that 5. The peroration must assert that the orator has proved his point. He must compare his arguments with those of his opponent, either ironically, or by interrogation. one has made good what he undertook; so that it will be to be stated, as well what one has adduced, as for what reasons. And it is expressed either by means of a juxtaposition with the adversary's statements; and draw the comparison either between every point whatsoever, which both have stated relative to the same thing; or else not by a direct opposition. " He, indeed, on this subject said so and so ; but I so and so, and for such reasons." Or, by a kind of bantering: thus, "He said so and so, and I so and so." And, " What would he do, had he proved this, and not the other point!" Or by interrogation :-" What has not been fully proved on my side ?" or, " What has this man established?" Either in this way, then, must the speaker conclude, or he must, in natural order, so state his reasoning as it was originally stated; and, again, if he pleases, he may state distinctly that of the adversary's speech. And, for 6. The disjointed style is suitable to the peroration. the close, the style without connectives is becoming, in order that it may be a peroration, not an oration1: I have spoken,—you have heard,-the case is in your hands,-pronounce your decision 2. See the conclusion of Lysias' oration against Eratosthenes. It cannot fail of being observed how neatly Aristotle employs this his concluding chapter, as at once an illustration of the subject and a farewell to the reader.