{ "cells": [ { "cell_type": "markdown", "metadata": {}, "source": [ "# What is an atom?\n", "## 10. Well, it depends on an observer's state of motion!\n" ] }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "metadata": {}, "source": [ "Let's recap. \n", "\n", "Our narrative has followed a particular thread: the generalization of the concept of number until it's adequate to describe the numbers which appear in physics.\n", "\n", "We've organized things, perhaps arbitrarily, through the unfolding of a \"dialectic.\"\n", "\n", "A word on this choice may be in order. The idea of a dialectic goes back at least to the beginning of written philosophy, and really in the end is just the idea that through a \"dialogue\" you can get farther than you can with a \"monologue.\" The point being that the results of a dialogue can't be totally anticipated beforehand.\n", "\n", "Whereas monological philosophy proceeds by definitions and confines itself to what can be proven from those definitions, fixing a set of static concepts at the beginning, dialogic philosophy tracks how concepts play off each other and evolve, emphasizing how seemingly irreconcilable ideas can often be unified in surprising ways by appealing to new points of view. A monologue explains a concept; a dialectic tells a story about concepts.\n", "\n", "It's not, however, a question of a dialogue always being better than a monologue. Rather, the dialectic is especially helpful when one isn't just delivering new or useful information, but instead, when there are many intellectual knots to untie, when there are many prejudices, preconcieved notions that need to be deconstructed before a new structure can be built. The original dialectician was Socrates, who never had some systematic theory of the world, but instead, stood in the Forum, challenging people by showing them the contradictions in the way they themselves used words.\n", "\n", "On the other hand, if you take a philosophy class, the character most famously associated with a \"dialectic\" is the German idealist Hegel. A caricature of a Hegelian dialectic goes like this: First, you have a thesis. Then, the thesis calls into existence its antithesis. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are overcome by a synthesis, which resolves them together, but which couldn't have been anticipated by mere analysis of the thesis and antithesis, which are by definition irreconcilable in their own terms. A new cycle begins: the synthesis itself acts as a thesis, bringing forth an antithesis, etc. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis: they could be ideas, states of consciousness, material situations, designs of spirit--it's left open to interpretation.\n", "\n", "Hegel famously used this device to try to retell human history as part of the dialectical unfolding of ideas in a cosmic spirit, whose intellectual development tracks the changes in the structure of the material world, and whose ultimate aim is absolute self-knowledge. In the next chapter of the history of philosophy, the young upstart Karl Marx turns Hegel on his head, applying dialectical reasoning to the material/social/economic affairs of different time periods, capitalism resolving the contradictions of feudal world, communism resolving the contradictions of capitalism, etc. After that intervention, the reputation of so-called \"dialectical reasoning\" has often been entangled with politics. \n", "\n", "I personally think that mathematics benefits from a dialectical exposition. First of all, mathematics is often difficult to learn because it is so conceptually unified: where do you start? Mathematics is the true heaven of coincidences. Every idea is used and reused and resonates across different scales of the subject, and to grasp the importance of even simple things, one has had to scale mountains. Whenever one teaches, one has to chart one of many possible paths through the territory, and the question arises of how best to tell the story. Often, to proceed step by step makes it impossible to grasp the long arc; yet to elide over details allows misunderstanding to creep in. \n", "\n", "On the other hand, things like Godel's theorems establish that sufficiently complicated formal mathematical systems can't coherently talk about themselves. They can only be analyzed from some higher vantange point. Furthermore, physics is always tugging mathematics by the hand, establishing empirical correspondences that couldn't have been deduced by pure analysis alone. \n", "\n", "With all that in mind, I've tried to tell one possible story about the \"dialectical unfolding of the concept of number,\" which is probably where Hegel's rather rigid concept of a dialectic is actually most applicable, in the end. \n", "\n", "We began (1) by investigating our most basic idea of a \"pebble,\" a \"bit.\" We could place a pebble somewhere, and we could take it away. To communicate with a pebble, we had to agree on whether presence or absence would be significant. As much a theory of numbers, we began developing a theory of symbols, which can be placed, erased, symbols symbolizing symbols, etc, and which come with rules which are necessary to abide by so that communication via those symbols is reliable.\n", "\n", "From (1), we asked: Why not place another pebble? And another, and another? And make a little pile of indistinguishable pebbles. And so we invented the counting numbers (2). To communicate with a counting number, we have to agree on what number we start counting from. So a pile of pebbles is like the contextualization of our original pebble: *this* pebble is actually the 4th pebble, if you've been keeping count, and to keep count is: to build up a little pile. So the pile is a contextualization of the pebble.\n", "\n", "Then (3), we imagined iterating \"counting\" itself, counting \"all at once,\" and so we invented addition, or combining piles. We had to have an inverse operation, and so we invented the negative numbers when it became clear that we had to be able to subtract past 0, and in this way achieved a synthesis: the \"integers.\" To communicate with an integer, we have to agree on what is 0, and also which direction we're in, positive or negative.\n", "\n", "Then (4), we imagined iterating addition to get multiplication, whose inverse is division. We thus discovered the rational numbers, or piles of \"prime pebbles.\" We could now contextualize a pile of pebbles by specifying a rational number which translates between your units and my units, between our different ideas of \"1\". We also noticed that allowing division by 0 wraps the number line into a circle.\n", "\n", "Then (5), we imagined iterating multiplication to get exponentiation, whose inverse is root-taking. We thus discovered the irrational numbers like the $\\sqrt 2$, but also the complex numbers $a + b\\sqrt{-1}$. We could thus rotate between two coordinate axes. And hidden inside, was a third axis, turning the plane into a sphere if we allow division by 0.\n", "\n", "We saw how our numbers turned reflexive, leading us to reflect on the general theory of computation and its limitations. We observed that no single set of logical atoms which are powerful enough to axiomatize arithmetic can be both consistent and complete, able to prove all true theorems about itself, and indeed, one such undecidable theorem is the consistency of the formal system itself. In other to prove the consistency of such a logical system, one has to move to a larger, more powerful system, adding axioms, which leads to yet other undecidable truths, which can only be decided with yet more axioms. The point being that one can't start from a single set of axioms and rules for inference and imagine a machine trying out every possible rearrangement of symbols and thus proving all possible theorems. This suggests that conceptually, there can't be a single set of \"master concepts\" from which all concepts can be mechanically derived. Pure deduction can only take you so far. For example, you could spend all day thinking about the nature of probability in terms of probability theory and you'd never be able to derive the surprising ways that probabilities enter into our theory of physics.\n", "\n", "Then (6), we began by considering an unordered \"pile\" of complex numbers, which we associated with points on the plane/sphere, and realized we could interpret them as the roots of a polynomial, giving us a yet higher order version of the idea of a \"pile of pebbles\": an *equation*. By the fundamental theorem of algebra, these unordered roots could be interpreted as a unique ordered sequence of coefficients up to a complex number. Out of the question of the solvability of equations, we extracted the theory of groups.\n", "\n", "In (7), we emphasized that polynomials form a vector space. We realized we could interpret finite degree polynomials as \"quantum states,\" specifically as the spin states of spin-$j$ particles, intepreting the roots of the polynomial as a constellation on the sphere, each root carrying a quantum of angular momentum $\\frac{1}{2}$. \n", "\n", "Vectors, however, are only defined up to a set of basis vectors. Hermitian matrices, which correspond to observables in quantum mechanics, automatically provide such basis sets via their eigenvectors. We've expanded our notion of a number to include a \"matrix,\" finite or infinite, whose multiplication rule isn't commutative, and which can therefore furnish representations of symmetry groups, in particular, the unitary representations of quantum mechanics. \n", "\n", "Indeed, linear algebra provides the theory of generalized \"perspective switches,\" and we realized we could generalize our idea of perspective to that of an \"experimental situation,\" by which a state is filtered probablistically into outcome states, the latter of which provide a complete basis for the Hilbert space of the state.\n", "\n", "In (8), we considered \"matrices of matrices\": tensors. The tensor product is the way that quantum systems combine, and its properties lead to much of the quantum \"magic.\" \n", "\n", "In one of the great twists of all time, entanglement proves that any simple reductionism can't work in science. When particles get entangled, there is more information in the whole than in the parts. For example, in the antisymmetric state, two spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$ particles are maximally uncertain with regard to their individual rotation axis, but their entanglement means that they must always point in the opposite direction. So that if one is measured to be $\\uparrow$, the other one must be $\\downarrow$ in any direction. Of course, through repeated experimentation on the two particles, one could precisely determine the quantum state of the whole, that it was in the antisymmetric state. But for each instance of the experiment, there is more information contained in the two particles together, in their \"jointness,\" than can be extracted from the parts.\n", "\n", "Continuing the spin theme, we realized that the symmetric tensor product of $2j$ spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$ states also gives us a representation of a spin-$j$ state, where the \"constellation\" is encoded \"holographically\" in the entanglement between the spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$'s. This itself was foreshadowed in the holistic relationship between the roots of a polynomial and its coefficients. Perhaps that's the twist: even if we have $2j$ spatially separate permutation symmetric spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$'s, where the entangled whole is greater than the parts, from another point of view the same situation can be described as a simple juxtaposition: a product of roots, constellated on the sphere. \n", "\n", "We discussed the theory of Clebsch-Gordan coefficients, and the idea that the tensor product of a bunch of spins could be decomposed into separate sectors with different $j$ values, turning the AND of the tensor product into the OR of a choice. And so we arrived at the theory of angular momentum conserving interactions with allusions to spin networks, which by the way, can be generalized to other types of interactions that conserve other quantities besides angular momentum. And we realized that angular momentum conserving vertices could be interpreted as the quantum polyhedra of loop quantum gravity, \"atoms of space.\"\n", "\n", "In (9), we discussed the quantum harmonic oscillator, a kind of twin to spin, the two being the simplest and arguably most fundamental quantum systems. Instead of interpreting the roots of a polynomial as living on the sphere (the classical phase space of a rotating object), we interpret the roots of the polynomial as living on the plane (interpreted as the classical phase space of a harmonic oscillator, the real axis being position and the imaginary axis being momentum). We discussed in this context coherent states, and coherent state quantization, which I poetically described as viewing quantum mechanics as an extension of classical mechanics that allows for negative definitions, the roots corresponding to multiple *forbidden* classical states. And we discussed the theory of the oscillator itself, full of indistinguishable, countable energy quanta, comparing the wave function representation to the polynomial representation.\n", "\n", "We then graduated to second quantization: We imagined introducing a quantum harmonic oscillator to each degree of freedom of a first quantized quantum system, upgrading it to a theory of indistinguishable particles (fermionic or bosonic). As an example, we introduced two harmonic oscillators, corresponding to the $\\uparrow$ and $\\downarrow$ states of a spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$ state. The total fixed number subspaces of this Hilbert space turned out to correspond to spin-$0$, spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$, spin-$1$, $\\dots$ Hilbert spaces, each of them indeed corresponding to a permutation symmetric tensor product of spin-$\\frac{1}{2}$'s. And so we developed a representation capable of expressing a superposition of spins with different $j$ values, which was also a representation of the polarization of light, and in either case was a theory of indistinguishable particles. And we alluded how we could develop the representation theory of other groups using the same method, e.g. $SU(3)$, and how in quantum field theory, we're also dealing with the position/momentum states. We digressed on the relationship between spin and statistics, and the use of oscillators in the Berry-Robbins construction.\n", "\n", "The punchline here is that all known actual particles are of this type, indistinguishable quanta of some quantum field, albeit more complicated. \n", "\n", "Zooming out, we can think about any measurement, in some sense, as being reducible to the measurement of *some* number operator, which is counting the number of \"particles\" in that state. And so, we've come full circle, able to contextualize our pebbles as counting the number of quanta of some mode of a quantum field. Indeed, we could say that the world is conceptually made of \"pebbles\" insofar as we can use pebbles, appropriately contextualized, to represent it. And indeed, the particles in nature are indistinguishable just like pebbles in a pile." ] }, { "cell_type": "markdown", "metadata": {}, "source": [ "