{ "@context": { "CIP100": "https://github.com/cardano-foundation/CIPs/blob/master/CIP-0100/README.md#", "hashAlgorithm": "CIP100:hashAlgorithm", "body": { "@id": "CIP100:body", "@context": { "references": { "@id": "CIP100:references", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "GovernanceMetadata": "CIP100:GovernanceMetadataReference", "Other": "CIP100:OtherReference", "label": "CIP100:reference-label", "uri": "CIP100:reference-uri", "referenceHash": { "@id": "CIP100:referenceHash", "@context": { "hashDigest": "CIP100:hashDigest", "hashAlgorithm": "CIP100:hashAlgorithm" } } } }, "comment": "CIP100:comment", "externalUpdates": { "@id": "CIP100:externalUpdates", "@context": { "title": "CIP100:update-title", "uri": "CIP100:uri" } } } }, "authors": { "@id": "CIP100:authors", "@container": "@set", "@context": { "name": "http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/name", "witness": { "@id": "CIP100:witness", "@context": { "witnessAlgorithm": "CIP100:witnessAlgorithm", "publicKey": "CIP100:publicKey", "signature": "CIP100:signature" } } } } }, "authors": [], "body": { "comment": "Despite being 1 of 15 proposals in this series of 39 treasury withdrawal governance actions that I had previously voted for during the budget reconciliation process via Ekklesia I have decided to change my vote to an abstain at this time. During the budget reconciliation process I absolutely felt it necessary to move beyond minimum viable governance (MVG), it was a term used so much during the CIP-1694 process that this felt like the right initiative to begin progressing the state of Cardano governance to a more mature iteration. \n\nThat said, I recall how tailored the experience of the CIP-1694 and Constitution workshops were, where people believed they would have a real chance at shaping the process, only to be greeted with pre-determined topics and attempts to raise any other concerns were stonewalled and labelled “out of scope”. \n\nI now see a pandering to a select number of DReps, unimpressed by language such as “top DReps” or “key DReps”. We like to preach about the liquid nature of voting power, so why one group should be favoured over others based on what is meant to be liquid voting power seems short-sighted. A large voting power doesn’t necessarily make someone a “top DRep”, some have low vote participation, may not provide on-chain rationales with their votes or simply vote yes to any proposal suggested by certain vendors without pause for evaluation. This does not bode well for what we like to proudly proclaim “decentralised governance”.\n\nUntil there can be assurances that this proposed iteration of Voltaire doesn’t descend into a repeat of past processes, with conversations shepherded to a pre-conceived outcome dressed up as decentralised consensus, I abstain from voting to fund such efforts at this time." }, "hashAlgorithm": "blake2b-256" }