--- name: secure description: "Trigger: auth, DB, API, infra, or secrets code touched — security checklist." --- # Secure — Security Review ## Iron Law NO DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT SECURITY REVIEW OF ALL CHANGED FILES. Every code change is a potential attack vector. ## Process 1. Identify security-relevant changes from the diff (auth, DB, API, infra, secrets) 2. Run the Checklist below, marking each item as pass, fail, or N/A with reason 3. For each failure, cite the file and line number with severity (CRITICAL/HIGH/MEDIUM) 4. Report findings using the Evidence Required section ## When to Trigger - Authentication or authorization code changed - Database queries written or modified - API endpoints added or changed - Environment variables or secrets referenced - File upload, user input parsing, or serialization code - Infrastructure config (Docker, K8s, CI/CD) ## Checklist ### Injection - [ ] All user input sanitized/escaped before use in queries — unsanitized input is the #1 attack vector for SQL injection, XSS, and command injection - [ ] Parameterized queries used (no string concatenation in SQL) — string concatenation enables SQL injection even with escaping; parameterized queries are the only safe default - [ ] No `eval()`, `exec()`, or template injection vectors — these functions execute arbitrary code and bypass all input validation ### Authentication & Authorization - [ ] Auth checks on every protected endpoint — missing checks on a single endpoint exposes the entire system - [ ] Tokens validated and not just decoded — decoding without signature verification lets attackers forge any token - [ ] Session expiry and refresh logic correct — stale sessions allow account takeover; refresh token rotation prevents replay attacks - [ ] No hardcoded credentials or secrets in code — hardcoded secrets end up in version control and are impossible to rotate ### Data Exposure - [ ] Sensitive data not logged (passwords, tokens, PII) — logs are often accessible to more people than the database and persist indefinitely - [ ] API responses don't leak internal details — stack traces, DB schemas, and server versions help attackers craft targeted exploits - [ ] Error messages don't reveal system internals — generic errors in production prevent information disclosure; detailed errors belong in server logs only - [ ] `.env` files in `.gitignore` — committed `.env` files expose secrets permanently even after deletion (git history retains them) ### Access Control - [ ] RBAC/permissions checked before data access — authorization must happen at the data layer, not just the UI layer, to prevent IDOR and privilege escalation - [ ] No IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) vulnerabilities — replacing an ID in a URL should never grant access to another user's resource - [ ] Rate limiting on authentication endpoints — without rate limiting, brute-force and credential-stuffing attacks are trivial See `references/security.md` for the full OWASP Top 10 checklist. ## Anti-Rationalization | Excuse | Rebuttal | What to do instead | |--------|----------|-------------------| | "This is internal-only, no security risk" | Internal tools get exposed. Assume every endpoint is public-facing. | Apply the same security standards as public APIs. | | "We'll add security later" | Security debt compounds exponentially. Fix it now or pay 10x later. | Build it secure from the start. Retrofitting misses edge cases. | | "The framework handles security" | Frameworks provide tools, not guarantees. OWASP Top 10 still applies. | Verify framework defaults and add application-layer checks. | | "Security review is overkill for this" | One missed injection is a breach. Every input surface matters. | Run the checklist. It takes 2 minutes, a breach takes months. | | "We'll harden it before production" | Security bolted on later is always incomplete. | Build it secure now. Retrofitting misses edge cases. | | "It's an internal API, no one will abuse it" | Lateral movement attacks start from internal APIs. | Internal does not mean trusted. Validate and authorize every request. | | "I'll just disable CORS for development" | Dev shortcuts leak into production. | Use a proper CORS allow-list from day one. | ## Evidence Required Before claiming security review is complete, show ALL applicable: - [ ] Checklist above completed: each item marked pass or N/A with reason - [ ] No secrets in code: `grep -r "sk-\|password\s*=" --include="*.{ts,js,py}" .` shows clean - [ ] Parameterized queries used: show the query code (no string concat) - [ ] Auth checks present on new endpoints: show the middleware/guard - [ ] `.env` in `.gitignore`: confirmed **A blank checklist is not a review. Each item needs a pass or N/A.** ## Red Flags - Storing secrets in code or config files committed to git - Using `HTTP` instead of `HTTPS` for sensitive data - `eval()` or string-concatenated SQL anywhere