Some Research Directions in Automated Pentesting

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Agenda outline

Motivation

- 2 The Search for an Efficient Solution
 - Two primitives
 - Using the primitives in a Network Graph
 - Integration with a Pentesting Tool
- 3 The Search for a Better Model
 - POMDPs
 - Penetration Testing as POMDPs
 - Experiments

The Search for a Better Model

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What is Penetration Testing?

Penetration testing

Actively verifying network defenses by conducting an intrusion in the same way an attacker would.

- Penetration testing tools have the ability to launch real exploits for vulnerabilities.
 - different from vulnerability scanners (Nessus, Retina, ...)
- Main tools available:
 - Core Impact (since 2001)
 - Immunity Canvas (since 2002)
 - Metasploit (since 2003)


Need for Automation

- Reduce human labor
- Increase testing coverage
 - Higher testing frequency
 - Broader tests trying more possibilities
- Complexity of penetration testing tools
 - More exploits
 - New attack vectors (Client-Side, WiFi, WebApps, ...)
- Equip penetration testing tool with "expert knowledge"

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
Discussion

Anatomy of a real-world attack




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Anatomy of a real-world attack




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Anatomy of a real-world attack



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The Choose primitive



Problem

 $\{A_1, \ldots, A_n\}$ independent actions that result in a goal g. Each A_k has probability of success p_k and running time t_k . **Task:** Find order of execution to minimize total running time.

The Search for a Better Model

The Choose primitive



Problem

 $\{A_1, \ldots, A_n\}$ independent actions that result in a goal g. Each A_k has probability of success p_k and running time t_k . **Task:** Find order of execution to minimize total running time.

Solution


Order actions according to t_k/p_k (in increasing order).

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Discussion

The Combine primitive



Definition

We call *strategy* a group of actions that are executed in a fixed order.

Problem

 $\{G_1, \ldots, G_n\}$ are strategies that result in a goal g. **Task:** Minimize total time.

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Expected probability and time

If the actions of *G* are $\{A_1, \ldots, A_n\}$ then: The expected running time of *G* is

$$T_G = t_1 + p_1 t_2 + p_1 p_2 t_3 + \ldots + p_1 p_2 \ldots p_{n-1} t_n$$

The probability of success is simply

$$P_G = p_1 p_2 \dots p_n$$

Solution


Sort the strategies according to T_G/P_G . In each group, execute actions until one fails or all the actions are successful. Complexity of planning: $O(n \log n)$ Motivation

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The **Combine** primitive (cont)



Groups of actions with an AND relation (order is not specified).


Motivation

The Search for an Efficient Solution


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Discussion

The **Combine** primitive (cont)



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 - FRHACK Conference, France. Sept 7/8, 2009.
- [Sar09b] Probabilistic Attack Planning in Network + WebApps Scenarios
 - H2HC Conference, Sao Paulo, Brazil. Nov 28/29, 2009.

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
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First level: fixed source and target

Given a source machine and a target machine, the problem is to find a path in an Attack Tree:



- Action node: connected by AND relation with its requirements —> use Combine primitive.
- 2 Asset node: connected by OR relation with the actions that provide that asset \rightarrow use *Choose* primitive.

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Second level: graph of machines

Use First level procedure to compute Time(u, v) and Prob(u, v) for all $u, v \in V$ and then ...

Algorithm 1 Modified Dijkstra's algorithm

```
T[s] = 0, P[s] = 1
T[v] = +\infty, P[v] = 0 \quad \forall v \in \mathcal{V}, v \neq s
S \leftarrow \emptyset
Q \leftarrow \mathcal{V} (where Q is a priority queue)
while Q \neq \emptyset do
      u \leftarrow \arg \min_{x \in O} T[x]/P[x]
      Q \leftarrow Q \setminus \{u\}, S \leftarrow S \cup \{u\}
      for all v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus S adjacent to u do
             T' = T[u] + P[u] \times Time(u, v)
             P' = P[u] \times Prob(u, v)
             if T'/P' < T[v]/P[v] then
                     T[v] \leftarrow T'
                    P[v] \leftarrow P'
return \langle T, P \rangle
```

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
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Discussion

Anatomy of a planning-based attack


Attack Planning, as used in Core Insight Enterprise

[LSR10]; a.k.a. "Cyber Security Domain" [BGHH05]



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Experimental results



- Scales up to 1000 machines.
- Planner running time is cuadratic
- Memory consumption is linear.

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Discussion

References (for this section)



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 - C. Sarraute, G. Richarte, J. Lucangeli
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
Anatomy of a real-world attack w/o uncertainty

What's the problem?

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Anatomy of a real-world attack w/o uncertainty

What's the problem? PDDL & Planner w/o Uncertainty!



What kind of uncertainty?

Penetration testing has insider knowledge. But can't know *everything!* OS versions, applications installed, ...

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(I) gather information (run scans); (II) attack (run exploits)

- Still simplified: scans don't yield perfect knowledge
- Exhaustive scans expensive (runtime, traffic)

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- Our solution: explicit model of uncertainty in POMDP
 - POMDP plans intelligently mix (I) and (II)
 - Grounds attack planning w/ uncertainty in formal framework
 - Only related work: neither of these [SRL11]

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 - Only related work: neither of these [SRL11]
 - And, yes, it doesn't scale ... (to be continued)

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Markov Decision Process (MDP)

Definition

An *MDP* is a tuple $\langle S, A, T, r \rangle$ where:

- S is the state space
- A is the action space
- $T: S \times A \times S \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is the transition function
 - *T*(*s*, *a*, *s*') is the probability of coming to state *s*' when executing action *a* in state *s*
- $r: S \times A \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is the reward function

Definition

Solution: policy $\pi : S \to A$ Objective: maximize expected reward $E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} r_t | \pi\right]$

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Discussion

Partially Observable MDP (POMDP)

Definition

A POMDP is a tuple $\langle S, A, T, r, O, O, b_0 \rangle$ where:


- $\langle S, A, T, r \rangle$ is a Markov decision process
- O is the space of observations
- $O: \mathcal{S} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{O} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ is the observation function
 - *O*(*s*, *a*, *o*) is the probability of making observation *o* when executing action *a* in state *s*
- b₀ is the initial belief (probability distribution over S)

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POMDP Policies

Definition

Solution: policy $\pi : \mathcal{H} \to \mathcal{A}$ (\mathcal{H} : action/observation histories) Objective: maximize expected reward $E\left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} r_t | b_0, \pi\right]$



Equivalent: policy $\pi : \mathcal{B} \to \mathcal{A}$ where $\mathcal{B} = \Pi(\mathcal{S})$

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Solving POMDPs

Is it hard?

- S: all states (= all possible configurations)
- Belief states *b*: probability distributions over *S*
- ... and we need to reason about this stuff!

How to do it?

- Here: SARSOP [KHL08]
- Approximate belief value based on selected belief states (get hyperplane for each, compute upper envelope)

What about scaling??

- Bad
- Long-term proposal: use in "1-machine case", design global solution by decomposition + approximation

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Birds-Eye View

- States
 - Network structure static and fully known
 - Combinations of configuration parameters ...
 - ... as relevant to modeled exploits!

Actions

- Exploits: succeed/fail depending on state
- Scans: return observation depending on state
- Both are deterministic!

Rewards

- r = V T D: value of computer, runtime, detection risk
- V: human decision; T, D: estimate using statistics

Initial belief

- Probability distribution over configurations
 - \implies uncertainty from point of view of pentesting tool

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The Search for a Better Model

Example: Actions

actions :

Probe-M0-p445 OSDetect-M0

Exploit-MO-win2000-SMB Exploit-MO-win2003-SMB Exploit-MO-winXPsp2-SMB

Terminate

"Terminate" action: give planner the choice to "give up" if expected costs outweigh expected reward

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Discussion

Example: States (1 Machine)

states :

M0-win2000 M0-win2000-p445 M0-win2000-p445-SMB M0-win2000-p445-SMB-vuln M0-win2000-p445-SMB-agent

M0-win2003 M0-win2003-p445 M0-win2003-p445-SMB M0-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln M0-win2003-p445-SMB-agent M0-winXPsp2 M0-winXPsp2-p445 M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-vuln M0-winXPsp2-p445-SMB-agent

M0-winXPsp3 M0-winXPsp3-p445 M0-winXPsp3-p445-SMB

terminal

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Example: Scans – Port Scan

- : closed-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : closed-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : closed-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : closed-port 1
- : open-port 1
- : open-port 1

The Search for a Better Model

Discussion

Example: Scans – OS Detection

```
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2000
                                            : win 1
O: OSDetect-MO: MO-win2000-p445
                                            : win 1
. . .
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-win2003
                                           : win 1
O: OSDetect-MO: MO-win2003-p445
                                            : win 1
. . .
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp2
                                             : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-MO: MO-winXPsp2-p445
                                             : winxp 1
. . .
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp3
                                             : winxp 1
O: OSDetect-M0: M0-winXPsp3-p445
                                             : winxp 1
. . .
```

Example: Exploit SAMBA Server on Port 445

- T: Exploit-MO-win2003-SMB identity
- T: Exploit-MO-win2003-SMB: MO-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln

: * 0

T: Exploit-MO-win2003-SMB: MO-win2003-p445-SMB-vuln

: MO-win2003-p445-SMB-agent 1

- O: Exploit-M0-win2003-SMB: * : * 0
- O: Exploit-MO-win2003-SMB: * : no-agent 1
- O: Exploit-MO-win2003-SMB: MO-win2003-p445-SMB-agent

```
: agent-installed 1
```

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Discussion


What is our "Initial Belief"??

Regular penetration testing

- Run tests every T time units (days)
- Possibly changed OS, applications (versions), ...
 - \implies Uncertainty in b_0 , function of T

• How to derive $b_0(T)$?

- In general: formal model of system evolution ...
- Here: (a) individual updates; (b) perfect knowledge at T = 0



"each day: either no change, or upgrade, or upgrade to latest version"

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Test Examples


Problem generator with 3 parameters:

- Number *M* of machines in network Agent on machine *M*₀, *M* "behind" *M*₀ in fully connected network
- Number *E* of exploits considered
 E ≥ *M*, distributed evenly across machines
- Time delay *T* (days) since last pentest Update parameters estimated by hand

Here: $1 \le M \le 7$; $1 \le E \le 50$; $0 \le T \le 200$

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Scaling *T*




Scaling T against M

Scaling T against E

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Scaling *E* and *M*



Scaling *E* against *M*; T = 10

Scaling *E* against *M*; T = 80

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References (for this section)

Joint work with researchers at INRIA (Nancy, France) Jörg Hoffmann, author of FF [Hof01] and Metric-FF [Hof02], reference tools for "classical" planning.

Olivier Buffet, author of books and tools on Markov decision process [SB10].



• [SBH11] Penetration Testing == POMDP Solving?

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Probabilistic Planner: Summary

First direction ... We have presented:

- An attack model based on exploits metrics:
 - Average running time
 - Probability of success
 - Details of the vulnerable platform (OS and application versions)
 - Connectivity requirements.
- An efficient planning solution, **integrated** to a penetration testing framework.
- An evaluation of our implementation that shows the feasability of planning and verifying attacks in real-life scenarios.

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POMDP model: Is it worth it?

Second direction ... POMDPs make better hackers!

- (a) Beliefs: likelihood of particular vulnerabilities
 ⇒ order exploits by promise
- (b) Belief transitions: update "promise" as more information comes in
 - \implies order exploits dynamically
- (c) Belief transitions vs. rewards (time/risk): trade-off observation gain against its cost
 - \implies apply scans only where needed/profitable

POMDP model: What have we gained?

- More accurate model of attack planning w/ uncertainty
- Scales "Ok" in 1-target-machine case
- Can deliver better plans thus more effective pentesting
 - Policy = stronger notion of plan
 - Contemplates all possible histories of actions / observations.
- No independence assumptions
 - Understand the limits of what can be done with state-of-the-art POMDP planners

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Bridging the language gap

- Separate the problem from potential solutions.
- Communicate our problem to the AI / Planning community —> they're looking for practical applications!
- Solving: PoC implementation shows feasibility Scaling to large networks with 1-target-machine cases
- Basic AI: these POMDPs have particular properties ...
 → open path for further research

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Discussion

That's all folks!

Thanks for your attention! Questions?

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