Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Edward C. Keefer Charles S. Sampson Louis J. Smith David S. Patterson United States Government Printing Office Washington 1996 10229 0160452104 9780160452109 frus1961-63v11 1962 to 1963 This publication contains 3 associated files. For page images, see the facsimile element.

Released in 1996 as printed book

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The following errors in the original edition have been corrected:

kennedy regular print cuban-missile-crisis cuba quarantine-blockade china covert-actions france germany military-bases italy kennedy-john-f nuclear-weapons laos morocco organization-of-american-states poland rusk-david-dean turkey united-kingdom venezuela vietnam russia civil-rights-domestic the-bahamas
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963 Volume XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath Department of StateWashington Editors:Edward C. Keefer Charles S. Sampson Louis J. Smith General Editor:David S. Patterson United States Government Printing Office Washington 1996 DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 10410Office of the HistorianBureau of Public AffairsFor sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328ISBN 0-16-045210-4
Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The series documents the facts and events that contributed to the formulation of policies and includes evidence of supporting and alternative views to the policy positions ultimately adopted.

The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. This documentary editing proceeds in full accord with the generally accepted standards of historical scholarship. Official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series were first promulgated by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

A new statutory charter for the preparation of the series was established by Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, which was signed by President George Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume, which was compiled in 1990-1991, meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the Foreign Relations series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the 3 years (1961-1963) of the administration of John F. Kennedy. The subseries presents in 25 print volumes and 5 microfiche supplements a documentary record of major foreign policy decisions and actions of President Kennedy’s administration.

This volume presents the documentary record of the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath as well as U.S. policy toward Cuba during the period October 1962 to December 1963. Volume X, Cuba, 1961–1962, covers the period January 1961 through September 1962 and includes documentation on the Bay of Pigs incident and U.S. courses of action in response to the unsuccessful invasion. A separate microfiche supplement will contain additional documentation on the crisis and U.S. policy toward Cuba for the period 1961-1963 regarded by the editors as significant but not warranting inclusion in this printed volume or Volume X. The microfiche publication will also include documentation supplementing Volume XII, American Republics.

Principles of Document Selection for the Foreign Relations Series

In preparing each volume of the Foreign Relations series, the editors are guided by some general principles for the selection of documents. Each editor, in consultation with the General Editor and other senior editors, determines the particular issues and topics to be documented either in detail, in brief, or in summary. Some general decisions are also made regarding issues for which space does not exist in the volume but which will be included in a microfiche supplement.

The following general selection criteria are used in preparing volumes in the Foreign Relations series. Individual compiler-editors vary these criteria in accordance with the particular issues and the available documentation. The editors also tend to apply these selection criteria in accordance with their own interpretation of the generally accepted standards of scholarship. In selecting documentation for publication, the editors gave priority to unpublished classified records, rather than previously published records, which are accounted for in appropriate bibliographical notes.

Selection Criteria (in general order of priority): Major foreign affairs commitments made on behalf of the United States to other governments, including those that define or identify the principal foreign affairs interests of the United States; Major foreign affairs issues, commitments, negotiations, and activities, whether or not major decisions were made, and including dissenting or alternative opinions to the process ultimately adopted; The decisions, discussions, actions, and considerations of the President, as the official constitutionally responsible for the direction of foreign policy; The discussions and actions of the National Security Council, the Cabinet, and special Presidential policy groups, including the policy options brought before these bodies or their individual members; The policy options adopted by or considered by the Secretary of State and the most important actions taken to implement Presidential decisions or policies; Diplomatic negotiations and conferences, official correspondence, and other exchanges between U.S. representatives and those of other governments that demonstrate the main lines of policy implementation on major issues; Important elements of information that attended Presidential decisions and policy recommendations of the Secretary of State; Major foreign affairs decisions, negotiations, and commitments undertaken on behalf of the United States by government officials and representatives in other agencies in the foreign affairs community or other branches of government made without the involvement (or even knowledge) of the White House or the Department of State; The main policy lines of intelligence activities if they constituted major aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward a nation or region or if they provided key information in the formulation of major U.S. policies, including relevant National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates as may be declassified; The role of the Congress in the preparation and execution of particular foreign policies or foreign affairs actions; Economic aspects of foreign policy; The main policy lines of U.S. military and economic assistance as well as other types of assistance; The political-military recommendations, decisions, and activities of the military establishment and major regional military commands as they bear upon the formulation or execution of major U.S. foreign policies; Diplomatic appointments that reflect major policies or affect policy changes.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XI

The original research and compilation of this volume was completed in 1992, and additional documents were added after access agreements permitting further research were concluded with various agencies. The editors of the volume focused much of their selection on documenting the most serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath. Although the crisis itself was short, it was so intense that it absorbed the entire attention of President Kennedy and his closest advisers. The editors reviewed the available written records as well as transcripts and accounts based on audiotape recordings in order to present a comprehensive record of the daily policy discussions of the crisis. The editors included the major policy option papers that Kennedy and his advisers were examining as part of these discussions. Only a small fraction of the extensive intelligence material relating to the crisis was included; most of the important intelligence documentation is in the microfiche supplement with footnote and editorial references in the print volume.

Much of the documentation printed in this volume relates to discussions with key Soviet officials through a variety of channels ranging from Kennedy-Khrushchev letters to communications through an American newsman with a Soviet official. Because of space constraints, the editors have included only the most important examples of the frequent and detailed consultation with key allies regarding the crisis.

The Cuban missile crisis, the “sixteen days in October,” ending with the Kennedy-Khrushchev “agreement” of October 28, 1962, has been studied extensively by scholars and has been described in a variety of published works. Less well-known in published works was the second dangerous crisis over the removal of Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba, which the United States insisted were “offensive weapons” and thus subject to the October 28 agreement. The editors have given full attention to this second crisis using the same methodology used for the missile crisis.

By January 1963 it was clear that no formal agreement would result. The editors gave special emphasis to the negotiations regarding the removal of Soviet bombers from Cuba and the establishment of procedures for the verification of Soviet compliance not only because they consider them an important if unsuccessful epilogue to the crisis, but also because the records of these talks were not available until they were declassified for this volume. In the concluding portion of the volume documenting U.S. policy in 1963, the editors focused on U.S. concern with Cuban President Fidel Castro. They also included documentation on a highly secret preliminary effort to explore a possible rapprochement with Castro through intermediaries at the United Nations, as part of the negotiations for the return of the prisoners captured in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961.

Only a representative amount of finished intelligence on the viability, strength, and weakness of the Castro regime has been selected for publication here or in the microfiche supplement. U.S. efforts to prevent Cuban subversion in the rest of Latin America are documented in Volume XII, American Republics, released in July 1996.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time or, in the case of conferences, in the order of individual meetings. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The source text is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents in the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the source text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the source text are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the source text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount of material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of source text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed by headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. The amount of material omitted from this volume because it was unrelated to the subject of the volume, however, has not been delineated. All brackets that appear in the source text are so identified by footnotes.

An unnumbered source note to each document indicates the document’s source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document. Every effort has been made to determine if a document has been previously published, and this information has been included in the source footnote.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. Although the Advisory Committee does not attempt to review the contents of individual volumes in the series, it does monitor the overall process and makes recommendations on particular problems that come to its attention.

The Advisory Committee has not reviewed this volume.

Declassification Review

The declassification review of this volume at the Department of State and other agencies resulted in decisions to withhold less than 1 percent of the documentation selected. No documents were denied in full. The withheld information in no way diminishes the accuracy of this account of U.S. Government policy during and after the Cuban missile crisis through 1963.

The Division of Historical Documents Review of the Office of Freedom of Information, Privacy, and Classification Review, Bureau of Administration, Department of State, conducted the declassification review of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 on National Security Information, which was superseded by Executive Order 12958 on April 20, 1995, and applicable laws.

Under Executive Order 12356, information that concerns one or more of the following categories, and the disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security, requires classification: military plans, weapons, or operations; the vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security; foreign government information; intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods; foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States; scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security; U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; cryptology; or a confidential source.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the John F. Kennedy Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, in particular Suzanne Forbes, and the officials at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library of the National Archives and Records Administration, the History Staff at the Central Intelligence Agency, especially Mary McAuliffe, Vivienne Manber at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, and other officials of specialized repositories who assisted in the collection of documents for this volume.

Louis J. Smith did the research for the volume and he and Charles S. Sampson selected and edited the portion of the volume dealing with the Cuban missile crisis. Edward C. Keefer selected and edited the portion of the volume beginning with November 1962 through to the end of 1963. All three editors worked under the general supervision of then Editor in Chief John P. Glennon. Kerry E. Hite, David C. Geyer, and Donna Hung coordinated the declassification of the documentation, and Vicki E. Futscher, Deb Godfrey, and Rita M. Baker did the copy and technical editing. Max Franke prepared the index.

William Z. SlanyThe HistorianBureau of Public Affairs

December 1996
Kennedy Administration Volumes

Following is a list of the volumes in the Foreign Relations series for the administration of President John F. Kennedy. The year of publication is in parentheses after the title.

Print Volumes

I Vietnam, 1961 (1988) II Vietnam, 1962 (1990) III Vietnam, January-August 1963 (1991) IV Vietnam, August-December 1963 (1991) V Soviet Union VI Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges (1996) VII Arms Control and Disarmament (1995) VIII National Security Policy (1996) IX Foreign Economic Policy (1995) X Cuba, January 1961-September 1962 XI Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath (1997) XII American Republics (1996) XIII Western Europe and Canada (1994) XIV Berlin Crisis, 1961-1962 (1994) XV Berlin Crisis, 1962-1963 (1994) XVI Eastern Europe; Cyprus; Greece; Turkey (1994) XVII Near East, 1961-1962 (1995) XVIII Near East, 1962-1963 (1995) XIX South Asia (1996) XX Congo Crisis (1995) XXI Africa (1996) XXII Northeast Asia (1996) XXIII Southeast Asia (1995) XXIV Laos Crisis (1994) XXV General; United Nations

Microfiche Supplements

Arms Control; National Security Policy; Foreign Economic Policy; General and United Nations (Volumes VII, VIII, IX, XXV)

Cuba; American Republics (Volumes X, XI, XII)

Western Europe; Berlin (Volumes XIII, XIV, XV) (1995)

Near East; Congo; Africa (Volumes XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI)

Northeast Asia; Laos (Volumes XXII, XXIV)

Contents Preface Kennedy Administration Volumes Sources List of Abbreviations List of Persons Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, 1962–1963 Index
Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. The editors believe that in terms of access this volume was prepared in accordance with the standards and mandates of this statute.

The editors had complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The editors were able to use intelligence-related files maintained in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

When this volume was compiled, all Department of State records consulted were still under the custody of the Department, and the footnotes citing Department of State files suggest that the Department is the repository. By the time of publication, however, all the Department’s indexed central (or decimal) files for these years were permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. Many of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, will also be transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II over the next several years.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Eisenhower and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Department of State historians also have access to records of the Department of Defense, particularly the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretaries of Defense and their major assistants.

Since 1991, the Central Intelligence Agency has provided expanded access to Department of State historians to high-level intelligence documents from those records in the custody of that Agency. This access is arranged and facilitated by the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, pursuant to a May 1992 memorandum of understanding. This access arrangement was concluded in connection with the research of volumes for the 1961-1963 triennium and in order to enlarge the scope of coverage as required by the 1991 law. Department of State and CIA historians continue to work out the procedural and scholarly aspects of identifying the key portions of the intelligence record. The variety of documentation made available to Department of State historians and ultimately selected for publication in the volumes has expanded.

All of this documentation has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of these agencies, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume XI

All sources for this volume are briefly identified in the list below.

Collections in the Kennedy Library were the primary sources for this volume, although material on informal contacts with Cuba for the later part of 1963, which was originally from the Kennedy White House, was filed in the National Security File, Country File, Cuba, at the Johnson Library along with material on Cuba after November 22, 1963.

Among Kennedy Library materials, the single most important collection was the National Security Files. Within it the Memoranda and Meetings Series, the records of the Executive Committee (EXCOM) and the National Security Council Standing Group were key. Also extremely valuable were the records in the Country Series for Cuba and the Soviet Union as well as the files of Kennedy’s key advisers such as Arthur Schlesinger and Theodore Sorensen. Also of importance are the audiotape recordings of meetings of the EXCOM whichbecame available to the editors in July 1994. As the two transcripts of these tapes printed in this volume demonstrate (see Documents 18 and 21), they are verbatim accounts of long and sometimes confusing meetings. The sound quality is often poor and it is occasionally difficult to determine the identity of the speakers. The transcripts were used only when no written account of the meeting had been found. Otherwise, those tape recordings that were available at the time of preparation of this volume have been referred to in the footnotes. These transcripts are not a substitute for listening to the tapes themselves, which provide context and nuance that cannot be adequately reflected in a verbatim text.

The Meetings and Memoranda Series also has folders containing papers of key members of the White House Staff:Walt W. Rostow, Carl Kaysen, Robert Komer, and Chester V. Clifton. The files of Clifton, who was Military Aide to the President, include the memoranda of most of the President’s meetings with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some important materials are also available in Department of State files. The most valuable Department of State collections are the lot (office) files, as described below. The most useful of all of these lot files is S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, the most concentrated Department of State collection on the missile crisis. Also consulted and listed below were several relevant files in the Department’s decimal and subject-numeric indexed central files. Since the central files of Department were in constant use for Freedom of Information requests, the editors felt it wise to consult and use USUN files especially for documentation on the negotiations at New York following the crisis.

The single best collection of Department of Defense records at the Washington National Records Center was OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896. This extensive collection on the missile crisis includes material that, for reasons of space and redundancy, was not included in the volume or microfiche supplement. Prominent among these are handwritten notes on EXCOM meetings by Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State Decimal Central Files. All the Department’s central files for this period have been transferred to Record Group 59 in the National Archives and Records Administration. The following files were most useful in compiling this volume: 601.6111: diplomatic representation between the United States and Soviet Union 611.3722: U.S. blockade of Cuba 611.61: U.S.-Soviet Union political relations 737.00: political affairs and conditions in Cuba 737.5211: U.S. intelligence activities in Cuba 737.56311: U.S. bases in Cuba 737.56361: Soviet bases in Cuba 761.00: political conditions in the Soviet Union 782.56311: U.S. bases in Turkey Central Files. In February 1963 the Department of State changed its decimal central files to a subject-numeric central file system. The following files were most useful in compiling this volume: POL CUBA: general policy toward Cuba POL CUBA-USSR: Soviet Union-Cuba relations POL 27 CUBA-US: military operations between the United States and the Soviet Union POL 30-2 CUBA: Cuban exile political activities POL 36 CUBA: travel control to and from Cuba Lot Files: These are the special decentralized files of the policymaking level of the Department of State, including the Executive Secretariat, overseas Foreign Service posts, and U.S. special missions. A list of the lot files used or consulted for this volume follows. ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501 Files of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for 1964 including certain top secret material from 1961-1963. Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272 Files of Under Secretary of State George Ball, 1961-1966, including transcripts of his telephone conversations. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204 Exchanges of correspondence between the President and heads of foreign governments, as well as certain correspondence of the Secretary of State, for 1953-1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163 Exchanges of correspondence between the President with the leaders of the Soviet Union, 1961-1964, the so-called “Pen Pal” correspondence. Also contains drafts of messages and memoranda to the President and Secretary of State about the correspondence. President’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149 A chronological record of cleared memoranda of conversations with foreign visitors for 1956-1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330 Memoranda of the Secretary’s and Under Secretary’s conversations for 1961-1964 as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438 Principal Department of State lot file on the Cuban missile crisis, October 1962-January 1963, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat. Also contains background material from 1961 and 1962, including documentation on Operation Mongoose. S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316 Department of State copies of National Security Action Memorandum (NSAMs) and related materials. U.S. Mission to the United Nations Files NYFRC 84-84-001/002. Secret and Top Secret records of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations with extensive material on the post-missile crisis negotiations. Central Intelligence Agency Cuban Files: Job 80-D0167R DCI/McCone Files: Job 80-B1285A Files of John C. McCone as Director of Central Intelligence, 1961-1965. DDI Files: Job 79-R1012A The Deputy Directorate for Intelligence’s Registry of National Intelligence and Special Intelligence Estimates HS/HC Files: Job 84-00499R Central Intelligence Agency History Staff’s source collection. O/D/NFAC Files: Job 80-R1386R Files of the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence. Department of Defense Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historian’s Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable Files Telegrams to and from the Secretary of Defense as maintained by the Office of the Historian, Department of Defense Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas National Security File: Country File, Cuba Rusk Appointment Book Vice Presidential Security File John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts National Security Files: Chester V. Clifton Series Countries Series, Cuba, USSR Meetings and Memoranda Series: National Security Council Meetings, Executive Committee Meetings, Standing Group Meetings, National Security Action Memoranda Regional Series President’s Appointment Books President’s Office Files: Countries: Cuba, USSR Presidential Recordings Staff Memoranda Papers of George Ball Papers of Roger Hilsman Papers of Arthur Schlesinger Papers of Theodore Sorensen National Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C. Taylor Papers Papers of General Maxwell D. Taylor, Chief of Staff of the Army, 1955-1959; Military Advisor to the President 1961-1962; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1962-1964. Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896 Principal file on the Cuban missile crisis as maintained by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration. Includes files of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. OSD Files:FRC 77-0131 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Foreign Policy Files, 1962-1972.

Published Sources

Documentary Collections and Official Publications U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. U.S. Department of State. Department of State Bulletin, 1963, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963. ———Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964.

Memoirs Note: The Department of State takes no responsibility for the accuracy of these memoirs nor endorses their interpretation of events. Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988. Hilsman, Roger. To Move a Nation. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967. Johnson, U. Alexis (with Jeff O. McAllister). The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1984. Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days, A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1969. Macmillan, Harold. End of the Day, 1961-1963. London, 1973. Salinger, Pierre. With Kennedy. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1966. Schlesinger, Arthur M. Robert Kennedy and His Times. A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Sorensen, Theodore. Kennedy. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. Rusk, Dean (as told to Richard Rusk). As I Saw It. New York:W.W. Norton & Co., 1990.

List of Abbreviations AAA, anti-aircraft artillery ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency AEC, Atomic Energy Commission AFB, Air Force Base A-4D, Skyhawk, U.S. single engine turbojet attack aircraft AG, Attorney General AID, Agency for International Development Amb., Ambassador AR, American Republics ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State ARC, American Red Cross CAP, Combat Air Patrol CCA, Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs CI, counter-intelligence CIA, Central Intelligence Agency CINCAFLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force, Atlantic CINCARLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army, Atlantic CINCEUR, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Europe CINCLANT, Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces, Atlantic CINCSTRIKE, Commander in Chief, Strike Command COCOM, Coordinating Committee of the Paris Consultative Group of Nations COMOR, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance COMSTs, Commander, Sea Transportation Service CRC, Consejo Revolucionario Cubano, Cuban Revolutionary Council CVA, attack aircraft carrier DCI, Director of Central Intelligence DEFCON(s), Defense condition(s) Deptel, Department of State telegram DOD, Department of Defense DRE, Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil, Student Revolutionary Directorate DTG, date-time group (date and exact time on telegrams) ELINT, electronic intelligence Embtel, Embassy telegram EMC, electronic countermeasures EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State EUR/BNA, Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State ExCom, Executive Committee Eyes Only, document to be read only by individuals with a need-to-know FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service FMF, Fleet Marine Force fol, following FRC, Federal Records Center FROGS, free over ground tactical rockets (Soviet luna rockets) FYI, for your information GNP, gross national product GOC, Good Offices Committee GOT, Government of Turkey GSA, General Services Administration GTI, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare HMG, Her Majesty’s Government ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross ILA, International Longshoreman’s Association IL-28, Soviet jet light bomber IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State IRBM, intermediate-range ballistic missile Ironbark, special information handling channel for intelligence generated by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff JCSM, Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum JURE, Revolutionary Junta KOMAR, Soviet missile carrying PT boats KW, kilowatt LAAM, light antiaircraft missile LICROSS, League of International Red Cross Societies LS, Division of Language Services, Department of State LST, landing ship, tank MC, memorandum of conversation MEB, Marine Expeditionary Brigade MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs MIG, Soviet-made fighter aircraft MLF, multilateral force MRBN, medium-range ballistic missile MSTS, Military Sea Transport Service mtg, meeting NAC, North Atlantic Council NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State niact, night action, telegram indicator requiring immediate action NIE, National Intelligence Estimate NORAD, North American Air Defense Command NPIC, National Photographic Interpretation Center NRO, National Reconnaissance Office NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum NSC, National Security Council NY, New York NYFRC, New York Federal Records Center OAS, Organization of American States OASD, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense OCI, Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency OD, operating directive OECD, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development OEP, Office of Emergency Planning ONE/OCI, Office of National Estimates/Office of Current Intelligence OP, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; operations plan OPLAN, operations plan OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense PAA, Pan American Airways PM, Prime Minister POL, petroleum, oil, and lubricants Polto, series indicator for telegrams from the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations to the Department of State re, regarding reps, representatives res, resolution RLG, Royal Lao Government RPM, Office of Atlantic Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State SA, Sterling Area SA-2, Soviet suface to air missile (SAM) SAC, Strategic Air Command SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe SAM, surface-to-air missile SAR, search and rescue SC, Security Council of the United Nations SCCS, Special Consultative Committee on Security (OAS) SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SNIE, Special National Intelligence EstimateS/P Policy Planning Council/Staff S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State SS-4, Soviet medium-range ballistic missile SS-5, Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile SYG, Secretary General of the United Nations TAC, Tactical Control Squadron TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskogo Soyuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union telcon, telephone conversation Topol, series indicator for telegrams to the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and European Regional Organizations U-2, U.S. high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft UAR, United Arab Republic UDT, Underwater Demolition Team UK, United Kingdom UN, United Nations UNMIS, United Nations Mission urtel, your telegram USAF, United States Air Force USG, United States Government USIA, United States Information Agency USIB, United States Intelligence Board USMC, United States Marine Corps USN, United States Navy USRO, United States Mission to European Regional Organizations in Paris USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations VOA, Voice of America
List of Persons Anderson, Admiral George W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations until August 1, 1963 Attwood, William, Ambassador to Guinea March 29, 1961-May 27, 1963 Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State Bohlen, Charles E., Ambassador to France after September 4, 1962 Brubeck, William H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary Bundy, McGeorge, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Burris, Colonel Howard L., Military Aide to Vice President Johnson Carroll, Lieutenant General Joseph F., USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Carter, Lieutenant General Marshall S., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Castro Ruz, Fidel, Prime Minister of Cuba Castro Ruz, Raul, Minister of the Armed Forces of Cuba Chase, Gordon, National Security Council Staff member Chayes, Abram J., Legal Advisor, Department of State Cleveland, J. Harlan, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Clifton, General Chester V., USA, Military Aide to President Kennedy Cline, Ray S., Deputy Director for Intelligence after April 23, 1962 Cottrell, Sterling J., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, and Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State after January 1963 de Gaulle, General Charles, President of France Dennison, Admiral Robert L., USN, Commander in Chief, Atlantic Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States Donovan, James B., New York lawyer Dungan, Ralph A., Special Assistant to the President Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States until January 20, 1961 Finletter, Thomas K., Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization FitzGerald, Desmond, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency Fomin, Aleksandr S., Counselor to Soviet Embassy in the United States Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense Glenn, Edmund S., Language Services, Department of State Gromyko, Andrei, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Harriman, W. Averell, Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until April 4, 1963; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Howard, Lisa, correspondent, American Broadcasting Company Hurwitch, Robert A., Special Assistant for Cuban Affairs, June 1962-January 1963; Deputy Coordinator for Cuban Affairs, Department of State, January 1963-August 1963 Johnson, Lyndon B., Vice President of the United States until November 22, 1963; thereafter President Johnson, U. Alexis, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., Assistant Attorney General 1961-1962; thereafter Deputy Attorney General Kaysen, Carl, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kennedy, John F., President of the United States until his assassination on November 22, 1963 Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States Kent, Sherman, Chairman of the Board of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency Khrushchev, Nikita S., Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Kohler, Foy D., Ambassador to the Soviet Union from September 1962 Kuznetsov, Vasiliy V., First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Lansdale, Major General Edward G., USAF, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations LeMay, General Curtis, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force Lundahl, Arthur C., Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center, Central Intelligence Agency Macmillan, Harold, British Prime Minister until October 20, 1963 Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs McCloy, John J., Presidential advisor and Chairman of the Coordinating Committee for U.S.-Soviet Negotiations over Cuba at the United Nations McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense Mendelevich, Lev I., Head, Latin American Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Mikoyan, Anastas I., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Miro, Cardona, Jose, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council Murrow, Edward R., Director, U.S. Information Agency Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until November 29, 1963; thereafter Secretary of the Navy Parrott, Thomas A., Executive Secretary, Special Group, National Security Council Plimpton, Francis T.P., Deputy Representative to the United Nations and the Security Council Rostow, Walt W., Counselor of the Department of State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State Scali, John, correspondent, American Broadcasting Company Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President Smith, Bromley, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Counsel to the President Stevenson, Adlai E., Permanent Representative to the United Nations Taylor, General Maxwell D., USA, President’s Military Representative until October 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Thant, U, Secretary-General of the United Nations Thompson, Llewellyn E., Ambassador at Large, Department of State, after October 3, 1962 Tyler, William R., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of the Army Wheeler, General Earle G., USA, Chief of Staff Wilson, Donald, Acting Director of the U.S. Information Agency Yost, Charles W., Deputy Representative to the United Nations Security Council Zorin, Valerian, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath
1. Briefing PaperSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 14, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence. Top Secret. Prepared by Colonel John R. Wright, Jr., USA. A note on the source text indicates that it was prepared initially for a briefing given on September 28 and that material from the paper was included in the briefing given the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1. Washington, October 1, 1962. SUBJECT Analysis of SAM Sites The intelligence community has now identified and confirmed a total of 15 SA-2 SAM sites. From the location of these sites, a discernible pattern is developing: In the Oriente Province, the identified sites (3) form a triangular pattern around the new military airfield at Holguin. This field is probably not yet operational, but soon could be. At the present time, there are no MIG-type aircraft stationed at this field. The MIGs believed to be assigned to the operational control of the Commander, Eastern Army, are stationed at the airfield at Camaguey, in the Central Army area. When Holguin becomes operational, these aircraft will probably be moved to that location. There are no SA-2 sites identified in the vicinity of Camaguey. In the Central Army area, 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military airfield near Santa Clara. This airfield has had MIGs for several months and is also the field upon which the first MIG 21 was identified. In the Western Army area, there are 3 and possibly 4 SA-2 sites forming a liner pattern to provide defense for the military airfield at San Antonia de los Banos and coincidentally for the defense of the Havana-Mariel complex. San Antonio de los Banos is the headquarters for the Cuban revolutionary Air Force and the assembly point for all MIGs, except the MIG-21, which have previously been received in Cuba. Further west in the Pinar del Rio Province a triangular pattern of 3 SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant military installation. The only known installation within this triangle are 2 underground facilities whose use and purpose are unknown. The only other military installation in this particular area is the military air base at San Julian near the western tip of Cuba. However, 1 of the 3 SA-2 sites is located at or very near this military airfield, a most unlikely spot to place SA-2s for the defense of this particular air base. Therefore, curiosity is immediately aroused to the purpose of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba. In the north central portion of the Pinar del Rio Province is a large trapazoid-shaped restricted area controlled by the Soviet military personnel recently introduced into Cuba, measuring 15-20 miles on a side. There are no known military installations in this rough and sparsely populated area. According to reports from refugees arriving in Miami, all Cubans have been evacuated from this restricted area. The purpose of this restricted area is not currently known. Information concerning the deployment of Soviet military personnel and “technicians” recently arriving in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources, however, an attempt has been made to plot all reported locations to determine whether there is any correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or missile activity. So far, the pattern indicates that there is a definite correlation, but significantly the greatest concentration of Soviet personnel, activity and camps is in the western end of the Island of Cuba. This would indicate a greater interest on the part of the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in the other provinces. A single unevaluated report states that the Soviet “SS-4 Shyster” missile may have been delivered to Cuba on or about 11 September. Some confusion is apparent in this report. The SS-4 missile is nicknamed “Sandal,” while the “Shyster” carriers a designation of SS-3. This confusion was caused by the interrogators of the source using a recognition manual which designated the SS-4 as the Shyster. However, the description of the missiles reportedly observed by the source could have applied equally to either the Shyster or the Sandal. Both missiles have essentially the same outward appearance except that the Sandal is about 5 feet longer. In all other respects, including the missile carrier, the two appear identical. The source of this report stated that on 12 September he had personally seen some 20 such missiles in the vicinity of Campo Libertad, a small airfield on the western edge of Havana. While this report is still unconfirmed and there are no other reports concerning the presence of either SS-3 or SS-4 missiles, it is significant to note that by using the approximate center of the restricted area referred to above as a point of origin and with a radius of 1100 nm, the accepted range of the SS-4 missile, the arc includes the cities of Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, Fort Worth-Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, Mexico City, all of the capitals of the Central American nations, the Panama Canal, and the oil fields in Maricaibo, Venezuela. The presence of operational SS-4 missiles in this location would give the Soviets a great military asset.
2. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Ball to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 194. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. Washington, October 2, 1962. SUBJECT Policy Toward Non-Bloc Ships in Cuban Trade

A. Recommended Action The President should make a public statement dealing with this topic. The President should close all U.S. ports to all ships of any country if any ship under the flag of that country hereafter carries arms to Cuba. The President should direct that no government cargo shall be carried on a foreign flag ship if any ship of the same owners is used hereafter in Bloc-Cuba Trade. The President should direct that no United States flag ship and no United States owned ship shall carry goods to or from Cuba.

Alternative I

The President should close all United States ports to any ship on a continuous voyage to or from Cuba.

Alternative II

The President should close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage carried or carries to Cuba items on the COCOM list.

Alternative III

The President should close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage carried or carries to Cuba items on the positive list under Regulation T-1.

Alternative IV

The President should close all United States ports to any ship that on the same continuous voyage was used or is being used in Bloc-Cuba trade.

The President should instruct the Secretary of State to explore every avenue to obtain cooperation from other countries in restricting the use of their ships in Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Legal Authority

The President has all the necessary legal authority to carry out the above recommendations without new legislation. A small supplemental appropriation for the Department of Agriculture might have to be included in the budget to pay for shipping in U.S. bottoms.

C. Action Not Recommended

The President has adequate legal powers to adopt more restrictive policies than those recommended above. There has been some talk, for example, of closing U.S. ports to the ships of any country which permits its ships to go to Cuba. Others have mentioned the possibility of closing territorial waters of the U.S. to such ships, or denying them use of the Panama Canal.

These proposals are not recommended.Printed from an unsigned copy.

3. National Security Action Memorandum No. 194Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 194. Confidential; Sensitive. Washington, October 2, 1962. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Secretary of Commerce The Secretary of Labor The Administrator, Maritime Commission The Director, Agency for International Development The Director, Bureau of the Budget The Director of Central Intelligence The President, Commodity Credit Corporation SUBJECT Policy Toward Non-Bloc Ships in Cuban Trade (State memo of 10/2/62)Document 2.

The President has approved the memorandum weIn some instances, departmental representatives were present representing their principals. [Footnote in the source text.] discussed at the meeting this morning,According to the President’s Appointment Book, President Kennedy met with George Ball and Carl Kaysen for an off-the-record meeting at 11:12 a.m. The meeting lasted for 15 minutes and no other participants are listed. (Kennedy Library) A memorandum for the record prepared by Captain William D. Houser, USN, based upon a debriefing provided by Gilpatric following the meeting indicates, however, that Gilpatric and several other concerned officals also participated in the meeting. According to Gilpatric, the group recognized that “none of these or any other actions not adopted have any real substantive effect on cutting down Soviet Bloc trade with Cuba.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962, 000.1-092)George Ball discussed the President’s decision on the afternoon of October 2 with Stevenson. Ball noted that the measures relating to trade with Cuba were “more for American public opinion” than for any practical effect they were expected to have on the availability of shipping to the Soviet Bloc for trade with Cuba. Nonetheless, he added, “the President felt strongly that we had to do something along this line” and that it would raise the cost to the Soviet Union of shipping arms and other supplies to Cuba. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Subject Series, Cuba, 1/24/61-12/30/62) See the Supplement. including Alternative IV, under point 5. A group will be formed to do what is necessary to put these recommendations into effect.Telegram 457 to Paris, October 2, instructed Finletter to inform the other permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council, at their scheduled meeting on October 3, that the United States proposed to take the steps outlined in NSAM 194 within a week. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-262) Mr. Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser of the State Department, will lead it. Will you arrange for your department to put an appropriate person in touch with Mr. Chayes?

Carl KaysenPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
4. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 66 A 3542, Cuba 1962. Top Secret. The source text is undated, but a copy found ibid., OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba 1962, 381 Jan-Oct, is dated October 2. Washington, October 2, 1962.

During my meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on October 1, 1962, the question arose as to the contingencies under which military action against Cuba may be necessary and toward which our military planning should be oriented. The following categories would appear to cover the likely possibilities: Soviet action against Western rights in Berlin calling for a Western response including among other actions a blockade of Communist or other shipping en route to Cuba. Evidence that the Castro regime has permitted the positioning of bloc offensive weapon systems on Cuban soil or in Cuban harbors. An attack against the Guantanamo base, or against U.S. planes or vessels outside Cuban territorial air space or waters. A substantial popular uprising in Cuba, the leaders of which request assistance in recovering Cuban independence from the Castro Soviet puppet regime. Cuban armed assistance to subversion in other parts of the Western Hemisphere. A decision by the President that affairs in Cuba have reached a point inconsistent with continuing U.S. national security.

May I have the views of the Chiefs as to the appropriateness of the above list of contingencies and answers to the following three sets of questions: The operational plans considered appropriate for each contingency. The preparatory actions which should now and progressively in the future be undertaken to improve U.S. readiness to execute these plans. The consequences of the actions on the availability of forces and on our logistics posture to deal with threats in other areas, i.e. Berlin, Southeast Asia, etc.

We can assume that the political objective in any of these contingencies may be either: the removal of the threat to U.S. security of Soviet weapon systems in Cuba, or the removal of the Castro regime and the securing in the island of a new regime responsive to Cuban national desires.

Inasmuch as the second objective is the more difficult objective and may be required if the first is to be permanently achieved, attention should be focused upon a capability to assure the second objective.

I have asked ISA to initiate discussion with State as to the political actions which should precede or accompany the various military actions being planned.

Robert S. McNamara
5. Memorandum From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Cuba, 1962. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text. Washington, October 2, 1962. SUBJECT Summary of Recent Soviet Military Assistance to CubaAccording to a February 21, 1963, letter sent by Ball to Congressman George H. Mahon, this memorandum was prepared at Ball’s request to prepare him for his testimony on October 3 before the House Select Committee on Export Control. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Controls)Ball noted in his letter to Mahon that, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, members of the committee had questioned the accuracy of the statements he had made with respect to the flow of Soviet military equipment and missiles to Cuba. He provided Mahon with a copy of the October 2 memorandum from Hilsman in order to demonstrate that his testimony was based upon the information available to him at the time. A copy of Ball’s testimony before the Committee on Export Control is ibid.

Since July when the volume of Soviet military shipments to Cuba suddenly increased very substantially, 85 shiploads of various military items, supplies, and personnel have arrived. More ships are en route.

In part the Soviet shipments have consisted of types of weapons previously delivered to the Cuban armed forces including more tanks, self-propelled guns and other ground force equipment. The major tonnage however has been devoted to supplying SA-2 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) together with all of the related gear and equipment necessary for their installation and operation. To date 15 SAM sites have been established in the island. We estimate the total may eventually reach 25.

In addition 3 (possibly 4) missile sites of a different type have been identified. These sites are similar to known coastal defense missile sites and are believed to accommodate Soviet anti-shipping missiles with a range of 20-35 miles. We expect that several more such sites will be installed.

Cuba is now estimated to have 60 older type MIG jet aircraft plus at least one advanced jet interceptor (MIG-21) recently received and probably several more in process of assembly. The MIG-21 is usually equipped with infrared air-to-air missiles. We estimate that the total of MIG-21s in Cuba may eventually reach 25-30.

Sixteen “Komar” class guided-missile patrol boats which carry two short range missiles (11-17 miles) were included in the new shipments.

About 4,500 Soviet military specialists have arrived including construction men and technicians.

If the SAM sites are to be operated solely by Cuban personnel six months to a year of training will be required.

There is a considerable amount of other new equipment which has not been precisely identified but it is believed to include a large quantity of electronic gear.

6. Editorial Note

The Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Republics met at the Department of State on October 2 and 3, 1962, at the invitation of Secretary of State Rusk to discuss matters of mutual concern, with a particular emphasis on the problems posed by Cuba. The invitation was extended on September 5 through the Latin American ambassadors in Washington. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 375) The Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela attended. The meetings were informal, without agenda or resolutions. Secretary Rusk opened the first session of the Foreign Ministers meeting at 10:30 a.m. on October 2 with a discussion of the threat posed to the Americas by communism; a threat, he stated, which was rapidly expanding with each shipload of modern weaponry that the Soviet Union sent to the base for Communist penetration it had established in Cuba. Rusk outlined the magnitude of the arms build-up taking place in Cuba and repeated the warnings President Kennedy had issued against the development of Cuba as a Soviet military base, or the introduction into Cuba of ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. He noted that there were to date no indications that the Soviet Union intended to violate those guidelines. Nonetheless, he argued that Soviet penetration of the hemisphere, and the aggressive use of Cuba as a focus for subversive activities posed serious problems, which he invited the Foreign Ministers to consider and address. (Memorandum of meeting, Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, Secretary’s Memcons) See the Supplement. President Kennedy hosted a luncheon at the White House for the Foreign Ministers following the opening session. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) The Foreign Ministers met again on the afternoon of October 2 and twice on October 3. The tenor of the remarks by the other Foreign Ministers reflected general agreement with Rusk’s emphasis on the need for hemispheric solidarity to face the perceived threat. (Memoranda of these three meetings are in Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 330, Secretary’s Memcons) See the Supplement.

In the final communique issued at the conclusion of the meetings on October 3, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the OAS conclusionthat the Soviet Union’s intervention in Cuba threatened the unity and democratic institutions of the Americas. They added that it was “desirable to intensify individual and collective surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere.” American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 391-393)

7. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/1-10/14/62. Top Secret. Washington, October 4, 1962. SUBJECT Presidential Interest in SA-2 Missile System and Contingency Planning for Cuba In your memorandum of 21 September 1962,See vol. X, Document 434. you noted an apparent lack of unanimity between General LeMay and Admiral Anderson with respect to aircraft losses that might occur in attacking an SA-2 site. You further requested assurance as to the currency of contingency planning for Cuba. I have discussed with General LeMay and Admiral Anderson their estimate of aircraft losses in attacking SA-2 missile sites. Admiral Anderson agrees with General LeMay’s point that no losses would be suffered from the SA-2 missile since the attacking aircraft would fly below the effective minimum altitude of the SA-2. General LeMay shares Admiral Anderson’s estimate that attacking aircraft might suffer some loss to antiaircraft artillery defenses of the SA-2 site. The National Intelligence EstimateReference is to SNIE 85-3-62; ibid., Document 433. credits the SA-2 missile system with a minimum effective altitude of 3000 feet due to inherent radar limitations. If antiaircraft artillery is employed in direct support of the missile site, losses may be expected. World War II and Korean experience, updated to reflect current antiaircraft artillery capabilities against modern aircraft, indicates that low level attack forces would incur some combat losses from antiaircraft artillery fire; however, numbers cannot be predicted accurately. There are currently no known antiaircraft artillery defenses of SA-2 sites in Cuba. Attack plans can be amended to take the antiaircraft weapons under fire during the attack if reconnaissance shows such defenses and if analysis shows such fire suppression necessary. Korean experience proved that such fire suppression was unnecessary when surprise could be achieved. In my opinion and that of the Joint Chiefs, it is not necessary to build a model of an SA-2 site for training purposes. However, the aircraft revetment of the type found at Santa Clara and Camaguey is a more difficult target than the SA-2 site. Therefore, the Air Force has found it desirable to reproduce that type aircraft revetment to aid in the selection of weapons, method of delivery and to assist in training crews. The target was completed at Nellis AFB, Nevada, on 30 September 1962, at an approximate cost of $28,000. Initial tests indicate that the GAM 83, 20 mm cannon, and napalm is the most effective weapons mix against aircraft in such revetments. I have taken steps to insure that our contingency plans for Cuba are kept up to date. The Navy plans to attack SA-2 targets at low level using 4 divisions of A-4D’s (4 aircraft per division) armed with 250#, 500#, and 2000# low drag bombs and napalm. All crews are proficient in the delivery techniques planned. Similarly, the Air Force plans primary use of napalm and 20 mm cannon delivered at low level, and crews are proficient. Both have made detailed target studies; target folders are in the hands of crews; and crews are familiar with their assigned targets. As new missile sites are located, they are picked up in the target and attack plans within a few hours of receipt of photographs.On October 5 General C.V. Clifton, the President’s military aide, sent a memorandum to Secretary McNamara in which he indicated that the President had “read with interest”McNamara’s October 4 memorandum dealing with the SA-2 missile system in Cuba. Clifton noted: “He commented that he was sure you had had an opportunity to tell General Taylor of the contents of the memorandum.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 10/1-10/14/62) Robert S. McNamaraPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
8. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Files, Job 80-B01676R, Box 17, Folder 12. Secret; Eyes Only. A memorandum for the record of this meeting, by Thomas A. Parrott, is ibid., Walter Elder Recop. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 111-113. Washington, October 4, 1962.

MEMORANDUM OF MONGOOSE MEETING HELD ONTHURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 1962

Chaired by the Attorney General.

Attended by:Gilpatric, Johnson, General Taylor, General Carter, McCone, Scoville, General Lansdale and Colonel Steakley (part of the time).

The Attorney General reported on discussions with the President on Cuba; dissatisfied with lack of action in the sabotage field, went on to stress that nothing was moving forward, commented that one effort attempted had failed, expressed general concern over developing situation.

General Lansdale reviewed operations, pointing out that no sabotage had been attempted and gave general impression that things were all right.

McCone then stated that phase one was principally intelligence gathering, organizing and training, that no sabotage was authorized, that one operation against a powerhouse had been contemplated but was discouraged by group, that he had called a meeting to review matters this morning and that he had observed a lack of forward motion due principally to “hesitancy” in government circles to engage in any activities which would involve attribution to the United States.

AG took sharp exception stating the Special Group had not withheld approval on any specified actions to his knowledge, but to the contrary had urged and insisted upon action by the Lansdale operating organization.

There followed a sharp exchange which finally was clarifying inasmuch as it resulted in a reaffirmation of a determination to move forward. In effect it seemed to be the consensus that phase two as approved on September 6, was now outmoded, that more dynamic action was indicated, that hesitancy about overflights must be reconsidered (this to be commented on later in this memorandum), that actions which could be attributed to indigenous Cubans would not be important or very effective, and that a very considerable amount of attribution and “noise” must be expected.

As a result, General Lansdale was instructed to give consideration to new and more dynamic approaches, the specific items of sabotage should be brought forward immediately and new ones conceived, that a plan for mining harbors should be developed and presented, and the possibility of capturing Castro forces for interrogation should be studied.

With respect to overflights, the NRO and Colonel Steakley were instructed to prepare and present to the Special Group on next TuesdayOctober 9; see Document 11. at a special meeting alternate recommendations for overflights. These to include the use of U-2s on complete sweeps (as contrasted with peripheral or limited missions), the use of firefly drones, the use of 101s or other reconnaissance planes on low level, intermediate level, and high level missions, and other possible reconnaissance operations.

Consideration was given to stating publicly that we propose to overfly Cuba in the interest of our own security and the security of the Western Hemisphere, and then to proceed even though doing so involved risk.

It was the consensus that we could not accept restrictions which would foreclose gaining all reasonable knowledge of military installations in Cuba.

During the meeting McCone reviewed the earlier meeting with General Lansdale, and pointed out to the group that this meeting clarified General Lansdale’s authority over the entire Mongoose operation and that the CIA organization was responsive to his policy and operational guidance, and this was thoroughly understood.

Consideration was given to the existing guidelines and it was the consensus that the August 1st guidelines for phase twoApparent reference to the attachment to Document 362, vol. X. were inadequate and new guidelines must be considered.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
9. Memorandum of Discussion With the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 115-117. Washington, October 5, 1962, 5:15 p.m. McCone reviewed details of the Donovan negotiations, discussions with the President, Attorney General, Eisenhower, the decisions not to approach Congressional leadership, the discussion with Senator Javits, and the final report from Donovan. Bundy expressed general agreement. At the October 4th meeting of the Special Group MongooseSee Document 8. was discussed in some detail as was the meeting with Carter, Lansdale, et al. in DCI’s office on that day. McCone stated there was a feeling in CIA and Defense that the “activist policy” which founded the Mongoose operation was gone and that while no specific operational activities had been (refused) the amount of “noise”from minor incidents such as the sugar, the students firing on the Havana Hotel and other matters and the extreme caution expressed by State had led to this conclusion. More importantly, however, the decisions to restrict U-2 flights had placed the United States Intelligence Community in a position where it could not report with assurance the development of offensive capabilities in Cuba. McCone stated he felt it most probable that Soviet-Castro operations would end up with an established offensive capability in Cuba including MRBMs. McCone stated he thought this a probability rather than a mere possibility. Bundy took issue stating that he felt the Soviets would not go that far, that he was satisfied that no offensive capability would be installed in Cuba because of its world-wide effects and therefore seemed relaxed over the fact that the Intelligence Community cannot produce hard information on this important subject. McCone said that Bundy’s viewpoint was reflected by many in the Intelligence Community, perhaps a majority, but he just did not agree and furthermore did not think the United States could afford to take such a risk. Bundy then philosophized on Cuba stating that he felt that our policy was not clear, our objectives not determined and therefore our efforts were not productive. He discussed both the Mongoose operations and the Rostow “Track Two”.See Document 14. Bundy was not critical of either or of the Lansdale operations. It was obvious that he was not in sympathy with a more active role such as those discussed at 5412 on ThursdayMcCone is apparently referring to the Special Group (the successor of the 5412 Committee) meeting on October 4; see Document 8. as he felt none of them would bring Castro down nor would they particularly enhance U.S. position of world leadership. Bundy seemed inclined to support the Track Two idea and also inclined (though he was not specific) to play down the more active Lansdale operation. Bundy had not talked to Lansdale but obviously had received some of the “static” that is being passed around in Washington. (Before)McCone in reporting on the discussions at Thursday’s 5412 meeting repeated the views of the President and expressed by the Attorney General it was agreed that the whole Government policy with reference to Cuba must be resolved promptly as basic to further actions on our part. In general, Bundy’s views were that we should either make a judgment that we would have to go in militarily (which seemed to him intolerable) or alternatively we would have to learn to live with Castro, and his Cuba and adjust our policies accordingly. McCone then elaborated on his views of the evolution of Soviet-Castro military capability stating he felt defense was just phase one, phase two would be followed by various offensive capabilities and indeed the existing defensive capabilities such as the (MIG) 21s a very definite offensive capability against nearby American cities and installations. McCone stated that he thought that the establishment of a very expensive defensive mechanism could not be the ultimate objective of the Soviets or Castro and therefore the objective was (a) to establish an offensive base or (b) to insert sufficient Soviet specialists and military leaders to take Cuba away from Castro and establish it as a true Soviet controlled satellite. McCone stated that he felt there were only two courses open—one was to take military action at the appropriate time or secondly to pursue an effort to split Castro off from the Communists and for this reason he, McCone, had vigorously supported the Donovan mission as it is the only link that we have to the Castro hierarchy at the present time. Note in this connection it might be well to study the evolution of the Toure experience in Guinea when the Communists moved in and captured all elements of the Government and economy and forced Toure to expel the Ambassador and try to rectify the situation. There may be a parallel here. McCone reviewed the Eisenhower discussions. Bundy read the memorandum covering these discussions.Not further identified. Bundy stated that Adenauer did not express the concern of the U.S. policy reflected by Eisenhower and reported in the memorandum. Bundy rejected the idea of regular NSC meetings stating that every President has to organize his Government as he desires and that the Eisenhower pattern was not necessarily adaptable to the Kennedy type of administration. McCone stated that if this is the case he intended to request occasional NSC meetings to review specific estimates or other intelligence situations and the next one would be a report and discussion of the estimate of Soviet air defense capabilities. Bundy agreed. Bundy rejected the idea (calling) the several Special Groups 5412, CIA, Mongoose, and North Vietnam together feeling it was better to keep them separated. He also rejected the idea that the visiting commissions such as the Byroade Team and the Draper Team should report back to the Special Group (CI) feeling it was appropriate that they report to the President, (through) the Secretary of State, with consultation with the Special Group (CI). It was agreed that we would have a further discussion over the weekend. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.5Director
10. Memorandum From the Central Intelligence Agency Project Officer for Operation Mongoose (Harvey) to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Lansdale)Source: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Operation Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, October 8, 1962. SUBJECT Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Ship It is requested that you present the following proposal to the Special Group (Augmented) for policy approval. Policy approval is requested to permit the sabotage of Cuban-owned vessels wherever and whenever secure access to them can be attained, normally this will be in non-Bloc ports. Attacks against the Cuban-owned ships must be considered essentially as attacks against targets of opportunity in the sense that in most cases there will be little advance information prior to the arrival of the ship in a non-Bloc port and the duration of the port call will be limited.

The following specific types of action are contemplated:

[13 paragraphs (40 lines of source text) not declassified]

 It is necessary to submit the request for policy approval in a somewhat more general form than usual to permit us to take advantage of targets of opportunity as they occur. In most cases we will not have sufficient advance notice of the arrival of the ship or have sufficient access to the ship to permit the preparation and submission of detailed individual approval requests in advance. In every case where time and circumstance permit, specific proposals will be submitted to the Special Group (Augmented) for approval. Any case involving unusual operational or security risks will be submitted in advance for Special Group (Augmented) approval. Later we will submit requests for policy approval of actions against other ships supplying Cuba. William K. HarveyPrinted from a copy that indicates that Harvey signed the original.
11. Editorial Note

President Kennedy met with the members of the Special Group (Augmented) on October 9, 1962, to consider recommendations for a proposed U-2 reconnaissanceflight over Cuba. The purpose of the flight was to obtain hard evidence concerning the development of suspected MRBM sites near recently established SA-2 emplacements, which suggested the development of concomitant ballistic missile sites. The President approved the recommendation for a U-2 flight, to be piloted by a Strategic Air Command pilot, or a military pilot attached to the Central Intelligence Agency. The recommendation for supporting low-level reconnaissance flights was deferred pending a review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of State, and the United States Intelligence Board concerning the necessity for such flights. The U-2 flight was expected to take only 12 minutes of flying time over Cuba at approximately 74,000 feet. It was noted during the course of the meeting that there were no indications as yet that the SA-2 antiaircraft emplacements had reached operational stage, although it had been nearly 2 months since their first installation. (Notes on a meeting with the President by Roswell L. Gilpatric; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, RLG’s Notes re Cuba)

12. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 123-125. Washington, October 11, 1962.

MEMORANDUM ON DONOVAN PROJECT

Meeting 10 Oct 62

Immediately after my discussion with the Cannon Committee (including Taber, Ford and Mahon), I went to the White House and explained to the President and McGeorge Bundy the positions taken by Ford and Mahon, as covered in separate memorandum prepared by Mr. Warner.Not found. Although the source text indicates the meeting with the President took place on October 10 there is no record of it in the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) The President made the judgment that we should proceed with the negotiations, recognizing there would be some political consequences and criticisms, but he, the President, was willing to accept this as a fact.

I then showed the President photographs of the crates which pre-sumably would carry, or were carrying, IL 28s, Soviet medium bombers, and were deck loaded on a ship which had arrived in Havana in the early days of October. The President requested that such information be withheld at least until after elections as if the information got into the press, a new and more violent Cuban issue would be injected into the campaign and this would seriously affect his independence of action.

McCone stated that these particular photographs could not be restricted as they had been disseminated to the Intelligence Community and several joint and specified commands, such as CINCLANT, SAC, NORAD, and others and would be reported in the CIA Bulletin on Thursday morning. The President then requested that the report be worded to indicate a probability rather than an actuality because in the final analysis we only saw crates, not the bombers themselves. DCI agreed. The President further requested that all future information be suppressed. DCI stated that this was extremely dangerous.

It was then agreed that future information would be disseminated to members of USIB, with appropriate instructions that only those responsible for giving the President advice be given the information. Furthermore, that within CIA circlesa minimum number of experts be informed. McCone stated there was no problem in CIA, that it was secure. It was therefore agreed that the USIB members would be instructed to restrict the information to their personal offices and fully and currently inform the Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Service Secretaries and the Secretary of Defense. Similar restrictive action would be taken in State. Therefore all those involved in “giving advice to the President” would be fully informed. However operational divisions and the joint and specified commands would not be informed at this time, except at the direction of the above people who are receiving the information.

At this point the President mentioned that “we’ll have to do something drastic about Cuba” and I am anxiously looking forward to the JCS operational plan which is to be presented to me next week.

McCone effected the above instructions by calling Mr. Cline, who was unavailable, and then Mr. Sheldon who agreed to prepare a procedure for review on Thursday morning.

McCone then called the Attorney General and advised him of his talk with the Cannon Committee. The Attorney General had no particular comment.

At six o’clock McCone received a report from Houston that Donovan had gone into a meeting at five o’clock. At eleven o’clock Houston reported the meeting was still in progress. At seven o’clock on Thursday morning Donovan still had no report.

At 11:15 General Eisenhower called McCone stating he was sorry a meeting could not be arranged, he was leaving very early the following morning for Gettysburg. McCone reported that negotiations were in progress and he also reported objections stated by several members of Congress. Eisenhower advised that the negotiations be pursued, indicating his support of it and furthermore stated that if the negotiations were satisfactorily concluded the complaints and objections would, in his words, disappear.

McCone told General Eisenhower there were some defendable evidences of shipments of twin-engined light jet bombers. Eisenhower responded the situation must be watched very carefully. Positive action might be indicated and then he said there had been two instances where action was warranted but had not been taken. Eisenhower did not elaborate; however, I know from previous discussions he feels that when Castro embraced Communism publicly and announced publicly his allegiance to Moscow, we had then a reason to act militarily and if we had chosen to so act, such action would have been defendable.

On ThursdayApparently, Thursday, October 11. morning McCone reported by telephone to Mr. Kennedy, reviewing the Eisenhower discussion and stating that he, McCone, was concerned over Donovan’s safety in view of the rash of publicity, most particularly the Herald Tribune article, and that he had instructed that contact be made with Donovan and that if things were not proceeding satisfactorily and a conclusion to the negotiations along the lines agreed in sight, then Donovan should come out. The Attorney General stated that he had no concern over Donovan’s personal safety, that “they will not do anything to him”. McCone stated he was not so sure and that he therefore concluded to bring Donovan out unless things were going well.

With reference to the political implications, McCone recalled that he had told the President and the AG that he would take all, or his full share of responsibility, that he wished the AG to bear this in mind as the position taken in this respect by Mr. McCone in the first conversation after his return from Europe still stood. AG expressed appreciation for this statement.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
13. Memorandum From the Director for Operations of the Joint Staff (Unger) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Historical File, Cuba, November 1962. Top Secret. Washington, October 12, 1962. SUBJECT Political Actions/Military Actions Concerning Cuba REFERENCE SecDef Memo of 2 October 1962Document 4. In furtherance of our discussion of last evening concerning the project included in the reference, we are having a meeting at 1300 hours today of operational and logistical planners from CINCLANT and CINCSTRIKE forthe purpose of developing our responses to the contingencies and other matters requested by the SecDef. Pending completion of the requirement given us by the SecDef, a general picture of each of our military contingency plans for Cuba is tabulated below as a basis for your initial discussions with State. On the other hand, it may be better to delay discussions with State until we have completed our part of the requirement and have submitted it to the SecDef and the JCS on Monday, 15 October. Blockade Plan—employs 24 to 36 destroyers, a carrier task force, etc., which can marshal significant strength to blockade Cuba, both air and maritime. Air Strike Plan—currently being revised, but employs between 450 and 500 aircraft. In the event of any execution of this plan steps would be taken to alert all forces allocated to the other assault plans. Fast Reaction Assault Plan—employs both air-borne and amphibious assault with about 32,000 troops in initial phase, with balance of assault forces arriving in increments as they become available. Ultimately builds up to about 80,000 troops in Cuba around D+18 days. Full-Scale Deliberate Assault Plan—employs simultaneous airborne and amphibious assault with around 49,000 troops engaged on D-Day, building to about 60,000 by D+5 days, and again to 80,000 by D+16 days. For your consideration, following are some of the political actions which might be undertaken in connection with the implementation of one or more of the foregoing plans: final arrangements for the tactical use of Mayaguana Island in the Bahamas; perhaps a request for token participation by Latin American military forces; in the case of blockade, notification of “neutral” shipping and publication of U.S. intent; in all cases, possibly, the preliminary political arrangements attendant to a state of war; and, of course, coordination with international organizations, such as the OAS and the UN duringthe execution of military action. F.T. UngerPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Major General, USA
14. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Mongoose. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hurwitch. Washington, October 12, 1962. SUBJECT Track Two

The following is the pertinent portion of Mr. Rostow’s paper:For text, see vol. X, Document 406.

“I believe we should consider the possibility of a Two-Track covert operation.

“Track One would consist of a heightened effort to move along the present Mongoose lines. The minimum objective here would be harassment: the maximum objective would be the triggering of a situation where there might be conflict at the top of the Cuban regime leading, hopefully, to its change or overthrow by some group within Cuba commanding arms.

“Track Two would consist of an effort to engage Cubans more deeply, both within Cuba and abroad, in efforts of their own liberation. This requires an operation with the following characteristics: “a. Authentic Cuban leadership with a considerable range of freedom to implement ideas and to assume risk. “b. Minimal U.S. direct participation: ideally, one truly wise U.S. adviser—available, but laying back; equipped to provide finance, but not monitoring every move; capable of earning their respect rather than commanding it by his control over money or equipment. “c. Basing outside the United States. “d. A link-up with the scattered and sporadic groups and operations now going forward of their own momentum in Cuba. “e. A plan of operation which aims at the overthrow of Castro primarily from within rather than by invasion from without. “f. A long enough time horizon to build the operation carefully and soundly.

“In suggesting that Track Two be studied—and sharply distinguished from Track One—I am, of course, wholly conscious of our failure of last year. But, as I read that failure in retrospect, its root lay in: U.S. bureaucratic domination; the lack of a Cuban political and organizational base; and a plan of operation that hinged on a type of overt invasion by a fixed date rather than the patient build-up of a true movement of national liberation. I’m sure it would be easy to argue that such a movement could not be generated against a Communist control system; that the Cuban refugees lack the capacity to play their part in such an enterprise with skill and minimal security; etc. And I am in no position to reply with confidence to such argument. On the other hand, Cuba is not located in Eastern Europe; and, presumably, some Cubans have learned something from last year’s failure, too.

“On the balance, I am prepared to recommend that Track Two be sympathetically studied and that General Lansdale be asked to formulate a design for it.”

The underlying philosophy is one which we have felt for some time merited exploration.

There is attached (Tab A) as you have requested, a paper describing the more important policy considerations bearing on this course of action.

Also attached (Tab B)Dated September 19; for text, see vol. X, Document 432. is the ARA memorandum, previously forwarded to you, describing some of the political thinking which leads us to the conclusion that we should experiment with this course of action.

Tab A TRACK TWO

A program of “giving the Cubans their heads” in an effort to effect the downfall of the Castro regime from within involves embarking upon uncharted waters as far as the U.S. is concerned. Grandiose U.S. plans based upon a substantially unified exile community would be unrealistic. Nearly all Cuban exile leaders, of whatever political persuasion, are convinced that only overt U.S. military action can remove the Castro regime. While we could probably force a semblance of unity based upon the “downfall from within” thesis, despite the sharp political rivalry among the exile leaders, our purposes would not be served. While “accepting” our thesis, most of the waking hours of these exiles would be devoted to devising ways of involving the U.S. militarily, rather than building the internal base of opposition we seek. We could thereby lose initiative and control over the situation and find ourselves in an untenable position from the international, and, perhaps, domestic, standpoint.

If the above judgment is accepted, two alternatives are available. We could cooperate with all anti-Castro-Batista exile groups which we have reason to believe have following inside Cuba, or we could, on an experimental basis work with one such group. By cooperating with all such groups we run the serious risk of accentuating rivalries among the exile leaders which would be inevitably reflected within Cuba. Rather than achieving a broad base of political opposition within Cuba, we may only be instrumental in fomenting splinter groups. In attempting to administer such a program, the U.S. would probably find itself in the midst of the crossfire of exile politics, very likely satisfying no one inside or outside Cuba.

Working with one group, on an experimental basis, would provide us with experience which could guide our future thinking and at the same time probably prevent problems of unmanageable proportions. Selection of the right group is of paramount importance. Even then, if we saw no progress in Cuba, we could not be certain that the thesis was impractical or the selection of the group erroneous.

Of all the exile groups the only one which has publicly adopted the thesis of “downfall from within” is that known as JURE, formed in September 1962 by Manolo Ray and based in Puerto Rico. (Since Ray has some friends within the U.S. Government and is presently employed by the Puerto Rican Government, it is reasonable to suppose that some of the recent official interest in the “downfall from within” thesis has been generated by him.) Ray was former Minister of Public Works under Castro, broke with Castro and formed an important underground movement which has since been badly smashed by Castro. Ray is a nationalist and left of center. The political program of JURE is one with which the U.S. can live.

The other feasible possibility is the CRC withwhich we have had a long standing relationship. Apart from Dr. Miro and some of the organizations that form an integral part of the Council, the CRC is not a very effective organization for what we have in mind. Its background is associated with the Bay of Pigs and its outlook is essentially one of military action.

Advantages of working with JURE would appear to be: A new organization which, as such, has no past relationship with the U.S. Commitment to the “downfall from within” thesis. Base outside the U.S. Political ideology which may be attuned to the desires of the Cuban people. Ray is experienced in underground activities and an independ-ent thinker.

Disadvantages of working with JURE are: Little, if any, assets known within Cuba today. Opposed by most of the established exile groups, particularly Dr. Miro. Ray is a complex personality, sometimes difficult to handle.

On balance it is worth trying. Although we would try to maintain security, Dr. Miro may discover our assistance to Ray and resign. The CRC is useful to us, but its disappearance would be bearable.

If we embark upon these unchartered waters, and it is recommended that we do so, we must be prepared for increased noise level and press inquiry. We must be prepared for a comparatively high rate of loss, failures and cries of anguish from JURE for assistance we may not be able to give it. It is essential that we recognize this and not be permitted to be stampeded into regrettable public postures or actions. A further important consideration is that Track Two operations may compromise Track One operations. Coordination would be essential.

Another conflict arises from the President’s desire that a Cuban Brigade be formed. While this would not necessarily be a serious conflict with the program envisaged, for there are probably enough exiles for both programs, it should be recognized that a number of young men qualified for infiltration activities will probably join the Brigade.

If we attempt our program on a large scale, or with more than one group, the immediately above-mentioned problems would multiply.

The program we would visualize is one of providing the selected exile group with funds, arms, sabotage equipment, transport and communications equipment for infiltration operations in order to build a political base of opposition inside Cuba. We would provide the best technical advice we could. Our role would essentially be that of advisors and purveyors of material goods—it would be the exile group’s show. We would insist that hit and run raids or similar harassing activities that clearly originate from outside Cuba and do not reflect internal activity not be engaged in.

In sum, we should be cautious about grandiose schemes, a “major” U.S. effort, and deep commitments to the exiles. We should experiment in this new venture on a small scale with patience and tolerance for high noise levels and mistakes.
15. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Bowles) to President KennedySource: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6111/10-1562. Secret. Drafted by Bowles on October 14. Washington, October 13, 1962.

REPORT OF CONVERSATION WITH AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 13th, REGARDING CUBA AND OTHER SUBJECTS

A week ago Ambassador Dobrynin called my office to say that he understood I was leaving for Africa and would like to have our “long postponed luncheon” before my departure.

I met him at the U.S.S.R. Embassy on 16th Street at 1 p.m. on October 13th. With the exception of an occasional exchange of courtesies at diplomatic functions, this was the first time I had talked with him.

It was a frank, free-wheeling discussion, lasting more than an hour and a half. Dobrynin’s manner was pleasant, with a show of reasonableness and concern about the current drift in Soviet-American relations.

At my first opportunity, I expressed deep disappointment that no more progress had been made in reducing tensions, and concern over the consequences of a further decline. I said that since I was speaking wholly unofficially, he should not attempt to read anything into my remarks. I would like to be utterly frank with him.

Almost immediately Dobrynin brought up the question of Cuba and expressed worry and surprise at the intensity of U.S. public reaction.

In response to his question as to why we attached such importance to a relatively small island, I outlined the history of U.S.-Cuban relations and drew a parallel to the situation in 1898, the presence of Spanish misrule, and the U.S. public agitation that abetted the outbreak of war.

When he protested that the Soviet presence in Cuba was no greater provocation than the U.S. presence in Turkey, I pointed out that the present Administration had inherited a status quo that had grown up since the war. In some areas the advantage in this status quo had been with us, in others with Moscow; in still others it was a stand-off.

Our presence in Greece and Turkey, for instance, represented our reaction to Stalin’s military and political pressures against these two countries following the war. It had become part of a status quo which in all its complexity could safely be changed only by negotiation with reciprocal benefits to each side.

The Kennedy Administration had hoped and expected that we could in fact negotiate a more rational set of relationships, easing the various danger points on a basis of reciprocal action to everyone’s benefit.

However, in Cuba the U.S.S.R. had unilaterally altered this status quo by introducing a wholly new element. Our reaction, in these circumstances, should have been foreseeable.

Moreover, many U.S. students of Soviet affairs were soberly convinced that the U.S.S.R. had made this move deliberately to provoke a U.S. military response against Cuba on the theory that this would divert our energies from Berlin, and elsewhere, and enable Soviet spokesmen to charge us with aggression in the UN.

If this kind of thinking had in fact played a part in the Soviet analysis, it was extremely dangerous. If we did move into Cuba in response to some overt act or offensive build-up by the U.S.S.R., a global chain of events might be set in motion which could have catastrophic consequences.

For instance, the Soviets might then be tempted to take what they would term “counter-action” in Berlin and perhaps Turkey; and the United States, by that time in an extremely tense mood, would react with vigor.

The U.S.S.R., in turn, would feel pressed by the Chinese and other extremists to counter our moves, and we would be on our way together down the long slippery slide.

I asked Dobrynin if he had read The Guns of August.Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, New York, 1962. He said “only a three-page summary.”

I urged him to read at least the first few chapters in which he would see a pattern of politico-military action and counter-action that could be repeated in the next six months.

In July 1914, men of intelligence in Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, France and England, all quite conscious of the forces which were feeding the approaching holocaust, found themselves enmeshed in internal pressures, commitments and precedents which left them powerless to avoid the inevitable. It would be the greatest folly in history if we were to repeat this insane process in the nuclear age.

Dobrynin asked me what, in the circumstances, I thought could be done in regard to Cuba. Stressing that I was speaking solely as an individual, I suggested three moves that the U.S.S.R. could sponsor to ease the situation.

Dobrynin should remind his government of President Kennedy’s sharp distinction between defensive and offensive weapons in his recent statement. I was particularly concerned on this point because current reports indicated that Soviet shipments were in fact beginning to include weapons which had a clearly offensive capacity.

If this continued, it could produce—with the help of some incident perpetrated perhaps by individuals striving to provoke another “Remember the Maine” incident—the very conflict which the Administration is anxious to avoid. President Kennedy had committed himself to act under certain specific circumstances. This was a clear commitment, and the U.S.S.R. should not take it lightly.

 From many reports, Castro now had ample defensive arms with which to protect himself from casual landings. The U.S.S.R. should tell him that under present circumstances no more arms will be shipped. The U.S.S.R. should then ask Castro himself to make a statement announcing that the defense of Cuba was assured and that no more arms were needed. Moscow could then inform us that no more arms would be shipped. Castro should be asked by Moscow to state that he has no design on his neighbors, that his entire energies would henceforth be devoted to the economic development of Cuba, and that he sought only peaceful competition with other Latin American nations. His decision not to indulge in further subversion, propaganda, and expansion in neighboring Latin American countries would, of course, have to be confirmed by deeds. However, Soviet assurances on this point would serve to reduce some of the current tensions and give us all a breathing spell.

If some progress along these lines were not possible, I had deep forebodings about the weeks ahead.

To all of this Dobrynin appeared to listen intently. I believe he was impressed.

He answered that in spite of our worries, the U.S.S.R. was not shipping offensive weapons and well understood the dangers of doing so. Moreover, it was unreasonable for the U.S., as a major power, to expect a small, weak country such as Cuba to make such public concessions to U.S. public opinion even though both the U.S.S.R. and Cuba might accept all three points in principle.

Why, he asked repeatedly, do we get so excited about so small a nation? Although the U.S.S.R. could not let Cuba down, they had no desire to complicate the situation further. Was it not possible for us to negotiate a modus vivendi with Castro directly?

I commented that Cuba had initiated the current conflict. Indeed, in 1959 most Americans had strongly applauded Castro’s revolution. If Dobrynin were misinformed about the types of weapons now arriving in Cuba, it would not be the first time in diplomatic history that this had occurred. As long as Soviet weapons flowed into Cuba and Cuban money was used to subvert Latin American countries which we were striving to assist into the 20th century, the situation would remain dangerously explosive.

I hoped that his government would see the danger and act accordingly to help ease the tensions.

Without directly responding to my remarks, Dobrynin referred to Max Frankel’s story in the morning Times which cited agitation by various private agencies, Cuban and American, to provoke a “Maine incident” with the connivance of U.S. official groups. I replied that our government would have no part in such an operation, that we were genuinely worried, and that his government should view the situation with serious concern.

[Here follow 9 pages on other topics. The full text of the memorandum is printed in volume V.]

16. Editorial Note

On the morning of October 14, 1962, a U-2 aircraft, piloted by Air Force Major Richard D. Heyser, flew a reconnaissance mission over the western part of Cuba, flying from south to north. The 928 photographs obtained during the 6-minute flight over the island produced the first verified evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Analysis and interpretation of the photographs at the National Photographic Intelligence Center revealed that three medium-range ballistic missile sites were being developed near San Cristobal, in Pinar del Rio province. Photo analysts counted eight large MRBM transporters at the three locations and four erector launchers in tentative firing positions. Two further U-2 missions, flown on October 15 by pilots of the Strategic Air Command, revealed a fourth MRBM site near San Cristobal, and two intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were discovered at Guanajay. Photos also revealed 21 crates for Soviet IL-28 Beagle medium-range bomber aircraft at San Julian airfield. (Chronology of Air Force Actions During the Cuban Crisis, 14 October-30 October 1962;USAF Historical Division Liaison Office, pages 11-12)

At 8:30 p.m. on October 15 CIA Deputy Director Carter reported to McGeorge Bundy the hard evidence of the MRBM’s, but the President’s Special Assistant decided not to notify the President that evening. In a memorandum to the President, dated March 4, 1963, Bundy explained his reasons for this decision: “1. This was very big news, and its validity would need to be demonstrated clearly to you and others before action could be taken. The blow-ups and other elements of such a presentation would not be ready before morning. I was satisfied that the word was going out quietly to those with an immediate need to know. The one obvious operational need was for more photography, and that was in hand. “2. It was a hell of a secret, and it must remain one until you had a chance to deal with it. Thus everything should go on as nearly normally as possible, in particular there should be no hastily summoned meeting Monday night. Chip Bohlen and I, for example, should not leave a dinner at my house where there were knowledgeable foreign guests, and others, I knew, were in the same spot. “3. On the other hand this was not something that could be dealt with on the phone except in the most limited and cryptic terms. What help would it be to you to give you this piece of news and then tell you nothing could be done about it till morning? “4. Finally, I had heard that you were tired. You had had a strenuous campaign week end, returning from Niagara Falls and New York City at 1:40 Monday morning. “5. So I decided that a quiet evening and a night of sleep were the best preparation you could have in the light of what would face you in the next days. I would, I think, decide the same again unless you tell me different.” (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba—Subjects Current)

Bundy prints this memorandum in Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, pages 684-685.

17. Editorial Note

On October 15, 1962, a major amphibious exercise was initiated in the southeastern United States and the Caribbean. The training exercise, which was code named PHIBRIGLEX-62, was scheduled for October 15-30. On October 15 more than 40 ships involved in the exercise were underway. The objective of the exercise was to conduct an amphibious assault on Vieques Island, Puerto Rico. The stated intent of the assault was to overthrow the imaginary tyrant “Ortsac”—Castro spelled backwards. Approximately 20,000 naval personnel and 4,000 marines were involved in PHIBRIGLEX-62. The exercise was not suspended until October 20. The CINCLANT history of the missile crisis notes that “as early as about 10 October the National Military Command Center began inquiring informally of CINCLANT as to the nature and scope of PHIBRIGLEX-62. Without ever relating the exercise to the Cuban situation, there were indications of high-level interest in it.” (CINCLANT HistoricalAccount of Cuban Crisis—1963, pages 2-3)

18. Transcript of a Meeting at the White HouseSource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts. No classification marking. The source text is a 35-page transcript of audiotape 28.1. Identifying footnotes in the source text are not included. For Taylor’s draft account of this meeting, October 16, including a list of participants, and Carter’s memorandum for the record, dictated on October 17, see the Supplement. Carter’s memorandum is also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 145-147. McGeorge Bundy had informed the President about the U-2 photographs of the missile sites at 8:45 a.m. October 16, and Kennedy immediately called for a meeting of his principal advisers at 11:45. Washington, October 16, 1962, 11:50 a.m.

[Here follows 7-1/2 pages of the transcript, which narrate the analysis of the U-2 photographs.]

JFK: Secretary Rusk?

Rusk: Yes. [Well?],All brackets except those citing declassification excisions and unrelated material are in the source text. Mr. President, this is a, of course, a [widely?] serious development. It’s one that we, all of us, had not really believed the Soviets could, uh, carry this far. Uh, they, uh, seemed to be denying that they were going to establish bases of their own [in the same?] [words unintelligible] with a Soviet base, thus making it [essential to or essentially?] Cuban point of view. The Cubans couldn’t [word unintelligible] with it anyhow, so… . Now, um, I do think we have to set in motion a chain of events that will eliminate this base. I don’t think we [can?] sit still. The questioning becomes whether we do it by sudden, unannounced strike of some sort, or we, uh, build up the crisis to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in, or, or even the Cubans themselves, uh, take some, take some action on this. The thing that I’m, of course, very conscious of is that there is no such thing, I think, as unilateral action by the United States. It’s so [eminently or heavily?] involved with 42 allies and confrontation in many places, that any action that we take, uh, will greatly increase the risks of direct action involving, uh, our other alliances and our other forces in other parts of the world. Um, so I think we, we have to think very hard about two major, uh, courses of action as alternatives. One is the quick strike. The point where we [make or think?], that is the, uh, overwhelming, overriding necessity to take all the risks that are involved doing that. I don’t think this in itself would require an invasion of Cuba. I think that with or without such an invasion, in other words if we make it clear that, uh, what we’re doing is eliminating this particular base or any other such base that is established. We ourselves are not moved to general war, we’re simply doing what we said we would do if they took certain action. Uh, or we’re going to decide that this is the time to eliminate the Cuban problem by actually eliminating the island.

The other would be, if we have a few days—from the military point of view, if we have the whole time—uh, then I would think that, uh, there would be another course of action, a combination of things that, uh, we might wish to consider. Um, first, uh, that we, uh, stimulate the OAS procedure immediately for prompt action to make it quite clear that the entire hemisphere considers that the Rio Pact has been violated [and actually?] what acts should [we take or be taken?] in, under the terms of the Rio Pact. The OAS could constitute itself an organ of consultation promptly, although maybe, it may take two or three days to get, uh, instructions from governments and things of that sort. The OAS could, I suppose, at any moment, uh, take action to insist to the Cubans that an OAS inspection, uh, team be permitted to come and, itself, look directly at these sites, provide assurance[s?] to the hemisphere. That will undoubtedly be turned down, but it will be another step in building up the, uh, building a position.

I think also that we ought to consider getting some word to Castro, perhaps through the Canadian ambassador in Havana or through, uh, his representative at the U.N. Uh, I think perhaps the Canadian ambassador would be the best, the better channel to get to Castro [apart?] privately and tell him that, uh, this is no longer support for Cuba, that Cuba is being victimized here, and that, uh, the Soviets are preparing Cuba for destruction or betrayal.

You saw the Times story yesterday morning that high Soviet officials were saying, “We’ll trade Cuba for Berlin.” This ought to be brought to Castro’s attention. It ought to be said to Castro that, uh, uh, this kind of a base is intolerable and not acceptable. The time has now come when he must take the interests of the Cuban people, must now break clearly with the Soviet Union, prevent this missile base from becoming operational.

And I think there are certain military, um, uh, actions that we could, we might well want to take straight away. First, to, uh, to call up, uh, highly selective units [no more than?] 150,000. Unless we feel that it’s better, more desirable to go to a general national emergency so that we have complete freedom of action. If we announce, at the time that we announce this development—and I think we do have to announce this development some time this week—uh, we announce that, uh, we are conducting a surveillance of Cuba, over Cuba, and we will enforce our right to do so. We reject the mission of secrecy in this hemisphere in any matters of this sort. We, we reinforce our forces in Guantanamo. We reinforce our forces in the southeastern part of the United States—whatever is necessary from the military point of view to be able to give, to deliver an overwhelming strike at any of these installations, including the SAM sites. And, uh, also to take care of any, uh, MIGs or bombers that might make a pass at Miami or at the United States. Build up heavy forces, uh, if those are not already in position.

That, uh, we then would move openly and vigorously into the, into the guerrilla field, and, uh, create maximum confusion on the island. [You know?] won’t be too squeemish at this point about the overtness, covert [counter?] [word unintelligible] of what is being done.

We review our attitude on, an alternative Cuban government. We get Miro Cardona and his group in, Manuel Rey and his group, and see if they won’t get together on a progressive junta. Uh, that would pretty well combine all principal elements, other than the Batista group, as the leaders of Cuba. And, uh, have them, give them more of a status, whether we proceed to full recognition or not is something else, but get, get the Cuban elements highly organized on this matter.

I think also that we need a few days, um, to alert our other allies, for consultation with NATO. I’ll assume that we can move on this line at the same time to interrupt all air traffic from free world countries going into Cuba, insist to the Mexicans, the Dutch, that they stop their planes from coming in. Tell the British, who, and anyone else who’s involved at this point, that, uh, if they’re interested in peace, they’ve got to stop their ships from Cuban trade at this point. Uh, in other words, isolate Cuba completely without at this particular moment a, uh, a forceful blockade.

I think it would be important to use the, uh, consider, uh, calling in General Eisenhower, giving him a full briefing before a public announcement is made as to the situation and the [forcible?] action which you might determine upon.

But I think that, by and large, there are, there are these two broad alternatives: one, the quick strike; the other, to alert our allies and Mr. Khrushchev that there is utterly serious crisis in the making here, and that, uh … Mr. Khrushchev may not himself really understand that or believe that at this point. I think we’ll be facing a situation that could well lead to general war; that we have an obligation to do what has to be done but do it in a way that gives, uh, everybody a chance to, uh, put the [word unintelligible] down before it gets too hard. Those are my, my reactions of this morning, Mr. President. I naturally need to think about this very hard for the next several hours, uh, what I and what my colleagues at the State Department can do about it.

McNamara: Mr. President, there are a number of unknowns in this situation I want to comment upon, and, in relation to them, I would like to outline very briefly some possible military alternatives and ask General Taylor to expand upon them.

But before commenting on either the unknowns or outlining some military alternatives, there are two propositions I would suggest that we ought to accept as, uh, foundations for our further thinking. My first is that if we are to conduct an air strike against these installations, or against any part of Cuba, we must agree now that we will schedule that prior to the time these missile sites become operational. I’m not prepared to say when that will be, but I think it is extremely important that our talk and our discussion be founded on this premise: that any air strike will be planned to take place prior to the time they become operational. Because, if they become operational before the air strike, I do not believe we can state we can knock them out before they can be launched; and if they’re launched there is almost certain to be, uh, chaos in part of the east coast or the area, uh, in a radius of six hundred to a thousand miles from Cuba.

Uh, secondly, I, I would submit the proposition that any air strike must be directed not solely against the missile sites, but against the missile sites plus the airfields plus the aircraft which may not be on the airfields but hidden by that time plus all potential nuclear storage sites. Now, this is a fairly extensive air strike. It is not just a strike against the missile sites; and there would be associated with it potential casualties of Cubans, not of U.S. citizens, but potential casualties of Cubans in, at least in the hundreds, more likely in the low thousands, say two or three thousand. It seems to me these two propositions, uh, should underlie our, our discussion.

Now, what kinds of military action are we capable of carrying out and what may be some of the consequences? Uh, we could carry out an air strike within a matter of days. We would be ready for the start of such an air strike within, within a matter of days. If it were absolutely essential, it could be done almost literally within a matter of hours. I believe the chiefs would prefer that it be deferred for a matter of days, but we are prepared for that quickly. The air strike could continue for a matter of days following the initial day, if necessary. Uh, presumably there would be some political discussions taking place either just before the air strike or both before and during. In any event, we would be prepared, following the air strike, for an air, invasion, both by air and by sea. Approximately seven days after the start of the air strike, that would be possible if the political environment made it desirable or necessary at that time. [Fine?] Associated with this air strike undoubtedly should be some degree of mobilization. Uh, I would think of the mobilization coming not before the air strike but either concurrently with or somewhat following, say possibly five days afterwards, depending upon the possible invasion requirements. The character of the mobilization would be such that it could be carried out in its first phase at least within the limits of the authority granted by Congress. There might have to be a second phase, and then it would require a declaration of a national emergency.

Now, this is very sketchily the military, uh, capabilities, and I think you may wish to hear General Taylor, uh, outline his choice.

Speaker?: Almost too [words unintelligible] to Cuba.

Speaker?: Yes.

Taylor: Uh, we’re impressed, Mr. President, with the great importance of getting a, a strike with all the benefit of surprise, uh, which would mean ideally that we would have all the missiles that are in Cuba above ground where we can take them out. Uh, that, that desire runs counter to the strong point the Secretary made if the other optimum would be to get every missile before it could, becomes operational. Uh, practically, I think the, our knowledge of the timing of the readiness is going to be so, so, uh, difficult that we’ll never have the, the exact permanent, uh, the perfect timing. What we’d like to do is to look at this new photography, I think—and take any additional—and try to get the, the layout of the targets in as near an optimum, uh, position as possible, and then take ’em out without any warning whatsoever. That does not preclude, I don’t think, Mr. Secretary, some of the things you’ve been talking about. It’s a little hard to say in terms of time how much I’m discussing. But we must do a good job the first time we go in there, uh, pushing a 100 percent just as far, as closely as we can with our, with our strike. I’m having all the responsible planners in this afternoon, Mr. President, at four o’clock, to talk this out with ’em and get their best judgment.

I would also mention among the, the military actions we should take that once we have destroyed as many of these offensive weapons as possible, we should, should prevent any more coming in, which means a naval blockade. So I suppose that all … . And also a reinforcement of Guantanamo and evacuation of dependents. So, really, the, in point of time, I’m, I’m thinking in terms of three phases.

One, a, an initial pause of some sort while we get completely ready and get, get the right posture on the part of the target, so we can do the best job. Then, virtually concurrently, an air strike against, as the Secretary said, missiles, airfields, uh, unclear sites that we know of. At the same time, naval blockade. At the same time, reinforce Guantanamo and evacuate the dependents. I’d then start this continuous reconnaissance, the list that you had, continue over Cuba.

Then, then the decision can be made as we, as we’re mobilizing, uh, with the air strike as to whether we invade or not. I think that’s the hardest question militarily in the whole business—one which we should look at very closely before we get our feet in that deep mud in Cuba.

Rusk: There are st-, one or two things, Mr. President, uh. Gromyko asked to see you Thursday. Uh, it may be of some interest to know what he says about this, if he says anything. He may be bringing a message on this subject. Uh, but that… . I just want to remind you that you are seeing him and that may be relevant to this [topic?]. I might say incidentally, sir, that you delay anything else you have to do at this point.

Secondly, I don’t believe, myself, that the critical question is whether you get a particular missile before it goes off because if they shoot those missiles we are in general nuclear war. In other words, the Soviet Union has got quite a different decision to make. If they, if they shoot those missiles, want to shoot ’em off before they get knocked out by aircraft… . So, I’m not sure that this is, uh, necessarily the precise [critical?] element, Bob.

McNamara: Well, I would strongly emphasize that I think our time should be based on the assumption it is, Dean. We don’t know what kinds of communications the Soviets have with those sites. We don’t know what kinds of control they have over the warheads.

Rusk: Yes, [words unintelligible] …

McNamara: If we saw a warhead on the site and we knew that that launcher was capable of launching that warhead, I would … . Frankly, I would strongly urge against the air attack, to be quite frank about it, because I think the danger to this country in relation to the gain that would accrue with the excessive [time?]… . This is why I suggest that if we’re talking about an air attack, I believe we should consider it only on the assumption that we can carry if off before these become operational.

JFK: What is the, uh, advant- … . Must be some major reason for the Russians to, uh, set this up as a … . Must be that they’re not satisfied with their ICBMs. What’d be the reason that they would, uh … .

Taylor: What it’d give ’em is primary, it makes the launching base, uh, for short range missiles against the United States to supplement their rather [deceptive?]ICBM system, for example. There’s one reason.

JFK: Of course, I don’t see how we could prevent further ones from coming in by submarine.

Taylor: Well, I think that that thing is all over …

JFK: I mean if we let ’em blockade the thing, they come in by submarine.

McNamara: Well, I think the only way to prevent them coming in, quite frankly, is to say you’ll take them out the moment they come in. You’ll take them out and you’ll carry on open surveillance and you’ll have a policy to take them out if they come in. I think it’s really rather unrealistic to think that we could carry out an air attack of the kind we’re talking about. We’re talking about an air attack of several hundred sorties because we don’t know where these airplanes are.

Bundy: Are you absolutely clear of your premise that an air strike must go to the whole air complex?

McNamara: Well, we are, Mac …

Bundy: … air complex? [Appears to be a repeat of the words above.]

McNamara: … because we are fearful of these MIG 21s. We don’t know where they are. We don’t know what they’re capable of. If there are nuclear warheads associated with the launchers, you must assume there will be nuclear warheads associated with aircraft. Even if there are not nuclear warheads associated with aircraft, you must assume that those aircraft have high explosive potential. We have a serious air defense problem. We’re not prepared to report to you exactly, uh, what the Cuban air force is capable of; but I think we must assume that the Cuban air force is definitely capable of penetrating, in small numbers, our coastal air defense by coming in low over the water. And I would think that we would not dare go in against the missile sites, knock those out leaving intact Castro’s air force, and run the risk that he would use part or all of that air force against our coastal areas—either with or without nuclear weapons. It would be a, a very heavy price to pay in U.S. lives for the, the damage we did to Cuba.

Rusk: Still, about why the Soviets are doing this, um, Mr. McCone suggested some weeks ago that one thing Mr. Khrushchev may have in mind is that, uh, uh, he knows that we have a substantial nuclear superiority, but he also knows that we don’t really live under fear of his nuclear weapons to the extent that, uh, he has to live under fear of ours. Also we have nuclear weapons nearby, in Turkey and places like that. Um… .

JFK: How many weapons do we have in Turkey?

Taylor?: We have Jupiter missiles…

Bundy?: Yeah. We have how many?

McNamara?: About fifteen, I believe it is.

Bundy?: I think that’s right. I think that’s right.

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]

Rusk: But then there are also delivery vehicles that are, could easily …

McNamara: Aircraft.

Rusk: … be moved through the air, aircraft and so forth.

Speaker?: Route ’em through Turkey.

Rusk: Um, and that Mr. McCone expresses the view that Khrushchev may feel that it’s important for us to learn about living under medium-range missiles, and he’s doing that to sort of balance that, uh, that political, psychological [plank?]. I think also that, uh, Berlin is, uh, very much involved in this. Um, for the first time, I’m beginning really to wonder whether maybe Mr. Khrushchev is entirely rational about Berlin. We’ve [hardly?] talked about his obsession with it. And I think we have to, uh, keep our eye on that element. But, uh, they may be thinking that they can either bargain Berlin and Cuba against each other, or that they could provoke us into a kind of action in Cuba which would give an umbrella for them to take action with respect to Berlin. In other words like the Suez-Hungary combination. If they could provoke us into taking the first overt action, then the world would be confused and they would have, uh, what they would consider to be justification for making a move somewhere else. But, uh, I must say I don’t really see the rationality of, uh, the Soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.

Bundy: It’s important, I think, to recognize that they did make this decision, as far as our estimates now go, in early summer, and, this has been happening since August. Their TASS statement of September 12, which the experts, I think, attribute very strongly to Khrushchev himself, is all mixed up on this point. It has a rather explicit statement, “The harmless military equipment sent to Cuba designed exclusively for defense, defensive purposes. The President of the United States and the American military, the military of any country know what means of defense are. How can these means threaten United States?”

Now there, it’s very hard to reconcile that with what has happened. The rest, as the Secretary says, has many comparisons between Cuba and Italy, Turkey and Japan. We have other evidence that Khrushchev is, honestly believes, or, or at least affects to believe that we have nuclear weapons in, in Japan, that combination, [word unintelligible] …

Rusk:Gromyko stated that in his press conference the other day, too.

Bundy: Yeah. They may mean Okinawa.

Speaker?: Right.

McNamara: It’s not likely, but it’s conceivable the nuclear warheads for these launchers are not yet on Cuban soil.

Bundy: Now that seems to me that’s … . It’s perfectly possible that this, that they are in that sense a bluff. That doesn’t make them any less offensive to us …

McNamara: No.

Bundy: … because we can’t have proof about it.

McNamara: No, but it does possibly indicate a different course of action …

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: … and therefore, while I’m not suggesting how we should handle this, I think this is one of the most important actions we should take: to ascertain the location of the nuclear warheads for these missiles. Later in the discussion we can revert back to this. There are several alternative ways of approaching it.

JFK: Doug, do you have any … .

Dillon: No. The only thing I’d, would say is that, uh, this alternative course of, of warning, getting, uh, public opinion, uh, OAS action and telling people in NATO and everything like that, would appear to me to have the danger of, uh, getting us wide out in the open and forcing the Russians to, uh, Soviets to take a, a position that if anything was done, uh, they would, uh, have to retaliate. Whereas, uh, a, a quick action, uh, with a statement at the same time saying this is all there is to it, might give them a chance to, uh, back off and not do anything. Meanwhile, I think that the chance of getting through this thing without a Russian reaction is greater under a quick, uh, strike than, uh, building the whole thing up to a, a climax then going through… . [It will be a lot of debate on it?]

Rusk: That is, of course, a possibility, but, uh… .

Bundy: The difficulties—I, I share the Secretary of the Treasury’s feeling a little bit—the difficulties of organizing the OAS and NATO; the amount of noise we would get from our allies saying that, uh, they can live with Soviet MRBMs, why can’t we; uh, the division in the alliance; the certainty that the Germans would feel that we were jeopardizing Berlin because of our concern over Cuba. The prospect of that pattern is not an appetizing one …

Rusk: Yes, but you see …

Bundy: … [Words unintelligible]

Rusk: … uh, uh, everything turns crucially on what happens.

Bundy: I agree, Mr. Secretary.

Rusk: And if we go with the quick strike, then, in fact, they do back it up, then you’ve exposed all of your allies [word unintelligible], ourselves to all these great dangers without …

Bundy: You get all these noises again.

Rusk: … without, uh, the slightest consultation or, or warning or preparation.

JFK: But, of course, warning them, uh, it seems to me, is warning everybody. And I, I, obviously you can’t sort of announce that in four days from now you’re going to take them out. They may announce within three days they’re going to have warheads on ’em; if we come and attack, they’re going to fire them. Then what’ll, what’ll we do? Then we don’t take ’em out. Of course, we then announce, well, if they do that, then we’re going to attack with nuclear weapons.

Dillon: Yes, sir, that’s the question that nobody, I didn’t understand, nobody had mentioned, is whether this s-, uh, “take-out,” this mission, uh, was [word unintelligible] to deal with …

Speaker?: I don’t know.

Dillon: … high explosives?

Speaker?: High explosives, yes.

JFK: How effective can the take-out be, do they think?

Taylor?: It’ll never be a 100 percent, Mr. President, we know. Uh, we hope to take out a vast majority in the first strike, but this is not just one thing, one strike, one day, but continuous air attack for whenever necessary, whenever we di-, discover a target.

Bundy: They’re now talking about taking out the air force as well… .

Speaker?: I [could tell you that in the staff?].

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]

Bundy: I do raise again the question whether, uh, whether we [words unintelligible] the problem, military problem, but there is, I would think, a substantial political advantage in limiting the strike in surgical terms to the thing that is in fact the cause of action.

McNamara?: I suggest, Mr. President, that if you’re involved in several hundred strikes, this is what you would—and against airfields—this is what you would do, pre-invade. And, uh, it would be very difficult to convince anybody that this was not a pre-invasion strike. I think also once you get this volume of attack that public opinion reaction, uh, to this, as distinct from the reaction to an invasion, uh, there’s [word unintelligible] little difference. And, uh, from both standpoints, it would seem to me that if you’re talking about a, a general air attack program, you might as well think about whether we can eradicate the whole problem by an invasion just as simply with as little chance of reaction.

Taylor: Well, I would think we would have, should be in a position to invade at any time if we so desired. Hence that, uh, in this preliminary, we should be, uh, it’s all bonus if we are indeed taking out weapons [word unintelligible] …

JFK: Well, let’s say we just take out the missile bases, then, uh, they have some more there. Obviously they can get ’em in by submarine and so on, I don’t know whether you, you just can’t keep high strikes on.

Taylor: I suspect, Mr. President, we’d have to take out the surface-to-air missiles in order to get in, to get in, take some of them out. Maybe [words unintelligible].

JFK: How long will, do we estimate this will remain secure, this, uh, information, uh, people have it?

Bundy: In terms of the tightness of our intelligence control, Mr. President, I think we are in unusually and fortunately good position. We set up a, uh, new security classification governing precisely the field of offensive capability in Cuba just five days ago, four days ago, under General Carter. That, uh, limits this, uh, to people who have an immediate, operational necessity in intelligence terms to work on the data and the people who have …

JFK: How many would that be, about?

Bundy: Oh, that will be a very large number, but that’s not generally where leaks come from. Uh, the more [important?] limitation is that only officers with the policy responsibility for advice directly to you’ll receive this …

JFK: How many would get it over in the Defense Department, General, with your meeting this afternoon?

Taylor: Well, I was going to mention that. We’d have to ask for relaxation of the ground rules, uh, that, that Mac has just enunciated, so that I can, uh, give it to the senior commanders who are involved in the plans.

JFK: Would that be about fifty?

Taylor: By then… . No, sir. I would say that, uh, within, at this stage ten more.

McNamara: Well, Mr. President, I, I think, to be realistic, we should assume that this will become fairly widely known, if not in the newspapers, at least by political representatives of both parties within—I would, I’m just picking a figure—I’d say a week.

[Several speakers speak at once and none of the words are intelligible.]

McNamara: And I say that because we have, we have taken action already that is raising questions in people’s minds. Normally, when a U-2 comes back, we duplicate the films. The duplicated copies go to a series of commands. A copy goes to SAC. A copy goes to CINCLANT. A copy goes to CIA. And normally, uh, the photo interpreters and the, and the operational officers in these commands are looking forward to these. We have stopped all that, and this, this type of information is going on throughout the department. And I, I doubt very much that we can keep this out of the hands of, uh, of members of Congress, for example, for more than a week.

Rusk: Well, Senator Keating has already, in effect, announced it on the floor of the Senate.

Bundy: Senator Keating said this on the floor of the Senate on the tenth of October …

Rusk: [That’s correct?]

Bundy: … “Construction has begun on at least a half-dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles.”

Rusk: Well, that’s, that’s the way that [words unintelligible]. I think we can count on announcing it not later than Thursday or Friday of this week.

Taylor?: There is a refugee who’s a major source of intelligence on this, of course, who has described one of these missiles in terms which we can recognize, who is now in this country.

JFK: Is he the one who’s giving Keating his stuff?

Taylor?: We don’t know.

Bundy: My question, Mr. President, is whether as a matter of, uh, tactics we ought not to interview Senator Keating and check out his data. Seems to me that that ought to be done in a routine sort of way by an open officer of the intelligence agency.

Speaker?: I think that’s [right?].

JFK: You have any thoughts, Mr. Vice President?

Johnson: I agree with Mac that that ought to be done. I think that, uh, we’re committed at any time that we feel that there’s a build up that in any way endangers to take whatever action we must take to assure our security. I would think the Secretary’s evaluation of this thing being around all over the lot is a pretty accurate one, I would think it’d take a week to do it. Maybe a little before then.

I would, uh, like to hear what the responsible commanders have to say this afternoon. I think the question with the base is whether we take it out or whether we talk about it, and, uh, both, either alternative is a very distressing one, but of the two, I would take it out.

JFK: Well, uh, the, uh …

Johnson: Assuming these commanders felt that way. I’m fearful if we … . I spent the weekend with the ambassadors of the Organization of American States. I think this organization is fine, but I don’t think, I don’t rely on ’em much for any strength in anything like this. And, I, the fact that we’re talking about our other allies, uh, I take the position that Mr. Bundy says, We ought to be living all these years with [words unintelligible] get your blood pressure up. But the fact is the country’s blood pressure is up and they are fearful, and they’re insecure, and we’re getting divided, and, uh, I don’t think that, uh … . I take this little State Department Bulletin that you sent out to all the congressmen. One, one of the points you make—that any time the build up endangers or threatens our security in any way, we’re going to do whatever must be done immediately to protect our own security. And when you say that, why the, give unanimous support. People are really concerned about this, in my opinion. Uh, I think we have to be prudent and cautious, talk to the commanders and see what they say, what they’re … . [I’m] not much for circularizing it over the Hill or our allies, even though I realize it’s a breach of faith. It’s the one not to confer with them. We’re not going to get much help out of them.

Bundy: There is an intermediate position. There are perhaps two or three of our principal allies or heads of government we could communicate, at least on a 24-hour notice basis. Certainly ease, ease the …

Johnson: [Take a large?] [words unintelligible] [to?] stop the planes, stop the ships, stop the submarines and everything else from [sending?]. Just not going to permit it. And then stop them from coming in.

Speaker?: Yeah.

JFK: Uh, eh, well, this, which … . What you’re really talking about are two or three different, uh, [tense?] operations. One is the strike just on this, these three bases. One, the second is the broader one that Secretary McNamara was talking about, which is on the airfields and on the SAM sitesand on anything else connected with, uh, missiles. Third is doing both of those things and also at the same time launching a blockade, which requires really the, uh, the, uh, third and which is a larger step. And then, as I take it, the fourth question is the, uh, degree of consultation. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

Speaker?: Um.

JFK: Just have to [words unintelligible] and do it. Probably ought to tell them, though, the night before.

RFK: Mr. President.

JFK: Yes.

RFK: We have the fifth one, really, which is the invasion. I would say that, uh, you’re dropping bombs all over Cuba if you do the second, uh, air, the airports, knocking out their planes, dropping it on all their missiles. You’re covering most of Cuba. You’re going to kill an awful lot of people, and, uh, we’re going to take an awful lot of heat on it …

Speaker?: Yeah.

RFK: … and, uh, and then, uh, you know, the heat, you’re going to announce the reason that you’re doing it is because, uh, they’re sending in these kind of missiles. Well, I would think it’s almost incumbent upon the Russians, then, to say, Well, we’re going to send them in again, and if you do it again, we’re going to do, we’re going to do the same thing to Turkey, or We’re going to do the same thing to Iran.

[Here follow 5 pages of discussion of which targets might be attacked.]

JFK: I think we ought to, what we ought to do is, is, uh, after this meeting this afternoon, we ought to meet tonight again at six, consider these various, uh, proposals. In the meanwhile, we’ll go ahead with this maximum, whatever is needed from the flights, and, in addition, we will … . I don’t think we got much time on these missiles. They may be … . So it may be that we just have to, we can’t wait two weeks while we’re getting ready to, to roll. Maybe just have to just take them out, and continue our other preparations if we decide to do that. That may be where we end up. I think we ought to, beginning right now, be preparing to… . Because that’s what we’re going to do anyway. We’re certainly going to do number one; we’re going to take out these, uh, missiles. Uh, the questions will be whether, which, what I would describe as number two, which would be a general air strike. That we’re not ready to say, but we should be in preparation for it. The third is the, is the, uh, the general invasion. At least we’re going to do number one, so it seems to me that we don’t have to wait very long. We, we ought to be making those preparations.

Bundy: You want to be clear, Mr. President, whether we have definitely decided against a political track. I, myself, think we ought …

Taylor?: Well, we’ll have …

Bundy: … to work out a contingency on that.

Taylor?: We, we’ll develop both tracks.

JFK: [1½ lines of source text not declassified] We ought to just decide who we talk to and how long ahead and how many people, really, in the government. There’s going to be a difference between those who know that—this will leak out in the next few days—there are these, uh, uh, bases, until we say or the Pentagon or State won’t be harsh. We’ve already said it on the [words unintelligible]. So we, let’s say, we’ve got two or three days.

Bundy: Well, let’s play it, shall we play it still harder and, uh, simply say that there’s no evidence and that we have to …

JFK: We ought to stick the battle till we want to do something.

Bundy: … [words unintelligible] the alliance [words unintelligible].

JFK: Otherwise we give ourselves away, so let’s …

Bundy: May I make one other cover plan suggestion …

JFK: Yes.

Bundy: … Mr. President? There will be meetings in the White House. I think the best we can do is to keep the people with a specific Latin American business black and describe the rest as “intensive budget review sessions,” but I haven’t been able to think of any other …

JFK: Nobody, it seems to me, in the State Department. I discussed the matter with, uh, Bohlen of the Soviet bloc and told him he could talk to Thompson. So that’s those two. It seems to me that there’s no one else in the State Department that ought to be talked to about it …

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible] in the department.

JFK: … in any level at all, and, uh, until we know a little more. And then, as I say, in Defense we’ve got to keep it as tight as possible …

Speaker?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: … particularly what we’re going to do about it. Maybe a lot of people know about what’s there, but what we’re going to do about it really ought to be, you know, the tightest of all because otherwise we botch it up.

McNamara: Mr. President, may I suggest that we come back this afternoon prepared to, to answer three questions. First, should we surface our surveillance? I think this is a very important …

Speaker?: Very important point.

McNamara: … question at the moment. We ought to try to decide today either yes or no.

JFK: By “surface our” …

McNamara: I mean should we state publicly …

JFK?: Oh.

McNamara: … that, that you have stated we will, we’ll act to take out any offensive weapons. In order to be certain as to whether there are or are not offensive weapons, we are scheduling U-2 flights or other surveillance …

Carter?: What’s the [skull number, commissar?]. [Laughs]

McNamara: … or reconnaissance flights to, uh, to obtain this information. We’ll make the information, uh, public.

JFK: There may not be one. All right, why not?

McNamara: This is one question. A second question is: Should we precede the military action with political action? If so, on what, uh, timing? I would think the answer’s almost certainly, yes. And I wouldn’t, I would think particularly of the contacts with Khrushchev. And I would think that if these are to be done, they must be scheduled in terms of time very, very carefully in relation to a potential military action. There must be a very, very precise series of, of contacts with him, and indications of what we’ll do at certain times following that. And, thirdly, we should be prepared to answer your questions regarding the, the effect of these strikes and the time required to carry them off. I think …

JFK: How long would it take to get ’em organized.

McNamara: E-, e-, exactly. We’ll be prepared …

JFK: In other words, how many days from tomorrow morning would it … . How many mornings from tomorrow morning would it take to get the, to take out just these missile [sites] …

[Here follow the last 6 pages, which include a discussion of who should be informed and when the next meeting should take place.]

19. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Files, Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Helms. Another memorandum for the record of this meeting, drafted by Parrott, is ibid. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 153-154. Washington, October 16, 1962. SUBJECT Mongoose Meeting with the Attorney General At 2:30 this afternoon, the Attorney General convened in his office a meeting on Operation Mongoose consisting of General Lansdale and Colonel Patchell, General Johnson of the Joint Staff, Robert Hurwitch of State (vice Ed Martin who was unable to attend), Hewson Ryan of USIA, and the undersigned. The Attorney General opened the meeting by expressing the “general dissatisfaction of the President” with Operation Mongoose. He pointed out that the Operation had been under way for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem and again noted the small accomplishments despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale’s personal appointment by the President a year ago. The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation Mongoose more personal attention. In order to do this, he will hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the Mongoose operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwitch, Ryan, and General Johnson). The Attorney General spoke favorably of the sabotage paper which had been presented by General Carter this morning to the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented).Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Cuban Files, Job 80-B1676R, Box 17, Walter Elder Recop.) See the Supplement. He obviously did not like the earlier memorandum, since he felt it showed no “push” in getting on with the acts of sabotage. When asked for my comments, I stated that we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it aggressively. I pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation Mongoose would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. I related my conversation with the young Cuban from the DRE who pointed out that they were willing to commit their people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. I defined “sensible” in Cuban terminology these days as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberation of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin countries, would bail them out militarily. My point was specifically echoed by Hewson Ryan. The Attorney General’s rejoinder was a plea for new ideas of things that could be done against Cuba. In passing, he made reference to the change in atmosphere in the United States Government during the last twenty-four hours, and asked some questions about the percentage of Cubans whom we thought would fight for the regime if the country were invaded. The meeting concluded with the reaffirmation by the Attorney General of his desire to hold a meeting each day, beginning tomorrow. He said that these meetings might later be changed to every other day when and if he finds a daily get-together is not necessary. The meetings are to last no more than one-half hour. RHDeputy Director (Plans)
20. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-1662. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 2:35 p.m. October 16. Moscow, October 16, 1962, 7 p.m.

978. Policy. Khrushchev-Kohler—Part III—Cuba.Parts I, II, and IV of Kohler’s conversation with Khrushchev on October 15, transmitted in telegrams 973, 974, and 979 from Moscow, October 16, are in volume V; Part V, transmitted in telegram 981 from Moscow, October 16, is in vol. XV, pp. 359–362.

Khrushchev said he wanted to express his disappointment at one thing that adds fuel to fire of the cold war, namely, that US now is trying to stop Soviet airplanes from flying to Cuba. After I interjected confirmation, he said they regard this as unfriendly act. This is not wartime. We should be developing trade and culture between our countries. He could not understand why we were acting this way. Perhaps we were frightened and our leaders’ nerves were bad. If we were going to start a war, then he could understand it. US was boycotting trade with Cuba and appealing to all countries to stop their ships from going there. US is great country with population 183 million, while Cuba has only seven million. Could it really be that US was afraid of Cuba? Who would believe that Cuba was a nightmare for US? It was too small; even if it wanted to gobble up US, it couldn’t. (There followed some good-natured byplay about census figures.)Khrushchev said that what US was doing complicated life of simple people and did not simplify it. Result was to make Cuban people go hungry. What did US want? To start war? If not, what was happening? “Are you too afraid? Do you want to commit suicide?” When last war started in USSR, on third or fourth day, a certain General came to him, where he was serving as member of military council of front, and said everything was lost, just as in France. General said command must be changed. General went to sleep that night and next morning came into peasant hut in which Khrushchev was staying and shot himself. He was a coward, lost his self-control, and let his nerves dominate his mind. Had US become a coward? Such people end by shooting themselves. Did US want to commit suicide? Is this the state in which American imperialism now finds itself?

I said I should of course report his remarks to President. At Vienna, President had spoken very frankly to him about Cuba. Chairman was misinterpreting Castro regime. Not only US, but all Western Hemisphere countries, feel Castro has let Cuban people down. US and other Western Hemisphere states are not going to help Cuba. We are certainly not afraid of them but we don’t intend to help them. Of course, we have different views than Chairman about situation. Speaking as frankly as he had, I felt I must add that size of Soviet shipments to Cuba has increased feeling in US on this problem.

Khrushchev said we must be responsible, since our countries are great powers. We cannot demand that other countries live as we like or there would be war. US has bases in countries neighboring USSR, such as Turkey, as well as in Greece, Italy, France, West Germany and Pakistan. But USSR does not attack these countries. If US thinks it has right to do as it likes about Cuba, why hasn’t USSR right to do as it likes about these countries? If we acted that way, might would make right. UN Charter would lose its force. That would be policy of banditry. Cuba is small; US is big. “You are so afraid of Cuba, you almost lost your pants.” US is located in Western Hemisphere; what is it doing in Eastern Hemisphere?USSR does not recognize right of US to be everywhere in world and to rule everywhere. It was one thing when US was very powerful, but now there is a force as great as yours. We will never agree to your capitalistic way of thinking. Our policy is, let us live in peace. Let us have our socialism and you can have your capitalism. Let’s respect internal affairs of other countries and not interfere with life of other countries. Take, for example, Shah of Iran, whom we don’t like. But we have no intention of attacking him. Or take Afghanistan, country with monarchical government. Its King recently visited me here and I entertained him. He is a nice fellow. We have good relations with him and this is the way it should be.

I said I took note of Chairman’s remarks. President has made it clear we are not going to interfere in Cuba by force. But we are not going to help Cuba, which does not mean we intend to interfere there.

Khrushchev accepted this, saying he also understood President that way but must still express his disappointment about blockade, which is inimical action. Let the people choose their own system. As a result of blockade, Cuban people are suffering and will become more embittered against US. You should trade with Cuba, as we do with Turkey and other of your allies. Why are you not trading with us? You want to strangle us. But you’ve lost any real understanding of history.

21. Off the Record Meeting on CubaSource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, Transcripts. No classification marking. The source text is a 52-page transcript of audiotapes 28.2 and 28A.1. Identifying footnotes in the source text are not included. Following the first meeting at the White House (see Document 18) the JCS and the commanders involved with Cuba planning met at 4:30 p.m. They were joined by McNamara at 5:40 p.m., and agreed that all significant military targets in Cuba and not just the missiles should be attacked. (History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, Part II, p. 246) At the same time Rusk, Ball, Martin, U. Alexis Johnson, Bohlen, Thompson, and Stevenson met to discuss Cuba. No record of these discussions has been found but they are cited in Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) Following the 6:30 p.m. meeting many of the participants went to the Department of State for further discussions, which ended at approximately 11 p.m. (Chronology of the Cuban Crisis, November 14; Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files:FRC 65 A 3501, Cuba, 1962) No other record of these discussions has been found. Washington, October 16, 1962, 6:30–7:55 p.m.

JFK: Uh, anything in ’em?

Carter: Nothing on the additional film, sir. We have a much better read-out on what we had initially. There’s good evidence of their back-up missiles for each of the four launchers at each of the three sites, so that there would be twice the number for a total of eight which could eventually be erected. This would mean a capability of from sixteen or possibly twenty-four missiles. We feel, on the basis of information that we presently have, that these are solid propellant, inertial guidance missiles with eleven-hundred-mile range rather than the oxygen propellant, uh, radar-controlled. Primarily because we have no indication of any radar or any indication of any oxygen equipment. And it would appear to be logical from an intelligence estimate viewpoint that if they are going to this much trouble that they would go ahead and put in the eleven hundred miles because of the tremendously increased threat coverage. Let me see that [words unintelligible].All brackets except those citing declassification excisions and unrelated material are in the source text.

JFK: What is this map?

Carter: That’s, shows the circular range …

JFK: When was this drawn?

Carter: … capability.

JFK: Is this drawn in relation to this information?

Carter: Uh, no, sir. It was drawn in, uh, some time ago, I believe, but the ranges there are the nominal ranges of the missiles rather than the maximum.

Speaker ?: The circles [around, or are added?] …

Carter: That’s a ten hundred and twenty circle, as against eleven hundred.

JFK: Well, I was just wondering, uh, whether, uh, San Diego de los Banos is where these missiles are?

Carter: Uh, yes, sir. Well, the …

JFK: Well, I wonder how many of these have been printed out.

Bundy: Yeah, well, the circle is drawn in red ink on the map, Mr. President.

Carter: The circle is …

JFK: Oh, I see. It was never printed?

Carter: No, that’s on top.

JFK: I see. It isn’t printed.

Carter: It would appear that with this type of missile, with the solid propellant and inertial guidance system, that they could well be operational within two weeks as we look at the pictures now. And once operational, uh, they could fire on very little notice. They’ll have a refire rate of from four to six hours over each launcher.

JFK: What about the vulnerability of such a missile to a, t-, uh, bullets?

Speaker ?: Highly vulnerable, [Mr. President?].

Carter: Uh, they’re vulnerable. They’re not nearly as vulnerable as the oxygen propellant, but they are vulnerable to ordinary rifle fire. We have no evidence whatsoever of any nuclear warhead storage near the field launchers. However, ever since last February we have been observing an unusual facility which now has automatic anti-aircraft weapon protection. This is at [Bahu?]. There are some similarities, but also many points of dissim-, similarity between this particular facility and the national storage sites in the Soviet Union. It’s the best candidate for a site, and we have that marked for further surveillance. However, there is really totally inadequate evidence to say that there is a nuclear storage capability now. These are field-type launchers. They have mobile support, erection and check-out equipment. And they have a four-in-line deployment pattern in launchers which is identical—complexes about five miles apart—representative of the deployments that we note in the Soviet Union for similar missiles.

JFK: Uh, General, how long would you say we had, uh, before these—at least to the best of your ability for the ones we now know—will be ready to fire?

Carter: Well, our people estimate that these could be fully operational within two weeks. Uh, this would be the total complex. If they’re the oxygen type, uh, we have no… . It would be considerably longer since we don’t have any indication of, uh, oxygen refueling there nor any radars.

Speaker ?: This wouldn’t rule out the possibility that one of them might be operational very much sooner.

Carter: [Well, or No?], one of ’em, uh, one of them could be operational much sooner. Our people feel that this has been, being put in since probably early September. We have had two visits of a Soviet ship that has an eight-foot-hold capacity sideways. And this about, so far, is the only delivery vehicle that we would have any suspicion that they came in on. And that came in late August, and one in early September. [Uh… .]

Speaker ?: Why would they have to be sideways [though?]?

Carter: Well, it’s just easier to get ’em in, I guess.

Speaker ?: [Well?], this way it sets down on [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: Well, all right.

Speaker ?: Fine.

Rusk: Uh, the, the, the total readout on the, uh, flights yesterday will be ready tonight, you think?

Carter: It should be, uh, finished pretty well by midnight.

JFK: Now what, that was supposed to have covered the whole island, was it, uh?

Carter: Uh, yes, sir.

JFK: Except for …

Carter: In two throws. But, uh, part of the central and, in fact, much of the central and part of the eastern was cloud covering. The western half was, uh, in real good shape.

JFK: I see. Now what have we got laying on for tomorrow?

Carter: There are seven, six or seven …

McNamara: I just left [word unintelligible] [equipment?]. We’re having ready seven U-2 aircraft: two high-altitude U-2s, five lesser-altitude U-2s; six equipped with an old type film, one equipped with a new type, experimental film which hopefully will increase the resolution. We only need two aircraft flying tomorrow if the weather is good. We will put up only two if the weather is good. If the weather is not good, we’ll start off with two and we’ll have the others ready to go during the day as the weather improves. We have weather aircraft surrounding the periphery of Cuba, and we’ll be able to keep track of the weather during the day over all parts of the island. Hopefully, this will give us complete coverage tomorrow. We are planning to do this, or have the capability to do this, every day thereafter for an indefinite period.

Carter: This is a field-type missile, and from collateral evidence, not direct, that we have with the Soviet Union, it’s designed to be fielded, placed and fired in six hours. Uh, it would appear that we have caught this in a very early stage of deployment. It would also appear that there does not seem to be the degree of urgency in getting them immediately into position. This could be because they have not been surveyed. Or it could be because it is the shorter-range missile and the radars and the oxygen has not yet arrived.

JFK: There isn’t any question in your mind, however, uh, that it is an intermediate-range missile?

Carter: No, there’s no question in our minds at all. These are …

JFK: Just [word unintelligible] …

Carter: … all the characteristics that we have seen, [live ones?].

Rusk: You’ve seen actual missiles themselves and not just the boxes have you?

Carter: No, we’ve seen… . In the picture there is an actual missile.

Rusk: Yeah. Sure there is.

Carter: Yes. There’s no question in our mind, sir. And they are genuine. They are not, uh, a camouflage or covert attempt to fool us.

Bundy: How much do we know, uh, [Pat?]? I don’t mean to go behind your judgment here, except that there’s one thing that would be really catastrophic would be to make a judgment here on, on a bad guess as to whether these things are. We mustn’t do that.

Carter: Well …

Bundy: How do we really know what these missiles are and what their range is?

Carter: Only that from the read-out that we have now and in the judgment of our analysts and of the guided missile and astronautics committee, which has been convening all afternoon, these signatures are identical with those that we have clearly earmarked in the Soviet Union, and have fully verified.

Bundy: What [made?] the verification? That’s really my question. How do we know what a given Soviet missile will do?

Carter: We, uh, know something from the range firings that we have vetted for the past two years. And we know also from comparison with the characteristics of our own missiles as to size and length and diameter. Uh, as to these particular missiles, we have a family of Soviet missiles for which we have all accepted the, uh, specifications.

Bundy: I know that we have accepted them …

Carter: This is …

Bundy: … and I know that we’ve had these things in charts for years, but I don’t know how we know.

Carter: Well, we know from a number of sources, including our Ironbark sources, as well as from range firings, which we have been vetting for several years, as to the capabilities. But, uh, I would have to get the analysts in here to give you the play-by-play account.

Rusk: Pat, we don’t know of any sixty-five-foot Soviet missile that has a range of, say, fifteen miles, do we?

Carter: Fifteen miles? No, we certainly don’t.

Rusk: In other words, if they are missiles this size, they are missiles of considerable range, I think.

McNamara: I tried to prove today—I am, I’m satisfied—that these were not MRBMs. And I worked long on it. I got our experts out, and I could not find evidence that would support any conclusion other than that they are MRBMs. Now, whether they’re eleven-hundred miles, six-hundred mile, nine-hundred mile is still a guess in my opinion. But that they are MRBMs seems the most probable assumption at the moment.

Speaker ?: I would apparently agree, uh, given the weight of it.

JFK: Is General Taylor coming over?

McNamara: He is, uh, Mr. President.

JFK: Have you finished, General?

Carter: Yes, sir. That, I think that’s at, uh, [word unintelligible] …

Rusk: [Because?] we’ve had some further discussion meetings this afternoon and we’ll be working on it [presently?] this evening,Presumably a reference to the President’s address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, April 20, 1961; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 304-306. but, um, I might mention certain points that are, some of us are concerned about. The one is, um, the chance that, uh, this might be the issue on which, uh, Castro would elect to break with Moscow if he knew that he were in deadly jeopardy. Now, this is one chance in a hundred, possibly. But, in any event, um, we, we’re very much, uh, interested in the possibility of a direct message to Castro, uh, as well as Khrushchev, might make some sense here before an actual strike is put on. Uh, Mr. Martin will present you with outline, uh, the kind of, uh, message to Castro that, uh, we had in mind.

Martin: This would be an oral note, message through a third party. Uh, first, uh, describing just what we know about what exists in th-, the missile sites, so that he knows that we are informed about what’s going on. Uh, second, to point out that the issues this raises as far as the U.S. security is concerned, it’s a breach of two of the points that you have made public. Uh, first, the ground-to-ground missile, and, second, obviously, it’s a Soviet-operated base in Cuba. Uh, thirdly, this raises the greatest problems for Castro, as we see it. In the first place, uh, by this action the Soviets have, uh, threatened him with attack from the United States, and, uh, therefore the overthrow of his regime; used his territory to, uh, make this, uh, to put him in this jeopardy. And, secondly, the Soviets are talking to other people about the possibility of bargaining this support and these missiles, uh, against concessions in Berlin and elsewhere, and therefore are threatening to, to bargain him away. Uh, in these circumstances, we wonder whether he, uh, realizes the, the position that, uh, he’s been put in and the way the Soviets are using him.

Then go on to say that, uh, we will have to inform our people of the threat that exists here, and we mean to take action about it in the next day or so. And we’ll have to do this unless we receive word from him that he is prepared to take action to get the Soviets out of the site. Uh, he will have to show us that not only by statements, privately or publicly, but, uh, by action; that we intend to, uh, keep close surveillance by overflights of the site to make su-, to know what is being done. But we will have to know that he is doing something to remove this threat, uh, in order to withhold the action that we intend to, we will be compelled to take.

Uh, if, uh, Castro feels that an attempt by him to take the kind of action that we’re suggesting to him, uh, would result in serious difficulties for him within Cuba, we at least want him to know that, uh, er, to, and to convey to him and remind him of the statement that you, Mr. President, made a year and a half ago in effect that there are two points that are non-negotiable. One is the Soviet tie and presence, and the second is aggression in Latin America. This is a, a hint, but no more than that, that, uh, we might have sympathy and help for him in case he ran into trouble trying to throw the old-line Communists and the Soviets out.

Rusk: Yes.

Martin: We’ll give him twenty-four hours to respond.

Rusk: The disadvantage in that is, of course, the, uh, the advance notice if he judges that we, we would not in this, in such approach here say exactly what we would do, but, uh, it might, of course, lead him to bring up mobile anti-aircraft weapons around these, uh, missiles themselves, uh, or, uh, take some other action that will make the strike that more difficult. Um, but there is that, there is that [move that?].

There are two other problems that we are concerned about. Uh, if we strike these missiles, we would expect, I think, uh, maximum Communist reaction in Latin America. In the case of about six of those governments, unless the heads of government had some intimation, uh, requiring some preparatory steps from the security point of view, uh, one or another of those governments could easi-, uh, could easily be over thrown—they, Venezuela for example or Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile, possibly even Mexico—uh, and therefore, uh, uh, the question will arise as to whether we should not somehow, uh, indicate to them in some way the seriousness of the situation so they can take precautionary steps, whether we tell them exactly what we have in mind or, or not.

The other is the NATO problem. Um, we, uh, we would estimate that the Soviets, uh, would almost certainly take, uh, some kind of action somewhere. Um, for us to, to take an action of this sort without letting, uh, our closer allies know of a matter which could subject them to very great, uh, danger, uh, is a very, uh, far-reaching decision to make. And, uh, we could find ourselves, uh, isolated and the alliance crumbling, very much as it did for a period during the Suez affair, but at a moment of much greater danger over an issue of much greater danger than the Suez affair, for the alliance. I think that these are matters that we’ll be working on very hard this evening, but I think I ought to mention them because it’s, uh, necessarily a part of this problem.

JFK: Can we get a little idea about what the military thing is? Well, of course, one, would you suggest taking these out?

McNamara: Yes, Mr. President. Uh, General Taylor has just been with the Chiefs, and the unified commanders went through this, uh, in detail. Uh, to take out only the missiles, uh, or to take out the missiles and the MIG aircraft and the associated nuclear storage facilities if we locate them, uh, could be done in twenty-four-hours’ warning. That is to say, twenty-four hours between the time of decision and the time of strike, uh, starting with a decision no later than, no earlier than this coming Friday and with the strike therefore on Saturday,October 19 and 20. or anytime thereafter with twenty-four hours between the decision and time of strike. Uh, General Taylor will wish to comment on this, but the Chiefs are strong in their recommendation against that kind of an attack, believing that it would leave, uh, too great a capability in Cuba undestroyed. The specific number of sorties required to, to accomplish this end has not been worked out in detail. The capability is for something in excess of seven hundred sorties per day. Uh, it seems highly unlikely that that number would be required to carry out that limited an objective, but at least that capability is available in the air force alone, and the navy sorties would rise on top of that number. The Chiefs have also considered other alternatives extending into the full invasion, uh, you may wish to discuss later. But that’s the answer to your first question.

JFK: That would be taking out these three missile sites, uh, plus all the MIGs?

McNamara: Well, you can go from the three missile sites to the three missile sites plus the MIGs, to the three missile sites plus MIGs plus nuclear storage plus airfields and so on up through the offensive, potential offensive [words unintelligible] …

JFK: Just the three missiles, however, would be?

McNamara: Could be done with twenty-four-hours’ notice and would require, uh, a relatively small number of sorties, less than a day’s air attack, in other words.

JFK: Of course, all you’d really get there would be… . What would you get there? You’d get the, probably you’d get the missiles themselves that are, have to be on the …

McNamara: You’d get the launchers …

JFK: … [Words unintelligible].

McNamara: … the launchers and the missiles on the [words unintelligible] …

JFK: The launchers are just what? They, they’re not much are they?

McNamara: No, they’re simply a mobile launchers, uh, device.

Taylor: This is a point target, Mr. , uh, President. You’re never sure of having, absolutely of getting everything down there. We intend to do a great deal of damage because we can [words unintelligible]. But, as the Secretary says here, there was unanimity among all the commanders involved in the Joint Chiefs, uh, that in our judgment, it would be a mistake to take this very narrow, selective target because it invited reprisal attacks and it may be detrimental. Now if the, uh, Soviets have been willing to give, uh, nuclear warheads to these missiles, there is every, just as good reason for them to give nuclear capability to these bases. We don’t think we’d ever have a chance to take ’em again, so that we lose this, the first strike surprise capability. Our recommendation would be to get complete intelligence, get all the photography we need, the next two or three days, no, no hurry in our book. Then look at this target system. If it really threatens the United States, then take it right out with one hard crack.

JFK: That would be taking out the, uh, some of those fighters, bombers and …

Taylor: Fighters, the bombers, uh, IL-28s may turn up in this photography. It’s not that all unlikely there’re some there.

JFK: Think you could do that in one day?

Taylor: Uh, we think that the first strike, we’d get a great majority of this. We’ll never get it all, Mr. President. But we then have to come back day after day for several days—we said, uh, five days perhaps—to do the complete job. Uh, meanwhile, we could then be making up our mind as to whether or not to go on and invade the island. I’m very much impressed with the need for a time something like five to seven days for this air purpose because of the parachute aspect of the in-, proposed invasion. You can’t take parachute formations, close formations of, uh, troop carrier planes in in the face of any air opposition really. So the first job, before the, any land, uh, attack, including [parachutes or paratroops?], is really cleaning out the, the MIGs and the, uh, the accompanying aircraft.

McNamara: Mr. President, could I outline three courses …

JFK?: [Yes?].

McNamara: … of action we have considered and speak very briefly on each one? The first is what I would call the political course of action, in which we, uh, follow some of the possibilities that Secretary Rusk mentioned this morning by approaching Castro, by approaching Khrushchev, by discussing with our allies. An overt and open approach politically to the problem [attempting, or in order?] to solve it. This seemed to me likely to lead to no satisfactory result, and it almost stops subsequent military action. Because the danger of starting military action after they acquire a nuclear capability is so great I believe we would decide against it, particularly if that nuclear capability included aircraft as well as, as, uh, uh, missiles, as it well might at that point.

A second course of action we haven’t discussed but lies in between the military course we began discussing a moment ago and the political course of action is a course of action that would involve declaration of open surveillance; a statement that we would immediately impose an, uh, a blockade against offensive weapons entering Cuba in the future; and an indication that with our open-surveillance reconnaissance, which we would plan to maintain indefinitely for the future, we would be prepared to immediately attack the Soviet Union in the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country …

Bundy: Attack who?

McNamara: The Soviet Union. In the event that Cuba made any offensive move against this country. Now this lies short of military action against Cuba, direct military action against Cuba. It has some, some major defects.

But the third course of action is any one of these variants of military action directed against Cuba, starting with an air attack against the missiles. The Chiefs are strongly opposed to so limited an air attack. But even so limited an air attack is a very extensive air attack. It’s not twenty sorties or fifty sorties or a hundred sorties, but probably several hundred sorties. Uh, we haven’t worked out the details. It’s very difficult to do so when we lack certain intelligence that we hope to have tomorrow or the next day. But it’s a substantial air attack. And to move from that into the more extensive air attacks against the MIGs, against the airfields, against the potential nuclear storage sites, against the radar installations, against the SAM sites means, as, as Max suggested, possibly seven hundred to a thousand sorties per day for five days. This is the very, very rough plan that the Chiefs have outlined, and it is their judgment that that is the type of air attack that should be carried out. To move beyond that into an invasion following the air attack means the application of tens of thousands, between ninety and, and, uh, over a hundred and fifty thousand men to the invasion forces. It seems to me almost certain that any one of these forms of direct military action will lead to a Soviet military response of some type some place in the world. It may well be worth the price. Perhaps we should pay that. But I think we should recognize that possibility, and, moreover, we must recognize it in a variety of ways. We must recognize it by trying to deter it, which means we probably should alert SAC, probably put on an airborne alert, perhaps take other s-, alert measures. These bring risks of their own, associated with them. It means we should recognize that by mobilization. Almost certainly, we should accompany the initial air strike with at least a partial mobilization. We should accompany an, an invasion following an air strike with a large-scale mobilization, a very large-scale mobilization, certainly exceeding the limits of the authority we have from Congress requiring a declaration therefore of a national emergency. We should be prepared, in the event of even a small air strike and certainly in the event of a larger air strike, for the possibility of a Cuban uprising, which would force our hand in some way. Either force u-, us to accept a, a, uh, an unsatisfactory uprising, with all of the adverse comment that result; or would, would force an invasion to support the uprising.

Rusk: Mr. President, may I make a very brief comment on that? I think that, um, uh, any course of action involves heavy political involvement. Um, it’s going to affect all sorts of policies, positions, uh, as well as the strategic situation. So I don’t think there’s any such thing as a nonpolitical course of action. I think also that, um, uh, we have to consider what political preparation, if any, is to occur before an air strike or in connection with any military action. And when I was talking this morning, I was talking about some steps which would put us in the best position to crack the …

JFK: I think the difficulty …

Rusk: … the strength of Cuba.

JFK: … it seems to me, is… . I completely agree that there isn’t any doubt that if we announced that there were MRBM sites going up that that would change, uh, we would secure a good deal of political support, uh, after my statement; and, uh, the fact that we indicated our desire to restrain, this really would put the burden on the Soviet. On the other hand, the very fact of doing that makes the military… . We lose all the advantages of our strike. Because if we announce that it’s there, then it’s quite obvious to them that we’re gonna probably do something about it. I would assume. Now, I don’t know, that, it seems to me what we ought to be thinking about tonight is if we made an announcement that the intelligence has revealed that there are, and if we [did the note?] message to Khrushchev… . I don’t think, uh, that Castro has to know we’ve been paying much attention to it any more than… . Over a period of time, it might have some effect, [have settled?] back down, change. I don’t think he plays it that way. So [have?] a note to Khrushchev… . I don’t… . It seems to me, uh, my press statement was so clear about how we wouldn’t do anything under these conditions and under the conditions that we would. He must know that we’re going to find out, so it seems to me he just, uh …

Bundy: That’s, of course, why he’s been very, very explicit with us in communications to us about how dangerous this is, and …

JFK: That’s right, but he’s …

Bundy: … the TASS statement and his other messages.

JFK: He’s initiated the danger really, hasn’t he? He’s the one that’s playing [his card, or God?], not us. So we could, uh …

Rusk: And his statement to Kohler on the subject of his visit and so forth, completely hypocritical.

[Reel 1 ends.]

[Reel 2 begins mid-conversation.]

McNamara: … Cuba. Is a great possibility they can place them in operational condition quickly. Unless, as General Carter said, the system may have a, a normal reaction time, set-up time of six hours. Whether it has six hours or two weeks, we don’t know how much time has started, nor do we know what air-launch capabilities they have for warheads. We don’t know what air-launch capability they have for high explosives. It’s almost certainly, uh, a, a substantial high-explosive capability in the sense that they could drop one or two or ten high-explosive bombs some place along the East Coast. And that’s the minimum risk to this country we run as a result of advance warning, too.

Taylor: I’d like to stress this last point, Mr. President. We are very vulnerable to conventional bombing attack, low-level bombing attacks in the Florida area. Our whole, uh, air defense has been oriented in other directions. We’ve never had low-level defenses prepared for this country. So it would be entirely possible for MIGs to come through with conventional weapons and do some amount, some damage.

JFK: Yeah. Not, uh, talking overall, not a great deal of damage …

Taylor: No, but it certainly is fair to …

JFK: … if they get one strike.

Dillon: What if they carry a nuclear weapon?

JFK: Well, if they carry a nuclear weapon… . You assume they wouldn’t do that.

Taylor: [Words unintelligible] I think we would expect some conventional weapon.

Rusk: I would not think that they would use a nuclear weapon unless they’re prepared to [join?] a nuclear war, I don’t think. I just don’t s-, don’t, don’t see that possibility.

Speaker ?: I would agree.

Bundy?: I agree.

Rusk: That would mean that, uh, we could be just utterly wrong, but, uh, we’ve never really believed that, that Khrushchev would take on a general nuclear war over Cuba.

Bundy: May I ask a question in that context?

JFK: We certainly have been wrong about what he’s trying to do in Cuba. There isn’t any doubt about that [possibly a word unintellig-ible] …

Bundy: [Words unintelligible] that we’ve been wrong.

JFK: … many of us thought that he was going to put MRBMs on Cuba.

Bundy: Yeah. Except John McCone.

Carter: Mr. McCone.

JFK: Yeah.

Bundy: But, the, uh, question that I would like to ask is, quite aside from what we’ve said—and we’re very hard-locked onto it, I know—What is the strategic impact on the position of the United States of MRBMs in Cuba? How gravely does this change the strategic balance?

McNamara: Mac, I asked the Chiefs that this afternoon, in effect. And they said, substantially. My own personal view is, not at all.

Bundy: Not so much.

McNamara: And, and I think this is an important element here. But it’s all very …

Carter: The reason our estimators didn’t think that they’d put them in there because of …

McNamara: That’s what they said themselves …

Bundy: That’s what they said themselves… .

McNamara: … in TASS statement.

Bundy: Yeah.

Carter: But then, going behind that …

JFK: [But why? Did it indicate? Being?] valuable enough?

Bundy: Doesn’t prove anything in the strategic balance [overall?].

Carter: Doesn’t prove anything. That was what the estimators felt, and that the Soviets would not take the risk. Mr. McCone’s reasoning, however, was if this is so, then what possible reason have they got for going into Cuba in the manner in which they are with surface-to-air, uh, missiles and cruise-type missiles. He just couldn’t understand while their, why the Soviets were so heavily bol-, bolstering Cuba’s defensive posture. There must be something behind it, which led him then to the belief that they must be coming in with MRBMs.

Taylor: I think it was [cold-blooded?] …

Carter: [Words unintelligible]

Taylor: … point of view, Mr. President. You’re quite right in saying that these, these are just a few more missiles, uh, targeted on the United States. Uh, however, they can become a, a very, a rather important adjunct and reinforcement to the, to the strike capability of the Soviet Union. We have no idea how far they will go. But more than that, these are, uh, uh, to our nation it means, it means a great deal more. You all are aware of that, in Cuba and not over in the Soviet Union.

Bundy: Well, I ask the question …

Taylor: Yeah.

Bundy: … with an awareness [laughter?] of the political …

JFK: I will say, my understanding’s that …

Bundy: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: … let’s just say that, uh, they get, they get these in there and then you can’t, uh, they get sufficient capacity so we can’t, uh, with warheads. Then you don’t want to knock ’em out [’cause?], uh, there’s too much of a gamble. Then they just begin to build up those air bases there and then put more and more. I suppose they really… . Then they start getting ready to squeeze us in Berlin, doesn’t that… . You may say it doesn’t make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flyingfrom the Soviet Union or one that was ninety miles away. Geography doesn’t mean that much.

Taylor: We’d have to target them with our missiles and have the same kind of, of pistol-pointed-at-the-head situation as we have in the Soviet Union at the present time.

Bundy: No question, if this thing goes on, an attack on Cuba becomes general war. And that’s really the question whether …

JFK: That’s why it shows the Bay of Pigs was really right. [We’ve, or We’d?] got it right. That was better and better and worse and worse.

Taylor: I’m [a pessimist,?] Mr. President. We have a war plan over there for you, calls for a, uh, for a quarter of a million Americans—soldiers, marines and airmen—to take an island we launched eighteen hundred Cubans against a year and a half ago.

[Faint laughter]

Taylor: [We’ve changed?] our evaluations well.

RFK: Of course, the other problem is, uh, in South America a year from now. And the fact that you got, uh, these things in the hands of Cubans, here, and then you, say your, some problem arises in Venezuela, er, you’ve got Castro saying, You move troops down into that part of Venezuela, we’re going to fire these missiles.

Taylor: Well, I think you’ve [words unintelligible].

RFK: I think that’s the difficulty …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible].

RFK: … rather than the [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible].

RFK: I think it gives the [word unintelligible] image.

JFK: It makes them look like they’re coequal with us and that …

Dillon: We’re scared of the Cubans.

RFK: We let the, uh… . I mean like we’d hate to have it in the hands of the Chinese. [Possibly words unintelligible]

Dillon: [Right?] I agree with that sort of thing very strongly.

Martin: It’s a psychological factor. It won’t reach as far as Venezuela is concerned.

Dillon: Well, that’s …

McNamara: It’ll reach the U.S. though. This is the point.

Speaker ?: That’s the point.

Dillon: Yeah. That is the point.

Martin: Yeah. The psychological factor of our having taken it.

Dillon: Taken it, that’s the best.

RFK: Well, and the fact that if you go there, we’re gonna fire it.

JFK: What’s that again, Ed? What are you saying?

Martin: Well, it’s a psychological factor that we have sat back and let ’em do it to us, that is more important than the direct threat. Uh, it is a threat in the Caribbean …

JFK: [Words unintelligible] I said we weren’t going to.

Martin: … [Words unintelligible].

Bundy?: That’s something we could manage.

JFK: Last month I said we weren’t going to.

[Laughter]

JFK: Last month I should have said we’re …

Speaker ?: Well …

JFK: … that we don’t care. But when we said we’re not going to and then they go ahead and do it, and then we do nothing, then …

Speaker ?: That’s right.

JFK: … I would think that our risks increase. Uh, I agree. What difference does it make? They’ve got enough to blow us up now anyway. I think it’s just a question of… . After all this is a political struggle as much as military. Well, uh, so where are we now? Where is the… . Don’t think the message to Castro’s got much in it. Uh, let’s just, uh, let’s try to get an answer to this question. How much… . It’s quite obviously to our advantage to surface this thing to a degree before… . First to inform these governments in Latin America, as the Secretary suggests; secondly to, uh, the rest of NATO—[1 line of source text not declassified]. Uh, how much does this diminish… . Not that we’re going to do anything, but the existence of them, without any say about what we’re gonna do. Let’s say we, twenty-four hours ahead of our doing something about it, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] we make a public statement that these have been found on the island. That would, that would be notification in a sense that, uh, of their existence, and everybody could draw whatever conclusion they wanted to.

Martin?: I would say this, Mr. President, that I would, that if you’ve made a public statement, you’ve got to move immediately, or they, you’re going to have a …

JFK: Oh, I …

Martin?: … a [words unintelligible] in this country.

JFK: … oh, I understand that. We’ll be talking about… . Say, say we’re going to move on a Saturday and we would say on Friday that these MRBMs, that the existence of this presents the gravest threat to our security and that appropriate action must be taken.

RFK: Could you stick planes over them, until you made the announcement at six o’clock Saturday morning? And at the same time or simultaneously put planes over to make sure that they weren’t taking any action or movement, and that you could move in if they started moving in the missiles in place or something, you would move in and knock, that would be the trigger that you would move your planes in and knock them out. Otherwise you’d wait until six o’clock or five o’clock that night. I don’t, is that, uh, is that… .

Taylor: I don’t think anything like that… . I can’t visualize doing it, uh, doing it successfully that way. I think that, uh, uh, anything that shows, uh, our intent to strike is going to place the airplanes and, and the missiles into, these are por-, really mobile missiles. They can be …

RFK: [You mean they can just?] …

Taylor: They can pull in under trees and forest and disappear almost at once, as I visualize.

McNamara: And they can also be readied, perhaps, between the time we, in effect, say we’re going to come in and the time we do come in. This, this is a very, very great danger to this, this coast. I don’t know exactly how to appraise it because …

Speaker ?: I don’t know.

McNamara: … of the readiness period, but it is possible that these are field missiles, and then in that case they can be readied very promptly if they choose to do so.

Carter: These are field missiles, sir. They are mobile-support-type missiles.

Taylor: About a forty-minute countdown, something like that’s been estimated.

Ball?: So you would say that, uh, the strike should precede any public discussion?

McNamara: I believe so, yes, if you’re going to strike. I think before you make any announcements, you should decide whether you’re going to strike. If you are going to strike, you shouldn’t make an announcement.

Bundy: That’s right.

Dillon: What is the advantage of the announcement earlier? Because it’s, it’s to build up sympathy or something for doing it; but you get the simultaneous announcement of what was there and why you struck, with pictures and all, I [believe?] would serve the same …

Ball?: Well, the only announ-, the only advantage is, it’s a kind of ultimatum, it’s, there is an opportunity of a response that, which would preclude it. I mean it’s, it’s more, a more, for, for the appearance than as for the reality. ’Cause obviously you’re not going to get that kind of response. But I would suppose that there is a course which is a little different, which is a private message from the President to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] …

Martin?: [1 line of source text not declassified]

Ball?: Uh, and, uh, that this is, you’re going to have to do this, you’re compelled and you’ve gotta move quickly and you want them to know it. Maybe two hours before the strike, something like that …

Dillon: Well, that’s it, that’s different.

Ball?: … even the night before. Uh, but you… . But it has to be kept on that basis of total secrecy. And then the question of what you do with these Latin American governments is another matter. I think if you, if you notify them in advance …

JFK: That’s right. [Indicated?]

Ball?: … it may be all over.

JFK: Then you just have to, uh, Congress would, take Congress along …

Bundy: I can’t… . I think that’s just not, not right.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: I’m not completely, uh, I don’t think we ought to abandon just knocking out these missile bases as opposed to, that’s much more, uh, defensible, explicable, politically or satisfactory-in-every-way action than the general strike which takes us …

Speaker ?: Move down …

JFK: … us into the city of Havana …

Speaker ?: … those two.

JFK: … and [it is plain to me?] takes us into much more …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: … hazardous, shot down. Now I know the Chiefs say, Well, that means their bombers can take off against us, uh, but, uh …

Bundy: Their bombers take off against us, then they have made a general war against Cuba of it, which is a, it then becomes much more their decision. We move this way… . The political advantages are, are very strong, it seems to me, of the small strike. Uh, it corresponds to the, the punishment fits the crime in political terms, that we are doing only what we warned repeatedly and publicly we would have to do. Uh, we are not generalizing the attack. The things that we’ve already recognized and said that we have not found it necessary to attack and said we would not find it necessary to attack …

JFK: Well, here’s… . Let’s, look, let’s, let’s, tonight, it seems to me we ought to go on the assumption that we’re going to have the general—number two we’ve called it …

Bundy: Uh-huh.

JFK: … course number two, which would be a general strike—that you ought to be in position to do that …

Bundy: I agree.

JFK: … then if you decide you’d like to do number one.

RFK: How does that in…

JFK: What?

RFK: Does that encompass, uh, an invasion?

JFK: Uh, no, I’d say that’s the third course. Let’s first start with… . I’d have to say first find out, uh, the air, so that I would think that we ought to be in position to do one and two. Which would be… . One would be just taking out these missiles, if there were others we’d find in the next twenty-four hours. Number two would be to take out all the airplanes, and number three is invade [here?].

Speaker ?: Well, they’d have to take out the SAM sites …

Dillon ?: [Words unintelligible] also, Mr. President.

JFK: [Okay?] but that’s in, that would be in two, included in number two …

Speaker ?: Well …

Speaker ?: That’s the, that’s a terrifically difficult …

Dillon: That’s a, I mean that’s just [words unintelligible] …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] that may be three, and invasion four.

Taylor: In order to get in to get the airfields, there’s a good number we’d have to [get out?].

Gilpatric?: Well, isn’t there a question whether any of the SAM sites are operational?

Taylor?: We’re not sure yet.

JFK: Okay, well, let’s say we’ve decided, uh, we’ve gotta go in the whole way. So let’s say that number two is the SAM siteplus the air …

Bundy: It’s actually to clear the air …

JFK: Yeah. Well, whatever it is …

Bundy: … to win the air battle.

JFK: … [words unintelligible] [to talk over?]. Yeah. Now, it seems to me we ought to be preparing now in the most covered [covert?] way to do one and two, with the freedom to make the choice about number one depending on what information we have on it, uh, what [word unintelligible] moves that requires, and how much is that gonna …

McNamara: Mr. President, it requires no action other than what’s been started, and you can make a decision prior to the start Saturday or any time thereafter.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: Well, where do we put all these planes?

Taylor: You recall, uh, we have …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

Taylor: … this problem, Mr. President. We’re going to get new intelligence that will be coming in from these flights …

JFK: Right.

Taylor: … and that’s gonna be, have to be cranked into the, any strike plans we’re preparing, so there is that factor of time. The Secretary has given you the, the time, the minimum time is to make a decision, uh, now to, so that we can brief the pilots and then crank in the new intelligence. I would point out that, well …

McNamara: [The main fact?], to answer the question you asked, we don’t have to decide how we’re gonna do it. All we have to decide is if we want …

Taylor: No.

McNamara: … Sweeney to be prepared to do it.

Taylor: That’s correct, the [words unintelligible] …

McNamara: And Sweeney has said that he will take the tape that comes in tomorrow and process it Thursday and Friday and prepare the mission folders for [word unintelligible] strikes on Saturday or earl-, every day thereafter.

Taylor: Yes. The point is that we’ll have to brief pilots. We’re, we’re …

McNamara: Right.

Taylor: … holding, uh, holding that back. And there’ll be, oh, would say four hundred pilots will have to go, to be briefed in the course of this. So I’m just saying this is widening the, the whole military scope of this thing very materially, if that’s what we’re, we’re supposed to do at this time.

JFK: Well, now when do we start briefing the pilots?

Taylor: They’ll need at least twenty-four hours on that …

JFK: They will.

Taylor: … when this new intelligence comes in and it’s, uh …

JFK: In other words, then, until tomorrow… . All I was thinking of at least until …

Bundy: Can they be briefed in such a way that they’re secure …

Taylor: [Words unintelligible] …

McNamara: [Words unintelligible] …

Bundy: … they have no access to [words unintelligible] …

McNamara: … [words unintelligible] now. You don’t have to s-… . The President does not have to make any decision until twenty-four hours before the strike, except the decision to be prepared.

Speaker ?: Uh-huh.

McNamara: And the process of preparation will not in itself run the risk of overt disclosure of the preparation.

Bundy? Doesn’t imply briefing, the preparation?

Taylor: Uh, it does but …

McNamara: It implies the preparation of mission folders.

Taylor: … uh, say twenty-four hours before they, before they go, they start a briefing. I’d like to say this, Mr. President, the more time you can give, the better. Because they can then do a lot more rehearsing and checking out of all the pilots, so, uh, while I accept the, the, uh, the time cycle, I …

JFK: Well, now let’s say you give a pilot, uh… . I mean, how does he find his way down to, uh, a SAM site off of one of these things?

Taylor: Well, they’ll give him a target folder with all, all the possible, uh …

JFK: They know how to do that, do they?

Taylor: … uh, guidance and so on to hit the target. Yes, sir, they’re well-trained in that, that procedure.

McNamara: Mission folders have already been prepared on all the known targets. The problem is that we don’t have the unknown targets, specifically these, these, uh, missile-launchers and the nuclear storage, and we won’t have that until tomorrow night at the earliest, and it’ll be processed photographically on Thursday, interpreted Thursday night, turned into target folders on Friday, and the mission could go Saturday. This is Sweeney’s estimate of the earliest possible time for a spare strike against the missiles. Decision by the President on Friday, strike on Saturday. As General Taylor pointed out, if, if we could have either another day of preparation, which means no strike till Saturday, or al-, and/or alternatively …

Speaker: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … more than twenty-four hours between the time of decision and the first strike, it will run more smoothly.

JFK: Right. Well, now, what is it, in other, the next twenty-four hours, what is it we need to do in order, if we’re going to do, well, let’s first say, one and two by S-, S-, Saturday or Sunday? You’re doing everything that is …

McNamara: Mr. President, we need to do two things, it seems to me. First, we need to develop a specific strike plan limited to the missiles and the nuclear storage sites, which we have not done. This would be a part of the broader plan …

JFK: Yeah.

McNamara: … but I think we ought to estimate the minimum number of sorties. Since you’ve indicated some interest in that possibility, we ought to provide you that option. We haven’t done this.

JFK: Okay.

McNamara: But that’s an easy job to do. The second thing we ought to do, it seems to me as a government, is to consider the consequences. I don’t believe we have considered the consequences …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … of any of these actions satisfactorily, and because we haven’t considered the consequences, I’m not sure we’re taking all the action we ought to take now to minimize those. I, I don’t know quite what kind of a world we live in after we’ve struck Cuba, and we, we’ve started it. We’ve put let’s say a hundred sorties in, just for purposes of illustration, I don’t think you dare start with less than a hundred. You have, you have, uh, uh, twenty-four objects. Well, you have twenty-four, you have twenty-four, uh, laun-, uh, vehicles, plus, uh, sixteen launchers, plus a possible nuclear storage site, but there’s the absolute minimum that you would wish to kill. And you couldn’t possibly go in after those with less than, I would think, uh, fifty to a hundred sorties.

Taylor: And you’ll miss some.

McNamara: And you’ll miss some. That’s right. Now after we’ve launched fifty to a hundred sorties, what kind of a world do we live in? How, how do we stop at that point? I don’t know the answer to this. I think tonight State and we ought to work on the consequences of any one of these courses of actions, consequences which I don’t believe are entirely clear …

Ball: With …

McNamara: … to any of us.

Ball: … at any place in the world.

McNamara: At any place in the world, George. That’s right. I agree with you.

Taylor: Uh, Mr. President, I should say that the, the Chiefs and the commanders feel so strongly about the, the dangers inherent in the limited strike, that they would prefer taking no military action rather than to take [that limited?] strike. They feel that the, it’s opening up the United States to attacks which they can’t prevent if we don’t take advantage of …

JFK: Yeah, but I, I think the only thing is the, the, uh, chances of it becoming a much broader struggle are increased as you step up the, uh… . Talk about the dangers to the United States, uh …

Bundy: Yeah.

JFK: … once you get into, uh, beginning to shoot up those airports, then you get in, you get a lot of anti-aircraft, and you got a lot of, I mean you’re running a much more major operation, therefore the dangers of the world-wide effects are substantial to the United States are increased. That’s the only argument for it. I quite agree that the, if [you’re? or we’re?] just thinking about Cuba, the best thing to do is to be bold if you’re thinking about trying to get this thing under some degree of, uh, control.

Rusk?: In that regard, Mr. President, there is a combination of the plans which might be considered, namely the limited strike and then the messages, or simultaneously the messages to Khrushchev and Castro, which would indicate to them that this was none other than simply the, fulfilling the statements we’ve made all along.

JFK: Well, I think we… . In other words, that’s a matter we’ve gotta think about tonight.

Speaker ?: Well …

JFK: I don’t… . Let’s not let the Chiefs knock us out on this one …

[Laughter]

JFK: … uh, General, because I think that, uh, uh, what we gotta be thinking about is if you go into Cuba in the way we’re talking about and taking out all the planes and all the rest, then you really haven’t got much of an argument against invading it.

Martin?: It seems to me a limited strike plus planning for invasion five days afterwards, to be taken unless something untoward occurs, makes much more sense.

Taylor: Well, I would be… . First thing, Mr. President, my, my inclination all against, against the invasion, but none the less trying to eliminate as effectively as possible every weapon that can strike the United States.

JFK: But you’re not for the invasion?

Taylor: I would not at this moment [words unintelligible].

McNamara: This is why …

Taylor: [Words unintelligible] we get committed to the, to the degree that shackles us with West Berlin.

McNamara: This is why I say I, I think we have to think of the consequences here. I, I would think an, a forced invasion, uh, associated with assisting an uprising, following an extensive air strike, is, is a highly probable set of circumstances. I don’t know whether you could carry out an extensive air strike of, let’s say, the kind we were talking about a moment ago—seven hundred sorties a day for five days—without an uprising in Cuba. I, I just don’t …

Martin: [Well?] in this morning’s discussion we went into this, talked to some of your people, I believe, a little bit, and we felt an air strike, even of several days, against any military targets primarily, would not result in any substantial unrest. People would just stay home and try to keep out of trouble.

McNamara: Well, when you’re talking about military targets, we have seven hundred targets here we’re talking about. It, this is a very …

JFK: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … a damned expensive target system.

Taylor: That was in number [word unintelligible], Mr. Secretary …

McNamara: Yeah.

Taylor: … but that’s not the one I recommended.

McNamara: Well, neither is the one I’d recommend.

JFK: What does that include, every anti-aircraft gun, or what does that include?

McNamara: Yeah, uh …

Taylor: This includes [related?] defenses, all sorts of things.

McNamara: … radar, radar sites, uh, SAM sites, and so on. But whether it’s seven hundred or two hundred, uh, and it’s at least two hundred, I think …

Taylor: More in the order of two hundred, I’d say.

McNamara: It’s at least two hundred. You can’t carry that out without the danger of an uprising.

RFK: Mr. President, while we’re considering this problem tonight, I think that we should also consider what, uh, Cuba’s going to be a year from now, or two years from now. Assume that we go in and knock these sites out, uh, I don’t know what’s gonna stop them from saying, We’re gonna build the sites six months from now, bring ’em in …

Taylor: Noth-, nothing permanent about it.

RFK: Uh, the, what, where are we six months from now? Or that we’re in any better position, or aren’t we in worse position if we go in and knock ’em out and say, uh …

Speaker ?: [We sure are?]

RFK: … Don’t do it. Uh, I mean, obviously they’re gonna have to do it then.

McNamara: You have to put a blockade in following any …

Speaker ?: Sure.

McNamara: … limited action.

RFK: Then we’re gonna have to sink Russian ships.

McNamara ?: Right.

RFK: Then we’re gonna have to sink …

McNamara ?: Right.

RFK: … Russian submarines. Now whether it wouldn’t be, uh, the argument, if you’re going to get into it at all, uh, whether we should just get into it and get it over with and say that, uh, take our losses, and if we’re gonna… . If he wants to get into a war over this, uh… . Hell, if it’s war that’s gonna come on this thing, or if he sticks those kinds of missiles in, it’s after the warning, and he’s gonna, and he’s gonna get into a war for, six months from now or a year from now, so… .

McNamara: Mr. President, this is why I think tonight we ought to put on paper the alternative plans and the probable, possible consequences thereof in a way that State and Defense could agree on, even if we, uh, disagree and put in both views. Because the consequences of these actions have not been thought through clearly. The one that the Attorney General just mentioned is illustrative of that.

JFK: If the, uh, it doesn’t increase very much their strategic, uh, strength, why is it, uh, can any Russian expert tell us why they… . After all Khrushchev demonstrated a sense of caution [thousands?] …

Speaker ?: Well, there are several, several possible …

JFK: … Berlin, he’s been cautious, I mean, he hasn’t been, uh …

Ball?: Several possibilities, Mr. President. One of them is that he has given us word now that he’s coming over in November to, to the UN. If, he may be proceeding on the assumption, and this lack of a sense of apparent urgency would seem to, to support this, that this isn’t going to be discovered at the moment and that, uh, when he comes over this is something he can do, a ploy. That here is Cuba armed against the United States, or possibly use it to try to trade something in Berlin, saying he’ll disarm Cuba if, uh, if we’ll, uh, yield some of our interests in Berlin and some arrangement for it. I mean, that this is a, it’s a trading ploy.

Bundy: I would think one thing that I would still cling to is that he’s not likely to give Fidel Castro nuclear warheads. I don’t believe that has happened or is likely to happen.

JFK: Why does he put these in there though?

Bundy: Soviet-controlled nuclear warheads [of the kind?] …

JFK: That’s right, but what is the advantage of that? It’s just as if we suddenly began to put a major number of MRBMs in Turkey. Now that’d be goddam dangerous, I would think.

Bundy?: Well, we did, Mr. President.

U.A. Johnson?: We did it. We …

JFK: Yeah, but that was five years ago.

U.A. Johnson?: … did it in England; that’s why we were short.

JFK: What?

U.A. Johnson?: We gave England two when we were short of ICBMs.

JFK: Yeah, but that’s, uh …

U.A. Johnson?: [Testing?]

JFK: … that was during a different period then.

U.A. Johnson?: But doesn’t he realize he has a deficiency of ICBMs, needs a PR capacity perhaps, in view of… . He’s got lots of MRBMs and this is a way to balance it out a bit?

Bundy?: I’m sure his generals have been telling him for a year and a half that he had, was missing a golden opportunity to add to his strategic capability.

Ball?: Yes, I think, I think you, you look at this possibility that this is an attempt to, to add to his strategic capabilities. A second consideration is that it is simply a trading ploy, that he, he wants this in so that he could, he could [words unintelligible] …

Bundy?: [A prime consistent to his?] [words unintelligible] …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] it means if he can’t trade, he’s still got the other.

[Several speakers speak at once and only a few words are intelligible.]

Speaker ?: And so …

Speaker ?: But [words unintelligible] …

Speaker ?: … the political impact in Latin America.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] the source [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] up front?

Speaker ?: Sure. Sure.

U.A. Johnson?: We are now considering these then Soviet missiles, a Soviet …

Speaker ?: I think we ought to.

U.A. Johnson?: … offensive capability.

Taylor?: You have to consider them Soviet missiles.

U.A. Johnson?: It seems to me if we go in there, lock-stock-and-barrel, we can consider them entirely Cuban.

Bundy: Ah, well, what we say for political purposes and what we think are not identical here.

Speaker ?: But, I mean, any, any rational approach to this must be that they are Soviet missiles, because I think …

Speaker ?: You mean …

Speaker ?: …Khrushchev himself would never, would never risk a major war on, on a fellow as obviously erratic, uh, and foolish as, as Castro.

Speaker ?: [A sub-lieutenant?]

JFK: Well, now let’s say …

RFK: Let me say, of course …

JFK: Yeah.

RFK: … one other thing is whether, uh, we should also think of, uh, uh, whether there is some other way we can get involved in this through, uh, Guantanamo Bay, or something, er, or whether there’s some ship that, you know, sink the Maine again or something.

Taylor: We think, Mr. President, that under any of these plans we will probably get an attack on, on Guantanamo, at least by, by fire. They have artillery and mortars in the, easily within range, and, uh, any of these actions we take we’ll have to give air support to Guantanamo and probably reinforce the garrison.

JFK: Well, that’s why, uh, it seems to me that, uh, this, if we decide that we are going to be in a position to do this, either one and two Saturday or Sunday, then I would think we would also want to be in a position, depending on [really?] what happens, either because of an invasion, attack on Guantanamo or some other reason to do the inva-, uh, to, to do the eviction.

Taylor: Mr. President, I personally would just urge you not to set a schedule such as Saturday or Sunday …

JFK: No, I haven’t.

Taylor: … until all the intelligence that could be …

JFK: That’s right. I just wanted, I just wanted, I thought we ought to be moving, I don’t want to waste any time though if we decide that, uh, time is not particularly with us. I just think we ought to be ready to do something, even if we decide not to do it. I’m not saying …

Taylor: All …

JFK: … we should do it.

Taylor: … all of this is moving, short of the briefing. We’ve held back, uh …

JFK: I understand.

Taylor: … we’ve restricted people to …

JFK: What about, now, this invasion? If we were going to launch that, what do you have, what do we have to be doing now so that wh-, ten days from now we’re in a position to invade if that was immediate?

Taylor: I would say that my answer would be largely planning, particularly in the field of mobilization, just what we wan-, uh, what we will, uh, want to recreate after we, uh, [words unintelligible] these forces to Cuba.

Speaker ?: This is [perhaps?] [words unintelligible].

Taylor: I might say that air defense measures we’re going to, we’re started to take already. We moved more fighters into the southeastern United States and gradually improving some of our, our patrol procedures, uh, under the general guise of, uh, of preparations for that part of the country. We don’t think there’d be any, any leaks there that might react against our military targets. I, I’d repeat that our defenses have always been weak in that part of the country.

JFK: Uh, Mr. Secretary, is there anything that, or any of these contingencies if we go ahead that, uh, the next twenty-four hours—we’re going to meet again tomorrow [for this?] in the afternoon—is there anything [words unintelligible] …

McNamara: No, sir, I believe that the military planning has been carried on for a considerable period of time, is well under way. And I believe that all the preparations that we could take without the risk of preparations causing discussion and knowledge of this, either among our public or in Cuba, have been taken and are authorized; all the necessary reconnaissance measures are being taken and are authorized. The only thing we haven’t done, really, is to consider fully these alternatives.

Bundy: Our principal problem is to try and imaginatively to think …

McNamara: Yes.

Bundy: … what the world would be like if we do this …

McNamara: [I know?]

Bundy: … and what it will be like if we don’t …

McNamara: That’s exactly right.

Bundy: … if we fail if we do.

McNamara: We ought to work on that tonight.

Ball?: This may be incidental, Mr. President, but if we’re going to get the prisoners out this would be a good time to get them out.

JFK: I guess they’re not gonna get… . Well… .

Bundy: You mean take ’em out.

Ball?: No, what I meant was …

[Laughter]

Ball?: … if we’re gonna trade ’em [word unintelligible] …

JFK: They’re on the Isles of Pines? These prisoners?

RFK: No. Some of them …

Speaker ?: [Yes?] sir.

RFK: … are. They’re split up.

Bundy: [If you can?] get them out alive, I’d make that choice.

JFK: There’s no sign of their getting out now, is there? The exchange?

RFK: No, but they will take a few weeks.

JFK: A few weeks.

RFK: [Yeah?]. You know they’re having that struggle between the young Cuban leaders and the [words unintelligible] …

Bundy: We have a list of the sabotage options, Mr. President, and I… . It’s not a very loud noise to raise at a meeting of this sort, but I think it would need your approval. I take it you are in favor of sabotage. The one question which rises is whether we wish to do this in, uh, naval area, [getting in?] international waters, or in positions which may… . Mining international waters or mining Cuban waters, may hit… . Mines are very indiscriminate. Uh… .

JFK: Is that what they’re talking about? Mining?

Bundy: That’s one of the items. There are, uh, there… . Most of them relate to infiltration of raiders, and will simply be deniable internal Cuban activities. The question that we need guidance from you on is whether you now wish to authorize sabotage which might have its impact on neutrals or even friendly ships.

JFK: I don’t think we want to put mines out right now, do we? [Make use of the nets?]

McNamara: Shouldn’t wait for twenty-four hours at least before any [words unintelligible] …

RFK: [Words unintelligible]

Bundy: Well, let’s put the others into action then in Cuba, the internal ones, not …

Speaker ?: Huh?

Bundy: … the other ones.

JFK: Mr. Vice President, do you have any thoughts? Between one and two?

L.B. Johnson: I don’t think I can add anything [that is essential?].

JFK: The, uh …

Speaker ?: There’s a …

JFK: … the, uh, let’s see, what time we gonna meet then tomorrow? What is it we want to have by tomorrow from the… . We want to have from the department tomorrow in a little bit more concise form whether there is any kind of a [words unintelligible] we have to give. How much of a [words unintelligible] and, number two, what you think of these various alternatives we’ve been talking about, if you see there is any use bringing this to Khrushchev in the way of, [for?], for example, do we want to, for ex-, here is Dobrynin now, he’s repeated… . Uh, I got to go to, uh, see Schroeder. Let’s meet at, uh, eleven to twelve. What time do I get back tomorrow night?

Bundy?: Reasonably [early?].

JFK: Get back about 7:45.

JFK: We meet here by five… .

Bundy: Mr. Secretary, some of the staff are in trouble with the dinner for Schroeder tomorrow night.

JFK: Okay, well, now the… . I don’t think, I don’t know, think we’ll have anything by noon tomorrow, do we?

Bundy: Would you want to wait until Thursday4 morning, Mr. President?

October 18.4

JFK: Looks to me like we might as well. I, I… . Uh. Everybody else can meet if they want to, if they need to. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense can …

McNamara: I think it’d be very useful to meet or else stay afterwards tonight [words unintelligible] [for a while?].

Bundy: It would be a great improvement not to have any more intense White House meetings—trouble with all the [words unintelligible] if we could meet at the State Department tomorrow.

[Several speakers speak at once and none of the words are intelligible.]

JFK: All right, then I could meet you, Mac, when I get back tomorrow and just as well, whatever the thing is and then we can meet Thursday morning. I don’t… . The question is whether, uh… . I’m going to see Gromyko Thursday and I think the question that I’d really like to have is some sort of a judgment on, is whether we ought to do anything with Gromyko. Whether we ought to say anything to him; whether we ought to, uh, indirectly give him sort of a, give him an ultimatum on this matter, or whether we just ought to go ahead without him. It seems to me that …

Speaker ?: In other words …

JFK: … he said we’d be… . The Attorney General, the ambassador told the Attorney General, as he told Bohlen the other day that they were not going to put these weapons there. Now either he’s lying or doesn’t know. Whether the Attorney General saw Dobrynin—not acting as if we had any information about ’em—said that, of course, that they must realize that if this ever does happen that this is going to cause this, give a very clear indication of what’s going to happen. Now I don’t know what would come out of that, I… . Possibly nothing. Possibly, uh, this’d alert them. Possibly they would reconsider their decision, but I don’t think we’ve had any clear evidence of that, and it would give them… . We’d lose a week.

Ball?: You mean tell them that… .

JFK: Well, not tell them that we know that they’ve got it, but merely in the course of a conversation Dobrynin, having said that they would never do it, the Attorney General, who sees Dobrynin once in a while, would …

Ball?: How would we lose a week?

JFK: What?

Ball?: How would we lose a week?

JFK: Oh, we would be… . What we’d be, Bobby would be saying to them, in short, is if these ever come up that we’re going to do, the present state would have to take action. And, uh, this [words unintelligible], uh, this could cause [words unintelligible] the most far-reaching consequences. On the possibility that that might cause them to reconsider their action. I don’t know whether his, they’re aware of what I sai-… . I can’t understand their viewpoint, if they’re aware of what we said at the press conferences. I say, I’ve never… . I don’t think there’s any record of the Soviets ever making this direct a challenge, ever, really …

Bundy: We have to be clear, Mr. President …

JFK: … since the Berlin blockade.

Bundy: … that they made this decision, in all probability, before you made your statements.

McNamara: Uh-huh.

Bundy: This is, uh, important element in the calendar.

Dillon: That didn’t change it.

Bundy: No. Indeed, they didn’t change it, but they, they… . It’s quite a different thing. There was either a contravention on one …

Dillon: Yeah.

Bundy: My, I wouldn’t bet a cookie that Dobrynin doesn’t know a bean about …

Dillon?: Uh-huh.

Bundy: … this.

JFK: You think he does know?

RFK: He didn’t know.

Bundy: I, I would [words unintelligible] …

RFK: He didn’t even know that [words unintelligible] in my judgment.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

Taylor: Why it’s, I mean there’s evidence of sightings in late August, I think, and early September of, of some sort.

Speaker ?: It seems to me, Mr. President, there’s, in your public presentation, simultaneous or subsequent to an action, your hand is strengthened somewhat if the Soviets have, uh, lied to you, either privately or in public.

Bundy?: I’ll agree to that.

Speaker ?: And then if, or if you, uh, without knowing, if you ask Gromyko, or if Bobby asks Dobrynin again, or if some other country could get the Soviets to say publicly in the UN, No, we have no offensive …

RFK:TASS, of course, said they’re gonna… .

JFK: When did TASS say that?

Speaker ?: A while back.

RFK: … said they would send offensive weapons to Cuba.

Bundy: Yeah. The TASS …

JFK:Khrushchev say that?

Bundy: … statement I read this morning.

RFK?: [Yes?]

Bundy: No, the TASS statement. It’s …

Speaker ?: We don’t know if Khrushchev under control yet.

Speaker ?: Uh.

Bundy: Uh, no, we don’t have any detail on that. Soviet …

JFK: Well, what about my… . What question would be there for what I might say to Gromyko about this matter, if you want me just get in the record …

Speaker ?: Uh-huh.

JFK: … like asking him whether they plan to do it.

Speaker ?: Well, I think what you get is to …

Bundy: Putting it the other way around saying that we are …

Speaker ?: … call his …

Bundy: … putting great weight upon the assurances of him …

Speaker ?: … call the attention to the statement that you’ve made on this …

Speaker ?: Yup.

Speaker ?: … this is your public commitment and that, uh, you, you are going to have to, you’re gonna abide by this, and you just want assurances from him that, that, uh, they’re, they’re living up to what they’ve said, that they’re not gonna …

JFK: Well, let’s say he said, Well, we’re not planning to.

Bundy: “The government of the Soviet Union also authorized TASS to state that there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression for a retaliatory blow to any other country, for instance, Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force, the Soviet Union has so powerful rockets to carry those nuclear warheads that there is no need to search for” …

JFK: [I see?]

Bundy: … “sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union.”

JFK: Well, what date was that?

Bundy: September eleventh.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

Dillon: When they were all there.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] certainly on the way.

JFK: But isn’t that… . but, as I say, we have to… . We never really ever had a case where it’s been quite this, uh… . After all, they backed down in, uh, Chinese Communists in ’58. They didn’t go into Laos. Agreed to a ceasefire there.

[Several speakers speak at once and many of the words are unintelligible.]

Bundy: We had this trouble …

JFK?: They backed up …

Bundy: … at [words unintelligible] where they …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK?: [What’s?] …

Bundy: … nuclear storage site.

Speaker ?: At least.

Bundy: Yeah. It’s very clear.

JFK: What?

Bundy: I’m as puzzled as Bob is by the absence of a nuclear storage site.

Taylor: We don’t know enough about it yet and we [words unintelligible] …

Bundy: I understand that. We may learn a lot overnight.

Speaker ?: Isn’t it puzzling, also, there is no evidence of any troops protecting the sites?

Taylor: Well, there’re troops there. At least there’re tents …

[Several speakers speak at once and many of the words are unintelligible.]

Speaker ?: [A few campers?] [words unintelligible].

Taylor: … [presumably they have some personnel?].

McNamara?: But they look like [words unintelligible]. It’s as if you could walk over the fields into those vans. [I agree?]

JFK: Well, it’s a goddamn mystery to me.

McNamara?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: I don’t know enough about the Soviet Union, but if anybody can tell me any other time since the Berlin blockade where the Russians have given us so clear provocation, I don’t know when it’s been, because they’ve been awfully cautious really. The Russians, I never… . Now, maybe our mistake was in not saying some time before this summer that if they do this we’re [word unintelligible] to act. Maybe they’d gone in so far [that?] it’s… .

RFK: Yeah, but then why did they put that statement in it?

JFK: Perhaps it… .

Speaker ?: That’s it [words unintelligible] …

JFK: This was following my statement, wasn’t it?

RFK: September eleventh.

Taylor: Quick ground [words unintelligible].

JFK: When was my statement? What?

Taylor: Ground it up. Well, I was asking Pat if they had any way of getting quick intelligence, that means somebody in there and out of there so we can really take a look on the ground.

Speaker ?: No, this is two days before your statement.

Carter: Uh, we can try it, but your problems about exfiltration and your problems with training an individual as to what to look for are not handled in twenty-four hours.

McNamara: A better way would be to send in a low-flying airplane …

Carter: Yes.

McNamara: … and we have today put those on alert, but we would recommend against …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … using the low-flying planes until shortly before the intention to strike.

Taylor: This was considered by the, by the co-, commanders today, and they’re all of that opinion that the, the loss of surprise would there, was more serious than the, the information we’d get from that.

Speaker ?: I would think it would be very valuable to have them go in shortly before the strike, just to build the evidence. I mean, when you’ve got pictures that really show what you were, what was there.

JFK: Now, with these great demono-, uh, uh, Bohlen and Thompson, did they have an explanation of why the Russians are sticking a [word unintelligible] by itself?

[Several conversations are going on at once and only the following fragments are intelligible.]

Speaker ?: Take them out …

JFK: [Words unintelligible] Acheson [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: … a little bit later something [words unintelligible]. Yeah.

JFK: What’re we going to say up in Connecticut? You expected the [Bentley trial?].

[Laughter]

JFK: This is a jeer for the … .

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] President?

JFK: [Words unintelligible] eight or nine-thirty …

Bundy: The cabinet at ten.

JFK: Yeah. I’ll just see Tom Mann at one.

Bundy: And that’s Mann or Sato or both?

JFK: Sato.

Speaker ?: Japanese, uh …

JFK: Mann ought to know something. Let’s have it here at eleven. Rusk at nine-thirty. In fact, they don’t even have to come.

Speaker ?: No.

JFK: [Words unintelligible] the cabinet.

Speaker ?: You just… .

JFK: We’re going to discuss the [words unintelligible] budget. What about Schroeder? Do I have anything we want to say to Schroeder?

Bundy: We, uh, have a lot on that to discuss which, uh, was halfway in early in the morning. I don’t think it’s very complicated. The big issue that has come up is Schroeder makes a very strong case for refusing visas on the grounds that he thinks that, uh, that would undermine morale in Berlin in a very dangerous way. I think that’s the principal issue that’s between us.

JFK: I wonder if we could get somebody to give me something about what our position …

Bundy: You want that?

JFK: … should be on that.

Bundy: Yeah. Very happy to. You want it tonight?

JFK: No, no. Just in the morning.

Speaker ?: Mr. President, at least they’re setting up the time …

Speaker ?: Yes, Mr. President.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

JFK: That’s very good, General, thank you.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] [Thompson here?]

[Several conversations are going on at once and only the following fragments are intelligible.]

McNamara: Where is Reilly going to be?

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

Carter: Mr. McCone is coming in tonight.

McNamara: … in Mac’s office. I’ll get you one. Did you see him?

Carter: Yes. [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: Yeah, I’ll go down and see him [words unintelligible].

Carter: I would suggest that we get into this hot water partly because of this.

JFK: Yeah, I want to talk to him in the morning. I’d like to just be briefed [words unintelligible]. Why is that? [Words unintelligible]

Bundy?: He won’t be… . Does he get back tonight?

Carter: Coming in tonight. Yes, sir. I’m going to get …

Bundy?: Then could he come in in the morning?

Carter: [Words unintelligible]

[Several conversations continue at the same time and only the following fragments are intelligible.]

Bundy?: Could he come in then at nine-thirty?

Carter?: Sure.

Speaker ?: [Bob?], [words unintelligible].

McNamara: Could we agree to meet, uh, mid-afternoon?

Speaker ?: Any time you say, Bob.

McNamara: And then, uh, guide our work tonight and tomorrow on that [schedule?]. Why, why don’t we say three o’clock? This’ll give us some time …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … to cover all we’ve done …

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: … and then do some more tomorrow night if necessary tomorrow afternoon.

Bundy: Would it be [word unintelligible] to make it a little earlier? I ought to get to a four o’clock meeting with Schroeder.

McNamara: [Word unintelligible] said two o’clock, I think, with Schroeder.

Dillon?: Two o’clock.

Bundy: Good.

McNamara: Really plenty of time between [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: Two o’clock [words unintelligible].

McNamara: [Words unintelligible] At 2:00 P.M. we’ll do it at State.

Speaker ?: All right.

McNamara: Now, could we agree what we’re gonna do? I would suggest that we, and I don’t expect, in fact I …

[McNamara and another speaker speak at the same time and none of the words are intelligible.]

McNamara: … I would suggest that we, uh, divide the, the, uh, series of targets up by, in effect, numbers of DGZs and, uh, and, uh, numbers of sorties required to take those out for a series of alternatives starting only with the missiles and working up through the nuclear storage sites and the MIGs and the, er, and the SAMs and so on. So we can say, This target system would take so many points, eighty points and so many objects would take so many sorties to knock out. The, the… . Not because I think that these are reasonable alternatives …

Bundy?: They’re not really going to be realistic, even, but they give us [words unintelligible] …

McNamara: … but they give an order [words unintelligible] to the President to get some idea of this. And this we can do, and this can be done very easily. But the most important thing we need to do is this appraisal of the world after any one of these situations …

Bundy: Sure.

McNamara: … in great detail.

Bundy?: That’s right.

McNamara: And, and I think probably this is something State would have to do …

Speaker ?: [Word unintelligible]

McNamara: … and I would strongly urge we put it on paper …

Speaker ?: That’s right.

McNamara: … and we, I’ll be happy to stay, or, how, or, uh, look at it early in the morning, or something like that if, in order that we may inject disagreement if we [words unintelligible] …

Bundy: What I would suggest is that someone be deputized to, to do a piece of paper which really is what happens. I think the margin is between whether we take out the [missile zone?, or missiles on?] strike or take a lot of air bases. This is tactical within a decision to take military action. Now, doesn’t, overwhelmingly, it may substantially if it doesn’t overwhelmingly change the world. I think any military action does change the world. And I think not taking action changes the world. And I think these are the two worlds that we need to look at.

McNamara: I’m very much inclined to agree, but I think we have to make that point …

Bundy: I agree.

McNamara: … within the military action …

Bundy: I agree.

McNamara: … a gradation …

Bundy: Oh, many gradations and they have major, it can have major effects.

McNamara: Yeah.

Bundy: I mean, I don’t need to exaggerate that now. The question is how to get ahead with that, and whether, uh, I would think, myself, that it, it, it, the appropriate place to make this preliminary analysis is at the Department of State. I think the rest of us ought to spend the evening really to some advantage separately trying to have our own views of this. And I think we should meet in order, at least, to trade pieces of paper, before two o’clock, uh, tomorrow morning if that’s agreeable.

McNamara: Why don’t we meet tomorrow morning, and, and with pieces of paper, uh, from State, and this is a h- …

Speaker ?: No.

McNamara: … maybe you don’t feel this is reasonable, but …

Speaker ?: No. [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … I, I would strongly urge that tonight State [words unintelligible] …

Bundy: Well, who is State’s de facto? Is, are, are you all tied up tonight? Or what?

Speaker ?: No, no.

Ball?: Uh, the situation is that the only one who’s tied up tonight is, is the Secretary and he is coming down at eleven o’clock from his dinner to look at what we will have done in the meantime.

Speaker ?: Alex is back waiting for him.

Ball?: Oh, good, we’ll have Alex, we’ll have Tommy. Well, we’ve kept …

Bundy: Right.

Ball?: … this to our, this has, this has been …

Bundy: But you have Tommy? I …

Speaker ?: Talked to him this afternoon some.

Bundy: Then you’re, do you have any, uh… . I’d be fascinated by this, the first sense of how he sees this.

Ball?: Well, the, the, the argument was really between, uh, Hilsman’s demonologists, who were already cut in because they [word unintelligible] your boots, who thought this was a low-risk operation. Tommy thought it was a high-risk operation by the Soviets, in other words they were taking real chances. Other people rather thought that they, they probably had miscalculated us and thought this wasn’t a risky operation. You know, on the way they were going at it …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

Ball?: … either impatient like the SAM sites hadn’t been set up to protect it, the various factors which suggest to them that they didn’t think anything was gonna happen. Tommy leaned the other way.

McNamara: Could I suggest that tonight we actually draft a paper and it start this way—just a paragraph or two of, of the knowns. Uh, we have to… . The knowns are that the SAMs that are here. Let’s say the, the probable knowns, because we’re not certain of any of them. The probabilities are the SAM system isn’t working today. This is important. The probabilities are that these missiles are not operational today. The probabilities are that they won’t be operational in less than X days, although we can’t be certain. Pat said two weeks. I’m not so sure I’d put it that far. But I… . There’s just two or three of these knowns. I would put in there, by the way …

Speaker ?: How …

McNamara: … the number of …

Speaker ?: Unprotected.

McNamara: Uh, they’re unprotected. Another known I’d put in is that they have about fifty X, uh, MIGs,-15,-17 and-19s; that they have certain crated, uh, I’ve forgotten, say, ten, er, X crated MIG-21s, only one of which we believe to have been assembled. They have X crated IL-28s, none of which we believe to have been assembled. These, this is, in a sense, the problem we, we face there.

Bundy: Do you believe State or the agencies should state the military knowns?

McNamara: Well, this… . I can sta- …

Speaker ?: I think …

McNamara: … we can do this in just ten seconds …

Speaker ?: Yeah.

McNamara: … a very, very simple …

Speaker ?: Yeah.

McNamara: … statement I think. But then I would follow that by the, the alternatives of, not all of them but the more likely alternatives that we consider open to us. And would hope we could stay just a second here and see if we could sketch them out now. Like …

Bundy: I’d like to throw one in of a military kind, and what… . Shall we get them in order and, uh, you move… . Well, we’ll all [words unintelligible]. I would like to throw one in that I do not think the army and the Chiefs would normally consider, and that is, uh, the possibility of genuinely making a quite large-scale, uh, strike, followed by a drop, followed by a recovery of the people dropped to get these things and not simply to increase the chance that we’ve hit most of them. There’s always unc-, incompleteness in a military opera-, in an air operation. But if these things are what the pictures show, you could drop a batallion of paratroopers and get ’em. Now what you do with a batallion, I grant you, is a hell of a problem.

Speaker ?: Yeah.

Bundy: I think there’s an enormous political advantage, myself, within these options, granting that all the Chiefs didn’t fully agree, taking out the thing that gives the trouble and not the thing that doesn’t give the trouble.

McNamara?: This, as opposed to, uh, is it an air attack on …

Bundy: Supplementary to an air attack. I mean, how’re you gonna know that you’ve got ’em? And if you haven’t got ’em, what’ve you done?

Taylor: Well, this, this, of course, raises the question of having gotten this set, what happens to the set that arrives next week?

McNamara: Oh, I, I think the ans- …

Taylor: Yeah.

McNamara: … I, let me answer Mac’s question first. How do we know we’ve got them? We will have photo recon [militarily?] with the strike. Sweeney specifically plans this, and …

Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.

McNamara: Pardon me?

Bundy: Proving a negative is a hell of a job.

Taylor: Yeah, but Central’s on the ground very well out of there, uh, Mac.

Bundy: That’s true.

McNamara: Terrible risk to put them in there, uh… .

Bundy: I ag-, I think the [words unintelligible] is probably a bad idea, but it …

McNamara: I think the risk troubles me, it’s too great in relation to the risk of not knowing whether we get them.

Bundy: Well …

McNamara: But, in any case, this is a small variant of one …

Bundy: That’s right, it’s a minor …

McNamara: … of the plans.

Bundy: … variant of one plan.

McNamara: It seems to me that there are some major alternatives here that I don’t think we discussed them fully enough today, and I’d like to see them laid on the paper, if State agrees. The first is what I, I still call it the political approach. Uh, let me say it’s a nonmilitary action.

[Laughter]

McNamara: It doesn’t start with one and it isn’t gonna end with one.

Speaker ?: Yeah.

McNamara: And I, for that reason I call it a political approach.

Speaker ?: Right …

McNamara: And I say it isn’t gonna end with one because once you start this political approach, I don’t think you’re gonna have any opportunity for a military operation.

Speaker ?: I agree.

Taylor: It becomes very difficult.

McNamara: But at least I think we ought to put it down there, uh.

Taylor: Right.

Bundy: And it should be worked out. I mean what, what is the maximum …

Speaker ?: Your ride is waiting downstairs [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: Very good, thank you [words unintelligible].

McNamara: Yeah, it should, should definitely be worked out. What, exactly what does it in-, involve, and what are the chances of success of it? They’re not zero. They’re plus I think.

Taylor?: We did an outline this morning along these lines.

McNamara: All right. That, that’s [word unintelligible] anyway …

Bundy: Um, but, do you see, it’s, it’s not just the chances of success, it’s the, it ought to be examined in terms of the pluses and minuses of, of nonsuccess …

McNamara: Yes. Yes.

Bundy: … because there is such a thing as making this thing pay off in ways that are …

McNamara: Yeah. Yeah.

Bundy: … are of some significance, even though we don’t act …

McNamara: Yeah. I completely agree.

Bundy: … or go with that.

McNamara: And, and this is my second alternative in …

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: … particular and I want to come to that in a moment. But the first one I …

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: … I completely agree it isn’t. I, I phrased it improperly. Not the chances of success. It’s the results …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … that [we’re calling? or causing?] …

Bundy: Yep.

McNamara: … for the mankind.

Bundy: Yep.

McNamara: Now, the second alternative, I, I’d like to discuss just a second, because we haven’t discussed it fully today, and I alluded it to, to it a moment ago. I, I, I’ll be quite frank. I don’t think there is a military problem here. This is my answer to Mac’s question …

Bundy: That’s my honest [judgment?].

McNamara: … and therefore, and I’ve gone through this today, and I asked myself, Well, what is it then if it isn’t a military problem? Well, it’s just exactly this problem, that, that, uh, if Cuba should possess a capacity to carry out offensive actions against the U.S., the U.S. would act.

Speaker ?: That’s right.

Speaker ?: That’s right.

McNamara: Now, it’s that problem, this …

Speaker ?: You can’t get around that one.

McNamara: … this, this is a domestic, political problem. The announcement—we didn’t say we’d go in and not, and kill them, we said we’d act. Well, how will we act? Well, we want to act to prevent their use, and it’s really the …

Bundy: Yeah.

McNamara: … the act. Now, how do we pre-, act to prevent their use? Well, first place, we carry out open surveillance, so we know what they’re doing. All times. Twenty-four hours a day from now and forever, in a sense indefinitely. What else do we do? We prevent any further offensive weapons coming in. In other words we blockade offensive weapons.

Bundy: How do we do that?

McNamara: We search every ship.

Taylor: There’re two kinds of, of blockade: a blockade which stops ships from coming in and, and simply a seizure, I mean a, simply a search.

McNamara: A search, that’s right …

Taylor?: Yeah.

McNamara: … and …

Speaker ?: Well, it would be a search and removal if found.

Bundy: You have to make the guy stop to search him, and if he won’t stop, you have to shoot, right?

Speaker ?: All [word unintelligible] up …

Speaker ?: And you have to remove what you’re looking for if you find it.

Speaker ?: That’s right.

McNamara: Absolutely. Absolutely. And then an ul-, I call it an ultimatum associated with these two actions is a statement to the world, particularly to Khrushchev, that we have located these offensive weapons; we’re maintaining a constant surveillance over them; if there is ever any indication that they’re to be launched against this country, we will respond not only against Cuba, but we will respond directly against the Soviet Union with, with a full nuclear strike. Now this alternative doesn’t seem to be a very acceptable one, but wait until you work on the others.

Bundy: That’s right.

[Laughter]

McNamara: This is the, this is the problem, but I’ve thought something about the others this afternoon.

Speaker ?: He’s right.

Ball?: Bob, let me ask you one thing that seems slightly irrelevant. What real utility would there be in the United States if we ever actually captured one of these things and could examine it and take it apart?

McNamara: Not very much. No. No.

Ball?: Would we learn anything about the …

McNamara: No. no.

Ball?: … technology that would be meaningful?

McNamara: I don’t [words unintelligible]. Pat may …

Carter: I don’t think so.

McNamara: … disagree with [me?], but I… .

Speaker ?: Yeah.

McNamara: Well, in any case, that’s an alternative. I’d like to see it expressed and discussed.

Ball?: Of course, if, if it takes two hours to screw a head on as a guy said this morning, two to four hours …

McNamara: Oh, by the way, that should be one of the knowns in this …

Ball?: Yeah.

McNamara: … initial paragraph.

Bundy?: That’s right.

Ball?: … uh, they got all night. How’re you gonna survey ’em during the night? Uh, I mean, it seems to me that they’re some gaps in the surveillance.

McNamara: Oh, well, it’s really the, yes, it isn’t the surveillance, it’s the ultimatum that is …

Ball?: Yeah.

McNamara: … the key part in this.

Ball?: Yeah.

McNamara: And really what I tried to do was develop a little package that meets the action requirement of that paragraph I read.

Speaker ?: Yeah.

McNamara: Because, as I suggested, I don’t believe it’s primarily a military problem. It’s primarily a, a domestic, political problem.

Ball: Yeah, well, as far as the American people are concerned, action means military action, period.

McNamara: Well, we have a blockade. Search and, uh, removal of, of offensive weapons entering Cuba. Uh, [word unintelligible] again, I don’t want to argue for this …

Ball: No, no, I …

McNamara: … because I, I don’t think it’s …

Ball: … I think it’s an alternative.

McNamara: … a perfect solution by any means. I just want to …

Bundy: Which one are we [still on?] would you say?

McNamara: Still on the second one, uh …

Ball: Now, one of the things we look at is whether any, the actual operation of a blockade doesn’t, isn’t a greater involvement almost than a …

McNamara: Might well be, George.

Ball: … military action.

Speaker ?: I think so.

McNamara: It’s, it’s a search, not a, not an embargo, uh… .

Speaker ?: Yeah.

Ball: It’s a series of single, unrelated acts, not by surprise. This, uh, come in there on Pearl Harbor just frightens the hell out of me as to what’s going beyond. [Yeah, well, anyway?] the Board of National Estimates have been working on this ever since …

Bundy: What, what goes, what goes beyond what?

Ball: What happens beyond that. You go in there with a surprise attack. You put out all the missiles. This isn’t the end. This is the beginning, I think. There’s a whole hell of a lot of things …

Bundy: Are they all working on powerful reaction in your [word unintelligible]?

Carter: Yes, sir.

Bundy: Good.

Ball: … which goes back down to, uh, Mr. Secretary, is this the central …

Bundy: Yeah.

Ball: … point of, to connect …

[Two conversations are going on at once. Only these fragments are intelligible.]

McNamara: Well, that, that takes me into the third category of action. I’d lump them all in the third category. I call it overt military action of varying degrees of intensity, ranging… . And, if you feel there’s any difference in them, in the kind of a world we have after the varying degrees of intensity …

Speaker ?: Right.

McNamara: … you have to divide category three into subcategories by intensity and probable effect on the world thereafter. And I think there is, at least in the sense of the Cuban uprising, which I happen to believe is a most important element of category three, it applies to some elements in categ-, some categories of category three, but not all. But, in any event, what, what kind of a world do we live in? In Cuba what action do we take? What do we expect Castro will be doing after, uh, you attack these missiles? Does he survive as a, as a political leader? Is he overthrown? Uh, is he stronger, weaker? Uh, how will he react? How will the Soviets react? What can… . How, how could Khrushchev afford to accept this action without some kind of rebuttal? I don’t think, he can’t accept it without some rebuttal. It may not be a substantial rebuttal, but it’s, gonna have to be some. Where? How do we react in relation to it? What happens when we do mobilize? How does this affect our allies’ support of us in relation to Berlin? Well, you know far better than I the problems, uh, but it would seem to me if we could lay this out tonight and then meet at a reasonable time in the morning to go over a tentative draft, discuss it, and then have another draft for some time in the afternoon …

Gilpatric?: One kind of planning, Bob, that, uh, that, uh, we didn’t explicitly talk about today, uh, which is to look at the points of vulnerability around the world, not only in Berlin …

McNamara: Sure.

Gilpatric?: … not only in Turkey …

McNamara: Sure. Iran.

Gilpatric?: Iran and all of them …

McNamara: And Korea.

Gilpatric?: What, what precautionary measures ought to be taken?

McNamara: Yes. Yes.

Gilpatric?: Well, these, this, these are, these are both military and political …

McNamara: Exactly. Well, uh, and we call it a world-wide alert …

Speaker ?: [Yeah?]

McNamara: … under that heading we’ve got a whole series of precautionary measures that we, we think, uh, should be taken. All of our forces should be put on alert, but beyond that, mobilization, redeployment, movement, and so on… . Well, would it be feasible to meet at some time in the morning, uh, that’s …

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … [words unintelligible]? Mac, what would you think?

Bundy: I ought to, uh, join the President for the meeting with Schroe-der and I’ll be involved in getting some, started for that until ten o’-, uh, from about nine-thirty on. I could be, meet any time before that.

Speaker ?: Well, why don’t we take the [words unintelligible]?

Carter: Well now, the President was going to see Mr. McCone at nine-thirty.

Bundy: That’s right.

McNamara: Well, why don’t we meet at eight-thirty? Is that …

Bundy: [Fine?]

McNamara: Let’s, let’s try that.

Bundy: Okay.

Speaker ?: Well you want… . Is [Halberstam?] coming?

McNamara: Now, there’s not much we can do to help, uh, I’d be happy to, though …

Speaker ?: No. [Words unintelligible]

McNamara: … if you think of anything we can do. We’ll, we’ll go to work tonight and get these numbers of sorties by target systems laid out. I’ll, Reilly’s up in Mac’s office and I’ll go down there now and get them started on it.

Carter: I think Mr. McCone could be helpful to you all in the morning.

McNamara: Well, I think he should try to stay here at eight-thirty.

Speaker ?: Yeah.

Carter: He didn’t worry about this for a heck of a long time …

Bundy: Sure.

Carter: … [word unintelligible] some.

[Meeting appears to be breaking up. Only the following fragments of conversation are intelligible.]

McNamara: Yeah.

Speaker ?: We can meet while [words unintelligible].

Speaker ?: Yeah.

Speaker ?: Are you going to be dining tonight? Or whatever it was you [word unintelligible]?

Bundy: I’m at your service.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible] I thought I, we might be in touch with you …

Bundy: I’ll be right there. I can come down, or at supper privately. Either way.

[Laughter]

Speaker ?: Well, uh, why don’t we, why don’t we see what it looks like …

Speaker ?: Yeah.

Speaker ?: … uh, [starting?] under way.

Ball?: We’re trying to run this with a minimum of manpower and it must still [words unintelligible].

[Several speakers speak at once and only the following words are intelligible.]

Bundy: We must do.

Taylor?: Secretarial problems. This has been one of the problems.

Speaker ?: Well, I think I could bust out a staff …

Bundy: I have two, extremely, totally …

McNamara: I’ve got, I’d trust my staff anywhere, I mean, I… . They [word unintelligible]… . I’ve got my car out here, Admiral.

Speaker ?: Oh, it’s out this way.

McNamara: Yeah. All right. Good night.

Bundy: Good night.

Speaker ?: [Words unintelligible]

[Conversations end. Room noises for almost four minutes. Telephone rings in the distance.]

Lincoln: Hello. [In the distance.]

[Footsteps]

Cleaning man: Yes, lady, I’m gonna bring this.

Lincoln: Hello, [words unintelligible] [left?]

Cleaning man: [Laughs] Here. There’s just some stacks, that’s all.

[Recording ends.]

22. Memorandum of MeetingSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memo for the Record. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 159-160. Washington, October 17, 1962, 8:30 a.m.

MEMORANDUM OF MEETING ATTENDED IN SECRETARY BALL’S CONFERENCE ROOM BY SECRETARY McNamara, BUNDY, GENERAL TAYLOR, ROBERT KENNEDY, MARTIN AND MCCONE AT 0830, 17 OCTOBER

Meeting involved an inclusive exploration of alternatives open to us in connection with the Cuban matter.

Ball seemed to feel military action would throw the NATO allies in disarray and permit Britain and France to separate from us on Berlin policy. Stated Kohler discussions with Khrushchev did not fit in with Soviet action in Cuba.See Document 20. Suggested Cuban situation might be by inadvertance. Suggested we might give Khrushchev an “out” on the grounds that he does not know what is going on in Cuba and discussed various types of action ranging from a limited military strike to minimize losses to the calling of a Summit conference.

 During the discussion Taylor and Ball speculated as to whether this whole thing was not a “mock up” designed to draw out action by us, and that the war heads were not there. This view was not supported. McNamara urged avoiding taking a position, considering all alternatives, with meetings this afternoon and this evening in preparation of final discussion with the President tomorrow. Urged exploration of all facts and listed the following:

About 50 or 60 MIG 17s and 19s now in Cuba and these apparently have no offensive capability.

One MIG 21 has been seen and a number of suspicious crates also seen indicating some MIG 21 capability and we do not know whether the MIG 21 has an offensive capability.

IL 28’s have been delivered.

Three MRBM sites under construction and can be ready in two weeks.

Warhead locations unknown; also unknown whether MRBM’s are nuclear or conventional. Also feels that if nuclear warheads supplied them Soviet will also supply nuclear bombs for bombers with offensive capability.

Shiploads of boxes of unknown purpose reported by Lundahl to DCI on October 14th.

28 Soviet ships en route to Cuba at the present time.

Sited at Havana, mysterious excavations, revetments, covered buildings, railroad tracks through tunnels, etc., might be nuclear storage site.

Other facts should be developed today.

Note:McCone responded by reading numbered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of attached memorandum dated October 17th.Document 26.

 General Taylor and Thompson discussed political nature of problem including possibility of forcing settlement in Berlin and elsewhere—Khrushchev wished show down on Berlin and this gave a show down issue. Believes Khrushchev would be surprised to find we know about MRBMs. Thompson emphasized Khrushchev wants Berlin settlement but on his terms. And will probably deny knowledge of Cuban situation but at any event would justify actions because of our missiles in Italy and Turkey. Also Khrushchev recognizes that action by us would be devisive among our allies. McCone emphasized his views on political objectives as stated in paragraph 5 of the attached memorandum, and also repeated paragraph 2-C. Also made the point in paragraph 6. McNamara discussed many operational questions concerning the use of Soviet nuclear warheads in Cuba; how communications could be arranged; what authority was in the field. Thompson believes Soviet nuclear warheads was under very tight control. McCone reviewed recent Chicadee reports, indicated considerable autonomy in hands of field commanders much more so than we have. Bundy and McCone left for meeting with the President.
23. Memorandum for the FileSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memo for the Record. No classification marking. Drafted by McCone on October 19. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, pp. 169-173. Washington, October 17, 1962.

Memorandum of Meeting, Wednesday, October 17th, at 8:30 a.m.,See Document 22. and again at 4:00 p.m., attended by Rusk, Ball (each part of the time)Martin, Johnson, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, McCone, Bohlen, Thompson, Bundy, Sorensen, Dean Acheson (for a short time).

Note: The 4:00 o’clock meeting adjourned at about 7:00, and reassembled at 10:00 p.m., in Secretary Ball’s conference room, adjourning at 11:45 p.m.These meetings, which are summarized below, are also described in Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 681-682;Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 34; and Dean Acheson, “Homage to Plain Dumb Luck,” in Robert A. Devine, The Cuban Missile Crisis, pp. 197-198. The Deputy Secretary of Defense’s handwritten notes on the day are in the Supplement. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Notes on Cuba)

Note: At 9:30 a.m. DCI went to see the President,McCone’s record of this meeting reads as follows: then went to Gettysburg to see General Eisenhower.McCone’s memorandum for the file on his meeting with Eisenhower is not printed. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

“President seemed inclined to act promptly if at all, without warning, targeting on MRBM’s and possible airfields. Stated Congressional resolutions gave him all authority he needed and this was confirmed by Bundy, and therefore seemed inclined to act.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President)

The purpose of the discussion was to develop a plan of action in connection with Cuba, and the alternatives are summarized in my memorandum of October 18th addressed to USIB, copy of which is attached.Not printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President)

This memorandum will record views as they were expressed and developed throughout the meetings.

Ambassador Bohlen warned against any action against Cuba, particularly an air strike without warning, stating such would be divisive with all allies and subject us to criticism throughout the world. He advocated writing both Khrushchev and Castro; if their response was negative or unsatisfactory then we should plan action; advise our principal allies, seek a two-thirds vote from the OAS and then act. The Attorney General and Bohlen exchanged views as to just what type of an answer we could expect from Khrushchev and what he might do if we threatened an attack. During this discussion Secretary Rusk seemed to favor asking Congress for a declaration of a state of war against Cuba and then proceed with OAS, NATO, etc., but always preserve flexibility as to the type of action. Bohlen consistently warned that world opinion would be against us if we carried out a military strike. Secretary Ball emphasized the importance of time, stating that if action was over quickly, the repercussions would not be too serious.

The Attorney General raised the question of the attitude of Turkey, Italy, Western European countries, all of which have been “under the gun” for years, and would take the position that now that the U.S. has a few missiles in their backyard, they become hysterical. This point was discussed back and forth by various people throughout both days of discussion.

Secretary McNamara made the point that missiles in Cuba had no great military consequence because of the stalemate mentioned in my October 18th memorandum. General Taylor supported this view in the early parts of the discussion, but in the later meetings expressed increasing concern over the importance of the missile threat from Cuba. Gilpatric supported McNamara’s position. McCone doubted it, stating that McNamara’s facts were not new as they had appeared in estimates months ago (which McNamara questioned). Nevertheless, he and McCone felt that a complex of MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba would have very important military significance. McNamara took issue claiming that the military equation would not be changed by the appearance of these missiles.

Bohlen and Thompson questioned the real purpose of the Soviet’s actions in Cuba and seemed to feel that their acts may be in preparation for a confrontation with President Kennedy at which time they would seek to settle the entire subject to overseas bases as well as the Berlin question. McCone indicated this might be one of several objectives and undoubtedly would be the subject of discussion at the time of confrontation; however, McCone doubted that this was the prime purpose of such an elaborate and expensive installation as the Soviets were going forward with in Cuba. Bohlen seemed to favor precipitating talks, and was supported by Thompson.

SecDef and Taylor both objected to political talks because it would give time for threatening missiles to become operational and also give the Soviets an opportunity to camouflage the missiles. McCone pre-sented most recent photographs and indicated CIA opinion that the first missiles will be operational within one or two weeks.

Bohlen again raised the question of opening up discussions. McNamara agreed that this would be desirable but emphasized the importance of developing sequence of events which would lead to military action.

There followed an extensive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of a military blockade, total or partial.

It was at this point that McNamara and Taylor presented their schedule of alternative military strikes, copy of which is attached, and which was the subject of continual discussion in the ensuing meetings.Not attached, but a copy of this 1-page paper, initialed by McNamara, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General.

Dean Acheson then expressed his views as follows:

We should proceed at once with the necessary military actions and should do no talking. The Soviets will react some place. We must expect this; take the consequences and manage the situations as they evolve. We should have no consultations with Khrushchev, Castro, or our allies, but should fully alert our allies in the most persuasive manner by high level people. This would include all NATO partners, and the OAS. The President should forget about the elections and should cancel all future campaign speeches.

As an alternate to military action, a plan was discussed involving a declaration of war and the creation of an all-out blockade. Thompson spoke strongly in favor of a blockade. General Taylor at this point indicated that he favored a blockade although in subsequent meetings he seemed inclined towards a military strike. McCone gave an intelligence estimate on the effects of a blockade, indicating its seriousness would depend upon how “hard” a blockade it turned out to be, and finally stated that the main objective of taking Cuba away from Castro had been lost and we have been overly consumed with the missile problem. McCone stated that we must all bear in mind that we have two objectives, one, disposing of the missile sites, and the other, getting rid of Castro’s communism in the Western Hemisphere.

The meeting adjourned for dinner and in the evening Secretary Rusk came forward with the following plan.

The United States cannot accept operational MRBMs in Cuba. There is not much profit in preliminary exchanges with Khrushchev and Castro because the President has said that the establishment of Soviet bases and offensive weapons in the Western Hemisphere would raise serious problems and therefore on September 5th [4th] and 13thFor texts of these statements, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 369-370 and 373-374. the President has in effect warned both Khrushchev and Castro.

Rusk continued that more talks with Khrushchev would result in extended parlays and therefore he recommended against such an approach. Rusk then proposed that we hold until the middle of next week and then follow the OD course No. 1 (52 sorties against MRBMs). Prior, we inform key allies probably on Tuesday (Macmillan, De Gaulle, Adenauer, possibly the Turks and a few Latin American Presidents). On Wednesday, we strike with missiles and simultaneously send a message to Khrushchev, NATO, OAS, etc. We should be alert for an attack on Turkey and be prepared for the consequences in Berlin, Quemoy, Matsu, Korea, etc. Rusk made the estimate that world opinion would go along, 42 allies would go along and some neutrals would be favorable. Latin Americans must be told that we are acting in the interests of the Western Hemisphere. Rusk advocated that the first step—we take out the missiles and thus remove the immediate problem of the establishment of an offensive capability, but that we be prepared for subsequent steps. He emphasized the United States cannot accept missiles in our security interests and in view of statements made by the President and others and our various policy declarations. Bohlen continued to persist for diplomatic approach but Rusk and several others were not at this point persuaded. McNamara raised innumerable questions concerning military operations; the manner in which the strike could be properly covered with protective air and how it might be restricted and also the advisability of case one, as contrasted with case one, two and/or three.

Both Ambassador Thompson and Secretary Martin in discussing the Rusk proposal favored a blockade, coupled with a declaration of war.

General Taylor at this point spoke in favor of a military strike taking out the MRBMs and the planes as well, and was supported by McCone, who took the opportunity to cover the points set forth in “talking paper for principals, October 17, 1962,” attached.Not attached, but a possible reference to Document 26. Also during the course of these meetings, McCone reported to the group and later to the President the results of his discussions with General Eisenhower, as covered in the attached memorandum of October 17th, this subject.

In addition to the attached papers, State tabled during the day’s meetings the following: Possible course of action (undated) in 14 pages.Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962) See the Supplement. Possible world consequences in military action, undated,Not found. 5 pages. Political actions (undated) 4 pages.A copy of this paper is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-1862. Political actions in support of major military action (undated) 3 pages.

These were all referred to as State papers (draft) and some were revised the following day.

Also State tabled the following papers: Limited one-time strike against MRBM sites, undated, 6 pages. Plan of blockade (undated) 4 pages. Paper labeled “Attack Three—Invasion” 5 pages with an attached scenario of 4 pages. Possible Soviet Reactions to the following alternatives, C.E. Bohlen, October 17th, 2 pages.

Also, proposed letter to Khrushchev was tabled, paper dealing with probable Castro response to U.S. appeal and a proposed letter to Fidel Castro, marked “To Mr. F.C.”, all included in State papers.None of these drafts has been found.

At the conclusion of the meetings, which served the purpose of airing the views of all parties responsible for giving advice to the President, the alternatives open to us were summarized by the Attorney General

By evening on October 17 The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff records that the following five possibilities were still under consideration:

“1. On Tuesday, 23 October, inform Western European and some Latin American leaders of the situation. On Wednesday, attack the MRBM’s, issue a public statement, and send a message to Premier Khrushchev. Then wait and see what happens. Secretary Rusk rejected this suggestion.

“2. Same as 1, but notify Chairman Khrushchev beforehand and wait about three days to obtain his reply. Defense spokesmen argued against this solution.

“3. Tell the Soviets that the United States was aware of the missiles and would prevent any more from arriving. Impose a blockade, declare war, and make preparations for invasion. Mr. Rusk and Mr. Ball seemed inclined to favor this course, but first wanted surveillance without air strikes.

“4. After limited political preliminaries, attack targets in Categories III-IV and prepare for invasion.

“5. Same as 4, but omit the political preliminaries.” (The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. VIII, Part II, p. 250)

and are covered in my memorandum to USIB, dated October 18th.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
24. Editorial Note

At 10 a.m. on October 17, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff met and decided that a surgical strike against the MRBM sites alone represented an unacceptable risk. They incorporated their views in a memorandum to Secretary of Defense McNamara (JCSM-794-62;JCS Files), which suggested air attacks on a wide variety of military targets.

25. Letter From the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text indicates it was written during the morning. A copy of Stevenson’s handwritten notes, “Cuba—Memo to Self for Conf—Dept—Oct. 17,” which seem to be the basis for this letter, are at Princeton University, Stevenson Papers, Box 846, Selected Correspondence, Cuba. Washington, October 17, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: I have reviewed the planning thus far and have the following comments for you:

As I have said I think your personal emissaries should deliver your messages to C and K. There is no disagreement as to C. As to K an emissary could better supplement the gravity of the situation you have communicated to Gromyko. And talking with K would afford a chance of uncovering his motives and objectives far better than correspondence thru the “usual channels.”

As to your announcement, assuming it becomes imperative to say something soon, I think it would be a mistake at this time to disclose that an attack was imminent and that merely reciting the facts, emphasizing the gravity of the situation and that further steps were in process would be enough for the first announcement.

Because an attack would very likely result in Soviet reprisals somewhere—Turkey, Berlin, etc.—it is most important that we have as much of the world with us as possible. To start or risk starting a nuclear war is bound to be divisive at best and the judgments of history seldom coincide with the tempers of the moment.

If war comes, in the long run our case must rest on stopping while there was still time the Soviet drive to world domination, our obligations under the Inter-American system, etc. We must be prepared for the widespread reaction that if we have a missile base in Turkey and other places around the Soviet Union surely they have a right to one in Cuba. If we attack Cuba, an ally of the USSR, isn’t an attack on NATO bases equally justified. One could go on and on. While the explanation of our action may be clear to us it won’t be clear to many others. Moreover, if war is the consequence, the Latin American republics may well divide and some say that the U.S. is not acting with their approval and consent. Likewise unless the issue is very clear there may be sharp differences with our Western Allies who have lived so long under the same threat of Soviet attack from bases in the satellite countries by the same IRBMs.

But all these considerations and obstacles to clear and universal understanding that we are neither rash, impetuous or indifferent to the fate of others are, I realize, only too familiar to you.

I know your dilemma is to strike before the Cuban sites are operational or to risk waiting until a proper groundwork of justification can be prepared. The national security must come first. But the means adopted have such incalculable consequences that I feel you should have made it clear that the existence of nuclear missile bases anywhere is negotiableThe word “negotiable” is double underlined in the source text. before we start anything.

Our position, then, is that we can’t negotiate with a gun at our head, a gun that imperils the innocent, helpless Cuban people as much as it does the U.S., and that if they won’t remove the missiles and restore the status quo ante we will have to do it ourselves—and then we will be ready to discuss bases in the context of a disarmament treaty or anything else with them. In short it is they, not the U.S., that have upset the balance and created this situation of such peril to the whole world.

I confess I have many misgivings about the proposed course of action, but to discuss them further would add little to what you already have in mind. So I will only repeat that it should be clear as a pikestaff that the U.S. was, is and will be ready to negotiate the elimination of bases and anything else; that it is they who have upset the precarious balance in the world in arrogant disregard of your warnings—by threats against Berlin and now from Cuba—and that we have no choice except to restore that balance, i.e., blackmail and intimidation never, negotiation and sanity always.

Yours,

Adlai S. StevensonPrinted from a copy that indicates Stevenson signed the original.

P.S. I’m returning to New York and can return, of course, at your convenience.
26. Memorandum for DiscussionSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. The memorandum indicates it was prepared for discussion on October 17. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 161-162. Washington, October 17, 1962. SUBJECT The Cuban Situation The establishment of medium range strike capability in Cuba by the Soviets was predicted by me in at least a dozen reports since the Soviet buildup was noted in early August. Purposes are to: Provide Cuba with an offensive or retaliatory power for use if attacked. Enhance Soviet strike capability against the United States. Establish a “hall mark” of accomplishment by other Latin American countries, most particularly Mexico, and other Central American countries within strike range of the United States. The MRBM capability we have witnessed will expand and the defensive establishments to protect this capability likewise will be expanded. There appears to me to be no other explanation for the extensive and elaborate air defense establishment. In my opinion the missiles are Soviet, they will remain under Soviet operational control as do ours, they will be equipped with nuclear warheads under Soviet control (because conventional warheads would be absolutely ineffective), Cubans will supply most of the manpower needs with the Soviets permanently exercising operational command and control. Nevertheless, there will be a substantial number of Soviets on site at all times. Soviet political objectives appears to me to be: The establishment of a “trading position” to force removal of U.S. overseas bases and Berlin. To satisfy their ambitions in Latin America by this show of determination and courage against the American Imperialist. Consequences of action by the United States will be the inevitable “spilling of blood” of Soviet military personnel. This will increase tension everywhere and undoubtedly bring retaliation against U.S. foreign military installations, where substantial U.S. casualties would result, i.e., Tule, Spanish bases, Moroccan bases, and possibly SAC bases in Britain or Okinawa. Jupiter installations in Southern Italy, Turkey, and our facilities [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] do not provide enough “American blood.” The situation cannot be tolerated. However, the United States should not act without warning and thus be forced to live with a “Pearl Harbor indictment” for the indefinite future. I would therefore: Notify Gromyko and Castro that we know all about this. Give them 24 hours to commence dismantling and removal of MRBMs, coastal defense missiles, surface to air missiles, IL 28s and all other aircraft which have a dual defensive-offensive capability, including MIG 21s. Notify the American public and the world of the situation created by the Soviets. If Khrushchev and Castro fail to act at once, we should make a massive surprise strike at air fields, MRBM sites and SAM sites concurrently. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
27. Memorandum by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Also reproduced in CIA Documentson the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 163-165. Washington, October 17, 1962.

Several alternatives indicated below were posed for consideration at the close of meeting covered by memorandum dated October 17th.See Document 23.

All dealt with the specific actions U.S. Government should take against Cuba at this time. The discussions centered around: Whether military action should be taken prior to a warning to, or discussions with, Khrushchev and Castro. Notification to or consultation with our allies, including NATO, OAS, and others. Referral to the United Nations. Effect on the “balance of nuclear power equation” of the MRBM installations in Cuba.

Three principal courses of action are open to us, and of course there are variations of each.

Do nothing and live with the situation. It was pointed out clearly that Western Europe, Greece, Turkey, and other countries had lived under the Soviet MRBMs for years; therefore, why should the United States be so concerned. Resort to an all-out blockade which would probably require a declaration of war and to be effective would mean the interruption of all incoming shipping. This was discussed as a slow strangulation process, but it was stated that “intelligence reports” indicated that a blockade would bring Castro down in four months. (Note: I have seen no such estimate.) Military action which was considered at several levels. The following alternatives are: Strafing identified MRBM installations. Strafing MRBM installations and air fields with MIGs. (a) and (b) plus all SAM sites and coastal missile sites. (a), (b), and (c) above plus all other significant military installations, none of which were identified.

Discussions of all of the above were inconclusive and it was asked that the group reassemble, and develop their views on the advantages and disadvantages and the effects of the following: Warning to Khrushchev and Castro. If the response is unsatisfactory, pursuing a course of military action. If the response is unsatisfactory, referring to the OAS and the United Nations prior to taking military action. Warning to Khrushchev and Castro and if the response is unsatisfactory, convening Congress, seeking a declaration of war, and proceeding with an all-out blockade. Strike militarily with no warning, the level of the military effort being dependent upon evolving circumstances. In all probability this type of action would escalate into invasion and occupation, although the meeting was not agreed on this point. Blockade with no warning and no advance notice such as a declaration of war, with the President depending upon existing Congressional resolutions for authority.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
28. Memorandum for the FileSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. The source text bears the handwritten notation “1100 AM-10-18-62 w/the President et al.” Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 183-186. A tape recording of this meeting is available in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 30.2 and 30a.1. The recording makes it clear that McCone’s account is a summarized version that excludes his own comments and observations. Washington, October 19, 1962.

Early in the morning of October 18th, Secretary McNamara called Mr. McCone at his residence expressing great concern over the reports from NPIC as a result of their examination of the two flights run on October 15th.Apparent reference to the “Wheeler Report,” October 17, reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 175-180. Lundahl was at the house with the enlargements which indicated that, in addition to the three mobile MRBM sites detected on flight October 14th, there appeared to be now two IRBM sites with fixed launchers zeroed in on the Eastern United States. McNamara felt that this development demanded more prompt and decisive action.

The group which had been meeting on Tuesday met in the Cabinet Room at 11:00 a.m. on WednesdayAt this point in the source text “Wed.?” and “Thursday?” are written for “Tuesday” and “Wednesday” and a marginal note indicates that the DCI did not attend the October 16 meeting or the one on Wednesday, October 17, in Under Secretary Ball’s Conference Room. with the President. State tabled revisions in their papers on covering a limited one-time strike and blockade, most of which are dated 10/18—11:00 a.m.Presumably McCone is referring to papers entitled “Plan I, Limited One-Time Strike (50 Sorties) Against MRBM Sites,” and “II, Blockade,” undated. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, Subjects, Standing Committee, 9/62-10/62) See the Supplement.

At the opening of the meeting, McCone gave a brief resume of current intelligence and Lundahl presented the most recent photography. President questioned Lundahl further if the uninitiated could be persuaded that the photographs presented offensive MRBM missiles. Lundahl stated probably not and that we must have low-level photography for public consumption.

Secretary Rusk then stated that developments in the last 24 hours had substantially changed his thinking. He first questioned whether, if it is necessary to move against Cuba, and then concluded that it was because Cuba can become a formidable military threat. He also referred to the President’s recent public statements and indicated a feeling that if no action was taken, we would free the Soviets to act any place they wished and at their own will. Also, Rusk stated the failure on our part to act would make our situation unmanageable elsewhere in the world. He furthermore indicated that this would be an indication of weakness which would have serious effect on our Allies. Secretary pointed out to the President that action would involve risks. We could expect counter action and the cost may be heavy. The President must expect action in Berlin, Korea and possibly against the United States itself. Rusk felt a quick strike would minimize the risk of counter action. He raised the question of solidarity of the Alliance and seemed to dismiss this question, feeling that the Alliance would hold together. Rusk stated that if we enter upon positive action, we can not say for sure what the final Soviet response will be and therefore what the final outcome will be. However he felt that the American people will accept danger and suffering if they are convinced doing so is necessary and that they have a clear conscience. The Secretary reviewed the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of World War I, World War II, and the Korean war. These factors militated in favor of consulting with Khrushchev and depending on the Rio pact. This, he indicated, might have the possibility of prevention of action and settlement by political means. The other course open was the declaration of war. Rusk expressed himself in favor of leaning upon the Rio pact, but does not dismiss the alternative of a unilateral declaration of war as the ultimate action we must take. The alternate is a quick strike.

Ambassador Bohlen was not present but his views were expressed in a message which was read in which he strongly advocated diplomatic effort and stated that military action prior to this would be wrong.Bohlen was on his way to Paris to assume the position of Ambassador. The message has not been found. He urged against action first and then decisive value of discussion. He also stated that limited quick military action was an illusion and that any military action would rapidly escalate into an invasion. McNamara at this point presented the alternatives referred to the previous day, stating that alternatives one and two were not conclusive and that we would have to resort to alternative 3 and in fact this would lead us ultimately into an invasion.Presumably a reference to Document 27.

General Taylor generally reviewed the situation stating that the Chiefs looked upon Cuba as a forward base of serious proportions, that it cannot be taken out totally by air; that the military operation would be sizeable, nevertheless necessary.

Ambassador Thompson urged that any action be preceded by a declaration of war;In an October 17 memorandum to Martin, Hilsman noted that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research had considered Ambassador Thompson’s suggestion that the United States “make a declaration of war against Cuba which would be followed by no immediate offensive action other than the isolation of the island by naval blockage.” Hilsman concluded that the idea had “very considerable merit.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2062) he strongly advocated that we institute a blockade and not resort to military action unless and until it is determined that Castro and Khrushchev refuse to reverse their activities and actually remove the missiles which are now in place.McCone briefed the group on his meeting at noon on October 17, at which Eisenhower also urged decisive rather than limited action. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 30.2) A memorandum for the file by McCone is in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record, 24 Sept.-31 Dec., 1962. It is also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 167-168.

Secretary Dillon questioned what would be accomplished by talking to Khrushchev. He pointed out that we would probably become engaged in discussions from which we could not extract ourselves and therefore our freedom of action would be frustrated. Dillon was very positive that whatever action we take should be done without consultation with Khrushchev. Rusk seemed to disagree indicating there was a possibility that Khrushchev might be persuaded to reduce his efforts but he admitted also that he might step them up as a result of discussions.

President Kennedy was non-committal, however he seemed to continually raise questions of reactions of our allies, NATO, South America, public opinion and others. Raised the question whether we should not move the missiles out of Turkey. All readily agreed they were not much use but a political question was involved. Bundy thought this a good idea either under conditions of a strike or during a preliminary talk.

McNamara discussed in some detail the effects of a strike indicating that we could expect several hundred Soviet citizens to be killed; he pointed out that all of the SAM sites were manned exclusively by Soviets and a great many Soviet technicians were working on the MRBMs and at the air fields. He agreed that we could move out of Turkey and Italy; pointed out the political complications. At this point McNamara seemed to be reconsidering his prior position of advocating military action and laid special emphasis on the fact that the price of Soviet retaliation, whether in Berlin or elsewhere, would be very high and we would not be able to control it.

Secretary Ball throughout the conversation maintained the position that strike without warning was not acceptable and that we should not proceed without discussion with Khrushchev. President Kennedy then said that he thought at some point Khrushchev would say that if we made a move against Cuba, he would take Berlin. McNamara surmised perhaps that was the price we must pay and perhaps we’d lose Berlin anyway. There followed an exchange of view on the possibility of the Soviets taking Berlin and our prospect of retaining it.

President Kennedy rather summed up the dilemma stating that action of a type contemplated would be opposed by the alliance—on the other hand, lack of action will create disunity, lack of confidence and disintegration of our several alliances and friendly relations with countries who have confidence in us.

As a result of discussions of the “price” of a strike, there followed a long discussion of the possibilities of a blockade, the advantages of it, and manner in which it would be carried out, etc. There seemed to be differences of opinion as to whether the blockade should be total, or should only involve military equipment which would mean blockading Soviet ships. Also there were continued references to blockading ships carrying offensive weapons and there seemed to be a differentiation in the minds of some in the policy of blockading offensive weapons as contrasted to blockading all weapons.

There followed discussion as to policies the President should follow with respect to calling Congress into session, asking for a declaration of war, advising the country and authorizing action. Thompson continued to insist that we must communicate with Khrushchev. There was a discussion concerning the President’s meeting with GromykoSee Document 29. and the position he should take should the Cuban question come up. The President was advised to draw Gromyko out and it was indicated he probably would receive a flat denial that there were any offensive weapons in Cuba.

Meeting adjourned with the President requesting that we organize into two groups. One to study the advantages of what might be called a slow course of action which would involve a blockade to be followed by such further actions as appeared necessary as the situation evolved. Second would be referred to as a fast dynamic action which would involve the strike of substantial proportions with or without notice.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
29. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko Talks. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky on October 21 and approved by the White House on October 23. The meeting was held at the White House. The President and the Foreign Minister also discussed Berlin, a test ban agreement, and U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations; memoranda of these conversations are printed in vols. XV, pp. 370–376; VII, pp. 589–592; and V, respectively. An October 17 briefing memorandum for the conversation is in Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/10-1762. Washington, October 18, 1962, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS US The President The Secretary Ambassador Thompson Mr. Hillenbrand Mr. Akalovsky USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko Mr. Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Sukhodrev

After a discussion on Germany and Berlin, Mr. Gromyko stated he wished to set forth the Soviet position on Cuba and to voice the views of the Soviet Government with regard to US actions relating to Cuba.Prior to his meeting with Gromyko, the President had discussed the Cuban situation with Dean Acheson at 3:45 p.m. For a record of their conversation, see Acheson, Homage to Plain Dumb Luck, p. 202. The President then conferred with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara from 4:30 to 5 p.m. No record of this meeting, other than a notation in the President’s Appointment Book, has been found. (Kennedy Library) Continuing to read from his prepared text, he asserted that the Soviet Government stood for peaceful coexistence and was against interference by one state in the internal affairs of another state, and this also applied to relations between big and small states. This, he said, was the basic core, the credo of Soviet foreign policy, and it was not just a statement.

The President was surely fully familiar with the attitude of the Soviet Government, and of Mr. Khrushchev personally, toward recent developments and toward actions by the United States Government in relation to Cuba. For quite some time there had been an unabated anti-Cuban campaign in the United States, a campaign which was apparently backed by the United States Government. Now the United States Government wished to institute a blockade against trade with Cuba, and there had also been some talk of organized piracy under the aegis of the United States. All this could only lead to great misfortunes for mankind. The United States Government seemed to believe that the Cubans must settle their internal affairs not at their own discretion, but at the discretion of the United States. Yet Cuba belonged to Cubans and not to the United States. If this was so, why then were statements being made in the United States advocating invasion of Cuba? What did the United States want to do with Cuba? What could Cuba do to the United States? If one were to compare the human and material resources of Cuba and the United States, one would see immediately that the United States was a giant and Cuba only a baby. Cuba could not constitute a threat to any country in Latin America. It was strange to believe that small Cuba could encroach upon any Latin American country. Cuban leaders, including Castro personally, had stated for all the world to know and in the most solemn fashion that Cuba did not intend to impose its system and was in favor of peaceful coexistence. However, those who called for aggression against Cuba said that Cuban statements were insufficient, in spite of the fact that those statements were substantiated by deeds. If one were to approach problems this way, then it would be easy to justify any aggression. All international problems must be resolved by negotiation between the states concerned. After all, the US and USSR were now negotiating and making statements which should be given credence. Was it not sufficient for Cuba to state that it wished negotiations and a solution of existing problems on a mutually acceptable basis? The President was surely familiar with President Dorticos’ speech at the General Assembly.For text of this address, October 8, see U.N. doc. A/PV.1145, pp. 369-375. What the Cubans wanted was to make their home and country secure. They appealed to reason and conscience and called upon the United States not to resort to encroachments. Thus the question arose of why it was necessary to fan this campaign, to organize hostile actions, and to take actions directed against those countries which were extending their hand of friendship to Cuba? This was a violation of international law, and how could the Soviet Government just sit by and observe this situation idly?

Mr. Gromyko said he knew that the President appreciated frankness. Mr. Khrushchev’s conversation with the President at ViennaMemoranda of Kennedy’s conversations with Khrushchev, June 3-4, 1961, are printed in volume V. had been frank and therefore, with the President’s permission, he himself wished to be frank, too. The situation today could not be compared to that obtaining in the middle of the 19th century. Modern times were not the same as those when colonies had been divided among colonial powers. Modern times could not be compared to those when it took weeks or months for the voice of the attacked to be heard. Statements had been made that the US was a powerful and great nation; this was true, but what kind of a nation was the USSR? Mr. Khrushchev had been favorably impressed with the President’s statement at Vienna regarding the equality of forces of our two nations. Since this was so, i.e., since the USSR was also a great and strong nation, it could not stand by as a mere observer when aggression was planned and when a threat of war was looming. The US Government was surely aware of the Soviet Government’s attitude toward the recent call-up of 150,000 Reservists in the United States. The Soviet Government believed that if both sides were for relaxation of international tensions and for solving the outstanding international problems, such demonstrations could be designed only for the purpose of increasing tensions and should therefore be avoided. If worse should come to worse and if war should occur, then surely 150,000 soldiers would be of no significance. As the President was surely aware, today was not 1812, when Napoleon had relied on the number of soldiers, sabres and rifles. Neither could today’s situation be compared to 1941, when Hitler had relied on the number of tanks and guns. Today, life itself and military technology had created an entirely different situation, where it was better not to rely on arms. As to Soviet assistance to Cuba, Mr. Gromyko stated that he was instructed to make it clear, as the Soviet Government had already done, that such assistance, pursued solely for the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba and to the development of Cuba, toward the development of its agriculture and land amelioration, and training by Soviet specialists of Cuba nationals in handling defensive armaments were by no means offensive. If it were otherwise, the Soviet Government would have never become involved in rendering such assistance. This applied to any other country as well. Laos was a good and convincing illustration of this point. If the Soviet Government had pursued a different policy, the situation in that country today would be quite different. It was quite evident that the Soviet Union and its friends had broader opportunities of influencing the situation in that country than had the United States. However, the USSR had sought an understanding on that question, since it could not go back on the basic principle of its foreign policy, which was designed to alleviate tensions, to eliminate outstanding problems and to resolve them on a peaceful basis.

Such was the position of the Soviet Government with regard to Cuba. The Soviet Government and Mr. Khrushchev personally appealed to the President and the United States Government not to allow such steps as would be incompatible with peace, with relaxation of tensions, and with United Nations Charter under which both the US and the USSR had solemnly affixed their signatures. The Soviet Government addressed its appeal to the United States on this question because both our countries were major powers and should direct their efforts only to ensuring peace.

The President said he was glad that Mr. Gromyko had referred to Laos because he believed that the Soviet policy on that problem was as Mr. Gromyko had described it. So far the Soviet Union had apparently met its obligations just as the United States had met them. However, a most serious mistake had been made last summer with respect to Cuba. The US had not pressed the Cuban problem and had attempted to push it aside although of course a number of people in this country opposed the regime now prevailing in Cuba and there were many refugees coming to this country. However, there was no intention to invade Cuba. But then last July the USSR, without any communication from Mr. Khrushchev to the President, had embarked upon the policy of supplying arms to Cuba. The President said he did not know the reasons for that shift in Soviet policy, because there was no threat of invasion and he would have been glad to give appropriate assurances to that effect had Mr. Khrushchev communicated with him. Soviet arms supply had had a profound impact in the United States; Ambassador Dobrynin was surely aware of how the American people and the Congress felt on this matter. The administration had tried to calm this reaction and he, the President, had made a statement that in view of the nature of Soviet assistance to Cuba at this time coolness was required. Yet, the President said, he wished to stress that Soviet actions were extremely serious and he could find no satisfactory explanation for them. The Soviet Union was surely aware of US feelings with regard to Cuba, which was only 90 miles away from the United States. The President continued that the US planned no blockade of Cuba; it was only a question of ships taking arms to Cuba not being able to stop in the United States with their return cargo. Thus a very unfortunate situation had developed. The President said he did not know where it was taking us but it was the most dangerous situation since the end of the war. The US had taken the Soviet statement concerning the nature of armaments supplied to Cuba at its face value. He, the President, had attacked last Sunday in Indianapolis a Senator who was advocating invasion, and he had stated that the Cuban problem must be kept in perspective.For text of Kennedy’s remarks, October 13, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 771-773. The President reiterated that this was a dangerous situation, and said he did not know where the USSR planned to have it end.

Mr. Gromyko said that there had already been an invasion, and it was well known how it ended. It was well known now, both from facts and statements, including the President’s own, under what circumstances and by whom that invasion had been organized. Everyone knew that if the United States had merely lifted its little finger, Cuban emigrees and smaller Caribbean countries which had helped them would not have dared undertake any invasion.

The President interjected that he had discussed with Mr. Khrushchev the April 1, 1961, invasion and had said that it was a mistake. He also pointed out he would have given assurances that there would be no further invasion, either by refugees or by US forces. But last July the Soviet Union took certain actions and the situation changed.

Mr. Gromyko continued that Cubans and the Cuban Government had before them the vital question of whether they should remain unprepared to resist attack or to take steps to defend their country. He said he wished to reiterate that the Soviet Union had responded to appeals for assistance only because that assistance pursued the sole objective of giving bread to Cuba and preventing hunger in that country; also, as far as armaments were concerned, Soviet specialists were training Cubans in handling certain types of armaments which were only defensive—and he wished to stress the word defensive—in character, and thus such training could not constitute a threat to the United States. He reiterated that if it were otherwise the Soviet Union would never have agreed to render such assistance.

The President said that in order to be clear on this Cuban problem he wanted to state the following: The US had no intention of invading Cuba. Introduction last July of intensive armanents had complicated the situation and created grave danger. His own actions had been to prevent, unless US security was endangered, anything from being done that might provoke the danger of war. The President then read a portion of his September 4 statement on CubaSee vol. X, Document 411. and stated that this had been US position and policy on this question. He noted that the Attorney General had discussed the Cuban situation with Ambassador Dobrynin so that the latter must be aware of what it was. The President again recalled his Indianapolis speech of last Sunday and said that we were basing our present attitude on facts as they had been described by Mr. Gromyko; our presumption was that the armanents supplied by USSR were defensive.

Mr. Gromyko stated the Soviet Union proceeded from the assumption that on the basis of Soviet Government’s statements and his own today the US Government and the President had a clear idea of the Soviet policy on this matter and of the Soviet evaluation of US action in relation to Cuba. He said he had nothing to add to what he had already said.The conversation concluded shortly after 7 p.m. and the discussion among the President’s advisors resumed in Ball’s conference room until 9:15 p.m. when they were recalled to the White House for a meeting with the President that lasted past midnight. No record of the discussion at the Department of State has been found, but the Attorney General recalled that at the White House they explained their “recommendations to the President,” who was “not at all satisfied” and sent them back to work (Thirteen Days, pp. 43-44), and the President’s Special Counsel remembered that the “President had already moved from the air-strike to the blockade camp.” (Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 691)

30. Editorial Note

On October 18, 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency released a “Joint Evaluation of the Soviet Mission Threat in Cuba,” based on intelligence obtained as of 9 p.m. that day. The evaluation, prepared by the Guided Missile and Astronautics Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, was codenamed Iron Bark because it drew upon intelligence material provided by the Central Intelligence Agency’s important Soviet source, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky. It was based on “relatively complete photo interpretation of U-2 photography” made on missions of October 14, and two on October 15 and “very preliminary and incomplete readout” of coverage of six U-2 missions on October 17.

The evaluation concluded that there was “at least one Soviet regiment consisting of eight launchers and sixteen 1020-nm (SS-4) medium-range ballistic missiles now deployed in western Cuba at two launch sites.” These mobile missiles had to be considered operational and could be launched within 18 hours after the decision to launch was made. The evaluation concluded that “Fixed, soft sites, which could achieve initial operational capacity during December 1962, are now being deployed near Havana.” These sites were probably intended for 2200-nm (SS-5) intermediate-range ballistic missiles and could be operational by December 1962. All missiles were manned by Soviet personnel and were under Soviet control. Although there was no positive evidence of nuclear warheads in Cuba, the evaluation suggested that “one must assume that nuclear warheads could now be available in Cuba to support the offensive missile capacity as it becomes operational.” The expected warheads for these missiles would weigh 3,000 pounds and have yield in the low megaton range.

The significance of these developments, according to the evaluation, was that the Soviet Union “intends to develop Cuba into a prime strategic base, rather than as a token show of force. The mixed force of 1020-and 2200-nm missiles posed a common threat to the United States and a large portion of Latin America. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80-R01386R, O/D/NFAC, Cuba, 5 Sept-19 Oct 1962) See the Supplement. An extract of this evaluation is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 187-191.

31. Record of MeetingSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba “Week” Drafts. Secret. Drafted by Meeker. The meeting was held in Ball’s conference room. McCone’s handwritten notes on this meeting are in the Supplement. Gilpatric’s handwritten notes on the meeting, comprising less than 1 page and dealing primarily with the Katzenbach-Meeker discussion of the legal framework, are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, RLG’s Notes re Cuba. Washington, October 19, 1962, 11 a.m. PARTICIPANTS Secretary Rusk Under Secretary Ball Ambassador Thompson Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Assistant Secretary Martin Leonard C. Meeker Secretary Dillon Secretary McNamara Deputy Secretary Gilpatric Assistant Secretary Nitze General Taylor Attorney General Kennedy Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach John A. McCone Ray S. Cline McGeorge Bundy Theodore Sorensen Dean Acheson

Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by asking Mr. Johnson if he was ready to lay a program before the group. Mr. Johnson said that he was not.

Then ensued a military photographic intelligence briefing on installations in Cuba, presented by a CIA representative (Arthur Lundahl). Following this, Mr. McCone called on Mr. Cline to give the most recent intelligence estimate conclusions of the United States Intelligence Board. Mr. Cline did so on the basis of three papers which were distributed to the group.Early the morning of October 19 McCone had sent a memorandum to the members of the USIB reviewing the discussion among the principals on October 18 and asking for guidance before the 11 a.m. meeting that day. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Box 6, Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) Presumably these papers are the response to that request. The papers have not been identified further, but McCone’s memorandum is included in the Supplement. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 193-194. (As he started, Mr. Cline spoke of China by inadvertence instead of Cuba; a few moments later this was called to his attention and corrected.)

Secretary Rusk then said he thought there should be an exposition of the legal framework surrounding possible military measures by the United States, turned to me, and seemed about to call on me, when the Attorney General signalled and said “Mr. Katzenbach.” Secretary Rusk then called on the latter. Mr. Katzenbach said he believed the President had ample constitutional and statutory authority to take any needed military measures. He considered a declaration of war unnecessary. From the standpoint of international law, Mr. Katzenbach thought United States action could be justified on the principle of self-defense.

I said that my analysis ran along much the same lines. I did not think a declaration of war would improve our position, but indeed would impair it. I said that a defensive quarantine of Cuba would involve a use of force, and this had to be considered in relation to the United Nations Charter. The Charter contained a general prohibition against the use of force except in certain limited kinds of situation. One of these was “armed attack,” but the situation in Cuba did not constitute armed attack on any country. Another exception was collective action voted by the competent United Nations organ to deal with a situation under Chapter VII of the Charter. Obviously, no resolution could be obtained from the Security Council. And it seemed quite problematical whether we could obtain a recommendation from the General Assembly.

The Charter also contained Chapter VIII on regional arrangements. Article 52 provided that regional arrangements could deal with “such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action”. Thus a case could be made under the Charter for the use of force if it were sanctioned by the American Republics acting under the Rio Treaty. The Organ of Consultation, pursuant to Articles 6 and 8 of that Treaty, could recommend measures, including the use of armed force, to meet a situation endangering the peace of America. As to the prospects for securing the necessary two-thirds vote in the Organ of Consultation, Mr. Martin would have something to say about that.

If the contention were advanced that a defensive quarantine voted under the Rio Treaty constituted “enforcement action” under Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, and therefore required the authorization of the Security Council, we would be able to make a reasonably good argument to the contrary. While our ability to persuade seven members of the Security Council to vote with us on this issue might be uncertain, we would in any event be able to prevent a vote going against our position.

Mr. Martin then gave as his estimate that the United States could secure immediately a vote of 14 in the OAS. He thought the majority could be increased within 24 hours to 17 or perhaps even 18 or 19. He was hopeful in regard to Ecuador and Chile, and believed there was a good chance of getting Mexico. The Attorney General said the President would be placed in an impossible position if we went to the OAS and then failed to get the necessary votes, or if there were a delay. He asked if we could be perfectly sure of the outcome before seeking OAS concurrence. Mr. Martin said he hated to guarantee anything, but he had a lot of confidence about this. You couldn’t go to the American Republics in advance without loss of security, but he felt that a last-minute approach to heads of state, laying the situation on the line, would produce the votes. The Attorney General again expressed his great concern at the possibility of a slip.

There followed a discussion covering the meeting held the night before with the President.See footnote 6, Document 29. One participant looked back on the meeting as having arrived at a tentative conclusion to institute a blockade, and thought the President had been satisfied at the consensus by then arrived at among his advisers. General Taylor quickly indicated that he had not concurred and that the Joint Chiefs had reserved their position.

Mr. Bundy then said that he had reflected a good deal upon the situation in the course of a sleepless night, and he doubted whether the strategy group was serving the President as well as it might, if it merely recommended a blockade. He had spoken with the President this morning, and he felt there was further work to be done. A blockade would not remove the missiles. Its effects were uncertain and in any event would be slow to be felt. Something more would be needed to get the missiles out of Cuba. This would be made more difficult by the prior publicity of a blockade and the consequent pressures from the United Nations for a negotiated settlement. An air strike would be quick and would take out the bases in a clean surgical operation. He favored decisive action with its advantages of surprises and confronting the world with a fait accompli.

Secretary Rusk asked Mr. Acheson for his views. Mr. Acheson said that Khrushchev had presented the United States with a direct challenge, we were involved in a test of wills, and the sooner we got to a showdown the better. He favored cleaning the missile bases out decisively with an air strike. There was something else to remember. This wasn’t just another instance of Soviet missiles aimed at the United States. Here they were in the hands of a madman whose actions would be perfectly irresponsible; the usual restraints operating on the Soviets would not apply. We had better act, and act quickly. So far as questions of international law might be involved, Mr. Acheson agreed with Mr. Katzenbach’s position that self-defense was an entirely sufficient justification. But if there were to be imported a qualification or requirement of approval by the OAS, as apparently suggested by Mr. Meeker, he could not go along with that.

Secretary Dillon said he agreed there should be a quick air strike. Mr. McCone was of the same opinion.

General Taylor said that a decision now to impose a blockade was a decision to abandon the possibility of an air strike. A strike would be feasible for only a few more days; after that the missiles would be operational. Thus it was now or never for an air strike. He favored a strike. If it were to take place Sunday morning, a decision would have to be made at once so that the necessary preparations could be ordered. For a Monday morning strike, a decision would have to be reached tomorrow. Forty-eight hours’ notice was required.

Secretary McNamara said that he would give orders for the necessary military dispositions, so that if the decision were for a strike the Air Force would be ready. He did not, however, advocate an air strike, and favored the alternative of blockade.

Under Secretary Ball said that he was a waverer between the two courses of action.

The Attorney General said with a grin that he too had had a talk with the President, indeed very recently this morning. There seemed to be three main possibilities as the Attorney General analyzed the situation: one was to do nothing, and that would be unthinkable; another was an air strike; the third was a blockade. He thought it would be very, very difficult indeed for the President if the decision were to be for an air strike, with all the memory of Pearl Harbor and with all the implications this would have for us in whatever world there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that kind of country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions. Thousands of Cubans would be killed without warning, and a lot of Russians too. He favored action, to make known unmistakably the seriousness of United States determination to get the missiles out of Cuba, but he thought the action should allow the Soviets some room for maneuver to pull back from their over-extended position in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy, addressing himself to the Attorney General, said this was very well but a blockade would not eliminate the bases; an air strike would.

I asked at this point: who would be expected to be the government of Cuba after an air strike? Would it be anyone other than Castro? If not, would anything be solved, and would we not be in a worse situation than before? After a pause, Mr. Martin replied that, of course, a good deal might be different after a strike, and Castro might be toppled in the aftermath. Others expressed the view that we might have to proceed with invasion following a strike. Still another suggestion was that US armed forces seize the base areas alone in order to eliminate the missiles. Secretary McNamara thought this a very unattractive kind of undertaking from the military point of view.

Toward one o’clock Secretary Rusk said he thought this group could not make the decision as to what was to be done; that was for the President in consultation with his constitutional advisers. The Secretary thought the group’s duty was to present to the President, for his consideration, fully staffed-out alternatives. Accordingly, two working groups should be formed, one to work up the blockade alternative and the other to work up air strike. Mr. Johnson was designated to head the former, and Mr. Bundy the latter. Mr. Johnson was to have with him Ambassador Thompson, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Mr. Martin, Mr. Nitze, and Mr. Meeker. Mr. Bundy was to have Secretary Dillon, Mr. Acheson, and General Taylor. Mr. McCone, when asked to serve with the air strike group, begged off on the ground that his position and duties on the US Intelligence Board made it undesirable for him to participate in the working group. Mr. Katzenbach was detailed to the Johnson group, later visiting the Bundy group to observe and possibly serve as a devil’s advocate.

Mr. Sorensen commented that he thought he had absorbed enough to start on the draft of a speech for the President.Sorensen drafts of letters to Khrushchev, De Gaulle, Adenauer, and Macmillan are in the Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2062, and the Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, respectively. No draft of the speech, dated this early has been found, but an 11-paragraph synopsis of a speech for October 23 is attached to the paper described in footnote 5 below. There was some inconclusive discussion on the timing of such a speech, on the danger of leaks before then, and on the proper time for meeting with the President once more, in view of his current Western campaign trip.

Before the whole group dispersed, Ambassador Thompson said the Soviets attached importance to questions of legality and we should be able to present a strong legal case. The Attorney General, as he was about to leave the room, said he thought there was ample legal basis for a blockade. I said: yes, that is so provided the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty adopted an appropriate resolution. The Attorney General said: “That’s all political; it’s not legal.” On leaving the room, he said to Mr. Katzenbach, half humorously: “Remember now, you’re working for me.”

The two groups met separately until four o’clock. They then reconvened and were joined once more by the cabinet officers who had been away in the earlier afternoon.

The Johnson group scenario, which was more nearly complete and was ready earlier, was discussed first.A copy of this 6-page paper with the handwritten notation “First Blockade Paper, Johnson” is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 7 A 2896, Historical, Cuba. After sketching the advantages and disadvantages of a blockade, it presented a 5-day scenario and predicted the reaction of U.S. allies, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Another paper “Second Draft, 10/19/62” on the blockade consisted of a detailed list of the elements in a course of action. (Ibid., Cuba Drafts) Numerous criticisms were advanced. Some were answered; others led to changes. There was again a discussion of timing, now in relation to a Presidential radio address. Mr. Martin thought Sunday might be too early, as it would be virtually impossible to get to all the Latin American heads of state on Sunday. Ambassador Thompson made the point that 24 hours must be allowed to elapse between announcement of the blockade and enforcement, so as to give the Soviet Government time to get instructions to their ship captains.

Approximately two hours were spent on the Johnson scenario. About 6 o’clock the Bundy approachA preliminary 7-page draft of this paper “Air Scenario, October 19, 1962” had sections on the military program, the schedule of public statements, notice to Khrushchev and Castro, and notice to friends. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-1862) Pre-sumably this is the draft discussed. A second draft included the same sections but suggested two different alternatives for notifying Khrushchev and Castro and included three additional parts: II) a 3-page possible White House statement for the evening of October 22, III) a 1-page paper dealing with an announcement for the morning of October 23, and IV) a 2-page, 11-paragraph synopsis of the President’s speech on October 23. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subjects Files, Cuba) was taken up, its author saying, “It’s been much more fun for us up to this point, since we’ve had a chance to poke holes in the blockade plan; now the roles will be reversed.” Not much more than half an hour was spent on the Bundy scenario.

More than once during the afternoon Secretary McNamara voiced the opinion that the US would have to pay a price to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. He thought we would at least have to give up our missile bases in Italy and Turkey and would probably have to pay more besides. At different times the possibility of nuclear conflict breaking out was referred to. The point was made that, once the Cuban missile installations were complete and operational, a new strategic situation would exist, with the United States more directly and immediately under the gun than ever before. A striking Soviet military push into the Western Hemisphere would have succeeded and become effective. The clock could not be turned back, and things would never be the same again. During this discussion, the Attorney General said that in looking forward into the future it would be better for our children and grandchildren if we decided to face the Soviet threat, stand up to it, and eliminate it, now. The circumstances for doing so at some future time were bound to be more unfavorable, the risks would be greater, the chances of success less good.

Secretary Rusk, toward the end of the afternoon, stated his approach to the problem as follows: the US needed to move in a way such that a planned action would be followed by a pause in which the great powers could step back from the brink and have time to consider and work out a solution rather than be drawn inexorably from one action to another and escalate into general nuclear war. The implication of his statement was that he favored blockade rather than strike.

In the course of the afternoon discussion, the military representatives, especially Secretary McNamara, came to expressing the view that an air strike could be made some time after the blockade was instituted in the event the blockade did not produce results as to the missile bases in Cuba. The Attorney General took particular note of this shift, and toward the end of the day made clear that the firmly favored blockade as the first step; other steps subsequently were not precluded and could be considered; he thought it was now pretty clear what the decision should be.

At about six-thirty Governor Stevenson came into the room. After a few minutes, Secretary Rusk asked him if he had some views on the question of what to do. He replied: “Yes, most emphatic views.” When queried as to them, he said that in view of the course the discussion was taking he didn’t think it was necessary to express them then. When asked: “But you are in favor of blockade, aren’t you?”, he answered affirmatively. He went on to say he thought we must look beyond the particular immediate action of blockade; we need to develop a plan for solution of the problem—elements for negotiation designed to settle the current crisis in a stable and satisfactory way and enable us to move forward on wider problems; he was working on some ideas for a settlement. One possibility would be the demilitarization of Cuba under effective international supervision, perhaps accompanied by neutralization of the island under international guaranties and with UN observers to monitor compliance.

Once again there was discussion of when another meeting with the President should be held. It was generally agreed that the President should continue on his trip until Sunday morning. He would be reachable by telephone prior to that time.

The meeting broke up about seven o’clock.

32. Special National Intelligence EstimateSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret; Controlled Dissemination; Psalm. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 197-202. SNIE 11-18-62 Washington, October 19, 1962. SUBJECT SNIE 11-18-62: Soviet Reactions to Certain US Courses of Action on Cuba

The Problem

To estimate probable Soviet reactions to certain US courses of action with respect to Cuba.

The Estimate

1. A major Soviet objective in their military buildup in Cuba is to demonstrate that the world balance of forces has shifted so far in their favor that the US can no longer prevent the advance of Soviet offensive power even into its own hemisphere. In this connection they assume, of course, that these deployments sooner or later will become publicly known.

2. It is possible that the USSR is installing these missiles primarily in order to use them in bargaining for US concessions elsewhere. We think this unlikely, however. The public withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba would create serious problems in the USSR’s relations with Castro; it would cast doubt on the firmness of the Soviet intention to protect the Castro regime and perhaps on their commitments elsewhere.

3. If the US accepts the strategic missile buildup in Cuba, the Soviets would continue the buildup of strategic weapons in Cuba. We have no basis for estimating the force level which they would wish to reach, but it seems clear already that they intend to go beyond a token capability. They would probably expect their missile forces in Cuba to make some contribution to their total strategic capability vis-a-vis the US. We consider in Annex BAttached, but not printed. the possible effects of a missile buildup in Cuba upon the overall relationship of strategic military power.

4. US acceptance of the strategic missile buildup would provide strong encouragement to Communists, pro-Communists, and the more anti-American sectors of opinion in Latin America and elsewhere. Conversely, anti-Communists and those who relate their own interests to those of the US would be strongly discouraged. It seems clear that, especially over the long run, there would be a loss of confidence in US power and determination and a serious decline of US influence generally.

Effect of Warning

5. If the US confronts Khrushchev with its knowledge of the MRBM deployment and presses for a withdrawal, we do not believe the Soviets would halt the deployment. Instead, they would propose negotiations on the general question of foreign bases, claiming equal right to establish Soviet bases and assuring the US of tight control over the missiles. They would probably link Cuba with the Berlin situation and emphasize their patience and preference for negotiations, implying that Berlin was held hostage to US actions in Cuba.

6. There is some slight chance that a warning to Castro might make a difference, since the Soviets could regard this as a chance to stand aside, but it also would give time for offers to negotiate, continued buildup, and counterpressures, and we think the result in the end would be the same.

7. Any warning would of course degrade the element of surprise in a subsequent US attack.

Effect of Blockade

8. While the effectiveness of Castro’s military machine might be impaired by a total US blockade, Castro would be certain to tighten internal security and would take ruthless action against any attempts at revolt. There is no reason to believe that a blockade of itself would bring down the Castro regime. The Soviets would almost certainly exert strong direct pressures elsewhere to end the blockade. The attitudes of other states toward a blockade action are not considered in this paper. It is obvious that the Soviets would heavily exploit all adverse reactions.

Soviet Reaction to Use of Military ForceFor a further comment on differences between reaction to a blockade and to US measures of force against Cuba, see Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. Annex A is attached, but not printed.]

9. If the US takes direct military action against Cuba, the Soviets would be placed automatically under great pressure to respond in ways which, if they could not save Cuba, would inflict an offsetting injury to US interests. This would be true whether the action was limited to an effort to neutralize the strategic missiles, or these missiles plus airfields, surface-to-air missile sites, or cruise missile sites, or in fact an outright invasion designed to destroy the Castro regime.

10. In reaction to any of the various forms of US action, the Soviets would be alarmed and agitated, since they have to date estimated that the US would not take military action in the face of Soviet warnings of the danger of nuclear war. They would recognize that US military action posed a major challenge to the prestige of the USSR. We must of course recognize the possibility that the Soviets, under pressure to respond, would again miscalculate and respond in a way which, through a series of actions and reactions, could escalate to general war.

11. On the other hand, the Soviets have no public treaty with Cuba and have not acknowledged that Soviet bases are on the island. This situation provides them with a pretext for treating US military action against Cuba as an affair which does not directly involve them, and thereby avoiding the risks of a strong response. We do not believe that the USSR would attack the US, either from Soviet bases or with its missiles in Cuba, even if the latter were operational and not put out of action before they could be readied for firing.

12. Since the USSR would not dare to resort to general war and could not hope to prevail locally, the Soviets would almost certainly consider retaliatory actions outside Cuba. The timing and selection of such moves would depend heavily upon the immediate context of events and the USSR’s appreciation of US attitudes. The most likely location for broad retaliation outside Cuba appears to be Berlin. They might react here with major harassments, interruptions of access to the city or even a blockade, with or without the signing of a separate peace treaty.

13. We believe that whatever course of retaliation the USSR elected, the Soviet leaders would not deliberately initiate general war or take military measures, which in their calculation, would run the gravest risks of general war.On October 20 this estimate was updated to include a 3-page inventory of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. The resulting estimate, SNIE1”>SNIE 11-19-62, which also included slight revisions and renumbering in the estimate section, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2662. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 211-220.

33. Editorial Note

On October 19, 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency released another “Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba” (see Document 30) for the initial evaluation. The new evaluation was based on intelligence as of 8 p.m. on October 19. It included Iron Bark material and was based on “relatively complete photo interpretation” of four of the six U-2 missions of October 17 and part of the final two missions.

This evaluation discovered an additional regiment of Soviet 1020-nm (SS-4) missiles at two sites east of Havana in the Sagua La Grande area that appeared to be more permanent than the two sites already identified at San Cristobal in western Cuba. This evaluation predicted that the two 2200-nm (SS-5) sites in the Guanajay area near Havana could be operational within 6 weeks and by December 15-30, respectively. Although there was still no evidence of currently operational nuclear storage facilities in Cuba, there was evidence that a site was under construction near Guanajay. The evaluation suggested that the assumption that nuclear weapons were already in Cuba still held true. The evaluation also suggested that the 1020-nm missiles would probably be equipped with 2 to 3 megaton warheads and the 2200-nm IRBM’s with 3 to 5 megaton warheads. The significance of the new intelligence in this evaluation was that it indicated that the Soviet military buildup in Cuba was being carried out on an “urgent basis” on a pattern of deployment “calculated to achieve quick operational status and then to complete site construction.” An extract is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pages 203-208.

In addition to the two evaluations, nine supplements were prepared. Supplement 1 was as of 10 p.m. October 20; supplement 2 was as of 10 p.m. October 21; supplement 3 as of 10 p.m. October 22; supplement 4 as of 1 a.m. October 24; supplement 5 as of 10 p.m. October 24; supplement 6 as of 2 a.m. October 26; supplement 7 as of 2 a.m. October 27; supplement 8 as of 2 a.m. October 28; and supplement 9 as of 10:20 p.m. October 28. The two evaluations and the annexes covered the immediate crisis. Extracts of the supplements are all ibid., pages 227-234, 261-262, 281-282, 293-294, 299-301, 313-314, 323-325, 337-340, 349-350, respectively.

34. Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Oval Room. For the Attorney General’s account of this meeting, see Thirteen Days, pp. 48-50. Washington, October 20, 1962, 2:30–5:10 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy CIA John A. McCone, Director Mr. Ray Cline Mr. Arthur Lundahl Mr. Chamberlain Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary (ISA) JCS General Maxwell D. Taylor, USA, Chairman OEP Edward A. McDermott, Director State Dean Rusk, Secretary George Ball, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary White House McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel Kenneth O’Donnell, Special Assistant to the President Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council

Intelligence Briefing

The first twenty minutes were spent in the presentation and discussion of photographic intelligence establishing the presence in Cuba of Soviet intermediate-range and medium-range missiles, mobile missile launchers and missile sites.

Mr. Ray Cline of the Central Intelligence Agency summarized the report of the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, and the National Photographic Interpretation Center, dated October 19, 1962 (SC 09538-62).Apparent reference to the report of 8 p.m., October 19; see Document 33. Mr. Arthur Lundahl of CIA described the various missile sites and launching pads, displaying enlarged pictures identical to those in the Committee report.

In response to the President’s question, Mr. Cline stated that there were no U-2 photographic reconnaissance missions over Cuba from August 29th to October 14th. The gap in photographic coverage was in part due to bad weather and in part to a desire to avoid activating the SAM Air Defense installations which the Russians were hurriedly installing in Cuba during this period. Since October 14th, nine high altitude missions have been flown. Information from these missions is not fully processed, but will be available for presentation by Monday.

In summary, the Council was informed that sixteen SS-4 missiles, with a range of 1020 nautical miles were now operational in Cuba and could be fired approximately eighteen hours after a decision to fire was taken. The bearing of these launchers was 315 degrees, i.e. toward the central area of the United States.

The President summarized the discussion of the intelligence material as follows. There is something to destroy in Cuba now and, if it is destroyed, a strategic missile capability would be difficult to restore. (Specific details of the briefing are contained in the attached Committee report.)Not found attached.

Blockage Track

Secretary McNamara explained to the President that there were differences among his advisers which had resulted in the drafting of alternative courses of action. He added that the military planners are at work on measures to carry out all recommended courses of action in order that, following a Presidential decision, fast action could be taken.

Secretary McNamara described his view as the “blockade route.” This route is aimed at preventing any addition to the strategic missiles already deployed to Cuba and eventually to eliminate these missiles. He said to do this we should institute a blockade of Cuba and be prepared to take armed action in specified instances.

(The President was handed a copy of Ted Sorensen’s “blockade route” draft of a Presidential message, which he read.)Not found; however, drafts of three unattributed papers for blockade scenarios, all dated October 20, are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings. One presented a 5-day scenario with anticipated Soviet, allied, and Cuban reaction; the second outlined nine courses of action in the 24 hours before a blockade was instituted; and the third, with “Third Draft” typed on it, offered 23 steps that had to be taken before the A hour. None of these papers, however, contained a draft Presidential message.

Secretary McNamara concluded by explaining that following the blockade, the United States would negotiate for the removal of the strategic missiles from Cuba. He said we would have to be prepared to accept the withdrawal of United States strategic missiles from Turkey and Italy and possibly agreement to limit our use of Guantanamo to a specified limited time. He added that we could obtain the removal of the missiles from Cuba only if we were prepared to offer something in return during negotiations. He opposed as too risky the suggestion that we should issue an ultimatum to the effect that we would order an air attack on Cuba if the missiles were not removed. He said he was prepared to tell Khrushchev we consider the missiles in Cuba as Soviet missiles and that if they were used against us, we would retaliate by launching missiles against the USSR.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that SNIE 11-19-62, dated October 20, 1962,See footnote 3, Document 32. estimates that the Russians will not use force to push their ships through our blockade. He cited Ambassador Bohlen’s view that the USSR wouldnot take military action, but would limit its reaction to political measures in the United Nations.

Secretary McNamara listed the disadvantages of the blockade route as follows: It would take a long time to achieve the objective of eliminating strategic missiles from Cuba. It would result in serious political trouble in the United States. The world position of the United States might appear to be weakening.

The advantages which Secretary McNamara cited are: It would cause us the least trouble with our allies. It avoids any surprise air attack on Cuba, which is contrary to our tradition. It is the only military course of action compatible with our position as a leader of the free world. It avoids a sudden military move which might provoke a response from the USSR which could result in escalating actions leading to general war.

The President pointed out that during a blockade, more missiles would become operational, and upon the completion of sites and launching pads, the threat would increase. He asked General Taylor how many missiles we could destroy by air action on Monday.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff favor an air strike on Tuesday when United States forces could be in a state of readiness. He said he did not share Secretary McNamara’s fear that if we used nuclear weapons in Cuba, nuclear weapons would be used against us.

Secretary Rusk asked General Taylor whether we dared to attack operational strategic missile sites in Cuba.

General Taylor responded that the risk of these missiles being used against us was less than if we permitted the missiles to remain there.

The President pointed out that on the basis of the intelligence estimate there would be some fifty strategic missiles operational in mid-December, if we went the blockade route and took no action to destroy the sites being developed.

General Taylor said that the principal argument he wished to make was that now was the time to act because this would be the last chance we would have to destroy these missiles. If we did not act now, the missiles would be camouflaged in such a way as to make it impossible for us to find them. Therefore, if they were not destroyed, we would have to live with them with all the consequent problems for the defense of the United States.

The President agreed that the missile threat became worse each day, adding that we might wish, looking back, that we had done earlier what we are now preparing to do.

Secretary Rusk said that a blockade would seriously affect the Cuban missile capability in that the Soviets would be unable to deploy to Cuba any missiles in addition to those now there.

Under Secretary Ball said that if an effective blockade was established, it was possible that our photographic intelligence would reveal that there were no nuclear warheads in Cuba; hence, none of the missiles now there could be made operational.

General Taylor indicated his doubt that it would be possible to prevent the Russians from deploying warheads to Cuba by means of a blockade because of the great difficulty of setting up an effective air blockade.

Secretary McNamara stated that if we knew that a plane was flying nuclear warheads to Cuba, we should immediately shoot it down. Parenthetically, he pointed out there are now 6000 to 8000 Soviet personnel in Cuba.

The President asked whether the institution of a blockade would appear to the free world as a strong response to the Soviet action. He is particularly concerned about whether the Latin American countries would think that the blockade was an appropriate response to the Soviet challenge.

The Attorney General returned to the point made by General Taylor, i.e. that now is the last chance we will have to destroy Castro and the Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen said he did not agree with the Attorney General or with General Taylor that this was our last chance. He said a missile buildup would end if, as everyone seemed to agree, the Russians would not use force to penetrate the United States blockade.

Air Strike Route

Mr. Bundy handed to the President the “air strike alternative,”A copy of this 3-page scenario, which had paragraphs on the military program, schedule of public statements, notice to Khrushchev and Castro—Alternative 1, notice to Khrushchev and Castro—Alternative 2, and notice to Friends, is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Nitze Files: Black Book Cuba, and in the Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba./5/ which the President read. It was also referred to as the Bundy plan.

The Attorney General told the President that this plan was supported by Mr. Bundy, General Taylor, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with minor variations, by Secretary Dillon and Director McCone.

General Taylor emphasized the opportunity available now to take out not only all the missiles, but all the Soviet medium bombers (IL-28) which were neatly lined up in the open on airbases in Cuba.

Mr. McNamara cautioned that an air strike would not destroy all the missiles and launchers in Cuba, and, at best, we could knock out two-thirds of these missiles. Those missiles not destroyed could be fired from mobile launchers not destroyed. General Taylor said he was unable to explain why the IL-28 medium bombers had been left completely exposed on two airfields. The only way to explain this, he concluded, was on the ground that the Cubans and the Russians did not anticipate United States air strike.

Secretary Rusk said he hesitated to ask the question but he wondered whether these planes were decoys. He also wondered whether the Russians were trying to entice us into a trap. Secretary McNamara stated his strong doubt that these planes were decoys. Director McCone added that the Russians would not have sent one hundred shiploads of equipment to Cuba solely to play a “trick”. General Taylor returned to the point he had made earlier, namely, that if we do not destroy the missiles and the bombers, we will have to change our entire military way of dealing with external threats.

The President raised the question of advance warning prior to military action—whether we should give a minimum of two hours notice of an air strike to permit Soviet personnel to leave the area to be attacked.

General Taylor said that the military would be prepared to live with a twenty-four hour advance notice or grace period if such advance notice was worthwhile politically. The President expressed his doubt that any notice beyond seven hours had any political value.

There was a brief discussion of the usefulness of sending a draft message to Castro, and a copy of such message was circulated.Not found.

The President stated flatly that the Soviet planes in Cuba did not concern him particularly. He said we must be prepared to live with the Soviet threat as represented by Soviet bombers. However, the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba had an entirely different impact throughout Latin America. In his view the existence of fifty planes in Cuba did not affect the balance of power, but the missiles already in Cuba were an entirely different matter.

The Attorney General said that in his opinion a combination of the blockade route and the air strike route was very attractive to him. He felt we should first institute the blockade. In the event that the Soviets continued to build up the missile capability in Cuba, then we should inform the Russians that we would destroy the missiles, the launchers, and the missile sites. He said he favored a short wait during which time the Russians could react to the blockade. If the Russians did not halt the development of the missile capability, then we would proceed to make an air strike. The advantage of proceeding in this way, he added, was that we would get away from the Pearl Harbor surprise attack aspect of the air strike route.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there was a risk that we would act in such a way as to get Khrushchev to commit himself fully to the support of Castro.

Secretary Rusk doubted that a delay of twenty-four hours in initiating an air strike was of any value. He said he now favored proceeding on the blockade track.

Secretary Dillon mentioned seventy-two hours as the time between instituting the blockade and initiating an air strike in the event we receive no response to our initial action.

Director McCone stated his opposition to an air strike, but admitted that in his view a blockade was not enough. He argued that we should institute the blockade and tell the Russians that if the missiles were not dismantled within seventy-two hours, the United States would destroy the missiles by air attack. He called attention to the risk involved in a long drawn-out period during which the Cubans could, at will, launch the missiles against the United States. Secretary Dillon said that the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba was, in his opinion, not negotiable. He believed that any effort to negotiate the removal of the missiles would involve a price so high that the United States could not accept it. If the missiles are not removed or eliminated, he continued, the United States will lose all of its friends in Latin America, who will become convinced that our fear is such that we cannot act. He admitted that the limited use of force involved in a blockade would make the military task much harder and would involve the great danger of the launching of these missiles by the Cubans.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric saw the choice as involving the use of limited force or of unlimited force. He was prepared to face the prospect of an air strike against Cuba later, but he opposed the initial use of all-out military force such as a surprise air attack. He defined a blockade as being the application of the limited use of force and doubted that such limited use could be combined with an air strike.

General Taylor argued that a blockade would not solve our problem or end the Cuban missile threat. He said that eventually we would have to use military force and, if we waited, the use of military force would be much more costly.

Secretary McNamara noted that the air strike planned by the Joint Chiefs involved 800 sorties. Such a strike would result in several thousand Russians being killed, chaos in Cuba, and efforts to overthrow the Castro government. In his view the probability was high that an air strike would lead inevitably to an invasion. He doubted that the Soviets would take an air strike on Cuba without resorting to a very major response. In such an event, the United States would lose control of the situation which could escalate to general war.

The President agreed that a United States air strike would lead to a major Soviet response, such as blockading Berlin. He agreed that at an appropriate time we would have to acknowledge that we were willing to take strategic missiles out of Turkey and Italy if this issue was raised by the Russians. He felt that implementation of a blockade would also result in Soviet reprisals, possibly the blockade of Berlin. If we instituted a blockade on Sunday, then by Monday or Tuesday we would know whether the missile development had ceased or whether it was continuing. Thus, we would be in a better position to know what move to make next.

Secretary Dillon called attention to the fact that even if the Russians agreed to dismantle the missiles now in Cuba, continuing inspection would be required to ensure that the missiles were not again made ready.

The President said that if it was decided to go the Bundy route, he would favor an air strike which would destroy only missiles. He repeated this view that we would have to live with the threat arising out of the stationing in Cuba of Soviet bombers.

Secretary Rusk referred to an air strike as chapter two. He did not think we should initiate such a strike because of the risk of escalating actions leading to general war. He doubted that we should act without consultation of our allies. He said a sudden air strike had no support in the law or morality, and, therefore, must be ruled out. Reading from notes, he urged that we start the blockade and only go on to an air attack when we knew the reaction of the Russians and of our allies.

At this point Director McCone acknowledged that we did not know positively that nuclear warheads for the missiles deployed had actually arrived in Cuba. Although we had evidence of the construction of storage places for nuclear weapons, such weapons may not yet have been sent to Cuba.

The President asked what we would say to those whose reaction to our instituting a blockade now would be to ask why we had not blockaded last July.

Both Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Ball made the point that we did not institute a blockade in July because we did not then know of the existence of the strategic missiles in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk suggested that our objective was an immediate freeze of the strategic missile capability in Cuba to be inspected by United Nations observation teams stationed at the missile sites. He referred to our bases in Turkey, Spain and Greece as being involved in any negotiation covering foreign bases. He said a United Nations group might be sent to Cuba to reassure those who might fear that the United States was planning an invasion.

Ambassador Stevenson stated his flat opposition to a surprise air strike, which he felt would ultimately lead to a United States invasion of Cuba. He supported the institution of the blockade and predicted that such action would reduce the chance of Soviet retaliation of a nature which would inevitably escalate. In his view our aim is to end the existing missile threat in Cuba without casualties and without escalation. He urged that we offer the Russians a settlement involving the withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and our evacuation of Guantanamo base.

The President sharply rejected the thought of surrendering our base at Guantanamo in the present situation. He felt that such action would convey to the world that we had been frightened into abandoning our position. He was not opposed to discussing withdrawal of our missiles from Turkey and Greece, but he was firm in saying we should only make such a proposal in the future.

The Attorney General thought we should convey our firm intentions to the Russians clearly and suggested that we might tell the Russians that we were turning over nuclear weapons and missiles to the West Germans.

Ambassador Thompson stated his view that our first action should be the institution of a blockade. Following this, he thought we should launch an air strike to destroy the missiles and sites, after giving sufficient warning so that Russian nationals could leave the area to be attacked.

The President said he was ready to go ahead with the blockade and to take actions necessary to put us in a position to undertake an air strike on the missiles and missile sites by Monday or Tuesday.

General Taylor summarized the military actions already under way, including the quiet reinforcement of Guantanamo by infiltrating marines and the positioning of ships to take out United States depend-ents from Guantanamo on extremely short notice.

The Attorney General said we could implement a blockade very quickly and prepare for an air strike to be launched later if we so decided.

The President said he was prepared to authorize the military to take those preparatory actions which they would have to take in anticipation of the military invasion of Cuba. He suggested that we inform the Turks and the Italians that they should not fire the strategic missiles they have even if attacked. The warheads for missiles in Turkey and Italy could be dismantled. He agreed that we should move to institute a blockade as quickly as we possibly can.

In response to a question about further photographic surveillance of Cuba, Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that no low level photographic reconnaissance should be undertaken now because we have decided to institute a blockade.

Secretary Rusk recommended that a blockade not be instituted before Monday in order to provide time required to consult our allies.

Mr. Bundy said the pressure from the press was becoming intense and suggested that one way of dealing with it was to announce shortly that we had obtained photographic evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba. This announcement would hold the press until the President made his television speech.

The President acknowledged that the domestic political heat following his television appearance would be terrific. He said he had opposed an invasion of Cuba but that now we were confronted with the possibility that by December there would be fifty strategic missiles deployed there. In explanation as to why we have not acted sooner to deal with the threat from Cuba, he pointed out that only now do we have the kind of evidence which we can make available to our allies in order to convince them of the necessity of acting. Only now do we have a way of avoiding a split with our allies.

It is possible that we may have to make an early strike with or without warning next week. He stressed again the difference between the conventional military buildup in Cuba and the psychological impact throughout the world of the Russian deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. General Taylor repeated his recommendation that any air strike in Cuba included attacks on the MIGs and medium bombers.

The President repeated his view that our world position would be much better if we attack only the missiles. He directed that air strike plans include only missiles and missile sites, preparations to be ready three days from now.

Under Secretary Ball expressed his view that a blockade should include all shipments of POL to Cuba. Secretary Rusk thought that POL should not now be included because such a decision would break down the distinction which we want to make between elimination of strategic missiles and the downfall of the Castro government. Secretary Rusk repeated his view that our objective is to destroy the offensive capability of the missiles in Cuba, not, at this time, seeking to overthrow Castro!

The President acknowledged that the issue was whether POL should be included from the beginning or added at a later time. He preferred to delay possibly as long as a week.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the problem involved in referring to our action as a blockade. He preferred the use of the word “quarantine”.

Parenthetically, the President asked Secretary Rusk to reconsider present policy of refusing to give nuclear weapons assistance to France. He expressed the view that in light of present circumstances a refusal to help the French was not worthwhile. He thought that in the days ahead we might be able to gain the needed support of France if we stopped refusing to help them with their nuclear weapons project.

There followed a discussion of several sentences in the “blockade route” draft of the President’s speech. It was agreed that the President should define our objective in terms of halting “offensive missile preparations in Cuba”. Reference to economic pressures on Cuba would not be made in this context.

The President made clear that in the United Nations we should emphasize the subterranean nature of the missile buildup in Cuba. Only if we were asked would we respond that we were prepared to talk about the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey. In such an eventuality, the President pointed out that we would have to make clear to the Italians and the Turks that withdrawing strategic missiles was not a retreat and that we would be prepared to replace these missiles by providing a more effective deterrent, such as the assignment of Polaris submarines. The President asked Mr. Nitze to study the problems arising out of the withdrawal of missiles from Italy and Turkey, with particular reference to complications which would arise in NATO. The President made clear that our emphasis should be on the missile threat from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson reiterated his belief that we must be more forthcoming about giving up our missile bases in Turkey and Italy. He stated again his belief that the present situation required that we offer to give up such bases in order to induce the Russians to remove the strategic missiles from Cuba.

Mr. Nitze flatly opposed making any such offer, but said he would not object to discussing this question in the event that negotiations developed from our institution of a blockade.

The President concluded the meeting by stating that we should be ready to meet criticism of our deployment of missiles abroad but we should not initiate negotiations with a base withdrawal proposal.

The NSC Record of Action No. 2457 for this meeting reads:

“Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

“a. Noted a briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence, supported by photographic intelligence, establishing the presence in Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles, including mobile launchers and missile sites under construction.

“b. Discussed alternative courses of action aimed at removing the strategic missiles from Cuba.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

35. Memorandum for the FilesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Drafted by McCone. Washington, October 20, 1962.

Following the White House meeting with the President on the afternoon of October 20th, I spoke privately to the Attorney General. The Attorney General was to meet alone with the President, presumably to discuss policy matters.

I told the AG I was very worried about some of the wording in the second draft of the speech of the President as prepared by SorensenNot further identified. and I was most particularly worried about the approach of Governor Stevenson. I reasoned, as I had repeatedly in meetings over the last 3 or 4 days, that we must not lose sight of the very important objectives of removing the Castro Communist government from Cuba and establishing a climate which would permit the Cuban people to establish a government of their own choice. In my talk with the AG I pointed out that Stevenson’s proposal would not only cause the removal of the Guantanamo Base, which was most undesirable, but it would also place a crown of jewels on the head of Castro and we nor anyone else could do much about it after such a position had been established publicly.

About 9:00 o’clock in the evening (time uncertain) the AG called me at my home and said he had discussed my views with the President who concurred and he felt I could rest assured that the situation that worried me would not develop further. I then mentioned to the AG that numbered paragraph 2 of the speech did not give the President latitude for military action which may be necessary without suffering the indictment of committing a “surprise attack” and that I had suggested some different wording to Sorensen.

The AG then asked I call the President to arrange for a briefing of General Eisenhower.

I immediately talked with the President by telephone and arranged to see Eisenhower on Sunday morning and possibly take him to the White House for a direct meeting with the President. Details to be worked out upon Eisenhower’s arrival.

I then expressed my concern at the wording of paragraph 2 of the speech. The President concurred; said he had made up his mind to pursue the course which I had recommended and he agreed with the views I expressed in the afternoon meeting.See Document 34. He said that he would be careful to preserve the widest possible latitude for subsequent military action at any time after the commencement of the blockade.

I then mentioned the Castro problem to the President. He seemed alert to the situation.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
36. Notes on Meeting With President KennedySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Misc. Papers Regarding Cuba. Top Secret. For McCone’s record of this meeting, mistakenly noted as occurring at 10 a.m., see the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President)Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 241-242. Washington, October 21, 1962. The meeting was held in the Oval Room at the White House and lasted from 11:30 a.m. to approximately 12:30 p.m. In attendance were the Attorney General, General Taylor, General Sweeney and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense stated that following the start of an air attack, the initial units of the landing force could invade Cuba within 7 days. The movement of troops in preparation for such an invasion will start at the time of the President’s speech. No mobilization of Reserve forces is required for such an invasion until the start of the air strike. General LeMay had stated that the transport aircraft, from Reserve and Guard units, which would be required for participation in such an invasion can be fully operational within 24 to 48 hours after the call to active duty. The Secretary of Defense reported that, based on information which became available during the night, it now appears that there is equipment in Cuba for approximately 40 MRBM or IRBM launchers. (Mr. McCone, who joined the group 15 or 20 minutes after the start of the discussion, confirmed this report.) The location of the sites for 36 of these launchers is known. 32 of the 36 known sites appear to have sufficient equipment on them to be included in any air strike directed against Cuba’s missile capability. We believe that 40 launchers would normally be equipped with 80 missiles. John McCone reported yesterday that a Soviet ship believed to be the vessel in which the Soviets have been sending missiles to Cuba has made a sufficient number of trips to that island within recent weeks to offload approximately 48 missiles. Therefore, we assume there are approximately that number on the Island today, although we have only located approximately 30 of these. General Sweeney outlined the following plan of air attack, the object of which would be the destruction of the known Cuban missile capability. The 5 surface-to-air missile installations in the vicinity of the known missile sites would each be attacked by approximately 8 aircraft; the 3 MIG airfields defending the missile sites would be covered by 12 U.S. aircraft per field. In total, the defense suppression operations, including the necessary replacement aircraft, would require approximately 100 sorties. Each of the launchers at the 8 or 9 known sites (a total of approximately 32 to 36 launchers) would be attacked by 6 aircraft. For the purpose, a total of approximately 250 sorties would be flown. The U.S. aircraft covering the 3 MIG airfieldswould attack the MIG’s if they became airborne. General Sweeney strongly recommended attacks on each of the airfields to destroy the MIG aircraft. General Sweeney stated that he was certain the air strike would be “successful”; however, even under optimum conditions, it was not likely that all of the known missiles would be destroyed. (As noted in 4 above, the known missiles are probably no more than 60% of the total missiles on the Island.) General Taylor stated, “The best we can offer you is to destroy 90% of the known missiles.” General Taylor, General Sweeney and the Secretary of Defense all strongly emphasized that in their opinion the initial air strike must be followed by strikes on subsequent days and that these in turn would lead inevitably to an invasion. CIA representatives, who joined the discussion at this point, stated that it is probable the missiles which are operational (it is estimated there are now between 8 and 12 operational missiles on the Island) can hold indefinitely a capability for firing with from 2-1/2 to 4 hours’ notice. Included in the notice period is a countdown requiring 20 to 40 minutes. In relation to the countdown period, the first wave of our attacking aircraft would give 10 minutes of warning; the second wave, 40 minutes of warning; and the third wave a proportionately greater warning. As noted above, General Sweeney strongly recommended that any air strike include attacks on the MIG aircraft and, in addition, the IL28s. To accomplish the destruction of these aircraft, the total number of sorties of such an air strike should be increased to 500. The President agreed that if an air strike is ordered, it should probably include in its objective the destruction of the MIG aircraft and the IL28s. The President directed that we be prepared to carry out the air strike MondayOctober 22. morning or any time thereafter during the remainder of the week. The President recognized that the Secretary of Defense was opposed to the air strike Monday morning, and that General Sweeney favored it. He asked the Attorney General and Mr. McCone for their opinions:

The Attorney General stated he was opposed to such a strike because: “It would be a Pearl Harbor type of attack.” It would lead to unpredictable military responses by the Soviet Union which could be so serious as to lead to general nuclear war.

He stated we should start with the initiation of the blockade and thereafter “play for the breaks.”

 Mr. McCone agreed with the Attorney General, but emphasized he believed we should be prepared for an air strike and thereafter an invasion. RSMcMcNamara’s initials appear in an unidentified hand indicating he signed the original.
37. Editorial Note

At 12:30 p.m. on October 21, 1962, President Kennedy met privately with British Ambassador Ormsby Gore at the White House. According to the Ambassador’s report to London, Kennedy summarized the evidence from the U-2 flights, stated that the United States appeared faced with either an all-out air strike on October 22 to eliminate the missiles or to blockade the island, and asked Ormsby Gore which of these two courses of action he could support. Ormsby Gore chose the second alternative. The President then admitted that he and his principal advisors had come to the same conclusion. For Ormsby Gore’s account of the meeting, see Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-1963, pages 190-194. No record of this meeting has been found at the Kennedy Library or in Department of State Files.

38. Minutes of the 506th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. The meeting was held in the Oval Room. Washington, October 21, 1962, 2:30–4:50 p.m. PARTICIPANTS The President Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy CIA John A. McCone, Director Mr. Ray Cline Mr. Whelan Mr. Arthur Lundahl Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary Paul Nitze, Assistant Secretary (ISA) JCS General Maxwell D. Taylor Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations OEP Edward A. McDermott, Director State Dean Rusk, Secretary George Ball, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs Adlai Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the UN Edwin Martin, Assistant Secretary, Inter-American Affairs Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large Treasury Douglas Dillon, Secretary USIA Donald Wilson, Acting Director White House McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Theodore Sorensen, Special Counsel Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary, National Security Council Others: Mr. Robert Lovett

(There is attached a tentative agenda for today’s meeting, which was followed in large part.)Not printed.

Introduction

Intelligence officers summarized new information which had become available since yesterday’s meeting.See Document 34. Attached is a page highlighting the new facts presented to the Council.Apparent reference to a revised and retyped version of a Deputy Director of Intelligence briefing, which is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 221-265.

Substantial Issues in a Draft Presidential Speech

The Council members read the third draft of the President’s speech. (Copy attached.)Attached but not printed There was some discussion of the date when positive information as to the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba became available. The draft was revised to state that such information became available Tuesday morning, October 16th.

The draft speech summarized the number of missiles and the number of sites known to exist in Cuba. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that specific numbers of missiles and sites be deleted.

The question was raised as to whether the speech should emphasize Soviet responsibility for the missile deployment or Castro’s irresponsibility in accepting them. Secretary Rusk argued that we must hold the USSR responsible because it is important to emphasize the extra-hemispheric aspect of the missile deployment in order to increase support for our contemplated actions.

The President referred to the sentence mentioning the deployment of missiles by the Soviet Union and called attention to our deployment of missiles to Italy. Secretary Rusk pointed out that our missiles were deployed to NATO countriesonly after those countries were threatened by deployed Soviet missiles. Hence, our deployment was part of the confrontation of Soviet power, and, therefore, unrelated to the Cuban deployment by the USSR.

The President pointed out that Soviet missiles were in place, aimed at European countries, before we deployed United States missiles to Europe.

Secretary Dillon recalled that we sent United States missiles to Europe because we had so many of them we did not know where to put them.

The President referred to the sentence in the draft speech which states that the USSR secretly transferred weapons to Cuba. He said we should emphasize the clandestine manner in which the USSR had acted in Cuba.

The Attorney General wanted to be certain that the text as drafted did not preclude us from giving nuclear weapons to Western Germany, West Berlin, and France in the event we decided to do so.

It was agreed that no message would be sent to President Dorticos of Cuba at the present time and the draft speech was so revised.

The question of whether our actions should be described as a blockade or a quarantine was debated. Although the legal meaning of the two words is identical, Secretary Rusk said he preferred “quarantine” for political reasons in that it avoids comparison with the Berlin blockade. The President agreed to use “quarantine” and pointed out that if we so desired we could later institute a total blockade.

Both Secretary Dillon and Director McCone urged that the speech state that we were seeking to prevent all military equipment from reaching Cuba. They argued that later we might act to prevent all equipment from reaching Cuba even though at present our objective was to block offensive missile equipment.

The President preferred the phrase “offensive missile equipment” on the grounds that within forty-eight hours we will know the Soviet reaction. At such time we will know whether, as is expected, the Soviets turn back their ships rather than submit to inspection. Secretary McNamara agreed we should proceed in two stages. Initially our objective is to block offensive weapons and later we can extend our blockade to all weapons, if we so decide.

The President parenthetically pointed out that we were not taking action under the Monroe Doctrine.

General Taylor returned to a sentence in the earlier part of the draft (bottom of page 4) and asked whether we were firm on the phrase “whatever steps are necessary.” The President agreed that these words should remain so that he would not be hindered from taking additional meas-ures if we so decide at a later date.

(The President asked Under Secretary Ball to obtain assurances that Dakar would not be used by the Soviets for air shipments to Cuba.)

Secretary Rusk commented that our objective was to “put out the fire” in Cuba and get United Nations teams to inspect all missile activity in Cuba. The President felt that a better tactic was for us initially to frighten the United Nations representatives with the prospect of all kinds of actions and then, when a resolution calling for the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, Turkey and Italy was proposed, we could consider supporting such a resolution.

Ambassador Stevenson said we should take the initiative by calling a U.N. Security Council meeting to demand an immediate missile standstill in Cuba. Secretary Rusk pointed out that following the President’s speech we would either be in the posture of a complainant or of a defendant.

Mr. Sorensen said our posture should be to accuse the Soviets of being the aggressors and seek to persuade others to agree with us. He foresaw that some nations in the United Nations would immediately try to label us as the aggressors because of the actions which we had taken.

Secretary Rusk raised the question of whether we should move first in the United Nations or first in the OAS. He said our United Nations action should be aimed at removing the missile threat while our objective on the OAS would be to persuade other Latin American countries to act with us under the Rio Treaty.

In response to the President’s question, Assistant Secretary Martin said that if there were a United Nations action before the OAS acted, the usefulness of the OAS would be seriously affected. Secretary Rusk felt we should act first in the OAS, then in the United Nations where our action program could be more flexible.

The President agreed that a reference in the draft speech to a Caribbean security force should be dropped.

The President said we should pin the responsibility for the developments in Cuba directly on Khrushchev. In response to the President’s question, Ambassador Thompson agreed—naming Khrushchev would make it harder for him to reverse his actions in Cuba, but such reference to him would be more effective in producing favorable actions.

The President asked that the phrases describing the horrors of war should be deleted.

Ambassador Thompson urged, and the President agreed, that we should use the part of the TASS statement on Cuba which flatly states that the Russians have all the weapons they need and require no more for their defense. Therefore, the only reason for Soviet deployment of weapons to Cuba is the aim of dominating the Western hemisphere.

The President agreed that the invitation to a summit meeting should be deleted.

Ambassador Stevenson repeated that he favored an early conference with the Russians on terms acceptable to us, to be held in an atmos-phere free of threat. The President responded that he did not want to appear to be seeking a summit meeting as a result of Khrushchev’s actions. Ambassador Thompson agreed. The President added that we should not look toward holding a meeting until it is clear to us what Khrushchev really thinks he will obtain worldwide as a result of his actions in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said our first objective was to get a fully inspected missile standstill in Cuba before we sit down to talk with the Russians. Mr. McCone was concerned that if we let it be known that we are prepared to talk to the Russians now, it would appear to outsiders that our only response to Khrushchev’s challenge was to negotiate.

The Attorney General said that in his view we should anticipate a Soviet reaction involving a movement in Berlin. Secretary Dillon felt that the Soviet reaction in Berlin would be governed by the actions we would take in response to the Russian missile deployment in Cuba.

Following a discussion of ways in which we could reach the Cuban people through television despite Cuban jamming efforts, the President told Mr. Wilson that we should go ahead with the television project involving the relay of signals via instruments aboard a ship at sea for use anywhere.

The Attorney General felt that the paragraphs in the President’s draft speech addressed to the Cuban people were not personal enough. The President asked that these paragraphs be rewritten.

Following discussion of the pressure by the press for information, the President decided that no information on the missile deployment would be given out today.

In response to a Presidential question, General Taylor said an invasion of Cuba could be carried out seven days after the decision to invade had been taken. Secretary McNamara said the President had asked a question which was difficult to answer precisely. Present plans called for invasion to follow seven days after an initial air strike. The timing could be reduced, depending upon whether certain decisions were taken now. Some actions which were irreversible would have to be taken now in order to reduce the time when forces could be landed. He promised the President a breakdown of the decisions which he would have to take immediately in order to reduce the seven-day period.

The President said that in three or four days we might have to decide to act in order that we would not have to wait so long prior to the landing of our forces. As he understood the situation, a decision taken today would mean that an air strike could not be undertaken before seven days, and then seven days later the first forces could be ashore.

General Taylor explained that air action would be necessary to bring the situation under control prior to the dropping of paratroopers. He added that 90,000 men could be landed within an eleven-day period.

Secretary McNamara said that planning was being done under two assumptions. The first called for an air strike, and seven days later, landings would begin. Twenty-five thousand men would be put ashore the first day, and on the eighteenth day, 90,000 would be ashore. The second plan provided for the landing of 90,000 men in a twenty-three day period. The President told General Taylor that he wanted to do those things which would reduce the length of time between a decision to invade and the landing of the first troops.

The President said he believed that as soon as he had finished his speech, the Russians would: (a) hasten the construction and the development of their missile capability in Cuba, (b) announce that if we attack Cuba, Soviet rockets will fly, and (c) possibly make a move to squeeze us out of Berlin.

Secretary Dillon said that in his view a blockade would either inevitably lead to an invasion of Cuba or would result in negotiations, which he believes the Soviets would want very much. To agree to negotiations now would be a disaster for us. We would break up our alliances and convey to the world that we were impotent in the face of a Soviet challenge. Unless the Russians stop their missile buildup at once, we will have to invade Cuba in the next week, no matter what they say, if we are to save our world position. We cannot convey firm intentions to the Russians otherwise and we must not look to the world as if we were backing down.

Secretary McNamara expressed his doubt that an air strike would be necessary within the next week.

Admiral Anderson described, in response to the President’s question, the way the blockade would be instituted. He added that the Navy did not need to call up reserves now to meet the immediate situation. He said that forty Navy ships were already in position. The Navy knew the positions of twenty-seven to thirty ships en route to Cuba. Eighteen ships were in Cuban ports, and fifteen were on their way home.

Admiral Anderson described the method to be used in the first interception of a Soviet ship. It was hoped that a cruiser rather than a destroyer would make this interception. It would follow accepted international rules. He favored a twenty-four hour grace period, beginning with the President’s speech, during which the Russians could communicate with their ships, giving them instructions as to what to do in the event they were stopped by United States ships.

Secretary McNamara said he would recommend to the President later today which kinds of reserve forces should be called up. He felt that air reserves would be necessary if it were decided to make an air strike, but probably would not be needed if our action was limited to a blockade.

Admiral Anderson said we had a capability to protect United States ships in the Caribbean. If the Komar ships took any hostile action, they could be destroyed, thereby creating a new situation. If a MIG plane takes hostile action, he would like to be in a position to shoot it down, thereby creating again a new situation. He estimated that the Soviets could not get naval surface ships to the area in less than ten days and Soviet submarines could not get to the area in less than ten to fourteen days.

In response to a question, Admiral Anderson said that if the Navy received information that a Soviet submarine was en route to Havana, he would ask higher authority for permission to attack it.

Secretary McNamara said he favored rules of engagement which would permit responses to hostile actions, including attacks to destroy the source of the hostile action.

The President answered a question as to whether we were to stop all ships, including allied ships by saying that he favored stopping all ships in the expectation that allied ships would soon become discouraged and drop out of the Cuban trade.

Diplomatic Measures

Under Secretary Ball summarized a scenario (copy attached)Attached, but not printed. providing for consultation with our allies. He said Dean Acheson would brief De Gaulle and the NATO Council, Ambassador Dowling would brief Adenauer, and Ambassador Bruce would brief Macmillan. Present at such briefings would be technical experts from CIA who could answer questions concerning the photographic intelligence which reveals the missile sites.

The President said we must assume that Khrushchev knows that we know of his missile deployments, and, therefore, he will be ready with a planned response. He asked that the draft speech emphasize his belief that the greatest danger to the United States in the present situation is doing nothing but acknowledging that in days to come we would be seriously threatened.

Ambassador Stevenson read from a list of problems which he foresaw in the United Nations. Secretary Rusk said we must decide on tactics for the Security Council meeting. He repeated his view that the aim of all our actions is to get a standstill of the missile development in Cuba to be inspected by United Nations observers and then be prepared to negotiate other issues.

The President asked Assistant Secretary of Defense Nitze to study the problem of withdrawing United States missiles from Turkey and Italy. Mr. Nitze said such a withdrawal was complicated because we must avoid giving the Europeans the impression that we are prepared to take nuclear weapons of all kinds out of Europe.

Secretary McNamara stated his firm view that the United States could not lift its blockade as long as the Soviet weapons remained in Cuba.

The President asked why we could not start with a demand for the removal or the withdrawal of the missiles and if at a later time we wanted to negotiate for a less favorable settlement, we could then decide to do so. The Attorney General said we should take the offensive in our presentation to the United Nations. Our attitude should not be defensive, especially in view of the fact that Soviet leaders had lied to us about the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba.

The President interjected a directive that we reverse our policy on nuclear assistance to France in the light of the present situation.

Ambassador Stevenson repeated his view that the United States would be forced into a summit meeting and preferred to propose such a meeting.

The President disagreed, saying that we could not accept a neutral Cuba and the withdrawal from Guantanamo without indicating to Khrushchev that we were in a state of panic. An offer to accept Castro and give up Guantanamo must not be made because it would appear to be completely defensive. He said we should be clear that we would accept nothing less than the ending of the missile capability now in Cuba, no reinforcement of that capability, and no further construction of missile sites.

Secretary McNamara stated his view that in order to achieve such a result we would have to invade Cuba.

The President said what he was talking about was the dismantlement of missiles now in Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson thought that we should institute a blockade, and when the Russians rejected our demand for a missile standstill in Cuba, we should defer any air strike until after we had talked to Khrushchev.

There followed a discussion as to whether we wanted to rely primarily on the United Nations or primarily on the OAS. Assistant Secretary of State Martin indicated that if we did not use the OAS in preference to the United Nations, we would jeopardize the entire hemispheric alliance. Under Secretary Ball agreed that we should put primary emphasis on the OAS and he preferred that any inspectors going to Cuba should be OAS inspectorsrather than United Nations inspectors.

The President indicated a need for further discussion of this matter and suggested that Secretary Rusk speak to him later about it.

As the meeting concluded, the President asked that the word “miscalculate” be taken out of the draft letter prepared for him to send to Khrushchev.A copy of this 3-page draft, dated October 20, is in Department of State, Central Files, 373.56361/10-2062. The letter as sent is printed in vol. VI, pages 165-166. He recalled that in Vienna Khrushchev had revealed a misunderstanding of this word when translated into Russian. He also requested that reference to a meeting with Khrushchev be deleted from the draft letter.

NSC Record of Action No. 2458 for this meeting reads:

“Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

“a. Noted briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the latest information about the Soviet strategic missile build-up in Cuba.

“b. Discussed and revised a draft Presidential speech to be made on October 22, 1962.

“c. Reviewed military plans to be implemented following the President’s speech.

“d. Reviewed diplomatic measures already under way, including consultation with allies and tactics in the UN and the OAS.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

39. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United KingdomSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10-2262. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by U.A. Johnson and cleared by Tyler. Washington, October 22, 1962, 12:17 a.m.

2269. Elite eyes only for the Ambassador. Following is text of letter to Prime Minister Macmillan to be delivered at 10:00 a.m. Monday London time:

“My dear friend:

We are now in possession of incontrovertible military evidence obtained through photographic reconnaissances, that the Soviets have already installed offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba, and that some of these may already be operational. This constitutes a threat to the peace which imperils the security not only of this hemisphere but of the entire free world. You will recall that last month I stated publicly that the Government of the United States would consider the presence of ground-to-ground missiles in Cuba as an offensive threat. In response to my remarks, the Soviets stated that such armaments and military equipment as had been shipped by them to Cuba were exclusively of a defensive nature, and this was repeated to me only last Thursday by Gromyko under instructions.See Document 29.

The foregoing has created a highly critical situation which must be met promptly and fearlessly. This evening at 1900 hours Washington time I shall be making a public statement of which Ambassador Bruce will be giving you a draft together with this message. This text is not necessarily final in every detail, but the essentials of the problem, and the means by which I intend to meet it, have already been decided as set forth in the present text. Ambassador Bruce will also be prepared fully to explain to you the evidence on which we have based our conclusions.

I am also writing to Chairman Khrushchev to bring home to him how perilous is his present course of action, but expressing the hope that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

I am quite clear in my mind that these missiles have got to be withdrawn, and you will see that I intend to state this publicly in my speech as well as telling Chairman Khrushchev this in my letter to him.

The object of the quarantine, which will be put into effect immediately, is to prevent the Soviet Union from introducing additional missiles into Cuba and to lead to the elimination of the missiles that are already in place.

I shall also be sending a personal message to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, General deGaulle, Chairman Adenauer, and Prime Minister FanfaniCopies of these letters and one to Nehru, all transmitted by telegram before 2 a.m. on October 22, and which repeated the substance of the letter sent to Macmillan, are in Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/10-2262. and have sent Dean Acheson to Paris [to] assist Ambassador Finletter in briefing the North Atlantic Council shortly before I make my public statement. However, I wanted you to be the first to be informed of this grave development, in order that we should have the opportunity, should you wish it, to discuss the situation between ourselves by means of our private channel of communication.

This is a solemn moment for our two countries, indeed for the fate of the entire world. It is essential that the already great dangers before us should not be increased through miscalculation or underestimation by the Soviets of what we intend to do, and are prepared to endure, in the face of the course on which they have so recklessly embarked.

I need not point out to you the possible relation of this secret and dangerous move on the part of Khrushchev to Berlin. We must together be prepared for a time of testing. It is a source of great personal satisfaction to me that you and I can keep in close touch with each other by rapid and secure means at a time like this, and I intend to keep you fully informed of my thinking as the situation evolves.

In the meanwhile I am also requesting an urgent meeting of the United Nations Security Council. I have asked Ambassador Stevenson to present on behalf of the United States a resolution calling for the withdrawal of missile bases and other offensive weapons in Cuba under the supervision of United Nations observers.For text of this draft resolution, which Stevenson presented to Valerian Zorin, President of the U.N. Security Council at 7:30 p.m., see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 404 or U.N. doc. S/5181. This would make it possible for the United States to lift its quarantine. I hope that you will instruct your representative in New York to work actively with us and speak forthrightly in support of the above program in the United Nations.”

Rusk
40. Editorial Note

President Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Secretaries McNamara and Rusk, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, and Under Secretary George Ball met on October 22, 1962, at 11 a.m. to discuss Cuba. A tape recording of the conversation is available, but is of poor quality and is punctuated by long periods when apparently material was being read and/or drafted. The discussion was on the President’s upcoming speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis; consideration of a proposal for removal of nuclear weapons from all non-nuclear nations—Turkey, Italy, and Cuba; and the handling of the press and other briefings before the speech. The tape, which lasts for 40 minutes and 40 seconds, ends before the meeting does. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Records, No. 32.1)

At 11:45 p.m. the group met again and discussed instructions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in anticipation of possible actions and confrontation. The President stressed the need to inform personnel at missile sites in Turkey not to fire if and when they came under Soviet attack. The group also discussed making clear to Allies that commitments in Berlin would not be compromised, and that the United States needed to protect U.S. credibility and to maintain the strategic balance. The group finished with a discussion of the timing of the President’s public announcement of the discovery of the missiles. The tape lasts for 11 minutes and 18 seconds and covers the entire meeting. (Ibid., No. 32.2)

41. Minutes of the 507th Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Washington, October 22, 1962, 3 p.m.

The President opened the meeting by asking Secretary Rusk to read the attached message from Prime Minister Macmillan which had just been received.A copy of this message, which expressed sympathy and support for the U.S. position but worried about how the Soviet Union might respond, is in the Supplement. (Telegram 222308Z from the White House; Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2262) Secretary Rusk observed that for a first reaction to information of our proposed blockade it was not bad. He added that it was comforting to learn that the British Prime Minister had not thought of anything we hadn’t thought of.

The President commented that the Prime Minister’s message contained the best argument for taking no action. What we now need are strong arguments to explain why we have to act as we are acting.

Secretary Rusk stated that the best legal basis for our blockade action was the Rio Treaty. The use of force would be justified on the ground of support for the principals of the United Nations Charter, not on the basis of Article 51, which might give the Russians a basis for attacking Turkey.

The Attorney General said that in his opinion our blockade action would be illegal if it were not supported by the OAS. In his view the greatest importance is attached to our obtaining the necessary fourteen favorable votes in the OAS. Secretary Rusk commented that if we do not win the support of the OAS, we are not necessarily acting illegally. He referred to the new situation created by modern weapons and he thought that rules of international law should not be taken as applying literally to a completely new situation. He said we need not abandon hope so early.

Mr. Salinger reported that Gromyko had departed from New York without making other than a usual departure statement containing nothing about Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said the Department had decided to hold off calling a Security Council meeting despite the possibility that the Russians might ask one first. The basis of this decision was that we would have to name Cuba in the documents requesting the Security Council meeting and this we did not wish to do.

Director McCone summarized the latest intelligence information and read from the attached document.Apparent reference to notes by McCone for this meeting, October 22. Reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 271-273. He added that we have a report of a fleet of Soviet submarines which are in a position to reach Cuba in about a week. He also mentioned that the London Evening Standard had printed a great deal of information about the existence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

In response to a suggestion by Mr. Bundy, the President outlined the manner in which he expected Council Members to deal with the domestic aspects of the current situation. He said everyone should sing one song in order to make clear that there was now no difference among his advisers as to the proper course to follow. He pointed out the importance of fully supporting the course of action chosen which, in his view, represented a reasonable consensus. Any course is extremely troublesome and, as in the case of the Berlin wall, we are once again confronted with a difficult choice. If we undertake a tricky and unsatisfactory course, we do not even have the satisfaction of knowing what would have happened if we had acted differently. He mentioned that former Presidents, Eisenhower, Truman and Hoover had supported his decision during telephone conversations with each of them earlier in the day.

The President then summarized the arguments as to why we must act. We must reply to those whose reaction to the blockade would be to ask what had changed in view of the fact that we had been living in the past years under a threat of a missile nuclear attack by the USSR.

In September we had said we would react if certain actions were taken in Cuba. We have to carry out commitments which we had made publicly at that time. The secret deployment by the Russians of strategic missiles to Cuba was such a complete change in their previous policy of not deploying such missiles outside the USSR that if we took no action in this case, we would convey to the Russians an impression that we would never act, no matter what they did anywhere. Gromyko had left the impression that the Soviets were going to act in Berlin in the next few months. Therefore, if they acted now in response to our blockade action, we would only have brought on their Berlin squeeze earlier than expected. The effect in Latin America would be very harmful to our interests if, by our failure to act, we gave the Latinos the impression that the Soviets were increasing their world position while ours was decreasing.

Two questions were raised which the President hoped would be discussed and settled the following day: What is our response if one of our U-2 planesis shot down by a SAM missile? If the missile development in Cuba continues, what is our next course of action?

The President concluded by acknowledging the difficulties which he was asking the military to accept because of the necessity of our taking action which warned Cuba of the possibility of an invasion.

Secretary Rusk commented that if anyone thought our response was weak, they were wrong because he believed that a “flaming crisis” was immediately ahead of us.

The President read from a list of questions and suggested answers which might be made public. The first question was why we had not acted earlier. The response is that we needed more evidence of the exist-ence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba. This additional evidence was required in order to gain the necessary fourteen votes in the OAS. In addition, if we had acted earlier, we might have jeopardized our position in Berlin because our European Allies would have concluded that our preoccupation with Cuba was such as to reveal our lack of interest in Berlin, thus tempting the Russians to act in Berlin. Earlier action would undoubtedly have forced us to declare war on Cuba and this action, without the evidence we now have, would have thrown Latin American support to Castro.

There followed a discussion of why evidence of Soviet missiles was lacking. Information about the strategic missile sites was reported by the refugees but these reports could not be substantiated from aerial photography. Aerial photographs taken on August 29th revealed no missile sites. It was not until October 14th that photographic evidence of the sites and missiles was available. The cloud cover prevented photography for a period of time and the possibility of an attack on an overflying American plane led to a restriction on the number of U-2 flights. Mr. McCone felt that the information given to Senator Keating about the missile sites had come from refugee sources, which he had accepted without further substantiation. The Attorney General pointed out that even if there had been U-2 flights, construction at the missile sites was not far enough along to have been detected by photography much earlier than October 14. It was pointed out that all Soviet experts agreed that Khrushchev would not send strategic missiles to Cuba. Therefore, there was a tendency to downgrade the refugee reports.

Commenting on what should be said publicly about our actions in Cuba, Secretary Rusk cautioned that we should say nothing now which might tie our hands later in the event we wanted to take additional actions.

The President referred again to the question of distinguishing between Soviet missiles in Cuba and United States missiles in Turkey and Italy. Secretary Rusk read extracts from the NATO communique of 1959. The President thought that it was most important that everyone be fully briefed as to why these situations with respect to the deployment of missiles do not match. He again called attention to the secret deployment of the weapons and the TASS statement saying that the Russians had no need to position strategic missiles in foreign countries. Soviet missiles in Cuba have a quite different psychological effect than Soviet missiles positioned in the USSR in that the Soviet action in Cuba may in fact be a probing action to find out what we would be prepared to do in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk added that the threat to the United States from Soviet missiles in Cuba was of worldwide importance because this threat was to a country which in effect provided the sole defense of some forty Free World States.

The President suggested that we should make clear the difference between our Cuban blockade and the Berlin blockade by emphasizing that we were not preventing shipments of food and medicine to Cuba, but only preventing the delivery of offensive military equipment.

General Taylor asked how we should reply to the question: Are we preparing to invade? The President responded by saying that we should ask the press not to push this line of questioning and to accept our statement that we are taking all precautionary moves in anticipation of any contingency. Secretary McNamara agreed that we should say that the Defense Department had been ordered to be prepared for any contingency and that we were not now ready to say anything more than was in the President’s speech.

In response to a Presidential question, Secretary McNamara said that an information group was working on the problem of voluntary press censorship based on experience during the Korean War.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Secretary McNamara reported that the Defense Department was working on how we would prevent the introduction into Cuba of nuclear weapons by airplanes. He said some planes could fly non-stop from the Soviet Union if refueled en route. Present arrangements provided that we would be informed of any plane flying to Cuba and we would then decide what action to take against it.

It was agreed that no reserves would be called today, but that a review would be made tonight as to the necessity of such action.

Acting Secretary Fowler raised several questions involving domestic controls, including gold transfers, foreign exchange controls, and control of the stock market. He said, in response to the President’s question, that another look would be taken the following day before any recommendation would be made as to closing the stock market.

Secretary Rusk said that if we were asked whether our blockade was an act of war, we should say that it was not. The President asked whether friendly ships would be halted and Admiral Anderson replied in the affirmative, saying that we would challenge all ships. The President agreed that we should stop all Soviet Bloc and non-Bloc ships when the order to institute the blockade was given.

Portion of the NSC Meeting Minutes, Monday, October 22, 1962The remainder of the source text is classified Top Secret; Sensitive and has the handwritten notation “Absolutely No Distribution.”

The President discussed the reasons why he had decided against an air strike now. First, there was no certainty that an air strike would destroy all missiles now in Cuba. We would be able to get a large percentage of these missiles, but could not get them all.

In addition we would not know if any of these missiles were operationally ready with their nuclear warheads and we were not certain that our intelligence had discovered all the missiles in Cuba. Therefore, in attacking the ones we had located, we could not be certain that others unknown to us would not be launched against the United States. The President said an air strike would involve an action comparable to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Finally, an air strike would increase the danger of a worldwide nuclear war.

The President said he had given up the thought of making an air strike only yesterday morning. In summary, he said an air strike had all the disadvantages of Pearl Harbor. It would not insure the destruction of every strategic missile in Cuba, and would end up eventually in our having to invade.

Mr. Bundy added that we should not discuss the fact that we were not able to destroy all the missiles by means of an air strike because at some later time we might wish to make such an attack.

NSC Record of Action No. 2459 for this meeting reads as follows:

“Soviet Strategic Missiles in Cuba

“a. Noted an intelligence summary presented by the Director of Central Intelligence.

“b. Discussed the domestic aspects of actions to be announced later in the day.

“c. Considered future military and political actions to follow implementation of the quarantine.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

42. National Security Action Memorandum 196Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAMs. No classification marking. In addition to the recipients mentioned in the source text, copies were also sent to Ball, Gilpatric, Thompson, Sorensen, Bundy, O’Donnell, Salinger, Wilson, Rostow, and Nitze. Washington, October 22, 1962. TO The Vice President The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of the Treasury The Attorney General The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Establishment of an Executive Committee of the National Security Council

I hereby establish, for the purpose of effective conduct of the operations of the Executive Branch in the current crisis, an Executive Committee of the National Security Council. This committee will meet, until further notice, daily at 10:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room. I shall act as Chairman of this committee, and its additional regular members will be as follows: the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Ambassador-at-Large, the Special Counsel, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The first meeting of this committee will be held at the regular hour on Tuesday, October 23rd, at which point further arrangements with respect to its management and operation will be decided.

John Kennedy
43. Memorandum for the FileSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on October 24. A briefer account of this meeting by Clifton is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, Conferences with the President. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 275-279. Washington, October 24, 1962. SUBJECT Leadership meeting on October 22nd at 5:00 p.m. ATTENDED BY The Leadership, except for Senator Hayden, The President, Rusk, McNamara, McCone and Ambassador Thompson

McCone read a summary of the situation, copy of which is attached.Not found attached and not printed. This statement had been discussed with the President, Attorney General and Bundy and had been modified to conform to their views.

There were a few questions of a substantive nature, Hickenlooper asked when missiles would be in operational status. McCone replied with the existing figures as reported in the morning report. Hickenlooper then asked if the Cuban situation is tied in to the China/India confrontation. McCone replied that we have no information one way or the other. Thompson then indicated it was more probable that Cuba may force a showdown on Berlin.

Secretary Rusk then reviewed his current appraisal of the Soviet Union indicating there had been some radical moves within the USSR which were indicating a tougher line. It appeared the hard-liners are coming in to ascendancy and the soft co-existent line seems to be disappearing. Peiping seems somewhat more satisfied with Moscow now. Rusk stated that he did not wish to underestimate the gravity of the situation; the Soviets were taking a very serious risk, but this in his opinion represents the philosophy of the “hard-liners”. Russell questioned the Secretary as to whether things will get better in the future, whether we will have a more propitious time to act than now, the thrust of his questioning being, “Why wait.”Rusk answered that he saw no opportunity for improvement.

The President then reviewed the chronology of the situation, starting on Tuesday, October 16th, when the first information was received from the photographic flight of October 14th. He stated that he immediately ordered extensive overflights; that McCone briefed President Eisenhower; that we must recognize that these missiles might be operational and therefore military action on our part might cause the firing of many of them with serious consequences to the United States; furthermore the actions taken, and further actions which might be required, might cause the Soviets to react in various areas, most particularly Berlin, which they could easily grab and if they do, our European Allies would lay the blame in our lap. The President concluded whatever we do involves a risk; however we must make careful calculations and take a chance. To do nothing would be a great mistake. The blockade of Cuba on the importation of offensive weapons was to be undertaken, all ships would be stopped and those containing offensive weapons would not be permitted to proceed. We have no idea how the Bloc will react but the indications are, from unconfirmed sources, they will attempt to run the blockade. Initially the blockade would not extend to petroleum. This might be a further step. We are taking all military preparations for either an air strike or an invasion. It was the President’s considered judgment that if we have to resort to active military actions, then this would involve an invasion. Rusk then stated that our proposed action gave the other side a chance to pause. They may pull back or they may rapidly intensify the entire situation existing between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Senator Russell then demanded stronger steps, stated he did not think we needed time to pause. The President had warned them in September and no further warning was necessary. We must not take a gamble and must not temporize;Khrushchev has once again rattled his missiles; he can become firmer and firmer, and we must react. If we delay, if we give notification, if we telegraph our punches, the result will be more a difficult military action and more American lives will be sacrificed. The thrust of Senator Russell’s remarks were to demand military action. He did not specifically say by surprise attack; however he did not advocate warning.

McNamara then described the blockade, indicating that this might lead to some form of military action; that there would be many alternative courses open to us. The President then reviewed in some detail time required to assemble an invasion force which would involve 90,000 men in the actual landings and a total of about 250,000 men. He stated this could not be done in 24 or 36 hours but would take a number of days and that many preliminary steps had been taken.

Halleck recalled a recent briefing by Secretary McNamara in which he stated it would take three months to prepare adequately to invade Cuba. McNamara then reaffirmed the 250,000-man figure, with 90,000 of them actually involved in the landing force. He stated that he could be ready in 7 days and that the landing would be preceded by substantial air strike. Russell again questioned the delay. He also seriously criticized any policy which involved extensive airborne alerts of SAC in the interests of our state of readiness, pointing out that the consequences would be the serious attrition of our SAC forces, most particularly the B-47s, which are now quite old. McNamara stated that we could carry on an airborne alert indefinitely because preliminary plans had been made, repair parts, etc., secured and were in position.

Vinson then asked if the Joint Chiefs of Staff actually approved the plans for the invasion. McNamara answered, “Yes.” The plans had been developed over a 10-month period and had been submitted to the President by the JCS on a number of occasions.

Note: This question did not refer to whether the JCS did or did not approve the proposed actions of blockade against Cuba.

The President then reviewed matters again, read an intelligence note from a United Nations source which indicated Soviet intention to grab Berlin. Russell promptly replied that Berlin will always be a hostage. He then criticized the decision, stated we should go now and not wait.

Halleck questioned whether we were absolutely sure these weapons were offensive. The President answered affirmatively. McNamara then made a most unusual statement. He said, “One might question whether the missiles are or are not offensive. However there is no question about the IL 28s.” Note: This was the first time anyone has raised doubt as to whether the MRBMs and the IRBMs are offensive missiles.

Questions were then raised concerning the attitude of our Allies. The President advised steps taken to inform our major Allies. He then read the message received from the Prime Minister which in effect agreed to support us in the United Nations and then raised many warnings including the dangers to Berlin, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, etc., etc.See footnote 1, Document 41.

Senator Saltonstall brought up the question of the legality of the blockade. A great many Senators expressed concern over the proposed action with the OAS, indicating that they felt the OAS would delay rather than act. Saltonstall then asked whether a blockade would be legal if the OAS did not support it. The President answered that it probably would not; however we would proceed anyway.

Fulbright then stated that in his opinion the blockade was the worst of the alternatives open to us and it was a definite affront to Russia and that the moment that we had to damage or sink a Soviet ship because of their failure to recognize or respect the blockade we would be at war with Russia and the war would be caused because of our own initiative. The President disagreed with this thinking. Fulbright then repeated his position and stated in his opinion it would be far better to launch an attack and to take out the bases from Cuba. McNamara stated that this would involve the spilling of Russian blood since there were so many thousand Russians manning these bases. Fulbright responded that this made no difference because they were there in Cuba to help on Cuban bases. These were not Soviet bases. There was no mutual defense pact between the USSR and Cuba. Cuba was not a member of the Warsaw Pact. Therefore he felt the Soviets would not react if some Russians got killed in Cuba. The Russians in the final analysis placed little value on human life. The time has come for an invasion under the President’s statement of February 13th.Presumably Fulbright is referring to the statement made by the President on September 13; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674-675. Fulbright repeated that an act [attack] on Russian ships is an act of war against Russia and on the other hand, an attack or an invasion of Cuba was an act against Cuba, not Russia. Fulbright also expressed reservations concerning the possible OAS action.

The President took issue with Fulbright, stating that he felt that an attack on these bases, which we knew were manned by Soviet personnel, would involve large numbers of Soviet casualties and this would be more provocative than a confrontation with a Soviet ship.

Vinson urged that if we strike, we strike with maximum force and wind the matter up quickly as this would involve the minimum of American losses and insure the maximum support by the Cuban people at large who, he reasoned, would very quickly go over to the side of the winner.

The meeting was concluded at 6:35 to permit the President to prepare for his 7:00 o’clock talk to the nation.For text of the President’s report to the American people, see ibid., pp. 806-809.

It was decided to hold a meeting on Wednesday, October 24th. During this meeting Senator Hickenlooper expressed himself as opposed to the action and in favor of direct military action. He stated that in his opinion ships which were accosted on the high sea and turned back would be a more humiliating blow to the Soviets and a more serious involvement to their pride than the losing of as many as 5,000 Soviet military personnel illegally and secretly stationed in Cuba.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
44. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. At 7:41 p.m. on October 21 the Department of State had sent Ambassador Kohler the first draft of this message. (Telegram 961 to Moscow; Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) Subsequent changes and additions resulted in only the second and final paragraphs remaining as originally drafted. The message was delivered to the Foreign Ministry at about 6 p.m. Washington time. Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 635-636. Washington, October 22, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: A copy of the statement I am making tonight concerning developments in Cuba and the reaction of my Government thereto has been handed to your Ambassador in Washington.See footnote 4, Document 43; a 3-paragraph memorandum of Rusk’s conversation with Dobrynin at 6 p.m., during which the Secretary of State gave the Soviet Ambassador copies of the statement and this message, is in Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/10-2262. In view of the gravity of the developments to which I refer, I want you to know immediately and accurately the position of my Government in this matter.

In our discussions and exchanges on Berlin and other international questions, the one thing that has most concerned me has been the possibility that your Government would not correctly understand the will and determination of the United States in any given situation, since I have not assumed that you or any other sane man would, in this nuclear age, deliberately plunge the world into war which it is crystal clear no country could win and which could only result in catastrophic consequences to the whole world, including the aggressor.

At our meeting in Vienna and subsequently, I expressed our readiness and desire to find, through peaceful negotiation, a solution to any and all problems that divide us. At the same time, I made clear that in view of the objectives of the ideology to which you adhere, the United States could not tolerate any action on your part which in a major way disturbed the existing over-all balance of power in the world. I stated that an attempt to force abandonment of our responsibilities and commitments in Berlin would constitute such an action and that the United States would resist with all the power at its command.

It was in order to avoid any incorrect assessment on the part of your Government with respect to Cuba that I publicly stated that if certain developments in Cuba took place, the United States would do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

Moreover, the Congress adopted a resolution expressing its support of this declared policy.For text of this resolution, October 3, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 389-390. Despite this, the rapid development of long-range missile bases and other offensive weapons systems in Cuba has proceeded. I must tell you that the United States is determined that this threat to the security of this hemisphere be removed. At the same time, I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part.

I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiation.

Sincerely,

JFKKennedy’s initials appear in an unidentified hand presumably indicating he signed the original.
45. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacmillanSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The source text bears no drafting information. No time appears on the source text. Kennedy refers to it as happening “one hour” after Rusk gave Dobrynin the message to Khrushchev, but that would be during the address to the nation. Macmillan states that the conversation took place at 11:30 p.m. London time. (Harold Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 1961-1963, p. 194) October 22, 1962.

The clandestine way that the Soviets have made their build-up in Cuba would have unhinged us in all of Latin America. To allow it to continue would have thrown into question all our statements about Berlin.

PM spoke.

We have the potential to occupy Cuba but we didn’t start that way.

There would be a gap of some days before invasion could be mounted. Preparations for invasion would have public notice. This way provides action without immediate escalation to war.

Action is limited now. Greater force would give him the same excuse in Berlin.

It may be necessary to expand blockade to include fuel, lubricants and so forth.

PM spoke. (about possible Russian actions)

He may require us to seize their ships by force.

There is no telling what he will do—probably it will be something in Berlin.

PM spoke.

We have had no plan to invade Cuba. We must get their missiles out. What exchange possible is not known. But getting the missiles out is the object of our policy.

We are aware that this action is not complete application of force—does not immediately solve the problem.

The alternatives were air strike or invasion. These may be necessary but going completely into Cuba now invites him into Berlin.

PM spoke.

If we had the force on hand to take Cuba tonight that would be okay, but it would take a week to build up.

Prime Minister spoke.

We are attempting to begin the escalation in a way to prevent WW III. Maybe this will result anyway, but we cannot accept his actions.

PM spoke. (about talking to K on phone)

No, but I sent a letter to him one hour ago.Document 44.

Khrushchev is playing a double game. He said he wasn’t going to do anything until after the election. He said weapons in Cuba were not offensive.

It is obvious that he was attempting to face us in November with a bad situation.

PM answered.

Mr. Bundy suggested the following point which the President made.

The build-up in Cuba, if completed, would double the number of missiles the Soviets could bring to bear on the U.S. They would also overcome our warning system which does not face south. Furthermore, the short distance involving short times of flight would tempt them to make a first strike.

PM spoke.

Some action was necessary. It could result in WW III; we could lose Berlin.

PM spoke.

Invasion may yet be required. It requires seven days for mobilization of the necessary forces. In any event we won’t invade until I speak again with you.

PM spoke.

It faces Khrushchev with action taken which has unpleasant options for him also.

46. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2262. Secret; Niact; Elite. Received in the Department of State at 7:29 p.m. Paris, October 22, 1962, 9 p.m.

1901. Eyes only for the Secretary. Deptel 2300.Telegram 2300, October 21, reported that a special air flight carrying Acheson and a special briefing officer would arrive in Paris at 2 a.m. October 22 and should be met by Finletter and Lyon. (Ibid., 611.3722/10-2162) I accompanied Mr. Acheson this afternoon when he called on President De Gaulle at five pm local time.For an account of this meeting and other briefings by U.S. officials in Paris, see Sherman Kent’s November 14 memorandum for the record in the Supplement under date of October 21. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, HS/HC 850A, Job 84-00499R) Mr. Acheson began conversation by presenting President De Gaulle with copy of President’s letter contained Deptel 2304.Not printed, but see footnote 2, Document 39. He also handed President De Gaulle part one of President’s speechFor text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806-809. since other sections not yet received by Embassy. However, they will be delivered to President De Gaulle’s Chef de Cabinet as soon as received.

President De Gaulle read both communications carefully and then remarked that he would welcome further elucidation by Mr. Acheson.

Mr. Acheson outlined background of present situation in Cuba, reason for President’s proposed action, going into considerable detail, emphasizing that maximum buildup had occurred within past week, and saying that he had Mr. Sherman Kent with him who was prepared to brief President De Gaulle in more detail.

President De Gaulle listened with obvious interest and then remarked that US for first time felt itself threatened since missiles in Cuba were aimed at US and they had no other reason to be in Cuba save threaten US. He continued that President Kennedy wishes to react, and to react now, and certainly France can have no objection to that since it is legal for a country to defend itself when it finds itself in danger.

He then referred to blockade and said that of course there would be no objection on part of France to US initiating such blockade, but he himself had doubts as to its effectiveness. He wondered whether it would be sufficiently effective to cause Cubans [Soviets] to remove missiles and their bases. He admitted it would at least stop additional missiles going to Cuba.

President De Gaulle then referred to our proposal to consult with other American nations, asked whether that would be effective, and remarked he himself did not know.

With respect to proposed action in Security Council, President De Gaulle remarked that he realized that this was in line with our policy. Personally he did not think it would be practical. There might be much talk, but he doubted whether Security Council would be effective.

In conclusion, President De Gaulle said that he felt blockade was one positive step, and he repeated that France made no objection thereto. President De Gaulle said he believed that if blockade were initiated USSR would react perhaps in neighborhood of Cuba, but more likely in area where they could act more effectively. President De Gaulle felt they would choose Berlin since they would want to make West suffer, and this was where they could do so most effectively. If they choose Berlin, President De Gaulle said, three powers would have to take necessary steps; number of countersteps have been prepared and they would have to be taken.

President De Gaulle continued that perhaps Soviets wished, and perhaps US also wished to some extent, to intensify international situation somewhat to bring about talks. Perhaps that is Mr. Khrushchev’s view. President De Gaulle said he did not think we would have war but if Soviets forced US in such places as Berlin, France would be with US, “France will act in accord with you.”

President De Gaulle expressed appreciation for having been informed by President. He said that he realized this had been done after decision had been made, but nevertheless appreciated being informed. He said he would reply to President’s letter as soon as possible, but meanwhile if Mr. Acheson saw President please explain De Gaulle’s appreciation and tell him he would be replying to his message.A copy of De Gaulle’s reply, November 2, is in the Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

President De Gaulle said that in this serious time it was important that governments keep in close contact. This would be done in Washington through Ambassador Alphand and through Ambassador Bohlen when he arrives here shortly. President De Gaulle ruminated that while one never knew what real intentions of Soviets were, he did not think present situation would lead to war. He thought it might be great maneuver to engage US in talks on Berlin and on Cuba. Berlin was the sensitive point and it was there that Soviets no doubt would press. Perhaps also Khrushchev had in mind impressing other Latin American states by showing them that USSR could establish themselves anywhere in Western hemisphere and could not be moved out. He repeated he hoped blockade would be effective, but did not think it would be.

At this point Mr. Kent was called into room to brief President De Gaulle. President De Gaulle was obviously very interested in briefing and showed keen interest, asking pertinent questions, which revealed his military background. In addition to specific technical questions, he inquired as to Cuba’s self-sufficiency with respect to food, petroleum, etc.

His obvious concern with this Cuban development was expressed in his statement: “US has been defending Europe in order that Europe may not become base against US. Now there is base in America directed against US. This is not a good thing.”

President De Gaulle inquired what countries were being informed in similar manner. Mr. Acheson replied UK, France, Germany.Records of briefings of various foreign leaders are in the Supplement.

President De Gaulle was friendly, relaxed and deeply interested. He appreciated significance of situation rapidly, and obviously found here subject which interested him considerably. His Chef de Cabinet was extremely cooperative in maintaining secrecy of interview, and we drove to Elysee in Elsyee motorcars and were taken in back door to avoid any leakage to press of Mr. Acheson’s visit.

Lyon
47. Minutes of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Executive Committee Meetings. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone’s 3-page record of this meeting, also printed in CIA Documentson the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 283-284, see the Supplement. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President)Gilpatric’s handwritten 2-page record of this meeting is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, RLG’s Notes on Cuba. Washington, October 23, 1962, 10 a.m.

1. Intelligence

The meeting began with a briefing by Mr. McCone in which, in addition to written material, he emphasized the strength of evidence substantiating the non-participation of Cubans in Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

2. Unity on the Home Front

There was general discussion of the problem of adequate briefing of Members of the Congress and of the press on the way in which the crisis had developed and on the reasons for the decisions which had been taken. A number of assignments were given to individual members of the Committee for further work on this problem.

3. Blockade Effects Estimates

The President asked the Director of Central Intelligence for an analysis of effects of the blockade on Cuba, not to include food and medicine, and for a comparable analysis of the effects of a comparable blockade on Berlin.See footnote 1, Document 54.

4. Items Presented by the Department of Defense The President approved plans for the issue of the Proclamation of Interdiction of ship delivery of offensive weapons to Cuba.For text of the Proclamation of Interdiction, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the Unites States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 809-811. It was officially signed at 7:06 p.m. The Proclamation was to be issued at 6:00 pm and the Interdiction to become effective at dawn October 24. The President approved and later signed an Executive Order authorizing the extension of tours of duty of certain members of the Armed Forces.For text of Executive Order 11058, see 27 F.R. 10403. The President approved the following contingency plan for action in the event of an incident affecting U-2 overflights. The President will be informed through SAC/DOD channels, and it is expected that if there is clear indication that the incident is the result of hostile action, the recommendation will be for immediate retaliation upon the most likely surface-to-air site involved in this action. The President delegated authority for decision on this point to the Secretary of Defense under the following conditions: that the President himself should be unavailable that evidence of hostile Cuban action should be very clear. It was expected, but not definitely decided, that if hostile actions should continue after such a single incident and single retaliation, it would become necessary to take action to eliminate the effectiveness of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba. The Secretary reported that he was not ready to make a recommendation on air intercept of Soviet flights to Cuba, that he was maintaining aircraft on alert for prompt reaction against known missile sites, that preparations for invasion were proceeding at full speed, that the quarantine would initially exclude POL, though this decision should be reexamined continuously. The Attorney General was delegated to check the problem of the legal possibility of permitting foreign flag ships to participate in U.S. coastwise trade, in order to prevent shipping requirements for an invasion from disrupting U.S. commerce. The Secretary of Defense recommended, and the President approved, about six low-level reconnaissance flights for the purpose of obtaining still more persuasive photography of Soviet missile sites. The President, on hearing these reports, asked whether U.S. air forces in Southeastern United States were properly deployed against possible hostile reaction, and after discussion he directed that photographs be taken of U.S. airfields to show their current condition.

5. State Department Business

Secretary Ball reported the urgent need for persuasive evidence in New York as described by Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, and the President directed Secretary Ball and Mr. McCone to work together to meet this requirement as well as possible. There was a brief discussion of possible reactions in Berlin, and the President indicated that he would wish to consider whether additional Soviet inspection of convoys would be acceptable. After the meeting, the President designated Assistant Secretary Nitze to be Chairman of a Subcommittee of the Executive Committee, for Berlin Contingencies.Documentation on the Nitze subcommittee is printed in volume XV. At this time the President also established two other subcommittees. The first, chaired by Rostow, was to consider advance planning during the crisis; the second, chaired by Wiesner, dealt with communications. The President decided that it would be advisable not to make his forthcoming trip to Brazil, and the assignment of diplomatic disengagement was given to the Department of State.

6. There was discussion of the problem of effective communications and it was agreed that for the present, Dr. Wiesner will be asked informally to lead an inter-departmental review of this matter and to report on the problem on Wednesday, October 24.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
48. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Niact; Elite; Eyes Only. The source text is a translation done at the Embassy in Moscow and received in the Department of State at 11:56 a.m. Kohler had been handed the letter at a meeting with Kuznetsov at 3 p.m. Moscow time. A copy of the Russian-language text is ibid. Moscow, October 23, 1962, 5 p.m.

1042. Policy. Embtel 1041.Dated October 23. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.3722/10-2362) Embassy translation follows of Khrushchev’s letter of October 23 to President. Kuznetsov informed me letter would not be published “for time being.”

Begin Text. Mr. President.

I have just received your letter, and have also acquainted myself with text of your speech of October 22 regarding Cuba.Document 44, and see footnote 4, Document 46.

I should say frankly that measures outlined in your statement represent serious threat to peace and security of peoples. United States has openly taken path of gross violation of Charter of United Nations, path of violation of international norms of freedom of navigation on high seas, path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against Soviet Union.

Statement of Government of United States America cannot be eval-uated in any other way than as naked interference in domestic affairs of Cuban Republic, Soviet Union, and other states. Charter of United Nations and international norms do not give right to any state whatsoever to establish in international waters control of vessels bound for shores of Cuban Republic.

It is self-understood that we also cannot recognize right of United States to establish control over armaments essential to Republic of Cuba for strengthening of its defensive capacity.

We confirm that armaments now on Cuba, regardless of classification to which they belong, are destined exclusively for defensive purposes, in order to secure Cuban Republic from attack of aggressor.

I hope that Government of United States will show prudence and renounce actions pursued by you, which would lead to catastrophic consequences for peace throughout world.

Viewpoint of Soviet Government with regard to your statement of October 22 is set forth in statement of Soviet Government, which is being conveyed to you through your Ambassador in Moscow.For text of the Soviet statement, see The New York Times, October 24, 1962.

/s/N. Khrushchev. End text.

Original of letter being airpouched today.

Kohler
49. Editorial Note

At 9 a.m. on October 23, 1962, Secretary of State Rusk addressed a Special Meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States. After reviewing the steps that had brought the situation to a head, Rusk asked the Council to take all measures necessary to remove the threat to hemispheric security. For text of his address, see Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, pages 720-722. The Council continued its deliberations until 5 p.m., when it passed, with one abstention, a resolution along the lines called for by Rusk. For its text, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962, pages 408-410.

At 4 p.m. Ambassador Stevenson delivered his opening statement to the specially convened meeting of the United Nations Security Council calling the installation of the missiles in Cuba a profound challenge to the peace. For text of his statement and the following ones by the Cuban and Soviet representatives, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 1022.

50. Record of Action of the Second Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone’s record of this meeting, see Document 51. Washington, October 23, 1962, 6 p.m.

1. Intelligence

There was a preliminary report of low level reconnaissance.

2. Proclamation of Interdiction

The Proclamation of Interdiction was reviewed, slightly revised, and approved in the version later signed by the President.See footnote 2, Document 47.

3. Message to Khrushchev

A further message to Khrushchev was agreed in the form later dispatched by the Department of State.See Document 52.

4. The President requested the Secretary of Defense to give a further review to the process of naval action and engagement under the quarantine.

5. The Secretary of Defense was requested to consider and recommend appropriate arrangements for the continuation of General Nor-stad as Supreme NATO Commander during the crisis.

6. Assistant Secretary Pittman reported briefly on civil defense capability and was requested to produce recommendations for a special plan covering the southeastern area of the United States during the period of a possible invasion of Cuba. The President expected to review these plans at a separate meeting on October 24th.

7. Assistant Secretary Nitze was confirmed as Chairman of a subcommittee on Berlin preparations of the Executive Committee. The President invited Mr. Nitze to sit regularly with the Executive Committee in this capacity.

8. Counselor W.W. Rostow was confirmed as Chairman of a second subcommittee on advance planning.

MG. B.
51. Memorandum for the FilesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 291-292. Washington, October 23, 1962. SUBJECT Executive Committee Meeting on 23 October 1962 6:00 p.m. All members present plus Counsel for Defense Department Committee reviewed the blockade proclamation and approved it. It was signed by the President at 6:00 p.m. The President instructed McNamara to review all details of instructions to the Fleet Commanders regarding procedures to be followed in the blockade. There was an extended discussion of actions to be taken under various assumed Soviet resistance activities such as (a) failing to stop, (b) refusing right to board, (c) ships turning around, heading in another direction, etc. Discussion of the effect on U.S. industry by chartering and preempting the use of 20 or 30 American ships. Gilpatric reported that this would have little or no effect on the American economy. McCone questioned these findings; however Gilpatric said that this had been thoroughly studied and McCone’s concerns as expressed at the morning meeting were unfounded. The Attorney General stated that it was within the law to use foreign bottoms, however decision was made to preempt U.S. bottoms and not worry about the consequences because they would not be serious. The President urged that Norstad be retained at SHAPE during the period of crisis, perhaps until 1 February 63. He indicated Lemnitzer might be used as CINCEUR with Norstad remaining as SACEUR. Bundy stated that this is complicated as the two posts are so co-mingled that they really must be held by one man. Taylor raised question that if this was done it would hurt Lemnitzer’s prestige. The President said that he felt that Norstad was so experienced and so capable and his judgment so sound, as evidenced by today’s cable,Not further identified. copy of which I have not seen, that he would take the risk of NATO country criticisms, he did not think that Lemnitzer would be hurt, and he wished Norstad to remain. Defense to take under advisement and report within 24 hours. In the prolonged discussion of report on Civil Defense problems, the President seemed particularly concerned over the situation if we should launch attacks which might result in four or five missiles being delivered on the United States. DOD spokesmen stated that the area covered by the 1100-mile missiles involved 92 million people. They felt that fall-out space was available though not equipped for about 40 million. The President asked what emergency steps could be taken. Replied that many arrangements could be made without too much publicity, such as repositioning food, actually obtaining space, putting up shelter signs, etc. I got the conclusion that not very much could or would be done; that whatever was done would involve a great deal of publicity and public alarm.

Prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara at approximately 7:00 o’clock, McCone (who had not been called upon for an intelligence appraisal) stated to the President that he felt certain intelligence should be reported to the meeting prior to the departure of Secretary McNamara as some items observed by the Intelligence Community might prove of great significance.

[1 paragraph (17½ lines of source text) not declassified]

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
52. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet UnionSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Confidential; Niact; Eyes Only. Washington, October 23, 1962, 6:51 p.m.

985. You should deliver following letter addressed by the President to Chairman Khrushchev immediately. This replaces message contained Deptel 982.Not printed. (Ibid.: Lot 66 D 204)

“Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October twenty-third.See Document 48. I think you will recognize that the steps which started the current chain of events was the action of your Government in secretly furnishing offensive weapons to Cuba. We will be discussing this matter in the Security Council. In the meantime, I am concerned that we both show prudence and do nothing to allow events to make the situation more difficult to control than it already is.

I hope that you will issue immediately the necessary instructions to your ships to observe the terms of the quarantine, the basis of which was established by the vote of the Organization of American States this afternoon, and which will go into effect at 1400 hours Greenwich time October twenty-four.

Sincerely, JFK”

Rusk
53. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Cuba, Security. Top Secret. A copy was sent to Rusk. Washington, October 24, 1962.

I met with Ambassador Dobrynin last evening on the third floor of the Russian Embassy and as you suggested made the following points:The meeting took place at 9:30 p.m., October 23.

I told him first that I was there on my own and not on the instructions of the President. I said that I wanted to give him some background on the decision of the United States Government and wanted him to know that the duplicity of the Russians had been a major contributing factor. When I had met with him some six weeks before, I said, he had told me that the Russians had not placed any long-range missiles in Cuba and had no intention to do so in the future. He interrupted at that point and confirmed this statement and said he specifically told me they would not put missiles in Cuba which would be able to reach the continental United States.

I said based on that statement which I had related to the President plus independent intelligence information at that time, the President had gone to the American people and assured them that the weapons being furnished by the Communists to Cuba were defensive and that it was not necessary for the United States to blockade or take any military action. I pointed out that this assurance of Dobrynin to me had been confirmed by the TASS statement and then finally, in substance, by Gromyko when he visited the President on Thursday.October 18; see Document 29. I said that based on these assurances the President had taken a different and far less belligerent position than people like Senators Keating and Capehart, and he had assured the American people that there was nothing to be concerned about.

I pointed out, in addition, that the President felt he had a very helpful personal relationship with Mr. Khrushchev. Obviously, they did not agree on many issues, but he did feel that there was a mutual trust and confidence between them on which he could rely. As an example of this statement I related the time that Mr. Khrushchev requested the President to withdraw the troops from Thailand and that step was taken within 24 hours.

I said that with the background of this relationship, plus the specific assurances that had been given to us, and then the statement of Dobrynin from Khrushchev to Ted Sorensen and to me that no incident would occur before the American elections were completed, we felt the action by Khrushchev and the Russians at this time was hypocritical, misleading and false. I said this should be clearly understood by them as it was by us.

Dobrynin’s only answer was that he had told me no missiles were in Cuba but that Khrushchev had also given similar assurances through TASS and as far as he (Dobrynin) knew, there were still no missiles in Cuba.

Dobrynin in the course of the conversation made several other points. The one he stressed was why the President did not tell Gromyko the facts on Thursday. He said this was something they could not understand and that if we had the information at the time why didn’t we tell Gromyko.

I answered this by making two points:

Number one, there wasn’t anything the President could tell Gromyko that Gromyko didn’t know already and after all, why didn’t Gromyko tell the President this instead of, in fact, denying it. I said in addition the President was so shocked at Gromyko’s presentation and his failure to recite these facts that he felt that any effort to have an intelligent and honest conversation would not be profitable.

Dobrynin went on to say that from his conversations with Gromyko he doesn’t believe Gromyko thought there were any missiles in Cuba. He said he was going to contact his government to find out about this matter.

I expressed surprise that after all that had appeared in the papers, and the President’s speech, that he had not had a communication on that question already.

Dobrynin seemed extremely concerned. When I left I asked him if ships were going to go through to Cuba. He replied that was their instructions last month and he assumed they had the same instructions at the present time. He also made the point that although we might have pictures, all we really knew about were the sites and not missiles and that there was a lot of difference between sites and the actual missile itself. I said I did not have to argue the point—there were missiles in Cuba—we knew that they were there and that I hoped he would inform himself also.

I left around 10:15 p.m. and went to the White House and gave a verbal report to the President.

54. Memorandum From the Acting Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Smith) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Washington, October 23, 1962. SUBJECT Soviet Challenge to the QuarantineAnother memorandum from Smith to McCone, October 23, estimating the effect on Cuba of a blockade covering all goods except food and medicines is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials, 10/1/62-11/12/62) Our best guess is that: A challenge at sea to the quarantine is unlikely, at least for a day or two. Thereafter a challenge is likely if the Soviets believe that their political efforts are not succeeding and a heightening of the crisis is required. In staging any challenge, they would probably employ a vessel with nonmilitary cargo, refuse boarding, and exploit the subsequent attack by the US. Retaliatory actions would follow if the incident itself failed to produce quick political results. It would be aimed either at a US ship elsewhere or at access to Berlin; we think the latter somewhat more likely. Today’s TASS statement suggests that the Soviets wish to retain full freedom of action while they consider their initial moves. There is some intelligence, dating from before the President’s speech, indicating that the Soviets had decided to run any US blockade which might be established. Nevertheless, we think it likely that, at least for a day or two, they will avoid a challenge at sea while they observe the results of their political efforts to get the quarantine lifted. If the USSR feels that these efforts are succeeding, the Soviets will probably continue to avoid challenges, lest an incident interrupt this favorable trend. On the other hand, if Soviet political tactics are bearing little fruit, they may judge that an incident would be useful as a means of heightening the crisis further and bringing extra international pressure on the US. If and when they decide to permit an incident of this sort, the Soviets would not allow the US to board a vessel, since this would mean acceptance in principle of quarantine. Instead, their tactics would probably be to choose a ship carrying a nonmilitary cargo and to allow it to be attacked. It is possible that the Soviets, in deciding to test the quarantine, would accompany their probe ship with a submarine which would counterattack the US vessel after the Soviet ship was struck. Or the counterattack might be made by an aircraft from Cuba. We think this unlikely, however, because the Soviets would almost certainly estimate that the US would respond by tightening the blockade and launching a full-scale effort to seek out and destroy a Soviet submarine in the area of quarantine operations. After an incident, the Soviets would probably allow a pause while they exploited this incident and observed its effects. Unless the US showed signs of quickly yielding, however, we believe that they would then follow with some form of retaliation. We do not believe that this would take the form of major military action. Instead, the Soviets would choose between an attack on a US ship elsewhere or a move on the access routes to Berlin, designed to remind the US of the vulnerability of its position there. In most circumstances, they probably would regard a Berlin move as both more effective and easier to control. Still, they would probably exercise care to avoid giving the impression that they were moving toward a general showdown with the US. The USSR might use a submarine, however, to deliver through the quarantine some particularly critical item and to demonstrate, with a subsequent announcement, its ability to frustrate US efforts. For the Board of National Estimates:Abbot Smith
55. Record of Action of the Third Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For Robert Kennedy’s recollections of the meeting, see Thirteen Days, pp. 67-71. Washington, October 24, 1962, 10 a.m.

Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence summarized the intelligence briefing. The President directed that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of Central Intelligence take immediate action to obtain more “black boxes.”

 Defense Operations The Secretary of Defense presented photographs of dispersal of existing U.S. planes in the southeast U.S., and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that modifications of readiness were being considered to permit improvement of the situation. The Secretary of Defense reported the plans for naval interception, noted the presence of a submarine near the more interesting ships, and warned that radio silence might be imposed. There was discussion of the problem of dealing with such submarines, and it was understood that in the event of intervention by a submarine in the process of interception the submarine might have to be destroyed. In the middle of the meeting there were reports that certain Soviet ships had appeared to have stopped or turned back, and the President directed that there be no interception of any target for at least another hour while clarifying information was sought. Dr. Wiesner presented an initial briefing on the communications situation and the President directed that most urgent action be taken by State, Defense and CIA to improve communications worldwide, but particularly in the Caribbean area. After the meeting, the President, in discussion with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, directed that special responsibilities should be assigned to designated individuals and a plan for this purpose will be presented for approval by State, Defense and White House officers at the next meeting of the Committee. The President directed that State and USIA should give immediate attention to increasing understanding in Europe of the fact that any Berlin crisis would be fundamentally the result of Soviet ambition and pressure, and that inaction by the United States in the face of the challenge in Cuba would have been more and not less dangerous for Berlin. The President directed that a senior representative of USIA should regularly be present at meetings of the Executive Committee.Following this meeting, the Nitze (Berlin-NATO) Subcommittee met at 11 a.m. to consider various aspects of the Cuban crisis that might affect Berlin. For a record of this meeting, see vol. XV, pp. 395–397. McGeorge Bundy
56. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in TurkeySource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2462. Secret; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ball, cleared with Tyler and NEA, approved by Rusk. Also sent to Paris for USRO. Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:24 a.m.

445. For Ambassadors Hare and Finletter from Secretary. Soviet reaction Cuban quarantine likely involve efforts compare missiles in Cuba with Jupiters in Turkey. While such comparison refutable, possible that negotiated solution for removal Cuban offensive threat may involve dismantling and removal Jupiters. Recognize this would create serious politico-military problems for US-Turkish relations and with regard to Turkey’s place in NATO Alliance. Therefore need prepare carefully for such contingency order not harm our relations with this important ally.

Urgently request Ambassador Hare’s assessment political consequences such removal under various assumptions, including outright removal, removal accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarine in area, or removal with some other significant military offset, such as seaborn multilateral nuclear force within NATO.

Ambassador Finletter also requested comment standpoint NATO aspect problem. Do not discuss with any foreigners.At 2:19 p.m. on October 24 the Department of State sent a similar telegram to Rome. (Telegram 865 to Rome; ibid.)

Rusk
57. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to President KennedySource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, WWRostow. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, October 24, 1962.

Representatives of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and Mr. Lovett, met to consider the course of action to be followed with respect to the Soviet vessels which have altered course (Group A), and those vessels still proceeding towards Cuba (Group B). With respect to Group A, it is recommended: That the Department of Defense intercept, trail, and photograph, but not interfere with, such vessels. The object is to record the fact of their turnaround and, to the extent possible, the character of their cargo.

With respect to Group B, it is recommended that: They be stopped and searched in accordance with the Proclamation; That the order to search be determined by the order of their operational availability to our forces; Should a vessel refuse to comply with orders to stop, we should proceed to execute the terms of the Proclamation with special attention to the minimum use of force, given the likelihood that their cargoes will prove innocent.

It is recommended that a Department of Defense spokesman announce that: Some of the Bloc vessels proceeding towards Cuba appear to have altered course; No intercepts have yet been necessary; Other vessels are proceeding towards Cuba and will be intercepted in accordance with the Proclamation.

On a background basis, it will be explained that those vessels which altered course were those we had reason to believe contained offensive weapons; but that inspection of other vessels is required, now and in the future, until offensive weapons and installations are removed from Cuba, because such vessels could contain essential components for offensive weapons.

W. W. R.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
58. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking appears on the source text. Washington, October 24, 1962, 3:25 p.m.

Bundy—Have you got the word in on what is happening at sea?

Ball—No.

Bundy—The six most interesting ships have turned back. Two others are turning on. We are starting over here a thinking session as to what might be done which will be going on all afternoon. If you want to come, it would be helpful to have you. Walt is here. If there is anyone you want to send, send him. I have told the Secretary and you are the only two I have told. Will you alert anyone else you wish to alert?

Ball—I will. The other ships are going forward?

Bundy—Two tankers are coming on, but six interesting ships have turned back; six may not be a precise figure. Khrushchev told Lord Russell he thought it would be useful to have a top level meeting.

Ball—I’ll be over.

59. Editorial Note

On October 24, 1962, Acting Secretary-General U Thant sent identical messages to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev appealing to them to refrain from “any action which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war.” He requested that each side take some time “to enable the parties concerned to get together with a view to resolving the present crisis peacefully and normalizing the situation in the Caribbean.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 422) Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 12, 1962, page 740.

On October 25 President Kennedy responded to the Secretary-General reiterating U.S. statements made in the Security Council and assuring U Thant of his desire to reach a satisfactory solution of the crisis. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, page 424) Chairman Khrushchev also wrote to U Thant on October 25 welcoming and agreeing with the Acting Secretary-General’s initiative. (Ibid., page 425)

U Thant responded to Chairman Khrushchev the same day requesting that Soviet ships en route to Cuba avoid the interception area imposed by the U.S. quarantine in order to allow time for discussion of an agreement under the U.N. Charter. In a letter to President Kennedy, also on October 25, U Thant appealed to him to issue instructions to U.S. ships in the Caribbean to “do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident” and expressed the hope that a settlement could be reached quickly. (Both ibid., pages 425-426)

60. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. A similar but briefer memorandum of a telephone conversation between Bundy and Ball at 8:05 p.m. is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba) Washington, October 24, 1962, 8:25 p.m.

Bundy—I am getting a little groggy, so many people have different views, but the current situation is this. Bob thinks that it may well be important to intercept a tanker and to turn him back. His own understanding was that that was his orders. I understand that there are complications. He is going to go down to Flag Plot and look hard and find out what he knows and what anyone knows about where these things will be. He agrees that we must not do this at night time. Therefore, the question is really what orders Admiral Innison (?) [Dennison] has for dawn, that they require Presidential action and a meeting of the Committee tonight. You had better argue with your Secretary.

Ball—Yes. Right.

Bundy—I understand that he is an anti-tanker interceptor. I think we have to leave the question of further discussion in suspense until McNamara has reviewed it and come in and said. If he comes in and says let’s let it go until the meeting tomorrow morning, which we might as well have at 10 as at 8, because we miss dawn in either case. If he comes in and says that, does the Department wish to say no, no, we want orders for interception at dawn?

Ball—I don’t think that we feel that strongly about that. My position is that since we are not singling out any special ships, then we ought to just take anything that comes on a completely nondiscriminatory basis, and not indulge any presumptions about what any particular kind of vessel might—

Bundy—I think that you will find that to do that requires a very distinct adjustment in the basic orders to the Navy. They are not operating on the basis of enforcing a blockade in that sense. They are enforcing a blockade with instructions from McNamara as to which ship to enforce it upon.

Ball—Adm. Ricker [Rickover?] felt that that was the easiest operational kind of—

Bundy—All I’m saying is is that means different orders from what they now have.

Ball—My own view, you may pick out certain ships as we were preparing to do, those ships are not now in the equation; therefore, the thing to do is to take anything that comes and I would feel happier if the first ship that came along was a Belgian or Moroccoan ship, so that we could establish the principle of what we are doing.

Bundy—Right.

Ball—If it happens to be a Soviet tanker, …

Bundy—Right.

Ball—I will probably hear later tonight from Bob after he has been out there and had a look.

Bundy—I would think that when Bob has had a look at Flag Plot, he will call me and I will call you.

Ball—Very good.

61. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Cuba. A copy of this letter, transmitted in telegram 1070 from Moscow, October 24, arrived in the Department of State at 9:24 p.m. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 304) Moscow, October 24, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: I have received your letter of October 23,See Document 52. have studied it, and am answering you.

Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us.

In presenting us with these conditions, you, Mr. President, have flung a challenge at us. Who asked you to do this? By what right did you do this? Our ties with the Republic of Cuba, like our relations with other states, regardless of what kind of states they may be, concern only the two countries between which these relations exist. And if we now speak of the quarantine to which your letter refers, a quarantine may be established, according to accepted international practice, only by agreement of states between themselves, and not by some third party. Quarantines exist, for example, on agricultural goods and products. But in this case the question is in no way one of quarantine, but rather of far more serious things, and you yourself understand this.

You, Mr. President, are not declaring a quarantine, but rather are setting forth an ultimatum and threatening that if we do not give in to your demands you will use force. Consider what you are saying! And you want to persuade me to agree to this! What would it mean to agree to these demands? It would mean guiding oneself in one’s relations with other countries not by reason, but by submitting to arbitrariness. You are no longer appealing to reason, but wish to intimidate us.

No, Mr. President, I cannot agree to this, and I think that in your own heart you recognize that I am correct. I am convinced that in my place you would act the same way.

Reference to the decision of the Organization of American States cannot in any way substantiate the demands now advanced by the United States. This Organization has absolutely no authority or basis for adopting decisions such as the one you speak of in your letter. Therefore, we do not recognize these decisions. International law exists and universally recognized norms of conduct exist. We firmly adhere to the principles of international law and observe strictly the norms which regulate navigation on the high seas, in international waters. We observe these norms and enjoy the rights recognized by all states.

You wish to compel us to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys, you are trying to legislate in questions of international law, and you are violating the universally accepted norms of that law. And you are doing all this not only out of hatred for the Cuban people and its government, but also because of considerations of the election campaign in the United States. What morality, what law can justify such an approach by the American Government to international affairs? No such morality or law can be found, because the actions of the United States with regard to Cuba constitute outright banditry or, if you like, the folly of degenerate imperialism. Unfortunately, such folly can bring grave suffering to the peoples of all countries, and to no lesser degree to the American people themselves, since the United States has completely lost its former isolation with the advent of modern types of armament.

Therefore, Mr. President, if you coolly weigh the situation which has developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the arbitrary demands of the United States. When you confront us with such conditions, try to put yourself in our place and consider how the United States would react to these conditions. I do not doubt that if someone attempted to dictate similar conditions to you—the United States—you would reject such an attempt. And we also say—no.

The Soviet Government considers that the violation of the freedom to use international waters and international air space is an act of aggression which pushes mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Therefore, the Soviet Government cannot instruct the captains of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba to observe the orders of American naval forces blockading that Island. Our instructions to Soviet mariners are to observe strictly the universally accepted norms of navigation in international waters and not to retreat one step from them. And if the American side violates these rules, it must realize what responsibility will rest upon it in that case. Naturally we will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on the high seas. We will then be forced on our part to take the measures we consider necessary and adequate in order to protect our rights. We have everything necessary to do so.

Respectfully,

N. KhrushchevPrinted from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.
62. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Confidential; Limited Distribution. The source text bears the notation “Bundy saw 11 p.m. 25 Oct.” New York, October 25, 1962, 8:40 p.m.

UNMIS 18. For Harriman—State; Forrestal—White House. From Schlesinger. Fol is text of memo I sent to Stevenson October 24: “Memorandum to Governor Stevenson.

I had a talk this evening with Averell Harriman. He made the following points: Khrushchev, he said, is sending us desperate signals to get us to help take him off the hook. He is sending messages exactly as he did to Eisenhower directly after the U-2 affair. Eisenhower ignored these messages to his cost. We must not repeat Eisenhower’s mistake. The signals are (1) the instructions to the Soviet ships to change their course; (2) the message to Bertrand Russell;For text of this letter, October 24, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962, pp. 421-422. (3) his obviously premeditated appearance last night at an American concert in Moscow and his subsequent visit with the American singer. In view of these signals from Khrushchev, the worst mistake we can possibly make is to get tougher and to escalate. Khrushchev is pleading with us to help him find a way out. The best way out is the resolution recommended by Cleveland as Tab C in his memorandum (the defanging resolution).Presumably a reference to Cleveland’s October 24 memorandum to Rusk and Ball. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438) See the Supplement. However, Harriman disagrees with Cleveland’s view that we should try to negotiate this resolution. He thinks we should try to get Ireland to introduce the resolution tomorrow. We cannot afford to lose any time. Incidents—stopping of ships, etc.—will begin the process of escalation, engage Soviet prestige and reduce the chances of a peaceful resolution. If we act shrewdly and speedily, we can bail Khrushchev out and discredit the tough guys around him—the ones who sold him the Cuban adventure on the theory that Americans were too liberal to fight.

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.

October 24, 1962”

63. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, October 24, 1962, 10:30 p.m.

Ball—The letter from KhrushchevDocument 61. is garbled, and I am trying to fill it in. As far as shipping goes, it is pretty repetitious. The significant part is the last paragraph. It says:Ball reads last paragraph. It simply says that the OAS has no authority in these matters; that one has to bide by international law; we are committing an act of piracy; if you were in his place you would take the same view. The significant part is the part I read to you. I don’t think we have any option but to go ahead and test this thing out, in the morning, but at least this is the notice he has given to us.

Pres.—Do you want to call up Bob McNamara because we have got the tanker we talked about stopping.

Ball—I’ll talk to Bob about it and I will also get hold of Dean and maybe we had better get back to you.A memorandum of Ball’s telephone conversation with McNamara at 10:40 p.m. is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba)

Pres.—I will be around.

Ball—The second thing is this. U Thant has just gotten through speaking, and I am waiting for a call from Stevenson. Stevenson is kicking like a steer about reply tonight, but I think we have to reply tonight.

Pres.—He doesn’t want to reply tonight?

Ball—He is concerned primarily about the conditions which we put in that proposed reply because he feels that those are in effect conditions to talking rather than the kind of conditions that might emerge out of talk. My own feeling is that we have got to be quite specific about them, otherwise we will get ourselves in a hopeless harass, and I don’t think we can afford to do it at this point.

Pres.—How does he want us to change it?

Ball—I think he would like to suggest some concessions we are prepared to make. I am waiting for a call from him. If it is agreeable to you, I am going to take a very firm line that we have to get this thing back to U Thant tonight even though it isn’t published because I think we ought to be very prompt in getting some reply back before the Soviet Union comes in with an acceptance of the U Thant proposal. I may not be able to hold the line with him and he may insist on talking with you. I think we have got to go ahead.

Pres.—They are obviously not going to stop. He is stopping the ones he doesn’t want us to have. I suppose we will have to stop these. The press will give the impression that we are easing the situation.

Ball—That is inevitable. I have told them that there was no decision not to stop tankers, but only the fact that the initial version does not include POL. They are confused on this. I think we have worked it out so that story will be all right.

Pres.—I think the impression tonight seems to be that the Russians are giving way, which is not quite accurate. They want to believe that it is giving way. I think that, after you talk to McNamara and the Sec., they ought to have either State and Defense put out the indication that Russian ships are approaching.

Ball—I’ll do that. Maybe I can persuade Adlai, if not he may insist on talking to you. In the meantime, I will get hold of Bob and Dean, and we may have to get back to you.

64. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:15 p.m.

Pres.—To be sure that the Russians.At 10:45 the President had called Ball and stated that he had just had Khrushchev’s letter (Document 61) read to him. A memorandum of this telephone conversation, which also deals with stopping a tanker, is ibid. See the Supplement. Of course we didn’t present them with a way out. I don’t know whether U Thant has presented them with a way out, whether they are interested in a way out. I suppose there may be a slim chance they may be, we ought to give out a message in a way that gives them enough of an out to stop their shipments without looking like they completely crawled down.

Ball—We could try something along that line.

Pres.—In other words just say that we suggest the Russians suspend their shipping, until we have a chance to meet with them. Just say otherwise, they have got, we can’t withdraw shipping, we can’t stop. It may be that is the way he wants it. There is not much time.

Ball—This is what the letter said, that you said last night,Document 52. because what you said last night was that you hoped that he would not challenge, direct his captains not to challenge the blockade, and that we were talking about these letters in the Security Council. It would be the same idea.

Pres.—I don’t know if there is any way for a binding concentration. The time is so short. When we talk about a barrier, we talk about 500 miles, we can always take it at 300 miles if you have to. We can take it late in the afternoon, the question would be if there is any message we would send to U Thant to give them a way out.

Ball—What we might do, we might get up a draft of something tonight. Let me just read you what we sent him last night, what you sent him last night. Ball reads the letter. He had this in front of him when he, this looks as if he wrote it himself, saying in effect, talking about it in the Security Council … . This is a letter coming back and saying that he can’t do it.

Pres.—The only thing it seems to me would be to U Thant. I don’t think there is anything we can say to him that will cause him to change. We are saying not to send them and he is going to send them. Whether U Thant gives him a way out or not, I don’t know.

Ball—I just have been talking to Stevenson and the trouble with the U Thant proposal is that there is no inspection or verification in it at all. Stevenson said that he thinks that if we were to accept the principle of some preliminary conversation, in the course of the conversation we could insist upon some kind of verification about when you have to point into the UN; I would not have too much confidence in him or boarding parties in the UN getting on ships and that would give us protection while we were trying to work something out. That is going to take 2 or 3 days to do.

Pres.—He is going to hold up his ships during that 2 or 3 days.

Ball—What we could say is that if you will hold up your ships during the 2 or 3 days, we would have some preliminary talks in the UN to see to if there is some solution.

Pres.—I think rather than direct a message to him, we should get ourselves back to U Thant and say that he can request the Soviet Union to hold up their shipping for the next, for the immediate area, that we would be glad to get into conversations about how the situation could be adjusted.

Ball—If we were to say to the Sov. Union, it appears that a confrontation is about to take place,

Pres.—And to hold their ships, while we meet with him tomorrow afternoon. Probably that is about all we can do. Otherwise we just have to go with this thing. In that case, we could pick up this tanker tomorrow afternoon, instead of tomorrow morning.

Ball—Yep. I will talk to Bob, Dean and Adlai and get back to you.

65. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, October 24, 1962, 11:25 p.m.

Ball—The President called me again and we’ve been talking about what we might do about getting some kind of a message to K [Khrushchev]. The Pres. had the idea that maybe we ought to do with U Thant tonight instead of trying to get a message back to K because there isn’t much we can say that we didn’t say in that message he sent last night. Try to get U Thant to make a direct appeal to Mr. K to hold off his ships on the ground that there is going to be a confrontation in the morning which could escalate until there is a chance for a discussion on the modalities of negotiation. The Pres. is very reluctant to face this thing particularly with a tanker involved tomorrow until we make one last try to see if the UN can get itself in between.

Secretary—I must say that I don’t think a tanker is the best case.

Ball—It isn’t the best case. I talked to McNamara and what he said they had in mind with regard to the tanker was simply to hail it and ask it what it is carrying, where it was going, and if it answered satisfactory to let it go, not to board it. In fact the Commander has no instructions to do more than that. If it goes on through, then we have lost the principle of the quarantine, having done that. On the other hand, we could let this one go but then there will probably be a whole day without stopping a ship, and I am afraid this would be misinterpreted in Moscow, particularly in the light of this letter. The President’s idea, this was a kind of an idea we were developing together was possibly if we could get Thant tonight to make the appeal on the ground that there was going to be a likelihood of a confrontation and ask K to instruct his fellows to talk with ours and see if a negotiation could be gotten under way. In the meantime, to hold his ships away from Cuba that something might be done.

Sec.—I don’t think there is a chance in the world that K would get instructions to this tanker by 2 am.

Ball—In the meantime, we could hold off til, actually we could even change the thing for half a day as far as that goes. We could outrun the tanker.

Sec.—I should think that we ought to wait til daylight anyhow.

Ball—Well, we are going to wait til daylight as I understood it.

Sec.—I think you might talk to Adlai about this and see if U Thant on his own responsibility will ask Mr. K not to send his ships pending modalities.

Ball—Let me see what we can do.

Sec.—All right, fine. What about the answer?

Ball—If we did that, I suppose we wouldn’t answer.

Sec.—Hold off until in the morning?

Ball—Yes. There really isn’t anything much that we can say that hasn’t been said. If we can now get Thant to do something rather than doing it ourselves.

Sec.—Right.

Ball—Let me see what I can work out when I talk to Stevenson.

66. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington;Stevenson was in New York. October 24, 1962, 11:45 p.m.

Ball—We’ve got another idea that I would like to try out on you. Do you think there is any chance that U Thant would be willing to send Mr. K a [letter?]. Let me bring you up to date. We’ve had a message from KDocument 61. in which he says in effect that he can’t give instructions to his ships to abide by the blockade and that if we violate these rules, that will be our fault and they will be forced to take measures that they deem necessary and adequate to protect their rights, and they have what’s necessary to do that. Implications being knowing that there may be a submarine or two in the waters, that could be an attempt to torpedo one of our ships. Would U Thant under all the circumstances knowing the possibility of a confrontation tomorrow be prepared to send a message to K along the lines that he is very concerned about possibility of a confrontation in connection with this quarantine, and that he asked K to hold his ships away from Cuban waters on the condition that we will not molest them while there is a discussion of the modalities of a possible negotiation.

Stevenson—Yes, I think he might do something like this.

Ball—If we could get something out like that tonight, I think we would hold off, because all we’ve got is a tanker coming through. We’ve just given instructions not to touch the thing tonight. We can buy a day or two here and see how it goes.

Stevenson—I think it would be a lot more helpful for me in trying to get U Thant to do this if I could have a copy of the message that we have from K.

Ball—I can give you. It’s a garbled message, and it hasn’t been cleaned up yet.

Stevenson—Well, if you could put on the wire to me, so that I would have it first thing in the morning a substantial text of it.

Ball—I think it would have to be done tonight if we’re going to do it because we’ve got a time dislocation and things are moving so swiftly. Is there a chance of getting hold of Thant tonight.

Stevenson—He’s awful hard to get when he goes home. I am afraid it will be almost impossible to do anything with him tonight.

Ball—If you could even talk to him tonight.

Stevenson—I could talk to him on the phone and tell him what the burden of this thing is and that I’m going to be around in the morning with a suggestion that he send a message to K saying that he. I don’t know whether he should say that he has this word.

Ball—I don’t think he needs to say that he has any word.

Stevenson—See, what he’s already said is please hold off on everything.

Ball—What he can say is that he is disturbed about the possibility of a confrontation at sea under the quarantine before further action could be taken toward trying to get this into political channels and he would therefore like an agreement from K that he will hold his ships off on the condition, away from Cuban waters, we won’t molest them while the discussion of modalities goes forward.

Stevenson—He says that all concerned should refrain from any actions which may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war. He will say, well I’ve already said that.

Ball—Yes, but this is giving specific content to it in terms of what the real danger, an immediate confrontation, may be.

Stevenson—I think if he had some feeling that we were likely to present this thing in general subject or conditions, which he knows about, I think maybe he would send such a message.

Ball—This position, I don’t want to misrepresent the President on it, but this position that I have from him is that we could hold off for a while while there is some discussions on the modalities of the thing if they will hold their ships away while we do that.

Stevenson—As I understand it, are there any ships nearby?

Ball—There is a ship which was going to be challenged at 2 o’clock tomorrow morning, which is just about 2-1/2 hours from now. We have got that held off.

Stevenson—That was a tanker?

Ball—Yes, and we can continue to hold that one off until we can see if something like this would work.

Stevenson—Would we stop it anyway?

Ball—Yes, we were going to stop it.

Stevenson—Although it was not carrying—

Ball—That is on the theory that we stop everything and challenge it and find out what’s on board.

Stevenson—Let me call him. I think he may have trouble getting this message off tonight.

Ball—You know, there is a little flexibility in this because we are challenging these ships 5 hundred miles out; we could outrun most of them and we could challenge them 200 miles out if necessary.

Stevenson—What’s next … .

Ball—I’m not very clear just what comes how soon. But we could adjust that. We don’t want to let ships go through because this discredits our firmness of attention. What I think, if we could get an agreement from the Russians to hold their ships off while we talk about this, the modalities.

Stevenson—For a couple of days?

Ball—Yes, I think it would be that long probably before we get something settled. We won’t take any action as long as their ships are held off, that way we avoid a confrontation until we can see if we can get the modalities with negotiation.

Stevenson—He has diverted the armed ships?

Ball—Yes.

Stevenson—Let me call him and see what I get.

67. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, October 25, 1962, 12:30 a.m.

Bundy—We have now written, and everybody but you have signed off on it, and I hope you won’t object, a message to the ChairmanSee Document 68. telling him it’s your fault and not ours on the basic ground that they misled us—the thing that we think we ought to get back into his chest—. The word of the Soviet Government is what caused the trouble. David Cline [Klein] is arranging to send it out. Do you want to hear it?

Ball—I would like to hear it. I’ll tell you about my conversation with Stevenson.A memorandum of Ball’s conversation with Stevenson at 12:20 a.m. is in Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. See the Supplement.

Bundy—How did it go?

Ball—With Stevenson?

Bundy—Yes, mine is in the typewriter.

Ball—The situation with Stevenson is that he finally got Thant out of bed and Thant has agreed to send a message to K which he probably can’t do tonight because of the communications but will do it first thing in the morning.

Bundy—Why don’t we offer him some communications?

Ball—I think it is probably a matter of his composing it.

Bundy—Nothing is going to happen tonight.

Ball—He says that first thing in the morning he will send the message to K saying that he, pending some consideration of his proposal, he would hope that K will keep his ships away and prevent a confrontation because he thinks there is a chance the Americans are prepared to discuss the modalities of a negotiation.

Bundy—Does that pin us to anything?

Ball—I raised this with Stevenson and in the first place this is not a public thing, this is a private—

Bundy—It will be public soon enough.

Ball—He doesn’t.

Bundy—U Thant is on and we are not on on this?

Ball—That’s it.

Bundy—Stevenson may go down the drain.

Ball—He just gives his impression. I think it’s worth a play.

Bundy—It’s worth a try.

Ball—I asked Stevenson to try to get the thing from him in the morning and shoot it down to us as soon as he can. I think I would have put it up in tougher terms, but that’s the way it went.

Bundy—Yes, I think the main thing is that Adlai should know what he has sent in the morning.

Ball—I asked him to get it from Thant first thing and let us know, and he said he would and I hope Thant doesn’t give too much of an impression of our willingness, but in any event it’s just Thant giving an impression.

Bundy—Bundy reads reply to K.

Ball—There is only one very minor point, but I think it might be a major one. That is we use these offensive weapons; actually, my understanding in the conversation with Gromyko, that Gromyko was explicit that they had no weapons that could reach the US.

Bundy—He didn’t say it that way.

Ball—I got this from the Secretary.

Bundy—He didn’t say it. At least it did not appear in any transcript we had.

Ball—This may have been given by Dobrynin.

Bundy—It is true that Dobrynin has said things. I think this language is more precise in the case than we can document to the Chairman.

Ball—Well, of course his answer will be that they are not offensive.

Bundy—Well, he never said that actually.

Ball—Well, except that this was the implication of what was said by—

Bundy—Then change it to “such as long range nuclear missiles.”

Ball—Yes, I think we can do that. It takes it out of that dialectical argument as to what’s offensive and what isn’t.

Bundy—“Such weapons as long range nuclear missiles.”

Ball—Yes.

Bundy—That doesn’t let us off the bombers. “Such weapons as (we don’t want quite long range) nuclear missiles?”

Ball—I think that would be all right.

Bundy—“Of considerable range?” I don’t know George; I have cleared it with everybody else; I think we had better leave it as it is. The point is clear enough.

Ball—Yes. We will deliver that tonight then.

Bundy—It’ll be along. Klein is handling that.

Ball—The only thing that concerns me about the Stevenson thing is that he has probably given the impression to U Thant that we will go further than we will go. That’s what worries me.

Bundy—I don’t know how to advise you on that other than to say that we probably will not go further than we will go.

Ball—If it indicates a weakness in relation to K that will create another element of miscalculation.

Bundy—If he will hold off his ships, then the Americans are interested in the modalities?

Ball—Yes.

Bundy—Has Stevenson showed him our answer?

Ball—No. That is reserved for tomorrow morning.

Bundy—It would seem to me that you should say to Adlai that nothing in, from the point of view of us in Washington, any message to K should be inconsistent with that message.

Ball—I think I will get hold of Adlai first thing in the morning and let him go over and talk to Thant.

Bundy—If Adlai knows early in the morning that he must not sign the US to anything that would make that letter impossible without checking back with us.

Ball—I think that’s the way to leave it.

Bundy—Right.

68. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet UnionSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Confidential; Eyes Only. Drafted at the White House. A note on the source text indicates it was relayed to McNamara, Lemnitzer, CIA, and Departments of the Treasury and Justice. Washington, October 25, 1962, 1:59 a.m.

997. Ref:Embtel 1070.See the source note, Document 61. Signed original following message from President to Khrushchev delivered to Soviet Embassy 1:45 a.m. Washington time October 25. Please deliver to highest ranking Soviet official immediately available.

October 25, 1962

“Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received your letter of October 24, and I regret very much that you still do not appear to understand what it is that has moved us in this matter.

The sequence of events is clear. In August there were reports of important shipments of military equipment and technicians from the Soviet Union to Cuba. In early September I indicated very plainly that the United States would regard any shipment of offensive weapons as presenting the gravest issues. After that time, this Government received the most explicit assurance from your Government and its representatives, both publicly and privately, that no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba. If you will review the statement issued by TASS in September, you will see how clearly this assurance was given.

In reliance on these solemn assurances I urged restraint upon those in this country who were urging action in this matter at that time. And then I learned beyond doubt what you have not denied—namely, that all these public assurances were false and that your military people had set out recently to establish a set of missile bases in Cuba. I ask you to recognize clearly, Mr. Chairman, that it was not I who issued the first challenge in this case, and that in the light of this record these activities in Cuba required the responses I have announced.

I repeat my regret that these events should cause a deterioration in our relations. I hope that your Government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation.

Sincerely yours, John F. Kennedy”

Please report time delivery.

Rusk
69. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received in New York at 3:01 a.m. Washington, October 25, 1962, 2 a.m.

1084. Deliver to Ambassador Stevenson personally 8:30 am.

On further checking with White House believe it important that you follow up first thing Thursday morningOctober 25. on suggestion you made to Secretary General late Wednesday night to make sure his message to Khrushchev reflects following general line: Concern that Soviet vessels may be under instructions to challenge quarantine and thus bring on a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and Western hemisphere ships which could lead to escalation of violence. Concern that such confrontation would destroy possibility of talks such as Secretary General has suggested as prelude to political settlement. Hope that Khrushchev will hold his ships out of interception area for limited time in order to permit discussions of modalities of agreement. Confidence, on basis that Soviet ships are not proceeding to Cuba, that United States will avoid direct confrontation with them during same period in order to minimize chances of untoward incidence.

FYI: While we are quite ready to begin conversations on modalities as suggested by SYG we should not give SYG impression nor encourage him to give Khrushchev impression that we can agree on any interim arrangement for uninspected moratorium or “voluntary suspension” without explicit provision for adequate UN observation to ensure against weapons being imported, work on sites continued, or offensive weapons being operational. In other words White House feels it undesirable to give any impression to SYG that would be inconsistent with draft answer to SYG’s proposal that was cleared by President and sent you Wednesday night.

Rusk
70. Memorandum for the FilesSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. Also reproduced in part in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 305-307. For Bundy’s account of this meeting, see Document 71. Washington, October 25, 1962. SUBJECT Executive Committee Meeting 10/25/62—10:00 a.m. All Members present

McCone reported on intelligence, reviewing summary of 25 October, including penciled memorandums as indicated, plus Cline memorandum of 25 October on talks with Sir Kenneth Strong, and the Watch Report of same date.A summary of the briefing paper, SC No. 08179/62, October 25 (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5), is included in the Supplement. The other documents have not been identified further.

I called special attention to the Belovodsk and reported on page II-5 and the searching of the Cubana airplane by Canadians as reported on page IV-2. Also the shipping schedule.

McNamara reported that at 7:00 o’clock a destroyer intercepted the tanker Bucharest which responded destination was Havana, cargo was petroleum and the Bucharest was permitted to proceed under surveillance. He stated that no United States Navy ships had orders to board. He recommended orders be issued to immediately board Bloc ships and then the Bucharest be boarded. Decision was reached that Navy be instructed to board the next Soviet ship contacted which would be the Graznyy, a tanker, but which was carrying a deck load which might be missile field tanks. Later in the meeting decision was reached not to board the Bucharest. Contact was to be made with the Graznyy as early as possible and that was estimated to be about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, Friday, October 26th.

McNamara recommended several recurring low-level surveillance strikes of multiple aircraft in an operation that would resemble an air strike. [6½ lines of source text not declassified] It was the Secretary’s opinion that since all of these were indicators of some indecision on the part of the Soviets, that we should pursue low-level surveillance in the interests of gathering intelligence, simulating air attack, demonstrating our intention to watch construction, familiarizing ourselves with camouflage and to determine whether the Soviets are building additional sites. This recommendation was approved and 8 sorties were ordered immediately to cover the nine missile sites, the IL 28 site, the MIG 21 airfield, and the nuclear storage sites and the KOMAR missile ship sites. It was decided this reconnaissance should not be announced but, if questioned, we should refer to the President’s statement.

McCone then noted the number of ships in the Eastern Atlantic and in the Baltic and Mediterranean which had turned back. Dillon asked about ships in the Pacific. The President asked whether Soviet ships bound elsewhere than Cuba had changed course. McCone said he would report on this in the afternoon.

There was a further discussion of the policy of stopping or hailing non-Bloc ships. It was decided that all ships must be hailed.

Rusk raised the question of discussions with the United Nations. Draft of U.S. reply to the U Thant letter was approved with modifications. It was agreed at the meeting that we must insist upon the removal of missiles from Cuba in addition to demands that construction be stopped and that UN inspectors be permitted at once.

Bundy reviewed Khrushchev letter to the President of the 24th of October and the Kennedy reply.Documents 61 and 68. McNamara raised the question of accelerating or raising the escalation of the actions we have so far taken, expressing concern over the plateau, indicating determination to meet our ultimate objective of taking out the missile sites.

Rusk then asked certain actions on the part of CIA as follows: (1) An answer to questions of the effect on Cuba because ships were turned about as indicated in recent reports; (2) What had happened to Soviet ships which were bound elsewhere than Cuba; (3) The general Cuban reaction to our actions to date: Do they know about Soviet missiles? Have they heard the President’s speech? What is the morale in Cuba?

McCone promised answers.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
71. Record of Action of the Fourth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. For McCone’s account of this meeting, see Document 70. Washington, October 25, 1962. Mr. McCone presented the intelligence briefing. The President requested Mr. McCone to prepare a careful analysis of the present situation inside Cuba, and he asked for further consideration by USIA of the possibility of dropping propaganda leaflets. The Secretary of Defense reported the current military situation, and on the President’s direction instructions were issued for selective investigation and boarding of non-bloc ships, excluding tankers. The Secretary reported that all armed forces in Cuba have been instructed to fire only in response to attack. Many installations are so camouflaged as to be in a low state of readiness. The Secretary recommended a program of low-level reconnaissance for the purpose of improving intelligence, camouflaging the possibility of a later low-level attack, and emphasizing our concern with offensive installations already in Cuba. The President approved an immediate daylight mission of 8 low-level reconnaissance aircraft to cover missile sites, airfields holding IL28’s and MIG’s, KOMAR navalvessels, coastal installations, nuclear storage sites, and selected SAM sites. The President directed that the tanker Bucharest not be intercepted for the present. Her status as a tanker with no contraband cargo made it desirable to allow her to proceed. He directed further that the Defense Department be prepared to make an intercept of an appropriate bloc ship on Friday in daylight. The President approved a version of an answer to U Thant, but in later discussion a revised version was worked out between New York and Washington and approved by the President at 1:15 p.m.For text of this letter and the letter from U Thant, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 422 and 424. There was preliminary discussion of alternative courses of action in the immediate future, and the President asked the other members of the Committee to make appropriate arrangements for preparing alternative courses of action for discussion with him at a later meeting. The President approved the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense that missile fuel be added to the list of contraband goods under the Proclamation of Interdiction.Following this meeting of the Executive Committee both the Nitze and Rostow subcommittees met to continue their work. Records of these meetings are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Germany, Berlin; and ibid., Cuba, General Planning Subcommittee, respectively. See the Supplement. McGeorge Bundy
72. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource:USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Stevenson and Sisco. New York, October 25, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

1459. Subject:SC on Cuba.

I saw U Thant this morning and conveyed to him suggestions contained in Deptel 1084 (USUN 4963).Document 69. He said he would transmit suggestions to Khrushchev in form of confidential message.For text of U Thant’s letter to Khrushchev, October 25, see American Foreign Policy, Current Documents, 1962, p. 425. He would also send President Kennedy note reporting his message to Khrushchev and asking that US exercise restraint in circumstances.

Thant told me Zorin asked him at 7:30 last night what Thant appeal in Council was going to say. Thant replied that it was based on his appeal to Khrushchev and Kennedy. Zorin said he had not received it. After Thant explained to Zorin nature of his appeal, Zorin replied that it was very bad proposal, since blockade was wholly illegal and that Thant should be concerned with legality and should not equate lifting quarantine with stopping ships going to Cuba. Thant replied he was not concerned with legality, but with averting a crisis.

Thant told me that Afro-Asians were putting great pressure on Zorin to accept, but that on basis of Zorin’s preliminary reaction Thant expects negative reply. Thant anticipates long legal attack on the quarantine.

If both sides accept his suspension proposal this afternoon, he thinks SC should recess pending discussion on modalities. Parties should then report what agreement they have reached on modalities and thereafter substantive negotiations could take place without another Council meeting.

Stevenson
73. Summary Record of the Fifth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 1-5. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone’s 3-paragraph summary of this meeting is in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, and reproduced in CIA Documentson the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 309. Washington, October 25, 1962, 5 p.m.

Director McCone gave an intelligence briefing which contained no major new information. He listed fifteen ships en route to Cuba, among them the Graznyy, which is one of three oil tankers with deck tanks probably containing ammonia.

Mr. McCone noted that a Bloc ship would be entering the Panama Canal on November 2. It would be searched, as have Bloc ships transiting the Canal during the past seven years.

Mr. McCone said he had no information of any unusual developments in Europe.

Secretary Dillon noted that there had been a run on gold in Germany and to a lesser extent in London. His conclusion was that these gold purchases reflected the fear of the buyers.

Secretary McNamara said that the East German passenger ship Voelker Fruendschaft was at the Cuban barrier. It is a fairly large ship, 525 feet long, and has been ordered to report its position every four hours. He said we faced a decision as to whether or not to stop it.

Secretary McNamara reported that the Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded had turned back before crossing the barrier. Late information on the Graznyy revealed that it was lying dead in the water. The result is that to date no ship has yet been boarded.

Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the question was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of success in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New York was furious about U Thant’s proposals for U.S./USSR talks under UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such talks.See Document 59. Our position would be that during these next two days of preliminary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us means they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us.

Referring to possible UN action, Secretary Rusk said we would probably be able to get only a seven-to-two vote in the Security Council,The U.N. Security Council had resumed discussion of the Cuban crisis at 4 p.m. on October 25. For a verbatim record of the discussion, see U.N. doc. S/PV. 1025. but even so, action in the UN General Assembly was a possibility. He specifically mentioned one possibility, i.e. Latin American States proposing a nuclear-free zone in Latin America. He thought that many Latin American States would support this zone, along with many other UN members, and the Soviets would have a difficult time opposing it.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the relationship between our quarantine and Soviet-Cuban relations. The Cubans, who would not be able to survive in political isolation, must henceforth rely entirely on the Soviets. He suggested that we might ask the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana to tell Castro that there was little for Cuba in being tied permanently to the Soviet Union. An appeal might be made to Castro to step aside so that a new government might break this complete dependence from here on out on the Soviet Union.

Secretary Rusk explained the nature of the preliminary talks which are to be held in New York in the next two or three days between U Thant and Zorin on one side and Stevenson and U Thant on the other. The purpose of these talks is to arrive at a solution of the crisis or, if no solution is possible, to provide a basis for later action, having been unable to negotiate a settlement. He said that these talks could not go on for two weeks, but must be limited to a very few days because the IRBM sites in Cuba are becoming operational and the IL-28 bombers will soon be able to fly.

Secretary McNamara said all of his actions were taken with a view to applying force gradually. The ten air reconnaissance missions flown today went well and he recommended that ten more missions be flown tomorrow. Other military actions being taken would be meaningful to the Russians but would still not force escalation.

Secretary McNamara described night reconnaissance flights which involve dropping flares—[6 lines of source text not declassified] The Soviet missiles now have an eight-hour countdown. Low-level reconnaissance could give us intelligence as to whether the Soviet missiles are being placed in position to reduce the length of the countdown.

Secretary Dillon noted that the urgency of the situation was considerably reduced if the Russians do not try to break the quarantine.

Secretary McNamara expressed his concern that if the New York talks go along very long, a kind of plateau will have been reached which would make the decision to take new actions very difficult.

Secretary Rusk summarized the political track as follows. We might get a unanimous vote in the OAS for our actions. We could expect a veto from the Russians in the Security Council. If the U Thant proposals were rejected, we could go to the General Assembly where as many as eighty States might support a Latin American denuclearization proposal. He was not ready to knock out the possibility of a political solution.

Secretary McNamara said there were many ways of increasing pressure on the Russians by military measures, i.e. quarantine, inspection at sea, surveillance, the addition of jet fuel to the list of products embargoes, and the holding of all petroleum tankers.

The Attorney General noted that if all Bloc cargo ships turn back rather than cross the quarantine barrier, we might let Soviet tankers through in order to avoid an incident at sea during the discussions in New York. He said we might decide that it was better to knock out the missiles by air attack than to stop a Soviet ship on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we might buy the charter and cargo of tramp steamers going to Cuba. We could pay either the captain or the owner of the ship whatever he asks to defect with his ship. Such action would step up pressure on the Cubans without further use of military force.

Director McCone agreed that such action would be effective because it would greatly reduce imports into Cuba and also take away from the Cubans their outgoing cargoes.

Secretary McNamara suggested that we might consider harassing all ships heading for Cuba by requiring that they go into U.S. ports for inspection, which could take up to several weeks. The purpose would be to throttle imports by Cuba.

In a discussion of other military measures, Mr. Rostow said any reconnaissance flights would have a beneficial effect on developments in New York.

Secretary McNamara commented that the dropping of flares on the IRBM sites at night would be highly effective. General Taylor thought that the psychological effect of night reconnaissance would be entirely favorable as well as serving to keep up the pressure and providing more information about the readiness status of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk said that he would seek to define our future political moves later in the evening.

Secretary Dillon stated his support of the idea of a Latin American denuclearized zone.

The Attorney General repeated his question as to whether we really wanted to stop a Soviet ship. He said he believed the Soviets had turned their ships around because they did not want us to see what was on them. The tankers, however, continue to move toward Cuba because they have nothing but petroleum. He said he felt that the measures we take should indicate clearly that we mean business but we should avoid a direct confrontation now.

Secretary McNamara said we should decide tonight to take measures tonight which would put us in a position of being ready to board Bloc ships approaching the barrier. We could let Soviet tankers through the quarantine and announce later we were putting an embargo on aviation gasoline. If we were going to board the East German ship we would have to decide tonight.

Both General Taylor and Secretary Dillon pointed out that we could not permit Soviet technicians to go through the quarantine even though technicians are not on the embargo list.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the East German ship not be stopped because it might be necessary for us to shoot at it or to ram it. There would be great danger to the some 1500 passengers aboard. The current situation is that the ship has been hailed and a U.S. destroyer is following it. If we ask it to stop and it does not, then we would have to use force. If in so doing we injure passengers and then discover there are no strategic missiles aboard, we would be in a very difficult situation. In addition, our world position would appear weak if we allow Soviet ships through the quarantine but stop an East German ship. The Voelker Freundschaft will make a landfall tomorrow and a decision must be made by 2:00 AM this morning if we want to stop it outside Cuban territorial waters.

At this point the President entered the Cabinet Room.

Secretary McNamara reviewed the situation with respect to the Voelker Freundschaft. He said the East German ship had left Rostov on October 11 and Leningrad on October 14. [2 lines of source text not declassified] The destroyer Pierce is following the ship which is still outside the barrier. Secretary McNamara recommended that we not stop this ship.

The President referred to the message from U Thant asking us to avoid incidents pending the talks at New York.See Document 59.

Mr. Bundy said the East German ship was not covered by U Thant’s message.

General Taylor and Director McCone asked Mr. McNamara [5 lines of source text not declassified]

The President said the only argument against stopping the ship is U Thant’s request for no incidents for the time being. He said that we would have to drop the other shoe soon.

Secretary McNamara repeated his earlier statement with respect to the difficulty of stopping a passenger ship. He preferred to stop the Graznyy tomorrow if Khrushchev did not accept U Thant’s proposed mediation effort.

The Attorney General said he wished to describe again the other side of the argument. He said we could let the tanker through the barrier. As of now no other ships were approaching the barrier. Surveillance measures could be taken to keep the pressure on the Russians and provide time for the political measures suggested by Secretary Rusk without appearing to be backing off from a confrontation. He repeated his view that we may decide that it is better to avoid confronting the Russians by stopping one of their ships and to react by attacking the missiles already in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he preferred that the confrontation take place in Cuba rather than on the high seas.

Secretary Rusk noted that the quarantine had become fully effective.

Secretary McNamara reported that there had been no response yesterday or today to our low-level reconnaissance flights. He recommended that we continue to fly daylight reconnaissance missions and add night reconnaissance not only to gain information, but also to convince the public that we are increasing the pressure on the Russians.

The President decided that we should not stop the East German ship. Tomorrow we will know the Soviet response to U Thant’s proposal. We will let the tanker through the barrier and later add jet fuel to the list of products embargoed.

The Attorney General said that fifteen ships have turned back, which is an impressive action taken by the Russians. We must be careful that the Russians do not think that we are backing down.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the importance of the first case of our boarding a ship. If the ship carried deck cargo or dry cargo, the case would be different than a passenger ship which is a bad first case.

Mr. Rostow stated the argument for adding petroleum products to the blockade which he said would have a drastic effect on the Cuban economy.

The President again said we should let the East German passenger ship go through and we should seek to avoid any incident in order not to create a bad effect on U Thant’s negotiations. We could decide tomorrow afternoon what more we should do after we know Khrushchev’s reply to U Thant. He said we must act soon because work on the missile sites is still going on and we must back up very soon the firmness we have displayed up to now.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that we must react very soon to Khrushchev’s strong letter.Document 61.

Secretary Rusk noted that Bloc shipping worldwide was behaving normally except for the ships in Cuban trade.

As the meeting concluded, Mr. McCone reported that some of the strategic missiles deployed in Cuba are now operational.

The President had before him at the meeting a folder containing drafts of alternative next major moves (copy attached).Not found attached. Apparent reference to three papers entitled “Political Path,” October 25 (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Political Actions), “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba,” undated (ibid., Air Strike—Cuba), and a paper on the Progressive Economic Blockage. The first two papers are in the Supplement. An earlier version of “Possible Courses of Action,” undated, includes a section on the blockade. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Historical, Cuba, October 1962) See the Supplement.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
74. Record of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacmillanSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. For Macmillan’s account of this conversation, see At the End of the Day, pp. 205-208. October 25, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

President: Prime Minister, how did you do with your debate?

PM: We did very well, actually very good, very good. I sent you the text of what I said, and I think it was very well accepted. I made all the points I could, especially the one you gave me about your statement of September 11, and the reception was good—and that was very well received.

President: We’ve got a second message from U ThantSee Document 59. which you may be familiar with which says that … asks Khrushchev to keep the ships out of there and asks us to avoid a confrontation. Now we are inclined to—we are sending back a message that if he keeps his ships out of there of course we will avoid a confrontation. As you know, today we figure now 14 ships turned around. They were probably the ones with the aggressive cargo. One tanker we stopped; we asked where it was going; it said it was coming from the Black Sea to Cuba and the cargo was oil. It was obviously a tanker and we passed that. We have tomorrow 2 or 3 vessels that—including particularly an East German vessel which has probably 600 or 700 passengers. It stopped in Leningrad on its way and it may have 6,000 tons of cargo on it, so we are going to have to stop that, we think. That’s what we are now discussing. Now we’ve got two tracks running. One is that one of these ships—these selected ships—which Khrushchev continues to have come toward Cuba—on the other hand, we have U Thant—we don’t want to sink a ship, and then right in the middle of one, U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out, so we are going to have to let some hours go by, but sooner or later, probably by tomorrow evening, we are going to have to accost one of these and board it. Now we got a message last night from Mr. KhrushchevDocument 61. which I’ll make sure you get, if you haven’t gotten it already, which says that this is piratical and their ships are going to go through and not submit to this, and if we do stop them they have the means of action against us. That’s last night. So that’s about where we are.

PM: Thank you very much. I have just seen your message to U Thant.1 It seems to me extremely ingenious and very calm, because you are saying that the—as you say, the real point is that they ought to get rid of these weapons.

And then Ambassador Stevenson will be discussing with U Thant the arrangements. What time do you think the Ambassador will be speaking with U Thant?

President: … about a half hour ago which goes somewhat further than the first one went. The second one said that he is asking Khrushchev to keep his ships out of there. His first message didn’t do that. We are therefore going to accept that because it comes further in our direction than his first one, and tell him that if he can keep the ships out of there that’s fine, then we won’t have the incident. On the other hand, we do point out in our response to him that some ships still are coming. Now that is that. Now if these conversations begin we are going to point out—once we get this matter of the ships straightened out, because we still haven’t had our first search yet, and that’s going to be a very important event because we will then know what the Russians are going to do, but that will come tomorrow. Now then, if we begin the conversation we are going to begin to point out that work is going on and that work must stop or otherwise we have got to extend this blockade, and consider other action to stop it. But I think that’s at least 24 hours away. I think the next thing for us to do is to figure out how we will handle this first search in view of the fact that the UN is involved in this now. In other words, I don’t want to have an incident—fight—with a Russian ship tomorrow morning and to search it at a time when it appears that U Thant has gotten the Russians to agree not to continue. I hope that by tomorrow afternoon it will be clear either that the Russians are discontinuing their shipping during these preliminary conversations or, if they are not, then the responsibility is on them.

… . garble …

President: Prime Minister, can you repeat that?

PM: I was saying that the question of dealing with the weapons in Cuba—you will be discussing that with U Thant?

President: Yes. As I say, the first problem we have is the circumstances under which we will search the first Russian ship, on the basis of two things: first, Mr. Khrushchev’s reply to me last night that he will not permit it; and secondly, U Thant’s appeal for a suspension of Russian shipping while these talks go on so that if we get Russian shipping suspended that will produce one situation; if Russian shipping does not suspend, then we will have to face the search and the possible sinking of the ship sometime tomorrow afternoon, so that’s our first problem. Then … but if we satisfactorily get through that problem, then when these conversations begin we are going to then begin to emphasize that work on these sites is continuing and that unless it is discontinued we must tighten the blockade and possibly take other actions. That would probably begin to be emphasized the minute the talks begin, but even if the talks don’t begin, we are going to begin to say it on SaturdayOctober 27. anyway.

PM: I quite understand, and I think that’s what you must do. As I see it, there are two stages: the first question is the ships, and then the question of the actual weapons in Cuba… .

President: As I say, the 14 ships that have turned back are obviously the ones that have the sensitive cargo that he doesn’t want us to be able to produce. The ships that are continuing probably are ones that don’t have anything important in them, but we cannot permit him to establish the principle that he determines which ships will go and which will not, but as I say, I think we will—tomorrow night—we will know a lot better about this matter of the UN’s actions and Khrushchev’s attitude about continuing the shipping, and also what attitude he will take in regard to our searching them.

… garble …

PM: I say that this is very interesting about the ships. And we … the situation tomorrow night.

President: That is correct. We will know tomorrow night whether Khrushchev will accept U Thant’s proposal to cease all shipping going to Cuba during these talks, No. 1. No. 2, if he doesn’t do that, we will know what their reaction will be to our searching of a vessel, so I think that I could call you tomorrow night at the same time, unless this is too late for you.

PM: … indeed. I am very much obliged to you. We will have a talk tomorrow night. Good night.

President: Good night, Prime Minister. I’ll send you Khrushchev’s message of last evening. Good night.

PM: Yes, I’d very much like to see that.

President: Good night, Prime Minister.

75. Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter—Cuba. Secret; Priority. Received at 6:41 p.m. October 25. Paris, October 25, 1962, 9 p.m.

Polto 506. Eyes only for Secretary. Department may desire repeat Ankara and Rome eyes only Ambassadors. Policy. Reference:Deptels 2345 and 2349.Document 56 and footnote 1 thereto.

Turkish PermRep here has consistently made it clear that Turks set great store in Jupiters placed in Turkey. He makes very clear that Turkey regards these Jupiters as symbol of Alliance’s determination to use atomic weapons against Russian attack on Turkey whether by large conventional or nuclear forces, although Turks have been most reluctant admit presence IRBM’s publicly. Fact that Jupiters are obsolescent and vulnerable does not apparently affect present Turkish thinking. My impression is that symbolic importance represents a fixed GOT view, although of course Hare can comment much better than I on this point. For above reason any arrangement of kind suggested reftel which would not have received prior complete support by GOT would, it seems to us, be most damaging. I emphasize prior consultation, and I think it should be an arrangement freely arrived at by them. My guess is that any arrangement that would not substitute some other considerable kind of atomic capability in Turkey for Jupiters would be rejected by them. See suggestions paras. 8 and 9 below. In this connection, would appear preferable, since Cuba is by definition outside NATO area, to offer close down some US nuclear-capable base outside NATO area rather than making deal involving Turkey or Italy. Such deal would then be strictly US-USSR trade rather than involving one of our NATO allies in any deal. I think that we must be fully aware there is real possibility that, outside of any arrangement made in over-all disarmament context, whole Alliance might be dismayed by such a deal which would compromise and invalidate firm US action re Cuba which has received substantial approval from Alliance. As all know, these weapons were put in Europe as result of heads of government decision in 1957 in response to boastful Soviet MRBM threat to Europe, and Alliance might very well conclude that US was willing weaken nuclear defenses in Europe in order to remove threat in Western hemisphere. However, cannot discount possibility that some members Alliance might be willing accept Cuba-Turk deal “to avoid nuclear war”, i.e., Norwegians, Danes and maybe even British. Re question of removal Jupiters accompanied by stationing of Polaris submarines in area, doubt whether mere deployment Polaris would be attractive to Turks since they really would have no say in use of Polaris in time of crisis and they turned down similar proposal in April 1961. Nevertheless, one might argue Turks really have no say over Jupiter use now because of custodial arrangements, but they feel some assurance in having weapons on their territory and somewhat in their hands. Turkish concern re Polaris substitution might be partially met by consulting them on targeting so as to assure that targets of interest to them are covered by Polaris. Also could point out that three Polaris submarines in area would effectively more than double coverage presently afforded by obsolete Jupiters. Doubt, however, above arrangements would adequately compensate Turks. Re suggestion reftel concerning some other significant military offset such as NATO seaborne multilateral nuclear force, we believe most expeditious way do this would be set up small southern command multilateral seaborne force on a “pilot basis”. If such firm suggestion made this should be acceptable arrangement to Turks to compensate for loss of obsolete Jupiters. Such offer would take form of converting a number of merchant-type vessels to MRBM force, utilizing Polaris A-2 missiles along general lines of US studies and presentation to NAC by Smith on 22 October.Descriptions of the North Atlantic Council briefing on October 22 are in Polto 502, October 23 (Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2362), and Sherman Kent’s November 14 memorandum for the record. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 84-00499R, Box 1, HS/HC 850A) See the Supplement for both. Ships could be deployed in eastern Mediterranean and could be manned by Turkish, Italian and American mixed crews and also possibly Greeks, with appropriate targets of interest to Mediterranean allies covered. Although implementation of this type of force could be realized in short period of time, it would be necessary, as interim step before force comes into being, to station Polaris, as suggested reftel, in eastern Mediterranean. Polaris deployment would then fill gap caused by removal of Jupiters, while Southern Command Multilateral Force was being put together. At same time, rest of Alliance could be investigating possibility of setting up NATO-wide multilateral seaborne force. Southern Command MLF might well serve as model for larger force and could be expanded as other allies indicated desirability to join arrangements this type. To make this whole alternative palatable to Turks and others would require clear US support to implement multilateral seaborne-type force, and if properly presented to Turks and Italians we could highlight flexibility and greater efficiency this type force over Jupiters. Our impression here is that Italians more prone to dismantle Jupiters if proper substitute can be found. Such pilot arrangement, which would not come into being immediately, could permit us offer Soviets withdrawal obsolete Jupiters as face-saving device for Cuban withdrawal (Polaris deployment would cover in interval). Whether or not this would be acceptable to Soviets, the gesture could be made and might well look good in face of world opinion. Whether or not they accept this type of trade, we believe that in any event strong consideration should be given to withdrawing Jupiters and creating pilot MLF since this would strengthen NATO nuclear capability in eastern Mediterranean. Although Turks didn’t agree to stop Jupiter program in 1961, even when faced with facts Jupiters obsolete, of no military value and good Soviet target, they might be willing now to accept substitute in MLF which more effective from all angles.On October 26 the Embassy in Rome replied that removal of the Jupiter missiles from Italy “would probably be manageable,” but the United States should consult with the Italian Government before making the final decision. (Telegram 936 from Rome; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter—Cuba) See the Supplement. On the same day Ambassador Hare replied from Ankara that removal of the missiles from Turkey would present a major problem not only for U.S.-Turkish relations but also for NATO. He explained in detail the ramifications of removal and how some of them might be met. (Telegram 587 from Ankara; Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Jupiter—Cuba) See the Supplement. Finletter
76. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, Hilsman Papers, Cuba, 1962. Confidential. The source text bears no drafting information. Washington, October 25, 1962. INTELLIGENCE NOTE Soviets Continue to Seek Abandonment of Quarantine While Missiles Stay

Ships Turning. Yesterday’s pattern of Soviet ships turning off their Cuban courses has continued. Apparently only tankers are still on course. One, the Bucharest, has cooperated with us by indicating, on request, that its cargo was POL. It was permitted to proceed.

Soviet Intentions. Moscow’s immediate purpose still appears to be to leave the initiative for an incident up to the US. In doing so its reasons are probably (1) the desire to identify the US as the aggressor, and (2) recognition that if an incident occurs, the USSR will be helpless at the site of the incident and will face the choice of escalation. We believe Moscow is reluctant to make the latter choice.

Political Action. Soviet strategy at the moment still is designed to gain time and flexibility for political action, designed to get the quarantine stopped while the missiles stay in Cuba. By the turn-around of its ships Moscow is, in effect, already complying with the U Thant proposal, although formally it may refuse to do so; it is thus seeking to exert pressure for at least tacit US abandonment of the quarantine. For the moment it seems intent on insisting that there can be no restriction on weapons in Cuba and that these weapons are designed solely to defend Cuba against aggression. It is probably waiting (1) to see how much momentum will develop for a trade involving US strategic bases, and (2) whether the US is prepared to exert further force to achieve removal of missiles already in Cuba. Until it obtains greater certainty on these points, it will probably keep its missiles in place.

77. Paper Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. Secret. The source text is attached to a memorandum from Rostow to Bundy, October 25. Washington, October 25, 1962.

SOVIET TACTICS IN THE SHORT RUN

Soviet reaction since the outbreak of the Cuban crisis indicates Soviet short run tactics are governed by the following considerations: The USSR’s first objective in the present stage of the crisis is to retain the bases in Cuba. The Soviets not only see considerable military value in these installations, but they regard them as a telling demonstration of the long-proclaimed shift in the “world relation of forces.” Particularly now that the US has committed itself to their elimination, they believe that, if they can prevail, they will have scored a political victory of such proportions that opportunities for further advances will open up in all the areas of East-West contention. Thus the immediate Soviet aim is to deter the US from more drastic action. At the same time, they wish to keep the risks under control. Their diplomatic moves and conduct at sea to date suggest that they fear further US action may be imminent and wish not to have their prestige further engaged if this should occur. Thus they have turned back a number of ships, refrained from spelling out their commitment to Castro in as strong a fashion as previously, and tried to represent the crisis as primarily between Cuba and the US. The primary Soviet tactic will be to draw the US into negotiations, meanwhile getting a standstill. The Soviets calculate that, if this can be done, they will have laid heavy inhibitions upon further US unilateral action and that, with the passage of time, the existing bases will become part of the status quo. They prefer, of course, that the lifting of the quarantine be made a precondition of negotiations, but they probably will not insist upon this. They will probably propose or accept any of several forms of negotiation in addition to their own proposal for US-Soviet-Cuban talks. At the present juncture the Soviets probably view a summit meeting as an appealing proposal to keep open the line of negotiation, especially if a stalemate in the UN approaches which might free the US to take military action. With a summit in prospect they would estimate the pressures for the US to wait would be great. A summit therefore would buy the Soviets some additional time, offer a forum to make a reasonable case, confuse the issues, and raise the political costs of further US action. At the same time, they would not want to be faced at the summit with an ultimatum or an unyielding US position which if it resulted in further actions would redouble the humiliation to the USSR and Khrushchev personally. On balance they probably feel that as long as the US did not appear determined to take action the summit offers more advantages than drawbacks. Although the Soviets would like to minimize the risks at the present juncture, they find it very difficult to acquiesce in the US quarantine. Their reported reaction to U Thant’s appeal suggest that they could accept for some time a tacit agreement whereby they refrained from sending patently military cargoes into the quarantine area and the US allowed other vessels through upon a verbal declaration of cargo. It is unlikely that the Soviets will submit to boarding, since in doing so they would be accepting the quarantine. So long as they wish to avoid incidents, therefore, they will be extremely anxious to determine how the US intends to enforce the quarantine. At some stage a quarantine incident would probably commend itself to the Soviets as one means of raising tensions and thereby multiplying international pressures upon the US. The best circumstance would be to lead the US into attacking a manifestly peaceful vessel. If the Soviets decide that such an incident is desirable, they would be primarily concerned with subsequent political exploitation and might not undertake an immediate equivalent reprisal against the US. The time will probably come when the USSR decidesthat it would be useful to increase tensions by stepping up the element of threat in their pronouncements. Even in this circumstance, however, they are likely to continue avoiding any further commitment to Cuba so long as they remain uncertain about US intentions. With respect to the missiles already in Cuba it seems highly improbable that the USSR will agree to withdraw in the absence of major US concessions elsewhere. There is one circumstance, however, in which a break in this Soviet position might occur. The USSR would regard a successful US military action against the bases, or against Cuba as a whole, as a very great defeat, which might substantially stiffen Western determination to resist Soviet demands in other confrontations, e.g. Berlin. If, therefore, they believed that US military action was all but imminent and unavoidable, they might make a last-minute offer to dismantle the bases in return for some Western concession which, while not offsetting their loss, offered some prospect of saving face. They might even attempt to dispose clandestinely of their missiles. It is difficult to conceive, however, how the Soviets could frame such moves or time them properly. Thus in this circumstance they might decide to let the US attack proceed and to recoup as much as possible thereafter through political exploitation and, perhaps, an off-setting injury to US interests elsewhere.

78. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, October 26, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

Bundy—First two or three items; have you got a minute?

Ball—Oh, sure.

Bundy—We have boarded the LebaneseBundy is referring to the boarding of the Marcular at 7:50 a.m. on October 26 by personnel from the destroyers Pierce and Joseph P. Kennedy about 180 miles northeast of Nassau. No prohibited cargo was found and the ship was subsequently allowed to continue to Havana. (Department of Defense news release 1745-62, October 26; Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office, SecDef Cable Files, Cuba) and care(?)A blank at this point in the source text was filled in by hand with “care(?).” wants to have it got out by Sylvester right away in order to restore our credibility before flag plot leaps.

Ball—I don’t see any harm in that.

Bundy—I think that’s dandy. It turns out to be Soviet charter, did you know that?

Ball—Yes, and reconditional.

Bundy—Yes, and it even had an unidentified cargo. Second, we have got this very neat point of how to organize the process of Stevenson’s instructions today. My suggestion would be that we not have them at the 10:00.

Ball—Not have the instructions?

Bundy—No, not have the two of them—Stevenson and McCloy.

Ball—Well, the only advantage of having them is to get the flavor. Not go into the instructions necessarily.

Bundy—No, no. Well then let’s do it that way. Let’s have them at the meeting in order that they were at the meeting and then we better work out—Bob McNamara and the Attorney General are all steamed up about getting a think tank going like the ones we had last week. And I think they are right about that and they are going to want to borrow space in your Department to do it.

Ball—OK.

Bundy—Which I am all for. It seems to me that those two things—we will have to generate an instructions working party and maybe it’s all one thing—maybe the instructions will lead to what the rest of the problems are.

Ball—I had McCloy in for breakfast this morning, with Cleveland, going over the instructions.

Bundy—How was he?

Ball—He is all heated up. He is a very good fellow.

Bundy—Is he clear and strong?

Ball—Yes, very clear and very strong. What I want the President to suggest when he talks to him is now—to say to Stevenson—“When you and McCloy talk to Thant” and “When you and McCloy do this …” And if necessary, if he raises any question then you can say “Well, look, from the bipartisan position of this thing, this is in election time, we have got to keep it bipartisan.”

Bundy—You feel there has been some question of Jack’s energy and clarity and …

Ball—No, no, no.

Bundy—That’s nonsense.

Ball—He is very, very clear in what the objectives have to be and he is very firm and tough.

Bundy—OK, good news. I will feed that to the President ahead of the meeting.

Ball—I think it is very important that that point be made because what is happening right now is they haven’t given him anything to do.

Bundy—Well then he certainly should say to them at each stage and you should emphasize and the President should and you should bring them both to the 10:00 o’clock.

Ball—Yes, that’s right. I think the way to handle it is the President just takes it for granted that McCloy is in on all the talks, because he isn’t in on anything at the moment. This has got to be made clear.

Bundy—Otherwise, you will lose him for one thing.

Ball—Knowing my old friend I can tell you that this has got to be made explicit and the bipartisan way is the way to play it.

Bundy—Right. I will pass that to the Boss and I will have a word with you before the meeting if there is any difficulty about it.

Ball—All right.

79. Summary Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone’s account of this meeting is reproduced in CIA Documentson the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 317-318. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President) See the Supplement. The record of action of the meeting, prepared by McGeorge Bundy, is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10)Gilpatric’s 2-page handwritten notes for this meeting are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, RLG’s Notes re Cuba. Washington, October 26, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone summarized the attached intelligence memorandum, including a statement on the current status of Soviet air readiness.The summary of this CIA memorandum, [document number not declassified] (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) which recorded information available as of 6 a.m. October 26, is in the Supplement.

Mr. McCone described the celebration which took place in Havana following the arrival of the tanker Bucharest which had been allowed to pass the quarantine line because it was carrying only oil, which is not now contraband. He said non-Bloc ships could be used to carry military materials if they had been chartered on a bare boat basis by the Russians.

Mr. McCone reported that he had stood down a CIA operation which involved sending into Cuba by submarine ten teams involving fifty people. He said he did not believe this should be done by CIA unilaterally.The operation is described in an October 25 memorandum from Carter to McCone; for text, see CIA Documentson the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 311-312.

The President agreed and asked that the proposal to put ashore the ten teams be discussed by the Special Group (NSC 5412) today. The President further suggested that the Mongoose operation be reconstituted, possibly as a subcommittee of the Executive Committee, and oriented toward post-Castro Cuban problems. The President stressed the importance of tying together all existing groups engaged in covert activities in order to integrate our planning.

Director McCone raised the question of the location of the SS Oxford, a communications [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ship which is now standing some ten miles off Cuba. He expressed his concern that this very valuable ship might be destroyed by hostile action. The President said this was an operational problem, the Navy should have the authority to control this ship, but it should take into account CIA’s concern.

Mr. Bundy reported that three subcommittees are at work—one on Berlin, chaired by Paul Nitze, one on forward planning, chaired by Walt Rostow, and one on worldwide communications problems, chaired by William Orrick, who is working closely with the Defense Communications Agency.

Mr. Bundy called attention to the civil defense problem and obtained agreement that no crash program would be undertaken now, although preliminary measures are to be initiated. He referred to the amount of sensitive information which has been leaking to the press and urged that information about future actions must be more carefully guarded.

Secretary McNamara reported on the status of the quarantine. The Defense Department was authorized to release information on the boarding of the Lebanese ship, the Marucla, the first dry cargo ship which had been loaded in a Soviet port. In the event that comparisons were made between stopping the Lebanese ship and permitting an East German ship to go through the quarantine line, the point will be made that the East German ship carried only passengers.

Secretary McNamara read a list of Bloc ships and their locations and noted that there would be no intercepts at sea today. The tanker Graznyy is apparently moving but will not cross the line today. He suggested that shortly we should embargo fuel used by bombers and substances from which airplane fuel is made, i.e. petroleum products.

The President suggested that if we decide to embargo bomber fuel, we should also mention the fact that we were embargoing fuel which was contributing to the operational capability of the strategic missiles.

Secretary Rusk asked that POL not be embargoed for at least twenty-four hours in order to avoid upsetting the U Thant talks now under way in New York.

Under Secretary Ball asked for agreement on the embargo of petroleum as the next step in the effort to increase pressures—the timing of the embargo to be decided later in relation to the New York talks.

Secretary Dillon stated his reservations concerning this course of action. He said it ended up in stopping Soviet ships. Thus, a confrontation with the Russians would not be over the missiles, but over Soviet ships. He believed we should go for the missiles rather than force a confrontation with the USSR at sea.

A decision on adding petroleum to the embargo list was delayed until the political path was decided upon.

Secretary McNamara pointed out that construction on the strategic missile sites in Cuba was continuing. He asked that public announcement be made of our continuation of air surveillance. He recommended that daylight reconnaissance measures be flown today and a night mission tonight, including the dropping of flares.

Secretary Rusk asked that the night mission not be flown because of the unfortunate effect which it might have on the U Thant negotiations in New York.

Secretary McNamara thought that one way of avoiding reaction to night reconnaissance was to inform the Cubans and the Russians in advance that we were initiating such flights.

Ambassador Stevenson opposed any public announcement of our surveillance activities.

The President directed that we dramatize the fact that the missile buildup in Cuba is continuing. He authorized daylight reconnaissance measures but decided to delay night flights.

Secretary Rusk praised Ambassador Stevenson’s UN performance. He urged that USIA keep the pressure on the Cuban people and mentioned the dropping of leaflets over Cuba.

Acting Director Wilson requested that better aerial pictures be made available to USIA for distribution. The President authorized the use of any reconnaissance pictures, including those used by Ambassador Stevenson in his UN speech.

Secretary Rusk summarized political actions now under way. He said the object of the talks with U Thant today was to set up some form of negotiations with the Russians in New York. The objective would be to obtain a commitment from the Russians that there would be no further construction at the missile sites in Cuba, no further Soviet military shipments, the defusing of existing weapons in Cuba, UN inspectionof all nuclear-capable missiles, and an observer corps on the ground in Cuba of 350 technically able inspectors. The U.S. quarantine would continue until a UN quarantine is in place. UN teams would be put into specified Cuban ports. U.S. Navy ships would stay close to all Cuban ports to ensure that there were no landings unknown to the UN inspectors and no cargoes anywhere which UN inspectors did not see.

Mr. McCloy stated that our quarantine was vital and should be kept in place until the Russians had accepted all of our conditions.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that we must make clear to U Thant that the quarantine is related to the Soviet missiles rather than to Soviet military shipments to Cuba.

With respect to the proposed atomic-free zone in Latin America, Secretary Rusk said that Puerto Rico and the Canal Zone would be exempted, but that possibly we might have to accept a ban on the storage of nuclear weapons in the Canal Zone. Conceivably, the proposal would hinder the transit by air of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

Secretary McNamara said the Joint Chiefs were very cool toward the proposal of a Latin American atomic-free zone, but, personally, he favored the idea if it was conditioned on the elimination of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

General Taylor said the Chiefs had no formal position on the proposal, but they were very sceptical as to its efficacy. He felt that discussion of this proposal would divert attention from the Soviet missile program. He was also concerned about its effect on the defense of Panama and on our submarine defense system. He added that, if, as a result, a proposal was made for an atomic-free zone in Africa, the French would have real problems in connection with their weapons testing program. Secretary Rusk said this last point could be met by telling the French they could use our nuclear weapons test sites if their African sites were put off bounds.

Mr. Sorensen pointed out that if the OAS would support the atomic-free zone proposal, Cuba would be in violation and action could be taken to remove nuclear weapons from Cuba.

Secretary Rusk felt that it was better for us not to participate in such action as would be necessary if it were done by an organization, i.e. the OAS, to which we belong.

The President noted that the plan proposed by Brazil not only calls for an atomic-free zone in Latin America,This proposal was first made in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly by the Brazilian Representative on September 20. It was subsequently submitted to the First Committee as draft resolution A/C.1/L/312. but it also encompasses a guarantee of the territorial integrity on all Latin American States. He asked whether we could commit ourselves not to invade Cuba. Secretary Rusk commented that we are committed not to invade Cuba, having signed the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.

Secretary Rusk read a draft cable which he wished to send to the Brazilian Ambassador in Cuba outlining an approach to Castro,The draft has not been identified, but see Document 81. with a view to persuading him to break with the Russians. In commenting on the draft cable, Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of getting Soviet missiles out urgently.

Mr. McCone expressed his dislike of a situation involving continued control of Cuba by Castro. Even if the Soviet missiles are removed, Castro, if he is left in control, will be in an excellent position to undertake the Communization of Latin America.

Secretary Rusk said the present position is that Cuba ties to the USSR are not negotiable. Mr. Bundy pointed out, and the President agreed, that our objective was to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President said work on the missile sites has to cease and we have to verify what is going on at the sites every day during the talks in New York. As to the message to Castro, he agreed in general, but wanted to have another look at it. He doubted that it would do any good, but it might be undertaken if done now with the greatest urgency.

Ambassador Stevenson discussed the immediate negotiations now under way with U Thant and the longer talks which would follow if agreement can be reached with the Russians in New York. He said the immediate talks were aimed at getting a 24-48-hour standstill on the missile buildup in Cuba. He acknowledged that in these talks it would be impossible to obtain an agreement to make the weapons inoperable. He wanted to know whether he should seek a standstill on all Soviet arms or only offensive weapons. He would seek to get a commitment that there be no further construction, but it would not be possible to set up a system to ensure that the weapons were made inoperable and kept inoperable. In addition, he needed to know whether in return we would be prepared to suspend the quarantine.

Ambassador Stevenson said the aim of the longer term talks would be the withdrawal from this hemisphere of the strategic missiles and the dismantlement of existing sites. He predicted that the Russians would ask us for a new guarantee of the territorial integrity of Cuba and the dismantlement of U.S. strategic missiles in Turkey.

Mr. McCone disagreed with Ambassador Stevenson’s linking of Soviet missiles in Cuba to U.S. missiles in Turkey. He said the Soviet weapons in Cuba were pointed at our heart and put us under great handicap in continuing to carry out our commitments to the free world. He urged that we do not drop the quarantine until the Soviet missiles are out of Cuba. He believed that we must keep up the momentum so far achieved by the quarantine.

The President said we will get the Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba only by invading Cuba or by trading. He doubted that the quarantine alone would produce a withdrawal of the weapons. He said our objective should be to prevent further military shipments, further construction at missile sites, and to get some means of inspection.

Mr. McCone urged that any inspectors sent to Cuba be U.S. inspectors knowledgeable about strategic missiles.

The President said he understood Ambassador Stevenson to be asking for time during which he would try to negotiate the withdrawal of the missiles.

Secretary Rusk doubted that we could get any pre-conditions to negotiation.

Secretary Dillon agreed that the Soviets could not back down merely in return for dropping the quarantine.

Mr. Nitze called attention to the importance of obtaining a guarantee that the nuclear missiles would be disassembled from their launchers.

Mr. Bundy said negotiations for a standstill or a standdown were not enough for our security because we must press, in addition, for guaranteed inspection of Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said we could not negotiate for two weeks under the missile threat which now exists in Cuba.

The President noted that there appeared to be little support for Ambassador Stevenson’s plan. If the quarantine would not result in the Soviets withdrawing the missiles, what will we do if negotiations break down?

Mr. Bundy said when the interim 24-48-hour talks fail, then our choice would be to expand the blockade or remove the missiles by air attack.

General Taylor urged that we increase our reconnaissance activity in order to keep informed as to what was happening in Cuba.

The President decided to delay night reconnaissance missions, at least until the Soviets turn down U Thant’s proposal. He also agreed that we should announce publicly that construction work at the missile sites in Cuba was going on and that, therefore, we will continue our aerial reconnaissance flights. The President also wanted attention called by a White House spokesman to his earlier speech which insisted that work at the missile sites in Cuba cease. The President decided that a presentation of the current situation should be made to the Congressional Leaders.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
80. Memorandum From ABC Correspondent John Scali to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hilsman)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Elite-Psalm Documents. Confidential; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Ball, and Thompson. The source text bears the handwritten notation “Secretary has in hand.” For Hilsman’s account of drafting of this memorandum and his subsequent discussion with Rusk see To Move a Nation, pp. 217-218. Printed in part in Pierre Salinger, With Kennnedy, p. 274. Washington, undated.

Alexander S. Fomin, Sov Emby Counselor, at lunch which he sought urgently, asks if State would be interested in settlement of Cuban crisis along these lines:

Bases would be dismantled under United Nations supervision and Castro would pledge not to accept offensive weapons of any kind, ever, in return for US pledge not to invade Cuba.

I said I didn’t know but that perhaps this is something that could be talked about. He said if Stevenson pursued this line, Zorin would be interested. Asked that I check with State and let him know. He gave me his home telephone number so I could call him tonight, if necessary.

Fomin claimed that Cuban delegate to UN during Security Council debate asked for such no-invasion assurances in return for dismantling but that he got no reply. I told him I’d followed the UN debate very carefully but could not recall any such remarks on Cuban’s part.

Fomin also said Russia had been forced “to make some concessions” to Communist China in order to convince them to stop the fighting against India. He declined to say what under my questioning. But he recalled they hadn’t helped the ChiComs with nuclear weapons or conventional weapons in the past, even tanks, and hinted it might be aid in the conventional field.

ScaliPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
81. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in BrazilSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2662. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Drafted by Martin, cleared with U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Rusk. Washington, October 26, 1962, 2 p.m.

1055. Ambassador from Secretary. We believe time has come for representative friendly country to discuss with Castro alone predicament in which Soviet actions have placed him. We also believe Brazilian Ambassador in Havana is best person to do this and therefore wish you to see Hermes Lima as soon as possible to secure his agreement to instruction to their Ambassador along following lines. This approach to Castro should be handled in such way as make absolutely clear to Castro it is solely Brazilian initiative. Naturally we would hope matter could be handled by Brazilians with greatest discretion. In this connection we feel strongly that need for complete secrecy between FM and Ambassador in Havana only, and absolute accuracy, is so great that the instructions should be taken to Havana by special courier in special airplane as soon as possible (FYI. Important should not be any Brazilian cables referring this subject. End FYI.) Report reaction niact.

Would wish instructions to Ambassador Luis Batian Pinto to read substantially as follows: The world now knows without any question and in great detail the nature and size of the buildup of Soviet offensive missile capability in Cuba. There can be no valid question in anyone’s mind on this point. The action of the Soviet Union in using Cuban soil as sites for offensive nuclear missiles capable of striking most of the Western Hemisphere has placed the future of the Castro regime and the well-being of the Cuban people in great jeopardy. The countries of the Inter-American System have unanimously called for their removal and approved and are participating in the meas-ures being taken to eliminate this Soviet threat to all of them. The Soviet Union is turning around its cargo ships in face of US quarantine which the countries of hemisphere have authorized. Not only is the Soviet Union failing to support Cuba on this matter, but numerous feelers have been put out by high Soviet officials to allied governments for exchanges of their position in Cuba for concessions by the NATO countries in other parts of the world. Thus you are not only being used for purposes of no interest to any Cuban, but deserted and threatened by betrayal. It is also well known that work is proceeding rapidly to complete and make operational the offensive nuclear missile installations and to assemble the IL-28 bombers. The threatened countries clearly cannot sit still while the threat against them is being increased in this fashion. Further steps will have to be taken against Cuba and very soon. Castro might recall that President Kennedy has said publicly that only two issues were nonnegotiable between Castro and the US—the military-political ties to the USSR and the aggressive attitude toward the internal affairs of other Latin American countries. This view will be shared by other members of the Inter-American System. Of course this now means giving up the offensive nuclear capability being established in Cuba and sending home Soviet military personnel, on which help can certainly be given if needed. From such actions many changes in the relations between Cuba and the OAS countries, including the US, could flow. Time is very short for Cuba and for Castro to decide whether to devote his great leadership abilities to the service of his Cuban peoples or to serving as a Soviet pawn in their desperately risky struggle for world domination by force and threat of force. If Castro tries to rationalize the presence of these missiles as due to Cuban fear of a US invasion, Ambassador Batian should reply that he is confident that the OAS wouldnot accept an invasion of Cuba once the missiles were removed and that the US would not risk upsetting hemispheric solidarity by invading a Cuba clearly committed to a peaceful course.

Rusk
82. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Special Group (Augmented). Top Secret; Eyes Only. The time of the meeting is from McCone’s account, which is reproduced in part in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 319-321. Washington, October 26, 1962, 2:30 p.m. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation Mongoose, 26 October 1962 PRESENT Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, General Lansdale, General Johnson; the Attorney General; Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin; Mr. Bundy; Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey; Mr. Wilson

The meeting began with a discussion of the considerably-increased activity in the dispatch, and preparation for dispatch, of agent teams. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that all plans for dispatch should be suspended pending further examination; instructions were issued during the course of the meeting designed to recall the three teams already on the way.

It was agreed that the first order of business with regard to these teams is to examine in detail the requirements toward which they could contribute. General Lansdale will arrange to get CIA into contact with: (a) General Carroll, to examine what military requirements such agents could service; (b) similarly, the State Department for political intelligence requirements; (c)USIA for requirements peculiar to that Agency. After this examination, it will then be decided what the best use of these agent assets actually should be.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Harvey said during the course of the discussion on agent teams, that the action taken had represented a unilateral decision by CIA andwas not in response to specific military requirements. CIA had felt that this was within its sphere of responsibility, and particularly with respect to the first three teams had considered that it was a continuation of previously-approved operations. Mr. McCone commented that internal security in Cuba is now far more stringent than it was two weeks ago, thereby making agent operations much more difficult; he felt, therefore, that agent activity on this scale will only be justified if the responsible departments specifically require it for intelligence purposes.

In this connection, General Taylor brought out that the Chiefs had approved the use of submarines for agent dispatch but had not been asked to review the operation in broader context. The Chiefs had concluded, however, that no revolt should be stimulated unless and until the U.S. is ready to support it and that the military establishment does not wish to take over sabotage and similar operations at this time, although it should be prepared to do so if an invasion should be mounted. Mr. McCone agreed that it is possible that as the situation develops, CIA Cubanoperations might move under military control, but that such action is not indicated at this time.

 Mr. Harvey made the point that the proposed agent dispatches would not use up all existing assets. He said that in the event of invasion, a sizable number of Cubans could be trained quickly. The Attorney General and General Lansdale emphasized that the Cubans are entirely prepared to make the necessary sacrifices if they are in support of an approved plan. The Cubans do want, however, assurances that such activities are in fact approved at a high level. Mr. Bundy emphasized the importance of planning for the use of Cubans in political and civil activities during and after any military action. He felt that there should be established within the government some sort of “Office of Free Cuban Affairs,” which probably should be placed within the Department of State. The activities of this office would be distinct from General Lansdale’s operations but would be closely related to them. He pointed out that top priority should be given to selecting a man to head such an office. Mr. Bundy also said that he thought a subcommittee of the NSC Executive Committee should be established to deal with Mongoose affairs. Mr. McNamara thought that Mongoose in the short-term should be considered in the context of (a) providing support for action designed to get rid of the missiles, and (b) support for a possible invasion. Specific discussion took place on points raised in the paper distributed at the meeting, as follows: CIA should continue to develop the balloon propaganda facilities, although it was recognized that by the target date of 1 December this capability might no longer be needed because of other methods of delivery. No major acts of sabotage should be undertaken at this time. This decision will be reviewed in about a week. General Lansdale should develop further plans to “help the Cubans to help themselves.” Mr. Morales-Carrion should be brought into this planning. Political planning for the post-Castro period will be assigned to the “Office for Free Cuban Affairs.” Establishment of USIA’s new 50 KW transmitter in the Florida Keys should be expedited. It was reiterated that General Lansdale is the focal point for all Mongoose activities, that he is charged with their overall management and that he should be kept informed of all significant plans and activities in connection with the project. Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.
83. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Cleveland and cleared in draft by Rusk, U. Alexis Johnson, Chayes, Martin, McCloy, Stevenson, and Nitze. Repeated to Moscow. Washington, October 26, 1962, 5:16 p.m.

1105. For Stevenson. Subject: Cuba: Talks with Acting Secretary General U Thant.

At beginning of first meeting with SYG you should take occasion restate basic US position that early removal nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba is the essence of the matter. We understand that the Secretary General is proposing first a discussion of some form of standstill or freeze (covering arms shipments to Cuba, the build up of offensive weapons in Cuba, and our quarantine action), to be followed by broader talks on peaceful settlement of the larger issue created by Soviet introduction of missiles and other offensive weapons into an island just off our shores.

While we are willing to handle matter in two stages, we would emphasize at the start that the build up must stop, and the weapons must be removed before too long and that these things must be done under inspection arrangements that insure against secrecy and cheating. We would emphasize further that the OAS quarantine action will not be lifted until the threat which provoked it is removed.

Within this framework of policy, following is for your guidance in early discussions with SYG and Soviet delegates.

We understand procedural state of affairs to be as follows: Security Council has adjourned sine die and all efforts will be focused for next two or three days on US-USSR discussionsthrough or with Thant. Both U.S. and USSR (not at this stage Cuba) have agreed to meet with Thant for discussion “modalities”. What SYG calls discussion of “modalities” is not an attempt to solve basic problem (which from our standpoint is removal of offensive weapons from Cuba) at one stroke, but must at least attempt to achieve a condition which would involve (i) no more offensive arms being delivered to Cuba, (ii) no further build-up of missile sites or bomber facilities, and (iii) any existing Cuban nuclear strike capability being kept inoperable. Achievement of such a standstill will require a substantial administrative effort by SYG with assistance of a number of countries, to put UN in position to guarantee that standstill would be effective while negotiations designed to remove threat to Western Hemisphere could be brought to a conclusion. The problem of “modalities” divides naturally into two parts, (a)UN control of shipments to Cuba and (b)UN observation of Cuban compliance with suspension of further build-up with safeguards to ensure inoperability of any nuclear strike capacity. Control of Shipments to Cuba: FYI. The US Fleet would remain approximately as deployed at the present time. US Naval Force would maintain surveillance to discover any attempt to off-load or trans-ship at locations other than designated UN ports. Responsible US Fleet Commander in the area would report any violation he might observe to Washington which would bring violation to attention of SYG or head of UN observation operation. It would have to be understood by SYG from the outset that US surveillance continues and latent force is in background. End FYI. All Cuba-bound ships would be required to enter Cuba at ports designated by the UN. On present basis, sea traffic to Cuba consists of one or two ships arriving per day. UN inspectors would be stationed at those ports in adequate numbers. With necessary cooperation Cuban authorities they would inspect arriving ships of all nationalities to verify the presence or the absence of any arms as defined by SYG. FYI. A list of “prohibited material” presently included in Presidential Proclamation and supplementary orders under it will be provided for your guidance in discussing this point. End FYI. These UN inspectors would be given full access to all such ships. UN observers would be stationed in the main military and civilian airfields in Cuba. Their mission would be to: examine incoming cargo shipments to verify presence or absence of offensive weapons or components thereof, and assure grounding of bomber aircraft. Observers would be stationed in adequate numbers to ensure no further construction or improvements of MRBM or IRBM sites, and to ensure that any existing missiles are kept inoperable. FYI. Preliminary Department of Defense estimates would require close to 500 persons for the three tasks identified in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5. End FYI.

Inspectors to be provided under this procedure must be of such technical competence as to insure that they are able in fact to identify items of offensive military equipment, and to carry out control functions at airports and missile sites. FYI. Not only must inspectors be physically placed to observe what is there, they must also have the authority to observe separation of components of the missile system to ensure that the missiles are inoperable. End FYI. While many of the personnel would in practice be performing administrative functions, several dozen well-trained technical people would be required and number of countries from which they could come is limited.

Dependable first-rate personnel for this operation will be essential, and US should have a strong voice in their selection. Advance preparation of technical teams would include examination of US advice as to where to go and what to look for. Full and free access for UN teamsthroughout island should be assured. FYI. Quality and political reliability of inspectors would be key to any inspection system. Likelihood that Soviets will permit real inspection their site is so remote that it would be unwise to concede on quality and reliability in return for paper agreement on access to site. End FYI.

 Violations or suspected violations of agreed arrangements observed by that UN observer team will be immediately notified to the SYG, and would be passed by him to the parties concerned. “All’s well” reports should be made around the clock at frequent intervals (every 2 hours); the absence of such reports would be a signal for immediate surveillance of the site by the United States. The US will, of course, retain the right to reactivate quarantine measures or take other necessary action if agreed arrangements are violated. Legal and parliamentary status in the United Nations of arrangements agreed between the parties directly concerned can only be worked out when it is possible to see what kind of a UN operationwould be involved. Security Council action would probably be useful at least to place at SYG’s disposal the resources he would require for any substantial UN operation. FYI. During talks on standstill arrangements we do not think it would be useful to start process of bargaining on such wider issues, or on possible terms of final peaceful settlement. End FYI. Rusk
84. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Cuba Security, Khrushchev Correspondence. Secret; Niact; Eyes Only; Verbatim Text. Relayed to the White House. The original Russian language text, which bears no classification, is ibid. Also printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 640-643. The source text is a translation done at the Embassy in Moscow, which received the letter at 4:43 p.m. Moscow time. The first section arrived in the Department of State at 6 p.m. and the last at 9 p.m. A “formal” translation, done by the Language Services Division of the Department of State, is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. 1101. Policy. Embassy translation follows of letter from Khrushchev to President delivered to Embassy by messenger 4:43 p.m. Moscow time October 26, under cover of letter from Gromyko to me. Moscow, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

Begin text.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of October 25.See Document 68. From your letter, I got the feeling that you have some understanding of the situation which has developed and a sense of responsibility. I value this.

Now we have already publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba and each of us has set forth his explanation and his understanding of these events. Consequently, I would think that, apparently, a continuation of an exchange of opinions at such a distance, even in the form of secret letters, will hardly add anything to that which one side has already said to the other.

I think you will understand me correctly if you are really concerned about the welfare of the world. Everyone needs peace: both capitalists, if they have not lost their reason, and, still more, Communists, people who know how to value not only their own lives but, more than anything, the lives of the peoples. We, Communists, are against all wars between states in general and have been defending the cause of peace since we came into the world. We have always regarded war as a calamity, and not as a game nor as a means for the attainment of definite goals, nor, all the more, as a goal in itself. Our goals are clear, and the means to attain them is labor. War is our enemy and a calamity for all the peoples.

It is thus that we, Soviet people, and, together with US, other peoples as well, understand the questions of war and peace. I can, in any case, firmly say this for the peoples of the socialist countries, as well as for all progressive people who want peace, happiness, and friendship among peoples.

I see, Mr. President, that you too are not devoid of a sense of anxiety for the fate of the worldGarble in the source text. It was subsequently corrected to read “not without an”. understanding, and of what war entails. What would a war give you? You are threatening us with war. But you well know that the very least which you would receive in reply would be that you would experience the same consequences as those which you sent us. And that must be clear to us, people invested with authority, trust, and responsibility. We must not succumb to intoxication and petty passions, regardless of whether elections are impending in this or that country, or not impending. These are all transient things, but if indeed war should break out, then it would not be in our power to contain or stop it, for such is the logic of war. I have participated in two wars and know that war ends when it has rolled through cities and villages, everywhere sowing death and destruction.

In the name of the Soviet Government and the Soviet people, I assure you that your arguments regarding offensive weapons on Cuba are groundless. It is apparent from what you have written me that our conceptions are different on this score, or rather, we have different definitions for these or those military means, indeed, in reality, the same forms of weapons can have different interpretations.

You are a military man and, I hope, will understand me. Let us take for example a simple cannon. What sort of means is this: offensive or defensive? A cannon is a defensive means if it is set up to defend boundaries or a fortified area. But if one concentrates artillery, and adds to it the necessary number of troops, then the same cannons do become an offensive means, because they prepare and clear the way for infantry to advance. The same happens with missile-nuclear weapons as well, with any type of this weapon.

You are mistaken if you think that any of our means on Cuba are offensive. However, let us not argue now, it is apparent that I will not be able to convince you of this, but I say to you: You, Mr. President, are a military man and should understand: can one advance, if one has on one’s territory even an enormous quantity of missiles of various effective radiuses and various power, but using only these means. These missiles are a means of extermination and destruction, but one cannot advance with these missiles, even nuclear missiles of a power of 100 megatons because only people, troops, can advance, without people, any means however powerful cannot be offensive.

How can one, consequently, give such a completely incorrect interpretation as you are now giving, to the effect that some sort of means on Cuba are offensive. All the means located there, and I assure you of this, have a defensive character, are on Cuba solely for the purposes of defense, and we have sent them to Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government. You, however, say that these are offensive means.

But, Mr. President, do you really seriously think that Cuba can attack the United States and that even we together with Cuba can advance upon you from the territory of Cuba? Can you really think that way? How is it possible? We do not understand this. Has something so new appeared in military strategy that one can think that it is possible to advance thus. I say precisely advance, and not destroy, since barbarians, people who have lost their sense, destroy.

I believe that you have no basis to think this way. You can regard us with distrust, but, in any case, you can be calm in this regard, that we are of sound mind and understand perfectly well that if we attack you, you will respond the same way. But you too will receive the same that you hurl against us. And I think that you also understand this. My conversation with you in Vienna gives me the right to talk to you this way.

This indicates that we are normal people, that we correctly understand and correctly evaluate the situation. Consequently, how can we permit the incorrect actions which you ascribe to us? Only lunatics or suicides, who themselves want to perish and to destroy the whole world before they die, could do this. We, however, want to live and do not at all want to destroy your country. We want something quite different: to compete with your country on a peaceful endeavor. We quarrel with you, we have differences in ideological questions. But our view of the world consists in this, that ideological questions, as well as economic problems, should be solved not by military means, they must be solved on the basis of peaceful competition, i.e., as this is understood in capitalist society, on the basis of competition. We have proceeded and are proceeding from the fact that the peaceful co-existence of the two different social-political systems, now existing in the world, is necessary, that it is necessary to assure a stable peace. That is the sort of principle we hold.

You have now proclaimed piratical measures, which were employed in the Middle Ages, when ships proceeding in international waters were attacked, and you have called this “a quarantine” around Cuba. Our vessels, apparently, will soon enter the zone which your Navy is patrolling. I assure you that these vessels, now bound for Cuba, are carrying the most innocent peaceful cargoes. Do you really think that we only occupy ourselves with the carriage of so-called offensive weapons, atomic and hydrogen bombs? Although perhaps your military people imagine that these (cargoes) are some sort of special type of weapon, I assure you that they are the most ordinary peaceful products.

Consequently, Mr. President, let us show good sense. I assure you that on those ships, which are bound for Cuba, there are no weapons at all. The weapons which were necessary for the defense of Cuba are already there. I do not want to say that there were not any shipments of weapons at all. No, there were such shipments. But now Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense.

I don’t know whether you can understand me and believe me. But I should like to have you believe in yourself and to agree that one cannot give way to passions; it is necessary to control them. And in what direction are events now developing? If you stop the vessels, then, as you yourself know, that would be piracy. If we started to do that with regard to your ships, then you would also be as indignant as we and the whole world now are. One cannot give another interpretation to such actions, because one cannot legalize lawlessness. If this were permitted, then there would be no peace, there would also be no peaceful coexistence. We should then be forced to put into effect the necessary measures of a defensive character to protect our interest in accordance with international law. Why should this be done? To what would all this lead?

Let us normalize relations. We have received an appeal from the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, with his proposals. I have already answered him. His proposals come to this, that our side should not transport armaments of any kind to Cuba during a certain period of time, while negotiations are being conducted—and we are ready to enter such negotiations—and the other side should not undertake any sort of piratical actions against vessels engaged in navigation on the high seas. I consider these proposals reasonable. This would be a way out of the situation which has been created, which would give the peoples the possibility of breathing calmly. You have asked what happened, what evoked the delivery of weapons to Cuba? You have spoken about this to our Minister of Foreign Affairs. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, what evoked it.

We were very grieved by the fact—I spoke about it in Vienna—that a landing took place, that an attack on Cuba was committed, as a result of which many Cubans perished. You yourself told me then that this had been a mistake. I respected that explanation. You repeated it to me several times, hinting that not everybody occupying a high position would acknowledge his mistakes as you had done. I value such frankness. For my part, I told you that we too possess no less courage; we also acknowledged those mistakes which had been committed during the history of our state, and not only acknowledged, but sharply condemned them.

If you are really concerned about the peace and welfare of your people, and this is your responsibility as President, then I, as the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, am concerned for my people. Moreover, the preservation of world peace should be our joint concern, since if, under contemporary conditions, war should break out, it would be a war not only between the Soviet Union and the United States which have no contentions between them, but a worldwide cruel and destructive war.

Why have we proceeded to assist Cuba with military and economic aid? The answer is: we have proceeded to do so only for reasons of humanitarianism. At one time, our people itself had a revolution, when Russia was still a backward country, we were attacked then. We were the target of attack by many countries. The USA participated in that adventure. This has been recorded by participants in the aggression against our country. A whole book has been written about this by General Graves, who, at that time, commanded the US Expeditionary Corps. Graves called it “The American Adventure in Siberia.”

We know how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. We sincerely sympathize with Cuba and the Cuban people, but we are not interfering in questions of domestic structure, we are not interfering in their affairs. The Soviet Union desires to help the Cubans build their life as they themselves wish and that others should not hinder them.

You once said that the United States was not preparing an invasion. But you also declared that you sympathized with the Cuban counter-revolutionary emigrants, that you support them and would help them to realize their plans against the present Government of Cuba. It is also not a secret to anyone that the threat of armed attack, aggression, has constantly hung, and continues to hand over Cuba. It was only this which impelled us to respond to the request of the Cuban Government to furnish it aid for the strengthening of the defensive capacity of this country.

If assurances were given by the President and the Government of the United States that the USA itself would not participate in an attack on Cuba and would restrain others from actions of this sort, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. I am not speaking for Fidel Castro, but I think that he and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization and would appeal to the people to get down to peaceful labor. Then, too, the question of armaments would disappear, since, if there is no threat, then armaments are a burden for every people. Then, too, the question of the destruction, not only of the armaments which you call offensive, but of all other armaments as well, would look different.

I spoke in the name of the Soviet Government in the United Nations and introduced a proposal for the disbandment of all armies and for the destruction of all armaments. How then can I now count on those armaments?

Armaments bring only disasters. When one accumulates them, this damages the economy, and if one puts them to use, then they destroy people on both sides. Consequently, only a madman can believe that armaments are the principal means in the life of society. No, they are an enforced loss of human energy, and what is more are for the destruction of man himself. If people do not show wisdom, then in the final analysis they will come to a clash, like blind moles, and then reciprocal extermination will begin.

Let us therefore show statesmanlike wisdom. I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, are not carrying any armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to weigh well what the aggressive, piratical actions, which you have declared the USA intends to carry out in international waters, would lead to. You yourself know that any sensible man simply cannot agree with this, cannot recognize your right to such actions.

If you did this as the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident that nothing else is left to us but to accept this challenge of yours. If, however, you have not lost your self-control and sensibly conceive what this might lead to, then, Mr. President, we and you ought not now to pull on the ends of the rope in which you have tied the knot of war, because the more the two of us pull, the tighter that knot will be tied. And a moment may come when that knot will be tied so tight that even he who tied it will not have the strength to untie it, and then it will be necessary to cut that knot. And what that would mean is not for me to explain to you, because you yourself understand perfectly of what terrible forces our countries dispose.

Consequently, if there is no intention to tighten that knot and thereby to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this.

We welcome all forces which stand on positions of peace. Consequently, I both expressed gratitude to Mr. Bertrand Russell, who manifests alarm and concern for the fate of the world, and readily responded to the appeal of the Acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant.

There, Mr. President, are my thoughts, which, if you agreed with them, could put an end to that tense situation which is disturbing all peoples.

These thoughts are dictated by a sincere desire to relieve the situation, to remove the threat of war.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ N. Khrushchev

October 26, 1962. End text.

Original of letter being air pouched today under transmittal slip to Executive Secretariat.

Kohler
85. Editorial Note

According to a 4-page paper in the Sorensen papers at the Kennedy Library, ABC Correspondent John Scali met with Soviet Counselor Alexandr Fomin at 7:45 p.m. on October 26, 1962, and made the following statement:

“I have reason to believe that the United States Government sees real possibilities in this and supposes that the representatives of the USSR and the United States in New York can work this matter out with U Thant and with each other. My definite impression is that time is very urgent and time is very short.”

The paper went on to note that Fomin asked several times if this message came from high sources and Scali replied that it came from very high places. The Soviet Counselor then inquired if it would be possible to have U.N. inspectors also check U.S. bases in Florida and surrounding Caribbean countries. Scali replied that he had no official information on this possibility, but stated that “he felt it would raise a terrible complication for President Kennedy in a period when time was of the essence.” Fomin, who left the meeting in haste, said the information would be communicated simultaneously to the highest Soviet sources and to the Soviet U.N. Representative in New York. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers Classified Subject Files, Cuba—Subjects) For a similar account including some of the details of the discussion and drafting of the statement, see Hilsman, To Move a Nation, pages 217-219. For a memorandum by Scali on this second meeting and reports on similar conversations during the next 3 days, see Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy, pages 274-279.

86. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2662. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 8:19 p.m. New York, October 26, 1962, 7 p.m.

1484. Cuba. Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and Plimpton met at 4:30 pm at Secretariat with SYG, Loutfi, Narasimhan and Rikhye.

We pointed out that the real essence of the problem was to get the missiles and the nuclear aircraft out of Cuba. Immediate problems were: No further weapons or materiel should be introduced; There should be no further work on the sites; The missiles presently in Cuba should be inoperable; and The suspension of the quarantine. As to shipping, if it were agreed that no bloc ships or bloc-chartered ships were to approach Cuba, the only remaining problem would be the inspection of other ships. This inspection could take place at the ports of embarkation, on the assumption that the ship was not calling at a bloc port, or at the landing ports. Rikhye pointed out that ships declare cargoes at landing ports, which should simplify inspection. We stated that US Fleet would continue to be deployed during interim period, not for purpose of interception but to ensure that there was no trans-shipment at sea or landing at uninspected ports. US Fleet would report any violation to the SYG. It was agreed that the problem of inspection would be quite simple if bloc lived up to Khrushchev agreement to keep bloc shipping away from Cuba. We next raised question of inspection of incoming aircraft at airfields. It was pointed out that few aircraft come in from the bloc, and that the principal problem might relate to incoming cargo planes from other countries. We then raised question of ensuring that IL 28’s would be inoperable. Rikhye thought that UN presence might be sufficient check. We pointed out that they were located at a strictly military field, which had previously been closed up. Rikhye agreed it might be practicable to close it up again. As to sites, we said that construction was progressing rapidly through yesterday, and that heavy camouflaging of the sites was being attempted. We pointed out this was vitally important and urgent problem, which required UN inspectors and constant reports by them. SYG said he would send appeal to Castro tonight through Inchaustegui (Cuba) to suspend construction of the sites, and would also speak to Zorin about it. As regards the ultimate dismantling of the sites, SYG said he would insist on a UN teamto oversee compliance. We stated that non-operability of existing missiles was a difficult problem which it was essential to deal with. Problem related primarily to medium-range missiles since IRBM missile sites were not yet ready and would not be for some time. We discussed possibility of separating the missiles from the launchers as a guarantee of non-operability. If missiles close to launchers, only a few hours are required for firing, and we must have guarantee against surprise launching. Rikhye said he was sure Soviets would not permit inspectors to look at such equipment. He asked whether UN presence might not give assurance that there would be no attack. Our aerial surveillance was also mentioned as a possible deterrent and a possible Soviet and Cuban guarantee of no attack. We pointed out that problem of crucial importance since the Soviet nuclear striking capacity was estimated to be increased 20 per cent by Cuban installations. SYG again raised question of solving whole problem through assurance by US that it would not attack Cuba and would prevent others from doing so, with resulting dismantling of all Soviet installations, and reiterated that this should be a starting point. He suggested the possibility of the President’s writing him a letter to the effect that the US willing to make such a guarantee, if offensive weapons withdrawn, which he would use in negotiations. We pointed out that the OAS would have to be consulted in any such connection, which the SYG said he understood. We also referred to problem of what LA states considered Cuban indirect aggression against them. As regards UN inspection teams in Cuba, SYG said it would be much easier to get Cuba to agree if there were some reciprocity for face-saving purposes, such as UN inspection of Cuban refugee camps to prove no military training, and to ascertain that no evidence of preparations for any invasion of Cuba. With reference to the constitution of the UN inspection teams, we pointed out that they must include sophisticated experts who understand enough of missiles to know what to look for. We pointed out that US ought to be able to designate or nominate people for the team. SYG said it would be difficult to include nationals of US and USSR, and that he was sure that teams would have to be composed of neutrals. It was pointed out that many neutral countries now know quite a bit about missiles as a result of Geneva conferences. It was agreed that the US could brief the teams ahead of time to show them what to look for Rikhye said that he would be glad to get together with a US expert on missile matters to discuss the inspection problem as related to missiles. Comment: Suggest such expert be sent to New York immediately. As regards publication of SYG’s recent letters to and from President and to and from Khrushchev, SYG asked Zorin as to publication. Zorin said he had no instructions and would ask for them. Until agreement to publish was received from Soviet, SYG said publication of such letters should be withheld. General atmosphere was quite relaxed and friendly. SYG much less concerned with blockade than at earlier meeting with Yost and Plimpton,The Mission to the United Nations had reported on this conversation at 11:30 a.m. in telegram 1479 from New York, transmitted at 4 p.m. (Ibid.) Since Stevenson was still in Washington, Yost and Plimpton had represented the U.S. side. The discussion generally proceeded along the lines above. and seemed much more aware of site construction and missile operability problems and need for inspection. He clearly putting principal emphasis in his mind on possibility of US guarantee to Cuba as short-circuit solution of whole problem. Stevenson
87. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and Prime Minister MacmillanSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations. Top Secret. For Macmillan’s record of this conversation, see At the End of the Day, pp. 209-212. Washington, October 26, 1962.

President: Hello, Prime Minister.

PM: Hello, what’s the news now?

President: Well, Governor Stevenson saw U Thant this afternoonSee Document 86. and made our proposals about the importation of arms ceasing, and that work on these bases stopping and leading to eventual dismemberment. There are some reports around, some Russian conversations, but it’s rather unofficial and unreliable, about some thought that it’s possible they might do something about withdrawing the weapons if they could get a territorial guarantee of Cuba. But that is so unofficial that I’m not in a position now to know whether there’s anything to it or not. Khrushchev told U Thant that he would keep his ships out of there for the time being, but he wouldn’t do it very long. He isn’t giving us very much because actually he’s got no ships in the area anyway. But at least he’s made that announcement; he’s keeping his ships out of there for the time being. We are continuing the quarantine. The build-up of the sites continues, however. And I put a statement out this afternoon describing how the build-up is going on, so that unless in the next 48 hours we get some political suggestions as to dismantling the base we’re then going to be faced with a problem of what to do about this build-up.For text of this statement, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, p. 812.

PM: (garbled) Well as I see it—one idea you just mentioned is that Cuba might be made like Belgium was—an international guarantee of inviolable country which all of us would guarantee its neutrality and inviolability independently. Is that a possibility?

President: Well, that is a matter that it seems to me we ought to be thinking about and we will be talking about that in the next 24 hours—as to whether there is any room for a settlement on that basis. That would leave Castro in power. It would leave the Russians perhaps free to ship in a good deal more of defensive equipment and they have shipped in a good deal. We now find a good many self-propelled armored vehicles, with very sophisticated conventional equipment, and so on. But it may be a possibility, but I could probably give you more information about that by tomorrow night. But at least there have been a couple of hints but not enough to go on yet.

PM: Yes, well all right. Well, another possibility was that U Thant might himself propose to the United Nations, which I believe they would accept, that he should go with the team and insure that these missiles were made inoperable during the period of any conference or discussion.

President: Yes, that is correct. There would have to be some technical way of determining that these weapons were being made inoperable and that work on the sites was ceasing during these conversations. That’s correct.

PM: (garbled) I am quite sure that U Thant would have done such a thing. (more garbled) He might suggest to the UN that he would go … with a team of experts which would supervise the matter during the talks.

President: Yes, there’s some suggestion of that. Also they want to inspect some of the refugee camps in Florida and Nicaragua, Guatemala and Swan Island. That came up in the conversation with the Governor. I am looking into it. I don’t think we’ve got anything going there that would be difficult to inspect. But this is all part of the political proposals which are now being looked at in view of the Governor’s conversation. So I would sum it up, Prime Minister, by saying that by tomorrow morning or noon we should be in a position of knowing whether there is some political proposal that we could agree to, and whether the Russians are interested in it or not. We will know a little more, I think, by tomorrow afternoon. In the meanwhile the quarantine stays; he doesn’t send ships in; we let a ship pass this afternoon, but there are no other ships within 48 hours or so, so we don’t expect any problems on the sea. The problem that concerns us is the continued build-up, and I issued a statement on that today. I think I could probably get you a little more precise information on the various political proposals than U Thant’s conversation with Stevenson. I’ll send you a report on that tonight and then you will have it in the morning.

PM: If we want to save face, would it be worthwhile our undertaking to keep open eyes on all exiles which are here in England during the same period, during the conference.

President: Let me put that into the machinery and then I will be in touch with you on that.

PM: (unintelligible)

President: Good, Prime Minister, let me send that over to the Department. I think we don’t want to have too many dismantlings, but it’s possible that that proposal might help. They might also insist on Turkey and Italy, but I will keep in mind your suggestion here so that if it gets into that that may be advantageous.

PM: (garbled)

President: Yes, that is correct. I will let Stevenson know that and he will have that in mind in the conversation.

PM: That’s correct. You will send your message tomorrow and we will continue this tomorrow.

President: That’s correct. I think we just have to wait until we fully analyze this conversation. I haven’t seen the entire conversation, but I think that there may—and the prospect of a trade of these missiles and some guarantees of Cuba is still so vague that I am not really in a position to say that there is any possibility as yet. Maybe by tomorrow evening at this time we’ll know better.

PM: Yes, but of course at this stage any movement by you may produce a result in Berlin which will be … (garbled) … that’s the danger now …

President: Well, we’re not going to have any problem at sea because he is keeping his ships out of there, and as I say we let one ship pass today for the very reason that you’ve named. On the other hand, if in the end of 48 hours we are getting no place and the missile sites continue to be constructed, then we are going to be faced with some hard decisions.

PM: (a garbled reference to Berlin)

President: That’s correct, and that is really why we have not done more than we have done up until now. But of course on the other hand if the missile sites continue and get constructed and we don’t do anything about it, then I would suppose that it would have quite an effect on Berlin anyway.

PM: Yes … (garble) I will send you a message concerning them and you will send me U Thant’s conversation.

President: Yes, I’ll send you a memorandum based on the copy of the conversation that Stevenson had with U Thant. I will also keep in touch with you tomorrow at this time if you—or otherwise I’ll send you a message tomorrow. Maybe I’ll send you a message unless we have got something immediate; and No. 3, we will not take any further action until I have talked to you in any case. I won’t bother to call you tomorrow, because I may be down—I may be away from here tomorrow evening, and I assume you may be too. But I will send you a message if there is anything new, and in any case I will talk to you on the phone before we do anything of a drastic nature.

PM: … thank you… . (garble)

President: Prime Minister, I’m going to send you a note tonight or tomorrow morning about asking if it’s agreeable with you if General Norstad stay on until January 1st, that there be an overlap with Lemnitzer’s tour of duty; that Lemnitzer go over there and take over the American forces and be there and have that 60-day period to be sort of adjusted to his new responsibilities. You’ll be getting a formal letter, and I didn’t want to say anything about it because we haven’t been in touch with General De Gaulle as yet, who is very sensitive in these NATO matters. But I will be in touch with you and I would assume probably that that suggestion would be agreeable to you?

PM: It is indeed very sensible… .

President: Good. Well, I’ll be in touch in a formal way with you tomorrow on that matter and I’ll send you tonight the memorandum on the U Thant conversation—and I hope all goes well.

PM: Thank you very much (garble)

President: Good, fine, Prime Minister, and I’ll be in touch with you very shortly. Thank you and good night.

PM: Good night.

88. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow. Washington, October 26, 1962. SUBJECT Report Number Three of the Planning SubcommitteeReports number one and two (ibid.) are included in the Supplement. The Planning Subcommittee considered the situation as of Friday morning, October 26, 1962. It was agreed that, unless the U Thant initiative led to prompt negotiations, the three major requirements were: To maintain diplomatic and public focus on the continued exist-ence and expansion of offensive installations in Cuba; To increase the degree of our pressure and to build anxiety in all quarters that more decisive action will be required of the U.S. to eliminate the offensive installations; and To maintain a diplomatic track which holds open the possibility of a peaceful resolution on terms consistent with the President’s speech. The planning process was brought into focus around the following major problems: An operational and political scenario for the extension of the blockade to POL. (ARA, Mr. Hurwitch) Operational and political track involving progressively increased pressure building up to an airstrike against missile installations. (Amb. Thompson; Messrs. Rowen and Kitchen) A consolidated negotiating track. (EUR, NEA, S/P) Assessment and recommendations concerning possibilities and dangers in Cuban political situation. (ARA) Regular daily reassessment of Soviet intentions and appropriate posture for U.S. (S/P, Mr. Harvey) Assessment of Free World political position vis-a-vis the crisis, with recommendations for U.S. action. (Mr. Jorden, USIA, and appropriate State Department bureaus) Post-crisis Cuba: conditions of coexistence with Hemisphere. (ARA) The planning tasks listed in Report Number Two are either going forward or will be consolidated into the tasks listed above.
89. Memorandum Prepared by the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, WW Rostow. Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is attached to an undated memorandum of transmittal to the President and to an October 26 memorandum from Rostow to Rusk, which states that it was prepared in response to a “direct request” from Bundy on October 24. Washington, October 26, 1962. SUBJECT Negotiation

Background. The optimum setting for US-Soviet negotiations, particularly at the Summit, would be one in which Soviet offensive weapons had already been removed from Cuba. This may not be feasible. If so, the question of how to undertake negotiations with the Soviets will present itself against the background of either: Soviet acceptance of some proposal involving cessation of Soviet site construction and perhaps of Soviet shipping to Cuba; or ascending US economic and military pressures on Cuba.

These two alternatives are not wholly mutually exclusive. The actual situation may include both some diplomatic progress and some increased US pressure.

 Basic Strategy. Our purpose, in negotiations, should be: To afford the Soviets face-saving cover, if they wish, for a withdrawal of their offensive weapons from Cuba. To pave the way, if the negotiations fail, for expanded US economic or military action to remove the weapons. To use the crisis to reach agreement on other measures that would, in any case, be in our interest.

Allied Interests. In pursuing these purposes: We must have full and intimate consultation with our allies. It is essential to avoid any implication that we are trading off pre-crisis allied or US interests to secure removal of Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba.

Failure on either of these fronts could undermine the Alliance.

 Level. The best way to attain the purposes in para 2 may be through a Summit meeting. At this level, it may be easier to widen the scope of the negotiations in such a way as to resolve the crisis without an obvious and humiliating Soviet backdown. Other levels and forums are also available, however, the situation may well develop so as to make these alternatives more feasible and useful. Prior Action. Before any negotiation opens, we should take two actions to help set the stage: Assuming that negotiations take place before the Cuban issue is settled, we should make clear that, if negotiations do not succeed, we will take early action to remove Soviet offensive weapons. We should seek an immediate allied decision in principle to set up the small pilot NATO Southern Command multilateral seaborne force (Italians, Turks, Greeks, US, and perhaps Canadians) proposed by Ambassador Finletter in Polto 506,Document 75. and we should make clear our intent to provide interim coverage with Polaris and other external forces. We should then urge the Turkish and Italian governments to get quietly on the NAC record what we would take to be their intent, in any event, in this circumstance, i.e., to phase out IRBM’s in view of both the prospect of a Southern Command force and the interim Polaris and other US coverage. Negotiations. We should make crystal clear, in negotiations, the sharp division between Cuba and other subjects on which we would wish to negotiate regardless of whether there was a Cuban crisis. In negotiations about Cuba, we should demand early agreement on removal of Soviet offensive weapons, possibly in the context of a Latin American (and, if necessary, African) “nuclear free” zone, in return for the end of the quarantine. In respect of other subjects, some of which could be dealt with rapidly and simultaneously with Cuba and some of which would take longer, we might try to do business as follows: Arms Control. US and Soviet non-diffusion declarations; US and Soviet declarations of intent not to facilitate procurement of MRBM’s for land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries other than US and USSR. (The US would only enter into such an exchange of declarations after full allied consultations, and would base its declaration on the previously stated US policy only to facilitate MRBM procurement for multilateral sea-based force.) Safeguards against miscalculations, e.g., exchange of US and Soviet military observation teams, direct communication facilities between US and Soviet national command centers, etc. Review of key differences of approach in the Geneva Disarmament and Test Ban negotiations, to determine whether any useful new directive can be given to the US and Soviet negotiators. Berlin. We would make clear that the troop issue was non-negotiable, but that we were prepared to reach a “Solution C” type agreement, which did not purport to be a final Berlin settlement but which put the matter on ice and allowed East Germans to substitute for the Soviets in access functions. This could be dressed up in various ways—UN observer, no nuclear arms in Berlin, etc.—for face-saving purposes. If the Soviets were interested, this matter could be pursued further at the minister level with other interested parties. Germany. We might suggest to the Soviets that feasible aspects of the German question—mixed commissions to increase inter-German contacts, and declarations regarding non-use of force to change the demarcation line and change the external frontiers—might be pursued further at the foreign minister level with other interested parties. Future Summitry. It might be agreed that the heads of the UK and French governments would be invited to meet in a future quadripartite Summit, to review any work done at the foreign minister level in the meantime on Berlin and Germany and to consider new topics, e.g., NATO and Warsaw Pact non-aggression declarations, which might be more appropriately handled in a more relaxed atmosphere than the present crisis. Action. If this general course of action commends itself, we should: move immediately to consultation with our allies; then move to negotiations with the Soviets, preferably at the highest level.

Speed is of the essence, since passage of time may make less credible our resolve soon to take action to remove Soviet offensive weapons if negotiations fail.

90. Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. A Record of Action of this meeting is in the Supplement. McCone’s 2 pages of handwritten notes for the meeting are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. They are also reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 331-332. Tape recording transcripts of this meeting are in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Presidential Records, No. 41.1 and 41a.1. For two other accounts of this and other meetings on October 27, see Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, pp. 93 ff. and Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, pp. 712-716. Washington, October 27, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone highlighted the intelligence information contained in the first two pages of the attached CIA Cuba Crisis Memorandum.A summary of this memorandum, SC No. 08184/62, is reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 328-329. See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara reported on the positions of Soviet Bloc ships moving toward Cuba. He said we do not know yet whether any such ships will enter the interception area. He recommended that we be prepared to board the Graznyy, which is now out about 600 miles. We would put ships alongside her and follow along for about 200 miles. If we asked her to stop and she did, we would inspect the cargo for contraband and release her if, as expected, she had no prohibited material aboard. If she refuses to stop, we would stop her by force and sink her if the cargo included prohibited material.

Under Secretary Ball pointed out that the Soviets did not know the extent of our quarantine zone.

The President agreed that we should ask U Thant to tell the Russians in New York where we are drawing the quarantine line. The Russians would then be in a position to decide whether to turn back their tanker or allow her to enter the quarantine zone sometime later today.

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, two daylight reconnaissance missions, one in the morning and one in the afternoon. Secretary McNamara also recommended that a night reconnaissance mission be flown—Secretary Rusk recommended against a night flight. The President instructed the Defense Department to place the night reconnaissance planes on the alert and to prepare a public announcement of the mission in order that a final decision to be taken this afternoon could be promptly implemented.

The discussion then turned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Mr. Nitze said it would be an anathema to the Turks to pull the missiles out. He feared the next Soviet step would be a demand for the denuclearization of the entire NATO area. He urged us to focus attention on Cuba rather than on U.S. bases in other countries.

Under Secretary Ball reported that the Turks would be very difficult about withdrawal of their strategic missiles, but the Italians would be easier to persuade if we chose to withdraw Jupiters from Italy.

At this point in the meeting the partial text of a Soviet public statement was read by the President as it was received in the room.Document 91. The President commented that the statement was a very tough position and varied considerably from the tone of Khrushchev’s personal letter to the President received last night.Document 84. The President felt that the Soviet position would get wide support and said we should consider making public the Khrushchev private letter.

Secretary Rusk returned to the question of U.S. missiles in Turkey and pointed out that this subject must be kept separate from Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Turkish missile problem should be dealt with in the context of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact.

Mr. Bundy said we could not accept the Soviet proposal on Turkish missiles because the Soviet missiles were not out of Cuba.

The President recalled that he had asked that consideration be given to the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey some days previously.

Under Secretary Ball replied that the Department had decided it could not raise this question with the Turks at this time for fear of a disastrous Turkish reaction. He said the question had been raised with Finletter in Paris and study was being given to whether any method could be worked out to reassure the Turks if we were going to offer to withdraw the Jupiter missiles.

Mr. Bundy said we cannot get into the position of appearing to sell out an ally, i.e. Turkey, to serve our own interests, i.e. getting the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President commented that the Russians had made the Turkish missile withdrawal proposal in the most difficult possible way. Now that their proposal is public, we have no chance to talk privately to the Turks about the missiles, which, for a long time, we have considered to be obsolete.

Secretary Dillon said that it was possible that the Russians had made their public statement as part of a stalling tactic to provide them with sufficient time for a full-fledged confrontation with us.

The President read a draft statement telephoned from New York by Ambassador Stevenson commenting on the Soviet statement.A copy of this statement is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General. AmbassadorStevenson argued for releasing his statement in an effort to keep the “peace offensive” from going to the Soviets.

The President left the meeting at this point with Mr. Sorensen. There ensued a discussion of how to handle the discrepancy between the Khrushchev private letter and the Russian offer made public in the Soviet statement. A suggestion was made that the Russian proposals contained in the private Khrushchev letter be made public.

The President returned to the meeting. He said we must ensure that the construction work on the missile sites in Cuba be stopped at once. He suggested that we talk to the Turks about the missiles, pointing out to them the great peril facing them during the next week. He acknowledged that the Turks were now in no position to make a statement to the effect that they would ask that the Jupiters be withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we tell the Turks they must say that the Jupiter problem is a NATO problem and is not associated with the Cuban missile problem.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the fact that the missiles belonged to Turkey and that only the nuclear warheads are under our total control.

The President returned to a discussion of where we now find ourselves, i.e. we now have Soviet public proposals and Khrushchev’s private proposals. What we must seek is an immediate cessation of the work on offensive missiles in Cuba. Once this work stopped we could talk to the Russians.

Mr. Bundy reiterated the view that the threat to us is Cuba. One explanation for the varying Soviet proposals is that the hard line Russians wanted to make public their preferred demands in order to make impossible progress toward the Khrushchev private offer which may have been drafted by those who are less hard-nosed.

The President noted that it appeared to him that the Russians were making various proposals so fast, one after the other, that they were creating a kind of shield behind which work on the missile sites in Cuba continued. He said we had a perfectly defensible position, i.e. work on the missile sites must stop. Secretary McNamara added the thought that these offensive weapons must be made inoperable.

Mr. Bundy suggested that we tell Khrushchev privately that the position in their public statement was impossible for us, but that the position Khrushchev took in his private letter was different and we were studying these proposals. In the meantime, however, time is running out.

The President interrupted to take a telephone call from Ambassador Stevenson in New York. He resumed the discussion by saying that Khrushchev obviously is attempting to limit our freedom of action in Cuba by introducing the question of the missile bases outside this hemisphere.

Mr. Bundy read a draft press statement and Mr. Gilpatric read a statement which he had prepared.Neither of these drafts has been identified further.

Mr. Alexis Johnson reported that he had just been informed that the Turkish Government had issued a press statement saying that the Russian proposal with respect to Jupiters in Turkey was not conceivable.

(As the remainder of the Soviet public statement was received in the Cabinet Room, it appeared that the Russian base proposal involved not merely Turkey but all of NATO.)

Mr. Sorensen introduced a draft statement which was read by the group.Not found.

Revisions were made in the Gilpatric draft, which was issued shortly thereafter in the form attached.For text of the agreed statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 440-441. This statement emphasized the offensive weapons buildup in Cuba.

The Attorney General said that the statement might make people think that if the Russians stopped the missile buildup in Cuba, we would be willing to withdraw our missiles from Turkey. He desired that we make doubly clear that Turkish NATO missiles were one problem and that Cuba was an entirely separate problem.

Mr. Gilpatric stated that it was crucial for us to stand on the position that we will not negotiate with the Russians while the Soviet missile threat is growing in Cuba. The President recalled that over a year ago we wanted to get the Jupiter missiles out of Turkey because they had become obsolete and of little military value. If the missiles in Cuba added 50% to Soviet nuclear capability, then to trade these missiles for those in Turkey would be of great military value. But we are now in the position of risking war in Cuba and in Berlin over missiles in Turkey which are of little military value. From the political point of view, it would be hard to get support on an airstrike against Cuba because many would think that we would make a good trade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey in the event the Russians would agree to remove the missiles from Cuba. We are in a bad position if we appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of keeping useless missiles in Turkey. We cannot propose to withdraw the missiles from Turkey, but the Turks could offer to do so. The Turks must be informed of the great danger in which they will live during the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some kind of a trade over missiles.

The President left the meeting to meet the State Governors who had been waiting for one-half hour to see him.

The discussion continued in the President’s absence. It was not possible to say with certainty whether the Soviet public offer included all NATO basses or referred specifically to Turkey.

The Attorney General expressed his concern as to what our position would be if we talked to the Russians for sixty days and then the Cubans refused to permit UN inspectors to continue to ensure that missiles in Cuba were inoperable. The reply was that we could then decide to attack the bases by air.

There was discussion of a second statement to be put out but this proposal was later abandoned.

A draft message to Khrushchev, which had been prepared by Ambassador Thompson, was read and a final version was to be completed for the President’s consideration later in the day.The draft is not found; for the letter as eventually sent see Document 95. The group agreed to meet at the State Department without the President at 2:30 PM and meet with the President again at 4:00 PM

(Note: At the meeting at the State Department, the Attorney General repeated his view that we should keep the focus on the missile bases. He preferred to let the Soviet tankers through the quarantine line in order to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets over one of their ships. He said if we attack a Soviet tanker, the balloon would go up. He urged that we buy time now in order to launch an air attack Monday or Tuesday.October 29 or 30.)

Secretary McNamara expressed his view that before we attack Cuba we must notify the Cubans.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
91. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. No classification marking. Other copies of this letter are ibid.: Lot 77 D 163, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. This “official translation” prepared by Language Services of the Department of State and an “informal translation” from the Embassy in Moscow are printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1962, pp. 646-649. A note on the source text indicates a copy was sent to Acting Secretary-General U Thant. Problems of Communism reports that this message was broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m., the same time the Russian text was delivered to the Embassy. Moscow, October 27, 1962.

Dear Mr. President, I have studied with great satisfaction your reply to Mr. ThantSee Document 59. concerning measures that should be taken to avoid contact between our vessels and thereby avoid irreparable and fatal consequences. This reasonable step on your part strengthens my belief that you are showing concern for the preservation of peace, which I note with satisfaction.

I have already said that our people, our Government, and I personally, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, are concerned solely with having our country develop and occupy a worthy place among all peoples of the world in economic competition, in the development of culture and the arts, and in raising the living standard of the people. This is the most noble and necessary field for competition, and both the victor and the vanquished will derive only benefit from it, because it means peace and an increase in the means by which man lives and finds enjoyment.

In your statement you expressed the opinion that the main aim was not simply to come to an agreement and take measures to prevent contact between our vessels and consequently a deepening of the crisis which could, as a result of such contacts, spark a military conflict, after which all negotiations would be superfluous because other forces and other laws would then come into play—the laws of war. I agree with you that this is only the first step. The main thing that must be done is to normalize and stabilize the state of peace among states and among peoples.

I understand your concern for the security of the United States, Mr. President, because this is the primary duty of a President. But we too are disturbed about these same questions; I bear these same obligations as Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. You have been alarmed by the fact that we have aided Cuba with weapons, in order to strengthen its defense capability—precisely defense capability—because whatever weapons it may possess, Cuba cannot be equated with you since the difference in magnitude is so great, particularly in view of modern means of destruction. Our aim has been and is to help Cuba, and no one can dispute the humanity of our motives, which are oriented toward enabling Cuba to live peacefully and develop in the way its people desire.

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But how are we, the Soviet Union, our Government, to assess your actions which are expressed in the fact that you have surrounded the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases; placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile armaments there? This is no secret. Responsible American personages openly declare that it is so. Your missiles are located in Britain, are located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90 miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But Turkey adjoins us; our sentries patrol back and forth and see each other. Do you consider, then, that you have the right to demand security for your own country and the removal of the weapons you call offensive, but do not accord the same right to us? You have placed destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us. How then can recognition of our equal military capacities be reconciled with such unequal relations between our great states? This is irreconcilable.

It is good, Mr. President, that you have agreed to have our represent-atives meet and begin talks, apparently through the mediation of U Thant, Acting Secretary General of the United Nations. Consequently, he to some degree has assumed the role of a mediator and we consider that he will be able to cope with this responsible mission, provided, of course, that each party drawn into this controversy displays good will.

I think it would be possible to end the controversy quickly and normalize the situation, and then the people could breathe more easily, considering that statesmen charged with responsibility are of sober mind and have an awareness of their responsibility combined with the ability to solve complex questions and not bring things to a military catastrophe.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey. Let us reach agreement as to the period of time needed by you and by us to bring this about. And, after that, persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made. Of course, the permission of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey is necessary for the entry into those countries of these representatives and for the inspection of the fulfillment of the pledge made by each side. Of course it would be best if these representatives enjoyed the confidence of the Security Council, as well as yours and mine—both the United States and the Soviet Union—and also that of Turkey and Cuba. I do not think it would be difficult to select people who would enjoy the trust and respect of all parties concerned.

We, in making this pledge, in order to give satisfaction and hope of the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to strengthen their confidence in their security, will make a statement within the framework of the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet Government gives a solemn promise to respect the inviolability of the borders and sovereignty of Turkey, not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available our territory as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and that it would also restrain those who contemplate committing aggression against Turkey, either from the territory of the Soviet Union or from the territory of Turkey’s other neighboring states.

The United States Government will make a similar statement within the framework of the Security Council regarding Cuba. It will declare that the United States will respect the inviolability of Cuba’s borders and its sovereignty, will pledge not to interfere in its internal affairs, not to invade Cuba itself or make its territory available as a bridgehead for such an invasion, and will also restrain those who might contemplate committing aggression against Cuba, either from the territory of the United States or from the territory of Cuba’s other neighboring states.

Of course, for this we would have to come to an agreement with you and specify a certain time limit. Let us agree to some period of time, but without unnecessary delay—say within two or three weeks, not longer than a month.

The means situated in Cuba, of which you speak and which disturb you, as you have stated, are in the hands of Soviet officers. Therefore, any accidental use of them to the detriment of the United States is excluded. These means are situated in Cuba at the request of the Cuban Government and are only for defense purposes. Therefore, if there is no invasion of Cuba, or attack on the Soviet Union or any of our other allies, then of course these means are not and will not be a threat to anyone. For they are not for purposes of attack.

If you are agreeable to my proposal, Mr. President, then we would send our representatives to New York, to the United Nations, and would give them comprehensive instructions in order that an agreement may be reached more quickly. If you also select your people and give them the corresponding instructions, then this question can be quickly resolved.

Why would I like to do this? Because the whole world is now apprehensive and expects sensible actions of us. The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement and of the eradication of the controversy that has arisen. I attach great importance to this agreement in so far as it could serve as a good beginning and could in particular make it easier to reach agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests. The question of the tests could be solved in parallel fashion, without connecting one with the other, because these are different issues. However, it is important that agreement be reached on both these issues so as to present humanity with a fine gift, and also to gladden it with the news that agreement has been reached on the cessation of nuclear tests and that consequently the atmosphere will no longer be poisoned. Our position and yours on this issue are very close together.

All of this could possibly serve as a good impetus toward the finding of mutually acceptable agreements on other controversial issues on which you and I have been exchanging views. These views have so far not been resolved, but they are awaiting urgent solution, which would clear up the international atmosphere. We are prepared for this.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. KhrushchevPrinted from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.
92. Record of the Fourth Meeting of the Berlin-NATO Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Washington, October 27, 1962, 11 a.m.

1. Daily Briefing

The situation briefing was omitted today. (Mr. Nitze was detained and Admiral Lee took the chair.)

2. U.S.-Berlin Buildup

It was agreed that Paper No. 7 revised on the date of 27 October 1962For text of this paper, see vol. XV, pp. 401–402. would be sent forward to the Executive Committee on Monday morning, 29 October, with the inclusion of a statement indicating that a supporting study is being prepared which assesses the economic implications for the budget and the balance of payments. This study will be provided by the Department of Defense in conjunction with the DOD Comptroller’s office. (Action: Admiral Lee.)

3. Consultation with Allies

The subject was discussed at length. Mr. Schaetzel stressed the dilemma involved in trying to keep the Allies sufficiently informed to carry them with us while at the same time guarding the security of our deliberations and decisions. He pointed out that it would be highly desirable for the Allies to be kept abreast of the developing situation through official U.S. channels rather than through the press. Proposals were made to have Mr. Thompson and Mr. Nitze give regular briefings to the quadripartite Ambassadors; to have a cable based on these briefings sent to Mr. Finletter for briefing the NAC a few hours later; and to have the Finletter cable used by Defense for briefing the Standing Group and Military Committee. Mr. Schaetzel will have a paper on Monday setting forth this proposal in detail. General Twitchell was asked to put in a paper at the same time on the possibility of supplying screened operational information. Mr. Schaetzel will also look into the question of making similar periodic reports to other nations through our embassies. (Action: Mr. Schaetzel and General Twitchell.)

4. Base Trade-Off

The subject was discussed and while no firm and formal judgments were reached the sense of the group was that the door should be closed as quickly as possible on the idea of trading the U.S. position in Turkey for the Soviet position in Cuba. In connection with the nervousness of the Turks on this score, it was proposed that a special envoy, possibly Mr. Livingston Merchant, should be sent to Ankara to consult with the Turkish government and keep them informed of developments in this area.

5. Khrushchev Letter

(Mr. Nitze joined the meeting at this point.) Mr. Nitze summarized the contents of the letter sent by Khrushchev last nightSee Document 84. to the President and also referred to a subsequent TASS release which linked the Cuban missiles with those in Turkey.See the source note, Document 91. Mr. Nitze read a draft of a proposed replyNot found. and there was a brief discussion with particular emphasis on its final paragraph which referred to the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere. The sense of the group regarding the need to keep Turkish bases from being linked in any way with the Cuban situation was conveyed to Mr. Nitze.

6. Administrative

There will be no meeting on Sunday, October 28, except at the call of the chair. Future meetings will be scheduled to begin at 11:30.

93. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2762. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 2:06 p.m. New York, October 27, 1962, 2 p.m.

1494. Cuba. Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and Plimpton had conference with SYG alone at 11:45 this morning.

We showed SYG Khrushchev’s message of last night to the President,See Document 84. pointing out that it contained no reference to Turkey. We also pointed out it in effect conceded existence in Cuba of complete nuclear missile capability. SYG had just seen Reuter despatch regarding Khrushchev’s public statement regarding Turkey.See the source note, Document 91. We pointed out that effect of Khrushchev’s Turkey proposal was that, as the result of his own clandestine nuclear intrusion into the Western Hemisphere, he gets a guarantee of Cuban integrity and the removal of the Turkey base, whereas all we get is removal of intrusion which he should not have made anyway. We also pointed out that the Turkey base is not for the defense of Turkey but for the defense of Europe and is part of the whole NATO defensive structure. The removal of that base would upset the European balance of power. We pointed out that these were informal observations and that we had no positive instructions from Washington. We said the Turkish base might be a proper subject for discussion covering various aspects of the overall disarmament and European situations after the status quo had been restored, and that such restoration requires removal of weapons from Cuba. Since all NATO partners involved in Turkey base any negotiations as to its removal would require a great deal of time whereas removal of nuclear weapons from Cuba was an immediate essential. We said it seemed highly probable that the Cuban issue could be very promptly settled on the basis of Khrushchev’s first letter, namely, on basis of immediate withdrawal of nuclear weapons as against US guarantee as to territorial integrity and political independence of Cuba, and we urged SYG to press for such immediate solution and for confining all discussions to Cuba and the exclusion of the Turkish base problem. SYG said he would keep these points in mind, but that he did not wish to make any remarks on substance of the matter. He said he hoped the President’s reply to Khrushchev would be cooperative and conciliatory in tone, as the SYG does not want the American image tarnished by any public impression that Khrushchev is reasonable and the US not, and that the reply would evidence willingness to negotiate. SYG mentioned the great concern all over world as to seriousness of situation. He said he had received 620 telegrams, most from US, as to his proposals, only 5 of which were negative. SYG said he had urged both Castro and Zorin to have work on sites stopped immediately. Cuban Rep had said he would communicate SYG’s request to his govt. Zorin had turned request aside asking how anyone could rely on US intelligence. SYG also said that as to inspection of ship cargoes arriving in Cuba, Zorin had said this question should be addressed to Cuban authorities. While we believe SYG would prefer to confine discussions to Cuba, we have little confidence he will take firm position with Sovs on this point since he shows every evidence of wanting to avoid being caught in middle. Stevenson
94. Summary Record of the Eighth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. A copy of McCone’s 2-page handwritten notes for this meeting are in the Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. They are reproduced in CIA Documentson the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 333-334. A Record of Actions taken at the meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) A transcript of this meeting is ibid., President’s Office Files, Presidential Recordings, No. 42.1 and 42.2. Washington, October 27, 1962, 4 p.m.

Secretary McNamara reported on today’s daylight reconnaissance mission. One mission aborted for mechanical reasons, according to preliminary reports. One plane is overdue and several are said to have encountered ground fire.

Secretary McNamara again recommended night reconnaissance missions. The President delayed a decision on night flights pending a full report on today’s daylight mission (the night mission was later called off).

There followed a discussion of a draft letter from the President to Khrushchev.This draft has not been identified further, but for the final text, see Document 95. The President added to the draft an offer to discuss with the Russians the proposals they had made public.Document 91. He predicted that Khrushchev would say we had rejected his proposal. The formulation included a comment that Khrushchev must realize that matters relating to NATO must be discussed at a later time. The letter was approved in a revised form.

A message to U Thant was discussed and approved. The purpose of the message was to obtain the halting of work on the bases in Cuba as a condition to discussion of various other problems.

Secretary Rusk reported that one of our U-2 planes had overflown the Soviet Union by accident due to navigational error. Soviet fighters were scrambled from a base near Wrangel Island. The Secretary thought that the Russians would make a loud fuss about this incident.

The President decided not to make the incident public, but be prepared to do so as soon as the Soviets publicized it.

The President asked whether we wanted to continue to say that we would talk only about the missiles in Cuba. He believed that for the next few hours we should emphasize our position that if the Russians will halt missile activity in Cuba we would be prepared to discuss NATO problems with the Russians. He felt that we would not be in a position to offer any trade for several days. He did feel that if we could succeed in freezing the situation in Cuba and rendering the strategic missiles inoperable, then we would be in a position to negotiate with the Russians.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that there would be a serious reaction in NATO countries if we appeared to be trading withdrawal of missiles in Turkey for withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. The President responded that if we refuse to discuss such a trade and then take military action in Cuba, we would also be in a difficult position.

The President left the room to talk to General Norstad on the KY-9 secure telephone to Paris.

In the President’s absence the message to U Thant was further discussed. The Attorney General felt we should say to U Thant: “While these and other proposals are being discussed, would you urgently ascertain whether the Soviet Union is prepared to cease work on the bases and render the missiles inoperable?”U Thant would be asked to convey the President’s message to the Russians in New York most urgently.

Secretary Rusk questioned whether the Russians are trying at the last minute to obtain more of a quid pro quo from us or whether they are introducing new elements in the picture merely to weaken our public position worldwide.

Secretary McNamara pointed out, in connection with the current military situation, that a limited airstrike on Cuba was now impossible because our reconnaissance planes were being fired on. He felt that we must now look to the major airstrike to be followed by an invasion of Cuba. To do so he said we would need to call up the reserves now.

Secretary McNamara [1½ lines of source text not declassified]. If we could do this he felt that the Soviets would not attack Turkey when we invaded Cuba. Our objective should be to seek to avoid any Soviet attack in Europe as a response to our invasion of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson commented that it was impossible to draw any conclusions from the fact that one of our reconnaissance planes over Cuba had been shot at.

The President returned to the meeting, accompanied by General Lemnitzer.

The President approved the final revision of the statement to U Thant, which was to be phoned to U Thant and released here publicly. (Copy attached)The text of this message is included in the Record of Actions for the meeting.

The President asked whether we should call together the represent-atives of NATO to report to them what we had done and were planning to do. If we reject Soviet efforts to tie in NATO problems to the Cuban situation, then we could persuade NATO to take the same position. An additional reason for a NATO meeting then is that if the Russians do attack the NATO countries we do not want them to say that they had not been consulted about the actions we were taking in Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said that current military planning provided for 500 sorties to take out the SAM sites, the MIGs in Cuba, and the missiles and missile sites. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

The President expressed his concern that the alternatives we are facing have not been presented to NATO. NATO does not realize what may be coming and the Europeans do not realize that we may face a choice of invading Cuba or taking the missiles out of Turkey.

Secretary McNamara urged that a NATO meeting be held tomorrow only if we have decided to launch our strike tomorrow. He repeated his hope that we can act in such a way as to reduce the pressure on the Russians to hit Turkey.

Secretary Rusk recommended that mobilization measures be authorized immediately.

The President suggested that we talk immediately to the Turks, explaining to them what we were planning to do with our missiles and then explain the entire situation to the North Atlantic Council.

Secretary Rusk then read a Stevenson draft of a letter to Khrushchev.Not found.

The President said that the key to any letter to Khrushchev was the demand that work cease on the missile sites in Cuba. He predicted that if we make no mention of Turkey in our letter, Khrushchev will write back to us saying that if we include Turkey, then he would be prepared to settle the Cuban situation. The President said this would mean that we would lose twenty-four hours while they would continue to work on the bases and achieve an operational status for more of their missiles. He suggested that we would be willing to guarantee not to invade Cuba if the Soviet missiles were taken out.

Secretary Rusk returned to the Stevenson draft, which the President approved as revised. The phrase “and assurance of peace in the Caribbean” was discussed and the reference to no invasion of Cuba was omitted. The President also agreed not to call a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

The Attorney General commented that in his opinion the Stevenson draft letter was defensive. It sounded as if we had been thrown off balance by the Russians. The State Department draft merely said that we accepted Khrushchev’s offer.

General Taylor summarized the conclusions of the Joint Chiefs. Unless the missiles are defused immediately, the Chiefs recommended implementation on MondayOctober 29. of OP Plan312, i.e. a major air strike, and, seven days later, OP Plan 316, which is the invasion plan. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Secretary McNamara asked what we should do about air surveillance tomorrow. He stated his recommendation, i.e. if our reconnaissance planes are fired on, we will attack the attackers. General Taylor noted that in order to be ready to invade on Monday, we must continue intensive air surveillance.

The President directed that our air reconnaissance missions be flown tomorrow without fighter escort. If our planes are fired on, we must be prepared for a general response or an attack on the SAM sitewhich fired on our planes. We will decide tomorrow how we return fire after we know if they continue their attacks on our planes and after we hear from U Thant the Russian reply to our offer.

The President considered a draft message to the Turks about their missile.Not found. His objective was to persuade the Turks to suggest to us that we withdraw our missiles. He noted that negotiations with the Turks were very difficult if there was any life left in the proposal which we had asked U Thant to make to the Russians.

General Taylor read a late report of the shooting down of the U-2 reconnaissance plane in Cuba which said that the wreckage of the U-2 was on the ground and that the pilot had been killed. He felt that we should make an air attack tomorrow on the SAM site responsible for shooting down the U-2 plane.

Secretary McNamara said that we must now be ready to attack Cuba by launching 500 sorties on the first day. Invasion had become almost inevitable. If we leave U.S. missiles in Turkey, the Soviets might attack Turkey. If the Soviets do attack the Turks, we must respond in the NATO area. The minimum NATO response to Soviet attack on Turkey would be to use U.S. forces in Turkey to attack, by sea and by air, the Soviet Black Sea fleet. However, we should make every effort to reduce the chance of a Soviet attack on Turkey.

In an informal discussion following the formal end of the meeting, the Vice President asked why we were not prepared to trade the withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey for the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba, if we were prepared to give up the use of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Under Secretary Ball responded that last week we thought it might be acceptable to trade the withdrawal of the missiles in Turkey if such action would save Berlin. He felt that we could accept the Soviet offer and replace the missiles in Turkey by assigning Polaris submarines to the area.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
95. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet UnionSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2762. Unclassified; Niact. Regarding the drafting of this message, see Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 102, and Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, p. 714. Also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 441-442. Washington, October 27, 1962, 8:05 p.m.

1015. Following message from President to Khrushchev should be delivered as soon as possible to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed Soviet Embassy in Washington and has been released to press:

“Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have read your letter of October 26Document 84. with great care and welcomed the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first thing that needs to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective United Nations arrangements.

Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out this week and—in cooperation with the Acting Secretary General and your representative—an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26. As I read your letter, the key elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

If you will give your representative similar instructions, there is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more general arrangement regarding “other armaments”, as proposed in your second letter which you made public.Document 91. I would like to say again that the United States is very much interested in reducing tensions and halting the arms race; and if your letter signifies that you are prepared to discuss a detente affecting NATO and the Warsaw Pact, we are quite prepared to consider with our allies any useful proposals.

But the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable, under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensification of the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

/s/John F. Kennedy”

Rusk
96. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Cuba Missile Crisis, Khrushchev Correspondence. Top Secret. Drafted by Kennedy. For McGeorge Bundy’s recollections of the meeting with the President during the late afternoon of October 27, at which the decision was taken to send Robert Kennedy to talk with Dobrynin, see Danger and Survival, pp. 432-434. Washington, October 30, 1962.

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2’s had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter.

He raised the point that the argument the Cubans were making was that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air space then we would still be believing what he and Khrushchev had said—that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples all over the world.

I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory action but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.

He asked me then what offer we were making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive weapons should be removed from Cuba.See Document 95. In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive activities in other Central and Latin American countries, we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not permit an invasion from American soil.

He then asked me about Khrushchev’s other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo—no deal of this kind could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union.The following typed sentence at the end of this paragraph was crossed out: “If some time elapsed—and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months—I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactory.”

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

97. Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone’s and Gilpatric’s 1-page handwritten notes of this meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2846, Gilpatric’s Notes on Cuba. McCone’s notes are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 335. The Record of Action for the Meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) Washington, October 27, 1962, 9 p.m.

Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President approved, the call up of twenty-four air reserve squadrons, involving 14,000 personnel and 300 troop carriers. The call up of the air reserve squadrons is necessary to the invasion plan and will also serve to keep the pressure on the Russians. He said mobilization of private U.S. shipping should be initiated tomorrow in order to have sufficient ships available for an invasion.

The President said that if our reconnaissance planes are fired on tomorrow, and if we know the results of U Thant’s talks with the Russians, then we should take out the SAM sites in Cuba by air action.

With respect to the Soviet tanker Graznyy approaching the quarantine zone, the Attorney General recommended that we take no action against it.

The President agreed that if the tanker crosses the barrier, we should let it through, but thereafter no Bloc ships would be allowed to cross into the zone.

The President directed that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be asked to tell U Thant of the location of the Soviet tanker and ask him to remind the Russians of their statement that their ships would not enter Cuban waters. A decision on whether to intercept the tanker could be taken tomorrow.

Secretary Rusk agreed, adding that the actions we had taken already had created sufficient pressure on the Russians for today.

The President said that tomorrow we could consider increasing the pressure by adding POL to the list of prohibited goods and by publicly announcing the mobilization of U.S. shipping.

The President read aloud the message from General Norstad concerning the tactics to be followed in a meeting of the North Atlantic Council.This message has not been identified further. The message included a list of questions to be answered and ended with a recommendation to reject Khrushchev’s offer to trade European missiles for U.S. missiles in Turkey.

There followed consideration of a draft cable to Ambassador Finletter in Paris instructing him as to how the NATO meeting should be handled. (A copy of this message is attached.)Document 100.

Secretary Rusk recommended that we not state our preferred position first but present the various alternatives to the NATO members and oblige them to state their preference. We would make clear that we must stand unified with the NATO countries.

The President agreed that our posture should be that of consulting the NATO countries—not pushing for only one course of action.

The Attorney General recommended that we should not take our final position for a few more hours. In the NATO meeting we would do no more than recite the facts and express our objective of trying to keep the situation limited to the Western Hemisphere. We would report the following day to NATO and hold off one more day a decision on accepting the Turkish/Cuban missile trade offer of the Russians. The President agreed to delete from the message the section on our preferred course of action. The NATO meeting tomorrow is to be a briefing and a request for their views. Ambassador Finletter is not to bring up the question of the possible withdrawal of the Jupiters from Turkey.

The President did not approve a draft message to Khrushchev dealing with the shooting down of a U.S. plane.Not identified further.

The President agreed that Ambassador Hare would not raise with the Turks the question of withdrawing the Jupiters, but that the State Department would inform Ambassador Hare, for his information, of what we are considering.A copy of the instructions to Hare along these lines is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Regional Security Series, NATO, Cables, Turkey.

Personal letters to De Gaulle and Adenauer were given to the President for signature.Copies of these 2-paragraph notes are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204.

The President asked the group to meet the following morning at 11:00 o’clock.

Low-level reconnaissance missions were authorized. If these planes were attacked, the attacking planes would be fired upon.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
98. Current Intelligence MemorandumSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Materials. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. OCI No. 2430/62 Washington, October 27, 1962. SUBJECT Soviet Communications to the US of 26-27 October In response to your request, there follows an analysis, prepared jointly by ONE-OCI, of the two Soviet letters to the US of 26 and 27 October. The likeliest explanation of Soviet behavior in addressing two inconsistent letters to the President in such short succession is that, some time after dispatching the first, the Soviet leaders came to believe that the US intended firm or even radical action against the Cuban bases at a fairly early date. They evidently felt it imperative to send and publicize a second letter, containing a more specific proposal, but one still involving substantial Soviet concessions, in an effort to generate pressures which would head off this US action or, if this failed, to make it as costly as possible in political terms. The US reply today leaves the USSR in a difficult position. The Soviets can, if they choose, repeat their Cuba-Turkey offer and complain that US preconditions amount to an unacceptable ultimatum, but they probably now recognize that this may not deflect the US from its insist-ence that the sites be immediately dismantled. Or they can alter tactics radically, going over to a threatening line in their statements and buttressing this with a deliberate maritime incident in the Caribbean and moves to globalize the crisis, e.g., some action against Berlin. Their tactics to date, however, and their apparent belief that the US is determined on further actions, argue strongly against this latter course. A third course would be to accept some of the conditions stated by the US today and to continue the search for negotiations which would lay inhibitions on further US unilateral moves. Already, in return for a removal of weapons from Turkey, calculated to raise doubts in that country and in NATO as a whole concerning the US commitment, the Soviets have now offered substantial concessions. These include not only the withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba, but inspection of the proc-ess and a time limit volunteered by the USSR. In the process, the Soviets have gone far to acknowledge the truth of the President’s original charges. As another result, they have made statements which must seriously undermine Castro’s confidence in Soviet support, and even Soviet intentions. Thus the next Soviet position may be less demanding than the Cuba-Turkey swap. We think that they might limit their demands to a US undertaking not to pursue Castro’s overthrow. In return, they might agree to cease work on those sites which are not yet operational and to discuss means of “rendering the weapons inoperable,” and to move toward some form of international inspection.
99. Editorial Note

In March 1987 former Secretary of State Dean Rusk shed new light on the question of whether the United States would have been prepared ultimately to consider the removal of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for a Soviet agreement to withdraw the missiles in Cuba and defuse the crisis. In a letter to James G. Blight, who helped organize a conference of former participants in the crisis at Hawk’s Cay, Florida, Rusk wrote:

“It was clear to me that President Kennedy would not let the Jupiters in Turkey become an obstacle to the removal of the missile sites in Cuba because the Jupiters were coming out in any event. He instructed me to telephone the late Andrew Cordier, then at Columbia University, and dictate to him a statement which would be made by U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations, proposing the removal of both the Jupiters and the missiles in Cuba. Mr. Cordier was to put that statement in the hands of U Thant only after further signal from us. That step was never taken and the statement I furnished to Mr. Cordier has never seen the light of day. So far as I know, President Kennedy, Andrew Cordier and I were the only ones who knew of this particular step.”

Rusk’s letter was read to the conference of former officials and scholars of the crisis by McGeorge Bundy. Bundy added that Cordier was asked to stand by with the contingency plan the night of October 27. The proposal, he noted, intentionally bypassed the U.S. Mission at the United Nations. The intention was to make it appear to be a U.N. proposal, rather than one that originated in Washington. (James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux/Hill and Wang, 1989), pages 83-84)

100. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Bundy and U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by EUR and NEA, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to all other NATO capitals eyes only info Ambassadors and New York. Washington, October 28, 1962, 12:12 a.m.

Topol 578. USRO pass Embassy.

The President desires that your briefing of NATO be essentially factual and reflect clear determination of US Government to press on its present course as reflected in (1) White House statement issued noon Saturday on continuing buildup, (2) President’s message to Khrushchev released White House Saturday evening, (3) announcement by DOD of continued surveillance, and (4)DOD announcement call up of Air reserves (all contained wireless file).

You can report that message from Khrushchev to President received night October 26 (being repeated Finletter, Paris and London only), while full of polemics, seemed to offer real hope solution could be found within framework supervised withdrawal offensive weapons from Cuba in exchange for commitment by United States not invade Cuba. U Thant’s conversations in New York and broad hints in Cuban speeches at UN also seemed offer hope settlement along these lines could promptly be reached. Khrushchev’s message to U Thant agreeing keep Soviet vessels temporarily outside quarantine area also seemed favorable sign.

These hopes have been diminished by subsequent public letter from Khrushchev to the President linking Cuban settlement to withdrawal of NATO Jupiters from Turkey, but we continue to press for solution in Cuban framework alone.

 The situation as we see it is increasingly serious and time is growing shorter. The United States remains determined to insure removal of offensive installations in Cuba. We are combining reasonable diplomatic offers and military pressure in even balance to this end. But construction on the missile sites continues and there is every indication that more of the missiles are becoming operationally ready. Moreover, unarmed US military aircraft which today were conducting publicly announced surveillance over Cuba were exposed to intensive ground fire and one of these aircraft is missing. At the same time, Soviet vessels are also continuing to proceed toward the quarantine area in direct violation of Khrushchev’s assurances to U Thant, although the Soviet Government was officially informed of the limits of the quarantine area by both U Thant and the United States Government. At the present rate of speed the first vessel will reach the quarantine area during daylight Sunday and an incident may occur. In these circumstances the United States Government may find it necessary within a very short time in its own interest and that of its fellow nations in the Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary to remove this growing threat to the Hemisphere. In the light of the developing possibility of the necessity for action in Cuba, the President has instructed you to bring this matter fully to the attention of the NAC. You should say that while the US holds to the position that this matter should be settled within framework of the Western Hemisphere, we have taken note of the Soviet public message to President of October 27th in which a connection is made between NATO defenses and Soviet action in Cuba. This Soviet position increases the possibility that US military action in Cuba may result in some Soviet moves against NATO. In these circumstances the US feels it essential to inform its allies and to consult with them on the general situation. FYI. It is of the utmost importance that nothing in your discussion should hint of any readiness to meet Soviet Jupiter exchange proposal, but it is equally important that you should allow free expression of European views, whatever they may be. In stimulating free response, you should strongly press the point that US action in Cuba—if it becomes essential—will be directed at a potential threat to the total strategic balance endangering other NATO countriesat least as much as the United States. End FYI. Rusk
101. Telegram From the Embassy in Brazil to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/10-2862. Top Secret; Niact; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 2:01 a.m. on October 28. Rio de Janeiro, October 28, 1962, 1 p.m.

902. Department telegram 1055.Document 81. Pursuant Martin telecon Saturday 2145 instructing to proceed on reference telegram,October 27. No record of this telephone conversation has been found. I contacted Hermes Lima and visited him at home from 2330 to 0030. Began by saying this extremely important and sensitive diplomatic initiative being made under direct instructions of Secretary and requiring utmost secrecy, with perhaps vital bearing on peace. Related substance introductory paragraph, emphasizing that talk must be with Fidel alone, [1 line of source text not declassified]. Then gave him Portuguese translation eight numbered points, typed on plain paper.

[1 paragraph (12 lines of source text) not declassified]

Hermes felt that new suggestion was a perfectly natural supplement to what they had been doing and said he would undertake it. I pointed out certain essential differences, notably effort to appeal personally to Fidel to divorce himself from Soviet control, referring to our previous talks with Dantas and to evidences some months back of friction between Fidel and Russians. [5½ lines of source text not declassified] I emphasized that Khrushchev speech Saturday should be final proof to Fidel that Soviets interested only in using Cuba to pursue own security interests, while creating new dangers for Cuba.

[12 lines of source text not declassified] Promised to advise me on action taken.

Gordon
102. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous. No classification marking. Other copies of this message are ibid.: Presidential Correspondence, Lot 66 D 204, and Lot 77 D 163, and in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The Russian-language text is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Also printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 995-999. This “informal translation” and an “official translation” prepared by the Department of State are printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 19, 1973, pp. 650-654. According to a footnote in the Bulletin this message was broadcast over Moscow radio at 5 p.m. and a copy delivered to the Embassy in Moscow at 5:10. Moscow, October 28, 1962.

Dear Mr. President: I have received your message of October 27.See Document 95. I express my satisfaction and thank you for the sense of proportion you have displayed and for realization of the responsibility which now devolves on you for the preservation of the peace of the world.

I regard with great understanding your concern and the concern of the United States people in connection with the fact that the weapons you describe as offensive are formidable weapons indeed. Both you and we understand what kind of weapons these are.

In order to eliminate as rapidly as possible the conflict which endangers the cause of peace, to give an assurance to all people who crave peace, and to reassure the American people, who, I am certain, also want peace, as do the people of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, I should like to repeat what I had already written to you in my earlier messages—that the Soviet Government has given economic assistance to the Republic of Cuba, as well as arms, because Cuba and the Cuban people were constantly under the continuous threat of an invasion of Cuba.

A piratic vessel had shelled Havana. They say that this shelling was done by irresponsible Cuban emigres. Perhaps so, however, the question is from where did they shoot. It is a fact that these Cubans have no territory, they are fugitives from their country, and they have no means to conduct military operations.

This means that someone put into their hands these weapons for shelling Havana and for piracy in the Caribbean in Cuban territorial waters. It is impossible in our time not to notice a piratic ship, considering the concentration in the Caribbean of American ships from which everything can be seen and observed.

In these conditions, pirate ships freely roam around and shell Cuba and make piratic attacks on peaceful cargo ships. It is known that they even shelled a British cargo ship. In a word, Cuba was under the continuous threat of aggressive forces, which did not conceal their intention to invade its territory.

The Cuban people want to build their life in their own interests without external interference. This is their right, and they cannot be blamed for wanting to be masters of their own country and disposing of the fruits of their own labor.

The threat of invasion of Cuba and all other schemes for creating tension over Cuba are designed to strike the Cuban people with a sense of insecurity, intimidate them, and prevent them from peacefully building their new life. Mr. President, I should like to say clearly once more that we could not remain indifferent to this. The Soviet Government decided to render assistance to Cuba with the means of defense against aggression—only with means for defense purposes. We have supplied the defense means which you describe as offensive means. We have supplied them to prevent an attack on Cuba—to prevent rash acts.

I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

It is for this reason that we instructed our officers—these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers—to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27,Document 91. we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict.

I note with satisfaction that you have responded to the desire I expressed with regard to elimination of the aforementioned dangerous situation, as well as with regard to providing conditions for a more thoughtful appraisal of the international situation, fraught as it is with great dangers in our age of thermonuclear weapons, rocketry, spaceships, global rockets, and other deadly weapons. All people are interested in insuring peace.

Therefore, vested with trust and great responsibility, we must not allow the situation to become aggravated and must stamp out the centers where a dangerous situation fraught with grave consequences to the cause of peace has arisen. If we, together with you, and with the assist-ance of other people of good will, succeed in eliminating this tense atmosphere, we should also make certain that no other dangerous conflicts which could lead to a world nuclear catastrophe would arise.

In conclusion, I should like to say something about a detente between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries that you have mentioned. We have spoken about this long since and are prepared to continue to exchange views on this question with you and to find a reasonable solution.

We should like to continue the exchange of views on the prohibition of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, general disarmament, and other problems relating to the relaxation of international tension.

Although I trust your statement, Mr. President, there are irresponsible people who would like to invade Cuba now and thus touch off a war. If we do take practical steps and proclaim the dismantling and evacuation of the means in question from Cuba, in so doing we, at the same time, want the Cuban people to be certain that we are with them and are not absolving ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people.

We are confident that the people of all countries, like you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly. We are not threatening. We want nothing but peace. Our country is now on the upsurge.

Our people are enjoying the fruits of their peaceful labor. They have achieved tremendous successes since the October Revolution, and created the greatest material, spiritual, and cultural values. Our people are enjoying these values; they want to continue developing their achievements and insure their further development on the way of peace and social progress by their persistent labor.

I should like to remind you, Mr. President, that military reconnaissance planes have violated the borders of the Soviet Union. In connection with this there have been conflicts between us and notes exchanged. In 1960 we shot down your U-2 plane, whose reconnaissance flight over the USSR wrecked the summit meeting in Paris. At that time, you took a correct position and denounced that criminal act of the former U.S. Administration.

But during your term of office as President another violation of our border has occurred, by an American U-2 plane in the Sakhalin area. We wrote you about that violation on 30 August. At that time you replied that that violation had occurred as a result of poor weather, and gave assurances that this would not be repeated. We trusted your assurances, because the weather was indeed poor in that area at that time.

But had not your planes been ordered to fly about our territory, even poor weather could not have brought an American plane into our airspace. Hence, the conclusion that this is being done with the knowledge of the Pentagon, which tramples on international norms and violates the borders of other states.

A still more dangerous case occurred on 28 October, when one of your reconnasissance planes intruded over Soviet borders in the Chukotka Peninsula area in the north and flew over our territory. The question is, Mr. President: How should we regard this? What is this: A provocation? One of your planes violates our frontier during this anxious time we are both experiencing, when everything has been put into combat readiness. Is it not a fact that an intruding American plane could be easily taken for a nuclear bomber, which might push us to a fateful step? And all the more so since the U.S. Government and Pentagon long ago declared that you are maintaining a continuous nuclear bomber patrol.

Therefore, you can imagine the responsibility you are assuming, especially now, when we are living through such anxious times.

I should like to express the following wish; it concerns the Cuban people. You do not have diplomatic relations. But through my officers in Cuba, I have reports that American planes are making flights over Cuba.

We are interested that there should be no war in the world, and that the Cuban people should live in peace. And besides, Mr. President, it is no secret that we have our people in Cuba. Under such a treaty with the Cuban Government we have sent there officers, instructors, mostly plain people: specialists, agronomists, zoo technicians, irrigators, land reclamation specialists, plain workers, tractor drivers, and others. We are concerned about them.

I should like you to consider, Mr. President, that violation of Cuban airspace by American planes could also lead to dangerous consequences. And if you do not want this to happen, it would be better if no cause is given for a dangerous situation to arise.

We must be careful now and refrain from any steps which would not be useful to the defense of the states involved in the conflict, which could only cause irritation and even serve as a provocation for a fateful step. Therefore, we must display sanity, reason, and refrain from such steps.

We value peace perhaps even more than other peoples because we went through a terrible war with Hitler. But our people will not falter in the face of any test. Our people trust their Government, and we assure our people and world public opinion that the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be provoked. But if the provocateurs unleash a war, they will not evade responsibility and the grave consequences a war would bring upon them. But we are confident that reason will triumph, that war will not be unleashed and peace and the security of the peoples will be insured.

In connection with the current negotiations between Acting Secretary General U Thant and representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the Republic of Cuba, the Soviet Government has sent First Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation.

Respectfully yours,

N. KhrushchevPrinted from a copy that indicates Khrushchev signed the original.
103. Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone’s 1-page typed summary of the meeting and Gilpatric’s page of handwritten notes on the meeting are in Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01895A, Meetings with the President, and Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, RLG’s Notes re Cuba, respectively. McCone’s notes are reproduced in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, p. 345. An account of the meeting as dictated by Walter Elder, based on a debriefing of McCone, is reproduced ibid., p. 347. A Record of Action for the meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. I, Meetings 6-10) Washington, October 28, 1962, 11:10 a.m.

The full TASS text of the Khrushchev replyDocument 102. to the President offering to withdraw Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba under UN supervision had been read by all prior to the opening of the meeting. (It had been received over the FBIS ticker beginning about 9:00 AM—copy attached.)

Secretary Rusk began by making general comments to the effect that everyone present had helped to bring about the highly advantageous resolution of the Cuban missile crisis. Mr. Bundy interrupted to say that everyone knew who were hawks and who were doves, but that today was the doves’ day. Secretary McNamara said we would not have to face a decision on halting a Bloc ship today because the Soviet tanker Graznyy was lying dead in the water outside the quarantine zone and no other Bloc ships, if they continued toward Cuba, would be reaching the barrier.

Secretary McNamara and Secretary Rusk recommended, and the President agreed, that no air reconnaissance missions be flown today.

The President asked what we would substitute for our air surveillance of Cuba.

Secretary McNamara said this surveillance might be by the UN or a joint inspection of U.S./UN inspectors in a neutral plane, flown by Brazilians or Canadians. He said our objective should be to have reconnaissance carried out by the UN tomorrow. Technically, this could be arranged, but we do not know whether the UN would undertake the task.

The President suggested that we tell the UN theymust carry out reconnaissance or else we will. He authorized the release to UN officials of classified information on Cuba, including photographs and refugee reports, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The purpose of the release of this information on Soviet armaments in Cuba was to facilitate the inspection task which we expected the UN to promptly undertake.

Secretary Rusk, in commenting on Khrushchev’s reply, called attention to the text which said the Russians would “come to an agreement.” He said Kuznetsov was coming to New York to conduct the negotiations. He suggested that we pick up and accept Khrushchev’s description of what he was prepared to withdraw from Cuba, i.e. “offensive weapons.”

The President called attention to the IL-28 bombers which he said we should ask the Russians to withdraw by making a private approach to Khrushchev. He said we should not get “hung up” on the IL-28 bombers, but we should seek to include them in the Soviet definition of “offensive weapons” or “weapons we call offensive.”

General Taylor said our objective should be the status quo ante.

The President agreed, but added that he did not want to get into a position where we would appear to be going back on our part of the deal. The IL-28 bombers were less important than the strategic missiles. Admittedly, we would face the problem of Soviet armaments in Cuba if the Russians continued to build up their defensive capability there.

At this point the Attorney General arrived.Robert Kennedy had been meeting with the Soviet Ambassador at the former’s office. At this time Dobrynin told the Attorney General that Khrushchev had agreed to dismantle and withdraw the missiles. (Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days, p. 110)

The President agreed to a statement to be made public, as revised in the meeting.For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 444-445. He asked that a draft reply to Khrushchev’s statement be prepared for him to consider. He directed that comments by everyone on the Soviet statement be reserved. Our posture is to be one of welcoming the Soviet offer to take out the offensive weapons under UN inspection, but attention should be called to the many problems we would encounter in the implementation of Khrushchev’s offer. We should point out that we were under no illusion that the problem of Soviet weapons in Cuba is solved. In addition, he said we should make clear that we can draw no general conclusions about how the Russians will act in the future in areas other than Cuba. He made specific mention of the problem of Communist subversion in Latin America and asked that we refer to this problem either in our letter to Khrushchev or in U Thant’s letter to Khrushchev. He directed that Ambassador Stevenson be asked to talk to UN officials about this aspect of the Cuban problem.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
104. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet UnionSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862. Unclassified; Niact. Drafted by Thompson and Ball, cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by Rusk. Repeated priority to Paris, London, and New York. Washington, October 28, 1962, 5:03 p.m.

1020. Following is text President’s reply to Khrushchev letter of October 28Document 102. for delivery to highest available Soviet official. Text has been handed to Soviet Embassy and released by White House at 4:35 PM.

Begin text

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am replying at once to your broadcast message of October twenty-eight even though the official text has not yet reached me because of the great importance I attach to moving forward promptly to the settlement of the Cuban crisis. I think that you and I, with our heavy responsibilities for the maintenance of peace, were aware that developments were approaching a point where events could have become unmanageable. So I welcome this message and consider it an important contribution to peace.

The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October twenty-seventhSee Document 95. and your reply of todayDocument 102. as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area.

You referred in your letter to a violation of your frontier by an American aircraft in the area of the Chukotsk Peninsula. I have learned that this plane, without arms or photographic equipment, was engaged in an air sampling mission in connection with your nuclear tests. Its course was direct from Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska to the North Pole and return. In turning south, the pilot made a serious navigational error which carried him over Soviet territory. He immediately made an emergency call on open radio for navigational assistance and was guided back to his home base by the most direct route. I regret this incident and will see to it that every precaution is taken to prevent recurrence.

Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have great unfinished tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago.

I agree with you that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament, as it relates to the whole world and also to critical areas. Perhaps now, as we step back from danger, we can together make real progress in this vital field. I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere.

John F. Kennedy Rusk
105. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5211/10-2862. Confidential; Niact. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and approved by Ball. Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:05 p.m.

1130. For Stevenson. Am seriously disturbed at apparent lack of interest on part Secretariat in great importance of aerial photographic surveillance in carrying out task in Cuba. While we have made available to the Secretariat fullest information (derived almost entirely from aerial photography) on characteristics and locations of weapons as of forty-eight hours or more ago, this by no means is necessarily a complete inventory of offensive weapons in Cuba or their locations as of the time UN begins its operations. While aerial photography does not guarantee one hundred percent knowledge of situation nevertheless it is vastly superior, more thorough, more efficient and economical than Nineteenth Century approach based entirely on observation on the ground confined to previously established weapon sites. This is particularly true where weapons concerned are of mobile field type not requiring elaborate fixed bases. Thus we consider it essential that every effort be made to impress on Secretariat importance of aerial photography as an essential supplement to ground observation in carrying out its task of verification. As you know, we stand prepared immediately assist UN in any way agreeable to it and have made substantial preparations that would permit UN begin this mission tomorrow including possibility of flying UN marked planes carrying UN observer. If even with this assistance UN unwilling or unable undertake mission tomorrow, we must assert position that we have preserved our freedom of action and will undertake mission ourselves, recognizing however that this politically less desirable than UN mission and physically more dangerous. Only in this manner can we carry out obligation to forestall any chance trickery endangering our national security. Of course results such mission would be made available to UN to assist it in its task. If UN does not intend undertake aerial reconnaissance US may find it necessary in its own protection continue reconnaissance.

Rusk
106. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330. Secret. Drafted by Tyler and approved in S on October 30. A memorandum of a similar conversation with Alphand earlier in the afternoon is in the Supplement. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330) Washington, October 28, 1962, 6:15 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador Mr. William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

The British Ambassador told the Secretary how gratified HMG was by the present course of events. He said that the most important thing to do now was to consider what the next stage would be (assuming that things continue to go well). His Government thought that it was important to consider what might be done next, and in what forum. Should there be an initiative in terms of NATO-Warsaw Pact discussions, or should we try to do something about Berlin?

The Secretary said he first wished to make it very clear that there had been no “cozy deals” in connection with the change in the Soviet position. The only thing that Khrushchev was getting for his present attitude was that the United States would not intervene militarily in Cuba so long as the offensive weapons were removed under conditions of proper inspection and verification. He added that we were not going to guarantee the Castro Government, and that the Rio Pact still holds.

The British Ambassador said he thought that there might be some value in making the US guarantee dependent on Khrushchev’s behavior with regard to Berlin; perhaps Khrushchev could be brought to giving some assurances in this respect.

The Secretary agreed that if developments continued on their present course, this would require a major consideration of a lot of problems.

The British Ambassador said that Khrushchev would doubtless try to salvage his position by assuming the posture of “a man of peace” who was leading the world in the direction of solutions of problems of disarmament and nuclear testing, etc.

The Secretary agreed and said it was important not to “crow” about the strengthened Western position. He said he had briefed the press on a background basis today to stress the importance of maintaining a tone of moderation as well as caution.A transcript of the background briefing at 1:04 p.m. is ibid., S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Miscellaneous.

The Secretary said that the prompt and full support of the British Government, as well as that of our other NATO Allies,A report on the North Atlantic Council discussion of the Cuban situation on October 28, is in Polto circular 12, October 28. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862) See the Supplement. have been a powerful factor in strengthening our position and in bringing home to Khrushchev the danger and the price of continuing on the course he had taken. However, we were not out of the woods yet, and it was not excluded that we would have to face unpleasant surprises tomorrow.

The British Ambassador said he agreed, but that he felt that the chances were all in favor of the West emerging from the present crisis in a greatly strengthened position, and that it was important and urgent to consider how this could be turned to even greater advantage.

107. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2862. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 10:09 p.m. New York, October 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

1523. Re Cuba. At mtg with U Thant this evening Stevenson received SYG’s message to President in regard to his negots with Castro and delivered President’s reply (transmitted separately).U Thant’s letter is dated October 28. (Ibid., S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438) See the Supplement. Stevenson pointed out reference to attitude other American states toward assurances against invasion of Cuba was based on our understanding their position and should not be understood as committing other govts whose attitude would presumably be relected in early OAS mtg.

SYG said it would be extremely helpful to him in working out desired arrangements with Castro if Pres could publicly suspend quarantine on Oct 30. He pointed out that he is constantly being belabored by Sovs and Cubans with claim they have complied with his appeal of Oct 25 and that US has not. He felt that US naval units could be left at present stations but would simply not exercise right of search during SYG’s two-day visit to Havana. If he should report on his return to New York either that he had not been able to establish adequate inspection or that inspection had revealed Sov failure to comply with their commitments, quarantine could be at once resumed. On other hand if his report was favorable and satisfactory verification arrangements established, suspension would become definitive.

It was also suggested that, without any public announcement, US reconnaissance flights over Cuba might be suspended during his visit there. It was pointed out that any incident caused by such flights during his visit would be extremely embarrassing to him.

In reply to our insistence that verification arrangements must be approved and in place before blockade suspended, SYG saidthat he simply did not believe there was any likelihood that Sovs would launch missiles on US during next two or three days. He felt it would obviously be suicidal for them and for Cubans if this were done. He expressed grave concern at call-up yesterday of Air Force Reserves and, without explicitly saying so, left impression he thought some of US actions have been excessive. In reply we explained in considerable detail very grave and important character of threat with which we had been confronted.

Stevenson mentioned possibility of Castro as useful gesture of good will restoring body of U-2 pilot.

Stevenson also suggested SYG might, if opportunity occurred, sound out Castro on ceasing his subversive activities in other countries. Stevenson emphasized however that this should not be connected in any way with present situation, which it would undoubtedly complicate but might simply be broached as an important matter to be dealt with in future. Narasimhan expressed view that Castro would almost certainly raise question of US subversion in Cuba and this would give SYG opportunityto respond in manner Stevenson suggested. He also thought Castro might raise question of Guantanamo. Stevenson urged again that all of these matters be firmly excluded from present negot since their introduction into it might cause serious delay and complication.

In closing, SYG said he hopes to leave about 10:00 am Oct 30 either on Brazilian Varig Airline Caravel or on Mexican DC6B.

Stevenson
108. Summary Record of the 11th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement. Washington, October 29, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone summarized current intelligence, including evidence that all Cuban military forces have been ordered not to fire at U.S. planes unless fired upon.

The President read and approved the announcement of the creation of a Coordinating Committee which will handle all matters involved in the conclusion of the Cuban crisis. (Text attached)Not printed. The members of the committee were Ball, Gilpatric, and McCloy.

Secretary Rusk acknowledged that we need aerial reconnaissance missions today, but he recommended that none be flown until after the Russian negotiator Kuznetsov sees the UN Acting Secretary General in New York today.

The President agreed that we could wait today, but that we did face the longer range problem of how we continue surveillance of Cuba, recognizing that we cannot rely on the UN to undertake adequate surveillance.

Under Secretary of the Air Force Charyk reported on a conversation last night with UN officials. He said he had offered them RC-130 planes, which they were prepared to use, but they did not want these planes flown by U.S. crews. Mr. Charyk said the Canadians, South Africans and Indonesians have crews which could fly these planes.

Mr. Charyk said the UN official, Mr. Rikhye, who would be organizing the UN aerial reconnaissance, acknowledged that the UN couldnot make arrangements to fly reconnaissance missions today, but the UN observers could be on the ground in Cuba by Wednesday morning. The UN official said the UN did not want U.S. reconnaissance planes overflying Cuba during the Secretary General’s visit there on Tuesday and Wednesday.October 30 and 31.

Mr. Charyk said that air reconnaissance could be very efficient. Pictures taken would reveal suspicious locations to which ground observers could be promptly dispatched.

Mr. Charyk said there had been no discussion yesterday of U.S. reconnaissance flights today, but UN officials had asked for our voluntary suspension of the blockade on Tuesday and Wednesday, leaving, however, the U.S. ships on station. UN inspectorswould be in all ports and would report to us on incoming and outgoing cargo. We would make available film to the UN reconnaissance missions if they would provide us with copies of the exposed films.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we send reconnaissance missions this afternoon after notice is given to the Cubans and to Kuznetsov. The decision would be final unless new information came out of the U Thant/Kuznetsov discussions in New York. He recommended that U.S. ships remain on station, challenge all ships entering the quarantine zone, and let such ships through because their cargo would be inspected by the UN observers in Cuban ports.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that we must maintain the quarantine until arrangements for UN inspection of offensive weapons in Cuba are completed.

The President made clear that we should have U.S. observers on any planes flown by the UN. He agreed that the U.S. ships should stay on station, but that we should leave ambiguous for the next twenty-four hours whether or not we will maintain the quarantine. He said we should not say that the quarantine was off pending installation of a UN inspection system. He agreed that the call up of the air reserves should not be reversed.

Secretary McNamara urged that the new Coordinating Committee work immediately on the question of Communist covert aggression in Latin America which would be based in Cuba.

The President said he had talked to Ambassador Stevenson yesterdayNo record of this conversation has been found. whose view was that the phrase “peace in the Caribbean” covers subversion. The President said Ambassador Stevenson had discussed this question with U Thant and would try to get back into the formulation of the settlement some specific reference to subversion.

General Taylor urged that we be prepared to fly six to eight low-level missions today, but no high-level missions. He said we had seen nothing from SaturdayOctober 27. until now. He recommended that we announce in advance we were conducting low-level reconnaissance pending satisfactory and effective UN reconnaissance arrangements.

The President agreed to the low-level reconnaissance unless he directed otherwise before 2:00 PM. He turned again to the question of what we would do on the surveillance problem for the long run.

Secretary Rusk noted that Khrushchev expressed his wish that reconnaissance cease, but he had not made it a condition to withdrawal of offensive weapons. U Thant will have to deal with this subject in the New York negotiations.

The President decided that no public announcement of the aerial reconnaissance would be made, but that if we decided to fly these missions, we will notify the Cubans and Kuznetsov immediately prior to the overflights.

General Taylor restated the requirement for the reconnaissance missions if we are to know whether the Soviets are actually dismantling the missile sites or whether they are continuing to work on the missile complexes.

Secretary McNamara noted that U Thant believes that the UN observers arriving in Cuba on Wednesday will see no missiles.

The President, saying that we would need aerial pictures on Wednesday, asked the group to consider how this should be done. Aerial missions today are not crucial, but this week we must have aerial pictures of the missile sites.

Secretary McNamara expressed his doubt that we can get the UN to fly reconnaissance missions. Such missions must be flown to satisfy domestic opinion. He recommended that the flights be authorized today, subject to any developments taking place in New York.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
109. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. The source text bears Rostow’s handwritten notation: “The President may wish to see what we’re up to.” A summary of the Berlin/NATO subcommittee’s work on October 29 is printed in vol. XV, pp. 411–419. Washington, October 29, 1962. SUBJECT Report Number Five of the Planning Subcommittee The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of Monday morning, October 29, 1962. The only operational issue addressed was the need to maintain continuity in our aerial inspection of the offensive weapons in Cuba, both for evident reasons of national security and as a basis for later movement to legitimize photo reconnaissance on a collective basis (either UN or OAS). This issue, in its longer rUN aspects, is referred to below. The following tasks were discussed and assigned as follow-up of the crisis: It was agreed that the Soviet adventure in Cuba in part reflected a high degree of anxiety concerning the nuclear balance. The most likely assumption is that, having failed in the Cuban ploy, they will consider other methods for retrieving or appearing to retrieve their position in the nuclear arms race; for example, a radically accelerated ICBM program, the positioning of weapons in space, etc. It was judged urgent that these possibilities be explored and that we take countermeasures for two reasons: first, to insure ourselves against some Sputnik-like move which would endanger our present favorable posture; second, to maximize the influence in Moscow of those who may argue that the only realistic road to Russian security is by inspected arms control. This task was assigned to DOD (Mr. Rowen) in consultation with other appropriate parts of the Government. The crisis will evidently have implications for Soviet policy: for the Sino-Soviet split; and for the position and policies of Communist parties in every part of the world. The group chaired by Mr. Harvey will continue to explore these implications and propose courses of U.S. action. The situation inside Cuba, in the wake of the Russian defection, may open to us possibilities of change in the character of the Cuban government or its policy which, evidently, should be fully explored. This task was assigned to Mr. Hurwitch (ARA). It was judged possible that there are certain lessons to be drawn from the recent confrontation over Cuba for our Berlin contingency planning. Mr. Rowen and Mr. Kitchen will seek to formulate these in consultation with Mr. Nitze and his committee. Viet Nam. Although it is probable that the Soviet Union will be extremely sensitive to any further pressures we may mount against the Communist position in the wake of this crisis, it was judged appropriate to consider what political and other measures may be considered to induce or force the Soviet Union to honor its pledge given at Geneva that infiltration into South Viet Nam via Laos would end after the Laos settlement. I will raise this matter with Mr. Harriman. With confidence strengthened in the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, it was judged time to make a major push in the Atlantic partnership. There is an urgent need to improve the machinery of political consultation; to press on with various trade, currency and aid problems within the orbit of the OECD; and to look to a multilateral resolution of the nuclear problem at an earlier date than might have otherwise been envisaged. (Action:EUR) In the wake of the crisis, it was judged essential that we seek to consolidate the new unity and confidence of the OAS; press forward vigorously with the Alliance for Progress; and exploit the crisis to weaken the Communists; to reduce the fear of Communists in Latin America; and to draw leftist and neutralist groups away from the Communists and towards the center. It was noted that, in the face of U.S. strength, there was a danger that right wing groups might now assume that reform and development were less urgent than previously. Steps to discourage this view should be considered. (Action:ARA and AID in consultation with other interested agencies) Negotiations with the USSR. An initial paper on this subject, of October 27th, is available to the Executive Committee.Attached to an October 28 memorandum from Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba) See the Supplement. Further staff work will go forward within the Department of State and ACDA. Two observations emerged on the subject of negotiation with the Soviet Union. Historically, the instinctive reaction of the USSR to an international setback is to regroup, to consolidate, and to avoid, for a time, fresh initiatives. If that is their reaction on the present occasion, they may use it merely as an occasion to hold to firm previous positions. In that case, there may be no significant movement forward. On the other hand, it is conceivable that Khrushchev himself may wish to move forward towards a detente on Berlin and to leave behind him some achievement in the field of arms control and disarmament. In this case, some forward movement at a summit is conceivable. There is as yet no basis for a judgment as to the course Moscow will, in fact, follow. In the light of these alternatives, we should be prepared, should a summit take place, with an array of proposals, ranging from a mere reaffirmation of the status quo through limited to quite radical steps forward; and use the occasion of such negotiations as a means of assessing the policy and intention of the Soviet Union. The crisis has implications for every region and virtually every country with which we have relations in the world outside of NATO and the OAS. Courses of action designed to strengthen our position vis-a-vis these countries have to be designed on a case-by-case basis. (Action to be initiated by Mr. Jorden, with relevant regional bureaus and S/P officers.) The crisis bears on future disarmament negotiations and meas-ures in two specific respects. First, the Soviet performance in Cuba dram-atizes beyond any doubt the case for inspection. Ways for driving home this lesson should be devised. (Action:ACDA) In addition, we should explore ways of consolidating the de facto precedent of our unilateral inspection of Cuban bases and the OAS ruling that secrecy is inappropriate in this Hemisphere. (Action:ACDA, IO, ARA) The possibility of a White Paper on the Cuban crisis was discussed. It was universally agreed that such a paper, if it were decided to issue one, should be factual with no elaborate effort to draw lessons for propaganda purposes. The question of whether such a paper should be organized to provide a full record of what now can be made public, both for our own people and for the world, as well as the terms of reference for such a paper, were referred to Mr. U. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Edward Martin.
110. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, 782.56311/10-2962. Secret. Drafted by Helseth on October 30 and initialed by Tyler. Washington, October 29, 1962. SUBJECT Turkish Missiles and the Cuban Crisis PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Turgut Menemencioglu, Turkish Ambassador William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary, EUR Irwin M. Tobin, Deputy Director, RPM GTI—William A. Helseth

The Turkish Ambassador, acting on the urgent instructions of his Government, called on Mr. Tyler on October 29. First, he said, he wished to extend the thanks and gratitude of his Government for President Kennedy’s refusal of any “deal” with the Soviet Union regarding the missile bases in Turkey.

Secondly, he wished to inform the United States Government that the Turkish Government had instructed its permanent representative in NATO to ask urgently for a special session of the North Atlantic Council. At this special session, the Turkish permanent representative would review the events which led up to the IRBM’s being stationed in Turkey and would emphasize that the IRBM’s were placed in Turkey not merely for Turkey’s defense but for NATO defense. The Turkish permanent representative would state that the Turkish Government regretted that, when dangers subsequently appeared, some seemed to regard Turkey as at fault. Turkey wished to discuss this turn of events with its allies. (The Ambassador then referred to press comments in various allied countries and to some non-United States personalities who spoke in the same tone.)

Mr. Tyler stated his appreciation for the advance information the Ambassador had given us and said he wished to repeat and to reinforce what the Ambassador had said regarding the circumstances that led to the placing of the missiles on Turkish soil. The United States Government, he said, looked at these from the point of view of the NATO complex. These missiles were for the defense of the NATO area and that defense was indivisible. The United States viewed our commitments in all areas of NATO as being equal. Furthermore, he hoped that Ankara would not pay too much attention to our own press comment which had ranged far and wide. Even we, he said, wondered at times whether a given article had been inspired, was a trial balloon or what. Ambassador Menemencioglu interrupted to say that he recognized the freedom of our press but had noticed that it was disciplined when the facts were known and mentioned particularly that the line taken by the press today (October 29) was a very good one. Mr. Tyler said that the Secretary had recently talked with the press on a background basis.

Mr. Tyler stated that the Cuban crisis was not yet settled and that we would know tonight if work on the bases had been stopped. We had, he said, resumed aerial surveillance today. Mr. Tyler stated that he wished to reassure the Ambassador again that there had been no “deal” regarding Turkey. The Ambassador responded that he had no doubt of that. He remarked upon the audacity of Khrushchev in drawing a parallel between Turkey and Cuba. Mr. Tyler said that there was nothing in the arrangement with the Soviets which implied a guarantee of the Castro regime. We had only stated we would not attack Cuba. We had based our action on the Rio Treaty.

(Note: On the way out of the building, Ambassador Menemencioglu informed Mr. Helseth that his Government would be especially pleased with Mr. Tyler’s response to the Ambassador’s approach.)

111. Summary Record of the 12th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement. Washington, October 29, 1962, 6:30 p.m.

Secretary Rusk reported on developments during the day in New York. The Soviet position on inspection, as stated by Kuznetsov, is that the Russians are willing to have the International Red Cross officials inspect all cargoes going to Cuba to ensure that no arms at all are taken to Cuba. The Red Cross officials could inspect cargoes at sea from non-U.S. ships or from the wharves in Cuban ports. The Russians would not permit on-site inspection until all Soviet missiles are removed. Kuznetsov hinted that the missile removal operation would take about a week. (See attached cable.)Document 112.

Secretary Rusk said that if there was to be no inspection on the ground, air reconnaissance became crucial. He indicated that the Russians might not object to our overflights. He said that U Thant had asked Stevenson how long we wanted the inspection to go on. Permanent inspection would be difficult, but inspection limited to a period of weeks would be easier. He said the Russians were prepared to accept UN inspectors in Cuba.

The President said he approved of the plan to have Red Cross officials inspect all ships from Bloc ports. He also agreed to suspend the quarantine for two days during the visit of the Acting Secretary General to Havana.

Secretary McNamara reported that a Soviet ship, listing its cargo as wheat, but carrying unidentified crates, was about 300 miles off Cuba. Admiral Anderson wanted to stop this ship, but it had been decided not to stop it.

General Taylor commented that what we are asking the Russians to do is to dismantle their missiles immediately. Mr. Bundy added that our request did not include dismantling the SAM sites.

The President returned to the question of air reconnaissance. He agreed that surveillance should be done in the least provocative way, but we must continue to maintain surveillance until a satisfactory UN system is in place. He said he thought we should tell Mr. McCloy in New York of our plans, but no public announcement should be made. He agreed that no reconnaissance flights would be flown tomorrow or Wednesday.October 31. He asked that a study be prepared for him as to what we consider a satisfactory inspection system.

Secretary McNamara said that if we were to have no on-site inspection in Cuba, we must have high- and low-level reconnaissance.

The President asked whether it would be possible for us to obtain pictures of the outgoing Soviet ships. He asked Secretary Rusk to make clear to our officials in New York that we must continue aerial reconnaissance unless the UN takesover this task.

Secretary Rusk commented that the political situation, as it had developed during the day, appeared to support the belief that Khrushchev’s deal is still on, but if pictures from today’s reconnaissance mission reveal that the nose cones are on the missiles in Cuba, then we will face a most difficult decision.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
112. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2962. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 9:16 p.m. At 5:22 p.m. McCloy had called Rusk to report on the meeting described in this telegram. A memorandum of that conversation is in the Supplement. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962) New York, October 29, 1962, 9 p.m.

1535. Cuba. At mtg with Stevenson, McCloy and Yost this afternoon SYG gave fol report on discussion with Kuznetzov:

Latter commenced by saying USSR had complied with SYG’s appeals by suspending arms shipments and avoiding confrontation at sea but there had been no US response. Thant replied response is that US will suspend blockade when verification established. Thant had suggested to Zorin two days ago that Sov ships submit to verification. Kuznetzov replied “USSR is prepared to agree to proposal that Red Cross visit Sov ships going to Cuba in order to ascertain that they carry no weapons as the US is worried about offensive weapons to Cuba”.Kuznetzov added his govt would prefer Red Cross personnel undertaking task should be from neutral nations. Red Cross could board Sov vessels either from neutral ships or Sov ships at sea. When SYG mentioned inspection at Cuban ports Kuznetzov replied he had no objection but this would depend on Cuba. He made clear he was not willing to have UN team inspect Sov ships.

SYG expressed to US personal doubts that Red Cross would undertake this duty, though UN hadhad offer from high Red Cross official several days ago to help in Cuban crisis. If they did accept he supposed they would fly people from Geneva to some spot near Cuba where they would embark on neutral ships to accost Sov ships. Obviously inspection in Cuban ports if Castro accepts would be far simpler. SYG expressed view Sovs would not submit even to Red Cross inspection if they had any intention of shipping arms and that they would therefore be very unlikely to do so at least during immediate future.

As to sites and missiles, Kuznetzov mentioned reference in Khrushchev’s second letter to SC involvement. He said missiles now being dismantled and shipped out. When dismantling has been completed Sovs will report to SC and propose UN team be sent to verify dismantling. No UN team is required until Sovs report to SC. Kuznetzov did not estimate duration of dismantling but SYG got impression it would be no longer than week or two. He is therefore thinking of SC mtg early next week after he has had opportunity for further round of consultations with US, USSR and Cuba following his return. Stevenson made clear it is imperative that US have assurance that dismantling is going on. He did not think we could allow more than 24-hour interval.

SYG expressed hope Sovs might be ready to send teams as early as next Monday. He was not inclined to press Sovs too hard since he could not imagine they would set off rockets at US during next few days. Cubans had refused to state their views on verification until he arrives in Havana but it is clear that Sovs control missile sites, are presumably engaged in rapid dismantling and will not permit verification until dismantling completed. Narasimhan pointed out this would probably be the case while weapons are actually being removed but that verification on the spot might well be permitted in second stage while launching pads and emplacements are being destroyed.

Stevenson made clear that our intense and urgent preoccupation is with weapons being rendered immediately inoperable and with this fact being verified.

SYG referred to fol phrase in second para of President’s Oct 27 letter to Khrushchev:See Document 95.“To insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments”. He was worried at implications of word “continuation” and feared this meant US expected UN to continue inspection of Cuba for indefinite period. If this were the case he felt it certain that Castro would make counter-demand for inspection of what SYG called “CIA training camps for exiles” in US and certain Caribbean countries. We disabused him of idea that inspection for an indefinite period is contemplated.

Stevenson and McCloy again referred to necessity of inspection during immediate interim period. If inspection on the spot cannot be obtained, aerial inspection becomes all the more important. SYG said he saw no objection to aerial inspection during interim period if Cuban Govt agrees. McCloy indicated that until UN aerial observation set up US has to reserve right to maintain observation itself.

McCloy also indicated we could give no assurances concerning lifting of quarantine until verification established. Discussion ensued whether quarantine linked only with imports of arms into Cuba or with elimination of offensive weapons from Cuba with UN side maintaining former and US side latter. It was eventually agreed that for immediate purpose of SYG’s visit most desirable handling would be issuance by US of simple statement to effect that at SYG’s request quarantine being temporarily suspended for the duration of his visit.

Stevenson emphasized importance of dissuading Castro from introducing into negots extraneous elements, such as those covered in yesterday’s five-point declaration,For text of this statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448. which would only complicate and perhaps even jeopardize settlement reached between US and USSR. He also mentioned that expression in Pres’s letter to Khrushchev that he was confident other Western Hemisphere nations would also give assurances against invasion of Cuba was of course merely expression of US conviction and not commitment on behalf other American Republics. Presumably there would be an agreed OAS position on this subject.

Stevenson
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-2962. Confidential. Drafted by Cleveland, cleared with the Department of Defense, approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Moscow. Washington, October 29, 1962, 10:50 p.m.

1136. Subject: Cuba.

We understand from telcons that Khrushchev has proposed that International Red Cross (ICRC) assume function of monitoring shipments into Cuba to make sure that no arms are coming in from Soviet Union to Cuba. This inspection to be in port of entering if Cuba agrees or at sea if preferred. If at sea, Red Cross personnel should board from neutral or Soviet ships, not American vessels. Red Cross personnel should be citizens of neutral or non-aligned countries. This arrangement on monitoring in shipments is satisfactory. If possible, we would prefer that ICRC operate in some fashion as executive agent of the SYG, in manner analogous work of League of [International] Red Cross Societies (LICROSS) in refugee field.

Some continuing reconnaissance from the air seems essential, during period of dismantling and withdrawal of missiles and other major weapons. This will be especially true if no on-site inspection of missile sites can be arranged until dismantling completed. If necessary U.S. will continue its own reconnaissance. If possible, we would still prefer a technically competent reconnaissance done by UN itself. Therefore important to pursue Canadian offer of pilots for RF-101s, or other possibilities accomplishing same purpose.

FYI. One of U.S. planes on today’s reconnaissance was fired on by Cubans. End FYI.

 Statement on quarantine approved for release Monday evening:

“The White House announced tonight that, in response to the request of Acting Secretary General U Thant, enforcement of the quarantine has been voluntarily suspended during the period of his visit to Cuba.”

 Pending examination results of today’s reconnaissance, no decision yet on whether to suspend US aerial reconnaissance during period SYGs visit to Cuba. It will be important to have assurance, including if possible photographs, of missiles being packed up and actually leaving on ships. Perhaps as part of monitoring operation in ports, ICRC couldlikewise monitor export of major weapons. Rusk
114. Summary Record of the 13th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action of this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement. Washington, October 30, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone reported that incomplete interpretation of pictures from yesterday’s reconnaissance mission did not reveal whether work on the missile sites had halted or whether dismantlement of the missiles had begun. Construction at the nuclear sites appears to be continuing. Some of the missile launchers have been removed to cover areas.A copy of the CIA memorandum, SC No. 11155/62, with information as of 6 a.m. October 30, from which McCone briefed the Executive Committee, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16.

Secretary McNamara called attention to the reported activities of Alpha 66. The President stated that insofar as we had any control over the actions of Alpha 66, we should try to keep them from doing something that might upset the deal with the Russians. The President noted that anti-Castro groups did have a stake in continuing the struggle, and, therefore, might make an effort to cause difficulties during the period when it appeared we would be reaching some kind of a solution with the Russians.

The President authorized a public statement to the effect that it was too early to judge whether the missiles were being dismantled and construction at missile sites halted.

Secretary McNamara said he had directed that no U-2 planes fly anywhere until he was satisfied that a system had been developed to safeguard against navigational errors resulting in overflights of Soviet territory. He felt it was important to avoid another incident.

Secretary Rusk reported that U Thant had told our people in New York that he would not go to Havana if we conducted air reconnaissance during the two days he is expected to be in Cuba.

The President agreed that no air reconnaissance missions would be flown over Cuba today or tomorrow, but he directed that every effort be made to get UN surveillance under way as soon as possible. Secretary McNamara said that there were ten or twelve issues connected with the Cuban crisis which were being reviewed and would be ready for Presidential consideration tomorrow.

Turning to the question of guidance for the press, the President directed that no one on the Executive Committee should personally see any reporter and that nobody in the group should say anything except Mr. Bundy, Mr. Salinger, and Mr. Sorensen, who were authorized to talk to reporters. The President said we were not dealing with a finished episode, and, therefore, information going to the press needed to reflect the solidity of the Committee.

Mr. Salinger said that three sanitized versions of the crisis, all of them to be approved by the President, were being prepared by Defense, State, and White House press officers.

The President agreed not to issue the draft Executive Order covering ships engaged in the Cuba trade, but requested the State Department to explain to reporters that the reason for not issuing the order was because it was aimed at a situation which had been radically altered by the discovery of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba.

Acting Director of USIA Wilson reported that Cuban exiles were seeking to buy time on U.S. radio stations. It was expected that if they succeeded, they would make inflammatory statements about present U.S. policy toward Cuba. The President authorized Mr. Wilson to talk to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission about some way of blocking these broadcasts without appearing to be imposing censorship of the radio stations.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
115. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3062. Secret; Niact. Repeated to USUN. Received in the Department of State at 12:15 p.m. Moscow, October 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

1139. Policy. During courtesy call on Gromyko at 4:00 p.m. today, he introduced subject of Cuba, saying that Soviet Government wished as quickly as possible to reach agreement pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters. Agreement should “codify” obligations of both sides, i.e., US obligations to refrain from attack on Cuba and to rescind blockade, “which you call quarantine, but which we regard as inadmissible arbitrary act in peace-time”; Soviet obligation to remove weapons “which President called offensive”; and Cuban obligations. Agreement should stem from talks now going on at UN in New York. Soviet Government expects US will take steps to bring negotiations quickly to satisfactory end. Gromyko said he did not want to enter upon substantive discussion this matter now, just wanted to mention it in passing.

I said that, while I had no instructions discuss this subject, it was clear US Government desired and intended to proceed as swiftly as possible to overcome crisis. President regards exchange of letters with Khrushchev as constituting agreement on basic principles involved, on basis of which question was prompt execution of obligations. So far as speed of negotiations was concerned, the faster the better, but talk should not delay action.

Kohler
116. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, October 30, 1962.

There will be a meeting without the President in the Conference Room of the Under Secretary of State at 6:00 p.m. this evening,No record of this meeting has been found, but it is noted in Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library) at which time Mr. Ball will lead discussion of some of the outstanding issues. It will be helpful if members can find a little time to think about them beforehand. Among these issues are the following:Another list of issues for this meeting is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General 10/28/62-10/31/62) What are the conditions for lifting the quarantine, either temporarily or permanently? What other procedures for inbound inspection of shipments from the bloc are practicable? What is our plan for the resumption, the continuance, and the possible abandonment of aerial reconnaissance? What is our policy for the problem of definition of offensive weapons? What verification do we expect before the re-export of offensive weapons? What shape and definition can we give to our undertaking not to disturb the peace of the Caribbean? What are the elements of a new policy toward refugee Cubans? What political action can we take to exploit strains in the Castro regime? What can be the long-term balance of assurance of our undertakings as against those of the USSR?

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
117. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3062. Secret; Priority. Received in the Department of State at 6:49 p.m. New York, October 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

1547. Policy. Conversation with Kuznetsov.

At lunch with Kuznetsov today we discussed Cuba and he was very pleased that we would accept Red Cross inspection of the incoming ships. He assured me emphatically that the weapons would be dismantled and removed and that we could count on it, and then have whatever verification at the end of the process we wanted. He found it hard to believe that we would doubt their word in present circumstances, when I explained that surveillance during the interval to confirm compliance was necessary. Then he asked if we could not fly our high-level reconnaissance planes along the coast outside Cuban territorial waters and get good enough pictures. I said I doubted if that would be adequate, and suggested that reconnaissance planes could be transferred to the UN, painted and marked appropriately, and manned by neutrals if available, or even by combined Russian, Cuban and American crews. He was noncommittal, but clearly worried about Cuban objections to over-flights, although they did not appear to bother him. He did, however, say something about compromise of Russian prestige by this evidence of our skepticism. As to time involved to complete dismantling and removal process, he said Khrushchev had told him before he left Moscow that it would probably take two or three weeks.

He seemed to be especially eager to discuss disarmament and other bases and to explore any other possibilities for talks on broader basis. He plans to stay here as long as he can do anything, see people, and talk usefully about our mutual problems. He asked why he and I should not discuss the whole range of problems and added that as peoples we get along very much better than on official level, and that just now relations were badly strained.

On disarmament, he interrogated me closely in reply to suggestion about some bilateral talks on testing here in New York. He feels our positions are now so close that we should be able to reach agreement. In response to my suggestion that agreement on above-ground testing could now be reached quickly, he pressed me on why we insisted on underground inspection and why we seemed to want to make more underground tests when we had made far more tests than they, to our great advantage. Moreover, he felt confident that our scientists could really detect and identify everything. After the usual explanations that all underground tests could not be identified and that there were means to prevent any real danger of espionage, he was noncommittal and proposed a toast to disarmament and that we should talk some more.

He adverted several times to removal of our bases which threaten the Soviet Union as they had removed their base in Cuba which threatened the US.

Mtg was extremely cordial, and we also talked about previous mtgs and my writings on the Soviet Union with which he was familiar. He discussed with great candor the agricultural problem and the slow development of the virgin lands project, where they are consolidating and mechanizing and not increasing acreage. He brought me friendly messages from Khrushchev and Mikoyan.

Arthur Dean is seeing him this afternoon with regard to the disarmament negotiation.

Stevenson
118. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. Rusk was in Washington;Stevenson was in New York. October 30, 1962, 7 p.m.

Stevenson said that Seamens [Narasimham] (?) called in. He said they had a wonderful code—they talk in Hindi. Riki [Rikhye] reported that the first session which has terminated went very badly. Castro says no intrusion or inspection whatsoever on Cuban soil by anybody. They are now adjourned to meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. They will do some work on him tonight and might break him down by tomorrow morning. He asked that further reconnaissance by us be held off for another day so that it would not screw the thing up. He thinks if they don’t get results tomorrow and he runs in this stone wall he will come back and call a Security Council meeting Thursday to ask for further instructions. The Cubans have refused Riki any access to inspect the sites and he has no clue as to what has transpired. Kuznetsov seemed alarmed todaySee Document 117. about the attitude of the Cubans, but so far as the Russians are concerned, he was confident of progress, but we would have to take a look so far as the Cubans are concerned and we would have to rUN some high level overflights unless we get a breakthrough. The Security Council thing will be awkward because the absence of an agreement of that kind would, of course, only increase the offense to the Cubans. If this is the only way out we had better have a talk with Kuznetsov and see if we can reach some sort of secret agreement and then go ahead with the Security Council agreement and confer with the Soviets. The Secretary suggested possibly the Cubans and Stevenson asked do we want to do that. The Secretary replied he did not know. Stevenson would think twice about that. There might be an interim meeting of the Latin American group on this. Stevenson is not clear in his mind who it would possibly be—perhaps Mexico.

The Secretary said he would report this to the group meeting nowSee footnote 1, Document 116. and see where we come out after the session ends. Stevenson said they were having a Delegation meeting tomorrow and he will caution them on any statements.

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.5211/10-3062. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Sisco, cleared with Hilsman and Ball, and approved by Cleveland. Washington, October 30, 1962, 9:50 p.m.

1141. Please request Narasimhan transmit confidentially to Rikhye by phone in Hindi following information for SYG. This should under no circumstances be sent by UN inclear to U Thant.

Before he left for Havana SYG requested information on results US aerial surveillance October 29. SYG should be informed results of October 29 surveillance inconclusive. Moreover, since aerial observation not conducted October 28, pictures resulting from October 29 surveillance merely establish the initial base from which subsequent series of photographs must be made and evaluated. Importance of making sure Soviets are complying with their own commitments will probably make urgent the resumption of air reconnaissance by Thursday, November 1. Rusk
120. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence. The source text bears no classification or indication who made the translation. Moscow, October 30, 1962.

Dear Mr. President, I want to convey to you confidentially some considerations which, if you agree with them, could serve, in my opinion, our common cause, that is, prompt elimination of the remnants of the dangerous crisis which you and we have in the main liquidated. This would help to finalize the settlement more quickly so that life would resume its normal pace.

First of all, I would like to express a wish that you already now remove the quarantine without waiting for the procedure for the inspection of ships on which an agreement has been reached to be put into effect. It would be very reasonable on your part. You yourself realize that the quarantine will in fact accomplish nothing since those ships that are now heading for Cuba naturally, after we have agreed on the removal of our missiles from Cuba, do not carry not only any offensive weapons, but, as I have already stated it publicly and informed you confidentially, any weapons at all. Immediate lift of the quarantine would be a good gesture. It would be appreciated both by us and world public opinion as a major step to speed up liquidation of the after effects of the crisis. For all practical purposes the quarantine is of no use to you, but being a manifestation of the crisis, it continues to poison relations among states, relations between you and us and Cuba and produces a depressing effect on world public which would like to see a complete relaxation. You would lose nothing but you would score a gain as far as public opinion is concerned.

On the other hand, immediate lift of the quarantine would give us an opportunity to use our ships that are approaching Cuba to take out the weapons which are being dismantled now and, I think, have been already dismantled. After the ships are unloaded the dismantled weapons could be loaded on them and shipped to the Soviet Union.

Naturally, after the elimination of the crisis it is impossible to continue the blockade and discrimination in trade and communications. All this must be done away with. But you, as we know, undertook measures and put pressure on your allies and other countries so that even flights of civilian passenger planes be not permitted. Do you really think that IL-28 carries any means of destruction? This is laughable.

All this is being done not to ensure security, but as pinpricks and cannot but cause irritation and worsening of our relations. Why should it be done? Who needs it? It serves only the aggressive forces to strain nerves and thus to reach their goal which is to push the world into the abyss of thermonuclear war.

Therefore I believe, that you, Mr. President, will understand me correctly and will draw appropriate conclusions aimed at clearing the way for bettering the relations between our states.

Next question. I do not know what you will think about it but if you were prepared already now to proclaim the liquidation of your base in Guantanamo, this would be an act which would give world public opinion real satisfaction and would contribute to the easing of tension. I think that you yourself realize what significance the base in Guantanamo may have now after your statement that you do not pursue the aim of invading Cuba. Then the question arises: at whom this base is aimed, what purposes does it serve, from whom can it guard the approaches to America? I do not see forces that can threaten America from that direction. Therefore the base in Guantanamo is only a burden for your budget, and what is the main thing, it is a great burden of a moral nature for political leaders in the USA. And everybody realizes that the functions of the base in Guantanamo—and this is in fact the case—are aggressive, not defensive.

You know our position with regard to the bases. We are against military bases in general and that’s why we liquidated those our bases that we had in Finland and China and we think that we acted rightly. That was an act that manifested our good intentions in ensuring peaceful coexistence. By that we did not diminish our defensive capability but raised our moral prestige among the peoples of all the world. The more true it is now when there are perfect means of war the range and destructive power of which are so great that no bases could in any degree replace them.

This would be a good preparation to an agreement between you and us on the liquidation of all military bases in general since military bases have lost now their importance. Those are not my words. I think, you yourself said and even stated it publicly that you want to reduce the number of your military bases. Of this spoke Bowles and others, and they spoke correctly.

Such your step would be highly appreciated by world public.

I would like also to tell you my following consideration.

My colleagues and I consider that both sides have displayed restraint and wisdom in liquidating the military conflict which might have resulted in a world thermonuclear war. I take the liberty to think that you evidently held to a restraining position with regard to those forces which suffered from militaristic itching. And we take a notice of that. I don’t know, perhaps I am wrong, but in this letter I am making the conclusion on the basis that in your country the situation is such that the decisive word rests with the President and if he took an extreme stand there would be no one to restrain him and war would be unleashed. But as this did not happen and we found a reasonable compromise having made mutual concessions to each other and on this basis eliminated the crisis which could explode in the catastrophe of a thermonuclear war, then, evidently, your role here was restraining. We so believe, and we note and appreciate it.

Our systems are different and my role was simpler than yours because there were no people around me who wanted to unleash war. My efforts aimed at eliminating the conflict were supported by both our military men and my colleagues in the leadership of the party and government.

Mr. President, we have now conditions ripe for finalizing the agreement on signing a treaty on cessation of tests of thermonuclear weapons. We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of test in atmosphere, in outer space and under water. In this respect we are of the same opinion and we are ready to sign an agreement.

But there are still some differences with regard to underground explosions. Therefore it would be good if you gave instructions to find a compromise in the decision on the underground test ban, but without inspection. We shall not accept inspection, this I say to you unequivocally and frankly. Of course, if one aims at delaying or torpedoing an agreement then there is sense in insisting on the inspection of underground explosions.

We do not carry on underground tests, we did it but once and we are not going to do it anymore. Maybe such a necessity will arise sometime in future, but in any case I do not envisage it.

It would be very useful to agree on ending tests after such strain when people lived through great anxiety. It would be a great reward for the nervous strain suffered by the peoples of all countries. I think that your people felt as much anxiety as all other peoples expecting that thermonuclear war would break out any moment. And we were very close to such war indeed. That is why it would be good to give satisfaction to the public opinion. This would contribute to easing the tension.

We appreciate it very much that you took the initiative and in such a moment of crisis stated your readiness to conduct negotiations with the purpose of signing a non-aggression treaty between the two military blocs. We responded and supported it. We are prepared to come to an agreement on this question confidentially or through diplomatic channels and then make it public and start negotiations. This also would contribute to lessening tension. The world public would learn with satisfaction that in the moment of crisis not only declarative statements were made but certain commitments with signatures affixed were taken as well.

But the best thing to do would be—I do not know how you will look upon it—to disband all military blocs. We are not coming up with this now though we spoke of this before; however we believe now too that this would be most reasonable. But if you and your allies are not ready yet for that we are not pressing. However I must say that in the interests of the same elimination of tension this would be greatly useful.

We have eliminated a serious crisis. But in order to foresee and forestall appearance of a new crisis in future which might be impossible to cope with everything in our relations capable of generating a new crisis should be erased now. It would seem that now when we possess thermonuclear weapons, rocket weapons, submarine fleet and other means the situation obliges all states, every state to adhere to such norms of conduct which would not generate conflicts, to say nothing of wars. From our point of view, this is quite obtainable. This would be a big step forward at a time when we in effect have not yet disarmed. I think that this would be not a loss but a gain for the supporters of peaceful coexistence, a mutual benefit which the peoples of the U.S. and other countries participating in military blocs would enjoy. It can also be said with confidence that this would be highly appreciated by all peoples and would give great reassurance and satisfaction to people interested in securing peace. More efforts should be made already now to solve the problem of disarmament. To do it with regard not to one stage but to a real solution of the whole problem.

In our proposals on general and complete disarmament which we have made we have taken into consideration your wishes as well. Our recent proposals on this point were expressed by the USSR ForeignMinister A.A. Gromyko at the XVII session of the U.N. General Assembly. In those proposals of ours adjustments were made to take into account your wishes. What we considered to be reasonable we took into consideration.

And of course, Mr. President, I am again reminding you of the necessity to solve the German question because next crisis, possibly of no lesser danger, can be caused by the German question. And the main thing is that that crisis will be foolish as all crises are.

There was war, two German states emerged, or actually three states, which are in existence since the end of World War II. Specific relations among them have already developed. But these relations—economic and political—exist because the German Democratic Republic regulates traffic through its territory on the basis of some substitutes for treaties though in reality, in daily life, in practice such treaties are already operative.

Besides, we and you, our Foreign Minister and your Secretary of State, have agreed on all questions. And the only question which remains unsolved is that of the presence of troops in West Berlin and in effect not even of the troops but under what flag those troops will be and of what states, naturally within certain period of time.

Could not we both understand it? And who needs that the present unsolved situation continue? Not you and not your people. This is not in our or your interests, and not in the interests of our or your allies. This is only—and I repeat again—in the interests of revanchist forces who do not want to recognize the borders and conditions emerged as a result of the defeat of the Hitlerite Germany. Only they benefit from that. Nobody else.

Who expresses such policy now—Adenauer or somebody else—that is of no particular importance to me or to you. But if one takes a realistic view, if you, Mr. President, analyze the situation then you in your heart will undoubtedly agree with me. What you say publicly is another matter. But that comes not from how you personally understand the situation but, so to say, from political expedience, from desire “not to offend” your ally. However it would be better to be guided by a desire not to offend the public opinion and to give satisfaction to it, to give satisfaction to all peoples, the American people included—to eliminate the hotbed of international tension in the center of Europe. And we would be able to eliminate it. If you and we come to an agreement on this question—and we do want it—this would be a great joy for all peoples because this would mean consolidation of peace.

There would remain many unsettled matters in the world but the main thing after that—and I would like to tell you about it—is the question of China. It is anomalous that China is not having her seat in the U.N. Similar anomalies already existed in history and were overwhelmed by life. When the Revolution broke out and won in America the Russian Emperor showed stubbornness and did not recognize America for 26 years. But America did not cease to exist because of that. So, that was a foolish policy. The United States answered with the same lack of cleverness. But that happened, however, in different times. Therefore the U.S. acted unreasonably for roughly half that time: the Russian Emperor—for 26 years, you—for 16 years. But then the U.S. realized that it was unwise, and your great President Roosevelt took the courage and responsibility and displayed wisdom.

You would greatly raise your prestige, personal and that of your country, in the eyes of the peoples if you take an attitude facilitating China taking its lawful seat in the U.N. This is possible only if it is understood that there cannot be two Chinas. No state which respects itself can agree to a part of its territory, a part of its population being cut off, it applies even more strongly to a great power. This is an internal question of China and let the Chinese decide it among themselves. When China participated in the creation of the U.N. and when it was made a permanent member of the Security Council, then it was one China. And that one China exists now. If China occupies again its lawful seat in the U.N., if you understand the necessity of it—and I think that you do understand it—then it would be good, it would be a great contribution to the cause of peace.

It is impossible to come to an agreement on disarmament without China. There are countries with population of half a million and even less which are members of the U.N. and have voice in this international organization. Iceland, for instance, has the population of 180 thousand people. China has 650 million people and does not have such voice. We have respect for the people of Iceland and their will as well as for all peoples. But from the point of view of ensuring peace—even if there seems to be a contradiction here—the contribution of a given people and that of another people, the real contribution to the cause of ensuring peace may be different.

Therefore it would be proper to solve the question of the restoration of China’s rights in the U.N.; the peoples are waiting for it. And this will happen, it is only a matter of time. Therefore in order not to prolong this time, if you understood now the necessity for such a step, then, it would in effect be possible to solve this problem at the present session of General Assembly. What satisfaction it would give to the world public opinion, you would see from the expression of feelings of all peoples because it would be a real step, indeed, towards stabilization and strengthening of peace all over the world.

We, the Soviet people and the peoples of Asian and European countries saw war. War often rolled through our territory. America participated in the two wars but it suffered very small losses in those wars. While huge profits were accumulated as a result of the wars. Of course, it was monopolists who benefited but workers, working people got something out of it, too. War did not touch the soil of the United States. The American people did not experience destruction, sufferings, they only received notifications about deaths of their kin. Now during this crisis war was knocking at the gates of America.

These, in effect, are my considerations after the crisis situation. I want to tell you that in this crisis, as our saying goes, there is no evil without good. Evil has brought some good. The good is that now people have felt more tangibly the breathing of the burning flames of thermonuclear war and have a more clear realization of the threat looming over them if arms race is not stopped. And I would say that what has just happened will serve especially good the American people.

Mr. President, I believe that you as a military man, and your military people understand that we were not preparing for war when we delivered means of defense to Cuba. Those means were not meant against the U.S., but were the means to ensure the security of Cuba. Do you really think that we are so narrow-minded in our understanding of military matters that in preparing for war against the U.S. we picked up Cuba as a bridgehead for such a war? And the means there—a certain number of missiles. This is foolish. For Cuba is no good as a bridgehead for a big war and it cannot be used for those purposes and, of course, nobody ever contemplated that. Those were the means for deterring aggressor, to use the language of the late Dulles.

It is our opinion that the crisis has been eliminated on the compromise basis through reciprocal concessions. We are satisfied with it. We also appreciate your cooperation in the elimination of the crisis and your understanding of the necessity for reciprocal concessions and compromise so that the conflict be prevented from going beyond the limits that might really break into a thermonuclear war. All the peoples of the world, the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the peoples of all other countries, are interested in eliminating this conflict. In particular, I think, it will be highly appreciated by the people of Cuba who have now been assured that their borders will be respected and there will be no threat of invasion of their land on the part of stronger states. In other words, the Cuban people will have the long-awaited opportunity to enjoy the benefits of their labor and they will have the guarantee of their independence on the basis of the U.N. Charter, which provides for non-interference into internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty and integrity of states.

These are the considerations, Mr. President, which I wanted to express to you. I understand that I listed a great number of questions. Therefore, if we started after breakfast we would not have finished solving them before dinner. It would require more time but they have to be solved. They face the world. And the more we delay the solution of these questions, the more of unknown will appear which can prove to be fatal in a future crisis. Therefore, the sooner we clear away the roadblock, the windfallen wood, which has piled up in the international relations, and make clear the roads to correct mutual understanding the better it would be.

Mr. President, you lived through this crisis yourself. For us too, it presented the Rubicon: whether to agree to a compromise, whether to make concessions. Indeed, from the point of view of the legal standards your claims had no grounds whatsoever. Therefore there was a great trial and there were hesitations. We still believed, however, that you might have difficulties too since how could it be that you could not know that the unjustified demands of the USA exposed the world to the hazards of catastrophe. However, we decided to make a compromise proposal which would suit both you and us. We received your assurances that you would not invade Cuba and would not permit others to do it and on this condition we withdraw the weapons which you called offensive. As a result, there has been practically achieved the purpose which had been intended to be achieved through the shipments of means of defense. Now this question is solved on these compromise and reciprocal concessions.

And we consider it to be reasonable. Having eliminated this crisis we gave each other mutual satisfaction: you promised not to attack and not to permit attack against Cuba on the part of others, and we moved forward to make the USA feel confident that we do not contemplate anything bad against it and that there is no threat against the USA on our part. You certainly possess means of destruction. But you know that we also have these means and they are of a different nature than those that were in Cuba. Those were trifles there. Our means were brought to the state of combat readiness, they were of a more serious nature and they were pointed at the USA and your allies.

To our mutual satisfaction we maybe even sacrificed self-esteem. Apparently, there will be such scribblers who will engage in hair-splitting over our agreement, will be digging as to who made greater concessions to whom. As for me, I would say that we both made a concession to reason and found a reasonable solution which enabled us to ensure peace for all including those who will be trying to dig up something.

Such is our understanding of this whole question.

I would like to sum up the above said and express in conclusion the following considerations on the questions touched upon in this letter.

I think it would be possible to pick up from the questions listed by me those which are more ripe and which should, perhaps, be prepared for taking decisions on them. Then it would be possible to meet, maybe, at the U.N. or maybe at a specially arranged meeting. I repeat, I have in mind a meeting in case questions are prepared for taking decisions on them so that the appropriate agreements could be signed during the meeting. It would be a good gift for the peoples of the whole world.

We have a different understanding of the mentioned questions. Therefore I would like to know your considerations as to whether you believe that some or other of the questions raised by me are ripe for decision. If you do not consider them ripe, then there should be no meeting because a meeting in such conditions would not only fail to justify hopes of the peoples, but would distress them.On October 29 Dobrynin had given Robert Kennedy a different unsigned letter from Khrushchev to the President which spelled out the basis for agreement on Cuba. The Attorney General studied the letter over night before asking Dobrynin to come to his office on October 30 and take it back because it involved a quid pro quo. For an account of this incident, see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 546. No record of the October 30 meeting has been found. For text of the letter, see vol. VI, Document 70.

Sincerely,

N. KhrushchevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
121. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/10-3162. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution. Received in the Department of State at 7:20 a.m. The source text notes that a copy of the telegram was passed to the White House on October 31. Moscow, October 31, 1962, 2 p.m.

1149. Policy. Gromyko initiative on Cuba yesterday (Embtel 1139)Document 115. appears corroborate estimate of Soviet intentions salvage as much as possible of their position in Cuba. In this respect seems to us to reflect same kind of internal pushing and hauling which must have taken place between despatch Khrushchev private letter October 26 and published letter October 27.See Documents 84 and 91.

Western colleagues incline to view “heads must roll” as result set-back, though neither they nor we are able to identify source of any differences in leadership.

In any event, we believe Khrushchev personally convinced situation was critically dangerous and had to be liquidated. (We are struck by parallel between danger to USSR in which Cuban gamble eventuated and Khrushchev’s accusations against Stalin in “secret speech” for having permitted Soviet Union come up to threshold World War II grossly unprepared, both militarily and psychologically.)

On balance we consider selection of Kuznetsov for New York and decision to despatch Mikoyan to Cuba encouraging factors. Seems to us of some importance they chose to send Mikoyan via New York for consultation with Kuznetsov rather than direct, as they could have done (Embtel 1145).Dated October 31. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.6111/10-3162)

Factors producing dramatic decision withdraw included not only striking display US determination and unity Western alliances when chips are down, but distaste Soviet populace for Cuban adventures. Sense of relief here following publication exchanges of letters unmistakable.

Kohler
122. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Legere. The source text is initialed by Taylor. Washington, October 31, 1962. SUBJECT Daily White House Staff Meeting—31 October 1962 Mr. Bundy presided throughout. DEFCONs no change. The following matters arose: Mr. Bundy devoted most of the meeting to securing ideas on what might come up at the President’s press conference to morrow, and on what ought to be the appropriate responses to these matters. The following were the major items identified and discussed: The status of dismantling is sure to arise, but the answers are unlikely to be sufficiently “hard” by tomorrow afternoon for a categorical answer. The chances are that the President will say this Government is satisfied that construction has stopped, hoping that the reporters will understand that this judgment rests only partially on hard photographic evidence, the other part being the exercise of a political judgment. I mentioned that the wolves had already begUN to howl about intelligence shortcomings during the period prior to the crisis. The President’s answer to this almost-certain question will probably be based on the multiplicity of indicators that must be evaluated, etc.,—i.e., more or less a standard Intelligence Officer’s answer. Someone will probably ask the President whether the US means to guarantee the continuance of the Castro regime. The answer to this will in part refer to the President’s statements of September 4 and 13,For texts of these statements, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 369-370 and 373-374. and in part refer in general terms to the fact that the United States and the OAS are permanently committed to resist aggression in the Hemisphere. Any question about the Cuban refugees will be extremely tough to answer. Bundy said that the fact of the matter was that these refugee organizations had been under restraint by US “law enforcement agencies” during the past week or so, but of course this is just about the last thing the President would want to say at the conference. There was no real feeling on how to handle this query. A few individuals around the table thought that the President might say a few words in a very optimistic vein about the future of world peace, but the consensus was that it would be best at this time to fuzz this over at least or maybe even stay away from it altogether. A rather abstract discussion on the role of force in international affairs thereupon ensued. Nothing much came out of it except general agreement that the President in his opening statement should steer clear of any discussion of the role of force, concentrating instead on how our Allies and other friends rallied to the cause. Given the general intellectual brilliance of this group, I was amazed to note heads nodding when Arthur Schlesinger gravely remarked that the role of force in this crisis had not been very great because, after all, no force at all had been used—e.g., only one casualty: Major Anderson.

[Here follows discussion of the Congo and Latin America.]

LJL
123. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. McCone’s 1-page summary of this meeting and the Record of Action (both ibid.) are in the Supplement. Washington, October 31, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone stated that aerial photographs taken on October 29 did not conclusively prove that the missile buildup and construction at missile sites in Cuba had halted.The CIA intelligence memorandum, SC No. 11195/62, based on information received as of 6 a.m., October 31, which McCone used to brief the Executive Committee is in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16) The Russians in Cuba had received their orders to withdraw the missiles only on Sunday. There had been some movement but nothing conclusive.

Referring to the task which the intelligence community had carried out in connection with the Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba, Director McCone acknowledged that from September 15 on we had failed to evaluate properly the refugee reports and reports from third country representatives in Cuba. He explained this failure in part by referring to a September 19, 1962 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 85-3-62)For text, see vol. X, Document 433. which stated all the reasons why we did not think the Russians would deploy nuclear weapons to countries outside their borders. This estimate, in effect, prompted evaluators to downgrade the fragmentary reports which we received during the latter part of September and early October.

Secretary Rusk reported that the Russians apparently are prepared to go along with the general inspection procedures which we think are necessary. However, Castro, during the conversation yesterday with Acting Secretary General U Thant, flatly refused to accept on-site UN inspection. Secretary Rusk said this meant that we must continue to obtain aerial pictures of Cuba. He asked the President to call off his press conference in view of Castro’s position.

The President agreed to call off his press conference and inform the press, on a background basis; that Castro’s opposition to acceptable inspection procedures created a situation about which he did not wish to speak publicly at this time. The President felt the cancellation of the press conference would have a healthy effect on both the Cubans and on U Thant.

Under Secretary Ball presented draft instructions to Ambassador Stevenson covering negotiations with the Russians and with U Thant on inspection procedures we would accept.The draft has not been identified further, but see Document 125 for the final text of Stevenson’s instructions. These instructions, which the President approved, did not cover inspection procedures acceptable to us during the period after the offensive missiles had been removed from Cuba.

Secretary Rusk said that on ThursdayNovember 1. we must fly U-2 and low-level reconnaissance missions over Cuba if Castro remains adamant in his opposition to on-site inspection. He suggested that Mr. McCloy tell Kuznetsov in New York that we intended to overfly Cuba and ask Kuznetsov whether the Russians in Cuba could be instructed not to fire on our planes. He also suggested that Mr. McCloy tell Kuznetsov that we have encountered real difficulties as a result of Castro’s refusal to accept on-site inspection procedures. He might even propose a bilateral arrangement with the Russians for air reconnaissance in view of the fact that UN arrangements did not appear to be possible. He noted that if U Thant extends his stay in Havana, we will be in difficulty because of the UN request not to fly reconnaissance missions during the time U Thant is there.

The President agreed that reconnaissance missions should be flown tomorrow unless significant progress was made by U Thant in his negotiations with Castro. If agreement appeared likely, we might postpone further flights until Friday.

Mr. Gilpatric commented that UN reconnaissance flights were very unlikely, but that the New York group would continue efforts to establish a UN surveillance capability.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that the International Red Cross will participate in inspection measures only if Castro approves. If Castro will not approve, then we must reestablish our U.S. quarantine.

Ambassador Thompson mentioned the possibility that the Soviets might go along with our air reconnaissance if we did not reimpose the quarantine.

The President said that if the Castro/U Thant negotiations break down, as we assume they will, we would fly reconnaissance missions, but what would we do about the quarantine?

Secretary Rusk said we might ask the Red Cross to inspect at sea ships bound for Cuba, but he predicted that the Red Cross would not agree to do so in view of Castro’s opposition.

The Attorney General said that we must keep our ability to put pressure on the Cubans by means of a blockade. He said the Russians could tell the Cubans that unless they accepted adequate inspection procedures, the U.S. would resume the blockade and expand it to include POL cargoes.

Secretary McNamara reported that all Soviet ships near the quarantine line were now lying dead in the water, but that non-Bloc ships were proceeding toward Cuban ports.

Secretary Rusk suggested that one way of putting pressure on Castro would be to ask free world states to tell the Cubans that Cuba must comply with UN inspection procedures or else they would break diplomatic relations with the Cuban government.

The President said we should consider broadening the blockade because otherwise we would be in the position of stopping only non-Soviet ships. If U Thant stays in Cuba longer than planned, we must decide what we will do then. One proposal would call for hailing all Russian ships but allowing them to proceed. Non-Bloc ships carrying cargoes consisting of goods included on an enlarged prohibited list would be stopped. The President called attention to the importance of keeping the Organization of American States geared up so that if firmer action were required, the Latin Americans would support us. We must keep information about Castro’s attitude flowing to OAS members.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
124. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telcons—Cuba. No classification marking. The conversation probably took place after the 14th meeting of the Executive Committee since Rusk’s Appointment Book shows that he met with Ball at 11:09 p.m. (Johnson Library) October 31, 1962.

Stevenson: When Khrushchev said to Kennedy on SundayOctober 28. morning that he was going to dismantle, Castro had not been consulted. He immediately stated five points three hours after Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy.For text of the five points, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448;Khrushchev’s letter is printed as Document 102. He made it purposely in order to complicate the situation for the Russians. Sooner or later there will be a show-down and that is the reason, of course, for Mikoyan’s arrival. So now the question of UN inspection becomes important. He wants everyone to respect our integrity… . outside agency to inspect on Cuban soil. No Cuban has been permitted to visit the sites. They don’t even know when the construction started of the sites, or when the dismantling started. Today U Thant asked the Soviet Ambassador to come in and asked him two questions. The US is concerned about the launchings of the missiles and want urgent dismantling. When will the dismantling start? Secondly, how long will this take? The Soviet Ambassador’s answer was that he would have to refer the question to the military and ask Moscow. This morning, before the second meeting with Castro, the Soviet Ambassador telephoned him. Then he arrived at U Thant’s place with the General in charge of the dismantling at 2:30 this afternoon and made the following answer to the question. With regard to Khrushchev’s order to dismantle on Sunday “we received it between 1 and 3 p.m. We started the dismantling on Sunday at 5 p.m. It will be all over by tomorrow night, and by the latest on Friday,November 2. when we will have finished the bulldozing of the sites by Friday night. We have asked for ships. We don’t know when they will be in the ports. But the equipment will be in the ports Thursday night or Friday morning. We are crating the equipment at the ports for sea voyage. Most of it will not have to be crated because of deck loading. The bases no longer exist. Even the pads will be gone, but no Cuban observation of the dismantling is permitted.” This is what the Russians say. “By Friday there will be nothing.” The instruction of the UN was that this included aircraft. Although they were not very specific as to whether or [not] they have interrogated them about aircraft. As to the aircraft, the Russians assured them that the Cubans had not been trained to fly them. There was no discussion of the SAM sites. Any equipment, Soviet-manned, will go. Anti-aircraft manned by all the anti-aircraft, both SAM and conventional is manned by the Cubans. It was a Cuban Colonel that shot down our plane. Castro says all anti-aircraft commanded by Cubans will stay, including the SAM sites, they assume. Castro was apparently ranting most of the time and pretty sarcastic and kept screaming no inspection would be permitted under any circumstances, either … but that they must go through the blockade. Kuznetsov said in Cuba, “We’ll tell them at the UN what the ship schedule of arrival will be in Cuba.”Castro said “Pushoff should not have promised verification.” My notes say that since the Soviet guarantee we can inspect on the high seas. The Cubans won’t know what to do with what is left behind. They are using only Russian labor, only Russian equipment, like bulldozers, etc. Castro talked a lot about aerial reconnaissance, even by the United Nations, as a violation of Cuban integrity, soil, airspace, etc., as an intolerable offense. U Thant’s suggestion is that the blockade continuation is not necessary if we can establish some system like … .

Secretary: We’ve already done that.

Stevenson: On the incoming ships. He says the economic situation in Havana is incredible. There are no foodstuffs, no meat—all of this confirmed by the Legations there. They are shut off from the outside world. The people are getting desperate. We should be satisfied with these assurances; that the Red Cross inspection on the seas of incoming vessels. Castro is frustrated, intense, psychotic, infuriated by the US radio constantly stating that the US was coming to inspect instead of the SYG arrivingwith a large team to inspect. It was impossible to get across anything before 2:15—before the meeting first started. This morning he was in a better mood. U Thant decided to see him alone. He has with him Dorticos and Rowan. He said they would fight to the last man, wanted everybody to inspect their soil, their integrity, etc. They would discuss the future of Cuba only on the basis of the five points, and he distinguished in the future—not the present problem. If the SC, in other words, discusses the Cuban problem, it can only be on the basis of the five points. When the question of Major Anderson was brought up, Castro became much softer and said he would be glad to return him alive, but he is not alive, and “I will return his body under the auspices of the UN.” He rejected again and again any United Nations inspection to verify. He said the Soviets have done this whole thing on Cuban soil; but the future of the UN should be involved but only on the basis of the five points. This is the long-term problem which must be done by the UN. It is his impression that the Soviets don’t want to stay a single hour; that the General said that he was going at once and that he was glad to leave. There is thought there will be a show-down some time between the Cubans and the Russians. He said the Brazilian would confirm all this in two or three days—after he got back to Rio. He can’t suggest what we should do but implied that maybe we should verify on Friday, after the bulldozing has been completed. The Soviet General said “ask us any questions you wish”. Now they must arrange for ships to come in. The blockade, if it continues, will make the Cubans more and more angry. I told him that we had already instituted a pass on incoming ships not to in any way interrupt the shipping to get the stuff out of there. He said there is no shortage of conventional hardware in Cuba. There is so much they don’t want to know what to do with it—machines, anti-aircraft, etc. What they need is food, not hardware. Then as I left the room with Jack McCloy Rikhye stopped me at the door and sort of whispered to me as a final concluding remark which the SYG apparently never felt it was appropriate to say. He said “Please lay off the aerial reconnaissance until Friday. After that you will find they have bulldozed all of the sites.” … They will call us after they have talked with … in the morning. I don’t know what time; I should think it will probably be after they have had a good night’s sleep—possibly 10 o’clock. I think that is the substance of the thing.

Sec: Thanks a lot.

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56311/10-3162. Secret; Niact. Drafted by McNaughton and Cleveland and approved by the President at the 14th meeting of the Executive Committee (Document 123). Repeated to Moscow. Washington, October 31, 1962, 12:46 p.m.

1147. Subject: Cuba: New York Negotiations

1. General Considerations

Please be guided by the following in your New York negotiations whose entire purpose is to reach final solution, in framework of exchanges of letters between President and Khrushchev, of problem created by introduction by USSR of offensive weapons into Cuba. In spite of Kuznetsov’s eagerness to discuss disarmament, bases, and other broader questions (USUN’s 1547)Document 117. the present negotiation should not include issues beyond immediate objective, which is verified dismantling and removal of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba at earliest possible date.

Your purpose will be to reach straightforward realistic solutions to practical problems along lines indicated below. We assume that in line with established Soviet doctrine, Kuznetsov’s insistence on no physical inspection of dismantling and removal Soviet weapons is essentially non-negotiable. It is probable, therefore, that we shall have to rely on aerial surveillance and port-removal inspection to satisfy ourselves that missile bases are dismantled and weapons are removed from Cuba or destroyed.

While you should strive for as much pre-removal ground inspection as possible, the formula of post-removal ground inspection together with high and low aerial surveillance during both the dismantling period and the post-evacuation period should, if efficiently carried out, provide adequate evidence of removal and destruction and so could be accepted.

2. Definition of Offensive Weapons

The offensive weapons which the United States insists be removed from Cuba and not be further imported into Cuba are those enumerated in the Presidential Proclamation 3504 of October 23.For text, see Public Papers of the President of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 809-811. The list is as follows: Surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support or operate the above items. Also, pursuant to authority granted in the Proclamation, the Secretary of Defense, in Special Warning (Notice to Mariners) No. 31, stated that the prohibition of surface-to-surface missiles covers a prohibition of missile propellants and chemical compounds capable of being used to power missiles.

Note that the definition includes short-range surface-to-surface missiles and surface-to-surface missiles designed for use at sea. Notice also that mechanical and electronic equipment to operate surface-to-surface missiles includes a wide variety of communications, supply and missile-launching equipment, including Komar class motor torpedo boats.

Suggest you start with wider definition, including supplement to Presidential Proclamation. Fall back position, on which we would insist, would be categories enumerated in Proclamation.

Not included in formal definition are Soviet troops and technicians. However, we should assume on basis Khrushchev letter of October 26Document 84. that “the necessity for the presence of [Soviet]All brackets are in the source text. military specialists in Cuba would disappear” along with the offensive weapons they are manning and protecting.

Also not included within the definition are fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles. Also not included are storage sites or any petroleum products other than missile propellants. It would be desirable to have these items destroyed or removed as well, but the USG is not willing to pay a price to have them destroyed or removed.

3. Two-Phase Program

The US envisages two phases in the UN verificationprogram, each requiring specific control measures: First Phase—This phase should begin immediately and would cover the period up to the Soviet report to the SC that they have dismantled and withdrawn proscribed weapons. Since the Communists will undoubtedly prove chary of UN observationof weapons withdrawal, as Kuznetsov has already indicated, we assume they are unlikely to accept on-site inspection during the period when weapons are being withdrawn. Therefore we probably will need to rely in practice, during the first stage, on (i)US and UN aerial reconnaissance and (ii)UN/ICRC inspection of incoming shipments. Second Phase—This phase would begin when the SC convened to receive the Soviet report on compliance and to authorize establishment of a UN on-site inspection system. During this period, verification of compliance would be accomplished through: (i) continued aerial reconnaissance; (ii) continued inspection incoming cargoes; and (iii) ground inspection. This phase would end when the SC has accepted the report of the SYG that offensive weapons have been removed from Cuba.

4. Aerial Reconnaissance

Systematic high and low aerial reconnaissance is essential. This is so particularly if surface inspection is limited or non-existent. The reconnaissance, or any aspect of it, can be done either by the US or by the UN. Our only insistence is that a job be done which is adequate to provide the USG withinformation sufficient to convince US that compliance is taking place.

We recognize that (unlike US)UN will wish to overfly Cuba only after explicit clearance by Cuban authorities.

US would of course need access to photos resulting from UN reconnaissance.

Two types of air surveillance should be considered—photographic (high and low) and visual monitoring by holding the aircraft in a pattern so as to maintain continuous air surveillance of missile transport movements.

The Canadian Government has offered to have Canadian pilots fly Canadian supplied RF-101 aircraft. USG endorses use of Canadians and RF-101s but recognizes that SYG will be reluctant to accept. Alternatively we could make available C-130s and within two-week period train air crews from one of the following: Mexico, Argentina, Chile or Colombia. Canada (4 crews) and Indonesia (10 crews) already have competent crews which would take only brief period to check out. There are four C-130 aircraft with the UN markings and high quality photographic equipment in Georgia now available to UN on request. In addition, we have sold C-130 aircraft to Australia and are currently in the midst of completing negotiation on providing C-130 aircraft to Argentina and Chile. The UN has been informed that USG prepared provide rapid (jet) transportation for C-130 crews politically acceptable to the UN from anywhere in the world.

Another highly attractive possibility would be for Mexico or Argentina to volunteer squadron of T-11s (C-45s) and crews which DOD believes would be fully capable to do kind of job we want. They have adequate high-quality camera equipment. Mexico has six aircraft and Argentina has comparable number. Also Sweden has made available for Congo operation two reconnaissance PT-9s (single-jet aircraft). It is understood that they have a number such aircraft fully equipped with photographic equipment.

Processing unit with US equipment could be readily provided to operate in Havana or at whatever place UN would wish to use as base of operations.

You should therefore reaffirm all this to SYG, strongly urging him develop a UN reconnaissance capability. Support of UN surveillance, however, should not be tied to US cessation of surveillance. Statements that “the US will reconsider its surveillance requirements based upon the effectiveness of UN operations” can be made, but we should do nothing to suggest that US determination to conduct air surveillance is necessarily limited by UN operations.

It should go without saying that to the extent no adequate substitute has been developed by the UN, the US high and low surveillance will continue throughout entire dismantling and withdrawal operation and as long thereafter as necessary to satisfy us that offensive weapons have been fully removed from Cuba.

5. Incoming Cargoes

As indicated Deptel 1136,Document 113. we prepared accept ICRC inspection incoming cargoes on all ships, of whatever flag, embarked from bloc ports. According to our projection, _____ ships now in transit or scheduled depart bloc ports shortly to arrive in Cuba during next three or four weeks. Number Red Cross inspectors required to do job will depend on whether inspection at sea or on shore. Most efficient use manpower would be port inspection at agreed ports. This would permit close inspection of vessels, one after another, without transit time required to shuttle between vessels at sea. Accordingly, hope port inspection agreeable to Cubans. If inspection done at ports, we estimate _____ personnel needed. If done on high seas, estimate _____ would be required. [Estimates to be supplied.]

We expect thorough inspection, including at least selective examination of cargoes abroad to assure that no weapons we consider offensive will enter Cuba. Inspection should provide for masters of incoming ships to notify their cargoes to UN inspectors well in advance of arrival at port. This would expedite checking and clearance and help make entire inspection process more effective.

We believe inspection of incoming cargoes should continue until entire verification process completed (i.e., through end of Phase Two), in order to give us assurance all offensive weapons withdrawn and related facilities dismantled. During this period, enforcement of quarantine would be suspended, but US ships would remain on duty stations. Incoming ships would not be stopped or searched by US, but we would keep a watching brief on all traffic, noting outbound missile-carrying ships and assisting UN inspectors in assuring they informed of all incoming traffic. US would thus be in position to renew immediately the enforcement of the quarantine if circumstances required such action.

6. Verification of Removal of Offensive Weapons

When Soviets prepared to say they have removed from Cuba the “weapons US considers offensive”, a Security Council meeting would be called to authorize the Acting Secretary General to establish arrangements for verification. Executive organization operating in Cuba for this purpose is here referred to as UN/Cuba.

(a) Terms of Reference:UN/Cuba

UN teams should inspect on spot, after dismantling, those sites which identified by US as missile bases as any Cuban airport which could accommodate bombers, and any other area where we have reason to believe there may have been concealment of offensive weapons, including storage sites for nuclear warheads. Such teams should have unrestricted confidential communication facilities with their headquarters units, and free access to areas required for the performance of their duties. US will furnish to UN comprehensive list of locations to be covered.

(b) Number of Observers

The number of observers required to do job satisfactorily will depend on length of time permitted to accomplish task and on the extent of mobility. US would prefer to see such verification accomplished quickly. Assuming for political reasons Communists would prefer keep number UN inspectors relatively small, suggest UN consider possibility utilizing number of helicopters or small planes (which US prepared make available) to permit rapid transit inspection teams maximum number sites in minimum time. It appears to us that team of 50 or 60 men with adequate air transport could accomplish verification job within a week or two. Moreover, any UN aerial observers should participate in verification process.

(c) Composition

While we assume that probably only citizens of certain types of countries will be acceptable to Communists as sources of UN ground observers, it is important from our standpoint that eligibility be restricted to technically trained personnel of genuinely reliable nations who have demonstrated a reasonable objectivity during crisis. For example, we would wish to exclude UAR and Ghana citizens in light of distinctly “unneutral” statements made by their Delegates in Security Council meetings on Cuba. On criteria indicated, we would prefer nationals from Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Nigeria, India and Ireland. When it comes to UN air reconnaissance, it is probably not so important to have neutral personnel; Canadians and Argentines, for example, might prove acceptable.

7. Administration and Finance

We greatly prefer that any and all of the UN operations that may be created (air reconnaissance group, port inspectors, ground inspection teams) should operate under executive direction of SYG. To the extent the International Committee of the Red Cross is involved, it should (as indicated Deptel 1136) operate as executive agent of SYG. We understand ICRC has operated in similar capacity at UN request in checking compliance with Geneva Convention in US POW camps in Korea. ICRC has acted also as executive agent for High Commissioner for Refugees in Congo. We believe financing all verification measures should come under $2,000,000 provision in regular UN budget for small-scale peace and security operations. If total cost likely to exceed one million dollars, financing problem will need to be reviewed in the light of the then U.S. position on financing UN peace-and-security operations.Following a telephone conversation later in the day between officials at the Department of State and the Mission at the United Nations changes were made in sections 3-6 of this instruction. A copy of telegram 1153 to New York at 11:09 p.m. on October 31, which enumerated the revisions, is in the Supplement. (Department of Defense, OSD HistoricalOffice, Secretary of Defense Cable Files, Cuba, Oct. 25-31, 1962) Rusk
126. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Planning Subcommittee of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (Rostow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Planning Subcommittee. Top Secret. Initialed by Rostow. Washington, October 31, 1962. SUBJECT Report Number Six of the Planning Subcommittee The Planning Subcommittee reviewed the situation as of late Wednesday afternoon, October 31, 1962. The situation was assessed as one in which the Soviets were seeking to retrieve diplomatically as much as they could from the debacle: re-raising, at levels short of formal diplomacy, the question of Turkish bases and Guantanamo; seeking to protect the Cuban revolution and maintaining some credibility for the value of Soviet support outside the Bloc; seeking, by propaganda, to make the most of Khrushchev’s “statesmanship” and to reaffirm Soviet strength and toughness. The Soviets evidently have a problem with Castro; but it was judged likely that they would seek to salvage the Communist revolution in Cuba, with or without Castro; and that Mikoyan’s mission was designed, by means of stick and carrot, to achieve a reconciliation of their commitment to remove the missile bases with this longer rUN objective. It was judged urgent that we resume a posture of pressure unless there was a radical break in the diplomatic situation, including reconnaissance and maintenance of the blockade. On a contingency basis preparations for putting increased pressure on Castro by extending the blockade to POL were judged urgent. Such measures might be introduced in the first instance by increments, through low-level, informal action. Such measures of increased pressure on Castro might be executed with the knowledge and even connivance of the Soviet Union, if it found Castro too difficult to deal with; although we should refuse any substantial price for Soviet collaboration in this exercise. In the light of Soviet tactics, including Kuznetsov’s invitation to Stevenson to widen soon the area of discussion, it was felt more important than ever that we separate all other matters from the three central issues; that is, the removal of offensive missiles, the lifting of the blockade, and a form of assurance that we would not invade, consistent with our OAS commitments and the President’s September 13 press conference. As counterpoint to UN negotiations, the OAS should be active on several fronts, including the review of latest evidence on Cuban indirect aggression in Latin America. If discussions with Soviet officials were to go beyond Cuban problems, the first issue that ought to be raised is the question of the enforcement of the Laos agreement. The eleven tasks listed under 3 a-j in Report Number Five were reviewed.Document 109. All are in motion. With respect to task 3 a (probable Soviet military policy), it was noted that among the options open to the Soviet Union was a stepped up missile defense system, the possibilities for which should be included in that task, along with other measures for correcting what Moscow evidently regards as the dangerous Soviet nuclear imbalance. In addition, the CIA representative undertook to generate a speculative paper which would attempt roughly to cost out alternative Soviet methods for correcting the nuclear imbalance. (Action: Mr. Whitman) One of the most likely possibilities was judged to be that the Soviet Union would undertake, as after Stalin’s death, a prolonged and serious re-evaluation of its military and foreign policy in the light not merely of their Cuban misadventure but the frustration of many lines of policy which they have been pursuing since, roughly, 1957. The decisions at which they finally arrive in this likely reassessment will depend, in part, on our posture and our policy from the present forward, as they perceive it, just as Stalin’s policy was shaped after 1945 by his assessment of our strengths and vulnerabilities, and Khrushchev’s after 1957, by his assessment as of that time. The cast of our total military and foreign policy in coming months is thus one critical variable in the making of new Soviet dispositions. The implications of this possible interconnection and recommended courses of action and signals to Moscow, designed to produce new Soviet dispositions most in our interest, is a new task assigned to the group chaired by Mr. Harvey.
127. Summary Record of the 15th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The Record of Action for this meeting (ibid.) is in the Supplement. Washington, October 31, 1962, 6 p.m.

Mr. McCone noted that on an open line between Moscow and Havana, Suslov, speaking for Gromyko, had talked to Abramovich, the Soviet Ambassador in Havana, giving urgent instructions.

Secretary Rusk gave a preliminary report on U Thant’s failure to persuade Castro to accept UN inspection procedures in Cuba. He said that McCloy in New York had reported Kuznetsov had said that antiaircraft complexes in Cuba were controlled by the Cubans.

The President directed that all government officials talking to the Russian officials should talk only about Cuba and the removal of offensive weapons. The Russians should be told that when the Cuban crisis is settled, we will talk about other matters. Our policy is to listen to whatever the Russians have to say on other matters but make no response until the Cuban situation has been resolved. The President asked that Ambassador Stevenson in New York be so informed.

Secretary McNamara reported that U-2 flights had produced no pictures because of bad weather and that there existed a requirement for low-level flights. Secretary Rusk and General Taylor agreed.

Secretary Rusk said the time had come for us to build up pressure on our side.

Secretary McNamara recommended that the quarantine be reinstituted for dawn tomorrow. U.S. ships will hail all ships entering the quarantine zone. If they reply, giving their name, port of origin, and cargo, they will be allowed to proceed to port. If their reply is unsatisfactory, the U.S. Navy ship will report to Washington. No ship would be boarded without specific authorization by the President, which the Secretary of Defense will obtain after consulting the Secretary of State.

With reference to low-level flights, Secretary McNamara said that he favored ten or twelve sorties, General Taylor favored eighteen, and General LeMay recommended thirty.

The President directed that fourteen low-level sorties be made with no more than one pass over each target. Missile sites and roads were acceptable targets, but no ports are to be included.

Returning to the decision on reinstituting the quarantine, the President said a final decision would be made after Secretary Rusk reported to him later this evening on the U Thant/Castro talks. If the quarantine was reinstituted, we would make a public announcement.

In response to a request by USIA Acting Director Wilson for guidance with respect to official radio broadcasts to Cuba, the President recommended no verbal attacks on Cuba via this media for this week. He asked that emphasis be given to the fact that the OAS decision is the basis for our aerial surveillance of Cuba and that the issue is not U.S. vs. Cuba, but Cuba vs. all the Western Hemisphere. Mr. Wilson read the themes which are being used by USIA on its broadcasts. The President asked Mr. Wilson to get from others, including foreign diplomatic officials in Cuba, their impression of our radio broadcasts.

The President asked that Kuznetsov be informed of the arrest at sea of anti-Castro Cubans heading toward Cuba. (The U.S. ship arresting the Cubans was the PT-109, the ship used in the film of that name.)

The President also asked that McCloy be informed of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] planned sabotage in Venezuela.

The President held for decision tomorrow a proposal which would initiate the next step in the planned U.S./USSR space cooperation program. He asked that the initialed U.S./USSR civil air agreement, which had never been finally signed, be reexamined.

The President commented that we should make known that we are anxious to stop our air surveillance of Cuba if the UN comes up with a satisfactory substitute. However, we must continue surveillance in our own national interests until a satisfactory substitute is found.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
128. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/10-3162. Confidential; Eyes Only. Received in the Department of State at 10:59 p.m. New York, October 31, 1962, 10 p.m.

1579. For Secretary from McCloy. Department pass White House. Immediately after I received from you President’s instructions, Akalovsky at my request informed Kuznetsov along following lines:

In absence international inspection personnel, such as ICRC, US prepared make gesture re quarantine. While quarantine in full will start tomorrow, we prepared let ships pass on hail-and-pass basis, as in case Sov tanker Bucharest, i.e., no inspection on board vessels would be involved. We prepared use this procedure for a few days until more solid basis for inspection of ships is developed. Re aerial surveillance, US believes it would be good for everybody if evidence were obtained that dismantling of relevant facilities has started, i.e., if we could show to world pictures attesting to that fact. We hope USSR would do everything to avoid incidents in connection our overflights, because any such incident would create gravest situation and would again put us face to face.

Kuznetsov appreciated information, but with respect to second point stated USSR could not do anything because anti-aircraft defense was in Cuban hands. US was facing Kuznetsov with problem where he could do nothing because problem related to Cuban territory and sovereignty. Akalovsky observed USSR could use its influence with Cuba in order prevent incidents fraught with gravest danger. Kuznetsov replied he could not add anything to what he had already said.

Stevenson
129. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource:USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, October-November Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Akalovsky and concurred in by McCloy. New York, October 31, 1962, 10:50 p.m.

1581. Subject: Cuba. Dept pass White House. McCloy had one hour mtg with Kuznetsov today.Gilpatric’s 2-page handwritten notes on this meeting are in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD(C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreements re Cuba, Gilpatric Notes. After exchange of pleasantries, McCloy noted U Thant and his entire party leaving Havana 4:30 p.m. today, and according our info there were difficulties with Castro. While we understood Sov reluctance admit inspection on ground before weapons removed, which might reveal secret technology, US would have to continue aerial surveillance starting tomorrow, and until verification by UN arranged. Most dangerous situation would arise if our planes were to be shot at or downed. We prepared to turn aerial surveillance over to UN, but so long as no adequate UN verification existed US would continue its own flights. Our photographs of day before yesterday did not indicate any marked progress in dismantling, indeed indicated some further construction, although we realized not all sites may have received appropriate orders. We hoped photographs after tomorrow would show such progress.

Kuznetsov observed all anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands. McCloy said we had thought sophisticated weapons were in Soviet hands. Kuznetsov repeated all anti-aircraft weapons were in Cuban hands. McCloy reiterated most dangerous situation would arise as result US surveillance planes being shot at or downed.

Kuznetsov then said President and Khrushchev had committed themselves to certain steps and it was his and McCloy’s job see that arrangements be made for carrying out those steps. Dismantling of relevant facilities would be finished in couple of days, probably by Nov 2 or 3, although he not familiar with details. McCloy asked what he meant by dismantling. Did this include destruction buildings and emplacements?Kuznetsov said he did not know details. As to time required for removal of what US called offensive weapons, that would depend on number of ships available, which in turn depended on US position re quarantine, because if no Sov ships were able go to Havana, removal would obviously be protracted. McCloy observed he believed Sovs would have no difficulty getting enough ships to Havana for purpose of removal offensive weapons. Kuznetsov continued verification arrangements must be worked out with Castro; as to USSR, it prepared fulfill its obligations.

Kuznetsov then said that number other problems must be discussed so as to create a situation precluding recurrence of what happened this time. Suggested McCloy think about them so as to have discussion those problems at later date. Kuznetsov said under U Thant proposal, USSR had fulfilled its part, i.e., it refrained from sending ships to quarantine area and from sending arms to Cuba. Thus it had also met US desires. On other hand, U Thant’s proposal also provided for lifting quarantine, but so far US Govt had agreed to suspend quarantine only for two days. Another problem was that of assurances to Cuba that no invasion would be launched from US or Latin American countries, that no preparations for invasion would take place in territory of US or LA’s and that no organization of subversive activities by refugees against Cuba would take place in US or LA’s. Important make clear that Cuban people could live in security and peace. President-Khrushchev exchange indicated some assurances should be given to Cuba against subversion and interference in its internal affairs.

McCloy responded he could not tell definitely US attitude on these points; however, Kuznetsov’s statement of problems welcome and we would express our views on them at appropriate time. Problem of exiles ticklish, since they anxious make Cuba free so that it could do what it wanted do and be free of pressures by Castro. It would be difficult to control their thoughts. Organizing refugees into units was one thing, but control of their thoughts was a different matter. We could not get into a position of guaranteeing support for Castro, particularly in view Cuba now center of infection of subversive and sabotage activities against Latin American countries as demonstrated by recent events in Venezuela. McCloy then stressed main problem at this time was removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. When this done atmosphere for discussion other problems, including test ban and disarmament, would be much better. Kuznetsov agreed but commented it difficult define defensive and offensive weapons since US called its weapons at foreign bases defensive, although those weapons were same as weapons USSR had placed in Cuba. Suggested however that discussion this subject would serve no useful purpose at this time and that McCloy and he deal with practical matters before them to make arrangements which would preclude recurrence present situation.

McCloy inquired whether USSR thought ICRC would act as agent of UN. Kuznetsov replied definitely yes. Re Kuznetsov’s remark USSR haddone something under U Thant proposal, McCloy pointed out it had been USSR who had created this situation in first place by introducing offensive weapons Cuba and pointing them at our hearts. It impossible negotiate while gUN was on table and therefore removal those weapons was primary problem. As to definition offensive weapons, US had made clear what it meant and Sovs knew it.

Kuznetsov then inquired re US views on what if any UN presence would be required after removal of relevant weapons completed. President’s message to Khrushchev contained two points relating to this problem, which needed clarification. McCloy replied he had not given much thought to what would be required after removal completed, but he did not think that any interminable UN presence would be needed. We would give this matter further consideration.

Kuznetsov suggested thought be given to procedure for handling Cuban item in Security Council. Noting USSR had no fixed views on this point as yet, wondered whether might not be possible have a joint US/USSR statement or separate statements by two Govts with Security Council taking note of such statement or statements and appealing to all states to facilitate implementation arrangements. McCloy responded he no UN expert and pointed out Stevenson rather than he US Rep in UN. His own function was merely to coordinate US policy on Cuban problem. Kuznetsov said that his assignment was to assist Acting SYG in resolving Cuban problem as speedily as possible and Zorin was USSR spokesman in UN. McCloy expressed hope Castro would be less recalcitrant and observed US and Sovs might find themselves united vis-a-vis Castro. Kuznetsov smiled.

At one point early in conversation Kuznetsov said Mikoyan arriving NY 2 or 3 p.m. Nov 1 and leaving NY shortly after noon Nov 2. Mikoyan would like meet with McCloy and extended invitation to dinner Nov 1. McCloy said he would of course make himself available for meeting with Mikoyan, but not quite sure whether he had any prior engagement for tomorrow night. Would give definite reply first thing tomorrow morning after checking calendar. Subsequently, after talking with Secretary, McCloy confirmed he would be available for dinner.

Stevenson
130. Summary Record of the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, November 1, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary of developments in Cuba and brief reports on situations in several other areas.Based in part on CIA memorandum [document number not declassified], “The Crisis USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600, 1 November 1962.” (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 11-16) See the Supplement. The question of who mans the SAM sites in Cuba is still unanswered, but existing evidence indicates that the Russians control and command these missiles. Mr. McCone added that the Russians may be using Castro’s obstructionism to serve Soviet interests in connection with on-site inspection. He said the Soviets, in talks with U.N. and U.S. officials, are forthcoming on questions of on-site inspection.

Secretary Rusk said the most important question to be decided is whether we should make low-level flights over Cuba today. He recommended that if we fly and if we lose a reconnaissance plane, we should not retaliate today.

The President noted that we could expect nothing more from Castro until Mikoyan arrives in Havana.

Secretary McNamara reported that Mr. Gilpatric and our officials in New York recommend that no reconnaissance flights be flown today in view of U Thant’s request that nothing be done to interfere with his discussions with Mikoyan. The Soviets are reported to have told U Thant that the missile sites in Cuba would be bulldozed beginning tomorrow.

Secretary McNamara said personally he thought we ought to fly low-level missions today. The Russians have not so far complied with their agreement to withdraw the missiles and the U.S. public needs to be reassured that we know what is going on in Cuba. He said we need more information on the IL-28 bombers in Cuba. He urged that flights be authorized today because Mikoyan would be arriving in Cuba tomorrow. He doubted that there would be any Soviet or Cuban reaction to our flights.

General Taylor stated that we cannot appear to be stopped by Castro’s threat to shoot down our reconnaissance planes. He recommended that fourteen flights be authorized over missile sites and Cuban ports. If a reconnaissance plane was shot down, he recommended that we reinstitute the blockade.

The President said he did not favor reinstituting the blockade because we would have to stop Soviet ships. He thought that we could carry out low-level reconnaissance missions because our best guess is that there would be no reaction to such flights. He asked how we could deal with the shooting down of one of our planes if the pictures revealed that the Soviet missiles were being dismantled.

Secretary McNamara recommended that there be two flights of two planes each, one over the airfield where the IL-28 planes are based, and the other over the three MRBM sites. The eastern part of Cuba would be covered only by U-2 flights. The purpose of overflying the IL-28 airfield would be to make clear that we consider these bombers “offensive weapons,” to be removed by the Russians.

The President asked that Kuznetsov be told that we are making low-level flights. It should be made clear to the Russians that the Cubans are preventing us from establishing inspection procedures accepted by the Russians, and, therefore, we must continue our aerial surveillance.

The Attorney General suggested that we talk to UN officials and get from them a promise to institute a UN inspection system.

The President wanted the Defense Department to provide him with the proposed flight patterns and the time over target of each flight.

Assistant Secretary Nitze said that the IL-28 bombers had been given to the Cubans, and, therefore, if we overflew the bomber bases, we should expect to be fired upon. He doubted that we would be fired upon if we flew over the SAM sites. He recommended that we not fly low-level over the IL-28 base because we have not made clear yet to the Russians that the IL-28 bombers are included in the deal as “offensive weapons.” In addition, he noted that we do not intend to include the SAM sites in our discussion of weapons to be withdrawn from Cuba.

Secretary McNamara restated his view that we should get pictures of the IL-28 base, but that no flights need be flown over the Isle of Pines. He said again that chances of losing one of our planes are very small. In his view it is essential that the IL-28 bombers be included among Soviet weapons to be withdrawn, hence, we should have the latest information as to whether they are being dismantled.

The President authorized low-level flights of six planes over the IL-28 base and of several MRBM sites. If a U.S. plane is shot down, no military reprisal will be taken today. The President asked that a full brief be provided to Mr. McCloy in New York in order to reinforce his strong statement to Mikoyan about why we are making low-level flights.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize full photographic coverage of Cuba on SaturdayNovember 4. when the Soviet missiles will supposedly be removed.

The President asked for consideration of a longer range surveillance plan. He suggested that we tell the Soviets that if they refuse to take out the IL-28 bombers, we will insist upon on-site inspection.

Secretary Dillon noted that the OAS would support our demand in view of the fact that the Russians have now admitted that their forces are in Cuba. He urged that we make no commitment about not invading Cuba if we do not get satisfactory aerial surveillance and an acceptable inspection system.

The President directed that if one of our planes was hit, we would not announce this fact. We would not announce our intention to make low-level flights, but we would announce the return of our planes after they are back.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
131. Record of Action at the 16th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 11-16. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, November 1, 1962. Director McCone presented the intelligence summary covering developments in Cuba, as well as brief reports on situations in other areas. In response to a question, he said the admittedly confused evidence pointed to the conclusion that SAM sites in Cuba are under Russian control. There followed a discussion of whether aerial reconnaissance should be carried out over Cuba today. The President authorized low-level flights of six planes over the airbase where the IL-28 planes are stationed and over certain MRBM sites. Weather conditions ruled out U-2 flights today. The major reason for overflying the IL-28 base is to make clear that we consider these planes “offensive weapons” to be removed by the Russians, and, therefore, we must know whether they are being dismantled. The President asked that Mr. McCloy make clear to Mikoyan during a conversation later today that we must carry out aerial reconnaissance over Cuba because the Cubans are preventing the implementation of the Soviet agreement to UN inspection of the removal of the missiles. A message to McCloy was to be drafted.See Document 132. Following a discussion of reprisals to be taken if a U.S. reconnaissance plane is shot down over Cuba, the President decided that no retaliation would take place today. General Taylor was assured that the full photographic coverage of Cuba planned for a later time—after the reported date of the removal of Soviet missiles from existing sites—would be authorized. McGeorge Bundy
132. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource:USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1952-1963. Confidential; Niact. Washington, November 1, 1962, 3 p.m.

1158. Eyes only from Undersecretary Ball. President believes it essential that in conversation with Mikoyan (and Kuznetsov as appropriate) following points be made with utmost emphasis: Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding based on assumption that Sovs would and could deliver on Khrushchev commitment to remove all offensive weapons systems in Cuba and through UN verification satisfy U.S. and other OAS countries. This in fact done and does not recur. Although four days have now passed since understanding reached that U Thant has made best efforts, all we have so far is verbal assurances by Sov reps in NY and Cuba to US and UN without element of verification which in view history of this affair US regards as essential. US has acted expeditiously and in good faith, promptly accepting Soviet proposal that ICRC act as UN agent for inspection incoming vessels. (US believes we should promptly move to put this in effect with or without Cuban agreement. Further instructions on this will come later today.)US also promptly responded SYG request suspend quarantine and recon flights during period his Havana visit. Also as Sovs aware USG has close watch to prevent anti-Castro Cubans from any action which would upset execution of agreement, e.g. arrest of group with boat in Florida yesterday. On question verification USG has expressed willingness accept wide range of possible UN arrangementsbut there does not yet appear likelihood even any one of these can be implemented. President’s responsibility for US security demands that in absence UN verification, US undertake whatever steps it can to provide verification. Subordinate to this overriding consideration but nevertheless important is assurance to US and LA publics. Thus, although much less satisfactory than UN verification on the ground and from the air with cooperation Sovs and Cuba, US must in elemental interests of safety continue aerial surveillance. This surveillance is being carried out in as unprovocative a manner and on as limited a scale as possible by unarmed aircraft. While US accepts that some conventional anti-aircraft guns may be under Cuban control, it cannot accept that sophisticated weapons and control systems, including SAM’s, do not require participation of Sov technicians and thus are not or could not be made subject to Soviet control. If US reconnaissance aircraft fired on or destroyed, serious question appropriate means protect US aircraft will arise. We might thus face a cycle of action and reaction which would put us back where we were last week. Thus of utmost importance Sovs immediately take measures to assure reconnaissance aircraft not fired on. Second sentence of President’s letter to Chairman Khrushchev of October 27 is clear in covering “all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use.” This covers not only systems under Soviet control but also those allegedly under Cuban control. The President considers Khrushchev’s reply of October 28 as clear acceptance that all of these arms are to be dismantled, crated and returned to Sov Union (or destroyed). You should seek to elicit a clear confirmation that the IL28’s are included and are being dismantled for removal from Cuba. In addition, you should point out that if Sov missiles and bombers are being removed, there seems no need for Soviets to leave in Cuba equipment and military technicians brought to Cuba primarily to protect the offensive weapons. (Note that SAM’s use missile fuel which proscribed under quarantine regulations.) President’s undertaking against invasion is adequate assurance that these weapons are not needed. The President particularly desires that there should be no discussion of wider issue from our side until the offensive weapons in Cuba are clearly on their way home. You must therefore avoid any exploration of tempting fields like Berlin and disarmament, making it plain that while we look forward to such discussion later, we cannot get anywhere on anything else until we have successfully put in operation the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement on this present matter.

Rusk
133. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/11-262. Top Secret; Priority. Received at the Department of State at 1:52 a.m. A 21-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place at the Soviet Mission, is in USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, IA October/November Meetings. New York, November 2, 1962, 1 a.m.

1604. Eyes only for the Secretary. McCloy, Stevenson and Akalovsky met with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, Dobrynin, Menshikov and Zhukov from 7 to 11 pm ThursdayNovember 1. night. Mikoyan started in aggressive mood, insisting on suspending quarantine now, saying that was U Thant’s intention. We repeated that the agreement was embodied in the correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy and left no uncertainty that the hail and pass quarantine could not be suspended until the Red Cross inspection was in effect. This seemed to bother Mikoyan considerably, but after some further discussion he dropped the matter. When asked how far away the nearest Soviet ships were, he replied four or five days. We pointed out that in that event, if Red Cross inspection was established quickly, few if any Soviet ships would have to pass the present quarantine. He said Thant had agreed with him that the US should suspend quarantine during the interval.

Mikoyan then asked if we were working now to formalize the agreement between us. We replied there were only three questions: Red Cross inspection, inspection and verification of removal of weapons, and the guarantee to Cuba; and saw only one difficulty in reaching an agreement, namely Castro’s rejection of verification. Mikoyan made long speech insisting on linking Castro’s five points with Soviet-US agreement and charged US with drawing attention to only “temporary” questions while overlooking “cardinal” questions. He said we obviously did not want to hear about interests of others and were only concerned with our own interests. He went on to suggest certain reports should be made to United Nations and that a formal document or protocol should be executed, and that he wanted negotiations to commence formally on basis of the letters, including Castro’s five points,Castro’s five points were made in a letter to U Thant, October 28. Castro stated that U.S. guarantees against an invasion would be ineffective without: 1) cessation of the economic blockade and commercial and economic pressure against Cuba; 2) cessation of subversive activities; 3) cessation of piratical attacks from U.S. and Puerto Rican bases; 4) cessation of violations of Cuban air space and territorial waters; and 5) U.S. withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its return to Cuba. The text of the letter is in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 447-448. between the US, Soviet and U Thant. Later he asked if Cuba should not be included in the discussions, repeating again and again that we must discuss Guantanamo and the other points relating to normalizing the situation in the Caribbean with UN presences in Cuba, in the US and in other parts of the area, to see that agreement adhered to. Castro, he said, was Prime Minister of independent state and we can’t evade assurances of non-aggression against Cuba, that we were withdrawing from our commitments and must discuss everything, that they must know the US position in order to tell Castro.

We repeated over and over that we must stick to this problem and this problem only and could consider no other questions. We added that Castro could raise any questions he pleased and that they would be dealt with at the right time and that we were concerned with one question only and that was between the US and Soviet Union. He went back again and again to his insistence that we were by-passing the other side, including lifting the blockade and normalizing the situation, that the whole understanding would have to be formalized in documents registered with the United Nations and approved by the Security Council, and that we can’t disregard the demands of Castro. Following our insistence that we can negotiate only one problem and that any discussion of Guantanamo in connection with it was out of the question, he remarked that the Soviet Union had never raised Guantanamo, which was a Cuba-US problem, but that the US should discuss the other four points.

We explained to him that we needed no documents except the declarations of USSR, US and SYG before Security Council after transaction completed. For that purpose Cuba was not a necessary party, especially if it refused any United Nations inspection as Khrushchev had promised.

We then turned to other forms of inspection and verification, by air recon and tables of organization, and suggested he could argue with Castro that a UN presence would be an assurance to Castro against invasion in interim as well as an assurance to US. Mikoyan was at pains to say that this meeting was not a final negotiation, but merely an exploration to see what everyone had in mind. We said that we felt time was of the essence and that we could agree upon modalities of the Red Cross inspection directly or through our deputies almost at once, on basis of Thant’s proposals. We added that we could see no necessity for documentary agreement on aerial inspection, but wanted assurances from him that our planes would not be fired on if that was the only form of inspection and verification available to us. They replied they could not guarantee that the guns would not shoot, because Cuba was an independent country over which they had no control, and adverted again to fact that we should consider everything, but that at least this talk had served to expose our differences. (Later in a summary we had feeling we were really very close together and that if Mikoyan would drop his effort to link Castro’s five points our differences were few.)

When we tried to get down to details of the Red Cross and aerial inspection Mikoyan said he was not specialist and these were details, that he had brought a General and Colonel to help Kuznetsov, repeating again and again that he could give us no guarantee regarding the security of our over-flights. We reminded him Khrushchev had agreed to UN inspectionand that we understood his difficulties if Cuba refused, in view of its independence, and were trying reach accommodation for quick and satisfactory results. He reverted again to argument that if we insisted on UN inspection in Cuba, it had a right to insist on inspection of refugee camps and training activities anywhere. He was assured that there were no such camps any longer and that US was not engaged in such activities. Likewise we tried reassure him about training of Cuban citizens in the army and that US wanted to regularize relations in Caribbean for protection of others as well as Castro, but that this was a separate matter that had nothing to do with this question. Mikoyan quickly asked if we were referring to possible restoration economic and diplomatic ties with Cuba, and we explained regional arrangements in this hemisphere through OAS and that such matters were not excluded from future consideration if other aggravations could be relieved, but that we must get the one question before us promptly resolved.

FYI. With regard to SAM sites, we had clear impression they intended to leave them in Cuba, and they also said they had given these guns to a number of other countries, including Indonesia and UAR.

Meeting became more cordial and friendly as it proceeded and was exclusively dominated by Mikoyan. He said he did not know whether he was coming back through New York on way home, but we had impression he intended to.

Their estimate of time to complete removal was ten to fifteen days, including the IL-28’s.

At one point he repeated Khrushchev’s statement that what we call offensive weapons had been given to Cuba to deter US aggression, but that if non-aggression was guaranteed they would be withdrawn and that they would ship no more weapons.

In summarizing our conclusions, we reviewed the procedure before the Security Council and they suggested we exchange drafts of declarations, which seemed to us to indicate acceptance of this procedure. On the whole our feeling was that we had left no doubt the five points and weapons transaction could not be linked and that he will meet Castro with a clear impression of our position, and understand we will insist on interim inspection by our means if an agreement for UN presence cannot be reached. It is our intention to proceed as promptly as possible with Kuznetsov and his deputy Morozov to try complete modalities on Red Cross inspection pending Mikoyan’s return.The morning of November 2 Stevenson sent Mikoyan a letter stating that during last evening’s conversation he and McCloy had neglected to discuss with Mikoyan a list of items that the United States considered offensive weapons. See the Supplement. (Telegram 1606 from USUN, November 2;USUN Files:NY FRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Stevenson
134. Summary Record of the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 12:05 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)John McCone also prepared an account of this meeting, memorandum for the record, November 2. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) Washington, November 2, 1963, 11 a.m.

The President referred to a newspaper story by Roland EvansIn the Herald Tribune, November 2. which reported details of Khrushchev’s private letter of October 26.See Document 84. The President said the White House had already issued a denial that the U.S. Government believed this letter was written by an agitated or an overwrought man. He directed that all copies of the letter be returned to the State Department. He added that apparently a copy of the letter had gone to an allied embassy in Washington. He reaffirmed an earlier instruction that the only sources of information on the Cuban situation are Mr. Bundy and Mr. Sorensen. He indicated his unhappiness with the amount of information which had been given to the press without authorization. He directed that all aerial reconnaissance information be kept out of the Top Secret CIA Bulletin until after he had seen it. He would then decide what circulation within the government was to be given the reconnaissance information. He restated his view that we must make information available to the press in our own way rather than have it leak out.

Director McCone then summarized the intelligence memorandum.[document number not declassified], “The Crisis USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600, 2 November 1962”; see the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security File, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24) He said we now have information of a highly sensitive nature which convinces us that Soviet officers control the Cuban air defense system. In conclusion, he reported on the current Soviet test series. So far there have been fifty Soviet tests, including one yesterday of an estimated 1.2 megatons, at an altitude of fifty nautical miles.

Under Secretary Ball reported on a dinner meeting held last night in New York between our officials and Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov.See Document 129. He said Mikoyan started with a very hard position, but modified this somewhat later in the evening. He repeatedly attempted to tie Castro’s five pointsSee footnote 1, Document 129. to the agreement between President Kennedy and Khrushchev. He proposed that there be a formal exchange of documents which would conclude the Cuban missile negotiations. We opposed such a proposal and suggested instead that there be a UN Security Council meeting which would be called to hear three unilateral declarations—one by U Thant, another by the Soviets, and a third by the U.S.

There was a discussion of some UN presence in the form of a peace commission. The Russians were ambiguous on the status of the SAM sites. One of the Russians said that the Cubans might agree to the dismantlement of the SAM sites in return for our promise to stop overflights. The IL-28 bomber issue was not pinned down in the conversations. The Russians said repeatedly that they could not force Castro to accept on-site inspection. There was no decision on how inspection will be carried out after the missiles have been withdrawn. Mikoyan did not ask us not to overfly, but he did admit that he could not get Castro to accept ground inspection.

Deputy Secretary Gilpatric urged that we insist upon UN inspection as promised by Khrushchev. He noted that KOMAR missiles have been given to the Cubans and recommended that we keep our quarantine until a satisfactory substitute was in place.

The President decided that in view of the unsatisfactory discussions with the Cubans and the Russians, he would cancel his planned press conference in order not to be obliged to reply to questions about what guarantees we have that Russian missiles had been withdrawn from Cuba. Under Secretary Ball read a six-point statement which he recommended the President issue in lieu of a press conference.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not call attention to the IL-28 bombers at this point because we may want to retaliate against these planes if one of our reconnaissance planes is shot down.

The President directed that a statement be prepared for issuance by the White House or the State Department. It should include what the Russians have agreed to and what we have agreed to.Apparent reference to the statement released by the White House on November 2; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 451-452. He asked what had been discussed in New York about the quarantine and about our overflights. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric reported that UN officials have given up on a UN surveillance system because Castro won’t accept it.

The President asked how we were going to check on Soviet missiles being withdrawn.

Secretary Rusk said we could ask the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] in Cuba check on Soviet equipment there, and where it was being moved to in Cuba.

The President noted that inspection of incoming material could be achieved, but we must develop some way of inspecting outgoing Soviet missiles.

The President asked that instructions to McCloy be prepared which would lay down the line he is to follow for the next three days.Telegram 1177 to USUN, November 2, 7 p.m., in which Stevenson and McCloy were told that the President wanted to tie down the Soviets on inclusion of IL-28 bombers as offensive weapons. The President also instructed Stevenson and McCloy to stress that it was the Soviet responsibility to provide acceptable verification, that Soviet cargo ships should not seek to enter the quarantine area until ICRC inspection procedures were in effect unless they were prepared to accept U.S. inspection, and that after removal of weapons, continuing arrangements would be required to assure against reintroduction. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, 1952-1963) See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara recommended that we continue limited but daily overflights. He asked authorization for two flights of two planes each to cover different areas than were photographed yesterday. Targets would include Cuban ports and the IL-28 airfield. He opposed high altitude flights until we are certain that the Soviets do control the SAM sites. In answer to a question, he said we could use a drone for overflights, but the Air Force was opposed because of the possible loss and compromise of the highly classified drone.

In answer to a question, Director McCone said it was conceivable but improbable that missiles fired from SAM sites in Cuba could reach the U.S.

The President authorized the release to the press of the pictures of the missile sites taken yesterday, but not the pictures of the IL-28 bombers. He agreed that the quarantine should be continued until a satisfactory substitute was found.

Secretary McNamara reported on the current shipping situation and recommended that our ships hail all Bloc ships crossing the quarantine line but board none of them. He said Admiral Dennison had asked permission to board a Soviet ship, but had been denied this authority. The President agreed that we should not now board Bloc ships.

The President again called attention to the necessity of inspecting Soviet ships leaving Cuba with Soviet missiles as cargo. This inspection must be carried out either by the International Red Cross or by the U.S.

The President then turned to a discussion of atomic testing. He asked that consideration be given to what we will say publicly when our current test series ends and what we should say about our plans for future tests. He asked whether we should announce that we were prepared to halt tests until there was a test ban agreement. He said he opposed any pledge to refrain from testing for an indefinite period.

In response to the President’s question, Mr. Bundy stated that our scientists doubt that the “black box” method of detecting nuclear tests is promising. The President asked that he be provided an evaluation of these unmanned seismic stations as a means of monitoring an atomic test ban.

Acting USIA Director Wilson asked the President for guidance for USIA during the next few days. The President instructed that USIA emphasize that Castro was obstructing peace in the Caribbean by blocking UN inspection measures. For the time being, USIA should not use the theme that Castro is a Soviet stooge.

The President asked for a report on the fighting between the Indians and the Communist Chinese, along with an estimate of what we thought would develop in this area.According to a memorandum for the record of this meeting by McCone, November 2, the CIA “was asked to prepare an immediate report on the effectiveness of the blockade” so as “to have some indication of its effect on the Cuban economy, if any.”McCone’s record indicated that “it was decided that a drone should be flown promptly” over the objections of McNamara and the Air Force. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962)

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
135. Record of Action Taken at the 17th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, November 2, 1962, 11 a.m. Referring to a newspaper story giving alleged details of Premier Khrushchev’s October 26th letter, the President said the White House had issued a denial that the U.S. government believed it was written by an agitated or overwrought man. He instructed that henceforth information obtained from aerial reconnaissance of Cuba should not be released within the Government until after it had been presented to him for decision as to whom it would be made available. He reemphasized the importance of preventing unauthorized release to the press of information about the Cuban situation. Director McCone summarized the intelligence memorandum, emphasizing the sensitive nature of information in our possession which convinces us that Soviet officers control the air defense system established in Cuba. He also reported on the Soviet nuclear test series, including yesterday’s test of a 1.2 megaton weapon at 50 nautical miles. There followed a report and a discussion of the meeting last night in New York of U.S. officials with Messrs. Mikoyan, Zorin and Kuznetsov. It was decided that, in lieu of a press conference, a White House statement would be prepared for release today summarizing where we are in the Cuban situation. The President authorized two aerial reconnaissance missions consisting of our planes, the first over Cuban ports and the second over the IL-28 airfield. The President authorized the release to the press of pictures of the missile sites taken yesterday. Yesterday’s pictures of the IL-28 bombers will not be released. Following a discussion of the current status of the quarantine, the President instructed that until further orders U.S. naval ships should not board Bloc ships, but U.S. ships should continue to hail all vessels entering the quarantine zone. The President asked that draft instructions to Mr. McCloy covering the negotiations for the next few days be prepared for his approval. These instructions would make clear that we want the IL-28s removed, that our quarantine must be maintained until a satisfactory substitute is provided, and that ships coming from the USSR to take the Soviet missiles out of Cuba must be inspected by the U.S. or by the International Red Cross. The President asked that consideration be given to what we will say publicly about the ending of our test series and about our policy toward future nuclear tests. He also asked for an evaluation of unmanned seismic stations as a means of inspecting an atomic test agreement. In response to a request for guidance, the President instructed USIA, for the time being, to emphasize Castro’s obstruction to UN inspection and to measures necessary to restore peace to the Caribbean rather than to depict Castro as a Soviet puppet. The President asked for a full report on Indian-Chinese fighting and an estimate of future developments. McGeorge Bundy
136. Summary Record of the 18th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 10:52 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement. Washington, November 3, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary, emphasizing reports about the construction of a submarine base in Cuba. He called attention to the increasing number of reports of missiles being stored in Cuban caves.McCone prepared an account of this meeting in which he described his presentation in more detail. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) See the Supplement.

Secretary McNamara reported that a peripheral flight of a U-2 about five miles off the west coast of Cuba had been authorized by the President. The weather for reconnaissance was poor. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated a requirement for fourteen low-level sorties, covering harbors, roads, storage areas, the IL-28 air base, and Banes, which is suspect as a possible submarine base site. Secretary McNamara said he recommended fewer low-level flights.

Mr. McCone predicted that it would take from two weeks to a month to get the Soviet missiles out of Cuba.

The President, commenting on the recommended low-level flight over the port of Havana, said he thought this target would be a day off and deferred authorizing this reconnaissance mission.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the presence in Havana of Mikoyan and stated his view that the port of Havana was not a good target for today. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

The President authorized three low-level sorties of two planes each, one over the IL-28 base, the second over the Banes area, and the third over the San Julian port area.

General Taylor asked that the President authorize a major aerial reconnaissance mission Sunday or MondayNovember 4 or 5. in order to see what had been moved in Cuba. He said we need pictures of the ports in order to know what was being loaded on outgoing ships and pictures of assembly areas where Soviet equipment is being moved prior to being shipped out.

The President said that he wanted by Sunday or Monday a recommendation on the future use of U-2 planes. Secretary Rusk said daily pictures of the IL-28 planes are most important.

Secretary Rusk referred to a preliminary draft of inspection arrangements.Apparent reference to “Draft Instruction to USUN, Cuba: Inspection Arrangements,” for use by the Executive Committee and submitted for consideration at this meeting. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Verification of US-USSR Agreementsre Cuba) Text in the Supplement. Certain measures can be taken if Cuba agrees, but other meas-ures will have to be taken if Cuba refuses to accept inspection arrangements satisfactory to us. He noted that there was no real resist-ance from anywhere except Cuba to the continuance of overflights.

The President said the major issue is the inspection of outgoing Soviet ships which will be returning Soviet missiles to the USSR. He said he believed we would have to work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles in order to be certain that all were removed. He asked that we work out what arrangements we think we must have and what we think the Soviets would accept.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson suggested that the International Red Cross inspectors might look at cargo being loaded on outgoing Soviet ships to be certain that it had been properly identified on the ships’ manifests.

Director McCone said we had seen thirty missiles in Cuba and we estimate that forty-eight were brought in. He agreed that we must work out some way of counting the outgoing missiles.

Secretary Rusk said one major problem was how to inspect armaments in Cuba after the strategic missiles had been removed. One way to do this would be to propose an atom-free zone in Latin America. Treaty inspectors could go to Cuba to ensure that no nuclear weapons remained on the island or were introduced.

The President requested a paper stating exactly how we understand the agreement we have reached with the Russians. He wanted for his consideration the instructions to be sent to McCloy to govern McCloy’s talk with Kuznetsov. He suggested that we raise with the Russians the question of Cuban caves as an illustration of the need for an inspection procedure which would reassure us that the missiles were removed, even if we did not inspect each missile. He suggested that the New York negotiating group, including Ambassador Stevenson, be asked to come to Washington later today to discuss inspection arrangements with the Executive Committee.See Document 138. He made it clear that we could not live with a Soviet submarine base in Cuba. He wanted to hold Khrushchev to every single one of the points he had agreed to. He felt that we should insist on the general demilitarization of Cuba and he emphasized again the serious situation which would arise if there were an incident involving one of our U-2 planes and the SAM sites in Cuba.

Secretary Rusk commented that we must have acceptable inspection on the ground in Cuba before we make any commitment about our not invading the island.

Mr. McCone noted that evidence to date indicates the missiles are being dismantled, but apparently everything else is being built up, including communication complexes and possibly even a submarine base.

The President said he wanted to see detailed instructions covering the negotiations on inspection. He thought that we should give the Russians the impression that because the missiles are mobile and can be put back in place, we will have to insist on demilitarization of Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson suggested that we ask the Russians if they intend to keep a military base in Cuba. We would tell the Russians that this was not negotiable.

At this point the following joined the Executive Committee:AEC Chairman Seaborg; Commissioner Haworth; Dr. Wiesner; and Mr. Kaysen.

A draft announcement of the ending of our current nuclear test series was read and discussed.

In response to the President’s question, Dr. Seaborg said that the Commission tests in 1963 would be for the purpose of exploiting the Ripple development. He thought that by May we would be in a position to resume tests above ground. He acknowledged that weapons development would be possible if testing were limited to underground shots.

Secretary Rusk opposed stating in the announcement a time limit on our suspension of testing. He did not want us to tie our hands because at a later time we might have to resume tests in order to keep pressure on the Russians.

The President commented that we had a greater capability than the Russians to conduct useful underground tests. He felt that we would not lose if the Russians did not conduct atmospheric tests and we continued our underground testing.

The draft release was revised and approved, it being understood that underground tests would continue.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
137. Editorial Note

On November 3, 1962, John Scali of the American Broadcasting Corporation met with Alexander S. Fomin, Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington and reputedly head of Soviet intelligence in Washington. Fomin made five points to Scali. First, the United States must be patient with Soviet efforts to moderate Castro; second, the Soviet Union required reciprocal concessions; third, as Castro was adamantly opposed to inspection, the United States and Soviet Union should resolve the issue themselves, by inspection of Soviet ships at sea in international waters; fourth, the Soviet Union could not withdraw its surface-to-air missiles from Cuba for fear of leaving Castro defenseless; and fifth, the Soviet Union planned to leave some technicians in Cuba to train Cubans in the operation of defensive weapons.

Although original records of certain other Scali-Fomin conversations have been found, none for November 3 has been discovered. Pierre Salinger paraphrases and quotes from Scali’s report of this meeting in With Kennedy, pages 279-280. Salinger notes that Scali’s reports were regularly transmitted to members of the Executive Committee and that President Kennedy jokingly suggested that Scali should attend the sessions.

138. Summary Record of the 19th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. According to the President’s Appointment Book the meeting lasted until 6:25 p.m. (Ibid.) Washington, November 3, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

Prior to the reading of a summary of the latest intelligence on Cuba by Director McCone, Secretary Rusk said we may be experiencing the greatest deception in our history if the Russians are not removing their strategic missiles from Cuba. (Mr. McCone’s summary was apparently a special intelligence estimate prepared by USIB.)See Document 139 for additional information on McCone’s briefing.

The President suggested that the summary be sanitized and given to Mr. McCloy to use in his conversations with Soviet representative Kuznetsov.

The President then read the attached instruction to all officials concerned with the present negotiations with the Russians on Cuba.See Document 141. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that the reference to no Soviet missile base in Cuba is a reinterpretation of what Khrushchev agreed to.

Ambassador Stevenson read a list of questions which he hoped would be answered.Not found. Ambassador Yost of the USUN mission reported on negotiations with the International Red Cross aimed at establishing inspection at sea of Soviet ships leaving Cuba. Red Cross inspectors aboard neutral ships would go alongside the Soviet ships, board them and inspect them. It was hoped that the Russians would accept this sea inspection system.

Ambassador Stevenson reported efforts to set up a verification system on the ground in Cuba. The Russians are prepared to have UN inspectors look at the missile sites after the removal of the missiles and the destruction of the sites. We have insisted on inspection in the interim during the time the missiles are being dismantled and the sites destroyed.

Mr. McCloy reported on his talks with Mikoyan and Kuznetsov. The big problem is to get verification which covers all of the island. The Soviets appear to be stringing out the negotiations. Castro may well refuse to accept arrangements agreeable to the Russians. Examination of cargo at sea is very difficult and reading ship manifests in ports is not very helpful. One suggestion is that we ask the Soviets for the list of weapons and missiles they sent to Cuba. We would check outgoing equipment and missiles against this list. If we cannot arrange an inspection system at the docks in Cuba, we will have to work out some kind of inspection system at sea.

Secretary Rusk commented that the Soviets are under an obligation to see that the offer they made to us is implemented.

Ambassador Stevenson said there was little difficulty in seeing the missiles, but seeing the equipment is considerably more difficult. He felt that we should try to get an ex poste facto inspection of all of Cuba. If we cannot get this, we should accept inspection at sea. Our last resort position would be to seek inspection at the home port of the Soviet ships taking the missiles from Cuba.

General Taylor suggested that we should ask the Russians for their withdrawal plan.

The President said we must insist on UN inspectionon the ground. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we had no difficulty on this point with the Russians, but the Cubans were being recalcitrant. He believed that we would eventually have to accept an inspection at sea or inspection at the debarkation port.

With reference to our overflights, Ambassador Stevenson said the Russian position was that they could not agree because the Cubans refuse to permit overflights. The Russians say Cuba is an independent country which they cannot force to accept actions which are an invasion of their sovereign air space. It may be necessary for us to drop back to inspection at sea or at debarkation ports.

Mr. McCone noted that the SAM sites appeared to be under Soviet control.

The President asked whether we could obtain a sampling of outgoing cargoes by UN inspectors on docks at each of five ports. However, this procedure does not provide permanent safeguards against reintroduction of strategic missiles.

Ambassador Stevenson suggested that one way to deal with the future would be to support the nuclear-free zone for Latin America. Cuba might accept inspectors enforcing a nuclear-free zone treaty because inspectors would be visiting all Latin American countries.

The President said we should ask for the removal of the IL-28 bombers. Ambassador Stevenson commented that he believed the IL-28s would be removed, possibly by air.

Mr. McCloy raised the question of whether the President should see Mikoyan. A decision is to be made later after McCloy had talked to Mikoyan.

Ambassador Stevenson predicted that the Cubans and the Russians would insist on a Security Council meeting. He linked this meeting to actions which we plan to take with the OAS. Secretary Rusk commented that we were in no position to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba because no procedures had yet been worked out for the inspection of the withdrawal of the strategic missiles. He felt we should insist upon performance before giving any guarantee.

The President said he wanted any wording of a non-invasion guarantee to be approved by him before being discussed. He preferred that we limit any commitment to that included in our letter to KhrushchevSee Document 95. rather than making a reference to our obligations under the UN charter. He pointed out that our commitment would refer only to invasion and not exclude use of the threat of force. He asked for a paper which would summarize what we expect the Cubans to agree to, what we expect the Russians to agree to, and what we ourselves are prepared to agree to.

Secretary Rusk referred to reports of sabotage in Venezuela apparently instigated by a pro-Castro group or Cubans. The President said we should be as tough as we can in dealing with such situations.

Secretary McNamara asked that the New York negotiations repeat our insistence that the IL-28 bombers be removed from Cuba. He said he thought we should force the Russians to answer whether they intended to withdraw the bombers. Until the Russians answer on this point, he recommended that we reach no agreement of any kind.

Mr. McCone estimates there are forty IL-28s in Cuba. We have seen nine on the ground and additional planes still in their crates.

The President said he was willing to talk to Mikoyan if Mikoyan’s attitude was reasonable in his discussions with McCloy.

The President discussed our public attitude toward the Cuban crisis. He was not certain how much concern we wanted to surface. He felt that our attitude should be one of vigilance and watchful waiting. We should publicly make clear that we were insisting on implementation of all of the deal made by Khrushchev. We could say that we were sticking firmly to the terms of our offer. So far, Khrushchev has not denied the position we have taken in the letter to him. However, he has never said that he specifically accepted our offer. Thus, the deal we have with Khrushchev consists of what we say it is.

The President raised the question of what we should say about the IL-28s. He believed we should say publicly that we considered bombers as part of the deal, i.e. weapons offensive to us which would be withdrawn from Cuba. He agreed that we should delay announcing our public position on the bombers until tomorrow.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action dated November 3 for this meeting. It stated that the President authorized preparation of a sanitized version of McCone’s intelligence briefing for McCloy to use in his discussions with Kuznetsov; that the President approved the general instruction containing a restatement of basic U.S. policy; noted that in the negotiations at the UN there should be insistence on on-site on-the-ground inspection of missile sites; and stated that the President insisted that the basis of negotiations must be his October 27 letter to Khrushchev, and that U.S. posture, both publicly and privately, should be one of carrying out the specifics of that letter. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) See the Supplement.

At the conclusion of the meeting, the President revised and approved an announcement to be made tomorrow upon the conclusion of our current nuclear test series.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
139. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone on November 5. Washington, November 3, 1962. SUBJECT Meeting of the Executive Committee of NSC—Saturday, November 3, 1962—4:30 p.m.

Attended by all members

Also in attendance:

Ambassador Stevenson, McCloy, Yost and several of their staff from the United Nations

The President opened the meeting, stating the purpose was to clearly outline U.S. policy to be sure “all were on the same wave length”.

McCone then read a November 3rd memorandum summarizing intelligence information—copy attached. CIA Memorandum, “The Crisis, USSR/Cuba, Information as of 0600 3 November.” The memorandum reported that the whereabouts of missiles and equipment that had been removed was still unknown, and that uncrating and assembling of IL-28 bombers at San Julien was continuing. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) The President requested this memorandum, which he expressed as being very comprehensive, be sanitized for use in further negotiations and discussions with the Soviets.

The sanitized version of the CIA memorandum of November 3 was sent to Kuznet-sov under cover of a letter from Stevenson, November 3. It reads:

“The analyses of the photographic reconnaissance conducted by us yesterday over Cuban missile sites shows definitive evidence of dismantling of the sites and removal of missiles and related equipment from the area. Destination of the equipment is as yet not apparent.

“On the other hand, there is clear evidence of progressive work on decrating and assembling of the IL-28’s.” (Telegram 1625 from USUN, November 3;USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963)

Secretary Rusk emphasized the dangers of deception.

The President then read a draft of his instructions to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba, a November 3rd copy of which is attached.See Document 141.

There followed a long discussion of various means of verification, the importance of ground inspection, the dangers of deception and the difficult question of verifying that this operation would not be repeated at some future time. Included in these discussions were the disposition of the IL 28s, the manning and ultimate disposition of the SAM sites, the MIG 21 problem and most particularly the responsibilities to the OAS countries to make suitable arrangements for their protection against continuation of subversion, insurgency, sabotage, etc. stemming out of Cuba.

Preparation for the McCloy/Kuznetsov meeting on November 4thSee Document 142.—CIA arranged sanitized versions of a number of points covered in the attached memorandum of 3 November. This information was developed over night and on Sunday morning early Mr. Sheldon and others visited Mr. McCloy in Stanford, Connecticut and briefed him thoroughly on all subjects.

At about 11 o’clock McCone talked with McCloy who expressed appreciation for the briefing and seemed satisfied that he was armed with all necessary information to carry on his talks with Kuznetsov.

In the evening, Rusk called McCone, stating that Kuznetsov had indicated a willingness to have us look at the crates of the large missiles and that there were 42 missiles in Cuba. He asked that CIA study all pertinent data in the interests of verifying this figure. It will be recalled that CIA estimate had rUN to a probable 48 missiles in Cuba. McCone called Sheldon who agreed to study this matter.

In the discussion with McCloy, McCone was advised that Kuznetsov would agree that we could inspect and photograph a number of crates on board ships as they departed from Havana; the crates would be dock loaded so that they would be readily visual from a ship pulling alongside, or from the air; however we would not be permitted to board the ships. Apparently Kuznetsov did not feel he could arrange on-site inspection within Cuba.

Apparently Kuznetsov confirmed that there were a total of 40 launchers (10 sites) and that 24 launchers were operational at the time the whole matter was surfaced.

McCloy stated that Kuznetsov was non-responsive with respect to the operation of the SAM sites, to the withdrawal of the SAM sites; withdrawal of the IL 28s and the MIGs were not mentioned. Full telegraphic report is due 11:05.Attached to this memorandum for the record was a November 2 memorandum from the Deputy Director for Intelligence Cline to McCone entitled, “Time Factors in Construction of Soviet Missiles Bases in Cuba.” It estimated how long it would take to make a MRBM site operational and how soon U.S. reconnaissance could discover them. See the Supplement.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
140. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. A note on the source text indicates that a copy went to Thompson who “took it w/him.”Thompson and Bundy met with the President on November 2, from 6:10 to 6:23 p.m. for an “off the record meeting.” (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) The letter could have been drafted then. Washington, November 3, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I wish to thank you for your letter of October 30.Document 120. I am commenting now only on a problem raised in your letter which relates to the Cuban affair.

With respect to the quarantine on shipments to Cuba, I am hopeful that arrangements can be worked out quickly by the United Nations which would permit its removal. We were happy to agree to your suggestion that the International Committee of the Red Cross undertake responsibility for inspection. You are, of course, aware that Premier Castro has announced his opposition to measures of verification on the territory of Cuba. If he maintains this position this would raise very serious problems. So far as incoming shipments are concerned, I understand that efforts are being made to have the International Red Cross carry out the necessary measures at sea and I hope that these will be successful. In the meantime, perhaps the existence of the quarantine can be of assistance to Mr. Mikoyan in his negotiations with Premier Castro. I should also like to point out that in an effort to facilitate matters, I instructed our delegation in New York to inform your representative there, Mr. Kuznetsov, that for the next few days any Soviet ships in the quarantine area would be passed without inspection and only the hailing procedure which was carried out in the case of your vessel, the Bucharest, would be applied.

I am hopeful we can dispose of this pressing matter quickly so that we can go on in a better atmosphere to the broader questions. We both must make our best efforts to this end.

Sincerely,

John F. KennedyPrinted from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original.
141. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-362. Top Secret. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy, cleared by Rusk, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Washington, November 3, 1962, 8:44 p.m.

1189. Eyes only for Stevenson and McCloy. Following is text of an instruction from the President to all concerned with present negotiations in Cuba:

“It is time for a review of our basic position in these negotiations and for a clear restatement of our policy and purpose.

We have good evidence that the Russians are dismantling the missile bases. We have no decisive evidence of what they will do with this equipment. The assembly of IL-28’s continues. There is some evidence of an intent to establish a submarine-tending facility. The future of the SAM sites is unclear. We have no satisfactory assurances on verification. Our aerial surveillance still proceeds without guarantee of safety.

This crisis is likely to move in one of two major directions in the next few weeks. On the one hand, we may be able to make arrangements which will in fact ensure the verified removal of all Soviet offensive weapons systems from Cuba and establish reliable safeguards against their reintroduction. This is the object of our policy and it is precisely stated in my letter to Khrushchev of October 27:See Document 95. ‘You would agree to remove these weapons systems (previously defined as “all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use”) from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.’ Chairman Khrushchev’s message of 28 OctoberDocument 102. contained an explicit undertaking to dismantle, crate and return to the Soviet Union ‘the weapons which you describe as “offensive”’ under UN verification. It is the position of the United States Government that this is a clear acceptance of my proposal of October 27.

This requirement means removal of all offensive missiles and supporting equipment, and of all bombers and their equipment. These items and associated equipment are generally described in my statement of September 13 and in my address of October 22; they are clearly defined in my Proclamation of October 23.For texts, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 674-681, 806-809, and 809-811, respectively. All Americans should stick firmly to this position. We should add that a submarine base is equally unacceptable— as Chairman Khrushchev has acknowledged by clear inference in his assurances on the fishing facility.

In blunt summary, we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28.

If in fact the Soviet Government executes this kind of removal with the associated and necessary inspection, supervision, and safeguards against reintroduction, then we in turn will hold with equal clarity to the undertaking given in my letter of October 27, as follows: ‘(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.’ We also have an obligation to work with other Western Hemisphere countries to get them to take a similar position. The exact terms and meaning of this undertaking require further work, but its broad implication is clear: in the absence of other provocation or justification, we will give an undertaking not to invade Cuba if we are properly assured that Cuba ceases to be a Soviet military base and ceases to harbor weapons. This commitment in no way derogates from our Hemispheric obligations to deal with aggressive or subversive activities by the present regime in Cuba.

There is another major course which events may take. It is one with which all who have negotiated with the Soviet Government in the past are familiar. It is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents verification, agreements are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet Government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up.

There is much evidence to support the conclusion that this is what is now beginning.

This second line of Soviet conduct is unacceptable to the United States. To prevent it we must make it very clear, at every stage, by both word and act, that the United States Government will not accept a mere gentlemen’s agreement relating only to visible missiles on identified launch pads. We must have adequate arrangements for verification and inspection to be sure both that offensive weapons are removed and that no more are introduced. Without them, both surveillance and the quarantine must be continued and both may need to be extended. (This condition does not exclude temporary relaxation of either quarantine or surveillance in return for useful steps toward fully effective arrangements. Such a relaxation is foreseen in connection with our plans for ICRC inspection of certain inbound cargoes.) All the offensive weapons systems, including anything related to a submarine base, must be removed, or we shall have to consider further action of our own to remove them.

Finally, and most generally, the undertaking of the United States against invasion cannot take effect in any atmosphere of ambiguity or uncertainty such that the American Government or the American people would lack proper assurance against the existence in Cuba now, or at any future time, of any Soviet military base or offensive weapons. The Soviet Government must recognize that the events of the last three weeks have made it impossible for opinion in this Hemisphere to be satisfied with Soviet assurances alone. Verification is essential if the Governments of the Western Hemisphere are to be able to live with this situation without further action.

I repeat that this statement of policy should be taken as binding guidance by all who are engaged in the framing of instructions or the conduct of negotiations on this matter. It is of fundamental importance that we speak as one voice and continue to keep it entirely clear to all Soviet representatives that the agreements of October 27 and 28 must be carried out in full—and that otherwise the United States Government will find it necessary to move again by its own means to insure itself against a repetition of the extraordinary act of deception which initiated this crisis. In this situation the Soviet Government has a clear choice between verified removal of all offensive weapons systems and renewed action by the United States. It has no middle choice, and we believe its own interests should lead it to accept the honest and full execution of the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, and to see to it that Castro provides the necessary cooperation.

Detailed guidance in support of this general policy has been provided in approved instructions to USUN earlier this week. The basic messages are 1147 of October 31,Document 125. as amended, 1159 of November 1,Telegram 1159, November 1, instructed Ball to stress to Soviet negotiators the importance of verification, the consequences of attacks on U.S. reconnaissance planes, and the fact that IL-28 bombers were part of the agreement and should be dismantled. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Incoming Telegrams, Top Secret, Exdis, etc.) 1166 of November 1,Telegram 1166 contained instructions and suggestions on how to get ICRC inspectors into action as soon as possible. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-162) and 1177 of November 2.See footnote 7, Document 134. A codification of this guidance is planned. My only addition at present is that I now believe we should not be satisfied, as 1147 suggests, with aerial surveillance and post-removal ground inspection for departing offensive weapons. We must also have some way of verifying the reexport of the missiles, and the best practicable way seems to be to count them on departing ships. This can be done with no violation of Soviet security by reliable and non-technical non-Americans, and we should insist on this or an equally effective verification.”

Rusk
142. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562). Top Secret; Priority. According to the USUN copy, it was drafted by McCloy. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-002 Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)) New York, November 4, 1962, 11:50 p.m.

1630. Eyes only for the Secretary. Meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 4. Kuznetsov came to lunch at McCloy’s home at Stamford. En famille, most informal, no other officials or any translator present. After lunch took a long walk during the course of which talk was conducted lasting until about 5:00 PM. McCloy started out with a resume of our aerial surveillance of yesterday of Cuba again expressing great concern over the evidence of the assembly of the IL-28’s. The buildup of these planes was in sharp contrast to the dismantling of the sites and largely nullified the good impression we were getting from the rapidity with which the missile sites were being dismantled. K said that this had been something of a new subject to him and had been recently notified of it. He said he had notified Moscow of the importance we placed on it and that he had doubted that these were properly classified as offensive weapons but this was only his opinion. K would report Moscow attitude as soon as he received it.

McCloy told him that the President had refrained from publicly referring to the buildup of the IL-28’s as he was sure there would be a sharp reaction if it were made public. McCloy also stated that there could be no doubt of the inclusion of these bombers in the list of offensive weapons and if any documentation were needed it would be easy to provide it. Mc gave him our position on verification following the lines of 1189Document 141. stating we had been deceived by assurances given our officials in respect to the weapons introduced in Cuba and it was impossible for us now to act merely on a gentlemen’s agreement. McCloy said he was seriously troubled by the problem of verification as it seemed as if the Soviet Union would not be able to make good on their Chairman’s commitment for UN observation of dismantling and removal although Mc felt certain that they could get Fidel’s compliance if they really set about it. K said this was not by any means certain. Mc repeated we could not be satisfied with our reconnaissance alone (to which incidentally they still continue to object) and we would not be satisfied with the mere inspection of the abandoned missile sites. We had to have evidence of the disposition and the removal of the weapons. Mc referred to the stories about weapons in caves and said such stories were bound to arise if we did not have opportunity for inspection on the ground. We had to have evidence which would convince us as practical men that the commitments to remove these weapons had been carried out. K said they had been giving thought to this matter and the Chairman himself had been preoccupied with it as he was fully aware of his commitments and he wished to negotiate this thing honestly both in what he called the short rUN and the long run. K referred to a suggestion that Mc had made regarding manifests that they had followed up. He said manifests of what was going out would not be any good unless it was known what had come in, but in order to give us reasonable and practical assurance of their determination to fulfill their commitment and on instructions directly from the Chairman he wanted to submit the figures.

There were as of October 22, 24 completed sites and 16 in incomplete form, or a total of 40, and they had introduced a total of 42 missiles into Cuba. All of these sites had been dismantled and rendered inoperable by November 2. They were prepared to find reasonable means to convince us that these missiles had been removed and their suggestion was as follows: (1) They would give us photographs of the sites in dismantled form. (2) They would give us their schedule of removal to the ports and shipping schedules. He said that we could bring our own vessels along side the Soviet ships which were taking the missiles out in such a way as to enable us to see and count the missiles. They would also give us photographs of 42 missiles on the way out. Mc pointed out that the commitment to remove the missiles would include launching pads, trucks and other paraphernalia that goes with the missile and K said that he would assume this to be so. K said if we did not raise too many questions, insist on looking into every box and otherwise raise objections which would convince them that we were merely trying to find obstacles to the fulfillment of our own guaranties, he was certain we would be able to work out reasonable details involved in this verification process without friction.

Mc asked him whether as an alternative they would permit inspection in Soviet ports of the off-loading. K thought this might involve complications and from all points of view it seemed better to do it at sea where we could be sure the ships had just come from Cuba. He wanted us to know that what they had done and what they were prepared to do was not a result of weakness—simply a desire to do all possible to maintain and consolidate the peace. The balance would remain the same as it was before but he repeated that the Soviet Government wants honestly to negotiate this matter of the removal of the weapons at once. They want to normalize the situation very promptly. They want the quarantine lifted as it is a wartime rather than a peacetime measure. They want to remove the atmosphere of war. K gave Mc a rough translation of a message from the ChairmanDocument 145. to the effect that the Soviet Union seriously and sincerely sought to find a solution and make an effort to solve all the questions quickly on a basis of mutual conciliation and on the conditions which were stated in the letters of the President and the Chairman; and the Soviet Union expected that the United States will cooperate completely and promptly and lift the quarantine. The US should not doubt the full sincerity of the Soviet’s statement regarding the dismantling and shipping out of the offensive weapons.

K indicated that if Castro gave his consent to an on-site inspection they might be willing to accept verification of the shipment at the docks in Cuba, but he said it was necessary to plan for other eventualities. He repeated that the whole job of dismantling and preparation for removal could be effected by November 10 and presumably the shipping schedule would begin then.

There were other questions in addition to this matter of verification, particularly the one as to the form of the protocol or the declaration giving the United States guaranties. Those guaranties would have to be clearly expressed against invasion by the United States, in accordance with the President’s letter or permitting the mounting of an attack from the soil of the United States together with the use of the good offices of the United States to induce other Latin American countries to adopt the same attitude. K said there should also be some guaranties given against subversive activities against Cuba, at which point Mc interposed that this would be very difficult indeed to comply with inasmuch as Cuba was a hotbed of subversion itself and that we would and could do nothing which could be interpreted as support of Castro or his regime.

K also mentioned Guantanamo and Mc told him that it was out of the question that the United States would permit Guantanamo to be in any way related to the solution of the present Cuban problem. K rather pressed for a commitment on the part of the US to be willing to discuss the subject at sometime in the future but Mc told him that no joining of the Guantanamo question with this incident was feasible. As to the form of the US guaranty, K said he was not particularly concerned as to whether it was by protocol or by declaration although Zorin felt very strongly about this. Mc brought up the question of submarines and possible submarine bases and K said that this was something he was familiar with and he felt sure, particularly since the Chairman himself had given assurances on this subject, that the port was presently a fishing port with no intention of making it a submarine port. Mc referred to the presence of submarines in the area and stated that we were quite concerned about this as they seemed to be appearing in conjunction with the whole weapons buildup. Mc said he must realize what we object to is the establishment of a Soviet military base in Cuba—that defensive weapons can be supplied to the Cubans if they want to but they must be in the hands of Cubans and not Soviet troops or technicians. K said he understood this point of view—and how about Turkey. At this point K made quite an argument about our characterization of weapons in Turkey as defensive that we were calling offensive in Cuba. Mc said that we would be glad to talk to him about our bases abroad at some other time.

Mc also referred to the SAM sites and repeated that we could not give any credit to the statement that this weapons system was manned and operated by Cubans rather than Soviet technicians. Mc stated the evidence was conclusive of Soviet operations and that it was apparent that the whole complex was part and parcel of the buildup of the missile sites. K did not respond to this.

In regard to the President’s requirement that there should be some safeguards against the re-introduction of these weapons beyond a mere undertaking by the Soviet Union, he made reference to U Thant’s idea of a UN presence in the Caribbean on a reciprocal basis which should include UN observers in some sections of the United States. Mc told him that he thought this was out of the question. What then should be the form of the safeguards against the reintroduction of weapons?Mc told him that he hadn’t come to any conclusions in this regard although this might be dealt with in some way by a declaration of nuclear free zones, a thought to which K had previously referred. K again came back to the question of subversion and a guaranty against subversion. Mc again repeated that we could not take any steps which would mean support of Castro or establishment of a safe haven for Castro’s subversive activities against the rest of the hemisphere. Mc also told him that his representative, Morozov, in working out the Red Cross deal seemed to be rather sticky in regard to ships from which Red Cross personnel could inspect incoming vessels as well as in some other matters. Mc told him that K should be prepared to induce the Bloc ships to agree to the same procedures that the Soviet ships would agree to. Talk then turned to the type of ship which would be used by the Red Cross personnel. Mc urged him to accept a US ship rather than a neutral ship as a US ship would cost less and could be put into operation more expeditiously. K immediately countered with a Soviet ship stating that one could probably be made available just as rapidly from Havana as any US ship. Mc told him that he could not tell him whether a Soviet ship would be acceptable and argued in favor of a US ship such as a hospital ship or any other US ship utilizing a tender bearing a Red Cross or UN flagwhich tender would actually serve as the means by which incoming ships were boarded.

K then brought up the hail and pass formula and said that he understood that all the Red Cross would do would be to hail and pass. Mc disabused him of this and said that there would be no sense in having Red Cross personnel if this were all that was to be done. The hail and pass formula had been intended as a temporary measure to permit Soviet ships for a brief interval to enter Cuban ports carrying food or other innocent cargo until the Red Cross operation could be put into effect provided this could be done reasonably promptly. K seemed to accept this.

Finally K registered an objection to our constant reference to the deception that the officials of this country had been exposed. There had been no obligation to tell us of the character of weapons they were introducing into the Island of Cuba. Mc said that this was probably so but there was an obligation among the friendly countries to respond truthfully to an inquiry when so much was at stake.

At the end K asked Mc what his reaction was to his earlier proposal to which Mc replied that it showed evidence of their effort to try to meet the problem of their inability to obtain the on-the-ground inspection to which the Soviet Union had been committed, but he could not say more until after Mc again had consulted his Government.

K said we must take this as the basis for other long range negotiations because it is clear we should not risk the danger involved in another such confrontation. Mc refrained from asking what these long range negotiations might cover for fear of having them complicate the immediate problem, but he agreed as to the necessity of eventual long range discussions and hoped that the constructive solution of the present difficulty would lead to them.

Stevenson
143. Summary Record of the 20th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, November 5, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary.Based in part on CIA memorandum, “The Crisis, USSR/Cuba,” Information as of 6 a.m. November 5, in which the lack of agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba on inspection in Cuba and verification of the removal of Soviet missiles was highlighted. (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24)McCone’s memorandum for the record of this meeting, November 5, indicated that he also summarized other intelligence reports, including the SC 11157/62, a special memorandum on offensive missile strength in Cuba. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) See the Supplement. He then compared our figures on strategic missiles in Cuba with the Russian figures which Kuznetsov gave to McCloy yesterday.See Document 142. Kuznetsov says the Russians sent forty-two missiles to Cuba. We had estimated that there were forty-eight Soviet missiles in Cuba, thirty-three of which we have actually seen.

Secretary McNamara reported on the aerial reconnaissance missions of yesterday. Two U-2 missions aborted yesterday because of mechanical failure. Five more U-2s are flying today.

Secretary Rusk reported on the McCloy/Kuznetsov conversation yesterday. The Russians are prepared to give us an actual missile inventory, including the shipping schedules, so that we can count the missiles on their way out. Secretary Rusk said he continued to believe that we must have inspection arrangements on the ground in Cuba. We need a UN presence in Cuba, plus a Latin American atom-free treaty zone, if Castro will accept such. If not, we must refuse to give a commitment not to invade and we must continue aerial reconnaissance missions and our present intelligence efforts on the ground in Cuba. We are unable to put forward an inspection plan until we know what Mikoyan has proposed to the Cubans and what Castro has agreed to accept.

The President recalled that Zorin wanted a protocol covering the agreement on the withdrawal of the Soviet missiles. He asked that thought be given to how this might be done.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the difficulty of legislating on Communist subversion in the hemisphere.

The President asked: How we would get a guarantee that no Soviet submarine base would be built in Cuba. How to get out the IL-28 bombers. What was our position if a demand were made that UN observers inspect refugee camps in the U.S. and in other areas where Cuban nationalists might receive military training. How the U.S. or the UN would continue reconnaissance flights.

The President’s basic question was how much should we give for a permanent UN presence in Cuba. He believed that we should keep open the question of accepting UN observersin the U.S. until we knew exactly what we would get in return.

Secretary Rusk emphasized that all arrangements arising out of the current situation must focus on Cuba. Comparable actions such as inspection in Cuba in return for the UN investigation of complaints about the U.S. were difficult, not only for the U.S., but for other members of the OAS. As to future assurances, we want a permanent UN presence in Cuba for which we would guarantee that we would not invade. For us, the UN presence would be a guarantee against the reintroduction of strategic missiles. We should think about overflights of Cuba and the U.S. and about a UN presence in Florida as well as in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy said that the UN route to the demilitarization of Cuba would lead to a realignment of our relations with Castro.

Secretary Rusk said we must under all circumstances continue to overfly Cuba. The President asked how we would continue to overfly as long as the SAM sites were operational. Secretary Rusk replied that our overflights would continue by tacit agreement of the Cubans and the Russians.

The President asked whether a group was at work on what to tell McCloy in answer to questions raised by Kuznetsov. He believed that if Mikoyan asks Kuznetsov about our future assurances with respect to Cuba, McCloy should be in a position to respond. Secretary Rusk preferred to delay sending our final position to McCloy until after we knew what took place in Havana.

The President agreed that no release should be made to the press of pictures which reveal Soviet activity yesterday in Cuban ports. He added that we might have the International Red Cross inspect incoming ships and we would look at ships leaving Cuba. He agreed that we could delay reaching a final position on the permanent arrangements, but we should not discuss any arrangements for the time being with Mikoyan.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. It summarized the decisions and major points of the discussion and noted that a cable would be sent to McCloy which would give answers to the questions posed by Kuznetsov on November 4. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24) See the Supplement. For the cable to McCloy, see Document 147.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
144. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Robert Kennedy. Copies sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk. Washington, November 5, 1962.

Dobrynin asked earlier this morning if I could see him and I made arrangements to have him come to the office at 12 o’clock Noon.

He delivered another letter from Mr. Khrushchev.Document 145. I read it and found that it concerned our list of offensive weapons that Stevenson had submitted.

I explained to Dobrynin that from the first it had been made clear by the Soviet Union that they would get rid of any weapons which we considered offensive and certainly it was very clear that the bombers, the IL 28’s, had to go. Dobrynin replied that he was not familiar with that position and also did not know what was on the list that Khrushchev mentioned in his letter. I told him I would get a copy of it; that it was basically the same list of weapons that had been listed in the President’s Quarantine Proclamation. He replied he would obtain a copy from Kuznetsov.

During the middle of the conversation the President called and said that he had just received some preliminary information which indicated that several of our planes over Cuba had been fired upon. In ending my conversation with Dobrynin, therefore, I stressed the fact that any arrangements that were made were dependent upon there not being any incidents in the air above Cuba.

145. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. According to Problems of Communism the Russian text was transmitted by the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the Soviet Embassy in Washington on November 4. A note on the source text indicates it was received on November 5. Other copies are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, and ibid.: Lot 66 D 204. Moscow, undated.

Dear Mr. President, I have just received information from Mr. V. Kuznetsov, our representative at the negotiations in New York for liquidation of the tense situation around Cuba, that Mr. Stevenson handed him a list of weapons which your side calls offensive.See footnote 3, Document 133. I have studied the list and, I must confess, the approach of the American side to this matter has seriously worried me. In such a move, I will say frankly, I see a wish to complicate the situation, because it is impossible indeed to place into the category of “offensive” weapons such types of weapons which have always been referred to as defensive weapons even by a man uneducated militarily—by a common soldier, not to say of an officer.

It is hard for us to understand what aim is being pursued by the introduction of that list, by setting forth such a demand—in any case it must be some other aim, but not a desire for a speediest clearing of the atmosphere. And it is being done at a moment when we have already agreed with you on the main questions and when we on our part have already fulfilled what we agreed upon—have dismantled rocket weapons, are loading them now on ships and these weapons will be soon shipped from Cuba. That is why I feel greatly concerned with the advancing of such demand by the American side, concerned with its possible consequences, if necessary reasonableness is not displayed.

The demand which has been set forth is evidently pursuing, as I have already said, some other aims and that—I would wish, Mr. President, that you understand me correctly—can lead not to the betterment of our relations but, on the contrary, to their new aggravation. We should understand the position each side is in and take it into consideration but not overburden, not complicate our relations, especially at such an important moment when measures are being taken to eliminate the acute tension and bring these relations to a normal state.

That is why I would ask you, Mr. President, to meet our anxiety with understanding, to take measures on your side in order not to complicate the situation and to give your representatives a directive to eliminate the existing tension on the basis upon which both of us have agreed by having exchanged public messages. You spoke to the effect that missiles which you called offensive should be removed from Cuba. We agreed to that. You in your turn gave assurances that the so-called “quarantine” would be promptly removed and that no invasion of Cuba would be made, not only by the U.S. but by other countries of the Western hemisphere either.

Let us then bring the achieved understanding to a completion, so that we could consider that each side has fulfilled its pledges and the question has been settled. If, however, additional demands are made, then that means only one thing—the danger that the difficulties on the way to eliminating tension created around Cuba will not be removed. But that may raise then new consequences.

I think that you will understand me correctly. For you and I will evidently have to deal not only with elimination of the remnants of the present tension—there lies ahead for you and me a great, serious talk on other questions. Why then start now complicating the situation by minor things. May be there exist some considerations, but they are beyond our comprehension. As for us, we view the introduction of additional demands as a wish to bring our relations back again into a heated state in which they were but several days ago.

Sincerely,

N. KhrushchevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
146. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B10285A, Memos for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by McCone. Washington, November 5, 1962. SUBJECT Discussion with Mr. Bundy at 1:45 this date

I commented on Governor Stevenson’s report #1630, November 4th, midnight,Document 142. summarizing the McCloy/Kuznetsov meeting. I stated that we felt that the meeting was constructive, stating McCloy had adhered to policy but pointed out that the examination of missile cases on ships would not necessarily constitute convincing proof that missiles were actually exported; that no arrangement has been agreed on IL 28s, and that no form of verification short of a combination of aerial and on-site inspection would give us final answer. Bundy gave me a copy of draft of President Kennedy’s cable to Stevenson and McCloy, November 5, copy attached.Not attached, but see Document 147. I commented as follows:

I felt that we faced a serious problem in the future of Cuba and read my memo of 5 November (copy attached). In addition I stated that it seemed to me that we were going too far in assuming that we would have to grant reciprocal rights if we insisted on UN on-site inspection, of which my point was that the Kennedy/Khrushchev agreement provided for inspection of the dismantling, removal and continuing absence of offensive weapons and this agreement in no way referred to inspection of U.S. territory. Therefore it seems to me that the effect of the negotiation is to set up a situation in which we will have to submit to a situation not anticipated in the agreement if we are going to force the other sides to fulfill their obligations. Secondly, the question of the SAM sites. I advised Bundy that the building of the expensive SAM installation and the large number of operators required were the principal reasons that I suspected installation of offensive missiles. I could not rationalize the Soviet move on any other basis. I was now equally disturbed at the Soviet’s insistence that the SAMs remain in being and operational and their obvious deception in claiming they are operated by Cubans and not by Soviet personnel. I explained that I now feel that the SAMs are being left there to shield the reintroduction of missiles at some future time or the emplacement of missiles which are secretly detained on the Island. There can be no other explanation. The SAMs are useless as a defense against our military action as our attacking planes can come up in low undetected and destroy them instantly. Therefore they are targeted against U-2s. By leaving them on the Island the gravest situation faces us. We will be in complete ignorance of their activities and the reintroduction of weapons at a future time is a distinct possibility.

In later conversation with the AG I made both of these points very emphatically. He said he would discuss them personally with the President.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature. Attachment Secret. Prepared by McCone. PROBLEMS WE FACE IN THE FUTURE IN CUBA Castro will retain power. He will be given Soviet assurances and economic assistance to permit him to “ride through” the recent fiasco. He will hold his political organization together. It will be more violent than it has in the past. Militarily he will be stronger. Undoubtedly vast quantities of armament has been received recently (Note: we should enumerate types and quantities identified from pictures). He therefore has more for his own defense and to pass out to insurgent groups throughout the hemisphere. He will have a maritime capacity against Central America and the northern tier of Latin American by the utilization of 6 Khronstad and 18 Komar vessels. He will have an air strike capability against this same area with IL 28s. By retaining the SAMs, he will provide a shield against aerial inspection and therefore can arrange with the Soviets for the re-introduction of MRBMs and IRBMs with reasonable safety as the SAMs will protect him against our U-2 photography. This was the original purpose of the installation of the SAMs and there can be no question but that their retention is for no other purpose than to provide this same protection for the installation of MRBMs in the future. Sophisticated communication equipment will give him an improved capability to communicate with Moscow and also to broadcast instructions to his agents and operators throughout the Hemisphere. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
147. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562. Top Secret; Niact. Drafted by McGeorge Bundy and cleared by Ball. A draft of this telegram with Bundy’s handwritten revisions is ibid. Washington, November 5, 1962, 3:20 p.m.

1194. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy from President. Your conversation with KuznetsovSee Document 142. shows progress on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential.

One serious gap in Kuznetsov’s proposal respecting missiles is the absence of any reference to nuclear warheads. Our interest in their absence is intense, and you should emphasize to all Soviets that since Khrushchev spoke to Knox of the presence of such warheads in Cuba, we need assurances on warheads as much as on missiles themselves. Moreover, we need to know about possible warheads for IL28’s and even MIG 21’s.

This warhead problem highlights the general importance of post-removal verification in Cuba itself. Forty-two missiles is a plausible number and not inconsistent with our own reports, but Soviet figures, while genuinely useful, are not a wholly reliable basis for action. In this connection you should not hesitate to press home with Kuznetsov the fact that past Soviet deception remains a major element in our reaction to this whole episode. It may be true, as Kuznetsov argues, that the Soviets had no obligation to tell us exactly what they were doing in a country like Cuba, but what actually happened in this case was that they repeatedly gave us assurances of what they were not doing. These assurances came from highest levels, and proved absolutely false.

Your insistence on the removal of IL28’s, the unacceptability of any submarine support facility, and obvious Soviet involvement in SAM complex are all correct and worth repeating insistently. You are also right to resist guarantees on subversion and to keep Guantanamo out of it.

With respect to U.S. guarantees, we are not yet ready to give you more detailed instructions, but these three general points may be helpful: No long-term arrangements can be settled until after we have reached clear understanding on verified removal of offensive weapons systems, including IL28’s. OAS-approved right of surveillance will be kept intact and is important to both sides as last week’s flights showed. In this connection you should report to Kuznetsov that today one of our low-level flights was harassed by MIG’s apparently manned by Soviets. No damage was done, and it is not clear that MIG’s fired, but episode provides good basis for you to drive home our view of critical importance of unimpeded surveillance unless and until better arrangements can be made. You should remind Kuznetsov that surveillance must and will continue, and that further interference will be sure to bring prompt reaction including armed action if necessary. We do not wholly exclude some form of international inspection involving Caribbean areas outside Cuba, at a later stage. Ours is an open society, and the principle of reciprocal inspection is one of high value to us if it can be established in the right circumstances. You should emphasize that such reciprocal inspection can only be considered in return for permanently verified absence of any significant Soviet military presence in Cuba. You might try out the notion of removal of SAM sitesin this connection.In telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5, 10:59 p.m., the Department of State provided Stevenson and McCloy with a long guidance, as a followup to Kuznetsov’s suggested procedures and as a guide to the kind of inspection procedures required to check out-going cargoes. These procedures were prepared by an interagency panel. In discussing these procedures, Stevenson and McCloy were to stress that the United States still insisted on UN inspection in Cuba to guard against hidden or reintroduced offensive weapons. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-562) See the Supplement.

Rusk
148. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Cuba, General, 11/1/62-11/6/62. Top Secret. Washington, November 5, 1962.

We must operate on the presumption that the Russians may try again. This time they may prepare themselves for action on the sea in the Cuban area. Does Admiral Anderson think they could build up a secret subterranean base which will put them on a near parity with us if we should once again blockade. If he thinks there is substantial danger of this what suggestions would he now make?

John F. KennedyPrinted from a copy that indicates President Kennedy signed the original. Another note in the same hand reads: “Despatched by receipt #1073—11/15/63—3:30 p.m.”
149. Telegram From President Kennedy to the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/1/62-11/6/62. Top Secret; Operational Immediate; Urgent. This message was ostensibly from Bromley Smith, but it was sent apparently at the instruction of the President. The following times are handwritten on the source text: 3:30 p.m., 4:05, 4:35. It was received in the White House situation room at 5:20 p.m. Washington, November 5, 1962.

CAP 55515-62. Deliver immediately to Executive Secretariat for Ball and Alexis Johnson. Begin message: Your conversation with KuznetsovPresumably a reference to the discussion in Document 142. shows progress on one important point but raises a number of questions on which I wish to comment.

If we can see and count for ourselves departing missiles and associated equipment, that will be an important forward step and we see promise in the procedures Kuznetsov proposed as long as it is clear that reliable observation, not Soviet photography alone, is essential. End of message.

150. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962 (McNamara’s working papers). Top Secret. Washington, November 5, 1962.

As I have communicated to General Wheeler, through General Clifton, the plans for XThe reference to “plans for X” was to CINCLANT OPLAN 316, designed to exploit an unforeseen turn of events in Cuba that offered a worthwhile opportunity for exploitation by the United States. The range of circumstances in which this plan would be implemented ranged from support of a widespread rebellion of the Cuban population to military action to divert Castro from military adventure against Guantanamo. The reaction time for the plan was 5 days. The concept called for airborne assault in the vicinity of Havana by two airborne divisions, followed as quickly as possible by an amphibious assault by the 2d Marine Division/Wing Team over beaches to the east of Havana. Depending upon the amount of time for build-up, additional forces would be committed incrementally until approximately five full divisions, with necessary supporting troops, would be engaged. This plan was known as “quick reaction plan.” (Cuban Crisis, Operational Aspects, December 26; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, High-level Exchange) seem thin. Considering the size of the problem, the equipment that is involved on the other side, the nationalistic fervor which may be engendered, it seems to me we could end up bogged down.

I think we should keep constantly in mind the British in Boer War, the Russians in the last war with the Finnish and our own experience with the North Koreans. We are keeping, as I understand it, three divisions in reserve. I think we should plan to use them and call up any guard divisions we have available. This may require us to build additional divisions.

John Kennedy
151. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers—Cuba. Secret. Received at the Department of State at 1:50 a.m. According to the USUN copy of this telegram, it was drafted by Akalovsky and cleared in substance by Stevenson. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963) New York, November 6, 1962, 1 a.m.

1642. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy had a three-and-a-half hour meeting with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich today. Following summary based on uncleared memcon.A 19-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place on November 5, from 6 to 9:30 p.m. at the Soviet Mission in New York, is ibid., 1A October/November Meetings.

Stevenson and McCloy referred to Kuznetsov’s conversation with McCloy yesterday,November 4, an apparent reference to Document 142. in which former expressed misgivings re inclusion IL-28 aircraft in armaments subject to removal. Kuznetsov, frequently drawing upon prepared text, stated following: Sov Govt displeased with Stevenson’s Nov 2 letter to Mikoyan;See footnote 3, Document 133. Sovs surprised IL-28 aircraft regarded by US as offensive, because they basically obsolete in view their low ceiling and low speed. These aircraft, which 15 years old, belong to coastal defenses and cannot be used in combat over enemy territory; US demands this respect can be regarded only as attempt delay solution of problem and continue tense relations between US and USSR; USSR conducting present negotiations in good faith and wishes speedy agreement and normalization situation in Caribbean; if US also honest in its pledge re non-invasion, it should not be disturbed by exist-ence IL-28 aircraft in Cuban hands, since they defensive and subsidiary arms; Cuba sovereign state and can determine itself its defensive needs; no offensive weapons exist in Cuba; Negotiations should center on main problem at hand and raising additional questions can only complicate matters.

Stevenson and McCloy stressed question IL-28 aircraft not new, since President’s October 22 statement, quarantine proclamation, as well as October 28 letter contained either specific or general reference to offensive weapons other than missiles. Pointed out jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear warheads could hardly be qualified as obsolete. Noted such armaments in hands of man like Castro could create gravest situation, and LA countries deeply concerned by this. Denied Kuznetsov’s insinuation US seeking obstruct negotiations by raising this very important question. After prolonged exchange, in course of which Stevenson and McCloy continued press for removal IL-28 aircraft and Kuznetsov reiterated essentially same points as listed above, Kuznetsov contended negotiations must not depart from President-Khrushchev agreement, substance of which he described as follows: US is to give assurances against invasion of Cuba either by US or by its Allies, or by any state in Western hemisphere;Kuznetsov commented US trying evade this subject; As evident from Khrushchev’s message, USSR will remove missiles which President regards as offensive. He commented there no question that missiles had been subject President-Khrushchev exchange, Security Council debate, and current talks.

In response to direct question whether USSR wouldinclude IL-28’s in arms to be removed, Kuznetsov replied in negative, stating that they not offensive arms and SovGov would act accordingly. Suggested both sides report problem to their govts.

 Kuznetsov referred to schedule of removal, saying first Soviet vessel, Labinsk, due to leave November 6, with eight other ships, Bratsk, Leninskiy Komsomol, Kurchatov, Asosov, Divnogorsk, Volgoles, Polzunov, Alapayevsk, to leave November 7. Said he had no information whether this would complete removal operation.

Kuznetsov said USSR had decided make Sov vessel Almata available for verification inbound ships by ICRC. Details re signals and identification would have [to] be worked out and appropriate information had been given to member UN Secretariat. This vessel would be stationed north of Cuba and all Sov ships bound for Cuba would use only northern route, although southern route might be used after November 12.

McCloy and Stevenson pointed out no commitment had been made re US willingness accept Soviet ship, and noted neutral, i.e., Swedish, ship could also be used. Kuznetsov professed surprise, claiming US had not objected to Soviet ship. McCloy reiterated he had expressly stated he could not commit US Govt re use of Soviet ship.

 McCloy then raised subject of removal of warheads, pointing out this very important matter, and wondered how USSR could satisfy US re their removal. Kuznetsov asserted this question of detail;USSR’s actions clearly indicate that all equipment related to what US calls offensive missiles will be removed. Thus, there should be no doubt re warheads, if warheads are indeed in Cuba. USSR intends fulfill all these commitments in good faith, but US raising these questions in order postpone final solution of problem. Stevenson and McCloy stressed importance removal warheads, pointing out that with some modification they could also be used on bombers. Suggested verification removal of warheads could perhaps be done on see-and-count basis as Kuznetsov had suggested for missiles. Stevenson noted problem of warheads highlighted importance ground inspection, and wondered what progress Mikoyan had made in Havana. Asked when Mikoyan returning. Kuznetsov replied he did not know. McCloy said President regarded McCloy-Kuznetsov conversation yesterday as useful and indicating progress, to which Kuznetsov replied he gratified hear this and observed such appraisal fully justified, particularly since USSR doing everything necessary to resolve problem ASAP. Reiterated that as to warheads, USSR would remove from Cuba everything related to “so-called” offensive missiles, but noted he could not say anything beyond that. In summing up conversation Stevenson listed following questions as remaining open: Removal IL-28 aircraft, nationality inspection ship, and verification removal of warheads, although Kuznetsov had given assurances warheads would be removed. Kuznetsov disagreed, saying there no open question from Sov standpoint. Concluded US should consider Soviet deeds and respond in kind. Stevenson
152. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 6, 1962, 9:50 a.m.

Ball reported the Secretary’s conversation to BundyIn this telephone conversation, November 6, 9:45 a.m., Rusk suggested that since McNamara could not attend a meeting, Ball, Bundy, and McNamara should work out the policy for verification of missiles leaving on Soviet ships that day. (Ibid.) saying the Secretary suggested the three of them sort this thing out and decide what we want to do. Ball is reluctant because we also have McCone and Bobby. Bundy said that Bobby was away today and the President doesn’t get back until the middle of the afternoon. It doesn’t seem complicated to him, but he would be glad to sit down with Ball and Bob. Ball said he was concerned as 90% of them might be at sea by tonight. Bundy said we only have to say “We know you are going to sea.” Whatever happens, let it happen at sea. They won’t cross the Atlantic overnight. All we have to do today is to point out the rapid departure and emphasize the speed in the verification procedure. Ball thought the farther out to sea they get the more difficult it would be for psychological reasons.

Bundy thought rather than have the Executive Committee meeting, he would like to have a clear sense that Ball, the Secretary, Bob and Bundy know what we want to do and check it out with the President; then proceed on that basis.

Ball told him that Bob thought we ought to make immediate representation to Kuznetsov; that since they are leaving, it is urgent to get a neutral observer on board. The easiest way to do it is to take a US ship alongside, and if they won’t do it, would we take a Soviet ship to do it. We ought to have someone alongside to take a picture. Bundy asked if they were willing to have a US ship alongside and Ball replied they talked like they were prepared to do it. We could also get good photographs of the cargo. These missiles are not crated; they are under tarps, so that it is pretty good from that point of view. Also if we could get the tarp rolled back to make sure they are not duds, and take some pictures. Bundy would be inclined to take up Kuznetsov on his offer yesterday for UN ships alongside and if we can’t count through the tarps ask to see under them. Bundy will check this out with Bob and the President and call Ball back.Bundy telephoned Ball at 10 a.m. to report that McNamara agreed to Ball’s suggestion. Bundy could not reach the President, but he expected that Kennedy would call when he arrived at Hyannisport. Bundy suggested Ball proceed and promised to call after talking to the President. (Ibid.)Bundy called Ball at 10:25 a.m. to say that the President agreed, but “he would like to get a little neutrality on board if it could work.” Bundy thought it would be too complicated, and Ball agreed it would be “unrealistic” to try to get neutral observers on board Soviet ships. Both men concluded that the only plan was to get alongside the Soviet ships, “haggle from there.” The President wanted Gilpatric to do the haggling in New York. (Ibid.) Bundy said he did not get the impression from the conversation that they talked hard about the danger of the MIG business. He suggested that Ball go into that with Ros—he said he meant the MIGs scramble. He will report back to Ball after talking with Bob.

153. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), the Under Secretary of State (Ball), and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York;Ball and Johnson were in Washington. Yost also participated in the conversation. November 6, 1962, 11:30 a.m.

Stevenson—When does Gilpatric get here?

Ball—He is on the other line now. He is in New York, I will find out where he is. He is in New York and calling in on another phone. Alex Johnson is talking to him.Ball and Johnson talked to Gilpatric at 11:15 a.m., apparently Johnson stayed on the line while Ball talked to Stevenson. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. He is at the Waldorf Towers.

Stevenson—All right. We will get him over here as quickly as we can.

Ball—What we should do is to get back to the Russians and this is what Gilpatric is being told to get in touch with you about and since these things are going out of there we want to arrange to get these things photographed at close range and look at them. This is probably the best we can do under the circumstances.

Stevenson—I got a long God damn thing from the Department today.Telegram 1200 to USUN, November 5, 10:59 p.m., see footnote 2, Document 147.

Ball—Let me put Alex Johnson on because he wrote this long damn thing from the Department today.Captain Elmo Zumwalt and Joseph Sisco drafted the telegram and Johnson cleared it.

Stevenson—There is one ship already sailing. We have to get on to that one I suspect right away. This thing—5—requires a verification at sea and a loading time which we don’t have. I think maybe we can start with “D”—inspection from along side.Section 5, “Required Verification at Sea,” subsection d, “Inspection from Along Side,” was considered in this telegram as an acceptable fall-back position. If this was to be the verification mode, then the guidelines in this telegram suggested that all offensive equipment had to be on deck and uncrated. Can we skip everything before that?

Johnson—Yes, skip everything before that and go to “D”.

Stevenson—All right. I think—if the United States is limited to inspect from along side the vessel, how the hell can we do that if they loaded from below?

Ball—What we really need is this—what we really need to see are the missiles. The photographs we have indicate that they are in the proc-ess of loading the 26 out of the 42. We have to tell them we have to see all the missiles and if we can pull along side and see the missiles and make sure they are not dummies.

Stevenson—This telegram goes into such minute detail. Should we just disregard this and decide now what we want to do?

Ball—All right. I think we can. First, have a ship pull along side these ships and we will photograph from the ship or helicopter, or something like that, but at close range so that we can count for each missile; and have the tarpaulin pulled back so that we can see there are missiles under there.

Stevenson—We are not going to insist on boarding or uncrating.

Johnson—They are being loaded and covered with tarpaulins. It would be easy to the advantage of everyone if we could go on board and examine them, but if we could come along side and check that there actually is a missile under the tarpaulin that would be OK.

Stevenson—You want to see what is above deck on the associated equipment?

Ball—Yes, but we don’t have to account for all of it.

Stevenson—We are going to have a hard time getting that. We will have to move awfully fast on this. I think we ought to see if we can get a loading plan.

Ball—Yes.

Stevenson—What else about this?

Ball—Plus the instructions that the ships—we pull a ship along side and the right to take the picture from a helicopter.

Stevenson—All right.

Ball—Hold on, I will make sure about Gilpatric. Gilpatric will come right over.

Stevenson—All right. You told me about the ship inspection from along side. What about this associated equipment and missiles, do we have to see all of these things?

Ball—No, we just want to make sure that enough of it is going on board. Some will be deck loaded.

Stevenson—That is they are not holding back what they said they have?

Ball—That’s right. We are not going to try to take an inventory or count it on a piece-by-piece basis. I think this is what we will have to settle for.

Stevenson—Yes, I think this is what we will have to settle for. They are going to try to short circuit the ground inspection. This thing got so vicious last nightSee Document 151.—we have got to pull our wits together. If I can’t get some instructions pretty soon on the guaranty they are going to clam up. I have been waiting for some instructions for the guaranty for weeks.

Ball—We are going to have a meeting this afternoonSee Document 154. and we will try to get something out.

Stevenson—I wish they would talk to me before they send these instructions out.

Ball—I think this thing I have just given you is fairly realistic.

Stevenson—Yes, I think this is all right.

Ball—I don’t think we give up on the ground inspection.

Stevenson—You mean on the shipments or verification after the fact?

Ball—Verification after the fact.

Stevenson—Yes. The other thing we are going to have to take up again is this warhead business. What is your position on that? How can you tell if they have warheads?

Ball—One with a Geiger counter, I would think. I think our chances on doing anything on that are very slight. I think we should keep it for conversational purposes.

Stevenson—I don’t know. If we don’t have anything to say it is not very good conversation.

Ball—Ros is on his way there now. I think you should sit down and talk to him and see what you ought to recommend and get back here and I will see if I can clear it out.

Stevenson—Have we got any great signal forms on the ships?

Ball—Great signal forms on the ships?

Stevenson—Yes.

Johnson—Oh, you mean signaling from our ships to theirs?

Stevenson—Yes.

Johnson—No, I don’t think anyone contemplated that it would be used.

Stevenson—Telling them that our ship so and so will come by at a certain time.

Ball—We could furnish them that.

Stevenson—It is going to be rough. Most of the details I don’t know about and I would like to know about. I am going to have to proceed in writing or God knows where we will be. I want to know all the details about this particular aspect of it.

Johnson—We will undertake to get those details.

Ball—I think you should talk to Gilpatric about that and he can work it out directly with the Navy people and Defense. We would have to go back through them anyway on this.

Stevenson—On the warheads, you have given up I gather.

Ball—No, I don’t think, we are going to get it. We want to be satisfied the warheads are out. What suggestions can they make?

Stevenson—They say they haven’t any except their commitment that they would remove from the island anything that is offensive. I gather, by some small modification, you could use a missile warhead on an airplane. We can’t go on this way, George, it is intolerable, by having a lot of ambiguous talk. Yesterday they insisted that McCloy had agreed to the Soviet ship on Sunday and bitter accusations of bad faith. I think all McCloy said was he didn’t personally care if it was a Soviet ship or not but that he couldn’t commit the Government. I think we have to have a much higher degree of realism. They are going to stall on this ground verification because they can’t get it.

Ball—Right.

Stevenson—You see what I mean?

Ball—Sure.

Stevenson—They are going to say “No more overflights.” We will have to face this one in the course of the negotiations. They were insistent on bringing it up last night and I am sure they are going to say we have a few things you know about.

Ball—Did they get into the overflights last night?

Stevenson—No, but they got into the guarantees. I can ask questions like where will the warheads be and on what missiles and can we work out some scheme of identifying them above deck.

Ball—I think that is good.

Stevenson—Let’s talk about the IL-28’s here. Mikoyan ran into trouble on the IL-28’s after he got down there. They now have gotten sticky as hell on this. They may be introducing this as a bargaining point on something else. In all events we have to make up our minds and I think on the removal of the IL-28’s and that raises the question of airing nuclear bombs and how to get removal and also whether conventional bombs are going to be removed. I think all of these things I have to have some broad general sort of objective to obtain they are realistic. But I am pretty familiar with the other kind. We might as well forget the thing on conventional bombs. If we could just disregard that and get the record clear then we could concentrate on the thing which we can insist on more legitimately. The IL-28 as an aircraft and any nuclear weapons they carry.

Ball—I think that is fine.

Stevenson—If anyone has any ideas of what we can ask for or how many it should bring in and give us some assurance that you have taken them out …

Ball—We have a way of getting that at a high level.

Stevenson—You mean a message to Khrushchev?

Ball—Yes.

Stevenson—I think that is the only way really. I would think if we are going to do anything about this we should move on this promptly.

Ball—What I think would be most helpful for us—Ros is on his way down there now and if you could work something out and put it to us and we could get answers for you and he could interpret back to McNamara the way it looks from New York.

Ball—I think on this one point of these arrangements on these ships that you and Ros should go to work on that right away.

Stevenson—And you will be working on the guarantees. We have to button up on the Red Cross coming in, which is nonsense anyway, we will have to reach an agreement actually within hours as to if it will be a Swedish ship or a Soviet ship. We opened that one up again last night and any remarks that McCloy made about a Soviet ship have been erased. The negotiators are waiting here to see what they are to negotiate about.

Ball—I think the Swedish ship could be made available.

Stevenson—Is that what we want?

Ball—Yes.

Stevenson—All right, we will reject the Soviet ship. We will instruct the UN to charter the Swedish ship.

Ball—Gilpatric knows where the Swedish ship is.

Stevenson—All right. I would make this as simple as possible. I would tie it to the invasion and to the commitments in the inter-American agreement and then let me present it along with a demand for a reciprocal promise from them that they won’t reintroduce these weapons into Cuba. We have never let any doubt but that we were not going to make any guaranty at all.

Johnson—Yes. We want some verification of not introducing these then we can make one kind of a guaranty. If it is simple the removal of the missile without any … .

Stevenson—When you say guaranty against reintroduction, what do you mean?

Johnson—Some arrangement in Cuba on missiles—something to verify that these weapons are not being reintroduced.

Stevenson—If we are ready for that I think we can get something. That would mean inspection of the United States and on intervening countries.

Ball—In the message we sent up yesterdayApparent reference to Document 147. we didn’t reject … .

Stevenson—I think it would be helpful if we could proceed on the assumption that mutual inspection is something that will have to be worked out over a period of time by the Caribbean Defense Committee. We will guaranty against invasion by the United States in exchange for Soviet guaranty that they will not reintroduce these weapons in Cuba.

Johnson—What would the Cubans do under that?

Stevenson—They wouldn’t do anything. Let’s get this transaction completed first and then we will sit down and negotiate what we can do and undertake with Cuba on all of these things. Unless we have some very clear line that we ought to pursue right now it is difficult to deal with this. I don’t want to go over with a lot of vague alternatives. We can say if you don’t give us grounds and verification then we must ask for this. If you do and I don’t know what that could be, I don’t think they will ever buy it. They will immediately charge us with bad faith. They will say we have introduced new matter and we will have another bad time. I do think that probably we should separate two things—one is the immediate deal with the Russians and the other is future arrangements with Cuba. On the one with the Russians if we settle with a simple guaranty now and then assume we will rUN our air reconnaissance, this will present a very serious problem. It will be asserted into the Security Council over and over, regardless of what we promised. What we could do is for the future we will have to preserve the line to rUN reconnaissance flights to assure these weapons will not be reintroduced.

Johnson—Isn’t it very difficult for us to give—it seems to me it is very difficult for us to give that guaranty without Cuba in turn having done something.

Stevenson—I think we could ask Cuba to give us a guaranty that she won’t introduce these weapons. It is the verification procedure. I don’t want to get in a position where they now want to trade off Guantanamo for something more. It is the sort of thing we should get some of your views on as promptly as possible. Somehow we have been able to go through these meetings by saying you will get your guarantees; and then they get into the subject of protocol and a registered agreement.

Johnson—We hope to get to this at the meeting this afternoon, then we will get something to you.

Stevenson—I can hold it off today.

Johnson—They haven’t given us ground verification.

Stevenson—That is the one big handle we have got.

Johnson—If we get the IL-28’s and ground verification … .

Stevenson—That is only one verification for compliance it doesn’t take care of the future. McCloy has come to the conclusion that the ground verification is a lot of nonsense and he is against doing it. They are going to be almost impossible to find.

Johnson—That is the problem on it.

Stevenson—I have one other point—this business of the press stories that come from Washington, when we manage to keep this place silent, has caused us grief for two weeks. Every day there is a new story in the newspapers coming from Washington. I must have some knowledge in advance of what they are putting out down there, in the State Department, the Defense Department and the White House.

Ball—I don’t think any of it is going out through official channels. The Department is not putting anything out.

Stevenson—Isn’t Sylvester and Manning briefing people all the time?

Ball—No.

Yost—What about the Maggie Higgins story this morning about the Kuznetsov-McCloy talks?

Stevenson—It didn’t come from here. We maintain total silence here and down there there is a gush of talk. It goes to the Secretary General and we have to unwrap it, it goes to the Russians and we have to clear it up with them.

Ball—It causes me as much pain and anguish as it does you.

Stevenson—Well, the resentment of the press here … .

Ball—Yes, I understand. It is a problem.

Stevenson—We are at the point here where no one sees anything but Yost and me and our own Mission doesn’t know what is going on. I am a pitiful beggar here to get some kind of coordination.

Ball—This is an old problem and we were able to solve it for a week and we have not been able to solve it since. I don’t know where the stuff gets out.

Stevenson—Well this Rowan-Evans stuff got out. I was told that Bundy was telling Alphand what was in the telegram.

Ball—Well a copy of the telegram was given to the Ambassador.

Stevenson—Well that is like publishing it in the New York Times.

Ball—I agree.

Stevenson—I would like for you to take it up with Kennedy or Rusk or some one. Maybe we could do some backgrounding here and leaking of the right stuff to come out. Maybe we could get some of our stories planted and have the right thing come out at the right time. I don’t like to do it, but we did it years ago when we didn’t have any control. It is time consuming to me and to most of us likewise.

Ball—Let me talk to the President about that this afternoon.

Stevenson—OK, I will talk to Gilpatric.

154. Summary Record of the 21st Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 7:23 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement. The meeting was opened by the Vice President at the President’s request. The President joined the group twenty minutes after the meeting began. Washington, November 6, 1962, 6:15 p.m.

Secretary Rusk summarized a draft reply to Khrushchev (copy attached, as well as a copy of the final outgoing letter).Dated November 5. (Ibid., Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62) See the Supplement. For the letter as sent, see Document 155. The letter was revised, approved and later delivered to the Soviet Ambassador here. Secretary Rusk said that Khrushchev had not mentioned IL-28 bombers but referred to a list of weapons which we considered offensive. The Secretary said that the reply contained no ultimatum. The following proposed sentence was deleted: “But I cannot accept this view; I think you would not either if the activities being carried on in a third country were such as to threaten a major alteration in the world balance of power upon which our present uneasy peace depends.”

A proposed paragraph on Finland was deleted, which read:

“As you think about this matter, let me ask you to consider how you would have felt if the situation had been reversed and if a similar effort had been made by us in a country like Finland. If in Finland, or even Sweden, there had developed a government increasingly hostile to you and if then, during a very short period of time—while public and private reassurances were being given—there had been secretly sent to Finland a whole variety of dangerous means of destruction which were discovered only at the last moment, I am sure you know how the Soviet Government and people would have reacted. And that is how the action of your side in Cuba appears to us.”

The following sentence was also deleted: “The same consideration will face the American people as they frame their attitudes toward Cuba after this immediate crisis is surmounted.”

At this point the discussion was interrupted and the President brought into the Cabinet Room Mr. Aramburu, the former President of Argentina, and introduced him to those present.

Resuming the discussion, the following concluding sentence was approved: “This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and to give attention to other problems necessary to restore peace.”

The President interrupted to call attention to a news report prominently displayed on page one of the Washington Evening Star alleging that Soviet missiles were being hidden in caves in Cuba. Mr. McCone said the source of this story has been interviewed, but is unwilling or unable to say anything more than he told the press. The President suggested that Mr. McCloy talk to Mr. McKelway of the Star and other editors in an effort to persuade responsible editors to check such stories with the government before they print them and to include in the story a statement to the effect that the government has no information to substantiate the report, if such is the case.

The President then began reading the revised draft reply to Khrushchev. In commenting on the reference to a shift in the balance of power, the President said this statement was not persuasive unless the IL-28 bombers were linked to the entire Soviet action. He suggested that the reference in the first paragraph to the IL-28 bombers was not obnoxious. He felt that the letter could be toned down. He argued that the reference to Finland should be left in. Others said that the Finland paragraph should be saved and used, if necessary, in the next letter.

Secretary Rusk said that we did not have a good contract with Khrushchev but we have to get everything out of their language that we possibly can.

The President commented that the situation was capable of becoming dangerous very quickly. He thought reference should be made to Soviet military personnel in Cuba and he again stated his support of the reference to Finland. Both Mr. Nitze and Ambassador Thompson disagreed and the Finland paragraph was finally deleted.

There followed a discussion as to whether the public should be informed of our efforts to induce the Russians to take out the IL-28 bombers. Some felt that our public posture should be calm and not one which would hot things up. Others felt that we should tell the public of the instructions we had sent last Saturday in an effort to get the Russians to agree to remove the bombers. Mr. Bundy thought we should say publicly that we were discussing the removal of the IL-28 bombers. Secretary Rusk recommended that we say nothing about the bombers until all the missiles were out. The President decided that no official comment on the bombers should be made tonight.

The President was informed that Soviet missiles are actually being removed by Soviet ships. He commented that it was more important to get positive proof of the missiles leaving than it was to get the Soviet bombers out now.

Mr. Ball reported that the Russians are permitting us to take pictures of the departing missile ships from helicopters or from U.S. ships which come along side the Soviet ships.

The Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Mr. Minow, joined the group to discuss the use of two 50-watt medium-wave radio stations, one operated by the USIA and the other by the Navy, to broadcast to Cuba. Acting Director Wilson of USIA reported that nine commercial stations have been broadcasting nightly to Cuba. The radio time has been purchased by the U.S. These stations are now anxious to return to their regular programs. Mr. Wilson joined Mr. Minow in recommending that the two government-owned stations begin broadcasting this week end under the umbrella of the existing broadcasting of the commercial stations. Mr. Minow said the standard radio band had never before been used by U.S.-owned stations but there was a compelling need to go ahead as recommended. The President agreed.

There followed a discussion about the feasibility of using airborne television to get through to the Cubans. Mr. Wilson reported that the plane carrying equipment would have to fly within thirty miles from Havana. In about three weeks after the first telecast, the Cubans could jam the programs so that they could not be received. Mr. Wilson recommended that the airborne television be saved for an emergency. The President agreed.

The program for air reconnaissance tomorrow was discussed.

Three U-2 flights over Cuban ports were authorized by the President. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended ten low-level missions, four over the Port of Havana, two over the IL-28 bomber bases, two over the Port of Isabella, and two over Guantanamo and Santiago. Secretary McNamara suggested that the President turn down the request for low-level missions over Havana. The President agreed.

General Taylor reported on an abort of a U-2 reconnaissance plane which was half way through its mission when a Soviet radar locked on. Under the existing rule the U-2 broke off. Existing rules call for only one U-2 over the island at a time. It is not possible to obtain good pictures from planes flying outside the territorial limits of Cuba even from a U-2.

The President asked what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot down. General Taylor said we would halt further missions and try to find out if the Soviets ordered the shoot-down. If so, we would make an air attack on a SAM site.

Secretary Rusk urged that we do nothing which would upset the Castro/Mikoyan negotiations now under way in Havana. If one of our planes were shot down, we would have to respond. This would be awkward in view of the presence in Havana of Mikoyan.

Secretary McNamara said we really did not need the low-level missions over Havana because we were checking on the ships as they move out of Cuba. All Soviet missiles must go as deck cargo because no missile-carrying ships are available to the Russians as of now.

The President returned to his question as to what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot at or shot down. He asked for recommendations within the next twenty-four hours.

Mr. McNamara reminded the President that we had told the Russians that they were responsible if any of our planes were shot at or shot down.

The President asked the group to remain subject to call and suggested that we try to get the press to act more responsibly by playing down unsubstantiated reports from Cuban refugees about Soviet missiles being hidden in Cuban caves.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
155. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. No classification marking. Washington, November 6, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I am surprised that in your letter, which I received yesterday,Document 145. you suggest that in giving your representative in New York a list of the weapons we consider offensive there was any desire on our part to complicate the situation. Our intention was just the opposite: to stick to a well-known list, and not to introduce any new factors. But there is really only one major item on the list, beyond the missiles and their equipment, and that is the light bombers with their equipment. This item is indeed of great importance to us.

The solution of the Cuban affair was established by my letter to you of October twenty-seventh and your reply of October twenty-eighth.See Documents 95 and 102. You will recall that in my letter of October twenty-seventh, I referred to “all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use.” You will also recall that in my broadcast address of October twenty-second,For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806-809. in addition to medium-range ballistic missiles, I mentioned specifically “jet bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons,” as “an explicit threat to the peace and security of all the Americas.” Finally, my proclamation of October twenty-third entitled “Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba”For text, see ibid., pp. 809-811. specifically listed bomber aircraft. These facts were all known at the time of our exchange of letters on Cuba, and so it seems clear to me that our exchange of letters covers the IL-28s, since your undertaking was to remove the weapons we described as offensive.

Your letter says—and I agree—that we should not complicate the situation by minor things. But I assure you that this matter of IL-28s is not a minor matter for us at all. It is true, of course, that these bombers are not the most modern of weapons, but they are distinctly capable of offensive use against the United States and other Western Hemispheric countries, and I am sure your own military men would inform you that the continued existence of such bombers in Cuba would require substantial measures of military defense in response by the United States. Thus, in simple logic these are weapons capable of offensive use. But there is more in it than that, Mr. Chairman. These bombers could carry nuclear weapons for long distances, and they are clearly not needed, any more than missiles, for purely defensive purposes on the island of Cuba. Thus in the present context their continued presence would sustain the grave tension that has been created, and their removal, in my view, is necessary to a good start on ending the recent crisis.

I am not clear as to what items you object to on the list which Ambassador Stevenson handed to Mr. Kuznetsov. I can assure you I have no desire to cause you difficulties by any wide interpretation of the definitions of weapons which we consider offensive and I am instructing my representative in New York to confer promptly with Mr. Kuznetsov and to be as forthcoming as possible in order to meet any legitimate complaints you may have in order to reach a quick solution which would enable our agreement to be carried to completion. I entirely agree with your statement that we should wind up the immediate crisis promptly, and I assure you that on our side we are insisting only on what is immediately essential for progress in this matter. In order to make our position clear, I think I should go on to give you a full sense of the very strong feelings we have about this whole affair here in the United States.

These recent events have given a profound shock to relations between our two countries. It may be said, as Mr. Kuznetsov said the other day to Mr. McCloy, that the Soviet Union was under no obligation to inform us of any activities it was carrying on in a third country. I cannot accept this view; not only did this action threaten the whole safety of this hemisphere, but it was, in a broader sense, a dangerous attempt to change the world-wide status quo. Secret action of this kind seems to me both hazardous and unjustified. But however one may judge that argument, what actually happened in this case was not simply that the action of your side was secret. Your Government repeatedly gave us assurances of what it was not doing; these assurances were announced as coming from the highest levels, and they proved inaccurate.

I do not refer here only to the TASS article of September, but also to communications which were addressed to the highest levels of our Government through channels which heretofore had been used for confidential messages from the highest levels of your Government. Through these channels we were specifically informed that no missiles would be placed in Cuba which would have a range capable of reaching the United States. In reliance upon these assurances I attempted, as you know, to restrain those who were giving warnings in this country about the trend of events in Cuba. Thus undeniable photographic evidence that offensive weapons were being installed was a deep and dangerous shock, first to this Government and then to our whole people.

In the aftermath of this shock, to which we replied with a measured but necessary response, I believe it is vital that we should re-establish some degree of confidence in communication between the two of us. If the leaders of the two great nuclear powers cannot judge with some accuracy the intentions of each other, we shall find ourselves in a period of gravely increasing danger—not only for our two countries but for the whole world.

I therefore hope that you will promptly recognize that when we speak of the need to remove missiles and bombers, with their immediate supporting equipment, we are not trying to complicate the situation but simply stating what was clearly included in our understanding of October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth. I shall continue to abide fully by the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh, and specifically, under the conditions stated in that letter I will hold to my undertaking “to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.” This undertaking has already come under attack here and is likely to become increasingly an object of criticism by a great many of my countrymen. And the very minimum that is necessary in regard to these assurances is, as we agreed, the verified removal of the missile and bomber systems, together with real safeguards against their reintroduction.

I should emphasize to you directly, Mr. Chairman, that in this respect there is another problem immediately ahead of us which could become very serious indeed, and that is the problem of continuing verification in Cuba. Your representatives have spoken as if this were entirely a problem for the Castro regime to settle, but the continuing verification of the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba is an essential safeguard for the United States and the other countries of this hemisphere, and is an explicit condition for the undertakings which we in our turn have agreed to. The need for this verification is, I regret to say, convincingly demonstrated by what happened in Cuba in the months of September and October.

For the present we are having to rely on our own methods of surveillance, and this surveillance will surely have to be continued unless, as we much prefer, a better and durable method can be found. We believe that it is a serious responsibility of your Government to insure that weapons which you have provided to Cuba are not employed to interfere with this surveillance which is so important to us all in obtaining reliable information on which improvements in the situation can be based. It was of great importance, for example, for me last week to be able to announce with confidence that dismantling of missiles has begun.

Finally, I would like to say a word about longer range matters. I think we must both recognize that it will be very difficult for any of us in this hemisphere to look forward to any real improvement in our relations with Cuba if it continues to be a military outpost of the Soviet Union. We have limited our action at present to the problem of offensive weapons, but I do think it may be important for you to consider whether a real normalization of the Cuba problem can be envisaged while there remains in Cuba large numbers of Soviet military technicians, and major weapons systems and communications complexes under Soviet control, all with the recurrent possibility that offensive weapons might be secretly and rapidly reintroduced. That is why I think there is much wisdom in the conclusion expressed in your letter of October 26th, that when our undertakings against invasion are effective the need for your military specialists in Cuba will disappear. That is the real path to progress in the Cuban problem. And in this connection in particular, I hope you will understand that we must attach the greatest importance to the personal assurances you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba.

I believe that Cuba can never have normal relations with the other nations of this hemisphere unless it ceases to appear to be a foreign military base and adopts a peaceful course of non-interference in the affairs of its sister nations. These wider considerations may belong to a later phase of the problem, but I hope that you will give them careful thought.

In the immediate situation, however, I repeat that it is the withdrawal of the missiles and bombers, with their supporting equipment, under adequate verification, and with a proper system for continued safeguards in the future, that is essential. This is the first necessary step away from the crisis to open the door through which we can move to restore confidence and give attention to other problems which ought to be resolved in the interest of peace.

Sincerely,Printed from an unsigned copy.

156. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource:USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky and cleared by Yost. This telegram was incorrectly dated November 6. It was drafted the evening of November 6, but not sent until early the following day. New York, November 7, 1962, 12:45 a.m.

1660. Subject: Cuba. Eyes only for Secretary. Dept pass White House. Stevenson, Gilpatric and Yost had a five and half hour mtg with Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich today. Fol summary based on uncleared memcon.A 38-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 4-9:30 p.m., is ibid., 1A October/November meetings.

ICRC inspection. Stevenson informed Sovs US not prepared agree to employment Sov ship and preferred UN charteredneutral ship, i.e., Swedish vessel available in Carribean area. Noted ICRC would verify all Sov flag ships, Sov chartered ships, bloc ships, and bloc chartered ships. Kuznetsov argued at length Sovs could speak only for their own ships and perhaps Sov chartered ships, but could not speak for any other country, since that would be violation sovereignty those countries. Claimed US approach this problem at variance with Pres’s Oct 23 message,See Document 52. which spoke of “your” i.e., Sov ships only. Stevenson explained quarantine against offensive weapons imposed on all shipping to Cuba regardless of nationality and US willing replace quarantine temporarily ICRC verification. Kuznetsov claimed quarantine illegal and USSR could not be expected assist US in making arrangements which would be substitution for it. Discussion this subject concluded with Stevenson saying if Sovs refused apply ICRC verificationto all vessels with bloc cargoes, US would have to continue use quarantine with respect all ships other than Sov. Kuznetsov responded USSR agreedto ICRC “observation” Sov Cuba-bound ships and if US wished use quarantine for other ships, that its own business.

After further exchange re nationality ship to carry ICRC team, Kuznetsov admitted Sov original proposal had been to use either Sov or neutral ship. Finally indicated neutral ship would probably be satisfactory and agreed give USUN final word shortly. (Subsequently phoned to confirm Swedish vessel OK and ask name and location.)

 Inspection procedure outgoing Sov ships. Stevenson suggested Sovs give US schedule shipment 42 missiles Kuznetsov had told had been or were in Cuba, as well as time and place for rendezvous with US Navy ships for verification purposes. He outlined verification procedure as follows: Depending upon operational conditions, presence of missiles on board Sov ships would be verified either from US vessel or unarmed helicopter through visual observation and photography; one or two missiles should be sufficiently exposed so as to identify them as such but without revealing technical specifications. Photography necessary for purpose of verifying number outgoing missiles. Kuznetsov referred to list outgoing Sov ships he had given Stevenson yesterdayThe list of the ships, given on November 5, is in telegram 1646 from USUN, November 6, 7 p.m. Labinsk would sail on November 6, and Bratsk, Lenin Komsomol, Kurchatov, Anosov, Divnogosk, Volgoles, Polzunov, and Alapaevsk would depart on November 7. Also in this letter Kuznetsov stated that the Soviet Union had “no objections to the setting in motion by Mr. McCloy of the proposal for US ships to observe at closer range removal of the rockets on Soviet vessels.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-662) and said his understanding was those ships were carrying what US called offensive arms, including missiles. Had no info re ships and cargoes after Nov 7. Noted prompt action required since one ship already left Havana. Re use of helicopters, observed this new point but said it would be communicated to Sov Govt. Promised prompt reply.In telegram 1681 from USUN, November 7, 10 p.m., the mission reported that Mendelevich approached Akalovsky and, reading from a prepared text, stated that agreement had been reached on U.S. visual observation. Masters of the Soviet ships had been instructed to inform the U.S. ships that came along side of the number of missiles they were carrying. If needed, canvas could be partly removed. If the United States insisted upon using helicopters in case of bad weather, the Soviet Union had no objection. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams 1962 (Top Secret;Exdis, etc.)) Gilpatric and Kuznetsov agreed exchange call signals both Sov ships and US Navy vessels concerned, and masters would arrange between themselves time and place rendezvous.

Removal of warheads. Stevenson suggested Sovs furnish number of warheads and schedule their removal, following pattern envisaged for missiles. Said verification procedure for missiles could be applied to warheads as well, with one difference, i.e., Geiger counters should be placed close enough to warhead containers to detect radio active material therein. Gilpatric noted we assumed warheads would be transported in such containers as would not reveal nature of their contents, and we did not ask that they be opened.

Kuznetsov replied he could only repeat what he had said yesterday on subject of warheads, and went on rehashing arguments he had advanced yesterday, stressing that US complicating matters by raising additional questions while USSR honestly conducting negots and intended scrupulously fulfill its obligations with respect removal what Pres called offensive weapons and all equipment related thereto. In response to further pressing by Stevenson and Gilpatric, Kuznetsov said he regretted say Sov and US views on question warheads entirely different. Stevenson and Gilpatric stressed vital importance question removal warheads, which essential element offensive weapons, and need revert to it at first opportunity.

Activation of SAM sites. Stevenson said another very serious situation had arisen in connection with activation SAM sites in Cuba this AM. Protested such interference with conduct our aerial surveillance, which we obliged conduct in absence ground verification to monitor removal of weapons. Requested Sovs ensure non-recurrence such interference during completion of agreements. Gilpatric noted this very important matter and if SAM sites continued be deactivated as they had been during past ten days, that would avoid need for US taking other measures to make its aerial surveillance effective.

Kuznetsov agreed this major question, but claimed it merely demonstrated US pursuing policy of gross violation sovereignty other states. Reiterated this and similar arguments which he had used in conversation on this subject with McCloy last week. Suggested US stop over-flights now because “so-called” offensive weapons now removed and would be shipped out in couple of days; thus no need for over-flights existed. Refused accept US statement USSR must take steps to prevent recurrence, on grounds Cuba sovereign state. Suggested best way resolve this question and improve US-Cuban relations was to formalize guarantees to Cuba to be submitted to UN and to include assurances re: (a) non-aggression by US, (b)US steps to prevent its allies in Western Hemisphere from committing aggression against Cuba, (c) non-support by US of refugee attacks against Cuba, and (d) cessation subversive activities from US territory. Also said wishes Cuban people re Guantanamo should be satisfied. Claimed that all this would promote friendly US-Cuban relations and prevent another crisis. Said if such obligations were assumed, UN presence in Carribean, including territory of US, Cuba and other Latin American countries, should be instituted as proposed by U Thant, for purpose of verifying compliance. Stevenson and Gilpatric reverted to question over-flights and emphasized extreme gravity with which US regard any interference over-flights and that we would hold USSR accountable for whatever occurred. Kuznetsov replied USSR could not take any responsibility;US would be responsible.

 IL-28 aircraft. Stevenson recalled yesterday’s conversation this subject and quoted relevant portions Pres’s and own statements to prove jet bombers had always been included in category offensive weapons. Stated question IL-28 aircraft was being taken up by Pres with Khrushchev today. Noted all other matters on which Sovs negative would also have to be taken up in Moscow unless they could be resolved here. Kuznetsov denied Pres-Khrushchev correspondence referred to IL-28 aircraft and contended US and USSR had been talking about IRBMs and MRBMs. While US had made certain declarations and submitted lists of items, they were unilateral documents and could not be regarded as part of agreement. Reiterated arguments re obsolescence and non-offensive nature IL-28, and contended only reason why US raising these additional questions was to complicate matters and protract situation of crisis. Appealed US be reasonable and take into account fact steps taken by USSR clearly showed it wished implement agreement. Stevenson and Gilpatric asked Sovs reflect on unresolved problems so that they could be settled; otherwise sharp, profound and grave disagreement would exist which would have to be referred to higher authority. Kuznetsov concluded by stating USSR’s most sincere desire was not to sharpen US-USSR relations but to take any possible measures to resolve problems and eliminate tensions. Regretted he had failed convince Stevenson and Gilpatric position correct and expressed hope they would consider Sov views so as to find such solutions as were in interests both sides. Stevenson
157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers—Cuba. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Thompson; cleared by Cleveland, U. Alexis Johnson, and Rusk; and approved by Thompson. Repeated to Moscow. Washington, November 7, 1962, 2:48 p.m.

1210. Dobrynin in conversation with Thompson last night repeated arguments advanced by Kuznetsov on IL-28’s. He said Soviets considered that agreement between President and Khrushchev concerned only missiles. He said IL-28 was fifteen-year-old model incapable of being sent on long-range mission and would be sitting duck for modern air defense system. He stated Soviets considered quarantine proclamation illegal and therefore could not take into consideration its list of prohibited weapons.

Thompson pointed out we did not agree with their appraisal of offensive capabilities IL-28’s and observed that most Latin American countries did not have modern air defenses. He said it was clear on our side that bombers were included in the agreement on Cuba and cited specific mention of them in President’s October twenty-second addressSee footnote 3, Document 155. as well as language in President’s letter to Khrushchev of October twenty-seventh.See Document 95.

Dobrynin said Soviets had the feeling they were moving promptly to carry out agreement. He understood removal of MRBM’s had started November second and was expected to be completed by November tenth. The United States had not only done nothing to carry out agreement but was endeavoring to expand its scope. Dobrynin asked when and in what form non-invasion guarantee would be made.

Thompson drew attention to fact that invasion had not taken place, and that we had facilitated Soviet ships in quarantine area proceeding to Cuba. He said negotiations on guarantee declaration were going on in New York but it appeared to him that difficulty was caused by attitude of Cuban Government. The agreement specifically provided for verification of removal of offensive weapons and Cuban Government appeared to be blocking any UN effortto carry this out. He pointed out that there appeared to be at least two phases to the problem. The first was the dismantling and removal of the weapons and the second was assurances against their reintroduction. Dobrynin asked whether US guarantee would be given at the end of phase one. Thompson replied that the Soviets could be sure that we would not invade but he did not see how any formal action on a guarantee of indefinite duration could be taken until longer-range arrangements could be agreed upon. In this connection, he inquired whether Dobrynin thought some regional arrangement such as an atom-free Latin America or a Caribbean agreement would facilitate Cuban acceptance to verification and control measures, stress-ing that he was speaking personally and had no information on what US policy would be on such matters. Dobrynin replied this possibility had been raised by U Thant when he was in Cuba and he personally thought this was hopeful approach. He inquired whether it would be possible to include Florida or part of Southeastern United States in a Caribbean arrangement. Thompson replied that while this might raise a number of problems, we had nothing to hide and he would not exclude such possibility.

Rusk
158. Summary Record of the 22d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, November 7, 1962, 5 p.m.

Deputy Director Carter of CIA summarized the current intelligence.In his record of action of this meeting, November 7, Bundy noted that Carter reported that three ships had loaded 17 Soviet missiles, 11 of which were on the two ships already on the high seas. (Ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings 17-24) See the Supplement. Deputy Secretary Gilpatric explained our method of inspecting outgoing missiles. We will have pictures certainly of missiles aboard six outgoing Soviet ships. About 90 percent of the missile erectors have been moved to Cuban ports. Some Soviet troops are leaving. Photographs will be available in Washington tomorrow.

The President asked whether we should say something tonight about the outgoing missiles. Mr. Salinger said he thought something had to be said. The President authorized the Defense Department to say that ships with missiles are leaving Cuba.For text of the statement, November 8, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458. The President suggested that an attempt be made to take pictures of a passenger boat returning to the Soviet Union with Russian troops.

Secretary McNamara reported there had been no reaction to today’s aerial reconnaissance mission. The weather was bad. A request was made and permission granted to fly five U-2 flights and twelve low-level flights, some to photograph cave areas.

Secretary Rusk said we were heading toward a UN Security Council meeting during which the Russians would announce that there are no Soviet missiles in Cuba. Secretary General U Thant has put forward a suggestion that the five Latin American Ambassadors in Havana be named as inspectors and travel throughout Cuba.As reported in telegram 1661 from USUN, November 7, 6:30 p.m. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams 1962 (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)) The Department of State responded that it would be prepared to have U Thant make such a proposal with certain provisos: that Castro not learn that it had been first discussed with the United States; that U.S. aerial surveillance would continue; that the inspection team have full freedom of movement in Cuba; that it be an agent of and report to U Thant; that it have adequate logistical and technical support; and that it would be supplemental to ICRC inspection of incoming cargoes and U.S. along-side inspection of outgoing cargoes. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Background Papers—Cuba) Our problem is how to manage recurrent rumors in the U.S. and Latin America that the Russians are not moving out their missiles but merely putting them into caves. He said we must have evidence to reply to such allegations.

Secretary Dillon asked whether we were trying to get a bargain with the Russians or avoid one. The President replied that we have a little time now and we should play out our negotiations slowly. He said we wouldn’t invade with the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. We might make a formal commitment not to invade when the Soviets comply fully by removing the IL-28 bombers and we have assurances that there will be no reintroduction of strategic missiles. We must continue aerial reconnaissance until a UN substitute is in place or until we have ground inspection. He asked State to draft a statement covering our plans for continuing inspection. He said our posture with the Soviets should be such as to avoid the appearance of holding back in the light of the rapid withdrawal of Soviet missiles.

Mr. Bundy said the only weapons in the proclaimed list which we must really get out are the IL-28 bombers. Secretary McNamara agreed.

The President said we must continue aerial surveillance. The Soviets say that inspection is now a Cuban problem. But we must make clear to the Russians that if they retaliate against our surveillance planes they will be held responsible. We are supporting a Latin American atom-free zone. The UN is discussing a proposal to send teams to carry out on-the-ground inspection in Cuba. If we get the IL-28 bombers out we might be prepared to lift the quarantine.

The President then asked for a memorandum spelling out what the Russians had agreed to and what we had agreed to.

Secretary Rusk said the proposal to use the Latin American Ambassadors in Havana as inspectors is a help but it is not complete. The President said these Ambassadors could look at caves and inspect possible Soviet submarine base sites. The problem is how we can hurt Castro without a quarantine which stops Soviet ships.

Secretary Rusk said we might ask the Latin American States to break relations and we might tell our allies to get their ships out of the Cuban trade.

Mr. Nitze circulated a Defense Department paper on what we would do if a reconnaissance plane were shot down.In the paper, November 7, Nitze’s courses of action included private and public warnings to the Soviet Union, reimposition of the quarantine, and, if additional reconnaissance planes were shot down, U.S. attacks on the specific SAM sites. If attacks continued, all SAM sites in Cuba would be destroyed. (Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Cuba, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22-11/23/62) See the Supplement. General Taylor orally stated the Chiefs’ views.The Joint Chief’s views were sent to McNamara in JCSM-872-62, November 7. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files: FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962) See the Supplement. We must first find out whether a shoot-down is an isolated incident or whether it is the first of a series of actions undertaken with deliberate intent. We have a choice of hitting the offending source or if the shoot-down were deliberate, an air attack destroying the IL-28 bombers and the SAM sites. The President asked at what point we would give up low-level reconnaissance missions. We appeared to be running out of targets. He asked for a surveillance plan adequate to meet our interests on the assumption that the bombers remain and on the assumption that the bombers are taken out. He asked the group to meet again tomorrowSee Document 162. to decide whether we should go to the mat on the IL-28 bombers or whether we should say the Soviets have now completed their agreement to remove the missiles and move on to other problems.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-762. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted by Thompson and U. Alexis Johnson; cleared by Cleveland, Gilpatric, Bundy, and Rusk; and approved by Johnson. Washington, November 7, 1962, 9:32 p.m.

1223. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy. We have received from the Soviet Ambassador here a confidential indicationSee Document 157. that the Soviet Government takes strong exception to the list of weapons we consider offensive in accordance with the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev which you furnished Mr. Kuznetsov (Urtel 1606, November 2).See footnote 3, Document 133.

The Soviets take position that Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement related only to missiles. They also consider quarantine proclamation an illegal act and that they will ignore list of offensive weapons in that document.

Our primary purpose is to get the MRBM’s and IL-28 bombers out and we would be prepared to go far in reducing the list of offensive weapons in order to achieve this purpose. When Kuznetsov is in a position to negotiate (which may not be until Moscow gets him instructions following our approach to the Soviet Ambassador here last night) you may go as far as necessary toward the following minimum list: Surface-to-surface missiles. (We are prepared limit these to MRBM’s and IRBM’s and drop mention of those designed for use at sea, and propellants.) Bomber aircraft. Any nuclear warheads for missiles, nuclear bombs for aircraft, or any other type nuclear weapon.

With regard to the Komar-class torpedo boats you might, however, inquire whether Soviets intend to furnish any additional craft of this kind. What we are concerned about are the missiles and bombers with their immediate supporting equipment, and you could explain that point five in your letter to Mikoyan was included to prevent setting up of bases complete except for missiles which could quickly and secretly be brought in.

This modifies the instructions contained in section 2 Deptel 1034,Reference is to telegram 1147 to USUN, October 31, repeated to Moscow as 1034;Document 125. “Definition of Offensive Weapons.”

On submarines you should take the position that we are relying on Soviet assurances against the establishment of submarine bases in Cuba and our assumption that they did not intend to furnish such offensive weapons system to Cuba.

Rusk
160. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Under Secretary of State (Ball), the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 8, 1962, 10 a.m.

Ball told Bundy about the call from Stevenson saying he was concerned they have not seen the President’s reply to Mr. K.Johnson called Ball at 9:55 a.m. to report that he had just spoken to Stevenson who complained that he had not received the President’s answer to Khrushchev’s letter of November 5 (Document 145). Johnson told Stevenson that there was agreement in Washington not to send Kennedy’s response of November 6 (see Document 155) to the Mission at the United Nations. Stevenson told Johnson the Mission could not operate without it. Johnson asked Ball what should be done. (Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba) Ball knows it was agreed it not be sent up to them. Someone will have to placate him because he is upset about the fact they can’t conduct their business unless they at least know what the exchanges are at all levels. Bundy thought they were too leaky and Ball said he couldn’t say that to him because his answer would be they haven’t leaked anything and Washington has leaked everything.

Bundy said he knew the substance of what was in the message. He could read it when he is down here. Bundy was afraid if it were sent to him it would be all over the place. Ball suggested we send it up to him with someone who could show it to him and bring it back. Bundy thought that was all right. Ball told him we should do something because he was upset about it, and he is a member of the Cabinet. Bundy suggested it for his eyes onlyAt 10:15 on November 8, Ball called Stevenson to tell him that the President’s letter “was an attempt to nail it down to the IL-28’s,” and that only 4 or 5 people know of it. Stevenson said that unless the Mission knew what was being said at other levels, they could not operate. Ball told Stevenson he was “sure this was an oversight.” He would check it out and get the message to Stevenson right away. (Ibid.) and Ball should explain to him the reason we are being edgy about this is the very existence of secret correspondence with K has been a nuisance in the past; the moment anyone says there is a message, we have to show it to Alphand; then we are in trouble—as the message of the 26th shows. That is the reason for the absolute rigid rule; they don’t go anywhere but to people working in Washington and Moscow on the list approved by the President personally. Ball suggested that Bundy mention this to the President.

Johnson said the Secretary wants to get together at 12 over here.Rusk met with McNamara, Nitze, Ball, U. Alexis Johnson, Cleveland, Gilpatric, Martin, Thompson, and Manning from noon to approximately 2 p.m. McGeorge Bundy joined the meeting at 12:45 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) No other record of the meeting has been found. We are waiting for confirmation from Bob. We would be happy if Ted and Bundy could come. Bundy replied he would come.

161. Paper Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze)Source: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, Material Used at Hyannis, 11/22/62-11/23/63. Top Secret. Washington, November 8, 1962.

LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

Problem: What kind of continuing surveillance is required for our protection if offensive weapons are withdrawn with and without some inspection on the ground?

In general, it can be stated that our continuing aerial surveillance requirement is to obtain complete high level coverage of Cuba and of the Isle of Pines each thirty days, plus a sufficient number of low-level flights or on site ground inspections to check out specific locations which may appear, from high-level photography or from other intelligence, to be suspicious. It is estimated that a schedule providing complete higher level coverage of Cuba once every thirty days would allow elasticity in the scheduling of overflights. This should permit selecting days for flight when the weather was relatively good and therefore should lead to a requirement for no more than approximately six flights per month to produce complete coverage of the island. In perfect weather conditions, complete coverage of the island could be obtained in one day by four U-2 aircraft. We do not yet have the capability to provide search coverage of Cuba by oblique photography. There is a shortage of cameras for this purpose, and for the foreseeable future the oblique technique will not provide adequate coverage of interior locations. The number of flights required for low-level photography would depend almost entirely on the extent to which suspicions about specific locations arise as a result of high level surveillance or other intelligence and the adequacy of on site ground inspection. In the absence of reliable ground inspection, low-level surveillance would be required as needed to check suspicious locations. The minimum requirement would seem to be to schedule a sufficient number of such low-level flights to protect the “right” to them even if no suspicious locations were indicated by U-2 photography of other intelligence. This political consideration would indicate a requirement for perhaps two such overflights a month. In addition to aerial, and such on site inspection as may be available, we would plan to continue all other avenues of intelligence including continuing surveillance at sea of shipping bound for Cuba. Any unexplained increase in such shipping would be a ground for increased suspicion.
162. Summary Record of the 23d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement. Washington, November 8, 1962, 4:30 p.m.

A press release was revised and approved for the Defense Department to issue, copy attached.Attached, but not printed, for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458.

The problem of long-term surveillance requirements was discussed. A paper by Mr. Nitze was circulated.Document 161. Another surveillance paper will be prepared covering three contingencies: The missiles are out and we obtain satisfactory on-the-ground inspection. The missiles are out but we do not obtain satisfaction on ground inspection. The missiles and the IL-28 bombers are taken out.

There followed discussion on how pressure could be kept on Cuba without continuing the quarantine. None of the suggestions were quick acting. A proposal was made to ask the allies to put the maximum pressure on Castro so as to avoid a situation in which we would be retaliating for a shoot-down of one of our reconnaissance planes. Ambassador Thompson urged that we keep the maximum amount of flexibility until Khrushchev replies to our last letterDocument 155. and until the Mikoyan talks with Castro in Havana are completed.

The President said the key issue is whether we lift the quarantine if the IL-28 bombers don’t come out. Do we resume the quarantine and stop Soviet ships if we don’t get the bombers out? He thought we would know more in twenty-four hours about what we should do. He was inclined not to reimpose the quarantine, but he did favor pressure on our allies to keep their ships out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk suggested that two courses be studied. The first, reimposition of the quarantine, and the second, covert actions against Castro.

Five U-2 flights and ten low-level flights were authorized for tomorrow. Secretary McNamara reported that there was no reaction to today’s flights, but the weather had been bad, i.e., clouds had obscured the targets.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
163. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-862. Top Secret; Priority. According to the USUN copy, Yost was the drafter. (USUN Files:FRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams (Top Secret, Exdis, etc.)) Received at the Department of State at 11:04 p.m. and relayed to the White House at 11:14 p.m. New York, November 8, 1962, 11 p.m.

1697. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba. Fol is summary of this evening’s meeting of Stevenson, McCloy, and Yost with Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelevich. Full report follows:An 18-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which took place at the Soviet Mission from 5 to 8:30 p.m., is ibid., 1-A October/November meetings.

Sovs gave us position as of today of nine vessels leaving Cuba carrying 42 missiles. They pointed out vessels, while commencing voyage in Florida Strait, in fact turning eastward and proceeding through Bahama Strait by Crooked Island. They said masters of vessels have been given instructions concerning uncovering some missiles and concerning use of helicopters. (This info being telephoned this evening to Navy Department.)

Kuznetsov, after declaring Sovs have complied with their commitment to withdraw offensive weapons and that it is now up to us to comply with its commitments of guarantees to Cuba, read list of seven points which he felt should be embodied in our commitment. These seven points were elaboration of Castro’s five pointsSee footnote 2, Document 133. supplemented by US acceptance of what Kuznetsov described as U Thant’s plan for UN presence in Caribbean, including US, Cuba, and other LA states, to observe carrying out of obligations by all parties. Stevenson made clear guarantees we envisaged are those defined in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev.

In reply to Stevenson’s repeated inquiries about IL-28s and rehearsal of record defining bomber aircraft as offensive weapons, Kuznetsov rigidly maintained Sov position that these were never included in definition of offensive weapons and that Sovs had now fully complied with their commitments to remove offensive weapons from Cuba.

As to warheads Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev’s statement that all offensive weapons will be removed from Cuba means that there will be on Cuba no warheads related to such weapons. He went on to specify that “such weapons” means those loaded on vessels and now proceeding to the Soviet Union. He added that in fact warheads were loaded on board ship and carried out of Cuba immediately after decision to remove missiles had been taken. This being the case any further talk about verification of removal of warheads is pointless. Moreover it would be absurd to suggest warheads might be left behind after missiles removed since warheads without missiles are not weapons and cannot be used.

When Stevenson pointed out Sovs had not kept commitments made by Khrushchev for UN verificationof dismantling of sites in Cuba Kuznetsov replied that implementation of this verification of course depended on Cuban agreement, which had not been forthcoming. Para in summing up Stevenson pointed out (1) that in so far as concerns IL-28s Pres’s letter of Oct 27See Document 95. had referred not only to missiles but to “all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use” and that Khrushchev’s reply had made no objection to this stipulation; (2) that verification of withdrawal of warheads is no more “pointless” to US than verification of removal of rockets and that furthermore no reference had been made to nuclear aerial bombs; (3) that US guarantee to Cuba in terms set forth in exchange of correspondence between Pres and Khrushchev would be forthcoming when conditions are met, conditions being removal of all offensive weapons systems from Cuba and appropriate verification. Guarantee is clear and conditions are clear, he concluded, but transaction is not yet complete. If Soviet Union would help to complete transaction by removal of bombers and by enabling US to verify removals of all nuclear components, then we will give guarantees pursuant to exchange of correspondence, in form of declaration in the SC if that appears to be most suitable means.

Stevenson
164. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 9, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

Bundy: Who is going to take the planning burden on the business the President clearly wants to work through of what we do short of direct reimposition of the quarantine in the event of IL-28 trouble?

Ball: I thought I would get together with Alex over the weekend,November 10 and 11. and we will try to figure out something.

Bundy: Is that good enough timing? That is really the puzzle in my mind. Are we going to want to do more this weekend or do we want to let this thing sit a few days.

Ball: There are two big unknowns in this. One is the reply from Moscow,Reference is to Khrushchev’s November 12 reply (Document 171) to Kennedy’s letter of November 6 (Document 155). and the second is the Mikoyan report.The report of his discussions with Castro.

Bundy: Yes, it would be hard to make a concrete plan.

Ball: It is hard to go too far without knowing at least one of the two. On the other hand, we can come out with some planning on assumptions. This business of reimposition of a quarantine is much too brutal and much too hazardous. This is the last resort of solution because it would have to be undertaken in an atmosphere where we would be really going it alone, I think. But there are other things; I wasn’t at all satisfied with what we came up with yesterday. I was not feeling well the last couple of days.

Bundy: I know. The raw materials are in these papers, but someone has to go work and actually develop the scenario. One of the immediate questions is how soon do we begin to say in a relatively disagreeable tone that if the bombers don’t go the deal is off. Our view is it is not only off but pressure needs to be applied on this.

Ball: That is right. Furthermore I think we have to have a fairly definite philosophy about where we are going to aim our barrage—whether we are going to try to let the Russians off the hook to some extent and concentrate on the Cubans, or whether we are going to try to hold their nose strictly to it with whatever consequence there may be.

Bundy: It might be better—one could just make a shift—OK, we are now going to treat this as a Cuban problem.

Ball: That’s right, and much could be said about that, I think. As a matter of fact this is what I put forward with McNamara before you came in the meeting yesterday.See footnote 3, Document 160. That it would be better to try to move it over and then treat it as a Cuban problem and help the Russians themselves to disengage from the situation, get maximum freedom of action there ourselves, so that we can really bring that problem to a solution without prejudicing our larger interests with the Russians, is the way I would see it. Now the Russians are helping it this way, and particularly the Cuban assertion yesterday in the UN which was reported that the bombers were theirs; if we could build up this kind of a set of documentation, then we would be in a position to say we appreciate the Soviet Union had done what it could; that the Cubans are being recalcitrant, and we couldn’t possibly give assurances. Furthermore, since the Soviet Union has indicated that they are not in control of the situation, we must have freedom of action.

Bundy: Yes. Would you press on to direct action against Cuba?

Ball: Well, I think it could lead there. But leave the second stage business; then we would start in on pressures on the Cubans. In the meantime, with a kind of tacit understanding with the SU, this may be the best course. I don’t think that is an impossible direction.

Bundy: Nor do I.

Ball: I will get some of this stuff pulled together.

Bundy: I think we would do better not to try to do contingency planning; although the President wants work to go on, he won’t sit still for the thing that he doesn’t know and what I would say to him today is what I would like to do is to ask the Department, let your office be the center, to be the center of production of a respectable plan for a situation in which these things become Cuban property and we react accordingly. I think that probably is the likeliest development. If they say they will get them out, our whole planning problem changes. I think the President’s view is that he would buy this if it doesn’t lead him to a nose-to-nose with the Soviets, and he would want the strongest program that doesn’t do that. I’ll talk to him along those lines.

Ball: This, I think, is the best possibility.

Bundy: I’ll talk to him along those lines. I think we will probably have to have an Executive Committee meeting later this afternoon,There was no Executive Committee meeting the afternoon of November 9. for news and wrap up for the weekend the best we can. He is not going to Glen Ora until tomorrow midday. I think he would probably want to get the thing organized this afternoon if he can. Do you see any objection to that? The President does not want to take a weekend, I am sure, in any way that would complicate process, but the UN isn’t going to be a lively forum, and Mikoyan hasn’t come back, etc.

Ball: We just have too many unknowns in the equation.

Bundy: That is the way I feel about it.

165. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Among the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson), the Under Secretary of State (Ball), and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York;Ball and Johnson were in Washington. November 9, 1962, 12:30 p.m.

AES: We had a long one last night. The report was sketchy on it.See Document 163. They started off by trying to inject right away at the outset the guarantees and wanted to know why we evaded the subject, etc. Then we brought it around to the IL-28s and the other items we were interested in, and they keep pulling it back to the guarantee and set forth all of Castro’s points in their language. We kept it right on the language of the letters. We broke up with another deadlock. Now they have asked for an emergency meeting for 1:30.The emergency meeting turned out to be merely a protest by Kuznetsov over the way that three U.S. naval commanders were intercepting Russian ships, see Document 166. I think we are at a point where unless something breaks in Havana or Moscow, or unless they have something new to present today (it might be Mikoyan’s return or something from Moscow, I don’t know), we are at the point that they have said all the warheads relating to the missiles have been withdrawn. Whether there are any aerial bombs withdrawn they don’t say on that. We are at a point where we have [to] decide on the subject of the warheads. Whether we are willing to accept a certification that all warheads from planes have been withdrawn and won’t be reintroduced, or whether we have to take a position later on the IL-28s; and then do we have another problem in the post-facto verification. Then the question of continuing safeguards. On that we have come to the conclusion there is nothing we can do [sic] their promise they won’t reintroduce these weapons until we get around to some inspection system regarding a nuclear-free zone or some other action through the UN. If there is some other idea on that, we would like to know what it is.

Ball: I think that here it is certainly not accepted that we could simply take their word for it because of the fact that in the President’s letter itself he specified as one of the conditions some continuing safeguards. I think what the real posture probably is that unless they are willing to provide for some kind of continuing inspection on the ground which, with Cuban cooperation, might be worked out under the UN arrangement, that we would have to continue to assure ourselves of the situation through the closest kind of surveillance, which would mean continued aerial reconnaissance, etc. I would hope we would not have to be too specific at the moment.

AES: I wouldn’t agree altogether, if I may say so. I think we would continue the surveillance without arguing and announce publicly.

Ball: I think that is probably right, as far as any specifications of the surveillance is concerned, but I think that we reserve the point on safeguards on the assumption that they have to be some kind of arrangements or something of the sort on the ground.

AES: That immediately becomes reciprocal with them, and they say, well how about mutual observation on your ground?

Ball: On this one, I would avoid getting into any specification on the thing.

AES: We can’t avoid it.

Ball: The reason why they are pressing so hard on Castro’s five points, etc. is to make a record for the negotiations in Cuba that they want to be able to go back and tell Castro that they fought his battle to the bitter end, but that there is no give on our side. I think the way to get a clear definition of position here, which we are going to try to do later this afternoon, but certainly our tentative strategic direction is to say that as far as the Russians are concerned they are doing what they can subject to their being able to control Castro. We have the option of accepting their arguments that they can’t control Castro or trying to take the position that Castro is, after all, just a creature of theirs and holding them to the performance themselves. We should insist that we still have to have the safeguards provided in the arrangement, which means some form of ground inspection and some form of being able to satisfy ourselves against reintroduction. This is something we would then have to work out with Castro. But since the guarantees are for the benefit of Castro, without Castro’s cooperation in these things, we couldn’t possibly give securities. The advantage of this course is that it permits the Russians to disengage if they want to which would leave us free to pursue other subjects with them without the embarrassment of the Cuban problem, while reserving freedom of action on our own part to deal with Castro.

AES: There are two problems here. One is how we liquidate our deal with the Russians as to ground inspection. I don’t think we should talk about surveillance.

Ball: I agree. What we have to say to them is that we obviously cannot give assurances as long as Castro is in position on the IL-28s which are an offensive weapon and could be used against the other LA countries and against us, nor can we give such assurances unless we have some ability to safeguard ourselves against the reintroduction of weapons into Cuba. If we are unable to work these things out with Castro, then there is really a problem if the decision is in Castro’s hands and it leaves the problem between Castro and ourselves.

AES: All right. This is exactly where we are. We are not a fraction of an inch ahead. The question is whether we go any farther today.

Johnson: I think we have to wait to see what they say at 1:30, whether there has been any reflection from the exchange.

AES: I wonder if you think the time has come that we talk about the alternative of verification of warheads by ship inspection as we proposed and the aerial bombs, or whether we would be inclined to take their certification.

Johnson: I wouldn’t do that yet.

Ball: I don’t see how we can. I don’t see how we could ever defend it.

Johnson: If we get the IL-28 question resolved, then we might consider what is fact—that you have no way of verification. They have no means of delivery.

AES: Your feeling is as far as today’s meeting is concerned you don’t go any farther than we have?

Ball: Right.

166. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 9, 1962, 2:15 p.m.

Gilpatric said AES wanted him to tell Ball that the emergency meeting Kuznetsov called was simply for the purpose of registering a protest about the way three naval ships were acting in intercepting the Russian ships. They were trying to stop the ships, and one ship wasn’t even on the list—Alexandraska. They wanted us to do something about it and Gilpatric said they were. It was an over-zealous Commander. They thought it was going very well this morning. There was no word about Mikoyan’s return, and the Russian Ambassador made a fine speech about Mr. .Roosevelt this morning, which is interesting.

Ball asked if they pulled the tarps off and Gilpatric said they have been pulling the tarps off, getting down to what they call the rubber pants, which is enough to get an identification. Ball asked if the picture looked good enough to be persuasive and Gilpatric replied they thought so; they haven’t received them yet. They show, for example, fins and they show where the conduits were run. He thought they would correspond with the Red Square pictures sufficiently. The dimensions are right. They think it is going along pretty well.

167. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York;Ball was in Washington. November 9, 1962, 4:15 p.m.

AES: I wonder if you would care to submit this afternoon at the meetingThe Executive Committee meeting. a suggestion which I could dictate.

GWB: I think the meeting has been called off.

AES: Maybe you could send it over to Kennedy to be reflecting on.

GWB: OK.

AES: You know about our meeting today and the protest on the ships?See Document 166.

GWB: Yes.

AES: That is all it amounted to. It seems to me highly desirable to liquidate—this is all pending, no developments from Moscow or from Castro, I mean Havana. If this continues this way indefinitely, we are going to start to lose ground here; talks are going to start, and it will reverberate around the country. I think that is good reason to try to cut this off with the Russians and liquidate this part of it if we can and then see what is left in the way of possibilities for negotiation with the Cubans through the OAS. In any event, I could dictate the memo:

(Memo written up separately)Printed as an attachment.

Just chew on that for a while and extricate us from the deadlock we are in now. This would give them their five Castro points in the forum where we can handle it best—in the OAS, and meanwhile get the munitions out of there and the only verification we will ever get on the warheads anyway.

GB: The thing about that is it leaves Castro in an extremely favorable position, doesn’t it.

AES: He has lost his aircraft, his missiles, his nuclear striking capability; he has a guarantee against invasion by the US and nothing else.

GB: He still has his SAM sites and the missiles he never really thought were his anyway.

AES: We are never going to get them, I don’t think, without knocking them out.

GB: What disturbs me is from the point of view of the whole American state system, he has come out in a good position. He has guarantee with no obligations.

AES: No, he has given us a guarantee he won’t reintroduce these weapons into Cuba and the Soviets have given guarantee that they won’t reinstitute. The point is the problem of verification at the completion of the present transaction is in Castro hands and he isn’t playing ball. Now, mind you this is only contingency planning in the event we don’t get any break from Moscow now or ever.

GB: Let me say the majority view here is in favor of doing what you are trying to do which is to draw a line under the Russian undertakings and say we are prepared to accept at face value your statement that you have gone as far as you can go. The difference here is how Castro will proceed from there. It is then what we do as far as Castro is concerned. First, are we prepared to give him any undertakings at all until he does something himself which would be, I think, from the point of view of most of the people in Washington, which would require more than simply mutual undertakings. He would really have to provide for some kind of on the spot inspection or something of the sort of continuing presence that would provide some real safeguards or at least the appearance of safeguards. The alternative approach is maybe the thing to do is to let the Russians disengage along the line that you suggest and say to them you have done everything you can do and thanks very much; we still have the problem of dealing with Castro because our guarantee is with Castro and we may have to deal with him by ourselves and see if the Russians would not be prepared to let it go at that.

AES: As to the future safeguards, the only thing we will get is a promise the Russians won’t reintroduce unless we get ground inspection from Castro and Castro will put that on a reciprocal basis. Therefore tying to liquidate the Russian deal and if we come off with everything we anticipated, then that leaves us with dealing directly with Castro on any future assurances beyond his promise not to reintroduce.

GB: I think you will find there is a great deal of accord on the first part.

AES: You can’t impose on Castro obligations to do things because the Russians didn’t comply.

GB: Well, but the whole business of giving him an assurance was conditioned upon certain things being done, some of which are in his behalf.

AES: That is what worries me. You can withhold the assurance on invasion and cut off now and say we didn’t get strict compliance and therefore we are not ground inspection, and the people will say over here they have had virtual support of everything they expect and they are now reneging on their promise. I just don’t want to get in the position of anybody charging us with bad faith or nonperformance on our part. I don’t want to get so close to that line.

GB: Let me think this over.

AES: Of course this may all change when word comes from Moscow.

GB: No intimation from your friend as to when Mikoyan might have something.

AES: No, I think we are stuck here for the present and I think he has got down there and they are just going to work us over on these five points and we won’t really achieve anything.

GB: I’ll have this thing typed up and give it some thought.

Attachment No classification marking. This paper was discussed at the 24th meeting of the Executive Committee, November 12, 11 a.m., see Document 170. The Department of State sent this memorandum to the White House on November 14. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/11/62-11/15/62) Memorandum From the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) to President Kennedy

I won’t review the negotiations to date with which you are generally familiar.

Unless there is some break from Moscow or Havana—I think the situation is deadlocked, and I suggest trying to conclude the transaction with the Russians to enable us to get into contact with Cuba through the OAS or directly. Realizing that the Soviets may not be able to control Cuba, I suggest consideration as a contingency of a formula for terminating the present transaction somewhat as follows: If the Soviets will remove the IL-28 bombers and give us some means of verification (fuselages at sea) and formal assurance (in the Security Council) that all nuclear warheads for missiles and air nuclear bombs have been removed, and If the Soviets will give us some means (through the five Latin countries having diplomatic relations, for example) verify compliances above ex post facto (I assume our reconnaissance will also verify without any agreement by the Soviets or Cubans), and If the Soviets and Cuba will give us a formal public promise (in the Security Council) not to reintroduce these weapons into Cuba, We will call off the quarantine and give Cuba the formal guarantee (in the Security Council) against invasion and ask other Latin States to do likewise.

The open question then would be: reciprocal guarantees by Cuba and other Latins and the United States against interference, subversion, sabotage, support for attacks, etc., together with some system of mutual verification by international inspection. This should be worked out through the OAS, if the other Latin states think it worthwhile.

Adlai E. StevensonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
168. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 9, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

Ball told Bundy he hoped to get over to him by 10 a.m. tomorrow a memorandumDocument 169. which is a general kind of planning memo which incorporates some views of the DOD which came out of their meeting this afternoon.No other record of this meeting has been found. It sets up various courses of action based on pretty much the same assumption that we if we don’t get the IL-28s out or any security against reentry, but that we take the Russians at their word. It amounts to a consideration of direct military action to achieve it or a continued system of surveillance with the expectation of Cuba drawing fire and then taking some action on that. He is attaching a proposal of Stevenson,See the attachment to Document 167. which Ball does not endorse, but which he wanted the President to see on negotiating with Castro. It will give good plane reading if he wants it.

169. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Ball) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, Sorensen Papers, Classified Subject Files, Cuba, General, 11/7/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that it was part of the President’s weekend reading for November 10. Washington, November 10, 1962. SUBJECT Suggested Policy Line for Cuban CrisisUnder a covering memorandum of November 10, Ball sent a copy of this memorandum to the Executive Committee “for information and comment.” He noted that it “was hastily prepared at the request of the White House” and that it had been slightly revised since submission to the President. Ball also noted that the memorandum created the impression that the optional courses of action were mutually exclusive. They were not and combinations were “possible and perhaps desirable.” (Ibid.)

Assumptions

Until we have received a definitive Soviet answer regarding the IL-28s and a reliable report as to the progress of the Mikoyan-Castro discussions, we must be ready to proceed on any one of four assumptions:

Assumption A. That the USSR will remove the IL-28s and will arrange adequate ground inspection.

If the removal of the bombers is sufficiently assured and the inspection arrangements adequate, we could presumably regard the incident as closed and give some form of guaranty regarding the invasion of Cuba. These arrangements would, of course, need to include more than a provision for Second-Phase inspection by the five Ambassadors. But even that limited progress might indicate a sufficiently forthcoming attitude to make possible some Third-Phase solution through a nuclear-free zone or otherwise.

Assumption B. That the USSR will arrange ground inspection, but will refuse to remove the IL-28s on the ground that these are Cuban property.

This seems rather unlikely. If the Cubans should agree to yield on the question of adequate ground inspection, (which means something more than mere Second-Phase arrangements for inspection by the five Ambassadors) then it is hardly likely that they would insist upon the retention of the IL-28s.

Assumption C. That the USSR will agree to withdraw the IL-28s, but will assert that they are unable to arrange ground inspection because of alleged Cuban objections.

Assumption D. That the USSR will neither remove the IL-28s nor provide arrangements for ground inspection and continuing safeguards. Khrushchev will excuse his non-performance on the ground that Cuba is a sovereign country, the IL-28s belong to the Cubans, and Castro is unwilling to permit any form of ground inspection.

Under either assumption C or D we would be presented with a major choice of policy. Stated in large terms, two available lines of policy would seem worth consideration:

First, we might take the position that Cuba is effectively a puppet of the Soviet Union since it is economically dependent on Moscow; therefore, regardless of Cuban intransigence, we would continue to look to the Soviet Union to enforce the Kennedy-Khrushchev undertakings.

Or second, we might take at face value the Soviet assertion that Russia cannot control Castro. In that event we would tacitly or explicitly accept the fact or fiction (whichever it might be) that Khrushchev had complied to the extent of his ability and thereafter concentrate our pressure on Cuba. In that event, not only would we refuse to give any assurance of noninvasion, but we would make it clear that we could not tolerate—for reasons not only of our own security but of the security of the Hemisphere—that Castro be left in the possession of offensive weapons.

Advantages of Second Line of Policy

The second line of policy seems preferable from the point of view of the total American interest, for the following reasons: The shifting of the burden of responsibility would minimize the dangers of a direct confrontation with the USSR, which might escalate into a larger conflict. It would assist Khrushchev in extricating the USSR from an involvement in Cuba which is proving progressively more costly and less profitable. It would eliminate the Cuban question from the US-USSR dialogue and thus permit progress on other major issues. It would provide freedom of action for the United States to deal with Castro directly, both on its own behalf and on behalf of the other American states.

Continuing Course of Action Regarding Cuba

If the United States should encourage the de facto disengagement of the USSR from its Cuban involvement and thus achieve a measure of freedom of action against Castro, the question would remain: What course of action should we then elect to follow?

Presumably that course of action should include the following elements: It should be consistent with our position that the United States cannot accept either the continuance of offensive weapons in Cuba or the absence of adequate safeguards against the introduction of new offensive weapons. It should be designed to undermine the authority and prestige of Castro, both in Cuba and in the eyes of the world. It should be directed towards setting in motion a train of events that would progressively enhance the American ability to deal decisively with Castro. It should involve the least possible direct challenge to the prestige or authority of Chairman Khrushchev and the USSR.

Available Options

Four possible courses of action would appear worthy of serious consideration: Direct military action against Cuba. Resumption of the quarantine on the basis of an expanded list. Continued systematic aerial surveillance with the strong possibility of provoking interference that might lead to limited or general military action. Solution through Security Council Arrangements.

I

Direct Military Action

As contemplated in a paper prepared by the Department of Defense, direct military action would be taken against the IL-28s.The “Defense paper,” which is quoted from extensively, has not been found. Preparation for this action would consist of an announcement indicating the measures thus far taken by the USSR to comply with the agreement but emphasizing that the United States would have to take necessary actions to eliminate the threat created by the bombers. The President would, however, be “prepared to ensure that these actions will not include an invasion of Cuba.” The actions described in the Department of Defense memorandum are as follows: “1. Issue a warning that action to remove the bomber threat is about to be taken, that the areas where these aircraft are located should be evac-uated by all personnel, and that any attack on U.S. aircraft will be met with appropriate counter action. “2. Conduct the air attack by selective and discriminate attack: “a. At the present time it is estimated that such action within the next few days would require attacks (1) on San Julien Air Base with 16 F101 strike aircraft (includes local suppression aircraft) armed with napalm, 2.75” rockets and 20mm ammunition, accompanied by 8 F-104/F8U aircraft equipped with GAR 8 missile to fly low level CAP, (2) on Holguin Air Base with 8A4D aircraft armed with napalm and Zuni rockets and 8F8U-2/F4H aircraft as CAP equipped with Sidewinder/Sparrow missiles and 20mm ammunition (with suppression provided by 8F8Us armed with Zuni rockets and 20mm). “b. If the attack is delayed beyond the next 48 hours, dispersal of IL28s may require attack on additional airfields. “3. In the absence of air counter action, the attack should be strictly confined to the destruction or serious damaging of the IL-28 aircraft by the most precise air attack means available. If there is air counter action, the suppression of this action by the assigned suppression aircraft would be required.”

Arguments for Direct Military Action

Such action would presumably be effective in eliminating the threat from these offensive aircraft; It would be action consistent with our conduct of the Cuban affair, i.e., it would be “clear cut, forthright and have been fairly signaled in advance”. With its preponderant military strength the United States could promptly deal with any Cuban reaction.

Arguments Against Direct Military Action

It would be regarded as a direct attack against Cuba and the Soviet Union might feel compelled to intervene on Cuba’s behalf in order to save face, or react elsewhere. In the absence of any direct Cuban attack on the United States or any other OAS country, world opinion might tend to regard the United States action as excessive—particularly in view of our own maintenance of bomber bases around the world and the disparity in size and resources between the United States and Cuba. It might well provoke Cuban reaction against Guantanamo and possibly even against the Southeastern United States (presumably by MIGs).

II

Resumption of Quarantine on an Expanded Basis

The scenario for the reimposition of the quarantine is described in a Department of Defense memorandum as follows:

A public announcement should be made by the President, or other high government official, that: Uncrating, assembling and readying of IL-28 jet bombers has continued. The UN has been frustrated in its attempt to establish adequate inspection of incoming ships. The UN has been frustrated in its attempts to establish adequate on-site inspections.

These aircraft with a combat radius of 740 miles remain a threat to the entire Caribbean, the northern portion of South America, Mexico, and the southern portion of the United States.

The United States will maintain the present quarantine until the bombers are removed and adequate on-site inspections, including appropriate long term agreements, are achieved. The United States supports the Brazilian Resolution and believes that it may offer an adequate long term solution, not only to the present crisis, but to future crises of this kind. If the Cubans fail to comply, the United States will have to consider taking additional steps. a. If no steps are taken to remove the bombers as a result of this statement, then the US should extend the quarantine to petroleum, reiterating our position that we will lift the quarantine if the bombers are removed and adequate inspection is permitted. The inclusion of petroleum under the quarantine would have immediate and sharp reflections within Cuba. Not only normal oil consumption, but nearly all electric power production in Cuba is dependent upon fuel oil. The Cubans are estimated to have 60 days’ supply of gas and diesel fuel oil, and approximately 110 days’ supply for power and industrial use. Sabotage could further reduce this stockpile if necessary. For this reason, it would seem very likely that if such a quarantine were established, compliance should be forthcoming shortly thereafter.”

Arguments for Quarantine At the present time not only the OAS but the NATO countries strongly support our insistence on adequate inspection—and, perhaps to a lesser extent, on the removal of the IL-28s. The Soviet Union might be willing to withhold the further supply to Cuba of items on the proscribed list in order to reduce its investment in a rapidly wasting asset; for this reason it might secretly welcome a US blockade. The quarantine might result in the strangulation of the Castro regime without any direct loss of life. The imposition of a quarantine on shipments of POL would be directly relevant to the immobilization of the IL-28s. Even were the Soviet Union to rUN the blockade, the resulting confrontation could perhaps be restricted to sea warfare—an arena in which we have a clear advantage. The danger of escalation might, therefore, be less than in the case of any form of bombing attack on Cuba which might result in bombing reprisals elsewhere.

Arguments Against Quarantine The renewed quarantine would be a direct challenge to the Soviet right of free sea transit. It would thus fail to meet one of the criteria listed earlier—an action directly operating only on Cuba. Khrushchev yielded to the threat of our quarantine once by turning his ships around. He could not afford the humiliation of doing so a second time—especially after the missiles have been removed and he has claimed to have complied fully with his undertakings. Khrushchev was willing to pull back his ships carrying sophisticated weapons to safeguard USSR technology. He would not have a similar motive for holding back tankers filled with POL. The USSR could not stand idly by while the economy of a Socialist state was slowly strangled; the loss of face and appearance of impotence would be too high a price for it to pay. The quarantine would be resented by several of our NATO friends, including the UK, which never acknowledged its legality. They acquiesced before because the limited quarantine did not affect their trade; they might well refuse to recognize a blockade which cut off valuable shipping of POL—particularly since there is a fairly widespread feeling that we have already won our point by expelling the missiles.

III

Enforced Aerial Surveillance

It is suggested that, instead of reimposing the blockade, we should undertake a systematic and unremitting air reconnaissance over Cuba, both high and low until such time as Castro yielded on inspection and the removal of the IL-28’s; Castro was overthrown; or The reconnaissance provoked an armed response that justified our taking direct military action enabling us, at least, to eliminate the IL-28’s.

Arguments for Reconnaissance This course could be justified under the authority of OAS action. It would be thoroughly consistent with our position that we could not tolerate a situation in which we neither had safeguards against the introduction of offensive weapons nor adequate observation to insure that offensive weapons presently in Cuban hands would not be used. It would—hopefully—avoid direct confrontation with the USSR. It would provide a means for imposing a constant public humiliation on Castro. No Government can permit national air space to be constantly invaded without demonstrating its weakness, both at home and abroad. Castro could not continue for very long to stand down his planes and restrain his anti-aircraft fire without publicly acknowledging his own weakness. The result would be that sooner or later he would almost certainly attack our planes, which would permit an escalating scale of reprisal and counter-reprisal that could permit us to deal conclusively with the problem of Castro.

IV

Solution Through Security Council Arrangements

This course of action is explained and recommended in the attached memorandum of Governor Stevenson.See the attachment to Document 167.

CONCLUSION

The Problem of Choice

Direct action against Cuba on the basis suggested in Section I can probably be ruled out. Such a course of action would probably be regarded by world opinion as excessive, and it would involve grave risks of provoking retaliation elsewhere in the world.

Realistically, the choice would appear to be between an expanded quarantine, as recommended in Section II, or enforced surveillance, as recommended in Section III.

The decision between these alternative lines of policy turns in large part on a judgment as to the extent to which Khrushchev might in fact be prepared and able to disengage from Cuba. If, as a result of Castro’s obduracy, he could cut his investment and leave Cuba without specific security commitments, he might be willing to turn his back while the United States took advantage of the opportunities provided by Castro’s response to continued—and necessarily harassing—low and high level surveillance.

On the other hand, if it is felt that Khrushchev could not sit idly by while we forcibly eliminated the IL-28’s and wiped out the SAM sites, the surveillance course might appear too dangerous.

On this assumption an expanded quarantine has much to recommend it. If the quarantine route is followed no military action need be taken directly against Cuba; therefore, Khrushchev would not be called upon to respond to what he must necessarily denounce as imperialist aggression. Under these circumstances Khrushchev might be prepared to see Cuba go down the drain through the slow strangulation of a blockade.

But the vice of the blockade is that it directly engaged the prestige of the USSR since it interferes with the freedom of movement of the Soviet merchant fleet. Khrushchev would have to denounce the United States for piracy—as he has already done—and for seeking to starve a small country whose only fault is its allegiance to Communism, and his supine acquiescence in that piracy would be read by all the world as a humiliating confession of impotence.

Against the background of these considerations, the questions for decision must include the following:

Would Khrushchev be ready to absorb the prestige loss of acquiescing in a reimposed quarantine or would he feel compelled to use his submarines against our naval vessels?

The existence of substantial doubt regarding the answer to this question suggests that before a quarantine were reimposed some effort might be made to sound out Soviet reactions.

If the quarantine did result in limited naval action, how would this affect other US-USSR relationships? Even assuming that we encouraged Khrushchev to disengage from Cuba, if surveillance led to even limited bombing, could the Soviet Union afford to stand by while a nation was attacked that the USSR had vowed to defend? Might not the prestige costs be too great?On November 12 Nitze prepared for McNamara a suggested Department of Defense position paper on Ball’s memorandum to the President. It dealt with Ball’s memorandum on a section-by-section basis. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 1962, McNamara’s Working Papers) See the Supplement.

George W. Ball
170. Summary Record of the 24th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 12:24 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. II, Meetings, 17-24. See the Supplement. Washington, November 12, 1962, 11 a.m.

In response to the President’s question, General Taylor said that SAC is still on DEFCON 2. Other forces have been reduced to DEFCON 3. The President suggested that the level of alert might be reduced toward the end of the week, but he did not wish to make a decision now.

Secretary McNamara said any reduction in the state of readiness of U.S. forces would be a sign to the Soviet Union. The Russians would know immediately if our state of alert was reduced. He suggested that no reduction be made today. However, SAC should stand down as soon as possible because the present alert involves burning out large amounts of spare parts. The air defense units should also stand down, but this could not be done without giving a signal to the Russians. Secretary McNamara said he would recommend later this week when the reserve air defense units called up last month should be returned to civilian life.

Director McCone summarized current intelligence.In McCone’s memorandum of this meeting, which was mistakenly thought to have taken place at 4 p.m., the Director of Central Intelligence described his intelligence briefing. McCone noted that assembly of IL-28s was continuing, that the Soviet Union had given Cuba $550 million in military equipment and spare parts since August 1, 1962, and therefore Castro had the ability to support subversion all over Central America and the Caribbean as well as in the northern tier of South American countries. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President) He called attention to NIE 84-4-62 [SNIE 85-4-62] which summarizes Castro’s capability for subversion in Latin America and lists military equipment which the Russians have given to Castro.The conclusions of this SNIE, November 9, are summarized in footnote 1 above. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For text of SNIE 85-4-62, see vol. XII, pp. 234–235. The President commented that we should watch very carefully the use of Cuban arms to promote subversion in the hemisphere.

Secretary Rusk reported there had been no change over the week end on the political side. We had received no reply from the Russians on the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers from Cuba. We had heard nothing about the Castro/Mikoyan negotiations in Havana.

Ambassador Stevenson reviewed the deadlocked negotiations with the Russians in New York. His talking paper is attached.See the attachment to Document 167. It contains the specifics of a package to be presented to the Russians in an effort to end the New York negotiations and to seek a solution by negotiating with the Cubans directly or through the OAS. He commented that no proposals were being made in New York and the momentum of the negotiations there was slowing down. U Thant’s proposal to name five Latin American Ambassadors as inspectors has encountered Cuban objections. An effort is being made to sell the idea of choosing any five Ambassadors agreeable to the parties concerned. The Soviets are refusing to give in on the withdrawal of the IL-28 bombers and are insisting on the five points which Castro put forward some time ago.

Ambassador Stevenson said his proposal was aimed at ending the negotiations. He felt that the Russians would probably reject his package. Before presenting it to the Russians we would consult the major Latin American states to see if it was acceptable to them. If the Russians accepted, the transaction would be ended. If they came back with counterproposals, we might have to add to the package such things as an agreement to allow inspection of Cuban camps in the U.S. If it is rejected, we should avoid unilateral action as is proposed in the State Department papers.See Document 169. We should make every effort to go with the Latin American states and keep them unified with us.

Secretary Rusk said he agreed we should continue to follow a policy of seeking multilateral actions. He urged that we stay on our original course until we get a reply from Khrushchev. He preferred this course to Stevenson’s suggestion of putting forward a new proposal now.

The President asked whether we should give a guarantee against invading Cuba if the Russians refused to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we should not. If the Soviets refused to withdraw the bombers, we should make a full statement in the UN Security Council.

Mr. McCloy, who has been taking an active part in the negotiations, recommended that we make the following offer to Kuznetsov. If the Russians would agree to take out the IL-28 bombers by fixed future date, we would lift our quarantine at once. He asked whether we should give a guarantee covering only invasion. He said he believed Khrushchev was under real pressure and urged that we deal with the Cuban problem from a world point of view and with regard to U.S./USSR relations rather than as a U.S./Cuba problem. He believed we should make the Russians an offer covering Cuba. Khrushchev then might be easier to deal with on Berlin. He suggested that we talk about normalization in the Caribbean and offer to talk to the Russians about other problems. Khrushchev needs a facesaving device. He can’t back down again. We should make an informal approach to him now before he comes down very hard in opposition to further measures necessary to resolve the Cuban crisis.

The President commented that the quarantine was losing credibility. He added that in all papers discussing a no-invasion pledge the word “assurances” be used rather than the word “guarantee.”

Ambassador Stevenson again urged that we put our final position to the Russians before they put their final position to us.

Secretary Dillon asked how the U.S. could give an assurance not to invade Cuba without some safeguard covering the reintroduction of strategic missiles to Cuba. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we could rely on aerial reconnaissance plus promises from the Cubans and the Russians.

Secretary Rusk asked whether we should lift the quarantine if the Russians promised to withdraw the IL-28 bombers. He felt we should maintain our insistence on aerial surveillance and on on-site inspection but lift the quarantine if the Russians promise to take out the IL-28s.

Mr. McCloy suggested that we tell the Russians we would give a guarantee if they took certain actions.

The President said he did not want any assurances we might give to be included in any document more formal than a letter.

In response to the President’s comment that the ideal arrangement would be a monthly on-site inspection, Ambassador Stevenson said we can’t get on-site inspection. Our only hope is to reach some mutual understanding about inspection, such as counting the missiles as they go out on Soviet ships. He doubted we could get approval for a Latin American atom-free zone.

Secretary Rusk said we must have some way in which to answer the waves of reports that offensive missiles are still being put into Cuba by the Russians. Mr. McCloy suggested that we could hold the Russians to the commitment made in the October 26th Khrushchev letter,See Document 84. i.e., that the Russians would not bring in any weapons.

The Attorney General raised again the question of how we could prove that the Russians are not delivering new arms to Cuba.

Referring to the TV Today show,On the Today show on NBC, a Cuban refugee stated that he knew positively there were 82 missiles in Cuba. As only 42 were removed, 40 remained hidden in caves. the President asked that within twenty-four hours our officials interrogate every Cuban refugee who was making statements about arms going to Cuba. The refugees are naturally trying to build up their story in an effort to get us to invade. We must get to the people the fact that the refugees have no evidence which we do not have. Such refugee statements, if they continue, could make the problem almost unmanageable. He suggested again that we arrange to check every press, radio and TV report made by a refugee and promptly report back to the media involved if there was no evidence behind the refugee allegations.

General Taylor raised the question of how we ensure the continuation of necessary aerial reconnaissance in the long range. Mr. McCone pointed out that if the SAM sites are operational, we cannot ensure the continuance of aerial reconnaissance with U-2s.

The President said we should conduct the aerial reconnaissance we consider necessary. We must continue to do this because a UN system has not been created. He asked whether we should tell the Cubans we are continuing reconnaissance or just go ahead and do it. Ambassador Stevenson replied that we cannot tell the Cubans because they would oppose our reconnaissance. The President said our reconnaissance can be based on the OAS resolutionThe resolution of October 23; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 408-410. if no other position is acceptable to the Russians. The question is whether we surface our current aerial surveillance.

Secretary Rusk commented that no secrecy is possible in this hemisphere. Our air reconnaissance does not come under the OAS resolution.

Under Secretary Ball cautioned against building up Castro as being able to defy both the U.S. and the USSR. He felt such an impression would have a bad effect in Latin America.

Ambassador Stevenson said ex post facto verification of the removal of the Soviet missiles is one problem. Such verification we cannot get. Continuing verification that missiles are not being reintroduced is another problem.

The Attorney General pointed out that these two problems were not separable. He wanted to know what we tell the American people we are doing to prevent the reintroduction into Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles. Khrushchev lied once and he could lie again. We must have an acceptable guarantee that there will be no reintroduction of missiles. We can’t live without taking some action which ensures us that we know whether or not he is complying with a statement on non-reintroduction of missiles.

The President suggested that we say we are taking every means to ensure that there is no reintroduction of missiles. These actions were taken under the OAS resolution. We would not need to say we were overflying Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson agreed that we should just overfly Cuba and not say we were doing so. We should get the OAS to say that this hemisphere cannot live with a Cuba which is promoting subversion and action will be taken, if necessary, to prevent Cuban subversion.

The President commented that an assurance covering invasion does not ban covert actions or an economic blockade or tie our hands completely. We can’t give the impression that Castro is home free.

Secretary Rusk said we cannot unilaterally amend the Rio Treaty.The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocity Assistance of 1947; for text, see ibid., Basic Documents, 1950-1955, pp. 789-796. Any assurance which we would give does not affect the provision in the Rio Treaty which allows invasion under certain circumstances.

Ambassador Stevenson said we had to decide whether to give the Soviets a package proposal before hearing from Khrushchev or hold off until we had the Russian reply. If we decide on making a package proposal we must decide whether it is a full package or a partial package.

The President read the proposed wording of an assurance we would give against invasion. He suggested that any assurance which is made should appear as a restatement of undertakings in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty rather than as a new commitment.

Secretary Rusk suggested that no formal statement be given to the press today.

The President asked that a short statement be prepared for him to look at at a 4:00 meeting which would say we are waiting for a Russian reply to our demand that they remove the IL-28 bombers.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
171. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, 1962. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A note on this message indicated it was first given orally. Moscow, November 12, 1962.

Dear Mr. President, I would like to express my satisfaction that the mutual obligations taken in accordance with the exchange of messages between us are being carried out both by your side and our side. One can say that certain favourable results are already seen at this time. We appreciate your understanding of the situation and your cooperation in carrying out the obligations taken by our side. We, on our part, will as always honor our obligations. And I would like to inform you that our obligations with regard to dismantling and removal of both missiles and warheads have already been fulfilled.

We appreciate that we must come to an agreement with you regarding the mutually acceptable means for your side to ascertain that we really carry out our obligations. What has already been achieved in the course of negotiations between our reprsentatives—Kuznetsov, McCloy and Stevenson—and the cooperation reached in the process of these negotiations is a good thing. The same should be said about the cooperation between captains of our ships, which were taking our missiles from Cuba, and corresponding U.S. ships. This is very good, this has created an impression that your side also wishes to cooperate, eliminating the remnants of the tension which only yesterday were very dangerous both for our two peoples and for the peoples of the whole world. Thus, if we proceed from our understanding which was expressed in your message of October 27See Document 95. and in our reply of October 28,Document 102. then we, the Soviet side, have carried out our obligations and thereby have created possibility for complete elimination of tension in the Caribbean. Consequently, now it is your turn, it is for your side to carry out precisely your obligations. We have in mind that apart from the long term obligations that the United States itself will not attack Cuba and will restrain other countries of the Western Hemisphere from doing that, the most important thing which is required today is to give moral satisfaction to world public opinion and tranquility to peoples. And what is required from your side to that end is to lift the so-called quarantine and of course to stop violating the territorial waters and air space of Cuba. If this continues confidence in your obligations will thus be undermined which can only grieve world public and throw us back to the positions to which we must not return after the liquidation of such a dangerous situation. To say nothing of the fact that it would hamper us in the future.

At present, we must—and we are convinced in that—look forward and draw necessary conclusions from what has happened up till now and from the good which followed due to the efforts of both sides. Therefore, we believe that conditions are emerging now for reaching an agreement on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, cessation of all types of nuclear weapons tests and on all other questions which are ripe and require solution. You have already ended your tests and we shall probably also end our tests in November or at least before the end of this year.

Now it is also necessary to think of some real measures with regard to the question of ensuring more stable security in the world. In this connection we attach great importance to your statement that the US is ready to support idea of a non-aggression pact between NATO andthe Warsaw treaty countries. But the basic question, of course, remains that of disarmament, of destroying the whole war machine of states. To give more assurance on the first stage it might be expedient to return to the proposals forwarded by us some time ago on the establishment of observation posts on mutual basis at airfields, in major sea-ports, at railway junctions, on highways. This would exclude a possibility of a surprise attack if any side does not behave honestly, if it wants to concentrate military equipment and its troops for an attack. Precisely this is pursued by the suggestion made recently by Mr. Thant.

It goes without saying that the question of a German peace treaty still remains and we can not escape from solving it. Moreover what we and you have lived through makes a speediest solution of this question still more imperative.

I do not name other unresolved questions, we have plenty of them, I name only the main problems, on the solution of which the destinies of the world largely depend.

Now about the matter that, as you state, worries you today—about the IL-28 planes which you call an offensive weapon. We have already given you our clarification on this point and I think you can not but agree with us. However, if you do not agree—and this is your right—ask your intelligence after all and let it give you an answer based not on guesswork but on facts. If it really knows anything it must tell you the truth and namely that it is long since the IL-28’s have been taken out of production and out of use in our armed forces. And if some planes still remain now—and a certain number of them have been brought by us to Cuba—that was done as a result of your action last year when you increased the budget and called up reservists. We on our part had to take measures in response at that time, having postponed taking those planes out of use as well.

Had there been no such action on your part we would not have IL-28’s in existence because they would have been used for scrap. Such is this “formidable offensive” weapon. If your intelligence is objective it must give a correct appraisal of these 12-year-old planes and report to you that they are incapable of offensive actions. We brought them to Cuba only because they can be used as a mobile means of coastal defense under the cover of anti-aircraft fire from their own territory. They can not however fly beyond the limits of that cover since they will be immediately destroyed either by modern anti-aircraft means or by simple conventional artillery; not to speak of interceptors before which they are entirely defenseless. But all this must be known not only to the intelligence but to all engaged in military matters.

Nevertheless we regard your concern with understanding, though on our part we share the desire of the Government of Cuba to possess defensive weapons which would permit [it] to defend the territorial integrity of its country.

Therefore if you meet this with understanding and if we agreed with you on solving other questions in implementing the mutually assumed obligations then the question of IL-28 bombers would be solved without difficulties.

In what way should this cooperation, in our understanding, find its expression and what would facilitate the solution of this question?

We state to you that these bombers are piloted solely by our fliers. Consequently you should not have any fears that they can be used to do harm to the United States or other neighboring countries in Western Hemisphere. And since you and your allies in Western Hemisphere have taken an obligation not to invade Cuba then it would seem this weapon should not pose any threat for you. Moreover, we are aware of what military means are in your possession. If the enemy were threatening us with such weapon we would ignore that threat completely for it would cause us no anxiety whatsoever.

But because you express apprehension that this weapon can be some sort of a threat to the US or other countries of Western Hemisphere which do not possess adequate defensive means we state to you as a guarantee that those planes are piloted by our fliers and therefore there should be no misgivings that they could be used to the detriment of any state.

As you ascertained yourself we have removed the missiles, we also removed everything else related to missiles, all the equipment necessary for their use and recalled the personnel manning those missiles. Now that the missiles are removed the question of IL-28’s is an incomprehensible argument because that weapon as I have already said is of no value as a combat weapon at present, to say nothing of the future. Let us come to an agreement on this question as well, let us do away with tension, let us fulfill the mutual pledges made in our messages. We will not insist on permanently keeping those planes on Cuba. We have our difficulties in this question. Therefore we give a gentleman’s word that we will remove the IL-28 planes with all the personnel and equipment related to those planes, although not now but later. We would like to do that some time later when we determine that the conditions are ripe to remove them. We will advise you of that. I think that an agreement on such basis will enable us to complete the elimination of all the tension that existed and will create conditions for life to resume its normal course, that is the blockade would be immediately removed; the pledges of the sides would be registered in the appropriate documents in the United Nations Organization; non-invasion of Cuba and strict observance of her sovereignty guaranteed; the UN posts established in the countries of the Caribbean so that neither one nor the other side would indeed undertake any unexpected actions to the detriment of another state.

This would be the best solution which can be anticipated especially having in mind the tension that we lived through and the abyss we came to. And I believe, Mr. President, that you yourself understand that we were very close to that abyss. But you and we soberly and wisely appraised the situation and maintained self-control. Let us now give a complete satisfaction to the public.

What happened should now prompt us to make new great efforts so that no repetition of such events should be allowed because if we succeeded in finding a way out of a dangerous situation this time, next time we might not safely untie the tightly made knot. And the knot that we are now untying has been tied rather tightly, almost to the limit.

We displayed an understanding with regard to the positions of each other and came out of a critical situation through mutual concessions to the satisfaction of all peoples of the world. Let us now give joy to all peoples of the world and show that this conflict really became a matter of yesterday, let us normalize the situation. And it would be good if on your part efforts were made to make the normalization a complete, real normalization and it is necessary to do this in the interests of all peoples and this is within our power.

Sincerely,Printed from an unsigned copy.

172. Summary Record of the 25th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. According to the President’s Appointment Book, this meeting began at 5:30 p.m. and lasted until 6:15 p.m. (Ibid.)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. See the Supplement. Washington, November 12, 1962, 5 p.m.

Mr. Bundy summarized Khrushchev’s replyDocument 171. to the President’s message of November 6th.Document 155. The strategic missiles and warheads are out of Cuba. The IL-28 bombers might come out at some point, but would be removed under Soviet control.

There was a discussion of the McCloy offer which involved lifting the quarantine in return for the Russian promise to take out the IL-28 bombers. The question of safeguards against the reintroduction of strategic weapons would not be raised now because we have a limited set of unilateral safeguards to use which we do not want to lose.

Secretary Rusk said that there was an issue over whether the Soviet commitment on missiles and warheads was to be public or private. We would wish it to be public and Khrushchev wishes it to be private.

The President said we could live for two weeks with no public knowledge of the Soviet commitment.

Secretary McNamara asked if we are not willing to accept the situation as it now exists on the basis of the Soviet reply, would we reimpose the quarantine?

Mr. Bundy commented that the IL-28 bombers appear not to be a sticking point.

The President said we still have the questions of continued surveillance and the form of an assurance against invasion. The quarantine is not our only move. We could set the IL-28s off against the quarantine and our assurances against invasion off against safeguards covering reintroduction of missiles.

Ambassador Stevenson referred to the words in Khrushchev’s reply “at some point” and commented that this was not a specific time but meant that the bombers would come out when Khrushchev gets what he wants, such as assurances against an invasion.

Ambassador Thompson said that the timing of our commitment not to invade was important to Khrushchev because the Communist Central Committee will be meeting in Moscow soon.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we concentrate on a deal involving the quarantine offset against withdrawal of the bombers, but that we add that to the other subjects to be discussed.

Mr. Bundy suggested we might tell Khrushchev that he should give the order to remove the bombers, that we would then check on their removal, and verifying that the bombers had left, we would lift the quarantine. He proposed that an informal note be sent now and a letter later.

There was a discussion of the alternatives which consist of a public announcement that the bombers are coming out or verifiable proof that the bombers are being recrated, plus private assurances that they will be removed. The question of whether we should ask the Russians to remove them within thirty days was raised. The consensus was that Khrushchev should be told that he should give the order to remove the bombers, and when we observe the crated bombers leaving Cuba on Soviet ships, we will lift the quarantine.For the message as passed to the Soviet Union, see Document 173.

The President decided that we should not announce any message from Khrushchev. The public reason a second meeting had been held today was because the group’s business had not been finished in the morning.

The President approved up to five U-2 flights and ten low-level sorties for tomorrow.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
173. Editorial Note

At 8:30 p.m., on November 12, 1962, Robert F. Kennedy went to the Soviet Embassy’s reception for the Bolshoi Ballet. The Attorney General gave Ambassador Dobrynin an oral message. According to a typed note with a handwritten note by Bromley Smith, the message was: “if the Soviet Union will at once give the order to start removing IL-28’s and complete the removal in 30 days we would be prepared immediately to announce the removal of the quarantine.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/11/62-11/15/62)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the former Soviet Union has made available the following version of what Robert Kennedy proposed to Dobrynin:

“During the second meeting with A.F. Dobrynin on the evening of November 12, R. Kennedy, under instruction from the President, formulated the US proposal in this way: ‘N.S. Khrushchev and the President agree in principle that the IL-28 aircraft shall be withdrawn within a certain period of time. Following this agreement the US will immediately, even tomorrow, lift all quarantine, without waiting for the completion of the aircraft pullout. The US side would, of course, prefer that the agreed time period for withdrawing the IL-28 aircraft were made public. However, if the Soviet side has any objections to making it public, the President will not insist. N.S. Khrushchev’s word would be quite suffice. As for the period of time, it would be good if the aircraft were withdrawn within, say, 30 days.’” (This proposal was received in Moscow on November 13.)

Arthur M. Scheslinger, Jr., in Robert Kennedy and His Times, writes an account of the Kennedy-Dobrynin meeting, page 549.

174. Memorandum of Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. A note on the source text indicates the meeting was “Held at State Dept.” This was not one of the official numbered Executive Committee meetings. According to Rusk’s Appointment Book, he and Ball—and apparently the rest of the Committee minus the President—met in Ball’s office from 11 a.m. to noon. (Johnson Library) Washington, November 13, 1962, 11 a.m.

Purpose of the meeting was to crystalize policy concerning procedures to be followed in view of information received on November 12th concerning the disposition of IL 28s and other matters.

Kuznetsov requested meeting with McCloy at 3:00 o’clock;See Document 175. it was expected that this meeting might reveal Soviet position. In view of this, no firm policy position was developed, although there was an extended discussion of our position with regard to the IL 28s and also the question of inspection.

It was agreed that the IL 28s must be removed, and if they were removed, we could remove the quarantine. If the IL 28s are not removed, then it was felt we could take several steps to exert more pressure on Castro and the Soviets, and these would involve a meeting of the OAS to restate their policy, a statement by the President indicating non-compliance on the part of the Soviets, economic measures by the OAS, and a tightening of the quarantine. It was felt that one or several of these steps could be taken to extract a commitment to remove the bombers. However, we should not make a “no invasion” commitment unless appropriate measures for inspection were agreed upon by the Soviets and Castro.

McCone took a strong position covering the points outlined in attached memorandum of November 13th, warning against the serious long term outlook for Cuba and indicating that he felt the Soviets were trading on Castro’s position and they in effect, could dictate Castro’s terms if they so desired. Meeting did not seem disposed to go as far as McCone recommended, although the Vice President strongly supported this position.

The attached notes are pertinent.The notes were not attached.

Also at a meeting on Monday, November the 12th at 5:30 in the White House with all present,See Document 172. Mr. Bundy outlined the substance of a communication which had been received, expressing Khrushchev’s views in response to the exchange of letters of November 5th and 6th. It was decided that the communication needed study and hence its receipt was noted and a meeting arranged for the following day.

The attached notes are pertinent./2/

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director Attachment Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone

LONG TERM OUTLOOK FOR CUBA

It is my belief that a Castro-Soviet Communist Cuba, whose stated intentions and past actions are to support and spread subversion throughout Latin America, is unacceptable to the United States and should be unacceptable to most, if not all, Latin American states.

It can be said that through the removal of the missiles (and we must assume but do not know positively that all are removed) and the removal of the IL 28s (if this can be negotiated) the threat to the security of the United States and the Latin American states from a nuclear strike is removed. However, two serious problems remain:

One, no means have been established to reasonably guarantee that offensive missiles will not be reintroduced or, if offensive missiles remain on the island, that they will not be secretly placed in operational status. Aerial surveillance will help, but will not guarantee our ability to detect such an activity. Ground inspection would if properly organized and granted freedom of movement. But this has been denied by Castro and the denial is now supported by Mikoyan.

Furthermore, the SAM sites if operating can effectively deny aerial inspection. There can be no explanation for Soviet insistence on leaving the SAM sites except to shield future clandestine emplacement of offensive weapons such as MRBMs and IRBMs if the Soviets choose at some future time to reintroduce these weapons systems.

A combination of aerial inspection and properly organized ground inspection would give an effective guarantee against reintroduction of missile systems. The ground inspectors would have to have freedom of action so that they could make on-site checks of the ever increasing refugee and agent reports of the storing of missiles and their equipment in caves, which cannot be totally dismissed.

Therefore prior to a “no invasion” commitment we must have complete arrangements for inspections and they cannot be frustrated by either the Soviets or Castro.

Secondly, Castro remains over-equipped with ground equipment. He also now has amphibious equipment capable of supporting insurgency movements against any of the Caribbean, Central American states or states in the northern tier of South America. Castro has never changed in his determined effort to subvert these states. He has trained insurgents by the thousands; there are large numbers, they are in Cuba now in training. His insurgents are directed against a number of Central and South American states. He repeatedly expresses violent intentions against the organized governments of these states. Therefore one can only conclude that he would use his newly acquired amphibious lift and a substantial part of his excess arms to support insurgents who can readily overthrow neighboring governments. Our policy should anticipate this and should be designed to take action regardless of how extreme to remove this threat if the eventualities mentioned above materialize.

J.A.M.
175. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Permanent Representative to the Mission to the United Nations (Stevenson) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Stevenson was in New York;Ball was in Washington. There is no time on the dateline of the memorandum, but the call had to have taken place after 6:40 p.m. when the meeting between Stevenson and Kuznetsov concluded. November 13, 1962.

Stevenson—Kuznetsov started by saying that he had a very serious protest against the over-flights over Cuba.This meeting was summarized in telegram 1762 from USUN M, November 13, 8 p.m. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1362) See the Supplement. There is also a 25-page memorandum of conversation of the meeting, which lasted from 3:15 to 6:40 p.m., in USUN airgram 24, November 14, 2:30 a.m. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963) They were unlawful in that they violated Cuban airspace, and they would only make negotiations more difficult. The Soviets understood the categorical objections of the Cubans, and these were a violation of the feelings and integrity of the Cubans. They complicated settlement, and we should stop them now. The Soviets have fulfilled all their obligations. The Americans have no convincing arguments for continuing such over-flights which only injure the feelings of the Cubans and increase tension. He hopes the US will consider this protest with due attention. Our answer was that the President’s letter provides for UN observation and supervision of the fulfillment of this agreement. That has not been possible because the Soviet Union was unable to make such arrangements; we have had to use this means of reassuring ourselves that there was in fact compliance. These flights are in fact, Jack McCloy said, an element of stability. They have given us our only assurance of compliance. They have enabled us to detect what went, what was going on in Cuba, and we must continue to use these over-flights until the IL-28’s are removed and any suggestion that they should be ended is most disquieting.

Ball—Did we just put it on the removal of the IL-28’s?

Stevenson—No, that they should be ended. He said is most disquieting.

Ball—But you didn’t say that we would have to continue until the IL-28’s were removed.

Stevenson—That was sort of the tenor of what was said. Had it not been for these, we might have been at war, etc. Kuznetsov said regarding on-site inspection by the UN and the allegations that the Soviets did not fulfill its obligation, the obligation stated in Khruschev’s letters of Oct. 27 and 28Documents 91 and 102. on which they base their position. In the letter of the 27th he spoke of agreement in principal for verification and stressed that it could be done only by agreement of the Cubans. On Oct. 28, he referred to the letter of the 27th, and then he went on to say that he believes that the Soviets have made many efforts to prove that they are doing everything to come to an agreement with the US in order to assure us that the obligations would be fulfilled. They have made many steps forward. They permitted ship-side verification of the removal of the missiles, and that he is here to explain our position and settle this problem. He believes that all conditions have been created to solve all of our questions in a spirit of mutual confidence in order to normalize the situation in the Caribbean. All the Soviet acts show is, that its obligations have been fulfilled. They had gone further than the agreement in the letter in fact by removing the missiles when the President had only asked for them to be rendered inoperative and the sites dismantled. Then he started off on the usual say about the IL-28’s not being offensive, but only defensive, and he volunteered to tell us in detail why they could not be included, were not included, in the agreement between Khrushchev and Kennedy. He said that the flights over Cuba don’t create stability. They are over foreign territories; they create indignation and disrespect for the sovereignty and are a violation of the Charter and international law. They can lead only to further aggravation of the situation. If the parties could come to an agreement, all people would be relieved. As to the proposition that the U-2 had prevented war, what had prevented war was the patience and understanding of K and K, and that they had noted that the leaders could come to agreement quickly, so all questions could be decided if there was a desire to settle them on both sides. They don’t think that the U-2 violation of air-space eases tensions; it only aggravates them. He recalled the incident of May, 1960 and the increased tensions resulting from the failure of the Summit Conference in Paris. Also, the recent U-2 flights over the Soviet Union didn’t make the situation more favorable. Also the low altitude planes before the eyes of the Cubans are a source of great irritation. Continued flights indicate that the US does not recognize international law and that they are not in the interest of peace or settlement about Cuba. They cannot be justified. In answer we said, we quoted the letters of Oct. 27 and 28 on the agreement for UN observation and supervision to verify compliance. This position was not objected to by Khrushchev in his final letter. We had tried to accommodate the USSR by ship-side inspection and aerial reconnaissance in lieu of on-site inspection by the UN. McCloy referred again to the fact that these photos had helped stability; they disclosed facts that had been denied and the secrecy with which these weapons had been placed, and suggested that they now be stopped before other assurances contemplated by the agreement were completed would be very disquieting. I said that the way to stop these aggravations of Cuba is to conclude this agreement to remove the weapons as quickly as possible. We had tried to accommodate the realities of the situation to help conclude it, and that we expected them to do the same. The best hope for an improved climate is to end this episode as quickly as possible, and to let us hear the Soviet proposals for safeguards against reintroduction of these weapons in the future. As long as these negotiations go on, people are not reassured. All differences have in fact been isolated. We know our respective positions; now let’s settle them. Kuznetsov said that he agreed on desirability of prompt solution; that they were making every effort to solve; if the matter were still prolonged, it was the US that doesn’t show the same approach to the desirability of the solution that they did. I referred to the President’s letter of Oct. 27 with regard to the removal of the quarantine without delay and as to the UN, that they had agreed to stop building the bases and to dismantle them, and that he had gone even further, that they had actually withdrawn the weapons, the missiles from Cuba. That that could have been done only on a final settlement after verification by the UN, had they chosen to interpret the agreement that way. In other words, the Soviet Union has done everything possible to complete the agreement. Then he went on to say—what shall we do to come to a quick agreement. We have been waiting to hear from you so long. The US had fulfilled obligations in some document to be presented to the Security Council. The Soviets bear no responsibility toward the delay. That they too could put forward many questions to prolong the agony if they wanted to. The time has come to agree on all matters and draft a document for the Security Council. They said they wanted to clarify the position of the Soviets on other questions. They discussed McCloy’s thing (the open sky proposal) that there should be no secrecy and that to achieve this we have to complete disarmament. The US had refused to accept their proposals to start such observation over some parts of the United States and the SU; also the Soviet proposal to establish observation posts together with certain disarmament measures. These had also been rejected by the United States. Regarding the reconnaissance flights over Cuba, what would be the reaction of the United States if the Soviets overflew our bases all around the Soviet Union? They said that Mr. McCloy said that flights over the Caribbean clarified the situation. If that is so, why do we continue? The way out is to compromise constructive proposals. They asked us what to do to come to quick agreement. That the way to do it was that we would engage in no recriminations about who was responsible to the prolongation of the discussion. That if they didn’t know how to do it, we could only repeat what we have said before on many occasions. That was to remove the IL-28s and give assurances with respect to removal of all nuclear components, obtain from Cuba its cooperation for observation, verification, give us their assurances against reintroduction of such weapons and their suggestions for the safeguards for the future. As to what we, the United States, would do—as the agreement says, we would lift the quarantine and then we would give assurances regarding no invasion. Then I went on to say indeed we would lift the quarantine now if the Soviet Union would give us the promise that it was going to remove the IL-28 bombers within, say, three weeks—and the warheads. This was yesterday’s proposition, you will recall.

GWB—Yes.

AES—That I would defer any discussions of the open skies until some other time as we had all we could manage to resolve this problem at the present. Jack [McCloy] enlarged on the ending of the quarantine on the assurances of the removal of the IL-28s now. This was a further concession on our part and meanwhile we would have to continue the reconnaissance flights to confirm the fact of removal of the 28s. Then Kuznetsov came back and said regarding the 28s you know our position—that they are defensive weapons and can’t be regarded otherwise. And if your experts say to the contrary they are deceiving you and they are deceiving the President; that they are used only for training purposes and coastal defense under antiaircraft cover (almost the same language, by the way, as from the latter). We must be trying to delay working out the final guarantees; that we should be talking about a document containing all of our obligations to be presented to the Security Council. That the United States should say to them how we envision working out such a document contemplated by the letter. Regarding the reintroduction of these weapons into Cuba that they would obey strictly the letter of Chairman Khrushchev. Now as to the IL-28s they will study and they will consider the US suggestion, but they want us to know that the Soviet position (and here are some significant words) “as it now stands” is clear . That we should now discuss the longstanding, outstanding issues (I wasn’t sure what he meant). Discuss all the questions to see if we can agree. How do we propose to implement our obligation? In response I listed the things that we expected the Soviet Union to do; that the quarantine was already lifted; that we had only one remaining obligation and that was the declaration of the SC regarding the assurances on invasion. I summarized the outstanding obligations of the Soviet Union—the position that we were in now, which was: (1) that the Soviet Union study the removal of the IL-28s; (2) that if they agreed to remove them, we would lift the quarantine at the time that was proper; (3) that we would expect assurances on the removal of the nuclears; that we would expect assurances against reintroduction of the weapons; that we would expect verification in Cuba; that we would expect proposals regarding future safeguards regarding the reintroduction by anyone; and finally that with all of these accomplished that we would make a declaration regarding assurances on invasion in the SC. As to the language on assurances and safeguards we would refer the matter to Washington and we would be glad to discuss our language along with theirs. Kuznetsov said he was not going to deal with the previous questions which had been reviewed during the afternoon but regarding the IL-28s that he must make a further clarification. He wished the US to understand that they reaffirm their position; that the IL-28s are defensive but that he would report the consideration advanced by the US to his Government and then we adjourned. We got the impression today for the first time it looked as though Mikoyan might be waiting to hear from Kuznetsov on what he could get on the overflights and on the guarantees. I thought on the whole it was a more constructive meeting than we had had since the beginning. At least we isolated the problems that are outstanding and that we got on the table all of the things we expected from them and made it clear that the quarantine was already lifted and our declaration on the invasion would be made in SC. I don’t think we are through with Zorin on that. He will probably want to have a further argument on that ahead of us. That was about it. He obviously had been fully briefed on the letter and knew it by heart. He spoke again from documents much of the time (position papers) rather than just free style. I think that you can report to the President that we are back where I was talking about on FridayNovember 9; see Document 165. by getting the whole package before him, and I think personally it is a very good thing and we will now begin to hear one by one as to what they are going to reject and what they are going to take. I rather think they are going to go along on the ILs but we will have arguments on the form of assurance and probably they will never be able to concede the aerial surveillance. They can’t do that and we will just have to go on arguing that.

GWB—They are probably doing this so that they can tell Mikoyan they made a protest.

AES—Yes, I think that is right. It did occur to me that while they were making this protest that depending on what other considerations may be involved that I am not clear about that if we can slow up a little for a day and rUN high instead of low it might be a good thing—to see if we can bring them along on agreement on the ILs.

GWB—Well, let me see what we can do on that.

AES—If you can just tell them to leave out the low flights tomorrow and to confine it to the U-2s … . At least that is my judgment.

GWB—I think there may be something in that.

AES—I think Jack disagrees with me on that. He doesn’t think we ought to change our practices. It seems to me that maybe this is the time when they might be in a crisis there with Castro and that anything that would help there to get agreement on the ILs. I don’t know if it is the thing … . (checking with McCloy) He feels that if they think they should rUN low, go ahead and do it. If they don’t feel that they have to, then it would be a good idea to ease up a bit. We will send you an overnight on this.

GWB—I’ll report this to the President. I think it sounds a little encouraging.

AES—If he wants anything directly on atmosphere, etc. he can call me.

176. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C, 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. At 4:35 p.m., Ball telephoned McGeorge Bundy to say that “Bobby [Kennedy] has an answer [from Khrushchev], which is not too encouraging. It keeps it wrapped up.”Bundy told Ball that the President wanted the Under Secretary and Thompson to come to the White House to look over Khrushchev’s message with the President and Rusk. (Memorandum of telephone conversation between Ball and Bundy; November 14; Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba) Moscow, November 14, 1962.

I have read with great satisfaction the reply of the President of the United StatesApparent reference to Document 155. and I agree with the considerations expressed by the President. It is of particular pleasure to me that we seem to have the same desire to liquidate as soon as possible the state of tension and normalize the situation so that to untie our hands for normal work and for solving those questions that are awaiting their solution. And this depends in the main on agreement between us—the two greatest powers in the world with whom special responsibility for ensuring peace lies to a greater degree than with other countries.

The question of the withdrawal of the IL-28’s within mentioned 30 days does not constitute any complicated question. Yet this period will probably not be sufficient. As I already said in my oral messageDocument 171. I can assure the President that those planes will be removed from Cuba with all the equipment and flying personnel. It can be done in 2-3 months. But for me, for our country, it would be a great relief if the state of tension that evolved in the Caribbean were liquidated as soon as possible. I have in mind what I have already said, namely: to lift immediately the quarantine, that is, blockade; to stop the flights of the US planes over Cuba; to write down the mutual commitments ensuing from the messages of the President and mine of October 27 and 28See Documents 95 and 102. to which end your representatives and ours have to prepare with the participation of the UN acting Secretary General U Thant an appropriate document. This is the main thing now.

You understand that when we say that it is necessary to announce now the withdrawal of the IL-28’s at the time when your planes are flying over Cuba it creates for us no small difficulties. I have no doubt that you will understand—and the Cuban Government understands this—that such actions constitute violation of sovereignty of the Cuban state. Therefore it would be a reasonable step to create in this respect also conditions for the normalization of the situation and this in a great degree would make it easier to meet your wish of expediting the withdrawal of the IL-28 planes from Cuba.

If we attained all that now and if this were announced, then more favourable conditions would be created for our country to solve the question of time table for the withdrawal of IL-28 planes.

Now our main difficulties lie precisely in the fact that, as it is well known to everybody and it is being rightfully pointed out to us, we have removed from Cuba missiles and warheads, that is, we have fulfilled our commitments while the US is not carrying out its commitments—the quarantine continues, the US planes continue to fly over Cuba and there is no agreement that would register the pledges of the US. And all this finds ears that are listening and listening attentively. It is difficult for us to give explanations to such unjustifiable state of affairs. Therefore to carry out the final procedure after the missiles and warheads have been removed, already now the quarantine must be lifted, the flights of the American planes over Cuba must be stopped and mutual commitments of the sides must be written down in an appropriate document with the participation of the UN.

It is hard to say for me what specific agreement is possible on the question of UN observation posts. But we as well as the Government of Cuba have already expressed a desire to come to terms on this question. If the question of the observation posts is of interest to the US—and I think it must be of interest—then I consider it wise to come to an agreement on this. I think that the Government of Cuba will not object to the UN posts, of course on the condition of respect for the sovereignty of Cuba, on the condition of treating her as equal which must mean that on the territory of other countries of the Caribbean and in a corresponding region of the US there will be also set up similar UN posts, that is on the condition that reciprocity will be observed in this question.

You understand, Mr. President, that no country can assume unilateral commitments, and it would be wise to make them mutual.

I have already said that perhaps it will be necessary for us in the negotiations on disarmament between our countries at the first stage to return to our proposals providing for the establishment of posts at airfields, in major sea-ports, at railway junctions, on highways in order to give guarantees to all the countries of the world that no country will be able to secretly concentrate troops and get prepared for an attack against or invasion of another country. It is wise, it appeals to us.

If you would give your representatives—McCloy, Stevenson and others—appropriate instructions on the question of UN posts in the Caribbean region and adjoining regions of the US—and our representatives have such instructions—and if they would come to an agreement then all this could be made public. Then there would be removed the difficulties connected with making a public announcement on the withdrawal of IL-28 planes and we would name then specific dates. These dates will be probably much closer than those which I name and maybe even closer than those which were named by you.

That is why we should make a final step in this direction. Then we would really cut the knot which was tied tightly enough and having cut it we would create normal relations between our countries to which our people aspire and which your people, we are sure of that, also want.

I will allow myself to express some other considerations and I believe you will not take offense and will not consider that I intrude too much into the sphere of our internal affairs. Voting in the elections to the Senate, the House of Representatives and in gubernatorial elections which just took place has resulted in the defeat of your former rival who was clearly preparing again for the next presidential elections. It is significant that as a result of the elections precisely those candidates were defeated who, if I may use such an expression, were making most frenzied bellicose speeches.

This indicates that the American people already begin to feel that if the arms race continues further, if a reasonable solution is not found and an understanding is not achieved between our countries then our peoples will feel still more strongly the threat of the dreadful catastrophe of a thermo-nuclear war.

Let us then not keep people of peace all over the world in suspense, let us give them joyous satisfaction. Having cut the knot in the Caribbean we would thereby immediately create better conditions and would reinforce people’s hope for coping with other questions which are now awaiting their solution. Peoples expect wisdom from us, first of all from our two states. Of course our two states can not do everything, but all that depends on us in the sense of reaching an understanding will be of decisive importance. Needless to prove that other states would be also satisfied. And he who was especially displeased will have to agree after this understanding is reached that there is no other way of meeting the aspirations of all states, all peoples.

Sincerely,Printed from an unsigned copy.

177. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. November 14, 1962, 10:10 a.m.

McCloy—You have seen this report.Regarding the report of Stevenson and McCloy’s meeting with Kuznetsov and Zorin, see footnote 1, Document 175. This is my reading on it. In the first place on the overflights, I haven’t been quite able to make up my mind whether it was just a formal protest or whether it is something we have to look rather seriously at. But it might be no more than the former, although it is not too clear.

Ball—It is possible that it is something they had to do to help Mikoyan out.

McCloy—Well I wouldn’t be surprised. But they are going to put that in as a condition of their taking out the IL-28’s.

Ball—That is your impression?

McCloy—That is my impression. I think we should resist that.

Ball—Yes.

McCloy—But this is what is coming and it perfectly clear to me, after reading that full message from K the other day,Document 171. together with this thing here, that they are going to take the IL-28’s out but they want to take them out now at the end of the road rather than immediately. My instinct on this would be to tell Kuznetsov and not tell him at one of these formal meetings, to say “Now look here, we have done our damnedest here to relieve your situation, you are talking a lot about the quarantine, you have balled up the business on the Red Cross because you kind of insist on your definition of offensive weapons, we have done something now that is really beyond what we agreed to do.” Respond to that, don’t talk to us any more about your having done everything and we have done nothing. “And that you get those things out of there and we will do as we say, we will raise the quarantine the minute that you give the order.”

Ball—Right.

McCloy—But I would do that on a sort of another walk basis rather than on one of these damn meetings at which Zorin is present and the whole damn works are present.

Ball—Yes. I think that is right.

McCloy—You all get tensed up and the hell with this feeling of dignity. This is just an oil—it is just a different approach that may very well bring the thing about. Now that is what I would do, if I had a free hand on this thing.

Ball—Let me talk to Dean and the President about it. I am going to be seeing them both in a few minutes.

McCloy—Yes. I would just go in and say “Look Mr. K come on down and I will give you lunch and I will show you downtown New York” and incidentally put that in his ear.

Ball—Yes.

McCloy—Now that would be my way of coping with this. And then the second thing I have got in mind is I am damn sure that we are going to be faced with the necessity of drafting something on the guaranty or the assurances. To put something down on paper.

Ball—Yes.

McCloy—Because we are trying to get it very shortly from the Soviets and it is going to be a pretty elaborate document.

Ball—Right.

McCloy—I always believe in getting out first draft. I think we shouldn’t postpone that any longer.

Ball—Well we have got a draft of some stuff.

McCloy—Get it crystallized if you can, as soon as you can because I think that is going to be the first order of business.

Ball—Right. Don’t you think we can avoid any kind of protocol?

McCloy—Yes. I would—Zorin is the devil in the play on that. I would just say no, and fortunately we have got the UN with us on it and we will hold out on that. In the last analysis I would suppose—I don’t know what you mean by protocol—the form of the thing doesn’t make a great deal of difference, but I think we are going to get away with a declaration.

Ball—Yes. The only difference is if you get into a highly formal argument then the amount of comments is going to be terrific.

McCloy—Yes, and moreover I got a letter from Herman PhlegerNot found. that caused me a little concern. He said you know if you make a pledge of non-invasion that that has to take the form of a treaty because it is the impairment of the Congress’ authority to declare war and that this has to be approved by the Senate. That is something that I think Chayes ought to be looking at.

Ball—All right.

McCloy—You know Phleger is a pretty good lawyer and he was very serious about this because he didn’t see how we could get around it, in view of Congress’ authority to declare war.

Ball—Well, I will get the boys working on it.

McCloy—Yes, get them working on that. There is one thought that they all take comfort in, they say well all we are doing is what we have already done under the Rio Pact and the UN Charter. But that may not be so because we are in an awkward position there because under the UN Charter and the Rio Pact we still supported an invasion from the Bay of Pigs and we defended it. Now is this something more or how do you avoid going to Congress. I think the lawyers ought to be looking at it.

Ball—OK, fine.

178. Memorandum of Conversation Between Attorney General Kennedy and Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret; Eyes Only. Copy sent to Carter. Washington, November 14, 1962.

NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN PRISONERS

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney General at 10:30 a.m., on Thursday, November 14, at the DCI’s request.

McCone explained that he had dinner the evening before with Mr. Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury, legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DCI concerning the negotiations for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million dollars in drugs, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with members of the Industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed at length at the Industry’s Board of Trustees meeting in New York on November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding of the Government’s position, most particularly in view of Cuban developments of the last three weeks.

After explaining to Foley the background of the transaction I told him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I expressed grave concern over the situation, pointing out that CIA had 20 million dollars on covert deposit [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and that two letters of credit had been issued [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] one in the amount of 10 million dollars to Pfizer, and one for seven million dollars to Merck. As long as this money was on deposit and the letters outstanding, there was a danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug industry, or both. Despite the fact that no official government connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles) identifying Administration and CIA activitiesand citing the exact amount of 17 million dollars as representing the Government cost of the drugs. I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members of the drug industry made it almost a certainty that “leaks” would come from industry sources as long as the letter of credit were outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan’s denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction, the American public and a great many others would be confused and disenchanted.

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange for the bank to withdraw the letters of credit, and for the withdrawal of a substantial part of the money [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Also advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families Committee and possibly to Miro Cardona that we were in no way abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the negotiation aside pending further developments on other important problems involving our Cuban relationship.

McCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher authority. The latter was communicated to the DCI by telephone at 1:45 p.m.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
179. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 62 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. Washington, November 15, 1962, 9:25 a.m.

McCloy told Ball he thought he would call the fellowKuznetsov. for lunch if it is the desirable thing to do. He asked if Ball had anything new over night that might have some effect on it. There are rumors that Mikoyan is coming back tomorrow. If McCloy did this it would be mainly on a contact basis, but he is not so sure he would offer what Ball had suggested yesterday. He would simply tell him he was disturbed by his continuous talk that they have done everything and we have done nothing. Ball agreed this would be the thing to do and might be helpful at this time.

McCloy asked about the Fowler Hamilton business and Ball told him some time when he sees him he will give him a sketch of what he has in mind there.

180. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 62 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. Washington, November 15, 1962, 10 a.m.

McCloy said he had invited the fellowKuznetsov. to lunch but he told McCloy he had a date he could not cancel. He invited McCloy to come out to his place on Long Island some time during the weekend, and it was left that way. Ball asked if this would imply that Mikoyan might be there and McCloy said he didn’t know; that he could not get anything out of him about Mikoyan. McCloy said he thought this would be cleared up in the next 24 hours. We can bear this in mind should the opportunity come up.

Ball told McCloy he would tell the President.

181. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. I-C. 11/3/62-11/16/62. No classification marking. This message was considered an “oral” exchange, but a written copy was given to Dobrynin. Copies of this message were sent to Thompson, McNamara, and McCone. A note on the first page of the source text reads: “(This copy is as it actually went.).” Washington, November 15, 1962.

I am glad to learn of your assurance of agreement that the IL-28s should be withdrawn.See Document 176. All that remains is to reach understanding on the timing.

Let me review the undertakings in my letter of October twenty-seventh and your letter of October twenty-eighth.See Documents 95 and 102. You agreed to remove the weapons systems we described as offensive and with suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapons into Cuba. On our side, we undertook to agree to remove the quarantine measures in effect and to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. There were two conditions attached to our undertaking. The first was that the weapons systems would be removed “under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision,” and, second, that there would be established “adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments.”

I cannot agree with your statement that you have fulfilled your commitments and that we have not fulfilled ours. Let us recall what, in fact, has occurred. You have removed a certain number of missiles from Cuba—not under United Nations supervision—but you did cooperate in arrangements which enabled us to be reasonably sure that forty-two missiles were in fact taken out of Cuba. There has been no United Nations verification that other missiles were not left behind and, in fact, there have been many reports of their being concealed in caves and elsewhere, and we have no way of satisfying those who are concerned about these reports. The IL-28’s are still in Cuba and are of deep concern to the people of our entire Hemisphere. Thus, three major parts of the undertakings on your side—the removal of the IL-28’s, the arrangements for verification, and safeguards against introduction—have not yet been carried out.

We suppose that part of the trouble here may be in Cuba. The Secretary General of the United Nations was not allowed to make arrangements for the experts he took with him to Cuba to verify removal of the offensive weapons; the Cuban Government did not agree to international Red Cross inspection at ports; they have refused the Secretary General’s suggestion that the Latin American Ambassadors in Havana undertake this verification; they have rejected a further suggestion of the Secretary General concerning the use of various non-aligned Chiefs of Mission in Havana for this purpose. It is difficult for me to understand why the Cubans are so resistant to the series of reasonable proposals that have been made to them by U Thant unless, for reasons of their own, they are determined to see the crisis prolonged and worsened. We both have means of influencing the Cuban Government and I do not believe that we can allow that Government to frustrate the clear understandings our two governments have reached in the interests of peace.

In these circumstances we have so far been patient and careful, as we have been, indeed, at every stage. As you know from your own reports, we have always applied the quarantine with care and with regard for the position of others, and in recent days we have relied on the oral assurances of the masters of your ships and other ships. Moreover I myself held back orders for more forceful action right to the limit of possibility during the week of October 27th and 28th. But we cannot make progress from here—or avoid a return of danger to this situation—if your side now should fall into the mistake of claiming that it has met all its commitments, and refusing to help with the real business of carrying out our purpose of untying the Cuban knot.

What, in those circumstances, should be done? We are entitled to insist on removal of the IL-28’s and on safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons before we lift the quarantine or give assurances of any sort. But we are interested in making rapid progress, step-by-step, and that is why we have proposed an arrangement more favorable from your standpoint: that as soon as you give the order for the removal of the IL-28’s and their men and equipment, to be completed within thirty days, (and I am glad you say the length of time is not the real problem) we will announce the lifting of the quarantine. That is more than we agreed to on October twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth, but we wish to end this crisis promptly.

Beyond that, we are quite willing to instruct our negotiators in New York to work closely with yours in order to reach agreement on other matters affecting this problem. We believe, again, that these matters should follow the removal of offensive weapons systems, but just as we have been able to discuss other matters while a number of missiles were leaving, we believe the urgently needed talks can and should go forward while the bombers are leaving. We do not insist that everything wait its exact turn—but only that the essential first steps be clearly going forward.

But what is most urgent, after we can agree that offensive weapons are leaving, and after the quarantine is lifted, is to make some real progress on continuing observations and verification. It will be essential to have such arrangements—and this again is clear in the letters of October 27 and 28—before our assurances can be more formally stated. Our undertaking on this point remains firm and clear, and we want nothing better than to be able to give our assurances, just as we said we would, when the necessary conditions exist.

In the absence of any arrangements under the United Nations or otherwise for international verification or safeguards, we have of course been obliged to rely upon our own resources for surveillance of the situation in Cuba, although this course is unsatisfactory. Just today we learned of new threats by Castro against this necessary surveillance. I should make it very clear that if there is any interference with this surveillance, we shall have to take the necessary action in reply, and it is for just this reason that it is so urgent to obtain better safeguards.

We note with interest that in your last message the arrangement of observation and verification is enlarged from Cuba to include certain other areas. This is a substantial change from the terms of our exchange of messages, and as we see it any such wider arrangements would necessarily require careful discussion. For example, if we move outside Cuba to observe what is happening in other countries which have been involved in the recent tensions, there might have to be observation posts at the appropriate ports in the Soviet Union from which weapons could be shipped to Cuba, as well as in appropriate places in the United States. This is a matter which deserves close study and it may offer a chance of real progress in the long run, but for the immediate future it seems to us better to work within the framework of our understanding of October 27 and 28.

We also think that the Brazilian proposal for a verified Denuclearized Zone in Latin AmericaDraft U.N. Resolution A/C.1/L.312. A revised version of it, U.N. Document A/C.1/L.312/Rev. 2, was submitted to the First Committee of the United Nations by Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador, November 15. (Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1056-1057) could, with the cooperation of Cuba and if acceptable to the other Latin American countries, in the long rUN offer an acceptable means for a broader approach. However, the immediate problem is, I repeat, the carrying out of our understanding with regard to verification that offensive weapons have in fact been removed from Cuba and the establishing of safeguards against their reintroduction pending the coming into effect of longer-term arrangements. Even apart from our understanding, given the history of this matter, I am sure, Mr. Chairman, that you can understand that this is a real necessity if we are to move to the settlement of other matters.

But the first step is to get the bombers started out, and the quarantine lifted—for both are sources of tension. Meanwhile discussion can continue on other aspects of the problem.

182. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Macmillan Telephone Conversations, 10/62-11/62. Top Secret. Washington, November 15, 1962, 6 p.m.

Conversation between the President and Prime Minister Macmillan 15 November 1962, 6 pm

President: Did you get my two messages?The messages have not been found. On November 14 Kennedy called Macmillan to discuss the issue. Macmillan quotes from the November 14 telephone call in At the End of the Day, 1961-1963, p. 215.

Prime Minister spoke, and obviously said yes.

President: Yes, except that he still wants us to make a “no invasion” pledge and there can be no agreement on how to maintain surveillance. We may have to do so with disagreement. The other question, the IL-28’s must be removed before we make an agreement on invasion. You realize that here this is a major political step. What happens if he doesn’t agree to remove the IL-28’s without our agreement on the quarantine and invasion? What is your view on our re-imposing the quarantine?

Prime Minister spoke, but apparently did not answer the question.

President: We must have him take out the bombers. Perhaps we will agree to disagree on overflights. We continue them and they won’t shoot. Then we will agree, no invasion. We must have some type of inspection of sites, even though it won’t mean much with all the caves and cellars in Cuba. This just becomes an action for the record.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: Now on the subject of Laos. Our information is that it is coming apart. It would be bad if Souvanna left because Laos is an example of something negotiated with the Russians. It is the one ornament of the last two years.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: We can’t bring this up until Cuba is settled. So what about your going to him and pointing out that if fighting breaks out and we have partition, everyone will say that no agreement with the Russians will last more than a few months.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: Well, I thought if we got Cuba settled and if Laos will stay together, then we may have a good chance on Berlin. If he will agree to have the IL-28’s out before Christmas or New Year’s, and will give some type of on-site inspection for the record and understand that we will continue overflights, we will lift the quarantine and make a “no invasion” pledge.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: You go ahead on Laos. We will continue hard on Cuba.

Prime Minister spoke.

President: His conversation with Roberts gives promise. If we can get Cuba settled, we may make progress on Berlin. But from our information it looks like Laos is coming apart. If we can keep Laos together, go ahead on Berlin, we can look at Laos again six months from now.

[Here follows discussion on Yemen and Germany.]

183. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562. Confidential; Priority. Received at 1:22 a.m. and passed to the White House at 1:43 a.m. New York, November 15, 1962, midnight.

1818. Department pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. Policy. In course three-hour meeting with Stevenson and Yost tonightA 23-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, which lasted from 6 to 9:20 p.m. and was held at the Soviet Mission, is in USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, 1A October/November Meetings. at his request Kuznetsov stated he was instructed to tell us that “all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba.” Also stated that offensive weapons will not be reintroduced and that USSR was prepared cooperate in seeking suitable formula and to speak about guarantees about their non-reintroduction. At outset of meeting, before Kuznetsov spoke, Stevenson expressed vigorous reaction to Castro letter to SYGDated November 15, in which Castro also rejected any inspection of Cuban territory. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 459-460. threatening to shoot down US observation planes. Stevenson said this would be very serious matter with predictable consequences. Aerial surveillance was only means we had to assure ourselves in light Soviet failure produce verification in Cuba. He was certain we would issue counter-protest to Cuban protest and hoped this would end issue because consequences would not be our responsibility. Kuznetsov said he had nothing to add to previous Soviet position on overflights.

Reading originally from typewritten text, and frequently reiterating point throughout conversation, Kuznetsov took firm position that time had come to deal with entire settlement of Cuban problem, maintaining all remaining questions must be dealt with together and would then be more easily resolved.

Kuznetsov referred to Soviet-Cuban protocolThe proposed protocol was transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement. previously given SYG, gave us copy and reviewed its general terms listing obligations mainly directed at US. He referred to suggestion for UN Caribbean presence as means verification these obligations as proposal from U Thant and stated Cuban Government was prepared to support UN presence in Caribbean including parts of US and Western Hemisphere with corresponding control of Cuban territory. Noting this was at present scheme only in principle, Kuznetsov maintained that its spelling out would not be difficult for U Thant to arrange on basis equal rights, obligations and verification.

Kuznetsov also suggested that Cuba should be brought into discussions inasmuch as they affected Cuba and dealt with obligations of three governments. He added he was “expressing Soviet opinion for US consideration, of course.”Stevenson rejected proposal pointing out agreement was only between US and USSR.

Stevenson said we had studied Soviet protocol and found it “wholly unsatisfactory”. We did not agree to idea of a protocol and had said on many occasions we were prepared to have mutual declarations in SC in accordance with correspondence.

Stevenson noted Kuznetsov had said nothing about most important question—withdrawal of IL-28’s. Throughout rest of conversation he stressed that this was key issue which now needed to be resolved. Stevenson reiterated we were prepared to lift quarantine when Kuznetsov assured us IL-28’s would be taken out within limited period of time. Kuznetsov said he had nothing to add on IL-28’s.

In response to repeated Kuznetsov position that USSR had fulfilled its obligations and time had come for US to do something Stevenson said that we had made accommodations to Soviets on ship-side inspection and were prepared to lift quarantine when Soviets promised to take IL-28’s out. When all offensive weapons were out and appropriate inspection arranged we would make declaration on invasion. We would also be prepared to recommend in OAS that LA states restore status quo prior October 22 by repealing resolution authorizing quarantine. This would mean all rights and obligations under Rio Pact would apply, including obligations with respect to attack of one state against another. Kuznetsov said USSR did not recognize OAS decisions and was not interested in being involved in how we obtain LA adherence to President’s letter; if US stated it and LA’s would not invade Cuba that would be in accord with spirit of President’s letter.

Re UN presence in Caribbean to which Kuznetsov had referred, Stevenson said we were not aware of any proposal from SYG. We were unable therefore to comment on Kuznetsov’s remarks. We would have to find out more and talk about it later. Kuznetsov took note of this reply and he said he would expect to hear from us further on this point.

Re on-site inspection in Cuba, Kuznetsov reiterated that USSR did not object but agreement of Government of Cuba was required.

Toward end of conversation Stevenson listed unfulfilled obligations as follows:

On part of USSR: Removal of IL-28’s; Assurances all nuclear components, warheads and nuclear aerial bombs, had been removed; (it was in response to this that Kuznetsov made statement that “All nuclear weapons had been removed from Cuba”, adding that he hoped this would be sufficient to put an end to this question.) Provision for on-site inspection in Cuba; Assurances against reintroduction offensive weapons; (thereupon reiterated by Kuznetsov) Soviet suggestions re safeguards on non-reintroduction weapons. (Stevenson subsequently made point that Kuznetsov’s assurances re points 2 and 4 should be repeated in SC.)

On part of US: Lifting of blockade; Assurances against invasion; Seeking cooperation of other LA states with respect to assurances against invasion.

Stevenson concluded with statement that US had assumed no other obligations either to USSR or to Cuba.

At conclusion of meeting Kuznetsov said that their draft protocol contained provisions which should be in any document but that he would appreciate our opinion on their protocol and other suggestions, adding that if all issues were dealt with simultaneously we could reach agreement on form and wording.

Stevenson said we would be glad to prepare and show them statement we would be willing make in SC re assurances against invasion Cuba when USSR had fulfilled its obligations; he hoped we would be able to do so tomorrow. Stressed however no final conclusion could be reached before IL-28’s removed and verification of transaction worked out.

Stevenson also reiterated toward end of conversation that USSR should take careful note of our protest on Cuban threat to shoot at US planes.

Stevenson
184. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret. Washington, November 16, 1962. SUBJECT Status of the negotiations on removal of IL-28’s

We have exchanged a series of messages with Moscow in recent days, and the sum and substance is as follows:

The Soviets say that they will take the IL-28’s out, not now but at some later point, and the offer so far appears to be tied to a series of prior actions on our part: lifting of the blockade, registering assurances, etc. We have made it clear that this is quite unacceptable. Our view is that the first step must be a Soviet order to remove the IL-28’s within a period of 30 days. We have said that when that order is given, we are willing to announce the lifting of the quarantine. We have given a tone of increasing urgency to our messages on this subject, and yesterday we informed Ambassador Dobrynin that this matter was reaching a turning point and that if progress cannot be made, we may soon find ourselves back in a position of increasing tension.Apparent reference to Document 181.

These exchanges with Moscow have included reiteration of our position on the present urgent need for surveillance, and they have produced on the Russian side support for UN observation posts in the Caribbean area, including the U.S. We have replied to this last proposal by indicating that any reciprocal inspection which included the U.S. should logically include appropriate ports of the Soviet Union.

We have strongly attacked the Soviet claim that its part of the bargain has been fulfilled. Our position is that the Soviets are in default on three points: 1) removal of the IL-28’s; 2) on the spot verification of removal; and 3) adequate safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons.

The one piece of information not on the Washington-Moscow channel, which is some novelty, is the statement of Kuznetsov to Stevenson last night that he was instructed to report that “all nuclear weapons have been removed from Cuba.”See Document 183.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
185. Summary Record of the 26th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, November 16, 1962, 11 a.m.

Director McCone presented the intelligence summary.

Upon being informed that Castro’s letter to the UN Acting Secretary General had been released to the press,See footnote 2, Document 183. the President authorized the immediate release of a statement covering our continuing aerial surveillance of Cuba. The President asked that any reply to Castro’s letter be made by the OAS.A statement justifying surveillance and promising continuation of aircraft surveillance of Cuba was released by the Department of State through spokesman Joseph Reap at 12:23 p.m. on November 16.

The members read a summary of the current status of the negotiations on the removal from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers.Document 184.

The President asked how we would prove that strategic missiles would not be reintroduced into Cuba. Secretary Rusk said we could watch the Russian ships with big hatches and [1 line of source text not declassified] monitor the unloading of Russian ships. General Taylor said we should continue low-level reconnaissance. As to a Latin American nuclear-free zone, the President said Ambassador Stevenson had predicted that the UN would not accept this idea.

There was a discussion of the Soviet suggestion that the inspection of Cuba by the UN be matched by similar inspection of the U.S.See Document 183. The point was made that inspection of Cuba and the U.S. cannot be equated. If inspection of the U.S. were to be allowed, we would have to insist on inspecting Russian ports from which the missile ships could sail. The question was asked whether we would be prepared to accept inspection of Guantanamo Base, of Cuban camps in the U.S. and of Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk said that the short-term problem of inspection of offensive missiles related only to Cuba. The long-term problem of inspecting to prevent the reintroduction of missiles might be done by a UN commission charged with maintaining peace in the Caribbean. This commission might look at all complaints that peace in the area was being disturbed. Thus, the commission would not be limited geographically to Cuba but could inspect in the U.S. and in Latin American countries.

The President said that it appeared the Soviets were offering inspection in Cuba in return for inspection in Florida. Mr. Bundy said we might discuss some reciprocal inspection which we would not be prepared to implement as long as Castro was in Cuba.

The Attorney General commented that aerial reconnaissance upsets both the Russians and Castro. He predicted that Castro would accept inspection.

The President repeated his view that we should not give a pledge not to invade Cuba until we have adequate assurances protecting us against the reintroduction of strategic missiles. He asked whether we could not insist that only Cuba be inspected.

The Attorney General said he did not think that we could sell to the American people an inspection of Florida. Any adequate inspection must include not only Cuba but also two or three Soviet ports.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we not try to spell out the geographical limitations of the inspection. The President responded that we would have to limit inspection to Florida in any proposal that we might consider.

Mr. McCone expressed his concern that the Soviet military base would remain in Cuba. He considered this a more important consideration than the IL-28 bombers. If we allow a continuing Soviet military presence in Cuba we must have an inspection system. The SAM sites could ensure that we could not use U-2s to tell us of any military buildup. Without the U-2s, the Russians could secretly build up their forces in the interior of Cuba.

Mr. McCloy expressed his view that the Soviet military presence in Cuba will die on the vine. With the missiles and the IL-28 bombers removed, the remainder of the Soviet forces would then be withdrawn. The best Russian equipment now in Cuba will gradually be withdrawn because it was put there to guard the strategic missiles.

Mr. McCone expressed a reservation by pointing out that the Russians may have decided to use Cuba as a staging area for subversion in Latin America.

The President said we had the alternative of making a realistic proposal or a proposal which we know in advance they would reject and therefore provide grounds for us to hold back on any assurance against invasion. He asked what effect the two courses of action would have on our worldwide policy toward the USSR.

Ambassador Thompson replied that Khrushchev must decide shortly which road to go down. He needs to get the Cuban problem buttoned down and go on to other problems in order to continue along the existing coexistence line.

Secretary Rusk argued that we should stay put on our present position of lifting the quarantine in return for getting the IL-28 bombers out of Cuba. He would hold off on proposals covering the long-term inspection problem. He pointed out that a UN presence in Cuba had been turned down, that the proposal to have the International Red Cross conduct the inspection had been turned down, that the UN proposal to name five Latin American Ambassadors as inspectors, and later any five Ambassadors as inspectors, had also been rejected. He said it was not necessary for us to keep on making new proposals. He opposed any Cuba/Florida inspection deal now. He urged that we stay where we are and felt that we should continue to support an arrangement based on reciprocity rather than on geography.

The President pointed out that our policy of not giving an invasion assurance until we have acceptable inspection arrangements puts Khrushchev under heavy pressure. Secretary Rusk replied that we should be in no hurry to work out long-range arrangements. Khrushchev knows we are not going to invade Cuba. We should keep the situation fluid in the event that the Soviets come to favor a coup in Cuba. In such event they would want assurances that we would not interfere with their staged coup.

The President said it would be all right to wait unless Khrushchev is blocked on negotiations on other problems and if he is not further pushed by the Communist Chinese.

Secretary Dillon doubted that our negotiations with the Russians over Cuba would affect the Russians’ worldwide policy.

Mr. McCloy expressed Ambassador Stevenson’s view of the current situation: The negotiations in New York are deadlocked. The Soviets can’t deliver arrangements for on-site inspection because of Castro’s opposition, and hence, we can’t give assurances against invasion. We can give a conditional assurance if the Soviets continue to behave, i.e., take out the missiles, move to take out the IL-28 bombers, and assure us there are no nuclear warheads in Cuba. There has been considerable talk about a nuclear-free zone, but if we choose to support this idea, we will have to go through the OAS and this will take a considerable amount of time.

Secretary Rusk called attention to the difficulty of formulating any statement about our not invading Cuba. If we put in the conditions which we must, the statement comes out sounding as if we were all ready to invade.

The President asked that a statement covering our policy toward invasion be prepared for his use at his Tuesday press conference.For text of the statement as made on Tuesday, November 20, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 461-462. If we have no agreement from the Russians, the statement would take one form. If the Russians have agreed in New York to our current position, Mr. McCloy could tell the Russians what the President was planning to say at his press conference, namely, we will invade Cuba only if it becomes a military threat to its neighbors or if civil war develops. The President said that we would understand privately that such a position would cover only the next two years. Reference should be made to the President’s September 13th statement which said that pending arms verification arrangements in Cuba, we would continue our overflights unobtrusively.

The President suggested that we give to Kuznetsov the evidence we have of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. He asked that the State Department spell out exactly what we would accept as verification of Soviet arms in Cuba.

Mr. McCloy said we scared the Russians off their insistence on a protocol containing our invasion assurances by telling them that a protocol would require Congressional approval.

The President said he did not want any protocol on the invasion guarantee but merely a statement of our position. He asked that by Tuesday there be a detailed response to accusations that Soviet missiles are being hidden in Cuban caves. He said Mr. McCloy should ask the Russians in New York what their intentions are concerning their continued military presence in Cuba. He also said we needed to be in a position to respond to a Brazilian proposal for an atom-free zone.

The President asked for an analysis of the Soviet-Chinese differences including an estimate of the effect of the split on Khrushchev’s authority and on Communist parties worldwide.

Secretary McNamara requested authority for high-level flights but said he did not favor flying low-level missions. General Taylor reported that the Chiefs wanted to continue low-level missions. Secretary McNamara said the decision should be made on political grounds rather than military. The President decided to suspend low-level flights planned for tomorrow in the expectation that we might receive a reply from Khrushchev today. High-level flights were authorized.

Concluding a discussion on what we would do if a surveillance plane were shot at or destroyed, the President accepted Secretary McNamara’s recommendation that we defer a decision on the proposed courses of action until we have further word from Khrushchev with respect to the negotiations in New York.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, November 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 24-32a)

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
186. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret. JCSM-910-62 Washington, November 16, 1962. SUBJECT Status of Readiness for the Cuban Operation (C) The Joint Chiefs of Staff are glad to report that our Armed Forces are in an optimum posture to execute CINCLANT OPLANS312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba) OPLAN 312-62 evolved during the summer and early fall of 1962 as the build up of air-power in Cuba became apparent. The plan entailed the use of 500 tactical fighter aircraft and carrier aircraft in a series of strikes against Cuban offensive weapons. Initial strikes would eliminate SAM sites and associated conventional AA defenses. These strikes would be followed by massive attacks on Cuban hostile aircraft and other offensive weapons including, after their presence was discovered and until they were withdrawn, MRBMs and IRBMs. Subsequent attacks would target troop concentrations, artillery, and armor. (Cuban Crisis, Operational Aspects, December 26, 1962; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, High-level Exchange) and 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba).For a description of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, see footnote 1, Document 150. We are not only ready to take any action you may order in Cuba, we are also in an excellent condition world-wide to counter any Soviet military response to such action. Our status of readiness includes: SAC is maintaining 1/8 airborne alert and has implemented its force dispersal plan. An increased SIOP generation rate—1,456 aircraft and 355 missiles, including 80 Polaris missiles—is being maintained. Continental Air Defense Command interceptor forces have occupied their wartime dispersal bases and are partially deployed at increased alert (about 1/3). Special defensive measures have been taken to protect the Southeast, with particular attention to Florida. Air forces involved in CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 in daylight hours can respond for selective attack in graduated increments from two to twelve hours, according to the application of force desired. Amphibious and assault forces are at a high state of readiness, providing a seven-day reaction capability for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 following the air strike (CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62), with accelerated introduction of follow-on forces. All naval units are in a high state of readiness. In response to your request, we have studied the need for augmentation of forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62 and have concluded that while the forces originally included in the plan are probably adequate, it would be prudent to earmark additional forces as a ready reserve for the operation. Accordingly, we are planning to earmark the 5th Infantry Division, at approximately 20,000 strength including supporting forces, and a combat command (strength 6,800) of the 2nd Armored Division for possible commitment as reserve forces for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62; but these units will not be moved from home stations until S-day for OPLAN 312-62. Utilization of the increased Army and Marine forces will require an additional 16 transports, 68 cargo ships, and 11 LSTs. The LSTs and 15 transports would come from the Reserve Fleet, would require approximately 45 days to activate and assemble on the east coast, and would cost an estimated $28 million. For the total shipping requirements of the augmented Plan, chartering, requisitioning, and prepositioning of 60 cargo ships must be accomplished well in advance of execution of the Plan. The chartering/requisitioning of the remaining 105 cargo ships would require at least 30 days. The 5th MEB (Marine Expeditionary Brigade), at approximately 9,000 strength, has transited the Panama Canal, is in the Caribbean and has been added to the assault force. The advanced alert levels, if maintained for a protracted period, can reduce the over-all capability of the force because of maintenance and training short-falls. The current status of alert can be maintained for about 30 more days without adverse effect. After that time we could maintain the following reaction capability: With forces in present posture (Defense Condition 3) OPLAN 312-62 (Air Attack in Cuba)—12 hours OPLAN 316-62 (Invasion of Cuba)—7 days With forces largely returned to home bases (Defense Condition 5) OPLAN 312-62—2 days OPLAN 316-62“5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and its organic shipping excepted.” [Footnote in the source text.]—10 to 12 days The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend staying in the present posture for the immediate future. For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:Maxwell D. TaylorChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff
187. Paper Prepared for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) for a Meeting With President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Washington, November 16, 1962.

CHAIRMAN’S TALKING PAPER FOR MEETING WITH THEPRESIDENT

The Chiefs appreciate the opportunity to discuss some aspects of the current negotiations bearing on the IL-28’s and other matters related to Cuba. To lead-off, they would like to express their unqualified support for the insistence of our government upon the withdrawal of the IL-28’s. While these aircraft are of less military significance than the IRBM’s and MRBM’s which have withdrawn, their continued presence in Cuba would present a long-term threat to the continental United States, would consequently require a higher level of air defense of our southeastern states and would give deep concern to many parts of Latin America. These factors added to the public statements of our Government on the need for their withdrawal convince the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the IL-28’s must go. The Chiefs are aware of the offer to exchange a lifting of the quarantine for Khrushchev’s removal of the IL-28’s and will regret the possible loss of this useful naval tool if the offer is accepted. If the Soviets decline the offer, the quarantine will provide an immediate means to apply pressure both on Khrushchev and on Castro not only to remove the IL-28’s but also to obtain other ends such as the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and the acceptance of an inspection system. After appropriate warning to Khrushchev of our intentions, the Chiefs would favor a general extension of the quarantine to include a complete blockade of POL products. Concurrently, we should continue air surveillance and withhold any assurance against the invasion of Cuba. If the expanded quarantine did not succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of the IL-28s, we should be prepared to take them out by air attack. Even if the IL-28’s are negotiated out of Cuba, there will remain weapons systems of significant military importance; the MIG’s, the SAM’s, the air defense control system, and the large stocks of modern Army equipment which we have seen in our recent photography. The air defense weapons will be a constant threat to our surveillance of Cuba while the Army weapons may be used against Guantanamo or against any invasion attempt. But more important than this equipment are the thousands of Soviet military personnel who remain in Cuba to man it. The Soviet presence in Cuba poses a particularly sensitive problem to the United States. When the extent of this presence is known and the weapons systems remaining in Soviet hands are thoroughly appreciated, it will be clear to the Western Hemisphere that it has indeed been invaded and remains invaded by the Soviet Union. Under these conditions, we may anticipate a loud popular demand in the United States and in Latin America for the removal of the Soviet personnel and neutralization of their weapons. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the United States should generate now all the pressure possible to get the Soviet personnel out, feeling that their eviction is far more important than that of the equipment. The Chiefs are very much interested in the terms in which any assurance to Castro may eventually be couched, feeling that it would be damaging to our national interest and to the sense of security of our Latin American allies to create the impression of underwriting Castro for an indefinite period without careful qualification. If it is considered necessary to give Castro any assurance, the Chiefs feel that it should be tied to Khrushchev’s proposal in his 26 October letter to withdraw Soviet forces from Cuba, and to cease giving military aid to Castro. Also the assurance should be given without affecting our commitments under the Rio Pact and should be linked to concurrent good behavior on the part of Castro and to acceptance by the Castro government of continued air surveillance. The Chiefs recognize both the importance and the difficulty of obtaining an adequate verification system in Cuba. While sympathetic with their purpose, the Chiefs do not like two of the current proposals for inspection and verification. The first is the proposal from Ambassador Stevenson for a UN inspection system of the Caribbean or Central America. The Chiefs do not favor it because of its reciprocal features, its doubtful effectiveness and the danger of having it regarded as a substitute for effective aerial surveillance. The second is the Brazilian suggestion for the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Latin America. Apart from objections to the precedent of supporting such a proposal for any part of the world, and the divided opinion among our allies on this subject, we do not see any way to obtain from the proposal a satisfactory verification system for Cuba. Consequently, we would advise against supporting it. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend at this juncture: That the IL-28’s be removed from Cuba, preferably by negotiation—otherwise by blockade followed, if need be, by military action. That the removal of Soviet personnel from Cuba be made an immediate objective of negotiations with the USSR. That any assurance to Castro be hedged by conditions protecting our obligations under the Rio Pact and linking the duration of the assurance to good behavior by Castro and the acceptance of air surveillance. That in seeking a means of long-term verification and inspection, which we consider essential, we oppose the proposals for a reciprocal UN inspection of the Caribbean and for a nuclear free zone in Latin America.
188. Memorandum of a Conference With President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Meetings with the President, 10/61-11/62. Secret. The meeting lasted until 4:55 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, November 16, 1962, 4 p.m. OTHERS PRESENT General Taylor General Wheeler Admiral Anderson General LeMay General Shoup General Clifton

The meeting opened by General Taylor presenting three papers to the President in response to some of the President’s inquiries. One paper concerned the level of readiness that we have achieved and the ability to hold this level.The paper on the issue of level of readiness is Document 186; the other papers have not been further identified. All the Chiefs reported that they could maintain this readiness without any hardship for another month, and so recommended.

General Taylor and General LeMay reported that they had altered the SAC readiness so that each crew is getting one training sortie per week. They said that this was satisfactory for the moment.

General Taylor then led an additional discussion on plans and their modification, if necessary.See Document 187.

The President asked several questions about leave and rest policies for men away from home, and the Air Force reserves that had been called up recently.

There was considerable discussion about Soviet ground forces in Cuba.

There was a lengthy discussion of shipping and LSTs, and the President approved a recommendation that they get the LSTs out and maintain them.

Admiral Anderson reported on a meeting between the head of MSTS and shipowners and labor unions.

General Taylor summarized the views of the Joint Chiefs on the present situation, and each Chief in turn spoke about his particular zone of interest. General Wheeler showed pictures and gave a considerable discussion.

The President read to the Chiefs the letter from Chairman Khrushchev and the President’s reply which went out this morning.Documents 176 and 181. He gave the Chiefs a resume of his present feeling and disposition in regard to this situation.

The President thanked the Chiefs for coming to the meeting.

C.V. CliftonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
189. Memorandum of Conversation Between President Kennedy and Former President EisenhowerSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone, who was present at the meeting. The meeting was held at McCone’s residence. November 17, 1962, 9 to 10:10 a.m.

The meeting was arranged as a result of a decision reached between K and E at Mr. .Roosevelt’s funeral, that they should meet at an early date and the meeting should be with me present, but under circumstances in which there would be no Press or public recognition that the meeting had taken place.Kennedy and Eisenhower were attending the inauguration of Dulles Airport. This meeting apparently took place there, but it is not included in Kennedy’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library)

President explained to E the present status of the Cuban situation and the problems attendant to the removal of the IL 28s, the inspection to verify that all offensive missiles had gone, and inspection arrangements against reintroduction. Kennedy reviewed all of the various proposals that had been made, each one of which had been rejected by Castro, and concluded, stating that as matters stood at the present time, we would have to depend for the immediate future on aerial surveillance.

The President throughout the conversation expressed the thought that while it was possible there was some deception in connection with the 42 missiles removed, the probability was strong that this number were actually removed, that having had to withdraw it would be probably most unlikely that the Soviets would make a further attempt to introduce offensive missiles. There was general agreement on this point. General Eisenhower raised the question of deception and the possibility, however remote, that what we looked at were sections of large diameter pipe and that the missiles were actually retained. McCone made the point that the examination of the photography gave reasonable assurance that what we were looking at was missiles and furthermore there were accompanying the shipments of missiles, which were stored on deck, large quantities of clearly identifiable related equipment as well as personnel and hence it was reasonable to conclude that missiles had actually been taken away.

The conversation then turned to the rumors and reports which were disturbing to the American public of missiles being hidden in caves, etc. McCone stated that these reports were bound to remain because in addition to the offensive missiles there were four other types of missiles, and these did remain in Cuba and they would be seen from time to time and therefore we would always be confronted with the problem of “missiles in Cuba”.

It was Eisenhower’s very strong recommendation that the President at an early opportunity make a very positive statement that we were taking actions which would guarantee insofar as possible our knowledge of what was going on in Cuba and that he was going to insist that these actions, which included aerial surveillance, be continued and that he can give the American public some confidence in assurances that their security was not being endangered by clandestine Soviet activities. The President responded that he intended to make such a statement on Tuesday.On Tuesday, November 20, Kennedy read a statement at his press conference announcing the lifting of the blockade. In that statement, he said that as Cuba had not permitted U.N. verification and there were no safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons, “this Government has no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838) It was agreed that this statement should reflect initiative on the part of the President and the Administration.

[Here follows discussion of Berlin and reorganization of the National Security Council.]

The meeting was cordial and constructive. Both President Kennedy and General Eisenhower expressed their appreciation to me and their desire to continue communication one with the other in about the same form and in the manner of this meeting.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director

Add 11/19/62:

During the conversation General Eisenhower stated with some emphasis that he did not believe that our actions in Cuba would necessarily cause the Soviets to react in a retaliatory manner in some other tense location:Eisenhower presented many examples. He pointed out for instance that many Soviet experts predicted that his initiative in Lebanon would be met by Soviet actions in Berlin or elsewhere, however the reverse was true. The same situation developed elsewhere. Eisenhower therefore urged the President not to permit his course of action in Cuba to be dictated by fear of Soviet action elsewhere or an attempt to appraise in advance the type of actions Soviets might take elsewhere. Note: This point appealed to me as being particularly significant because it is the direct opposite of the advice that the President has been given by Ambassador Thompson and others who are presumably Soviet experts.

JAMPrinted from a copy that bears these typed initials.
190. Summary Record of the 26th-A Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting, which took place in Secretary Rusk’s conference room in the Department of State, lasted until 4:08, although Rusk continued to meet with Cleveland, Bundy, Johnson, and Ball for the rest of the afternoon until 5:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) Washington, November 17, 1962, 2:30 p.m.

President and Vice President absent

Others attending:Rusk, Thompson, A. Johnson, Cleveland, Bundy, Murrow, Nitze, Taylor, McNamara, Gilpatric, Dillon, McCone

The members revised and recommended to the President a press statement to be made TuesdayNovember 20; see footnote 2, Document 189. in the event the Russians have agreed to withdraw the IL-28 bombers within the next 3-4 weeks. The members discussed and revised a draft letter and declaration (USUN 1835)Dated November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1662) See the Supplement. but decided not to send it to Kuznetsov now or to authorize McCloy to inform Kuznetsov tomorrow of its contents. A decision as to when to give the Russians the letter is to be made Monday. Secretary Rusk will inform McCloy that in his talk with Kuznetsov tomorrow he is to stay within the limits of our last two letters to Khrushchev and not discuss a package proposal. McCloy may discuss the situation which will exist Tuesday if we have not received a favorable decision on the IL-28 bombers before the President makes a statement to the American people on the Cuban crisis.Rusk did so in a November 17 letter to McCloy. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1762) See the Supplement. There was a prolonged discussion as to whether low-level reconnaissance flights should be made tomorrow and Monday. Secretary Rusk will recommend to the President that no low-level flights should be made tomorrow and a decision can be made later as to Monday’s low-level flights.McCone prepared a brief memorandum of this meeting in which he noted that McNamara was opposed to low-level reconnaissance, stating that “there were no targets which demanded immediate surveillance and he preferred to depend on high-level flying.”McCone noted that he, Bundy, and Thompson advocated high-level flights, but the decision was made not to fly on Sunday, November 18. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, November 19; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) Among the factors discussed were: There is no military requirement for low-level flights on Sunday and Monday. If a plane is shot down, we must react. If many more days go by without low-level flights, the Cubans and others might think that the Cuban threat to shoot down our reconnaissance planes has scared us away from further missions. The effect of reconnaissance missions on the IL-28 negotiations—some believe this keeps pressure on; others believe we should tell the Russians we are not flying low-level missions in order to avoid complicating the IL-28 decision. Missions could be flown over heavily fortified areas with some risk of being shot down by Cuban antiaircraft fire or could be flown over rural areas where risk of hostile Cuban action would be very low but the Cubans and the Soviets would know we were flying low-level missions. State Department circulated a paper for later consideration on Caribbean security arrangements.Not found. Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
191. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-1962. Top Secret; Priority. Received at 2:32 a.m. Passed to the White House at 2:44 a.m. New York, November 19, 1962, 1 a.m.

1856. Department pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba—meeting between McCloy and Kuznetsov, Sunday, November 18, 1962.

Arrived at Soviet residence, old George Pratt Estate at Locust Valley, accompanied by Mr. . McCloy and son. Met by Kuznetsov, Zorin, Mr. . Zorin, Mendelevich, Morozov and translator Zherebtsov. Played Russian billiards and then had lunch. After lunch in presence of Kuznetsov, Zorin, Mendelevich and translator we had coffee and talk, which was conducted entirely in English.

Kuznetsov said he thought we were stalling in our negotiations; that they felt they had done all that could be expected of them and we had done very little to bring about rapid solution of Cuban problem. Then Kuznetsov said he would like to ask McCloy his impression of where we stood. McCloy said that he was glad to have opportunity to tell Kuznetsov just where he thought we stood.

In first place, we were getting nowhere by constant repetition on their part that they had done everything and we had done nothing. This simply not case and reiteration merely interfered with progress. It was necessary state what we had done.

In spite of assurances we had received directly from highest levels of Soviet Government no offensive weapons in Cuba and more specifically no weapons there capable of reaching targets in U.S. Soviet nuclear weapons had been secretly introduced into Cuba at same time we were receiving these assurances. Yet President, who was shocked by this revelation, did not thereupon take direct action against these weapons as we had full capacity to do. Instead President, although misled by these assurances, determined upon action which gave both sides time to work matter out. This was first important thing that we had done. This was done in spite of continuation of Mr. Zorin’s false position in UN.

Next, we had advised Kuznetsov that on temporary basis and in order to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships we had worked out hail and pass arrangement in connection with quarantine on Soviet assurance that no more weapons were being introduced into Cuba from Soviet Union. President had done this to relieve tensions and we were glad to note that Soviet Premier had responded in kind by prompt action in taking out 42 missiles which Soviets stated they had introduced into Cuba, as well as providing for reasonable means checkout at sea.

Next, President, in spite of fact that Soviet Premier had committed himself to removal of jet bombers as weapons that we considered offensive, offered to raise quarantine on assurance from Soviet Premier that orders had been given to remove bombers within limited period. This major concession on part of President as he had stated and it had been agreed in the October 27-28 exchange that quarantine would not be lifted and assurance against invasion given until there had been UN verification on ground of removal of weapons and adequate assurance against their reintroduction. Soviet Premier had stated that weapons were to be removed under UN observation but no steps leading to this observation had been accomplished due large part to obduracy of Cuban Government. Although we felt Soviet Union in position to compel Cuba to permit such observation we aware irresponsibility of Castro and have sincerely attempted to cooperate with Soviet Union pending such time as verification worked out. This problem related to Soviet commitment to provide adequate arrangements to guard against reintroduction of weapons. We aware this not easy problem but must be solved and does no good to pretend that problem does not exist or that one can act as if prior conditions had already been fulfilled. They have not been.

Removal of bombers cannot be indefinitely postponed based on accomplishment of some vague future event. Offer to lift quarantine very difficult step for President to take inasmuch as he had announced to nation that lifting of quarantine was dependent upon UN observation and upon receipt of adequate assurance against reintroduction of weapons. In other words, President was prepared to waive one of preconditions even though public opinion throughout US demanding that no relief from quarantine be given until all conditions met. President had taken this action largely in response to Soviet Premier’s prompt and effective action largely in regard to missiles. This action shows we are neither trying to starve out Cubans nor to be unresponsive to any constructive action taken by Soviet Union. If this offer does not result in removal of bombers President will have no choice but to reimpose quarantine in fully effective form. Effort to relate removal of bombers to some final conclusions regarding verification and arrangements for guaranteeing against reintroduction is no more appropriate than it would have been to delay removal of missiles. McCloy suggested though he could not commit his government it might be possible to work arrangements out for checking out bombers without stopping Soviet ships as had been arrangement with missiles. McCloy then stated that President was going to have a press conference this Tuesday;See footnote 2, Document 189. that he had postponed it in the interest of giving Soviets ample opportunity to respond to his request regarding IL-28’s but on Tuesday he will have to say something about bombers. President will be placed in very difficult position if not able to say that Soviets have agreed to get bombers out without further conditions. If he cannot do this it will put in question whether in fact we have an agreement with Soviet Union in regard to removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

McCloy next referred to assurances that we were prepared to give in regard to invasion. First, he made it clear we were not going to have anything to do with so-called document for which Zorin had been pressing,The text of this document was transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement. presenting as it does a lot of things never mentioned or covered in letters of October 27-28 and including in very thinly disguised form conditions Castro has insisted upon before he will cooperate in any way with settlement of issue which he did so much to create. We will not sign any document embodying these or any other such conditions. We prepared to give our solemn declaration in UN based upon Soviet declaration and fulfillment of conditions precedented that have so often been specifically stated. Cubans can make any declarations they see fit in UN or elsewhere but we will not be a party to them. Castro has defied Soviet Union, US and UN and any proposal to conform to his wishes in return for this defiance is out of the question. Certainly it is nothing with which US can be associated.

US prepared, assuming we can dispose of the IL-28 matter, to sit down with Soviet representatives and attempt to draw our respective declarations in UN. We will do all we can to hasten and record them. US declaration will be very simple. It will be not to invade, assuming fulfillment of conditions and we will be prepared to recommend to or use our good offices in connection with other Western Hemisphere countries to take same position as we do assuming Cuba does not institute aggression against them. We should not have much trouble in dealing with wording of declaration but are only wasting time in talking about any such document as has been presented to US by Kuznetsov. McCloy also referred to fact that any suggestion of document with two or three signatories appended to it such as was suggested by Soviet Union would take on character of treaty which might well require consent of two-thirds of Senate and it might be years before such consent could be obtained. Moreover, in McCloy’s judgment would never be recommended to Senate by President. Way to proceed is to get IL-28 issue settled and they would find US quick to give our best thought to next steps to wind up whole transaction.

There was no doubt that we have problem in connection with verification and reintroduction but suggestion that in order to obtain Castro’s consent we should have reciprocal UN observation in US as well as in Cuba is something entirely new and never contemplated by October 27-28 exchange. We should not attempt to appease Castro in this form. No inspection of US would be reciprocal without inspection also of Soviet Union.

At this point McCloy said that one of reasons that caused US to look carefully at assurances regarding reintroduction of weapons into Cuba was full development now of our information in regard to extent of Soviet military presence in Cuba. We were not introducing any new conditions but we were pointing out that military presence there so far transcended any technician status that we had to be cautious about this matter of reintroduction. We had confirmed presence of Soviet combat command and presence of number of fully manned Soviet combat teams organized in precisely same manner as army units in Soviet Union. We have identified units and at proper time we would be prepared to give evidence of this military command before UN orelsewhere. We were convinced that introduction of these units and formation of this command was component of whole attempt to change nuclear balance by introduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba. They bore no relation to the defense of Cuba as such but were part of defense of Soviet missile batteries that have been installed in Cuba.

There could be no hope of “normalization” of conditions in Caribbean as long as these units were there in this form and quantity. As long as they were there possibility of another surreptitious reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Cuba which these units would again be in position to defend, exists. Soviet Union must therefore understand our caution in regard to assurance against reintroduction of these weapons and giving of our own assurance against invasion. McCloy emphasized we were not introducing any new conditions but were simply pointing out emphasis which we had to place on presence of these units and their relation to matter of reintroduction of nuclear weapons.

We are quite as anxious as Soviet Union to wind up this transaction for there are number of things we ought to be discussing in order to keep this situation from arising again. Today it is Cuba and combination of this bearded figure who is dictator in Cuba and certain miscalculation on part of Soviet Union that almost brought us to war. Tomorrow it may be something else. In this connection McCloy said he was concerned about Chinese-Indian war. This seemed to be reaching very substantial proportions. It could easily develop into something that would cause both of us trouble in future and he wondered what thinking of Soviet Union was in regard to this. It may not be too soon for us to exchange some thoughts about it so that we would not have to act hastily and without careful prior thought if we were faced with some development there that again challenged peace of the world. Did Kuznetsov have any thoughts about China and how this war could be kept from becoming new threat to peace?

To this Kuznetsov responded that this situation caused them some concern. That was problem that troubled them and perhaps at some time some discussion could be undertaken about it. Said that this was his view but he could not speak for his government at this point. He added, however, that it was situations such as this that pointed to necessity for concluding Cuban affair promptly so that other matters and problems of concern to us both could be faced with benefit of successful solution of Cuban problem behind us.

Kuznetsov then repeated position of Soviet Union; namely, that they were prepared to consider removal of IL-28’s but that this must be done in connection with solution of other problems relating to Cuba. They would like to have removal coincide with final solution. He repeated that they had impression that we were merely putting up one obstacle after another and if IL-28 matter were solved we would have another precondition. At this point he said that we should undertake at time IL-28’s were removed to stop our overflights.

McCloy said he was disappointed Soviets were still attempting to postpone dealing with bombers until all problems connected with verification and reintroduction were settled. This would take some time and we would have to have some consultation with other countries in this hemisphere before we could give all assurances against invasion that Soviet Union was seeking. McCloy again referred to need for clearing up this matter before President’s Tuesday press conference. Though it was clear that Kuznetsov had no authority to accept proposal in regard to IL-28’s which had been offered, he did ask McCloy to repeat just what offer consisted of, which was done.

Kuznetsov came back to U Thant’s proposal for reciprocal UN observation and each time he did McCloy said he found great difficulties with it and stressed necessity if there was to be UN observation in US there had also to be reciprocity UN observation in Soviet Union.

Kuznetsov said in regard to assurance against reintroduction he did not know what Soviet Union could do except to solemnly declare it was not going to reintroduce weapons and asked what other guarantees we had in mind.

Kuznetsov also said he wanted to repeat at this time that he was now authorized to say that no nuclear weapons whatsoever were any longer on territory of Cuba. Please, he said, do not complicate situation by insisting upon interminable inspection on ground. It would be impossible to go all over Cuba turning over every stone, looking into every cave and into every bathroom to determine whether nuclear weapons still existed there. They were going to reaffirm that all nuclear weapons had been removed and that they were not going to reintroduce them.

McCloy said he wanted to have it clear that we were not in any way contemplating stopping of overflights in Cuba unless and until we were sure that there was not going to be any reintroduction of these weapons. We are doing utmost to keep overflights to minimum but in absence of any adequate verification this was only thing we could do and he repeated that overflights had probably saved us from war and they might do so again. McCloy made it clear that we would return fire if our planes were shot at; that we were going to do as we had been doing in past, i.e., keep overflights to minimum necessary to protect ourselves and hemisphere.

Kuznetsov was cordial throughout. Zorin was as difficult as ever. At end Kuznetsov said that he was glad to have had this frank discussion of our position; that he was troubled about our position in regard to verification and assurances against reintroduction as he could see how discussions in regard to these might go on interminably with our putting up obstacles to giving our assurance against invasion.

We left with no understanding in regard to future meeting and with no indication from Kuznetsov that they would give way in regard to IL-28’s other than to say that they would consider removal of IL-28’s in connection with solution of verification and reintroduction problems.

McCloy asked Kuznetsov if he had any word about Mikoyan. Kuznetsov said he still had no definite word as to when he was coming back.

Stevenson
192. Summary Record of the 27th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 10:55 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A. Washington, November 19, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone summarized the week-end intelligenceBased in part on CIA Memorandum [document number not declassified], November 19; “The Crisis, USSR/Cuba: Information as of 0600 19 November 1962.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba) See the Supplement. and commented on orders issued to Cuban anti-aircraft units to fire on reconnaissance planes.

Secretary Rusk reported on yesterday’s McCloy/Kuznetsov talk (attached is copy of USUN message 1856).Document 191. He said the Russians in New York consider the IL-28’s to be part of the deal, but we have received no word yet from Khrushchev.

Secretary Rusk initiated a general discussion of the need for overflights and the effect of such flights on the Cubans and the Russians. Secretary McNamara commented that the overflight problem is primarily a political one. General Taylor recommended that there be six low-level sorties, some over the harbor of Mantanzas in order to watch incoming Soviet ships. The planes would be over Cuba less than eight minutes and would fly at tree-top level.

The President said the decision on flying low-level today is political. Our intelligence on the orders to the Cubans to fire on U.S. reconnaissance planes is hard. By not going today do we increase the chance of a settlement or if one of our planes is fired on, and we retaliate, would that increase our chances of settlement?

Mr. McCloy recommended against low-level flights today. Secretary Rusk, however, was concerned by the effect on the OAS and on NATO if it becomes public knowledge that the U.S. has flown no low-level mission since Castro threatened to shoot down our reconnaissance planes.

The President decided that no low-level flights would be flown today. High-level missions were authorized. On WednesdayNovember 21. we should plan to fly low-level. He asked that we examine, possibly next week, those military actions to be taken in retaliation for a shootdown.

General Taylor said existing plans call for an armed air reconnaissance and then an attack on the offending anti-aircraft site. Secretary McNamara noted that our plans call for two hours’ advance notice before we attack Cuban territory.

The President made a comment, which was not clear, about photographs taken of our airfields by U.S. reconnaissance planes.

The President asked what was the impact on Khrushchev of the Indo-Chinese fighting.

Ambassador Thompson, reverting to an earlier question, said we should keep the way open to a coexistence line. The imposition of the quarantine would be very hard for the Russians to take. Therefore, we should act against the Cubans in Cuba. Mr. Bundy noted that we have given Khrushchev every escape hatch for the IL-28 bombers. If he does not now give in and remove them, there will be another serious Soviet miscalculation.

Mr. Nitze commented that the Russians wanted us to attack the Cuban anti-aircraft sites.

The President commented that we are heading down the road to a choice. Either the IL-28s will come out and we will continue to fly high-level missions, or if the Russians refuse to withdraw the bombers, we are heading for a new showdown on Thursday or Friday.November 22 and 23. We will wait today on the low-level flights and we will fly only when we believe it necessary for intelligence reasons, not as harassment.

Mr. Bundy said the scenario called for no action until tomorrow when, if we received no answer, we would seek to obtain OAS support for our demand that the IL-28 bombers be withdrawn. The next move would involve military pressure.

Under Secretary Ball commented on his recent briefing of the NATO Council in Paris.A report of Ball’s briefing is in Polto 577 from Paris, November 20. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-2062) See the Supplement. He said he was surprised at the unanimous reaction that we had let the Russians off too easily and had not demanded the elimination of the Soviet base in Cuba. He said our European allies would support us in finishing the job and that there would be no objection to putting pressure on the Russians again via a blockade.

The President said he was not sure that a quarantine is the right response to the shooting down of a plan or the refusal to pull out the IL-28 bombers. How can Khrushchev submit a second time? Secretary Dillon responded that Khrushchev could take the quarantine more easily than a U.S. attack on Cuba. Mr. Nitze said that under Communist doctrine a Communist state can back down in the face of the superior position of an enemy. Mr. Bundy pointed out that we would be acting not against the Soviets by hitting Cuba.

The President was given a paper on proposed actions in the OAS involving conversations in advance with OAS powers with respect to our air surveillance.Not found. Secretary Rusk said primarily we would be reporting our actions to the OAS. Secretary Dillon felt that inspection covering the IL-28 bombers should be an arrangement with the OAS rather than the UN.

The President said in the UN we could stress verification and in the OAS we could concentrate on the demand that the Russians withdraw the IL-28 bombers which are dangerous to other Latin American states.

In summarizing the present situation, the President said we now have no inspection and no safeguards on the reintroduction of offensive weapons. Castro has rejected UN inspection and now he has concentrated his opposition on arrangements for national inspection. He asked that a statement be prepared for his use on the assumption that we have no Russian response to our IL-28 bomber withdrawal demand. We should emphasize Castro’s rejection of ground inspection, thus requiring the continuance of air surveillance. We should seek to get the OAS to re-enforce our right to continue air surveillance.

Mr. Murrow commented that the Latin Americans are of the view that we are not doing enough against Castro.

The President requested that later in the day he be given a paper containing recommended courses of political and military actions which may have to be taken this week if we have no reply on the IL-28 bombers. This would include a recommendation as to what we would do if Khrushchev offers to take out the IL-28 bombers if our air surveillance ends.A draft contingency paper containing as Part IV, “Action in the Event Khrushchev Agrees to Withdraw IL-28’s” was prepared on November 19. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62)

(At a meeting in the Cabinet Room at 6:00 PM on November 19 without the President or the Vice President,McCone prepared a record of the meeting held at 6 p.m. on November 19, in which the contingency plan cited in footnote 7 was revised, a message from Kennedy to Adenauer, De Gaulle, and Macmillan was revised and approved, and it was decided that the OAS meeting should be “informative” and that a resolution should not be submitted. (Memorandum by McCone, November 20; Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B1285A, DCI Meetings with President, 1 July 1962-31 December 1962) See the Supplement. The approved messages to Adenauer, De Gaulle, and Macmillan are in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. See the Supplement. the group discussed a contingency plan which had been prepared by the State Department.A revised contingency plan, November 20, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. See the Supplement.)

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
193. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington;McCloy in New York. November 19, 1962, 2:45 p.m.

Ball told McCloy the general conclusion was that until tomorrow afternoon the President has to be in a position to say something in the way of a fairly full report to the American people. If he is not able to say the IL-28s have been promised by that time, that obviously this going to make the pressure increased for some kind of drastic action. Ball thought it just as well if the friends up there knew that. What we are doing, for McCloy’s information—not to tell them—is we are going to get our telegrams this afternoon to bring both the NATO and OAS countriesup to date on this situation and to tell them the thing may get considerably heated up to the point where there may be substantial action as a result of Cuban interference with our reconnaissance on the one hand or a continued refusal of the SU to come to grips with the IL-28 thing would be the reimposition of the quarantine perhaps on an extended basis. We are putting the governments on notice so that they can’t say that they are not consulted and also with the idea that if anything leaks out of the European capitals. We are not going to fly low level again before Wednesday.

Gilpatric said we were preparing for armed reconnaissance on Wednesday and following because we have now been clearly warned [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that we will draw some fire and we will be prepared in one way or another to return the fire. This will be at the low-level flights so that we won’t counter any fire but go on tomorrow at high level. Our story is we are continuing reconnaissance, high and low level, as required. We would try, pending resumption of low level, not to be put in any public position of having stood down the low level in response to the threats from Castro, although in fact Bob feels strongly we ought to wait until after the President’s statement tomorrow before we put ourselves in a position where we may have to return fire.

McCloy told Gilpatric that if he ran into these people he would indicate that we have to take more drastic action than we have taken in the past. Should he seek that out? Ball suggested that he simply say the President is going to have to make a statement to the American people. He hasn’t made any kind of comprehensive statement for some time because he wanted to keep things as quiet as possible; but out of obligation to the public opinion, he has to say something. He has set a press conference tomorrow afternoonSee footnote 7, Document 196. where he will have to say there has been no indication of movement on the IL-28s, if there has been no progress on this. The result of this could very well be to increase American pressure for some kind of strong action.

McCloy said he had gone over that three or four times yesterday and he feels he has put them on enough notice in this regard. Unless he should bump into them he would be inclined to think it would be weakness to call them. If he should want another talk this afternoon McCloy will say that again. Ball and Gilpatric agreed.

McCloy said regarding the President’s statement, this has to be worked on. Ball reported Sorensen and Johnson and Nitze were now working on that in another group. McCloy said they had been playing around on something up there. They may send their ideas down on this, to be put in the hopper.

194. Editorial Note

On the afternoon of November 19, 1962, Attorney General Robert Kennedy met with Georgi Bolshakov, ostensibly Press Attache of the Soviet Union but reputedly one of the leading KGB officials in Washington and a direct link to Chairman Khrushchev. The Attorney General warned Bolshakov that unless the Soviet Union withdrew its IL-28 bombers from Cuba, the United States was prepared to resume low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy insisted, required an answer before his press conference on November 20 at 6 p.m. (Memorandum by Robert Kennedy, November 30; Kennedy Library, Robert Kennedy Papers as cited in Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, page 550)

With the exception of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who had access for his biography, the Robert Kennedy Papers are not open to Department of State historians or any other researchers.

195. Memorandum of Conversation Between Alexander Fomin of the Soviet Embassy and John Scali of the American Broadcasting CorporationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/16/62-11/20/62. Confidential. Drafted and typed by Scali at 3:40 p.m., November 20. According to a typed note on this memorandum, Fomin requested this meeting on November 16. The two men met at Aldo’s Restaurant in Washington. Washington, November 20, 1962, 1:15–2:30 p.m.

In long give and take, mainly on Cuba, Fomin made these main points: Soviets are willing to allow the same kind of verification for exit of bombers as they allow for home shipment of missiles.The following handwritten sentence appears in parentheses at this point. “Check by US planes of Soviet ships taking bombers home.” Further on-the-spot inspection depends on U.S. negotiations with Cubans, not with negotiations with Soviets, because Cuban “sovereignty” is involved now. Soviets are willing to send technicians connected with IL-28s home. He claimed all technicians connected with missiles already have gone home. He professed to be ignorant of continuing stay of any missile technicians, particularly those whose past role has been to guard missile installations. Kennedy, he said, will lift the blockade today (Tuesday) and is now drafting text of non-aggression pledge he promised to make. “This will solve the Cuban problem.” Khrushchev has carried out all his undertakings with the President and is anxious for further progress in detente. He repeatedly asked what was next in President’s priority, specifically returning to nuclear test agreement and non-aggression pact between Warsaw and Atlantic pact powers. He implied repeatedly “progress could be made” in nuclear test agreement with compromise between number of on-site inspections suggested by West, which he put at 12, and number proposed by Soviets which he said was 3. Nothing now seems to stand in way, he said, of Warsaw pact-Atlantic pact non-aggression treaty. Russia’s ready, if only Kennedy is. [sic] He brought up what he said was Russia’s 1956 proposal for creating 800 mile aerial surveillance zone on both sides as step toward disarmament. Would U.S. be interested in this now, he asked, even though idea was rejected by “Dulles administration.” I replied that if I remembered correctly zone proposed at that time was pretty lopsided in favor of Soviet Union. He replied this whole area could be discussed again, perhaps with better results. Russia wants to concentrate on building up its economy and thus is in great need for prolonged period of peace. But there must be reasonable concessions on both sides, not on just Soviet side. Soviets are being “neutral” in Chinese-Indian war. Russia is unhappy about this but at the present time can’t do anything to stop it because the Chinese are being difficult. They don’t approve of Soviet agreement with Kennedy because Chinese have been observers at all Soviet nuclear tests and they know power Soviets have. Therefore Chinese are asking, “why do you give in?” Soviets realize Kennedy administration is much more reasonable, flexible and imaginative than Eisenhower administration was. Thus, Soviets realize there is now opportunity for reasonable agreements. But President mustn’t push what he believes to be his present advantage too far, lest it encourage “hard-line” group in Moscow.

(I made points: Russia has to agree to effective on site inspection in Cuba; must also agree to pull all technicians out connected with missiles and bombers, and give satisfactory pledge not to reintroduce weapons or technicians. Kennedy considered follow-through on Cuba matter of first priority. Only after this settled would there be any reasonable prospects for successful negotiations on testing, disarmament, and Warsaw-Atlantic pact agreements. I also said it wasn’t true that Kennedy had agreed to Adenauer’s alleged suggestion that all negotiations with Soviets over Berlin be broken off. On contrary, I said, President believed close brush with war over Cuba made it incumbent on both Soviets and Americans to seize opportunity for at least limited start toward responsible east-west agreements.

196. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. No classification marking. For Robert Kennedy’s account of how this message was delivered by Dobrynin, see Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 550. Moscow, November 20, 1962.

I have studied attentively your considerations which were forwarded through our Ambassador in Washington in the evening of November 15.Document 181. I wish first of all to express satisfaction with regard to your statement that the United States is also interested in the achievement of a rapid progress in untying the Cuban knot. This is our great desire too. It is good that you have confirmed once again that the U.S. commitment to give assurance of non-invasion of Cuba, which was agreed upon in the exchange of messages on October 27 and 28 remains firm and clear. I fully share also the thought expressed by you about the necessity to act with caution, to take into consideration the position of others. Now when we speak of eliminating the remnants of the crisis this is as important as at any of its past stages.

I always believed and believe now that both of us are guided by the realization of the immense responsibility for the peaceful settlement of the crisis over Cuba being completed. The basis for such settlement already exists: the sides have achieved an agreement and have taken upon themselves certain obligations. It is precisely where we proceed from.

What have we agreed upon? In brief our agreement has come to the following.

The Soviet Union removes from Cuba rocket weapons which you called offensive and gives a possibility to ascertain this. The United States of America promptly removes the quarantine and gives assurances that there will be no invasion of Cuba, not only by the US but also by other countries of the Western Hemisphere. This is the essence of our agreement.

Later on you raised the question of removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba. I think you could not feel the precariousness of that request. Now, of course, there may appear those who would wish to rummage in the wordings and to interpret them in different ways. But you and we do know well what kind of weapons they were that set the forest on fire, they were missiles. It was not accidental, indeed, that in our and your message of October 27 and 28 there was not a single mention of bomber planes and specifically of IL-28’s. At the same time those messages have direct reference to rocket weapons.

By the way, you yourself refer not to direct obligations of the sides but to the understanding implied by the American side in the expression “offensive weapons” mentioned in the messages and in this connection you recall your TV address of October 22 and your proclamation of October 23.For texts, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 806-811. But you will agree, Mr. President, that messages that fix the subject of agreement and unilateral statements of the US Government are two different things indeed.

I informed you that the IL-28 planes are twelve years old and by their combat characteristics they at present cannot be classified as offensive types of weapons. In spite of all this, we regarded our request with understanding. We took into consideration that you made certain statements and therefore the question of removal of IL-28 planes assumed for you as President a certain significance and probably created certain difficulties. We grant it. Since you might really have your difficulties in this question we moved in your direction having informed you of our consent to remove these planes from Cuba. What is the situation now if to summarize it in short and to speak of the main?

We have dismantled and removed from Cuba all the medium range ballistic missiles to the last with nuclear warheads for them. All the nuclear weapons have been taken away from Cuba. The Soviet personnel who were servicing the rocket installations have also been withdrawn. We have stated it to your representatives at the negotiations in New York too.

The US Government was afforded the possibility to ascertain the fact that all 42 missiles that were in Cuba have really been removed.

Moreover, we expressed our readiness to remove also the IL-28 planes from Cuba. I inform you that we intend to remove them within a month term and may be even sooner since the term for the removal of these planes is not a matter of principle for us. We are prepared to remove simultaneously with the IL-28 planes all the Soviet personnel connected with the servicing of these planes.

What can be said in connection with the commitments of the American side? Proper consideration through the UN of the commitment not to invade Cuba—and it is the main commitment of your side—so far is being delayed. The quarantine has not been lifted as yet. Permit me to express the hope that with receipt of this communication of mine you will issue instructions to the effect that the quarantine be lifted immediately with the withdrawal of your naval and other military units from the Caribbean area.

Furthermore, your planes still continue to fly over the Cuban territory. It does not normalize the situation but aggravates it. And all this is taking place at the time when we have removed the missiles from Cuba, have given you the possibility to ascertain it through appropriate observation and when we declare our intention to remove the IL-28 planes from Cuba.

I will not conceal that lately I have to hear more and more often that we are too trustful with regard to the statements of the US readiness to carry out its part of the agreement on Cuba and that the American side will under various pretexts evade the fulfillment of the obligations which it assumed. I do not want to believe this and I proceed from something different: the President has given his word and he will keep it as well as keep our word. But in such an acute and delicate question which we face there cannot but exist the limits beyond which the trust begins losing its value if it is not being strengthened with practical steps towards each other. All this should be mutually taken into consideration to sooner crown with success our efforts in settling the conflict.

I understand, of course, that some time is needed to formalize through the U.N. the agreement on the settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean area, including commitments of non-invasion of Cuba. But this time should be measured by days, not by weeks and, of course, not by months.

Of all the commitments based on the agreement achieved between us in the course of the exchange of messages you declare of your readiness to remove the quarantine immediately as soon as we agree on the term for the removal of IL-28’s, without waiting for their removal.

Moving in your direction and taking the decision on the removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba we presume that we have grounds to count on similar understanding on your part also in the questions of the flights of American planes over Cuba and in promptest formalizing through the UN of the US commitments.

As for the discontinuance of flights of American planes over Cuba you yourself can see better how this should be done. In my opinion, actual discontinuance of such flights over Cuba would already be a major step forward and would bring about a great easing in the situation, the more so that our missiles have been removed and your side has ascertained this.

They say that so far as it is a matter of formalizing the commitments through the UN it is difficult for the American side to accept the form of a protocol we are suggesting in which the commitments of the sides are to be fixed. We do not attach decisive significance to a form. Other forms are not excluded either. For instance, a declaration (or declarations) which would be confirmed by the UN. It is the content of the document which is important and also that the commitments of the sides be formalize through the UN without delay.

I heard that Americans have a rule: in any business each side should approach with the same standard the fulfillment of both its own obligations and the obligations of its counterpart and not use “double standard”—one for itself and another for the others. This is a good rule and if it is observed this promises a prompt settlement of the Cuban conflict. Let us follow this good American rule.

Now about the conditions which you set forth with regard to carrying out the verification and measures of further observation.

Yes, we really agreed to the effect that UN representativescould ascertain the removal from Cuba of rocket weapons which you called offensive. But we stipulated however that this question can be solved only with the consent of the Government of Cuba. We could not take an obligation for the Government of Cuba and your reference, Mr. President, that we allegedly took such an obligation, of course, does not reflect the real situation. I believe that you see for yourself the weakness of such a reference.

But what is the main thing in connection with the question of verification with regard to the missiles removed by us that is evaded in your communication? The main thing is that under agreement with you we gave you the possibility to carry out verification of the removal of our rockets in the open sea. We did that and that was an act of goodwill on our part. You will agree that we took this step in the circumstances when no promise had been made by us with regard to this matter in our messages. We did something more in comparison with what had been said by us in the message with regard to verification.

It is clear that the said verification of the removal of the missiles conducted in accordance with the arrangement between us substitutes the verification of which you spoke in your message and I would say, in a more effective form at that, because the American side was observing the missiles we were shipping out, so to say, at the final stage of their removal. While even verification of the dismantling would mean observing only the first stage of their removal from Cuba.

As a result the American side, as it itself so declared, had every opportunity to count the missiles put on our ships, to photograph them and to ascertain their removal.

Thus a way out was found and not a bad one, and the question of the verification must, of course, belong to the past. Now no one can doubt that we have carried out our commitment with regard to the dismantling and shipping of the missiles from Cuba which were a subject in our correspondence. The fact of the removal of those missiles has been officially confirmed also by the US Department of Defense.For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 458.

As for the rumors alleging that the missiles may have been left in Cuba somewhere in the caves, one can say that we do not live in the cave-man age to attach great significance to the rumors of this sort. If someone is spreading rumors of this kind he is doing that deliberately to create difficulties in the negotiations.

As far as the question of the American side ascertaining our removing the IL-28 planes from Cuba is concerned, we do not see any problem here. In this respect you and we have the paved way and let us take that way. We have no objections against applying also to this case the procedure agreed upon between us for observation of the removal of the missiles though, speaking frankly, one could do without it. But if you want your naval vessels and helicopters to spend several hundred tons of fuel sailing and somersaulting around our ships carrying the IL-28 planes, let us then consider that such possibility exists.

I will tell you frankly that it was part of our plans, and we believe that we will do it at a proper time, to ship out of Cuba those groups of our military personnel which although were not directly involved in servicing the rocket weapons now removed, still had something to do with guarding those installations. We will do this upon the arrival of our ships. But I must say that the strength of those groups in Cuba is not significant.

You raise the question as to what to do next, how to ensure that those types of weapons on the removal of which we have agreed are not brought back to Cuba. I believe that with respect to non-introduction of such weapons in the future you and I do not have any differences. We are prepared to give firm assurances with regard to this matter.

However, you speak not only about this. You now want some permanent supervision to be established, in Cuba or over Cuba. But where was it taken from that we gave our consent to permanent supervision? The question has never been put that way in the exchange of messages. And generally, how one can take as a normal thing an establishment, and without any reciprocity at that, of some permanent supervision over a sovereign state?

If we are to show serious concern that no unexpected steps are taken on either side to the detriment of each other, then as I already said, the proposal of the U.N. Acting Secretary General U Thant on the so-called “presence of the U.N.”, i.e. on establishing U.N. posts in the countries of the Caribbean area would meet this task. This proposal of U Thant was also supported as is known by the Government of the Republic of Cuba. We believe it to be a reasonable basis on which it is possible to come to an agreement. And it would be good if that idea was accepted by you and put into life.

To tell the truth, I am somewhat surprised that in connection with the idea of “presence of the U.N.” in the Caribbean area you are talking for some reason about setting up observation posts at the ports of the Soviet Union. May be you have in mind the proposals which we submitted during the negotiations on the problem of disarmament and on the problem of prevention of surprise attack in 1955 and 1958. But those proposals had nothing to do and cannot have anything to do with the question of Cuba since that question simply did not exist at that time. Incidentally, I have already told you that in our opinion it would be useful to get back to considering the proposals to set up on a mutual basis the observation posts at airfields, major sea-ports, railway junctions and auto routes. We have given our representatives at the negotiation on disarmament in Geneva the necessary instructions. I repeat—we would like to come to an agreement on this question and if you give such instructions to your representatives at the negotiations on disarmament we will only greet that.

Such is our viewpoint on the three questions raised by you: on the removal of the IL-28 planes, on organizing the verification and on non-introduction to Cuba of such weapons which in accordance with the agreement are removed from Cuba.

How should we deal with the matter now so that we and you could soon bring joy to humanity with the news that the crisis over Cuba is completely liquidated?

The Government of the USA in view of the agreement reached on the IL-28 planes should immediately remove the quarantine which corresponds to your own statement as well.

It is necessary to stick to generally recognized international norms and rules fixed in the UN Charter—not to violate the territorial waters and air space of sovereign states and stop the flights of American aircraft over Cuba. I will tell you frankly, Mr. President, that I met with some relief the report that during the last one-two days the flights of American planes over Cuba did not take place. It is good if it promises maintaining of such wise decision in the future as well.

Let both of us agree, Mr. President, also that our representatives in New York be given at once the instructions to immediately proceed with working out an agreed document (or documents) that would formalize through the UN the commitments of the sides.

As we see the matter this will require only a few days if, of course, all the sides want to have speediest liquidation of the aftermath of a tense and dangerous situation evolved in the Caribbean area, the situation that really brought humanity to the brink of thermonuclear war.

One more point. I have read V. Kuznetsov’s report on his talk with A. Stevenson from which I learned that the American side is going to give us a draft of its document stating the US commitments of non-invasion of Cuba.For Stevenson’s account of the meeting, see Document 183. Our draft of the document on settling the conflict has been already forwarded to your representatives.Transmitted in telegram 1798 from USUN, November 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-1562) See the Supplement. Naturally, we will study your document with utmost attention. Let us hope that as a result of the negotiations we will manage to formalize the achieved agreement so that it satisfies all the sides.

Your brother Robert Kennedy through our Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington and Mr. McCloy through our representative in New York expressed a desire to get promptly our answer to the considerations expressed by you on the question of the removal of IL-28 planes from Cuba.See Documents 173 and 191. Well, I think, this answer of mine gives you not a bad material for your statement at your press-conference.For Kennedy’s press statement, November 20, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838. However, I hope, Mr. President, that your statement will not be one-sided but will respond to mutual understanding of the situation with regard to immediate steps to remove the quarantine and to discontinue the flights of American planes over Cuba as well as with regard to the immediate formalizing through the UN of the commitments of the sides on the final liquidation of the crisis evolved in the Caribbean area.

In conclusion I wish to stress that much time has already passed since an agreement was reached between us and it is not in the interests of our countries, not in the interests of peace to delay the fulfillment of the agreement that has been reached and the final settlement of the Cuban crisis. Such is our conviction.

As far as we know F. Castro wants also to make a statement today concerning the settlement of the Cuban question. N.S. Khrushchev believes that it would be good if the President in his statements at the news conference did not introduce elements of aggravation and did not make any statements hurting the national feelings of the Cubans. Now it is especially important that the positive which has begUN to show in the settling of the conflict be by all means supported and encouraged. It seems to us that the present state of affairs demands that each side display caution and restraint to avoid creating needless obstacles to the final elimination of the crisis which developed around Cuba.

If Mr. President could take this into account while conducting his news conference it would have a positive significance and would correspond to our mutual efforts to come more promptly to a solution acceptable to all sides.Apparently the last two paragraphs are an addendum by Dobrynin.

197. Summary Record of the 28th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The President arrived at 4 p.m. and the meeting lasted until 4:55 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Washington, November 20, 1962, 3:30 p.m.

Khrushchev’s replyDocument 196. was read to the group, the President not having yet arrived.

A statement to be made by the President at his 6:00 PM press conference was discussed and approved.See footnote 7, Document 196. The following decisions were reached: The quarantine is to be lifted immediately and a proclamation revoking it is to be prepared.For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, p. 463. U.S. naval forces in the Caribbean will remain there for the time being and carry out normal exercises. Ships in the area will not be removed because it is normal for some to be always on station in the Caribbean. Latin American ships which are in the quarantine force will be asked to stay and participate in exercises. Secretary McNamara recommended, and the President agreed, that there would be no low-level reconnaissance missions flown tomorrow. High-level flights averaging not more than one a day will continue intermittently because of the importance of knowing that the IL-28 bombers are actually being removed.

Two other actions are to be taken without public notice: The SAC air alert will be terminated and all other military forces will be put on a reduced alert basis. TAC planes concentrated along the coast will be deployed inland.

Secretary McNamara recommended that within forty-eight hours we announce that the air reserves called up for the Cuban crisis would be released before Christmas.

The OAS Organ of Consultation meeting will be called off. The State Department will call in the Latin American Ambassadors before the President’s press conference to brief them on the Russian reply.

Attention was called to the reference in the reply to Soviet ground forces. The assumption was that these forces would be removed.

The President asked where the question of our no-invasion assurance stands. In the light of what Khrushchev has agreed to do, if he does not get our assurances he will have very little. We should keep the assurances informal and not follow up with a formal document in the UN.

Alexis Johnson returned to the meeting to report that ABC reporter John Scali had been given the substance of Khrushchev’s reply by a Russian source.See Document 195. There followed a discussion of whether we should insist on shipside inspection of the IL-28 bomber removal. No clear decision was reached, some of the group believing we should insist on the shipside inspection and others saying this was not necessary.

There was further discussion of the no-invasion assurances. The Attorney General expressed his opposition to giving the assurance informally. We would be giving away a bargaining counter because Khrushchev is not insisting on having formal assurances. The President restated his view that Khrushchev would be in a difficult position if he gave us something and got nothing in return. We do not want to convey to him that we are going back on what he considers our bargain.

An instruction to McCloy and StevensonSee Document 204. is to be drafted which says that we will make no formal no-invasion assurance and explained why we declined to do so.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
198. Editorial Note

At 5 p.m., November 20, 1962, 1 hour before President Kennedy’s press conference, Ambassador at Large Thompson transmitted the following message through Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin:

“In addition to what he intends to announce at the press conference, he has also ordered a lower state of alert for the US armed forces that had been introduced in the beginning of the Cuban events. Simultaneously, those air squadrons that had been called to active duty during the Cuban crisis have been ordered back into reserve”.

The text was provided by the Russian Foreign Ministry and is an unofficial translation.

199. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272. Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. McCloy was in New York;Ball was in Washington. November 21, 1962, 9:45 a.m.

McC: I have a feeling we have to do something now on our own and we can’t stall much longer. I think theyThe Soviet Union. came forward pretty well yesterday.

Ball: Yes, I think they did.

McC:Kuznetsov was on the phone a minute ago with me.

Ball: What’s his reaction to the President’s press conference?

McC: Well, I think he was all right on that, but he was angry over the passage of words between him and Adlai yesterday. Adlai was a little too blunt. He said “You ought to take those SAM-sites out”. We weren’t talking SAM-sites, we were talking about getting all the troops out. Then he blew his top and said “We are digging up something new all the time”. They were wrangling down at the end of the table; I was at the other end of the table and couldn’t intervene. But he came out of there boiling. He said “Gee whiz, after all we’ve done”, etc “to get that sort of reaction just convinces me you are stalling, and I’m going to pack up and go home and tell the Chairman that I have been misleading him about the good-will of the Americans in regard to settlement”. I think he was quite sincere. He was angry; there is no doubt about that. Now he called me up this morning and said “I’m going to call for a meeting right away”, and I said “Don’t do that. I can’t tell you this minute what we are going to do. I believe that the time has come to expedite the conclusion of this thing and we ought to pretty quickly have a SC meeting. Let me get in touch with Washington and let me get a little more bearing because I think their mood down there is that the Premier has made some very definite steps and it is our move—at least to sit down and give you some stuff and tell you this is the way it is going to go.” Then he said: “That’s okay with me. You know, the only progress we’ve made has been the result of our … . I would hope we could have another similar meeting to that which we had at Stamford and Glen Cove.”Kuznetsov and McCloy met at McCloy’s house in Stamford, Connecticut, on November 4 and at the Soviet compound in the city of Glen Cove (sometimes described as being located in the village of Locust Valley), on Long Island, on November 18; see Documents 142 and 191. Well, this is delicate. It is going to be all right if we are definite. If we know what our position is, then we can do it. If there is any further exploratory business, I’m inclined to think that it isn’t wise to have one of those formal meetings. He said that he had made a complete report of the Sunday meetingSunday, November 18, see footnote 2 above. to the Premier and he said he hoped that we saw in the Premier’s replyDocument 196. the results of that meeting. And I think you do. I haven’t seen that thing, by the way.

Ball: It’s on its way up by messenger right now.

McC: Okay. I think we ought to get a look at it and see the tone of it. My feeling is if you can only get off this on-site inspection you are better off than if you keep talking about verification instead. A memorandum that is coming down to you, the first one, was dictated by Stevenson and company, and the second one is the one that I did that I showed Rusk last night.McCloy is referring to drafts of U.S. guarantees against invasion of Cuba. A memorandum from Cleveland to Rusk, November 22, contains three drafts including the McCloy version as revised by Rusk. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62) See the Supplement. I think that that is a deal we can make, and that is the business of getting their troops out and the best safeguard of their reintroduction, leaving off in the vague future the UN presence. I think you ought to sit down at this stage and draft the thing that we can say in the declaration and don’t pussy foot on that any longer. Rusk said yesterday that we were deliberately holding it back from us. Let’s see what it looks like and send it up here so that we can get to work on it.

Ball: We’ve got a meeting at 4 p.m.See Document 201. scheduled to go over some instructions and we might have some conversations on the phone in the meantime about what those instructions should be.

McC: I think that would be good. Mind you, if the President goes off for the weekend it is going to be hard to hold Kuznetsov, and I think we should tell him something today. I think the Pentagon agrees with me on the general best safeguard business—removal of those troops, and I would push that ahead as something we ought to do and then draft the statement and get it up quickly as you can.

Ball: All right. I’ll get hold of Dean and see if we can get something so that we can at least work something out with you on the phone to get approved at 4 p.m.

McC: All right. And call me back this afternoon.No memorandum of the afternoon conversation has been found, but Ball summarized for the President an hour-long afternoon conversation with McCloy and Stevenson, see Document 203.

200. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 272. Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 21, 1962, noon.

Ball: I had a talk with Jack McCloy this morning.See Document 199.

Bundy: So did I.No record of Bundy’s conversation has been found.

Ball: I have a feeling that we may be running down two somewhat divergent tracks here.

Bundy: I have exactly the same worry and was about to call you about it.

Ball: I wonder if we shouldn’t get Jack down here for 4 p.m. and try to resolve this before we head into a long week where there can be no resolution.

Bundy: Let’s talk about your track.

Ball: There are two schools of thought over here. One of them would be to try to bring this to some kind of a conclusion, even though the formulation would differ from the formulation of yesterday along this line: that if we can be assured either through appropriate UN verification arrangements or through our own means that all offensive weapons are removed and not reinstituted, then Cuba has no fear of an invasion. That suggests that we are not going to invade as long as we keep ourselves … .

Bundy: Not going to invade on this ground. We are always going to have to reserve on other grounds. To form language for that is not too tough.

Ball: Yes. Something along this line “As a party to solemn treaty commitments.” (Ball reads draft of this morning.)

Bundy: Yes. This is my track, to be honest with you. That is what I would like to do. Does anyone think that we are really going to get much more than that?

Ball: I have Martin here at the moment, for example. He says the Latins will die; they will come to a very bad conclusion—that we shouldn’t give any kind of pledge except on a condition of adequate verification and safeguards which of course we are never going to get.

Bundy: That isn’t much of a pledge. It seems to me [what] I would say to Martin, and he would say to his Ambassadors, would be “We have said what we always have said.” What we did was to reiterate our existing policy in return for which we got 30 bombers and 40 missiles out of there, etc. Those who aren’t going to be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba aren’t going to have their views changed by the character of the noises we make while we’re not invading Cuba, either.

Ball: I think that may be. We ought to settle pretty solidly on it, however.

Bundy: I agree to that. I don’t think there is any doubt what the USUN thinks; if we ask them without Stevenson, we create trouble. If we ask Stevenson, we get filibuster.

Ball: What we can do is try to get it on … .

Bundy: Where is the Secretary on this?

Ball: I talked to him earlier. I haven’t had time. I don’t think we would have difficulty with him on this, but I am not sure. I’d hate to speak for him on this.

Bundy: I’m pretty clear this is the line the President will want to go on. He wants to get a reasonable sort of “well this is all we can give you, because this is all you can give us with the Russians”, and then go on with them to wider topics and let Fidel simmer while over the next six weeks … I think the President would like to or be prepared to trade a certain thickening of our assurance against a certain thickening of their affirmation that they are leaving.

Ball: Then the language I suggest “so long as we can be assured either …” you don’t think that would be too bad?

Bundy: No. That is the sort of thing we could give to Kuznetsov to chew on at the end of the day today. Then there would be a hassle in which it is clear that we say to him “Look, we can do this better if your people would do what you haven’t been able to get them to do. The best we can do in the light of what we initially said is to say that as long as we’re satisfied, we’ll be satisfied.” Which isn’t bad at all.

Ball: All right. I think we ought to be prepared.

Bundy: Why don’t you prepare a paper on that framework, and if anyone in the Department wants to argue the case for a more rigorous assertion of interlocking declarations, it is even possible that we could present them both to Kuznetsov and say “Look if you can get this …”

Ball: I am sure he would want the alternative because I think they have really given up on the first one.

Bundy: That’s right and it seems to me a question of if you spend a day on that or not. I don’t frankly see the point in it.

Ball: Let me get it up both ways.

Bundy: You had better have it out with your Secretary.

Ball: Of course, I will.

Bundy: I know McNamara if, in fact, the trend line of Soviet presence in Cuba is downward, he doesn’t see much point in trying to bargain for something we are never going to get and would be perfectly willing to give something that perhaps went a shade beyond what the President actually gave yesterday. One way to go at this would be for McCloy to begin with Kuznetsov “Didn’t you read the President’s press conference?”

Ball: I think that’s right. Of course Khrushchev may want something in the SC. I think McCloy has probably indicated … .

Bundy: That doesn’t break my heart. (He mentioned Stevenson’s “rough time” with Kuznetsov yesterday.)As described in Document 199. We perhaps ought to meet a few minutes before 4 over here to see what we’ve got. You might send over what you’ve got in advance.

201. Summary Record of the 29th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 4:35 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32a. See the Supplement. Washington, November 21, 1962, 4 p.m.

Under Secretary Ball reported that Russian representative Kuznetsov had told McCloy in New York that we were upping the ante by asking for assurances with respect to the SAM sites. Kuznetsov threatened to go back to Russia. McCloy wants to give the Russians something tonight. Three draft instructions, one written by McCloy, another by Stevenson, and a third by the State Department, were discussed.See footnote 5, Document 199. The State draft was largely a restatement of the President’s press conference statement. It made the point that we cannot ignore the necessity of ensuring the peace and security of the hemisphere. We must satisfy ourselves that no offensive weapons remain in Cuba. The burden is on Cuba, not the USSR, to ensure that we can do this. The State draft was described as an offering document.

Mr. Ball said that McCloy’s view is that we got from the Russians more than we expected. Therefore, we should not put so much stress on ground inspection now that if we don’t get it it is a defeat for us.

The President agreed that we could abandon insistence on ground inspection, but he felt that the proposed no-invasion assurances were too hard. He said our objective is to preserve our right to invade Cuba in the event of civil war, if there were guerrilla activities in other Latin American countries or if offensive weapons were reintroduced into Cuba. We do not want to build up Castro by means of a no-invasion guarantee. The pertinent sentence in the declaration which we would make to the UN SecurityCouncil was revised.For the draft declaration as sent to USUN, see Document 205.

The President left the meeting after approving an interim replyDocument 202. to the most recent message from Khrushchev.Document 196.

Secretary McNamara said he would be recommending to the President an aerial reconnaissance plan for the next few weeks. Low-level flights would be authorized only with Presidential approval, but he doubted that many such flights would be necessary. High-level flights, two per day accumulatively but not more than five in any one day, would be recommended. Secretary McNamara said that in the coming days we are going to have insufficient information out of Cuba but we can live with this rather than risk having one of our planes shot down and then having to retaliate.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
202. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR File, 1962. Confidential. A draft with Bundy’s handwritten revisions, also dated November 21, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. Washington, November 21, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I have been glad to get your letter of November 20,Document 196. which arrived in good time yesterday. As you will have seen, I was able to announce the lifting of our quarantine promptly at my press conference, on the basis of your welcome assurance that the IL-28 bombers will be removed within a month.

I am now instructing our negotiators in New York to move ahead promptly with proposals for a solution of the remaining elements in the Cuban problem. I do not wish to confuse the discussion by trying to state our present position in detail in this message, but I do want you to know that I continue to believe that it is important to settle this matter promptly and on reasonable terms, so that we may move on to other issues. I regret that you have been unable to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, and that in consequence we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday,In a statement at his press conference on November 20; see footnote 7, Document 196. there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course.Printed from an unsigned copy.

203. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between President Kennedy and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, November 21, 1962, 8 p.m.

Ball: I had about an hour’s talk with Jack McCloy and Adlai Stevenson in New York, and then Mac has also had a talk with McCloy. Stevenson is prepared to go along on a draft that we worked out over the phone.See the attachment which was then sent to USUN in Document 205. Jack has still got some reservations, and he wants to think it over overnight and then talk again in the morning. He wants to get out of it any reservation with regard to our right to overfly or protect ourselves, and I think that we really can’t do it.

President: What does he feel about the overflights?

Ball: He has a feeling that actually we shouldn’t insist on any kind of reservation of that kind; that we tell them orally we are going to have to do it, but that we don’t put anything in any document because he thinks this doesn’t give them enough, and that if we want to close this thing up we have to give them something.

President: He doesn’t think we can rest on what I said yesterday?

Ball: No, he doesn’t. He thinks we’ve got to go substantially beyond that. It is really a question of where we start in this thing and where we come out. My own feeling is that we probably ought to start with something not much different from what we arrived at tonight, and Stevenson himself agreed to that. I think Jack will in the morning, but he wanted to think it over a little further. Now I have some language which I worked out with Stevenson and which McCloy, although he doesn’t buy it completely, just to give you the trend of it (they were both on the telephone), it would rUN like this: (attached) The main crux of the argument is this business whether to include some such phrase as “and the US is in position to be satisfied on these points” which is really a reservation of our right to overfly which it seems to me is essential if we are not going to get ourselves in a position where we may lose a U-2 and not be still feeling committed in the eyes of the world to a non-invasion guaranty, which I don’t think we can be.

President: Well, could you put “if the US” part at the beginning?

Ball: As it was worked out with them it would be “Provided no nuclear weapons or other weapon systems capable of offensive use”.

President: Well, could you you say “Provided the US is assured that”.

Ball: You see, if you say “is assured” then the interpretation is that this means that the Russians have given them this assurance. What I propose to say was “Provided no nuclear weapons”.

President: Yes, the only question in my mind is whether your statement really is too limiting to us. What about now if there is a simple war in Cuba?

Ball: Well, we take that out by saying “this does not alter any of the rights or obligations of the US set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Treaty.” The Rio Pact would give us the right to move in.

President: Would it?

Ball: I think by interpretation that we would be justified in doing it.

President: Well, we would [do] it any way if we have to.

Ball: Yes. That’s the position I think we would have to take.

President: And we would probably get two-thirds of the OAS anyway.

Ball: Oh, I think so, yes. So that that is our real protection on that. But the problem with McCloy is that he just doesn’t want any reference to the fact that we’re protecting the right to overfly as a condition to the non-invasion assurance, and I really think we have to have it. So that he is going to think it over overnight and the idea is that we talk the first thing in the morning. If it is necessary I will then go up. Stevenson is rather opposed to my coming up. He thinks there are too many people in NY anyway. But we would like to get something in the Russian hands say toward noon tomorrow.

President: What do they say is the hurry up there?

Ball: It’s just that I think the Russians want to clean this thing up. It is a nagging business as far as Khrushchev is concerned in that he would like to get it behind him. I do think there is some value in not letting it drag out too long because I think the American people are never happy with a long, drawn-out negotiation, and that gives the newspapers a chance to build up all the suspicions and doubts, etc.

President: Yes. The only thing is, I say, we don’t want to get … the wording of that is going to be important to us in the next two years. McCloy, you know, doesn’t quite have that problem, which we have.

Ball: No, this wording is about what we came out with. It is only altered slightly from what we came out with this afternoon.

President: There’s nothing … you seemed to have more “whereases” in the meeting this afternoon.

Ball: No, I tell you, the only difference is that instead of saying “if and so long as” we say “provided”—that’s not really anything. And when we say “and the US is in position to be satisfied” what we have said before was “and the US and the other states of the hemisphere are in position to be fully satisfied”—but that’s not a significant change.

President: Let me ask you this, George. Is there any way we can make this appear to be more routine than it is?

Ball: Well, the reason we have written it this way, of course, is to bury it and to make it appear as subsidiary as possible.

President: Yes. What about putting some “of courses” in there some place?

Ball: Well, we can do that.

President: Read the whole thing again.

Ball: (Reads)

President: I think that is all right.

Ball: I think it protects us adequately, and I think this is certainly where we ought to put it up to them and simply say to the Russians “Now, look, if have another way of giving this assurance through some kind of UN presenceit is up to you to come forward with it.”

President: Let’s take two or three hypothetical cases. Suppose they pour a lot of conventional stuff in there. I suppose we can always blockade though, can’t we.

Ball: Sure.

President: Suppose they shoot down some of our planes and use the SAM-sites … .

Ball: Well, if they shoot down our planes, then you see under the language we have here, then we would say the whole deal is off, because they have frustrated us from being in position to be satisfied.

President: Right. OK. Now if they reserve the right that they could in Guatemala?

Ball: Then we would go into the OAS under the Rio Pact.

President: I see—and what does that say?

Ball: It gives freedom of action because it is based on the assumption that a presence outside the western hemisphere is incompatible with the American system, you see. By reserving our rights under the Rio Pact, it really permits us to do pretty much what we please.

President: All we would really need is two-thirds.

Ball: That is right.

President: Well, anyway, if we caught them red-handed, we could do it anyway.

Ball: I would think so.

President: Now, when is McCloy going to see Kuznetsov?

Ball: The idea was that he and I would talk first thing in the morning. Then I would check back with Mac. If he will go along with this draft, then he will deliver this draft to the Russians by noon.

President: I think we can’t go much further than this.

Ball: Well, I think what we can say is that this is the best we can possibly do for you. Now, the fact is that there is a reservation of our right to be satisfied. If you can produce it in any other way, we will be glad to look at it. If it is a UN presence or something, well let’s discuss it. But we’ve got to have this.

President: I think you ought to say that constitutionally the President cannot make a comment that cuts across the Rio Pact.

Ball: That’s right. I agree. I’ll tell them that.

President: I think you can use that if they try to throw that at him. I think you might get up a background sheet some time so that if we get assaulted we can show all the examples of where we can move.

Ball: All right, we’ll do that in the morning.

President: Let me know if they finally buy it. No, if they change it let me know; if not, that’s all right.

Ball: If I can get McCloy and Stevenson to agree with this in the morning I won’t bother you.

President: Fine. That’s all right.

Attachment No classification marking. A note in Ball’s handwriting indicated that this was agreed to by Stevenson, read to the President at 8 p.m., and McCloy would provide an answer on the morning of November 22. DRAFT ASSURANCE TO THE SOVIET UNION

Provided no nuclear weapons orBall wrote and added the word “other” at this point. weapon systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points; and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declarationBall added the following phrase at this point: “is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and”. does not alter any of the rights or obligationsBall added at this point, “of the United States.” set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.
204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56261/11-2162. Top Secret; Sensitive; Priority; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco and Cleveland; cleared with the Executive Committee and Ball, and approved by Cleveland. Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:49 p.m.

1338. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations.

I. Basic Assumptions

The loose ends still remaining unfulfilled in original understanding between President and Khrushchev are these: On Soviet side, on-site UN-supervised verification of removal of offensive weapons, and longer-term safeguards against their reintroduction. On our side, formal assurances against invasion of Cuba. Recent indications from Soviets make clear their intention: to disengage militarily from Cuba, but to stick to their story that they have saved the Castro regime from US invasion. Our interest lies in speeding the disengagement process, while avoiding the kind of commitment that unduly ties our hands in dealing with the Castro regime while it lasts. On verification and safeguards, The Soviets have given no indication that they are prepared to press Castro regime as hard as would be necessary to get Cubans to agree to any acceptable inspection system; Cubans have consistently been adamant in objecting to ground inspection of any kind, and have rejected several progressively softer proposals by SYG on verification; Both Soviets and Cubans have stressed need for reciprocal arrangements involving inspection of other Caribbean areas, probably including US, as price for inspection of Cuba. Therefore it is not going to be possible in the short rUN to get a UN system of short-term verification or long-term safeguards on offensive weapons in the Caribbean. Assuming (which is not wholly clear) that it would be possible to develop a satisfactory arrangement for adequate long-term safeguards on basis of mutuality in the Caribbean area, it is not to our interest to have the Soviets involved in creating, sponsoring, or administering such safeguards. Absence of inspection arrangements, while leaving part of original deal unfulfilled, does provide rationale for (a) continued US photographic reconnaissance over Cuba, operating under existing OAS resolution, and (b) the tough conditions on our non-invasion assurances.

II. Long Stall vs Rapid Wrap-up

On this analysis, that we will not be able to get satisfactory arrangements on verification and safeguards, we face two alternatives: to continue negotiations for an indefinite period, insisting on Soviet compliance with our full position that there should be UN verification of their withdrawal of offensive weapons as well as “suitable safeguards” against their reintroduction into Cuba; to close out this phase of the negotiations immediately on the basis of the steps the Soviet Union has taken and will promise to take, adapting our undertakings to reflect the absence so far of meaningful UN inspection arrangements. There are distinct advantages to closing out this phase of the negotiations with the Soviets without delay. The Soviets would have the opportunity to disengage themselves from major military involvement in Cuba. We would be enabled to deal with Cuba largely as a Hemispheric problem and to consider next steps on long-range safeguards in a Caribbean Latin American context, without the intrusion of the Soviet Union. This would permit us to seek progress with the Soviet Union on wider subjects, such as nuclear testing, Berlin, disarmament and the election of the Secretary General.

III. Toward a Security Council Meeting To accomplish a speedy wrap-up of current phase of negotiations, Soviets evidently have in mind a Security Council meeting at which agreed declarations would be made by the US and the USSR, a report would be made by SYG, and an agreed summation would be made by Chairman or in simple procedural resolution adopted by the Council. Soviets are not insisting on a formal protocol, nor do they seem to be insisting that Cubans be parties to this accord at this stage. The United States is quite prepared to work toward such a wrap-up meeting of Security Council. In view of the non-fulfillment of important aspects of the original understanding, we cannot and should not declare the understanding fulfilled. However, we can adopt a procedure which enables a “line to be drawn under” the US-Soviet crisis over Cuba, while leaving open questions that must be sorted out with Cuba in hemispheric context over longer span of time. In the course of negotiations during this next phase, we would have to make clear, both to Soviets and to general public, that Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding was never properly fulfilled, and the absence of on-site verification and of longer-term safeguards against reintroduction makes it necessary for OAS to retain full freedom of action as regards aerial surveillance and other means of keeping a close eye on Cuban behavior and any evidence of renewed Soviet intrusion into Hemisphere. We would continue to remind world that declaration of intention must be independently checked in a world still so full of international mistrust, which has just been treated to a classic example of large-scale duplicity. However, until after SC meeting we would avoid making our intentions on continued air surveillance manifest in a form or forum that would require Soviets to raise the issue of violation of Cuban air space. In the circumstances we will have to place conditions on our non-invasion assurance which are justified by absence of Cuban cooperation with the United Nations and the inability (or unwillingness) of the Soviets to induce the Cubans to cooperate. This will leave the door open for regional arrangements for longer-term safeguards if Cubans cooperate, and for continued OAS air surveillance of Cuba, and military response to any Cuban aggression, if they do not.

IV. Scenario in the Security Council

Within this framework we would favor a Security Council meeting during next week at which the following steps would be taken: The Secretary-General would report on the steps he has taken, and in particular his series of unsuccessful efforts to secure Cuban agreement to UN on-site inspection to verify withdrawal and dismantling of offensive weapons and to safeguard against future reintroduction. The Soviet Union would make a declaration indicating steps it has taken pursuant to the US-USSR understanding and containing assurances that all missiles and nuclear components have been removed, that the IL-28’s would come out within four weeks, that military units and personnel intended for the protection of these weapons systems will be removed in time, and that no offensive weapons would be reintroduced in Cuba in the future. The United States would make a parallel declaration: (Being sent USUN in septel)Document 205. taking note of the Soviet assurances cited above; indicating that we have lifted the quarantine; stating our non-invasion assurances, contingent on Cuban behavior. These declarations would be noted by the Security Council President in a “summation” which would have to be agreed ahead of time. Alternatively a brief procedural resolution noting the declaration might be less difficult to achieve than getting UAR to agree to an acceptable summation. If a resolution is used, it should contain no substantive elements and should establish no continuing machinery.

Rusk
205. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2162. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Cleveland, Sisco, and Ball; cleared by Ball; and approved by Cleveland. Washington, November 21, 1962, 9:50 p.m.

1339. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations. Following is draft U.S. declaration in Security Council referred to in previous telegram:Document 204.

In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962,See Documents 95, 102, and 104. firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

These undertakings were stated in President Kennedy’s letter of October 27, and quoted in the Acting Secretary General’s letter of October 28, along the following lines: The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. The United States would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

The United States notes the statement made by the Soviet Union that all medium and intermediate range missiles, all nuclear weapons and components have been removed from Cuba, that all IL-28 bomberaircraft will be removed by December 20th, and that all sites for medium range and intermediate range missiles have been dismantled. It notes also that the USSR has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed there for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems. The United States notes further the statements of the USSR that no weapons capable of offensive use will be introduced into Cuba in the future. We welcome these statements and assurances.

The undertakings in the President’s letter of October 27, that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites, and that United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use, have not been fulfilled. A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried out a number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar verification of the imminent withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft.

In the absence of Cuban agreement to United Nations verification and safeguards, the nations of the Organization of American States have no choice but to continue to be alert through their own resources to any possibility that offensive weapons systems remain or are reintroduced into Cuba.

In consideration of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date, the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, has been lifted on November 20, 1962.

Provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not invade or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba. This declaration is made on the representation of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council and does not alter any of the rights or obligations set forth in the UN Charter and the Rio Pact.

Rusk
206. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The source text is an unofficial translation. The Russian text is in Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Moscow, November 22, 1962.

Dear Mr. President, I have received your message.Document 202. I express great satisfaction. I fully trust the statement made in that message too that the United States confirms its commitment not to invade Cuba which you also confirmed in your statement at the news conference.

In my confidential messages to you I have already laid down our understanding of the questions and of those steps which are needed to normalize the situation in the Caribbean area after the great and dangerous tension we and you have lived through.

No less important questions are facing us now, that must be solved to avoid recurrence of the situation which has just been eliminated through our mutual efforts.

You say that I was not able to convince Prime-Minister Fidel Castro about something. In general you are partly right. But it should be taken into consideration that Cuba is a young republic the Cuban leaders being very able and devoted to their people are however young, expansive people—Spaniards in a word, to use it far from pejorative sense. But one should understand the position they are in as the leaders of Cuba. The Republic of Cuba is a small country having for its neighbor a big and powerful state—the United States of America, a state which has been unfriendly to her since the first day the Cuban revolution was born. Moreover, one should not forget either that there was an invasion of Cuba.

That is what has to be taken into consideration in order to correctly assess and understand the situation and, if you wish, the state of mind of the leaders of Cuba. I even think that Prime-Minister Fidel Castro may have looked upon some questions with a great sense of understanding but he probably also correlated his steps with the feelings of the Cuban people who are taken by a great patriotic upsurge and desire to defend their independence. The Cuban people and their desire are worthy of respect.

Of course, you and we have a different appraisal of the Cuban revolution and of the events which developed around Cuba and of the position of the Cuban leaders. But this is another matter. The different appraisal must not after all prevent us from finding agreed solutions in the interests of peace. That is what the peaceful coexistence is. One should treat both sides with understanding and take into account the actual state of things—in this case the situation in Cuba which has chosen the way for its development in accordance with the will of its people.

We have been doing with understanding and patience everything that was needed and that was within our power to ensure the achievement of agreement on the elimination of the remnants of the crisis. A great work has been done in Cuba on our instructions by our representative, my first deputy A.I. Mikoyan. Incidentally, he will come back soon because we have given him appropriate instructions to this effect.

I understood your message in a sense that you yourself regard with understanding the difficulties that still remain. I would wish that we having accomplished the main thing, having given relief to the world public and having given orders to the armed forces contributing to the normalization of the situation—and we gave such order at once as soon as we learned that analogous steps were taken on your side—that we would take speedy measures to complete the settlement of the questions that would crown all our efforts.

It would be necessary that appropriate instructions be also given to your representative, Mr. McCloy for whom we and I personally, after my meeting with him in Pitsunde last year have respect, despite the fact that he, as I told him half seriously and half-jokingly, is a representative of Wall Street. True, he tried to convince me that Wall Street was not so terrible a thing as I imagined. He even promised when I happen to be in New York to take me to Wall Street to try to convince me that this is so. I do not lose hope that one fine day Mr. McCloy will fulfil his promise, that is, will take me to Wall Street. But this generally, as you understand, is just a digression.

As for us, in connection with the completion of the questions which have not been completed yet, we on our part have already given instructions to Kuznetsov regarding proposals to that effect which, as far as I know, have already been forwarded to the attention of your representatives in New York. We consider these proposals to be constructive, and we were guided by a desire to facilitate the completion of our agreement.

Now I would like to express the following wish: it would be extremely useful if while working on the proposals no steps are made on your part that would be pin-pricks for the other participants in the negotiations and that would create hooks capable of causing scratches to national pride and prestige of these other participants. The main thing has been achieved indeed and at the final stage it would be necessary to create good, reliable relations so that, relying on common sense, on reason and on the understanding of all the responsibility that lies upon you and us, to reach a final solution on a firm reasonable basis and thus to create conditions for a good, stable situation in the Caribbean area.

In this message of mine I do not raise any questions of substance since the questions that must be completed are known to you. Let us then make a joint effort to complete the remaining questions as well. This may serve as a good omen for both our sides in working out an approach for the solution of other not less important questions that we face. After all the question that you and we are struggling with is, though important, but a particular one. Meanwhile there are questions the solution of which is extremely important for destinies of peace and they must be solved in order to really stabilize the situation and secure lasting peace on earth.

Sincerely yours,

N. KhrushchevPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
207. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2362. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Ball, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, and approved by Ball. Washington, November 23, 1962, 9:43 p.m.

1359. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations.Ball and Bundy discussed these instructions on November 11 at 3:30 p.m. Bundy told Ball that “the President is prepared to fall back from this but he does not see any reason not to try it out. The President asked Bundy, and Bundy gave him assurances, on the point whether we thought McCloy had it clear in his mind that we don’t want to haggle it to a dead end up there [United Nations]; that we would do anything [something?] else. He [the President] even suggested an exchange of private messages with the Chairman. Bundy told him he did not think the Secretary [Rusk] was ready to recommend this. Ball said he would be against anything that can’t be published. Bundy agreed this was something to be careful of.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation, November 23; ibid., Ball Files; Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba)

You should see Kuznetsov promptly to discuss next steps in effecting understanding of October 27 and 28. You should begin by emphasizing our desire that this be wound up very promptly, a desire Chairman Khrushchev evidently shares. Ways and means of ending matter should be governed by this requirement.

You should present SC scenario contained Deptel 1338,Document 204. give Kuznetsov our draft declaration (revised text of final paragraphs in next message),Document 208. and explain it to him as the most we can do—and more than was originally promised—in the light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. You should request prompt study and response. At the same time you should indicate that we do not want a long and fruitless haggle in the UN over differences which undoubtedly exist between what they would like and what we would like, particularly since some of these differences may wither away over time if things go well. Such a haggle is not in their interest either. If our statement is one which they could not live with in UN, we believe a satisfactory wind-up can be obtained by use of a Presidential statement, as in last press conference, which Soviets can readily interpret as promised assurance against invasion. We note with interest Chairman’s last messageDocument 206. which does indeed interpret President’s last press conference in this way.

You should emphasize that there is in fact no present danger of invasion of Cuba, but that we cannot be put in position of giving a blanket guarantee to a man who has refused to cooperate with UN to fulfill understanding of October 27 and 28.

If Kuznetsov’s initial response is cool, you may wish to press the point that exchanges between President and Chairman show no such Soviet position and that it may be helpful for Kuznetsov and perhaps Mikoyan to see President in Washington early next week so that negotiations in New York will not get out of phase with promising exchanges between Washington and Moscow.

If Kuznetsov presses Caribbean inspection scheme you should express readiness to discuss this point and point out again that any inspection of US would require inspection of USSR. We anticipate that these matters can well be discussed at Geneva in connection with negotiation on surprise attack. This is obviously a complex problem going well beyond initial understanding and requiring long discussion. Therefore we should not hold up all exchanges of assurances pending such an agreement but should promptly do the best we can in the light of Castro’s position and move on to other issues. We of course have confidence in your ability to persuade Kuznetsov that our draft declaration is an ideal solution.

Rusk
208. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2362. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted and approved by Ball and cleared by U. Alexis Johnson. Washington, November 23, 1962, 9:40 p.m.

1360. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: Next Steps in New York Negotiations. Revise last two sentences of seventh paragraph of US Declaration (Deptel 1339)Document 205. to read:

“A minimum inspection procedure was, however, arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which United States naval vessels have received substantial verification that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles which the USSR had certified to the United States as having been in Cuba. The Soviet Union has also agreed to similar form of verification of the impending withdrawal of all IL-28 bomber aircraft introduced into Cuba.”

In place of last three paragraphs, substitute following:

“In view of the steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union to date:

the United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962; and the United States further gives assurance that,

provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

This statement is made on the understanding that by reason of the refusal of Cuba to permit arrangements contemplated to assure the carrying out and continuation of the commitments in regard to the maintenance and introduction of such weapon systems in Cuba, the United States will, until such time as such arrangements can be effected, continue to employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary.

The undertakings started herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations contained in the United Nations Charter or the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to both of which the United States is a party.”

Rusk
209. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. No classification marking. A note on the memorandum indicates that this was part of the President’s weekend reading, November 25. Washington, November 24, 1962.

I talked to Jack McCloy about his conversation with General Eisenhower and have done the attached memorandum as a result. He was in the country without a stenographer, so I said I would do it. I have sent him a copy and have asked him to make any amendment or correction so that the record will be accurate.

I have also taken the precaution of sending a copy of the draft declaration to John McCone over CIA wires to his retreat in the Caribbean.In this message, November 24, Bundy told McCone, who was on vacation in the Caribbean, that “we believe it [the U.S. draft declaration] fully safeguards U.S. position especially by its incorporation of Rio Treaty, but in light of your personal note to me, I would like you to have it in time to comment if you wish.”Bundy also told McCone that McCloy had talked to Eisenhower “who fully supports plan to wind up negotiations in a way which fully protects overflights and intelligence resources, since he shares McCloy’s view that UN inspectionis both impractical and undesirable.” (Ibid.)/1/ I do not think he will raise objections, but I do think it is as well to have him signed on. The overtones of McCloy’s report suggest that McCone may be in even closer touch with General Eisenhower than I, at least, have supposed.

McG. B. Attachment Top Secret. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy Washington, November 24, 1962. SUBJECT Proposed Declaration on Cuba

I talked to Mr. McCloy about the language of the proposed declaration on Cuba and he agrees to stick with the wording which you approved yesterday on the first round.See Documents 207 and 208. When we have the first Soviet reaction we can see whether any alteration is desirable.

Mr. McCloy also told me that he had had an entirely satisfactory conversation with General Eisenhower and that General Eisenhower seemed to share McCloy’s view that we have a victory in hand and should now wind the matter up promptly. General Eisenhower also agreed that U.S. overflights and intelligence collection were a much better means of reassurance than some undefined UN inspection, and he expressedthe view that he had been worried that we might get tied on too hard to this kind of thing. He said that the declaration McCloy was planning to negotiate might meet with some criticism in the country but that he, General Eisenhower, would not only not criticize it, but would support it. He suggested that Mr. McCloy might want to check the proposed language with John McCone, and Mr. McCloy later tried to do so but found that McCone was not available. Mr. McCloy told General Eisenhower that he had the feeling that McCone would not really be satisfied with anything short of an invasion of Cuba. General Eisenhower said that he himself had no such view, but thought McCone might have useful comments.

General Eisenhower did remark that a solution of this kind would still leave us with the Castro problem, but Mr. McCloy and he agreed that nonetheless this seemed the best course available right now. Mr. McCloy reported that General Eisenhower plainly shared his view that a quick wind-up of the immediate negotiations was highly desirable.

McG. B.
210. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2562. Top Secret; Priority. New York, November 25, 1962, 11 a.m.

1941. Dept pass White House. Eyes only for the Secretary. Cuba—Meeting McCloy/Kuznetsov, Sat 24 Nov 62. Long session with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich this evening. No one else present. Dinner at McCloy’s New York apartment.

First McCloy paraphrased instructions, emphasizing desire for prompt windup and real efforts which had been made to present Kuznetsov with draft declaration carrying out spirit of October 27/28 letters, despite fact full compliance not possible due largely Cuban recalcitrance. Also suggested possibility avoiding long wrangle at UN by Presidential declaration if this seemed more compatible with their interests. First read and then delivered him our draft.

Kuznetsov immediately replied he was disappointed in it as it did not contain any suggestion of thinking which he felt we should have been prompted to include as result of great Soviet concessions, etc.According to telegram 1942 from USUN, November 25, Yost reported that on the morning of November 25 Kuznetnov telephoned McCloy and stated “that he had slept badly last night and liked U.S. draft even less this morning than he had last evening.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement. Nothing in document embodied matters that Chairman had brought up in correspondence with President such as stabilization and normalization of conditions in Caribbean. Then went through the paragraphs of the protocol for our reaction.

When McCloy asked Kuznetsov specifically what he had in mind, Kuznetsov then referred to paragraphs in his protocol which are mainly rehash of Castro conditions. McCloy simply said they were out. Kuznetsov argued at some length but McCloy thought rather perfunctorily on this point. Kuznetsov seemed seek some comments from us on willingness discuss outstanding issues with Cubans. McCloy replied that we always prepared discuss things with Cuba if they wanted but no such conditions could be part of this transaction. Believe may hear again on this after Mikoyan arrives but believe it only matter of record.

Next Kuznetsov objected to long statement of Soviet concessions sounding as if Soviets compelled to treat for ignoble peace. McCloy replied simply evidenced clear effort put things right with no inference of indignity involved. Moreover showed U.S. moved substantially from original position, particularly in abandoning quarantine before all conditions met. Really statesmanlike document.

These preliminaries. Kuznetsov’s real objection was to overflight reservation, stating this simply put us back to where we had started from. Referred to our same old insistence on-site inspection, which should now be discarded in light of their display of good faith. They had felt that if they agreed to take out their military units all further need for overflight would have passed. This clause defeats Kuznetsov’s hopes for rapid settlement and did not know how to put his failure on this to his government.

McCloy replied this was cardinal issue with us. Overflights our only reliable means checking compliance. Even they not complete. Overflights which pinpointed missile bases played large part in avoiding war. Inconceivable abandon them without thorough verification on ground though we prepared to seek more satisfactory method verification. We not asking him agree to overflights. Simply stating in all honesty we intended reserve this precaution and wanted world know our commitments made in light of this fact, etc.

Kuznetsov stated whole paper would have to be sent to his government. Was certain they probably have number comments but sure overflight paragraph considered unsatisfactory and objectionable. Complained about references to unfulfilled obligations of Soviet Union. McCloy agreed use phrase “had not been capable of fulfillment” in place of language of draft. Kuznetsov also stated withdrawal military units not part of original agreement.

McCloy admitted this arguable but at any rate was to their as well as our interest to have it stated. Indicated this might not be point of issue if we agreed on other things and so long as they got military units out soon as possible. Overflights however were essential and fundamental element of our position. Kuznetsov kept coming back to this clause, pointing out its difficulties for them. Suggested we accept what he called latest U Thant proposal which had some element reciprocity in it so Castro would have basis for giving us some on-site inspection.

McCloy said we had not agreed to U Thant proposals and no inspection U.S. could be made without inspection USSR. Any proposal take time to work out even if acceptable. Thing was to get on with declaration and move on to other important matters.

Further talk by Kuznetsov about U.S. not doing its share to which McCloy made usual reactions. Declaration not easy for U.S. local and hemispheric objections to thought U.S. providing sanctuary for Castro subversion of continent. We had made deal and prepared to live up to it and adopt all reasonable compromises necessary. This declaration gave Khrushchev all and more than he had asked for. Conditions were clear and overflight paragraph though understandably difficult for them was necessary for us and essential for us to make it clear.

Finally Kuznetsov almost pleaded with McCloy to take out this overflight clause, stating that we could made some reservation outside UN.In telegram 1992 from USUN, November 28, Stevenson corrected the following two sentences to read: “McCloy told Kuznetsov he had no authority modify it and personally did not see how we could fail to make this clear in any statement we made in UN or elsewhere regarding invasions, since we could not risk being charged with bad faith in regard to assurances against invasion if in fact we did employ these overflight facilities and had said nothing publicly about it. McCloy pointed out that the Soviets did not necessarily have to agree explicitly with our statement regarding overflights and could make such reservations with respect to this point as they might desire.” (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2862) McCloy told him he had no authority modify it and personally did not see how position adequately covered unless we did state understanding on this in UN, pointing out they did not have to agree to it. Kuznetsov strongly requested U.S. give some further thought to this clause. In essence he kept asking us to find a way to maintain our position without rubbing their noses in it.

Then talked of procedure. McCloy made clear U.S. not refusing go to UN, but were merely suggesting some alternative. In so doing insisted U.S. would not sign any protocol or agreement such as Sovs had in mind but would make declaration on basis of their declaration with thought SYG would note declaration had been made, perhaps congratulating leaders involved for statesmanship in avoiding disaster, and no more. Kuznetsov seemed feel no resolution of SC other than noting declarations necessary. McCloy repeated possible advantages declaration outside SC but gathered Kuznetsov inclined toward UN recordand anxious confirm U.S. not refusing UN record.According to telegram 1953 from New York, November 26, McCloy, Stevenson, and Yost saw U.N. Secretary General U Thant and brought him up to date on the conversation with Kuznetsov. They also gave U Thant a copy of the U.S. draft declaration and reported that his reaction was “good.” (Ibid., 737.56361/11-2662) See the Supplement.

Kuznetsov repeated would in due course give us their draft and their comments on our draft. Then we discuss both together, but Kuznetsov sure overflight clause unsatisfactory. Kuznetsov did not object specifically to use of word “intend” but Mendelevich picked it up. McCloy argued that constitutionally this best way for us handle it and Kuznetsov did not carry argument further. McCloy believes it will come up again when we receive their full comments as will “threat to peace and security” phrase. McCloy senses Sovs want declaration badly but overflight clause is bone in throat.

McCloy suggested that at appropriate time it might be well for Kuznetsov see President, perhaps with Mikoyan. Left that Kuznetsov would not get in touch with McCloy at least until Monday, that Mikoyan due back on Monday but Kuznetsov did not know for how long a stay. Kuznetsov said he would very much appreciate opportunity of paying respects to President at appropriate time.

Yost
211. Message From the Director of Central Intelligence (McCone) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. A covering note to Bundy indicates that this message was received from McCone, who was on vacation in the Caribbean, at 10:45 a.m., November 25. Washington, November 25, 1962.

Pass to Bundy immediate. Believe the proposed declarationSee Documents 205 and 208. satisfactorily meets condition for continuing surveillance of Cuba in the absence of latter’s agreement for U.N. inspection. Therefore feel such a declaration should not disturb those who view the total Castro problem as most serious. If this declaration acceptable to USSR then door should be open to informal discussion with Kuznetsov as to future of SAM installations which we know are now under Soviet control. Same applies to large amounts sophisticated ground equipment and missile launching boats. Assume references to OAS Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance would give us necessary latitude for action if Soviets replace Castro and his regime with their own people thus producing a true satellite from where the Soviets could effectively operate against established governments in Latin America.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2662. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by U. Alexis Johnson and with Rusk in substance, and approved by Cleveland. Washington, November 26, 1962, 9:28 p.m.

1379. For Stevenson and McCloy. Subject: New York Negotiations (urtels 1941, 1942, 1943).Document 210 and footnote 1 thereto. Telegram 1943 from USUN, November 26, in which the Mission suggested it was important to review U Thant’s report on Cuba before he submitted it to the Security Council, is in Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2662) Following amplifies and supplements Secretary’s conversation with McCloy today: We understand from reftels and Stevenson telecon that Soviets have expressed reservations or queries on four points: they have asked reason for reference to Acting Secretary General’s letter of October 28For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 446-447. (purpose is to underscore international character of undertakings); reference to fact that Soviet undertakings unfulfilled; recapitulation of Soviet “concessions” taken pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence; and inclusion of our overflight reservation. We understand further you preparing some textual changes for our consideration. While concurring in your acceptance of phrase “had not been capable of fulfillment,” we strongly believe that at your meeting with Mikoyan tonight you should continue to press Soviets on basis Deptel 1359Document 207. and urtel 1941. Mikoyan has well deserved reputation of being hardest bargainer in Kremlin’s stable of tough negotiators. We should not consider any textual changes at least until Soviets have received a considered reaction from Moscow to our declaration, and we have been presented with draft of Soviet declaration. We assume that for bargaining purposes at least Soviets will submit draft declaration which includes some or all of Castro’s demands and other unacceptable elements drawn from their protocol. Suggest following points might be stressed with Mikoyan: We prepared for prompt wind-up in Security Council; Draft declaration is most we can do—and more than was originally promised—in light of Cuban refusal to permit UN verification or safeguards. Alternatively, we prepared to substitute Presidential press statement of November 20;For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 830-838. Soviet protocol categorically unacceptable; Question of discussing outstanding issues with Cuba is outside framework US-USSR transaction pursuant to Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence; In absence of agreement on UN verification, reservation re use our own resources to check compliance absolutely essential. We not seeking to humiliate Soviets nor asking them to formally agree to our overflights; we are merely making a frank statement of our intentions lest some dangerous miscalculation should occur; and U Thant proposal unacceptable and no inspection of US could be made without inspection USSR. Hope you can probe Mikoyan re his talks in Havana. Re urtel 1943, we believe it important that US have opportunity to review SYG report before it submitted to SC. We are concerned, for example, that he might include proposal he made to us on Caribbean security zone which he gave to Soviets, although it was unacceptable to us. Believe Yost should discuss this with Narasimhan with view making appropriate arrangements.The Mission reported that U Thant told one of their members that he did not contemplate any report on Cuba to the Security Council at this time. (Telegram 1972 from USUN, November 27; Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2162)

Rusk
213. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 11/21/62-11/30/62. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland, copies sent to Thompson, Tyler, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy. Washington, November 28, 1962. SUBJECT Conversation with Mr. McCloy on Cuba

Mr. McCloy called in at 2:15 p.m. to summarize the results of the meeting which he and Ambassadors Stevenson and Yost had just completed with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich.

We will have a Niact cable here,Telegram 1991 from USUN, November 28. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/11-2862) See the Supplement. There is also a 21-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting in USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001,1A October/November meetings. probably before the end of the day, so I will summarize here only the highlights: Mikoyan did almost all of the talking. He was clearly influenced by commitments to Castro to make a strong case on Castro’s behalf; he also seemed to be motivated by the burden Cuba represents to the USSR. These two motivations produced many references to the “normalization” of relations with Cuba. Mikoyan said our declaration was unsatisfactory, and represented a retreat from correspondences between the President and Khrushchev. He particularly objected to making the non-invasion assurances an intention rather than an unequivocal commitment as it seemed to be in the President’s letter of October 27th. Mikoyan also jumped on our overflights and objected to US subversive activities in Cuba. Mikoyan went back to the idea of a protocol signed by all three countries, and seemed to attach a good deal of significance to Cuba being one of the signatories. He would like to have a resolution, not merely a collection of unilateral declarations, in the Security Council. Mikoyan’s plea for Castro’s conditions seemed more determined and comprehensive than in any of the Kuznetsov-McCloy discussions. Mr. McCloy’s guess is that this is still pro forma, but it was spelled out at great length and will undoubtedly be spelled out once again for the President. Mikoyan repeatedly came back to the difficulties in which Castro would find himself, if the situation in the Caribbean could not be “normalized”. “Normalization” of the Caribbean was, Mikoyan said, implied in all of the exchanges between the President and Khrushchev. On inspection, the emphasis was on reciprocity, and Mikoyan lectured the American group on the importance of not being obstinate on this point. “Some note of reciprocity should be in the picture, and then we would not have any trouble with Castro on getting international inspection in Cuba”. Mikoyan did not address himself to the US gambit that inspection in the United States would require inspection in the Soviet Union, even though this gambit was used again on this occasion. The Soviets mentioned Puerto Rico specifically, but the American negotiators said flatly that the inspection of any part of the United States was not in the cards, as a matter of reciprocity with Cuba alone. On reciprocity inspection, they referred to the “U Thant” proposal. Cuba, Mikoyan said, could not possibly accept a “one-sided inspection”; he said he had told Castro that his (Castro’s) position was right on this point. Mikoyan mentioned Guantanamo, indicating he did not expect us to withdraw right away but thought it would be reasonable for us to set a time at which we would begin to negotiate about withdrawal. Mikoyan pressed hard on the U.S. commitment to bring the other members of the Western Hemisphere into line. The U.S. representative emphasized that it came with bad grace from the Soviets to put any emphasis on this point, since they hadn’t even been able to bring into line the one Western Hemisphere country with whom they presumably had especially friendly relations. Mikoyan objected to the reference in our declaration to the Rio Pact. He said he had read the Rio Pact (Mr. McCloy got the impression that perhaps he had read it for the first time) and did not like it. The Americans said that it was absolutely necessary to refer to the Rio Pact, since it was the basic document of Western Hemisphere security and we owed it to our co-signers to make clear that we were not, in our arrangements with the Soviets, watering down our commitments under the Rio Pact. There was no detailed discussion of our draft declaration as such;Mikoyan said he would leave that to the negotiators. The Americans did indicate that we were not wedded to the reference in the declaration to U Thant; but no other concessions were made. A tentative date was made for Friday to continue the discussion.

Mr. McCloy’s prediction is that Mikoyan will rehearse for the President the Soviet position on the non-invasion pledge, on overflights, and on the need for a reciprocal form of inspection, and that it will not be possible to make any final arrangements with the Soviets in the course of Mikoyan’s short visit to Washington. It is, indeed, not clear that Mikoyan expects to wrap this up personally, in which case they might look forward to a somewhat longer negotiation than we had previously assumed they wanted.

Mr. McCloy’s suggestion is that the President make clear to Mikoyan: That there is a considerable record of conciliation and perform-ance on both sides, and that the Soviets should not take this moment to turn unreasonable just because they are having difficulty with the unreasonable Mr. Castro. We can’t think of giving up overflights, which everybody in the Hemisphere now knows have played such an important role in maintaining the security of the Hemisphere. That the kind of non-invasion statement that is contained in our draft declaration is really the most that the President can constitutionally do, especially in the absence of the arrangements for verification and safeguards that were agreed to in the correspondence between the President and Khrushchev. That it would be useful on both sides to wind the matter up quickly and with maximum good will, without trying to make a bargain out of every word. The Cuban problem will remain; if the Cubans want to normalize relations we are ready and willing to talk with them about it.

On the basis of today’s conversation, it does not appear that there will be a quick wrap-up of the matter in the present negotiating framework. We will want to consider the possible alternative of sawing off the negotiations unilaterally if the Soviets stick to their intention to draw the Cubans into the windup arrangements.

214. Memorandum Prepared by the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba. Top Secret; [distribution indicator not declassified]. [document number not declassified] Washington, November 28, 1962. SUBJECT Phasing of the Soviet Military Deployment to Cuba With benefit of hindsight, we have examined the timing of movements of various types of Soviet units to Cuba. We now believe that the primary purpose of the deployment of ground and surface-to-air units was to defend Cuba as a whole as a strategic base. From our preliminary analysis, we also conclude that there was some apparent relationship in time between the deployment of these units and the MRBM and IRBM units. In other words, the MRBM and IRBM units at least had priority for protection. It should be noted that our dates are approximate and the time-span overall is quite short. The Cuban operation began with the movement of SAM regiments and armored groups. Altogether, 24 SAM battalions and four armored groups were involved. The deployment of the SAM battalionsbegan with their departure from the USSR in mid-July and continued through August. The deployment of the armored groups began in late July and continued through the first weeks of September. The timing of arrival and the subsequent positioning of these units appear to have been phased with the closely following deployment of MRBM and IRBM units. (See table and mapThe map is not printed.)SAM units and armored groups were first deployed to western Cuba, including the ports of Havana and Matanzas; construction of SAM sites began in early August, while the armor arrived at its site about the middle of the month. The initial deployment of MRBM and IRBM units was also to western Cuba (San Cristobal and Guanajay), with construction equipment arrivals beginning in mid-August for the IRBM sites, and in mid-September for the missile equipment associated with the MRBM units. Construction at those sites began about two weeks later. The second section of the SAM and armored group deployment was to central Cuba, where the units were in place during the first week in September. The second group of MRBM and IRBM units also went to central Cuba (Sagua La Grande and Remedios), with equipment arriving at the sites in the last two weeks of September. A third group of SAM sites and an armored unit were established in eastern Cuba toward the end of September. Finally, a fourth increment of SAM units was deployed two to three weeks later to fill in gaps, thereby providing full coverage of the island. Three of the four Soviet armored groups known to be in Cuba were positioned where they could give rapid ground protection to IRBM and MRBM sites. The fourth was located at Holguin, an IL-28 base within the third group of SAM sites. It should be noted that the deliberately phased west-to-east sequence is consistent with the orderly military development of a base in the presence of the enemy. The detected deployment of strategic missile units, however, was asymmetric. We have found no evidence to suggest that additional units were programmed, except for the missing IRBM site at Remedios, but we are reexamining available evidence to see if any indications can be found of preliminary work for such installations. We are not able to determine whether the USSR intended to establish a submarine base. We do know that four Soviet “F” class long range conventional submarines, which left Northern Fleet bases about 1 October, were in waters south of Bermuda by about 22 October. (They remained outside the quarantine line and finally returned to base in November.) [7 lines of source text not declassified]

TIMETABLE OF SOVIET MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA

(July-October 1962)

(All dates approximate)

Date Western Cuba Central Cuba Eastern Cuba 25-31 July Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in western Cuban ports. 1-5 August Western Cuba: Construction begins on SAM sitesat Matanzas, Havana, Mariel, Bahia Honda, Santa Lucia, San Julian, & La Coloma. 5-10 August 10-15 August 15-20 August Soviet armored groups arrive at Santiago de las Vegas and Artemisa. Central Cuba: Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in central Cuban ports. 20-25 August Construction begins on SAM site at Cienfuegos. 25-31 August 1-5 September Construction begins on Guanajay IRBM sites. Construction begins on SAM sitesat Sagua la Grande, Caibarien, & Sancti Spiritus. 5-10 September Soviet armored group arrives at Remedios. 10-15 September 15-20 September Construction begins at San Cristobal MRBM sites. Construction begins at Remedios IRBM site. Upsurge of Soviet arms shipments begins arriving in eastern Cuban ports. Soviet armored group arrives at Holguin. 20-25 September Construction begins on SAM sitesat Los Angeles; Chaparra and Jiguani. 25-30 September Construction begins at Sagua la Grande MRBM sites.

Construction begins on SAM sitesat Manati, Senado, and Manzanillo.

Note: Construction of the remaining SAM sites, which apparently were considered less vital than those listed above to the protection of offensive missile bases in Cuba, began in late September or early October. Work probably began on the SAM site at Siguanea on the Isle of Pines in the last week of September and on the sites at Esmeralda, Chambas, Maldonado, Santiago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, and Deleite during the first half of October.

215. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff toSecretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba (Sensitive) 1962. Top Secret. JCSM-955-62 Washington, November 28, 1962. SUBJECT Readiness Posture Requirements (U) Following the announcement made by the President on 20 November 1962 with regard to the lifting of the maritime quarantine of Cuba in response to the Soviet agreement to remove the IL-28s from Cuba within a period of about 30 days, we are entering a new phase of the Cuban situation. The new phase has been highlighted by the termination of the 1/8 airborne alert; the return of B-47 aircraft to home bases, except for those in Florida; authorization for the commands to return to DEFCON 5 status except where specific situations dictate otherwise; the release of the Air Force Reserve Troop Carrier units; and the authority for the return to normal operations of US naval ships and air squadrons associated with the maritime quarantine. All other forces, however, are being maintained at high readiness, and military forces are capable of reacting on a 12-hour basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62 and a 7-day basis for CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, except that necessary shipping has not been accumulated. In this new situation, we must recognize the need for high- and low-level aerial reconnaissance over Cuba and over Soviet shipping in order to ascertain whether the Soviet commitments are in fact fulfilled. At the same time, we must recognize the maintenance needs of our forces and the personnel hardships which high alert levels have imposed. In recognition of these facts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following alert posture criteria to be appropriate at this time, with further reduction to normal pre-Cuba posture prior to Christmas contingent on actual Soviet withdrawal of IL-28 aircraftfrom Cuba:

Overflight reconnaissance: High-Level: Alert posture which will permit an average of two U-2 flights per day in any 10-day period and not more than a maximum of five U-2 flights on any one day. Low-Level: Four aircraft on 12-hour alert and eight aircraft on 24-hour alert, and similar readiness for all aircraft which support the foregoing reconnaissance missions (i.e., Fighter escort, CAP, SAR, ELINT, etc.).

[5 paragraphs (5½ lines of source text) not declassified]

 Air Defense: Resume normal posture except for those units which may be needed to increase the air defense of the Southeastern United States on a permanent basis. Long-term air defense needs for this region are under study. Strategic Forces: Maintenance of normal alert levels.

Relaxation of readiness posture to the foregoing levels will permit the following actions to be taken at this time: CINCLANT and component headquarters:CINCLANT and the component commanders will maintain the presently activated communications net. CINCARLANT and CINCAFLANT headquarters elements can be returned to home stations except for reduced staffs maintained at Homestead. Air forces: The reaction times provided permit the return of all units, less those required for conduct of and combat support to reconnaissance missions, to home bases and resumption of normal training. War reserve materiel and selected support and control personnel will remain at Florida bases. Marine forces: All West Coast units less 3d LAAM Battalion will be returned to home stations at once. The FMF Atlantic units which are presently part of the recent Guantanamo defense augmentation will remain as presently deployed with a goal of returning these units to home stations by 20 December 1962. 5th MEB shipping should be utilized insofar as practicable in returning the 2d Battalion, 1st Marines, to the West Coast. Army forces: All Army units can be returned to home stations except those required to meet the provisions of subparagraph 5a above, and the 159th Boat Battalion, which will remain temporarily at Fort Lauderdale pending completion of studies to determine a suitable location that will enable it to meet the required reaction time. Navy forces: One CVA Group will be retained temporarily in the Guantanamo sea area to support the defense of Guantanamo until 20 December 1962. A Carrier Task Group will be retained in the Norfolk-Mayport area against the possible requirement for sighting Soviet ships departing Cuba ports with IL-28 aircraft and to support possible airstrikes under CINCLANT OPLAN 312-62.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

COMSTS should be given authority to recall transports without completion of voyages in process when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62. COMSTS should be given authority to requisition ships when the decision is made to prepare for execution of CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62. The recommissioning of the 11 LSTs should be continued. However, they need not be fully manned. The Joint Chiefs of Staff propose to review the situation on a continuing basis in order to determine whether the criteria of paragraph 4, above, should be relaxed to permit a continuing phase-down to an approximately normal posture by about 20 December 1962. Should continued phase-down be warranted, the remaining units can be returned to home stations, and dependents can begin to be returned to Guantanamo prior to Christmas. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend the following program of action: An immediate reduction should be effected to the readiness levels reflected in paragraph 4, above, proceeding at a rate commensurate with optimum administrative efficiency. A reassessment of the situation should be conducted on a continuing basis in order to ascertain whether IL-28 withdrawalwarrants continued relaxation to approximately normal readiness levels prior to Christmas. Your approval of the foregoing program is requested as a basis for further action by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.In a memorandum to Taylor, November 28, McNamara concurred with the recommendations in this memorandum, but suggested that “the limitation on U-2 flights over Cuba be ‘an average of two per day, cumulative from November 21, with the understanding that no more than five U-2 flights would be scheduled for any single day.’” (Ibid.) For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:Maxwell D. TaylorChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff
216. Summary Record of the 31st Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Meetings, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The meeting lasted until 10:52 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book)McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of this meeting is ibid., National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 25-32A. See the Supplement. Washington, November 29, 1962, 10 a.m.

The attached tentative agendaNot attached. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee Series, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A) was followed.

Director McCone reviewed the remaining Soviet military presence in Cuba, including MIGs, SAM sites, Komar ships, Frogs and coastal defense missiles.

There followed a discussion of reports appearing in the press quoting Cuban refugees on the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. The President asked again how we can control such reports and how we can deal with them publicly. He asked that further efforts be made with news media to relate the refugee reports to the hard evidence available to us. Mr. Helms and Mr. Salinger were to be asked to see if some system could be worked out to deal with this problem.

Secretary Rusk summarized the Mikoyan/McCloy talks in New York.See Document 213. He recommended that in his talk with MikoyanSee Document 218. the President reaffirm our current position on Cuba, that he not raise the subject of Berlin, that he call attention to the situation in Laos, and stress the importance of reaching agreement on the nuclear test ban.

The President commented that the Russians won’t take out their ground forces until we give a no-invasion assurance. It is better for us to have the Soviet units in Cuba than to give a formal no-invasion assurance.

Secretary Rusk said that the Soviet troops were there not to defend Cuba but to guard the Soviet strategic missiles. The Russians may decide to keep their troops there to control Castro. So long as the Soviet forces are there, we must be suspicious about what weapons are on the island and what weapons might be introduced.

Secretary McNamara raised the question of overflights and recommended that in general low-level flights should only be flown when necessary to clarify high-level pictures revealing suspicious activity. He said that high-level photography was very good and there was no need at present to fly low for several days. We should avoid escalation until the IL-28s are out and until Mikoyan has left New York. There are five types of wicked looking Soviet defensive missiles and the presence in Cuba of probably one thousand of such missiles undoubtedly gave rise to some of the refugee reports. These missiles are certainly being stored in warehouses and caves.

General Taylor and Secretary Rusk agreed that no low-level flights were necessary for a few days, but thereafter suspicious sites should be photographed at low level. The longer we wait to fly low level the harder it will be to do so.

The Attorney General called attention to the reference in the Khrushchev letter to the cave rumors.Document 196. He thought this point should be raised with Mikoyan in connection with verification problems.

The President asked the State Department to prepare a plan which would keep the heat on Castro and bolster other regimes in the Caribbean. A recommendation should also be made as to when the plan should be implemented. Assistant Secretary Martin replied that the State Department had a plan but was holding off implementing it until Mikoyan leaves New York. He recommended implementation of the plan be delayed as long as Soviet bombers and Soviet personnel are moving out of Cuba.

The President called attention to the Knabel post mortem of the Cuban crisis and another by Daniels of Reader’s Digest. He mentioned Senator Keating’s line, i.e., he has details of Soviet offensive missiles being hidden in Cuba which the Government does not have.

The importance of limiting discussion of the Cuban crisis was reemphasized by the President who reminded the group that press contacts should be strictly restricted to authorized White House sources.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
217. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President, 1962-31 December 1963. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. Washington, November 29, 1962, 10 a.m. SUBJECT Executive Committee of NSC Meeting—10:00 a.m.—29 November All Present

McCone reported on the Cuban Memorandum of November 29, reading from the attached summary;Reference is to SC No. 11211/63, “The Crisis:USSR/Cuba, Information as of 060029 November 1962,” November 29. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, CIA-Cuba) No summary was found attached. See the Supplement. on the memorandum “Phasing of the Soviet Military Deployment to Cuba”Document 214. reading from the attached pages 2 and 2a; and the report “Deployment and Withdrawal of Soviet Missiles and Other Significant Weapons in Cuba”,Not found. reading from memos [paragraphs] 3a, 3b and 3c; and made reference to the memorandum on “Soviet Policy in the Aftermath of the Cuban Crisis”; and the memorandum covering the background and character of Mikoyan.Neither document has been found.

The President questioned DCI at length concerning the publicity, particularly the article in the New York Mirror and the CBS broadcast by Oxley, both of which indicated that offensive missiles were known to be stored in Cuba. DCI emphasizedin discussion that it was quite impossible to prove that offensive missiles had not been in caves, however all intelligence of every kind—photographic, agent reports, refugee reports, etc.—convinced DCI that this was most improbable. DCI and McNamara both commented on the various types of missiles remaining in Cuba and stated that without doubt some of them are in caves.

Rusk reported on the Mikoyan attitude as covered by the attached memo addressed to the Secretary of StateApparent reference to the last document cited in the first paragraph. and indicated that State felt that Mikoyan would take about the same position with the President in the afternoon. McNamara requested Committee authorization of two high-level flights per day. He requested no low-level flights. Taylor agreed. Rusk argued for low-level, principally for political reasons and fear that failure to fly would give Castro an opportunity for propaganda. McNamara indicated that the COMOR paper passed by USIB on November 21stNot found. demanded excessive coverage in the light of conditions which have developed in the last week or ten days. Bundy proposed to write a memorandum expressing the Committee’s requirements for reconnaissance and then the DCI would use this as a directive to the COMOR Committee and USIB for guidance in developing a new reconnaissance program designed to meet Executive Committee needs.

Action:DCI suggested to General Carter that CIA study this problem and develop a draft of an Executive Committee Directive and a reconnaissance program which would meet the directive and submit both to me for discussion by Bundy and others.

The President requested a development of a long range plan for Cuba. He spoke in terms of 6 months or a year. State indicated that such papers had been prepared and would be put in form for submission to the Executive Committee.

The President then brought up the question of publicity and various articles which are being written on the Cuban episode, referring particularly to an article in Reader’s Digest by Mr. Daniels and in Look Magazine by Mr. Knebel. Apparently both of these writers, particularly Daniels, is following the Keating line that considerable volume of information was in the hands of the Administration prior to October 22nd and that the Administration refused to accept positive information on offensive missiles. There followed a discussion of the over-flight policies in Cuba and an emphatic denial was expressed by various members of the Executive Committee that any flight requested by CIA or NRO during September had been denied. DCI took issue with these statements, stating that it was his understanding that the Administration wished Cuban over-flights program to avoid the possibility of a “U-2 incident”. This caused CIA and COMOR Committee to program September flights so that planes would not be engaged by operational SAM sites. McCone stated that this was, in his opinion, an error as those responsible for planning reconnaissance should have insisted upon over-flying areas protected by SAMs in order to determine what was going on. He stated this was not done during September and, indeed, was not finally agreed upon until after a rather heated discussion at Special Group meeting on October 4th which was followed by a further meeting on October 9th, at which time the October 14th flight was authorized. DCI stated that he had had some trouble defending our September program before the Killian Board and sharp questioning by Mr. Clark Clifford had brought out the difficulty of explaining the lapse of 40 days in programming an aerial photography which would produce a complete mosaic of Cuba.

It was decided that all press contact with feature writers should be confined to Mr. Bundy and the Attorney General and that our respective organizations should be advised not to discuss any details of Administration activity in August, September and October with such feature writers. A memorandum is being circulated in CIA to this effect.

The President left the meeting.

There followed a brief discussion of the Mongoose program. DCI stated he felt future activity should be restricted to intelligence gathering but this should be carried on in a most intense manner and that CIA was prepared to present an operational plan which would involve refugee interrogation at Opa Laka, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and elsewhere, and an intense program with infiltrated agents, the use of Cuban in-place defectors and very active operation with third country liaison. It was decided that Mr. Helms should present this program at the earliest moment and DCI was asked to call the meeting.

DCI also stated that the form of Mongoose organization should be modified and this was agreed, but no new organization form was discussed.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
218. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversations: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Edmund S. Glenn of Language Services and approved by the White House on December 13. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) The Department of State prepared a briefing paper with seven attachments for the President in anticipation of this conversation. (Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversation Files: Lot 66 D 149) Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40–7:55 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Secretary Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS Miss N. Kushnir, LS U.S.S.R. Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Mr. Yuriy N. Vino-Gradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter) Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

After a few brief remarks about lung cancer, the President asked Mr. Mikoyan how he had enjoyed his stay in Cuba.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he enjoyed his stay very much. The weather was ideal and nature beautiful. This was the second visit of Mr. Mikoyan to Cuba. He finds the Cubans a most interesting people. The brothers Castro, Fidel and Raoul, are also very interesting. There is also an older brother who was at one time against the Cuban revolution but who now approves of it. As a matter of fact, he told his brother Fidel that if he had known how history would develop he would have joined the revolutionary cause sooner. The Castro family were large land owners. Fidel and Raoul gave away their holdings a long time ago. The older brother gave up his holdings only recently. Their mother has retained one-half of her holdings to pursue the family tradition but has given up the other half. At the time of the first visit of Mr. Mikoyan, Fidel Castro was not yet a Marxist and the flag under which he waged his revolution was that of liberalism. He became a Marxist more recently under the influence of the wishes and thoughts ot the Cuban people.

The President asked Mr. Mikoyan when Castro became a Marxist.

Mr. Mikoyan said that it was one or two years ago. Raoul Castro, Che Guevara, and the eldest Castro brother [?]All brackets are in the source text. were Marxists already before the revolution. Not so Fidel, who was moved towards Marxism by the play of the revolution itself. Mr. Mikoyan said that the same thing would happen in regard to “you also”. Perhaps not the President personally but later on.

The President said that Mr. Mikoyan obviously believes that it will happen to the President’s brothers.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he spent two days traveling through Cuba. He admires greatly the liveliness of the Cuban people and the progress accomplished in Cuban agriculture. He saw a ranch with many lakes, 120,000 ducks and much cattle. Castro is doing a lot personally to mechanize agriculture and he is personally known by most of the farmers. Mr. Mikoyan saw Canadian milking machinery. He also saw a national cattle breeding farm with 12,000 cattle and 65 pure-bred bulls. Within five years this farm expects to increase the cattle herd to 70,000. Mr. Mikoyan also saw rural schools; one of these has 1,000 students fully supported by the government and expects within three years to increase the number of students to 20,000. All told, more schools were built in three years in Cuba than had been built during the 50 year period before Castro. There are in Cuba 70,000 students fully supported by the government and the enthusiasm of Cuban youth is impressive. The mansions of capitalists who have left Cuba—which the Cuban Government permits them to do—have been made into youth hostels. During the recent events the militia has been mobilized though on an entirely voluntary basis. The places of the men on the jobs were taken by the women who managed to fulfill their work quotas in all cases. Mr. Mikoyan was most impressed by all those young women at work.

The President said that now he understood why Mr. Mikoyan had liked his travels in Cuba.

Mikoyan said that indeed his visit to Cuba reminded him of his youth when he also was working for the cause of the revolution. He also made speeches at several universities and felt that the students greatly distrusted the United States. He must admit that they have some reasons for such an attitude. Since, however, it is expected that the exchange of correspondence between Chairman Khrushchev and President is to be registered with the United Nations, it is possible that the fears of the young Cubans will be calmed by the very fact of such a recording of this memorable correspondence.

The President said that the relations between the United States and Cuba are bad. What Mr. Mikoyan said about Cuban internal developments may be quite interesting; however, this is not the part of Cuban events which is of primary concern to us. What we are concerned with is the use of Cuba as a springboard for subversion, meaning both Soviet subversion and Castro’s own efforts in that direction. There is no reason why statements that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba should not go on record. Yet this is hardly necessary since it is obvious that the United States could have invaded Cuba any number of times beginning with April 1960 but did not do so. This should suffice to make United States intentions clear. As a matter of fact, only recently the President was speaking against those Americans who suggested an invasion of Cuba. Thus, once again the attitude of the United States was clear. However, beginning in July the Soviets have sent over 100 ships loaded with arms and military materiel to Cuba. While this was going on the President, trusting official statements by the Soviet Union, continued to affirm that there was no danger to the United States from an arms build-up in Cuba. This had led to very serious political difficulties on all levels. It is difficult for the President to say at the present moment that the situation with Cuba is in any way satisfactory, since it is not known what will happen next month or what the Chinese will do. Maybe the Chinese Communists will start an arms build-up in Cuba in January, or maybe the Soviet Union itself will start again such a build-up. After all, what the Soviets did once they could do again and no one could blame a certain feeling of mistrust on the part of the United States after what had happened.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that what the President had said presents an extremely serious matter. Yet the Soviet Union does not deserve any reproach. No one can believe that the arms build-up in Cuba was offensive and intended against the United States. It had, in fact, been decided as early as June, by Chairman Khrushchev and his colleagues, of whom Mr. Mikoyan was one, that the United States would be told about the arms build-up, in every detail, by the Soviet Union at an appropriate moment. First it was intended to communicate with the United States Government on a confidential basis and then to make an announcement to the press. Of course, this was something which the Soviet Union was not obligated to do since after all, the United States does not inform the Soviet Union of its military moves. As for the purpose of the military build-up, it was obviously not offensive; no military man and not even a civilian could ever believe that rockets in Cuba could be necessary or even useful for an attack against the United States. The decision had been made to inform the United States after the elections so as to avoid influencing in any way the political campaign in the United States. The President himself certainly would not want to have the elections influenced by Soviet moves. Of course on the 22nd of October no intimation of the build-up was made by the Soviet Union but even if a disclosure had not taken place the Soviet Union would have brought the entire build-up to the attention of the United States on November 8th or 10th, immediately after the elections.

The President said that the problem was not due to the fact that the Soviet Union did not make a statement to the United States about the arms build-up—as it obviously has the right to proceed with any such measures without announcing them to the United States—but on the contrary that the Soviet Union had made a statement according to which no offensive weapons were being sent to Cuba or were going to be sent there.

Mr. Mikoyan said that obviously the two speakers had a different interpretation of the recent events. The fact remains that the purpose of the arms build-up in Cuba was defensive and not offensive. They were sent there to defend the island against invasion and for no other purpose. There were some 40 medium and intermediate-range missiles. It is silly to believe that those missiles emplaced in Cuba could be needed for an attack against the United States. After all, there exist other missiles with a much longer range—so long a range in fact that they cannot be tested within the territory of the Soviet Union and must be shot into the sea. The United States Government knows very well how far into the sea they are falling.

On the other hand, the President had spoken in his exchange with Chairman Khrushchev of a United States pledge of non-invasion. Nothing more need to be said. Now, when the United States is making this pledge conditional on the conduct of Cuba it is departing from its previous position.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was reminded of conversations he had with President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles. He had asked Secretary Dulles whether the latter thought the Soviet Union wished to attack the United States. Secretary Dulles had replied that he did not think that the Government of the Soviet Union in power at that time wanted to attack. Secretary Dulles then asked Mr. Mikoyan whether the latter thought that the United States wanted to attack the Soviet Union. Mr. Mikoyan replied that he did not think so but that he had some doubts in the matter. If the United States did not want to attack the Soviet Union why did it ring the Soviet territory with bases and continue a cold-war policy? Now the United States says that the Soviet tried to establish an offensive base in Cuba. Mr. Mikoyan would like to ask once more whether the President thinks that the Soviet Union wishes to attack the United States.

The President said that he did not know what may have been the reasons of the Soviet Government to establish the base. The fact is that it was established.

Cuba was not threatened by the United States. At the end of September and throughout October the President attacked those people in the United States who spoke in favor of an aggressive policy towards Cuba. There were no indications whatsoever at the time when, in June, Mr. Mikoyan said a decision had been taken by the Soviet Union, that any aggressive moves by the United States were contemplated. Had the question been addressed to the President by Chairman Khrushchev at that time, the President would have been glad to say then as he says now that no invasion of Cuba is intended.

An invasion of Cuba is not a solution to the Cuban problem. We do not live now in the early days of the Twentieth Century. The United States has obligations extending throughout the world. It is true that there are refugees from Cuba who annoy Mr. Castro but there is no policy on the part of the United States Government to invade Cuba. Unquestionably, as able a man as the Soviet Ambassador in the United States must have been aware of that.

As for Soviet intentions, maybe war was not an aim of the Soviet Union but it seems that a policy of threat may well have been the objective. Mr. Mikoyan said that a statement about the build-up would have been made in November. At that time the missiles would have already been fully emplaced. What would have been the posture of the United States Government which had publicly affirmed its trust in the statements of Soviet leaders?

The entire episode cannot be interpreted in any other way than as a major attack against the present Administration and the Government of the United States.

The question is now how the lack of understanding between the two governments can be transformed into mutual understanding. Already in the recent past in the question of Laos and then again in that of Cuba, the two countries have come very close to the edge of the abyss. The question is now what about the future? How many more such near escapes or such situations of dire danger will happen during the next decade because the two governments do not understand one another?

Mr. Mikoyan said that he would first speak about the President’s concluding remarks. After that he would reply to the President’s earlier statements. In regard to the President’s concluding remarks he wished to say that he fully agrees that agreement is necessary for peace and that lack of agreement between the two great Powers may well lead to disaster. As to the President’s first remarks, he must emphasize that the Soviet move into Cuba had for a purpose only defense and deterrence. The Soviet Union acted in order to facilitate an agreement leading to peace. After all, it is well known that counter-revolutionary gangs were being trained in camps in the United States and on the territories of other countries of the Western Hemisphere allied with the United States. There was much war-like talk in the United States. Mr. Nixon spoke in favor of an invasion of Cuba, so did Pentagon generals. Under such circumstances, there was good reason to prepare deterrents and defense. It is quite clear that such was the purpose of the Soviet Union, which was going to inform the United States that what it intended through the build-up in Cuba was the defense of that island and not an aggression against the United States. After all, the Soviet Union has more than enough long-range missiles emplaced on its own territory to need anything else. Forty-two missiles are something insignificant for offense and therefore it is clear that they were meant for defense. Moreover, these missiles remained in the hands of the Soviet military and could not have been used without signal authorization from Moscow. Mr. Mikoyan would like to mention to the President in confidence that there exists Soviet legislation which makes it illegal to place nuclear or thermonuclear weapons under non-Soviet control. Mr. Mikoyan also feels that the threat of war is not Cuba but the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and therefore misunderstandings and threats must be eliminated from those relations. Mr. Mikoyan remembers a conversation with that very wise man, Secretary Cordell Hull, back in 1936. At that time, Secretary Hull had said that German fascism and Japanese militarism were preparing for war. Only the United States and the Soviet Union were in a position to defend peace. The situation at that time was already what it is at the present. Both countries have terrible weapons and therefore both have an overwhelming responsibility before the entire world. An understanding and agreement between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy must be obtained in order to prevent war. This means, first of all, that the Cuban affair must be brought to a final conclusion and then that the other “knots” of the international situation must be “untied”.

The President said that he did not know what exactly Mr. Nixon had said. In fact, Mr. Nixon had said many things throughout his career. What is clear is that during the period to which Mr. Mikoyan alluded Mr. Nixon was not in a policy making position. As for Pentagon generals, they are under the control of the Administration and there certainly had been no statements on their part calling for aggression. Once again, if the United States had wanted to invade Cuba it could have done so much earlier. There were no United States forces at the time of the hopeless attempt at landing made by Cuban patriots. There were no statements by any people in positions of responsibility in the United States which might have led to the belief that an invasion was being contemplated. The problem in fact is not Cuba, the problem is the attitude of the Soviet Government. Of course, it is clear that the United States Government has very little liking for the present Government of Cuba. This, however, does not mean an intent to invade them. After all, the Soviet Government does not like the present Government of Albania. This does not mean that the Soviet Union will invade Albania, as in such a case as well as in that of a hypothetical invasion of Cuba, international consequences could be very grave. The President stated that he is not, however, so terribly interested in Mr. Castro. What he is interested in, once again, is the attitude of the Soviet Government. How is it possible to go through the coming decade if we are, as in the past, to move from crisis to crisis. The President hopes that some day the Soviet Government will understand that its main duty should be the defense of the interests of the Soviet Union and not pushing the world from one small crisis to another one at the risk of catastrophe which would engulf everything.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Chairman Khrushchev shared the President’s opinion that an understanding between the two governments is necessary for peace. Therefore, all the points of disagreement have to be taken one by one and resolved. Both countries must work for peace. The first step should be a final resolution of the Cuban affair—as the President himself said. Much was done in that direction, but unfortunately, no final situation has been yet achieved. This is because the US Government’s attitude is not as helpful as it should be.

Once the Cuban crisis is resolved, the next steps might well be a non-aggression pact between the Warsaw Pact organization and NATO, the cessation of nuclear tests, disarmament, and Berlin.

As the President himself has noted, the fact that the Cuban crisis has been largely resolved proves the necessity of talks and negotiations between the two governments. As the President has communicated it to Chairman Khrushchev, negotiations should not stop short of a final solution.

The exchange of correspondence between the two heads of state provides a basis for such a solution. A good way to carry it out would be to place this exchange of correspondence within an agreed protocol. Such a draft protocol, which would also include the position of the Cuban Government, was drafted by the Soviets. Unfortunately, the American representatives refused to accept it.

Another procedure might consist in drafting three declarations, by the United States, Soviet and Cuban Governments, to be agreed upon in New York and then, as a second step, placed before the Security Council for its approval.

The President asked whether Mr. Mikoyan meant an approval by the Security Council or a recording of the declarations with the Secretary General. One of these procedures would require a vote by the Security Council. This, as well as the inclusion of a Cuban declaration, would make the entire procedure impossible to accept. After all, the United States representative in the Security Council cannot be expected to vote in favor of Mr. Castro’s declaration. What is important may be achieved simply by declarations agreed upon by the Soviet and United States Governments, which would then be registered with the Secretary General. As for the Cubans, let them do or not do whatever they wish.

Mr. Mikoyan said that after all, the Cuban question is on the agenda of the United Nations and, therefore, must be discussed there. What would be important is that an agreement be obtained between the two Governments before a discussion in the Security Council. The latter, however, cannot be avoided, and the lack of an agreement would amount to keeping alive an international dispute. The two countries, therefore, should come forward with an agreed position. As for such points which are not agreed, they might be the object of separate statements.

The President said that the Cuban Government must be left out of the negotiations. The problem now may be whether there would be agreement on one or two separate declarations.

Mr. Mikoyan said that there should be two declarations, one by each Government, however, that the texts should be agreed upon by the two Governments. The Security Council could then approve those two declarations and could call on the two Governments to resolve the remaining points of difference. What is necessary is a preliminary agreement by the two Governments on the texts of two declarations.

The President said that he understood that Soviet representatives did not like the American draft.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the President guessed correctly the opinion of the Soviet Government.

The President said that Soviet missiles have been removed from Cuba and that he expects that the Soviet bombers will likewise be taken out. He also hopes that the same thing will apply to the other military units and weapons covered by his correspondence with Chairman Khrushchev.

Mr. Mikoyan said that what Mr. Khrushchev has promised to do has either been done or is being done. No other weapons, however, beyond those covered by the correspondence, will be removed.

[An unclarity in translation seems to have led to a temporary misunderstanding. The President was apparently referring to “units servicing or guarding the missile force”. Mr. Mikoyan seems to have believed that the President’s remarks applied also to military materiel beyond those specifically “service or guard” units.]

The President said that the Agreement covered missiles, bombers, and in due course, other units destined to service or guard the strategic offensive weapons. There is, of course, in Cuba, other military materiel about which, however, the President was not speaking.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the correspondence between the two heads of State is clear on that point. Unfortunately the United States draft declaration also contains a condition which applies to its non-invasion pledge. The condition in question is that the pledge applies only if Cuba abstains from any action which may be considered subversive or of a nature to undermine the governments of others of the Western Hemisphere. Otherwise the non-invasion guarantee is withdrawn. This conditional clause gives to the United States the right to judge the actions of another government and in fact to invade Cuba as it pleases. Mr. Castro has rightly asked “Who has given to the United States the right to invade or not invade Cuba, depending on its own wishes and furthermore to demand guarantees from the Cuban Government?”

The President said that it is Mr. Castro who is asking for guarantees and not the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Mr. Castro was right in saying that no one gave the United States the right to invade or abstain from invasion according to its own interpretation of Cuban actions. Mr. Castro’s declaration of the 28th is quite reasonable.Reference is to the September 27 message from Castro to U Thant; for an extract of the text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 439-440. What he wants is a bilateral guarantee. According to the United States, Cuba must not undertake subversive action, but the United States and its Allies are free to undertake such actions. Castro’s demand that the agreement cut both ways is reasonable and in agreement with international law. Likewise, his demands for the liquidation of an economic blockade, the abstention from piratical acts, especially by ships belonging to Cuban counter-revolutionaries but based in United States ports and in particular Miami, are reasonable. So is his wish for a normalization of relations between the two countries. The only controversial point is that of the Guantanamo Base. Even there, however, Mr. Castro does not ask for the immediate elimination of the Base but only for the opening of negotiations to determine the time when it would be surrendered.

The President agreed that the actions of Cuban students shooting at Cuba from small boats are against United States legislation. Such actions are unimportant and only the sporadic exploits of publicity seekers. The United States Government is against such actions. The United States Government is not training any Cuban forces for action against Cuba and neither are such forces trained on the territories of the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The important point is that of a non-invasion policy by the United States. The President said that he is repeating here and now that it is not the intention of the United States Government to invade Cuba.

It is, however, much more difficult to put such a statement in an official document without surrounding it with the necessary guarantees. After all, Mr. Mikoyan himself had stated to the press that the actions of the Soviet Government had “tied the hands of the Imperialists”. Regardless of how the word “imperialists” might apply, the President cannot expect to tie the hands of the United States regardless of any situation which might arise. The declaration does not apply only to the present. It applies also to the future, at least to the next two or six years depending on the wishes of the American electorate. In the meantime, many things may happen. What will the Chinese Communists do? What if three years from now the Soviet Union decided to reintroduce offensive weapons into Cuba?

The President is stating once again that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. Any official written document, however, must be so drafted as to recognize the international responsibilities of the United States.

After all, we can neither forget or disregard the fact that Castro is not a friend of this country.

Yet the most important thing has been achieved: the Soviet Union knows that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and the United States knows that the Soviets have removed missiles from Cuba. This is the gist of the agreement between the two Heads of State.

The problem now is that of formal statements. Here difficulties arise. After all, no control has been allowed, as requested by the United States and agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence. In consequence the United States is forced to carry on the overflights against which the Soviet Union and Castro are protesting.

Another solution might perhaps be suggested to these two points: if no international control is possible, the United States must, as it said, find out about the situation through its own facilities. The only thing that can be done is to make United States surveillance as unobtrusive as possible. After all, the lack of international control places the United States Government in an exceedingly difficult position, as it makes it almost impossible for it to reply to charges which are being made that there are still Soviet missiles in Cuba.

The President showed Mr. Mikoyan a press clipping containing a statement that there are Soviet missiles hidden in Cuban caves.

Mr. Mikoyan reiterated that the agreement between the two Chiefs of State in regard to weapons has been reached and is being carried out accordingly. However, articles in the United States press and the attitude of United States military constitute an obstacle to the final resolution of the crisis. Now the United States is stating that it intends to continue its overflights of Cuban territory. This is a source of a legitimate irritation on the part of the Cubans. After all, the United States has aerial cameras which make it possible to photograph Cuba from outside Cuban airspace. In spite of that the United States insists on violating Cuban airspace. This is not acceptable.

The President said that there are no such cameras; the angle at which photographs can be taken from outside the three-mile limit makes the photographs untrustworthy. The United States, however, endeavors to keep its overflights inconspicuous by carrying them out at high altitude and avoiding low altitude flights.

Mr. Mikoyan said that low altitude overflights are blatant hooliganism. High altitude overflights are also hooliganism but less blatant. Castro is right when he says that he will have to deal with such overflights by his own means.

The President said that this is not a question of great concern to the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that such overflights violate the principles of the United Nations and Cuban sovereignty. Any country would protest against a state of affairs which hurts the legitimate pride and self-esteem of the Cubans. Castro has agreed to control. He only insists that such a control apply to all the parties concerned and not be strictly onesided. What makes the situation more difficult is the insistence of the United States to place a statement on this matter in the declaration. Trying to find out about facts by using one’s own facilities is against international law but might be ignored; however, statement to that effect in a declaration does violate international law and cannot be accepted. Furthermore, the statement in the declaration that a non-invasion pledge is conditional on Cuba’s abstention from subversive activities cannot be reconciled with international law as it in fact gives to the United States the right to determine by itself whether an invasion should take place. If there are any measures to be taken for the control of the subversion, they should apply equally to Cuba, to the other Caribbean nations and to the United States.

The President quoted the text of the proposed draft stating that “provided no nuclear weapons or weapons systems capable of offensive use are present in or reintroduced into Cuba, and the United States is in position to be satisfied on these points, and provided Cuba does not involve or support an invasion of any other country, the United States declares that it will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.”The quote is from Document 208.

Mr. Mikoyan said that it might not be impossible to express the fact that no nuclear weapons should be emplaced in Cuba, though not in the language of the present United States draft. In this draft it is said that Cuba might “support” the invasion of other countries. What is the precise meaning of the word “to support”?

The President said that he understands Mr. Mikoyan’s concern on the latter point. His own concern should also be understood: the guarantee in question ties the hands of the United States for a period of years. If nothing were said beyond the point of the exclusion of offensive missiles and nuclear weapons from Cuba, that would mean that Castro would be free to do anything else he chose to do, and that the United States would be prevented from reacting against it. The President does not intend to give such a license to Castro. He is ready to state that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba; the problem is, however, that of avoiding giving Castro a blank check for a number of actions against which retaliation would be prevented by the declaration. This is why the clause in question was included. It is not because we want to invade Cuba. If Castro wants peace, that is fine, because that is what the United States wants and what the United States is saying. If he keeps peace we shall not invade Cuba, regardless of what Mr. Castro does within the borders of his country. This is their business.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States declaration means that the United States intends to control the actions of the Government of Cuba. What Castro wants is simply that if there is to be control it should be multilateral. His position is fully in agreement with the spirit of the exchange of letters between the two Chiefs of State. On the contrary the President said that Castro is an enemy of the United States and that the United States is going to terminate its blockade only under certain conditions. This means that the United States is moving back from the position agreed upon in the exchange of correspondence. It means that the United States is to be free to continue its anti-Cuban policies but that Castro would be prevented from doing anything without the permission of the United States.

Multilateral control can be accepted, but a situation according to which one government would be in a position to judge the actions of another government is not acceptable.

Furthermore, the fact that the United States has responsibilities under the Rio Treaty does not need to be included, as this is of no concern to the Soviet Union and, furthermore, as the United States and its Allies have pushed Cuba out of the Rio Treaty organization.

The President said that Mr. Mikoyan had accused the United States of retreating from the position expressed in the exchange of correspond-ence. This is not so. It is on the contrary, the Soviet Union which is moving back from its position, as the correspondence specified inspection by the United Nations and that no such inspection was allowed. Mr. Mikoyan had said that the declaration should not contain any suggestion that one government might judge the actions of another. However, some safeguards are necessary since otherwise the hands of the United States would be tied even while the policy of the Soviet Union would be free to change.

Nothing was said in the exchange of correspondence about any control of American territory. Now, however, Mr. Mikoyan suggests that the United States as well as Cuba submit to control, while no control would be exercised over the territory of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union proposes that the declaration be placed before the Security Council by a simple expression of Soviet will, and describes a state of affairs depending entirely on Soviet intentions. This cannot be accepted by the United States. The United States Government was misled once and it intends to make certain that it will not be misled again.

The United States does not intend to invade Cuba and is ready to make that known. It must, however, insist on (1) a minimum of control, and (2) the expression of its obligations under the Rio Treaty. The Rio Treaty has been ratified by the United States Senate and is a part of United States legislation to which the President himself is subject. It cannot be ignored in a binding document.

If the Soviet Union prefers it, however, it may be possible to make the United States intent known in a way which would be quite clear though not imply the same legal complications, for example, through a statement by the President, let us say, a press conference. In fact, the President has already made a statement of this kind at his last press conference. If, however, an official declaration is called for it must include references to all the aspects of the problem.

Thus there is a choice between either an official declaration, the precise language of which could be worked out between Messrs. McCloy, Stevenson and Kuznetsov, or a simply verbal statement by the President at a press conference.

If the first alternate is chosen it would have to contain references to the Rio Treaty, of which the United States continues to be a member, and a clause referring to the possibility of the United States satisfying itself that Cuba and the Soviet Union are respecting their side of the bargain; a lack of such a clause would cause an uncontrollable uproar in the United States and throughout the Western Hemisphere.

The other solution might be a simple statement by the President that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba, with the hope that Castro will not undertake any provocative action and that the Soviet Union does not reintroduce a military threat into the Western Hemisphere. If Mr. Castro wishes to carry on the activities described by Mr. Mikoyan such as the education of Cuban children and the mechanization of Cuban agriculture, well and fine. All we ask is that he does not cause any trouble outside of his own borders.

If there is to be an official declaration its language can be worked out in New York by the representatives of the two countries but it will have to contain clear references to the absence of offensive weapons from Cuba, to the control of such absence, and to some guarantees to the defense. The only other possibility is an informal statement.

Mr. Mikoyan asked if the President’s statement at a press conference would be instead of or in addition to the formal declarations.

The President said that if no agreement can be reached on formal declarations, then it might be possible for him to clarify the position of the United States by means of a statement at a press conference express-ing the spirit of the exchange of correspondence between the two Heads of State. As a matter of fact, already at his last press conference the President had said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba and that the same applied to the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. The President also expressed part of what he thinks about Mr. Castro, but this is not the same thing as an invasion. Thus a lot of progress was accomplished on the most difficult and important elements of the crisis. Let us hope that progress will be possible also on its remaining formal aspect through agreed declarations registered with the United Nations. If not, the President is ready to make an adequate statement at a press conference. Thus again there are two possibilities. Either agreed statements registered with the United Nations or a unilateral statement by the President at his press conference. Mr. Khrushchev, of course, can also wish to make a statement in either case. A statement by the United States or a statement agreeing with the United States will have to contain references to control and to the Rio Treaty.

There are, in fact, three possibilities: either agreement within the United Nations or disagreement and debate within the United Nations, if the Soviet Government so wishes; or again something which may or may not be satisfactory, that is to say a simple statement at a press conference. At that the two Governments could perhaps pass on to the other problems such as that of disarmament. In the meantime, the Cuban affair might be permitted to cool off and the President hopes that it will remain cool for a long time.

Mr. Mikoyan said that, in fact, what the President wants is merely to cool off a burning situation, while keeping the fire alive, whereas the Soviet Government wants to put the fire out for good before passing on to other questions.

The President said that the interpretations of the two participants in the conversation obviously differ.

Mr. Mikoyan suggested that if agreement could be obtained on a part of the items to be included in the declarations, such declarations could be registered officially with the United Nations. Any points on which there would be no agreement would then be the object of the statements outside of the United Nations. What should be included in the declarations is what was included in the exchange of correspondence. Other items, such as the Rio Treaty, could be left outside.

The President said that he wished to make it quite clear for the record that the United States is not moving back from any position agreed to in the correspondence.

The President quoted from the exchange of correspondence to the effect that the removal of missiles and other strategic weapons and military units would proceed under the control of the United Nations. This was not done. If the Soviet Union can manage to abide by the exchange of correspondence to the letter, then the United States will abide by that exchange to the letter. If not, the President can only act in the best way the situation permits.

Mr. Mikoyan stated that the Soviet Union fully abides by the exchange of correspondence. It had allowed inspection as the owner of the missiles and other weapons. The permission of the government on the soil of which the missiles were placed still remained necessary, and this is something over which the Soviet Union has no control. This is what was said in Chairman Khrushchev’s letters of October 27 and 28. The only differences between the two letters being that all mention of Turkey was deleted from the October 28 letter. Thus the Soviets did everything which was incumbent upon them. Secretary General U Thant was kept informed of what the Soviets were doing. On the other hand the Soviet Government appreciates that the United States Government has agreed to verify the removal of missiles by means other than those specified in the exchange of letters. These means are, however, fully satisfactory, since American newspapers published photographs of missiles being removed and American officers made sure that the removal of missiles was taking place.

At the point where the entire deal is about to be finalized, the United States refuses to move forward but takes a step backwards. The aim of the United States Government is obviously to avoid guaranteeing the non-invasion of Cuba and this aim is being pursued through the imposition of a new condition. Perhaps the Soviet Union would also like to bring in some new conditions; but it realizes that it cannot be done without agreement on both sides, and thus it feels that it must, and the United States Government must likewise, simply abide by the exchange of correspondence. As for the obligations arising from the Rio Treaty, the United States may take care of them as it wishes, either through a statement at a press conference or by some other means. This is not a matter of concern for the Soviet Union.

The President said that nothing was said in the correspondence about any formal declarations. The only thing mentioned was an affirmation of United States intent in regard to the question of a hypothetical invasion of Cuba. This is something which the United States continues to be ready to do, and as a matter of fact, which it has done and is doing again. As for the draft declaration, it seems that the United States draft is not to the liking of the Soviet Government. So far, however, we have not seen any Soviet draft proposal.

The point of fact remains that it is not the intention of the United States Government to invade Cuba.

Mr. Mikoyan said that Castro has stated that his intentions are peaceful.

The President said that in such a case he does not have anything that should worry him.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States draft is insulting to Castro.

The President asked in what way could it be so interpreted.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the United States draft proposes that the actions of one sovereign government be subject to the control of another government. This is unusual in international relations.

The President said that the United States affirms its intent not to invade Cuba, such affirmations are not usual either.

Mr. Mikoyan said that this pledge of non-invasion is made subject to a condition placed unilaterally on Cuba and to be enforced unilaterally by the United States.

The President said that we cannot be expected to let this assurance stand if someday missiles or other similar weapons are introduced by Communist China, or once more by the Soviet Union or by somebody else, or if other similarly aggressive steps are taken by Castro. Can the United States be expected to extend a guarantee without any limitations?

Mr. Mikoyan said that the pledge of non-invasion should be stated in the terms in which it appears in the correspondence.

The President said that he is ready to make a simple statement. If, however, the Soviet Union insists on binding declarations, it must accept the complexities which unavoidably accompany the drafting of legal documents. The President would like to suggest to leave questions of precise drafting to Messrs. McCloy, Stevenson and Kuznetsov, with the repeated understanding that the declaration must include references to the obligations of the United States under the Rio Treaty and, in the absence of United Nations inspection, to some alternate system of guarantee and control. Thirdly, it must be specified that United States guarantees apply only as long as Castro abides by his peaceful statements. The United States is preparing to consider any draft which the Soviet Union might submit and which would satisfy those points.

Mr. Mikoyan said that the Soviet draft protocol contained all the necessary points but was not accepted by the United States.

The President suggested that matters of drafting be left to the delegations meeting in New York. The United States does not intend to invade Cuba and never intended to invade Cuba. The only threatening situation was the one created through the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba. If the Soviet Union does not repeat such an action, there may be no problem to worry about in the future. In any case it is clear that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. That is the most important, and suitable language may be found by the New York delegations. In fact, the most difficult problem has been resolved, and what remains is only a secondary one.

Mr. Mikoyan said that it is true that much progress has been made and that is why he is so surprised at the President’s position in regard to the final step of the declaration.

The President said that the difficulty is due to the failure of carrying out control. The Soviet Union objects to United States overflights of Cuba. The United States must insist on some means of control. It is possible that negotiations will lead to common ground. If so, fine. If not, a statement on the part of the President may be a step along the way.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he fully agreed with the spirit of the President’s statement. He realizes that it will be impossible to discuss the declaration paragraph for paragraph in the present conversation. He is concerned, however, with the proposal to replace action within the United Nations by a simple statement at a press conference. The Cuba affair is on the agenda of the United Nations and failure to agree in that forum would keep the question alive. In fact, there is no reason to keep it alive as the carrying out of its obligations by the Soviet Union has been verified. Agreement has been obtained on the difficult question, the points of disagreement deal with something which should be easier to resolve. Mr. Mikoyan understands the President’s concern, but he does not see why this concern should justify the inclusion of new conditions to the fulfillment of pledges. It is not possible to accept overflights. As for the Rio Treaty considerations, they belong in another forum. As for the question of preventing subversion, it should apply to all parties alike and not on a unilateral basis.

These are questions, however, which the delegations in New York might be able to resolve, if they are given correct instructions. Let them continue working at it. Nevertheless, Mr. Mikoyan has not fully understood what he must report to Chairman Khrushchev. Is it still the intention of the United States not to invade Cuba or is the United States backing away from that position?

The President said that he already has answered that question and said that the United States does not intend to invade Cuba. If the Soviet Union abides by the exchange of correspondence so will the United States.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he was happy to hear that.

The President said that he had made a statement to that effect already at the preceding week’s press conference. At the present moment the only question that remains is that of formal documents. The Soviet Government has now come up with a proposal of a formal protocol to be signed with Cuba.

The President does not intend to sign any documents with Castro. A statement at a press conference would be a simple manner of resolving the question. An official document signed by all the parties induces legal complexities. This is, however, what the Soviet Union insists upon.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he liked what the President said at his last press conference and so did Chairman Khrushchev.

The President said that much progress has been accomplished, perhaps more will be accomplished in the next few weeks. In any case when Mr. Mikoyan returns to Moscow he will be able to report to Chairman Khrushchev the precise understanding that the United States has of this matter.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he would be able to remain longer if this could help to discuss these questions more fully and obtain a greater degree of agreement on them.

219. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, S/S Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Glenn and approved by the White House on December 13. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Kennedy Library) This memorandum continues the conversation recorded in Document 218. Washington, November 29, 1962, 4:40–7:55 p.m. SUBJECT Laos—Relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, Cuba PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President The Secretary Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson Mr. E.S. Glenn, LS Miss N. Kushnir, LS U.S.S.R. Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Mr. Yuriy N. Vino-Gradov, Soviet Delegation to XVII General Assembly (Interpreter) Mr. Igor D. Bubnov, Third Secretary, Soviet Embassy

[Here follows discussion of Laos, see volume XXIV, pages 923–924.]

To return to the question of Cuba, it is possible that a solution as to form may be found provided there is no difference as to substance. It is necessary to decide to help the Delegations meeting in New York in order to make it possible for the latter to succeed in their task.

The President said that there is a U.S. draft. Does the Soviet Union wish to submit a draft of its own? Does it insist on the idea of a protocol? Or does it desire to work on the basis of the U.S. draft?

Mr. Mikoyan said that the Soviet Delegation would submit a draft.

The President said that there is time to work out this question in New York. What concerns him is that every six months another crisis seems to arise. How can the world go through the next decade under such circumstances?

Mr. Mikoyan said that step by step negotiations will be necessary. The next question to be taken up may be in regard to a non-aggression treaty between the Warsaw Organization and NATO.

The President said that it is strange that there are two countries such as the Soviet Union and the United States which are powerful and wealthy, and which have no direct conflicts of interest to separate them. In spite of that, they find themselves perpetually in a state bordering on conflict. At the same time many other parts of the world are facing problems of hunger and underdevelopment. It would be good if the Soviet Union were to devote its effort to the pursuit of its own interests, in the same way in which the United States devotes its efforts to the pursuit of its own interests, and abandon the belief that it is its job to kindle revolutionary fires all over the world. This would be worth more than 40 non-aggression treaties.

Mr. Mikoyan said that revolutions are not caused by the Soviet Union. It is not the Soviet Union which was the cause of the Cuban revolution; as a matter of fact it knew much less about this revolution than did the United States. He already had said the same thing in January.

The President said that he did not accuse the Soviet Union of having fomented the Cuban revolution.

Mr. Mikoyan said that there will be revolutions regardless of what either the Soviet Union or the United States do.

The President said that this may be true, but that it was still important for the two countries to understand each other better. How could the Soviet Government believe that the United States would not react on finding that there were 40 missiles emplaced in Cuba? How would the Soviets have reacted if the United States had emplaced 40 missiles in Finland, especially if the government of that country had been as inimical to the Soviet Union as Castro is towards the United States?

Mr. Mikoyan said that there are United States missiles in Turkey very close to the Soviet Union. In spite of that he feels that Soviet citizens may sleep with tranquility, as long as the missiles in question are in American hands. This is because he trusts President Kennedy.

The President said that he has always been of the opinion that American missile bases such as those in Turkey do not make sense. Several have been deactivated and for the last twenty months the United States Government has worked at deactivating more. This is why the emplacing of Soviet missiles in Cuba has come as such a shock.

It is quite clear that the two governments have misjudged one another. This is a type of misjudgment which neither they nor the world can afford.

Mr. Mikoyan said that he liked the spirit of what the President just said. That is why it is necessary to talk problems over and to agree.

The President said that it was not enough to obtain verbal agreements. They also must be implemented. It would be better perhaps if—as in the case of Laos—the Soviet Union would not always insist that it is fulfilling its obligations. It would be better if it were ready to admit its shortcomings as the United States is ready to admit its own shortcomings, and work harder to correct them.

Mr. Mikoyan said that problems had to be taken up one by one.

The President said that in doing so it must be remembered that the two countries have very few genuinely divergent interests, and yet there are many conflicts between them. There is something very wrong with such a situation.

220. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet UnionSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. Top Secret. The source text is a copy from Moscow and contains no drafting information. Washington, November 30, 1962, 6 p.m.

1180. Eyes only for Ambassador. Following is summary of meeting yesterday Stevenson, McCloy and Yost with Mikoyan, Zorin, Kuznetsov and Mendelevich:

Mikoyan said Soviet government, anxious terminate Cuban matter, believes Soviet draft protocol best form for termination, but since US doesn’t like it, is prepared accept declarations which will be presented to SC for approval. Raised several objections to US draft declaration. Argued that according US draft, if Cuba takes any act which US considers jeopardizes security of Caribbean, US obligation against invasion would lapse; that this is direct retreat from statement in President’s letter. Complained that there is no word in declaration about subversive activity against Cuba whereas Castro supported by USSR proposes that subversive activity be stopped by all countries. Contended that while US has right to ask for inspection in relation to non-introduction of weapons, Cubans also have right of inspection against invasion preparations. Supported multilateral inspection by UN observed. Said whole of US would not be inspected but only certain parts, including Puerto Rico, where camps of invasion bands are located; whole territory of Cuba would be subject to inspection as well as certain neighboring countries; one-sided inspection is impossible. Supporting Castro proposals, argued US need not at once abandon Guantanamo but should enter into negotiations with Cubans about its disposition. Also argued that if US not prepared normalize relations with Cuba at present, at least should say we are prepared negotiate later. Referred to statement President’s letter October 27See Document 95. not only US would not invade but was confident other states would give similar assurances. Complained this point does not appear in US declaration.

Stevenson replied US eager have Cuban affair settled and he hoped receive Soviet draft declaration soonest. Said it appears principal points outstanding between us are Castro’s five points; we cannot discuss them and it is better adhere to US-Soviet terms of agreement. If new matters introduced into negotiations, doubted they could ever be concluded said we understand Soviets feel obligated to support Cuba’s demands but we also have numerous demands from other American republics which we are not introducing into negotiations. Regarding safeguards against introduction offensive weapons in Cuba, noted that according President’s letter October 27 this was to be delegated to UN observers; since such observation in Cuba has not been possible, we have said frankly in our draft declaration that until such safeguards are provided, we must use our own means; we do not ask Soviets to agree to our unilateral means and inspection but simply point out to them we have no other choice. Pointed out US has gone further than exchange of correspond-ence by saying not only that we would not invade Cuba ourselves but that we would not support such invasion. As to assurances other American republics against invasion of Cuba, said President merely expressed opinion they would be willing give such assurances. As to procedures, believe best course is to proceed by agreed declarations in SC. If declarations cannot be fully agreed, they could at least be presented separately to Secretary General to be submitted to SC and have Cuban affair concluded in this manner.

McCloy urged should try to finish this crisis promptly and proceed to other problems to avoid other crisis. Pointed out US had gone beyond letters of agreement in raising quarantine before safeguards worked out and in demobilizing and sending back to their bases US forces in Florida. Emphasized US-Soviet agreement would not involve settlement with Castro. As to subversion, pointed out other American republics are threatened by Castro’s activity in this field, and there are camps in Cuba training men for subversion in Latin America. Said when Castro eventually ceases to be a threat to the western hemisphere, we are willing to normalize relations with him and help Cuba economically. Added cannot waste time talking about Castro’s conditions when US and USSR have much important matters of common concern to settle between themselves. Noted that inspection of US and Puerto Rico would be comparable to inspection of Soviet ports to detect offensive weapons being dispatched to Cuba.

Meeting concluded with repeated mutual assurances of desire to finish matter quickly and to study points made on both sides. Agreed meet again Friday.

Rusk
221. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, December 3, 1962, 9:35 a.m.

Ball—I just had a call from McCloy and he is seeing Kuznetsov at 11:00 am. He says Adlai is down here.

Bundy—I didn’t know that. Over this Alsop-Bartlett thing,Reference is to a story written by Stewart Alsop and Charles Bartlett for the forthcoming edition of the Saturday Evening Post claiming that Stevenson dissented from the Executive Committee consensus. The article claimed that Stevenson wanted to trade Turkish, Italian, and British bases for Cuban bases and that Stevenson advocated a new “Munich” appeasement settlement. A December 2 memorandum from Schlesinger to President Kennedy refutes the assertions of Alsop and Bartlett. (Kennedy Library, Schles-inger Papers, Cuba, 1961-1963) See the Supplement. See also Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, pp. 835-838. I guess.

Ball—He has a great anxiety to settle this thing and I am not at all clear … .

Bundy—That is not our view at all.

Ball—Jack is against trying to do business on the other fellow’s drafting. He wanted to see what kind of instructions he could get that would enable him to make some progress this morning.

Bundy—Have we seen the other fellow’s draft?

Ball—No.

Bundy—Well how can we say that?

Ball—He wanted some instructions … .

Bundy—He should do business on his draft but not theirs. He shouldn’t do much business. We can’t give him a free hand when we don’t know what their answer is. He should stonewall until we get back to him.

Ball—He says there are only three problems and he thinks if we want to settle we can get a quick deal and on probably plenty good terms.

Bundy—He has to do us the favor of letting us know the score. He should just go and listen. He should stand on the reasons of the President and Secretary of State and listen hard and we can’t give him a mandate.

Ball—I was only reporting. He was wailing on … .

Bundy—He has nothing to wail on.

Ball—I got the impression that he had a kind of telephone conversation on the areas of where the differences lay. One is on the overflights and there is a question of how we can state it as not to tie Kuznetsov to it. The second was Kuznetsov’s thinking this threat on security language is too rough. The third was this intention business. He said they are the only three elements that are interfering.

Bundy—Tell him to press them again; his client is not in any hurry.

Ball—All right.

222. Summary Record of the 32d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Bromley Smith. Washington, December 3, 1962, 10 a.m.

[Here follows 2 pages of discussion of India and Pakistan.]

Ambassador Stevenson and Under Secretary Ball reported on the current status of the Cuban negotiations in New York. Kuznetsov and McCloy are to meet again at 11:00 AMSee Document 223. when it is expected that a Soviet paper will be presented to us. Involved in the negotiations are the way we express our intention to continue overflights, our insistence on the preservation of peace in the Caribbean and the no-invasion undertaking or “intention.” The anxiety to conclude the negotiations is Russian rather than ours. We can go slow now because the pressure is on them.

The President agreed. He noted that Khrushchev had taken a very belligerent position with Canadian [British] Ambassador Roberts on Berlin. The statement on overflights can either be in or out. The reference to the Rio Pact can be in or out because the keys to the present negotiation are the no-invasion assurance and the peace and security of the Caribbean reference.

Ambassador Stevenson said present thinking was that there would now be no U.S. statement made before a Security Council meeting. The Secretary General could circulate a Russian statement and a U.S. statement to the UN members. We could thus reduce the elements of disagreement because two papers would be filed.

The President said we were not going to rat on an agreement with the Russians, but we were not going to tie on to a no-invasion pledge in a way which allowed Castro to operate from an invulnerable base.

Ambassador Stevenson said that as soon as the Cuban problem was settled, the Russians could heat up the Berlin situation. We would keep the Cuban problem in the UN as long as we possibly could.In the record of action of this meeting, December 4, McGeorge Bundy noted that Stevenson and Ball reported on the current status of Cuban negotiations in New York. Bundy continued, “the President accepted in general recommendations covering the future of these negotiations with the Russians.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 25-32A, 11/12/62-12/4/62)

[Here follows 1 paragraph of discussion on India.]

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
223. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-362. Top Secret; Priority. Washington, December 3, 1962, 8 p.m.

2086. Department pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Fol is summary five and one half hour meeting between McCloy and Yost, Kuznetsov, Zorin and Mendelovich.A 23-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting, lasting from 11 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., is in USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January meetings. In addition, McCloy and Ball discussed the conversation over a secure telephone, December 3, 4:45 p.m. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba) The memorandum of the Ball-McCloy telephone conversation is in the Supplement.

High points were fol: Sovs took even stronger position than formerly against 3 points in U.S. declaration: (1) ref to Rio Pact,For text of the Rio Pact, more formally known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, September 2, 1947, see A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949, pp. 226-229. (2) ref to overflights, and (3) condition that Cuba does not take action to “threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere” attached to our non-invasion assurances. Kuznetsov concluded session by saying that, if these 3 points included in U.S. declaration, it would be very difficult to foresee how long it would be before U.S. and Sovs could reach agreement on presentation to SC. On other hand he at same time emphasized great importance Sovs attach to presentation to SC of documents agreed on main points, if not in all details, which would lead to action by SC expressing satisfaction with work of parties and asking them continue negots to resolve problems still outstanding. Kuznetsov favored working rapidly toward conclusion of this kind which he said repeatedly would create more favorable prospects for solution of other international problems.

Kuznetsov said he “hoped” to have Sov draft declaration in couple of days and it was left that, unless some new ideas occurred to either delegation, we would await completion that draft before holding another mtg.

On points listed above to which Sovs strongly objected, they claimed ref to Rio Pact is part of U.S. attempt to give U.S. commitment conditional character and hence is unacceptable. It was part of effort to give U.S. free hand so it will not have to keep its obligations. It would authorize U.S. to take action against Cuba under Arts 6 and 8, including use of armed force, by alleging Cuba had undertaken aggression not involving the use of armed force including subversion. Kuznetsov also claimed Rio Pact violates UN CharterFor the U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, see ibid., pp. 95-110. in that (1) it authorizes armed response against non-armed attack which is not in accord with Art 51, and (2) it authorizes use of armed force without approval of SC as provided in Art 53. Therefore reference to Rio Pact in U.S. declaration would be illegal since pact in conflict with UN Charter. Ref to UN Charter itself in U.S. declaration should be sufficient for our purposes.

As to overflights Kuznetsov said this ref unacceptable and reiterated usual arguments about unilateral actions violating sovereignty of Cuba, norms of international law and UN Charter. He claimed U.S. desires overthrow whole set of legal norms covering relations between states. Question withdrawal missiles and IL-28’s settled and no more inspection needed except as agreed between U.S. and USSR. Only Sov obligations concerning non-reintroduction defensive weapons and U.S. obligations concerning non-invasion are outstanding and these both can be met by U Thant plan of observation in Caribbean. Sovs not opposed this kind of observation but must be in accordance with Charter and on basis of equality applied not only to Cuba but to all parties.

Kuznetsov objected to phrase in U.S. draft declaration reading “provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere” on grounds this is new subject not covered in exchange of letters. President’s letter of Oct 27 offered invasion assurance in return solely for actions by Sov Union. No mention was made of action on part of Cuba. Furthermore this condition would render valueless U.S. commitment not to invade Cuba since U.S. or other Western Hemisphere country could easily undertake provocation against Cuba and then claim Cuba had threatened their security.

Kuznetsov reiterated earlier claim that Khrushchev had not agreed to on-site inspection except with consent of Cuba and that moreover dismantling and withdrawal had been fully inspected by agreed shipside procedure.

He also spoke again of guarantees against invasions by other states of Western Hemisphere and quoted Pres’ letter on this point. He claimed U.S. draft contains no provision for U.S. implementing this obligation.

He also objected to phrase “weapons capable of offensive use”. He claimed only weapons envisaged in correspondence were those present in Cuba at time of crisis which had been referred to in Khrushchev’s letters as weapons you consider offensive. There were only medium range missiles with nuclear warheads and IL-28’s. These had also been only weapons referred to in Pres’ press conference of Nov 20. Phrase used in U.S. draft would give grounds for arbitrary and expanding definition in future which could be applied to all sorts of other weapons.

As to withdrawal of Sov military personnel, Kuznetsov asserted this need not be referred to in U.S. declaration since it had not been covered in original exchange of correspondence. Sov Govt had mentioned this subsequently as gesture of good will and not part of agreement. U.S. side had made clear in negots that it did not consider this to be “condition” of final settlement.

Kuznetsov repeated very briefly Sov support of Castro points included in protocol, mentioning specifically only economic blockade and Guantanamo.

He mentioned new point, asserting that, even if agreed declaration made by 2 parties in SC, much would remain outstanding, including reestablishment diplomatic relations and economic relations among countries in Caribbean. He hoped draft declarations would refer to continuing negot to clear up these matters.

He mentioned U.S. ref to medium and intermediate range missiles and suggested omission of latter since only former were in Cuba. He also objected to use of word “minimum” applied to shipside inspection procedure since he claimed there had been agreement that this procedure was satisfactory.

Summing up his remarks he said U.S. had made substantial step backward from exchange of letters and had introduced many new requirements which made it appear U.S. wishes delay concluding negots. If one side wished to introduce new questions other side will of course do likewise. Sovs wish to confine questions to those covered in exchange of letters and hopes U.S. declaration will be redrafted in this sense.

McCloy replied that there seemed to be very little left in U.S. draft that was acceptable to Sovs. He pointed out U.S. draft designed to move forward and bring about rapid settlement. He listed numerous steps U.S. had taken, including limitation of our quarantine, its lifting before all Sov obligations had been met and on basis of mere Sov assurances about removal IL-28’s, our acceptance limited method of verification of withdrawal missiles and bombers, and finally and most significant introduction of words “supporting invasion” in non-invasion assurance which was substantial and positive change in wording Pres’ letter Oct 27. If we have inserted additional points in declaration it is only in order to clarify matters not foreseen when letters were exchanged.

McCloy said he did not understand distinction between medium and intermediate missiles since we had identified both types on sites but supposed satisfactory nomenclature could be worked out. More fundamental problem was Sov objection to wording “other weapons capable of offensive use.” He was alarmed by thought Sovs considered as offensive only particular weapons which had been removed from Cuba in this instance. Obviously other types of missiles such as ICBM’s or other types of bombers were equally offensive. However this might also be matter of language which could be cleared up.

McCloy reiterated that, while we do not suppose either Sov Union or Castro is going to abandon the conditions he has put forward, we repeat once again that we do not accept these conditions and cannot deal with them in any way in our declaration. As to military personnel, McCloy agreed their withdrawal was not considered condition of settlement and emphasized U.S. nevertheless very much relieved when Khrushchev indicated they might be considered almost as component of missile complex and hence would be withdrawn.

McCloy also repeated again that in referring to non-invasion assurances which might be given by other Western Hemisphere nations that Pres was merely expressing an opinion, that while we do not believe other LA countries have any intention of attacking Cuba we are not in position to restrain them. However he emphasized again ref to non-support of invasion in our draft declaration.

McCloy expressed usual objections to so-called U Thant proposal for reciprocal inspection. He then repeated at length reasons why we must have right to use our own means of inspection in absence of acceptable international arrangements. This does not amount to any change in international law or norms of relations between nations but is merely statement that we are going to take this precaution until satisfactory international inspection system is set up. He does not expect Sov Union to agree with what we are doing but we cannot omit mention in our declaration. Possibly language can be improved but subject must be covered. This part of price that has to be paid for false assurances which had previously been given to U.S. Presumably overflights would not continue for all time but would have to continue until certain composure had been restored to area.

As to Rio Pact McCloy recognized there is fundamental difference between us. If Kuznetsov is correct that proposed U.S. declaration is incompatible with Rio Pact Pres would have to go to Senate and seek amendment to that pact. We do not however believe there is any incompatibility. However Rio Pact is principal international instrument dealing with security of Western Hemisphere and it cannot be omitted from our declaration.

McCloy concluded by urging that we not haggle interminably over language but agree to close out this transaction as quickly as possible. If Sov Union maintains all points Kuznetsov has put forward, McCloy would almost despair of reaching agreement on 2 declarations. While promising to consider points Kuznetsov had raised he urged him to take less jaundiced look at U.S. draft. He also urged Sovs to submit their draft soonest.

Yost added that it hardly seemed possible for 2 sides to reach total agreement on 2 declarations. What was important was that they be compatible and as close together as possible.

In concluding rebuttal, which covered most of above points in same general terms, Kuznetsov said it would be impossible to understand if, after all we have done, it should be impossible to prepare agreed documents for SC. Let us stick to exchange of letters of Oct 27-28See Documents 95, 102, and 104. and cut out new and unacceptable provisions he urged. He then ended with remarks reported at opening this message.

Yost
224. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President Kennedy

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Drafted by McCone. A note on this memorandum indicates that McCone took this paper to the White House on December 3 and stopped by the President’s office to drop it off after lunch.

This memorandum was attached to McCone’s memorandum of the Executive Committee meeting at 10 a.m. on December 3. McCone noted in the memorandum on the meeting that “later in the day I met with the President privately and pointed out to him my concern over Soviet conduct in Cuba.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

 Washington, December 3, 1962.

Three indicators from Cuba that worry me are: Detection of the presence of new and more sophisticated Soviet communications equipment as part of the air defense system. This would suggest that we soon would face the prospect of operational SAM sites manned by Soviets. Che Guevara’s statement to the London Daily Worker that peace has been assured and that Cuba will pursue the arms struggle already taking place in a number of Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Guatemala, Paraguay and Colombia. This would indicate no intention to halt Castro subversion in Latin America. Mikoyan’s public statement in Moscow that he had achieved Soviet objective of maintaining a Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere.

These three statements would prompt extreme caution on the part of the United States in any agreement which might give Castro and the Communists a sanctuary.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
225. Memorandum From the Vice President’s Military Aide (Burris) to Vice President JohnsonSource:Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security File, Memos to Vice President from Burris, July 62-April 1963. Top Secret. Washington, December 4, 1962. RE Low Level Reconnaissance Mission Over Cuba

The last low level reconnaissance mission was performed on November 15. Light, scattered ineffective anti-aircraft fire was received, but no damage was sustained by the planes.

Low level missions were also performed on November 11, 12 and 13, although no resistance was encountered. The record of action of the NSC Executive Committee reflects that the low level missions were author-ized on a day-to-day basis by the President. At Meeting No. 23 on November 8,See Document 162. the President authorized ten low level flights. At Meeting No. 24 on November 12,See Document 170. no discussion of low level reconnaissance is reflected, although at Meeting No. 25 on the afternoon of the same day, November 12,See Document 172. the President authorized low level flights for November 13. In other words, low level reconnaissance was performed on November 11 and November 12 without specific authorization by the President which normally took the form of an action of the NSC Executive Committee. It is possible and probable that the missions were authorized as a result of personal discussions between Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bundy with the President.

Subsequent records of actions of the NSC ExecutiveCommittee reflect discussion of high and low level reconnaissance with authorization being granted for high level flights only. On November 21, Mr. McNamara presented a plan for regular high level reconnaissance, but left low level flights to be authorized specifically by the President. At Meeting No. 31 on November 29,See Document 217. Mr. McNamara recommended that low level flights be made only when necessary to confirm certain indications gained from high level reconnaissance. This general policy is the subject for discussion by the working group at 5:30 p.m., December 4.See Document 226.

The above pattern of events suggests an evolution of low level reconnaissance in the Cuban operation. To suspend these flights is to eliminate one principal source of very precise intelligence. At the same time the provocative and psychological aspects against the Cubans of aircraft at near sonic speeds and tree top height are eliminated. The risk of loss to conventional anti-aircraft fire is eliminated, although the risk of loss to high flying aircraft from missiles remains. In this sense, an incident resulting from the loss of aircraft is perhaps proportionate to the number of flights being made. The basic issue remains the relationship between necessity for surveillance—and on the other hand—our willingness to accept losses in gaining this information. In this connection, having announced its intention to continue surveillance, the United States must be fully prepared and organized to invoke predetermined countermeasures, and in the aftermath to justify its actions. Neither the action to be taken if another plane is shot down, nor policies relating to explanation of the action, has yet been clearly delineated.

226. Summary Record of the 32d-A Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 25-32-A, 11/12/62-12/4/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, December 4, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

Mr. Bundy reported that Kuznetsov was telling Ambassador Stevenson the numbers and ports out of which the IL-28 bombers were leaving.Transmitted in telegram 2105 from USUN, December 4. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-002, Outgoing Telegrams, 1962 (TS, exdis, etc.))

A revised overflight guidelines paper was presented.November 30. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/11-30/62) Printed as approved as an attachment to Document 232. The general principle is that there will be regular high-level overflights and low-level missions will be done only on specific request, as authorized by the President.

There was a discussion of a Miami news story reporting the presence in Cuba of an armed Soviet division. In fact, there is merely a mechanized regiment which is part of four Soviet task forces in Cuba. It was decided that the Defense Department would release to the press factual information about the Soviet troops in Cuba.

The group agreed that a standstill posture should be maintained in New York until the Russians give us their latest draft declaration.

Mr. McCone reported that the CIA would engage in intense intelligence gathering in Cuba in the next four months, while avoiding provocation until we know whether the Russians are withdrawing their military forces or building them up.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
227. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-562. Top Secret. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House. New York, December 5, 1962, 8 p.m.

2140. Department pass White House. Eyes only for Secretary. Cuba. McCloy and Stevenson believe it is very much in US interest, if possible, to bring US-Sov negots on Cuba to rapid and mutually acceptable conclusion.In a telephone conversation between Ball and Stevenson at 6:40 p.m., December 5, Stevenson informed Ball that after a long discussion with McCloy, “there is obviously a feeling in the White House, which is shared by the Secretary, which is quite adverse to Jack’s [McCloy] views. (Ibid., Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba) They have growing impression that effects of victory in public mind are being gradually effaced by prolonged and inconclusive negotiation which gives impression we are still seeking vital objective we have not achieved. If public presumes this objective is on-site inspection, more and more importance will be attached to such inspection as negotiation continues. If and when we emerge from negotiation without achieving that objective, even though it may have been otherwise successful, we will risk seeming to have failed rather than to have succeeded.

Second consideration which we have in mind is that there may be some substance in Kuznetsov’s frequent reiteration of assertion that whether or not we agree on Cuban settlement will have most important effect on possibility of agreement in other fields. This may be bluff but there also may be element of sincerity in it and, if so, real effort on our part to reach prompt and agreed settlement could have substantial effect on Berlin, nuclear testing, etc.

We realize proposed Cuban SC declarationThe text is in telegram 2104 from USUN, December 4. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, Outgoing Telegrams, 1953-1963) See the Supplement. creates new, though not unforeseen complication and that either some way must be found to handle SC mtg harmoniously or alternative of separate declarations outside SC must be pursued.

In any case we think prompt determination should be reached as to what changes could be made in our draft declaration for use as soon as seems appropriate. We believe fol suggested changes largely verbal rather than substantive, would not in any sense jeopardize or weaken essential US positions. They might on other hand provide sufficient accommodation on some of points to which Sovs have most seriously objected so that latter could take amended declaration as basis for agreed settlement. If we put forward these amendments before receiving Sov draft declaration we would of course have to make clear that unacceptable Sov draft would necessitate withdrawal of our proposed declaration. However we are inclined to feel that more acceptable proposal on our part might produce less objectionable Sov draft and hence substantially reduce period of negotiation. In putting forward our amended draft we would certainly state unequivocally that it was as far as we could go and there was no use wasting time in attempting to negotiate our declaration further.

Our proposed amendments follow: Omit word “minimum” in second sentence para 6; In ninth para substitute for “other weapons capable of offensive use” more exact and less sweeping language which could not, as is case with present language, be applied to rifles and pistols. One possibility would be “other weapons of major offensive capability”; In same para, for words “provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the hemisphere” substitute “provided Cuba does not attack (or commit aggression against) any nation of the Western Hemisphere”; For penultimate para present draft substitute fol: “Pending such time as arrangements can be effected to provide the safeguards necessary to ensure that no such weapons systems are maintained or reintroduced into Cuba, the US will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary.” We have several other drafts for this para if the Dept finds above unsatisfactory. Since there can be no question that the Rio Pact remains in full effect and that our declaration in SC on this occasion does not and cannot impair it, there is some question whether it need be mentioned in declaration. Alternatively President in subsequent press conference might make statement along lines final para present draft declaration.

Stevenson
228. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Chairman of the Coordinating Committee (McCloy) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classificaiton marking. Washington, December 5, 1962, 5:30 p.m.

McC: I feel very strongly we are losing ground by this delay, and I feel that what we ought to do … I think there is misconception as to what our position is, and it is very serious. People are getting crystallized on this on-site inspection business, and I just think we are not wise in telling Kuznetsov that “Look, there are certain things that we can agree to, and there are certain things we can’t agree to”. What I would do is tell him, in the first place he didn’t like that word “minimum” inspection. Of course it doesn’t mean anything; we can strike that out. Secondly, I would tell him that the words we used there in regard to “nuclear or other weapons capable of offensive use.” He brought up the point of the pistol. If we can find something else to cover him on that. We aren’t talking about every kind of weapon that is capable of offensive use. So that I would say we were ready to change. Furthermore, I am ready to strike out “the Rio Pact” in this thing, because the Rio Pact exists anyway, and the President could say it on the side. And of course, nothing he says in connection with this in any way irrigates from the obligations and rights of our existing treaties. I would say we do have to reserve our intent to use such methods as we feel are necessary by way of observation and verification pending the adoption of other means that are satisfactory to us, and that we can’t give way on that, because if we say that we have no intent to invade and the next day we sent a U-2 over there, in some interpretations it is an invasion, an invasion of their aerial territory. So we just have to reserve the fact that our intent is to continue the ordinary precautions. Then on the word “threat” that Thompson introduced, I would go back to “attack” or “commit aggression” or something like that, because I do think that with “threat” security is rather illusory. You know, Castro could make a speech and could say we’re off the hook then. I believe it is good tactics to tell him irrespective of his declaration. His declaration is going to be … if we don’t get something in to indicate that we’re compromising, there is still going to be the reputation of Cuba, and then there will be a wrangle. But if he thinks that we are really trying to meet him, I believe he will come part way. And we may very well wind this thing up with a something less than transigent wrangle on both our parts, which may very well prejudice Berlin, or something else.

(Ball left to meet with the Secretary and on return called McCloy back.)

GB: I undertook to talk with the Secretary briefly about this. His feeling, and this is I am sure the President’s feeling, is that if we were really anxious on our part to close this thing up, what you are suggesting would be the thing to do it. But quite frankly the President doesn’t want to close it up right now, unless it were closed completely on our own terms. What he would propose (and this has been cleared with the White House) to do would be send it up tonight.

McC: Don’t tie our hands—don’t tie our hands. Well maybe … I don’t agree … what I’m telling you is that I think we can close it out, but we have a chance of closing it out on our terms if we do this. I think this dragging our feet is absolutely wrong. Now I can’t say anything since this is the President’s decision. I think we are petering away the victory, and I believe we have a reasonable chance by giving away nothing in this thing in consolidating the victory, and I’m not in doubt when I am saying that. I just think that you are getting them hardened up unnecessarily—at Geneva, on Berlin—and I don’t think that’s wise and I don’t think that anything that I am suggesting that we give way … . we’re not giving away anything when I strike out the word “minimum,” or don’t use the word “threat” …

GB: That’s right.

McC: I do think we have to hold onto the word “intend” and would intend to hold onto those words, but I would also hope that we could put into the operating clauses that there is nothing here in any way interrogates our intention to use all the observation and clarification facilities we have.

I just don’t believe we are giving away anything. But I do believe we are losing. And I am convinced we are losing. We are losing every day that goes by. I was at the Board meeting at Chase today. Everybody wanted to know what was going on here. Are we in another snarl? There is so much emphasis on the on-site inspection. If we don’t get the on-site inspection, which we don’t want, it’s going to be thought around the country we’re losing. Yet if we say that pending getting such an inspection as satisfies us we intend to use the facilities we already have. Everybody will applaud that. The world will applaud that.

GB: How would you envisage this thing. Let’s suppose that you were to make those amendments. How would it work out with Kuznetsov. What could he do then?

McC: I would say to Kuznetsov, “Now, look, if you … we’ve come a long way here toward meeting you on this business. You’ve talked all these things. We’ve met you on two out of four of them. We can’t give way on the intent business. But now if you say that you could acquiesce in this statement and give us a statement that doesn’t cause a wrangle in the UN, if it represents a real consensus, then, I would say let’s go to the UN together, file that thing,” and then let the SC head—he has seen these documents and congratulates the heads of state which worked out a situation in averting the crisis, and go on our way rejoicing. We have some language up here—it doesn’t amount to anything but that, and I think he would take it as being an indication that we were not trying to welch or to introduce new conditions and that we were holding out on one thing that Khrushchev is anxious to get. At the same time we don’t give up a thing that is of any value to us.

GB: I am going to have to … Let me see what kind of an advocate I can be here. I’ve got to get this back up to the President; because right now the posture of this thing that has come back from the White House cleared out, and I am going to have to let it go tonight with the idea that before you act on them we can have another look at this. I will see if we can get the Committee together in the morning if we can.

McC: Now, I have spelled this all out to Ros.Roswell Gilpatric. He tells me he agrees with it. There is one thing I have asked him to do and that is to give me the right definition of the “introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use”. We can change that language. But naturally we’re not going to limit it to merely these weapons that he took out, but we can use some such word as “major offensive weapons” or something like. I do this purely on the conviction that I have that we are not gaining ground now—that I think if we do close it up on that basis the President has nothing to fear. And I think we may have a better atmos-phere for stuff that may be coming up in the future.

GB: I’ll get this thing cranked up here. I’ll let it go tonight because I have no way of stopping it. Let’s talk first thing in the morning. In the meantime, I’ll get hold of the WH and see if we can set something up.

McC: I’ve got an [un]fortunate situation coming up Friday and Saturday. I’ve been postponing meetings with clients of mine for 60 days, so I just have do that then. And I have to testify in North Carolina on Monday. But you can reach me tonight or tomorrow.

GB: I’ll get back to you one way or another.

McC: You talk to Gilpatric about it.

GB: You bet.

229. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Top Secret. Washington, December 5, 1962.

At the close of the Executive Committee Meeting last night,See Document 226. I raised the question of courses of action we should follow if the Cuban SAM sites are made operational and a U-2 is shot down. This question has been considered and the consensus seems to be that in such an eventuality, we will be obliged to take out the SAM site or perhaps several SAM sites. There appeared no difference of opinion among those in attendance at the meeting last night or previous meetings when I raised this question concerning the policy.

However, as you said, the implementation of the “policy” was another matter and perhaps it would be more difficult to “seize the nettle” in such assumed circumstances than it is to agree among ourselves as to what should be done.

I continue to be disturbed over this situation as I feel that there is a strong possibility of such a confrontation as soon as the IL-28’s are all removed. In this connection, I find it significant that Mr. Kuznetsov advised Governor Stevenson with regard to the number of IL-28’s to be shipped on each of several ships, the ports and the dates of departure.See footnote 1, Document 226. This seems to indicate to me that the Soviets are about to “drop the curtain” on one phase of the Cuban problem.

Other indications of their intentions have appeared recently. On Monday I gave you a note reporting (by Stevenson)Mikoyan’s statements that “he had succeeded in maintaining a Socialist ‘communist-controlled’ state in Cuba.” I also reported that we had detected a continual improvement in Soviet-controlled communications systems throughout the Island.See Document 224.

Today the Watch Committee reports more extensively on the communications developments and their report, which appears as an Annex to this week’s Watch Committee statement, is attached.Not attached and not found.

I feel there is a very strong possibility that we will soon face a situation where the Soviets will first warn us against further overflights, indicate that their SAM sites are in operation, and if we persist will destroy one or more U-2’s. Action by us of a type planned and mentioned last night could, therefore, involve a military operation against Soviet soldiers.

This therefore is quite possibly the situation that we will face. It will not be action against “Cuban forces” in disguise; it will be action against Soviet forces and this may possibly be announced to us in advance. I bring this up because I think the possibility must be given serious thought at this time and we might devise diplomatic moves which would either forestall such a confrontation or, alternatively, a pronouncement made now might so indicate our intentions that the confrontation will not occur.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that indicates McCone signed the original.Director
230. Summary Record of the 33d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/5/62-12/17/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, December 6, 1962, 11 a.m.

Director McCone reported that all IL-28 bombers had been located at Cuban ports or on ships leaving Cuba. He called attention to a buildup of the Soviet communications system in Cuba and referred to the existing SAM sites and to the Soviet air defense capability.

The President read extracts from an FBI reporton Mikoyan’s briefing of the Soviet delegation in New YorkIn McCone’s account of this meeting, December 6, Rusk briefed the committee on Mikoyan’s visit to Cuba. According to that account “Secretary Rusk reported that Mikoyan had stated he had extreme difficulty in Cuba, that Castro refused to see him for nine days, and when he threatened to leave, Castro immediately stated he was prepared to make an arrangement with the Chinese Communists. Rusk therefore felt the Soviets may be inclined to leave substantial forces in Cuba to forestall a ChiCom takeover.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A) and asked that it be circulated to all Executive Committee members.The Federal Bureau of Investigation report, December 4, is attached to a December 6 memorandum from Smith to the members of the Executive Committee. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, NSC Executive Committee) See the Supplement.

Ambassador Stevenson reported on the most recent New York meeting with the Russians. He read the proposed changes in a draft declaration on the Cuban problem which we would make and recommended that we give to the Russians a draft, as revised in his telegram,Document 227. before the Soviet delegation received its draft from Moscow. The purpose would be to end the discussion. If our draft was not accepted by the Russians, then we should return to our position of circulating our own original draft declaration to the Security Council. He urged that we focus on our paper rather than theirs. We cannot haggle too long lest the Russians get tougher on Cuba and insist on discussion of other issues. The U.S. has achieved a victory, i.e., the strategic weapons have been removed. The longer we prolong the negotiation over minor issues, the closer we come to appearing to have failed. Mr. McCloy said that we may be dissipating our victory. In addition, the Russians may accept a one-shot inspection scheme which we don’t want but which would be difficult for us to oppose.

The President said he agreed that we could vitiate our success by prolonging the New York negotiations, but as long as Castro is in power, many will think that our victory will be pale. Senator Russell had already said that we had made a mistake by not invading Cuba. We are committed to make some kind of an invasion pledge. Do we want an agreement in New York or do we not? If we do not, we should stick on our present position. We do not know whether such a negotiating position in New York would affect negotiations on other issues.

Mr. McCloy said we should stick on our statement about aerial reconnaissance, but he opposed on constitutional grounds any statement of a declaration of our intentions on invasion.

Secretary Rusk said we do not want an agreement for agreement’s sake. We want only a good agreement. We should not chip away at our statement but wait until the Soviets produce theirs. We should stay with our present position. Prolonged negotiations in New York may appear as a failure, but if we give away our position in a declaration, we are failing.

The President commented that the hardening of the Soviet posture is not due to our action in Cuba.

Secretary Dillon said he thought disagreement in New York was certain, but Mr. McCloy said we might get an acceptable Soviet declaration, accompanied by a statement that our overflights were not acceptable.

The President asked what we would do if there was a civil war in Cuba. Would we go in only if invited? Secretary Rusk said we could not allow a Soviet takeover of Cuba similar to that which occurred in Hungary.

The President asked whether an agreement reached in New York would prevent us from taking action against Cuba if the Soviets moved in Berlin. He asked whether the Chinese Communists would come into Cuba if the Soviets phased out. Would we consider a Soviet submarine base as an offensive weapon? If many additional MIGs were sent to Cuba, would we consider these to be offensive weapons? He concluded by saying we should put in a revised draft declaration and tell the Russians they could take it or leave it. If they decide to leave it, we will rewrite our declaration entirely, taking a tough view.

Secretary McNamara said if we rewrite the declaration we should take a firmer stand on the no-invasion course so that we would not guarantee Castro sanctuary.

Mr. Bundy favored rewriting the declaration so that we could back away from a no-invasion guarantee. We could tell the Russians this was the last chance.

Ambassador Stevenson said we should be ready with a revised draft in the event the Russians rejected a new proposal.

There followed a discussion of whether we should tell the Latin American Ambassadors where the negotiations now stand. Ambassador Stevenson said all of them will leak to the press but even so we should brief them in New York. Secretary Rusk preferred to inform the OAS representatives here first, but preferred to hold off for a day or two. If the briefing is not given before Monday,December 10. it would be possible to do it with the OAS representatives here and the Latin American Ambassadors at the UN in New York.

The President suggested that we wait until tomorrow to see if we get an agreement from the Russians before we put out our statement. Mr. McCloy pointed out that there would be no time to get an agreement tomorrow. Secretary Rusk recommended that we do not put out our statement before we get the Russian draft because our statement would cause anxiety.

Mr. Murrow stated that if we are going to give up our demand for on-site inspection, then we should make a louder noise about aerial surveillance.

Ambassador Stevenson reported that the status of the proposal to create the nuclear-free zone in Latin America was in doubt because if we could not get the concurrence of all Latin American States we would have difficulty putting the proposal forward.

The President approved revised instructions to the New York team to cover the negotiation during the next few days.McGeorge Bundy prepared a brief 3-point record of action of this meeting on December 6. It noted McCone’s intelligence briefing, the recommended revisions to the U.S. draft declaration, and the President’s approval of those revisions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62) (Copy of instructions attached.)Sent as telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
231. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, ExCom Meetings, December 4, 1962. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, December 6, 1962.

We agreed that I would send you a summary of the informal comments made on the draft memorandum on “Future Policy toward Cuba”The draft memorandum printed as an attachment was attached to a copy of this memorandum in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. III, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62. which was discussed in the Executive Committee on Tuesday, December 4th.Discussion of the draft memorandum was not included in the summary record, see Document 226.

First, it was generally agreed that there should be a reorganization of our machinery for Cuban action. In particular, there seemed to be general support for the idea of an Office of Cuban Affairs which could be public and above board, and which might do a more effective job with free Cubans and others concerned with the hopes for post-Castro Cuba. You and I agreed after the meeting that you would explore the availability of a particularly well-qualified individual to head this office.

With respect to the draft memorandum itself, the following general comments were made: The memorandum is correct in recommending that no general policy be approved or set in motion until the current discussions with the Soviets on Cuba have developed somewhat further. The proposed action in the OAS should not be framed sharply until we know more clearly what kind of resolution is likely to obtain unanimous or nearly unanimous support. Our current posture in the OAS is so strong that we should not weaken it for marginal advantages. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the draft statement seemed approximately correct; paragraph 7 needed further development in order to distinguish desirable from undesirable travel to Cuba; paragraph 8 should make it clearer that it is Cuban funds whose transfer needs to be surveyed and controlled if possible; paragraphs 9 and 10 need to be spelled out carefully in cooperation with the other agencies primarily concerned.

The covert annex was considered only very briefly, but the preliminary sense of the meeting was that covert activities should be concentrated upon improvement in the collection of intelligence for the immediate future, and that we should not plan early sabotage activities.

Other items in the covert annex were not properly considered.

McG. Bundy Attachment See footnote 1. Top Secret. Drafted on December 3, although no drafter is indicated. Draft Memorandum for President Kennedy SUBJECT Future Policy toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro regime and its replacement by one sharing the aims of the Free World. Our immediate objectives are to weaken the regime; frustrate its subversive intentions; further reduce its influence in the Hemisphere; and increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime (or split the regime off from the Bloc).

A policy of containing, undermining, discrediting and isolating the Castro regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic economic, psychological and other pressures will achieve these immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Courses of Action

The following overtFor the program of covert actions please see Annex A. [Footnote in the source text. A typed note in the margin of the source text reads: “This annex will be circulated to ExCom members at a meeting called to discuss the memo.”] courses of action should be undertaken: OAS action: condemning the Castro regime for its duplicity; extending the trade embargo to all items except foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies; further limiting air and sea communications between the Hemisphere and Cuba; authorizing air and other surveillance; and warning Cuba against continued promotion of subversive and sabotage activities. Establishment of Caribbean security arrangements through ministerial level meetings of the Caribbean countries for the purposes of reaching agreement on increasing the intensity of surveillance of coastal and international waters; increased surveillance and control of land boundaries; increased control over subversive activities within national boundaries; systematic exchange of intelligence information; and, development of procedures for coordination of military contingency planning for emergencies. Application of the four-point shipping restrictions re Cuba. Inclusion by NATO of Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited. Discussion of Free World industrial nations from shipping crucial spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. Persuasion of non-Bloc nations to limit their airlines service to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. Persuasion of Latin American nations to limit the travel of their nationals to Cuba and to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their subversive activities. Persuasion of appropriate OAS organs to study urgently the transfer of funds to the other American Republics for subversive purposes, the plan of subversive propaganda and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive techniques; and to make recommendations to the member states regarding counter-measures. Maintenance of currently enhanced VOA mediumwave facilities beamed to Cuba and adoption by VOA of a more aggressive line toward Cuba. Facilitation of Cuban exiles’ entry into the United States Armed Forces for training, and formation of reserve units thereafter.

Timing

We should surface our program of isolating and weakening Cuba when it becomes clear that our discussions on Cuba with the Soviets are unlikely to be fruitful. Actions with respect to Cuba which may contribute substantially to creating a situation calling for United States military action should be withheld until the Soviet combat units have been removed from Cuba or efforts to persuade the USSR to remove them have failed.

 Annex A Top Secret. Drafted on December 1 although no drafter is indicated. Covert Courses of Action Support fully the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within, in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime. Continue to support the Cuban Revolutionary Council in its efforts to maintain a degree of order and unity in the Cuban exile community. Assist selected Cuban exile groups to encourage the Cuban people to engage in minor acts of sabotage. Utilize selected Cuban exiles to sabotage key Cuban installations in such a manner that the action can plausibly be attributed to Cubans in Cuba. Sabotage Cuban cargo and shipping, and Bloc cargo and shipping to Cuba. Encourage the defection of Cuban diplomats, officials and delegates abroad. Continue to assist and guide Cuban exiles in their radio broadcasts to Cuba. Encourage and assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters to Cuba. Develop more fully a clandestine “Voice of Free Cuba” radio capability either in Cuba or from a submarine in international waters. Develop more fully a capability for covertly intruding upon Cuban television broadcasts. Unless future developments warrant change, emphasize the following themes in covert propaganda output: a) the need to return to the original aims of the Cuban revolution; b) the Castro regime’s betrayal of these aims; and, c)Castro, as a pawn in the Soviet expansionist game, having subordinated Cuba’s national interests to those of the USSR. Assist, through subsidy if necessary, non-Bloc importers of Cuban sugar to find alternative sources of supply.
232. National Security Action Memorandum No. 208Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 208. Top Secret; Sensitive;Eyes Only. Information copies were sent to the other members of the Executive Committee. Washington, December 6, 1962. TO The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Cuban Overflights

The President has approved the attached Guidelines for the Planning of the Cuban Overflights and would like to have an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on the assumption that it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.

McG. B. Attachment Washington, December 4, 1962.

GUIDELINES FOR THE PLANNING OF CUBAN OVERFLIGHTS

This memorandum indicates the kinds of information the United States Government now needs to obtain with respect to the situation in Cuba, from the point of view of overall policy.

The United States Government has a high priority need for evidence of the deployment of offensive weapons systems in Cuba. The United States has a priority need for continuing and reliable information with respect to the general order of magnitude, deployment and state of readiness of Soviet military units and installations in Cuba. The United States Government has a need for continued information on the general situation in Cuba—political, military, and economic—but it is assumed that overflight contributions to this end will be by-products of missions undertaken in fulfillment of the needs in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. The United States Government is prepared to use both low-level and high-level reconnaissance, but it is desired that where practicable, necessary intelligence be obtained by a regular schedule of high-level flights, with low-level missions called for on the basis of specific indications of a target of special interest.
233. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 10:15 p.m. December 6. New York, December 6, 1962, 9 p.m.

2178. Department pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Reference: Deptel 1511.Telegram 1511 to USUN, December 6, 2:46 p.m., contained modifications to the draft U.S. statement on Cuba as approved at the NSC’s Executive Committee on December 6, (see Document 230). (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement. In mtg with McCloy and Yost this evening Kuznetsov and Mendelevich, after commenting on preferred changes in US draft declaration, put forward new suggestion as fols: That two sides agree on very brief declarations which would be presented in SC, that SC adopt res concerning these declarations and that points which are not agreed between parties be made in separate statements either in SC or outside. Sovs presented drafts their short declaration and SC res, text of which being transmitted immediately fol tel.Document 234.

At outset of mtg McCloy referred briefly to complications caused by Cuban declarationSee footnote 2, Document 227. and probability acrimonious squabble in SC resultingtherefrom. He then said in attempting to meet points in US draft declaration that Sovs had raised and to reach more or less agreed position we had some new language to propose. He emphasized however that, if Sov declaration which we had not received proves unacceptable, we would have to withdraw our new proposals and simply content ourselves with two separate statements drafted as we thought fit.

He then went over changes authorized first five numbered paras Deptel 1511. He also suggested that words “have not been fulfilled” at end first sentence para 6 might be changed to “have not been capable of fulfillment.”

Sovs continued to object strongly to phrase “offensive weapons systems”, claiming that it was as loose and as subject to expansion and misinterpretation as original phrase had been. Kuznetsov said it was definitely unacceptable. He insisted that weapons concerned were only those about which agreement had been reached in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev.

McCloy replied that this was impossible since there are four types of missiles and of bombers as well as submarines, for example, which are clearly offensive weapons systems the introduction of which into Cuba would cause us gravest concern. It finally appeared Sovs might accept some language referring to other weapons “similar” or “comparable” to weapons agreed upon between Pres and Khrushchev, but they continued to maintain new US language was unacceptable.

As to overflights, while recognizing McCloy’s statement that new text removed any implication Sovs are approving overflights, Kuznetsov nevertheless declared it maintains same idea and is not acceptable. US wants to get official justification to overfly. Moreover in connection with clause commencing “pending such time”, he claimed US does not want any arrangements for international safeguards since it has turned down U Thant plan. He objected strongly to any reference to overflights in declaration and declared it was also unacceptable. McCloy countered with clear exposition why it was essential in US point of view that this reference be maintained.

As to proviso that “Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation in the Western Hemisphere”Kuznetsov said this proviso is not in exchange of letters. McCloy replied Pres could not possibly say he would stand by if Cuba attacked another country with which we have a treaty obligating us to come to its defense. Kuznetsov replied Cuba has offered in protocol not to attack anyone else and that moreover threat is not from but against Cuba, citing Dec 4 attack on Cuban soil by boat containing exiles.

After inquiring whether we really had to put it in, Kuznetsov did not object seriously to new language in regard to US treaty rights.

Concluding discussion on changes in US draft Kuznetsov said that they had not removed main obstacles. McCloy thought we had sincerely tried to meet Sovs half way but that this is best we can do and if we cannot agree on this we must agree to disagree.

Kuznetsov thereupon put forward new suggestion reported in opening para this message. He proposed we make our declarations very brief and limit them to agreed points. All other points which either side feels it necessary to make could then be covered in separate statements either inside or outside UN.

He then went over US draft suggesting what might be omitted to make it acceptable to Sovs if we adopted suggestion of shorter form. These omissions were as fol: Two numbered paras quoted from Pres’ letter of Oct 27; in next para reference only to medium and not intermediate-range missiles (it appears same Russian word applies to both these two); omit sentence concerning Sov military units and personnel; in next para omit whole of first sentence commencing “The undertakings in the President’s letter”; in next sentence omit word “substantial”; in fol para omit words “to date”; in fol para omit two provisos so that pertinent portion would read “the US further gives assurances that it does not intend, as the President made clear” etc; omit whole of next para. He concluded he would consult about new language our final para.

Kuznetsov reiterated argument that new procedure he proposed would raise both sides of difficulties in reaching agreement which had emerged from discussion US draft. The points not agreed could be sure they were not “too odious”. This procedure would also take care of Cuban declaration which he understood would not be agreed.

McCloy concluded by saying he was disappointed in response to our new proposals. He emphasized again that they were in any case dependent on our reaching agreement and would have to be withdrawn if there is no agreement. He pointed out we were going far in giving our assurance against invasion without any arrangements for on-site inspection. This of course further underlined necessity for overflights.

Also in conclusion Kuznetsov indicated that new Sov suggestion had been put forward by Khrushchev with view to making settlement easier for both sides. He thought however SC should adopt res and that mere consensus statement by Chairman would not be enough. It was important for peace of world that we go as far as possible in settlement of Cuban question and that parties therefore continue negotiations normalize situation. McCloy remarked again that we do not intend to negotiate with Castro in framework this transaction though of course wouldnegotiate willingly with him if he showed signs of wishing to live in peace in this hemisphere. He noted however US and Sovs had achieved good momentum in these negotiations and urged it be maintained and carried forward to other problems. Kuznetsov agreed.

Yost
234. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 10:29 p.m. December 6. New York, December 6, 1962, 9 p.m.

2179. Dept pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Re: Cuba. Fol is text of draft declaration and draft res referred to in ourtel 2178:Document 233.

Draft declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the Security Council

Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world and seeking to conclude peaceful settlement of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean according to an agreement achieved;

Taking into consideration that on November 20, 1962 the Government of the United States terminated all measures it introduced on October 23, 1962 regarding the ships bound for the Republic of Cuba;

Taking further into consideration the statement of the United States Government contained in its declaration of … 1962 to the effect that the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba and that it is convinced that other countries of the Western Hemisphere will act likewise;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states the following: All weapons, regarding the dismantling and withdrawal of which from the Cuban territory an agreement was reached between the Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, have by this time been removed from the territory of Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union. Such weapons shall not be introduced by the USSR in the territory of the Republic of Cuba. The USSR Government proceeds from the premise that negotiations will continue between parties concerned on the questions connected with further normalization of the situation in the Caribbean with the purpose of working out mutually acceptable solutions.

The Security Council,

Expressing its approval of the understanding reached on the meas-ures for peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean in the negotiations between the parties concerned with the active participation of the Secretary-General of the United Nations;

Takes note of the declarations of the sides dated … 1962;

Expresses its firm belief that the Governments of the USSR, of the United States and of the Republic of Cuba will strictly fulfill the assumed obligations;

Calls upon the parties concerned to continue negotiations with the purpose of working out mutually acceptable solutions to the questions related to further normalization of the situation in the Caribbean area.

Yost
235. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-162. Top Secret; Priority. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House. New York, December 7, 1962, 1 p.m.

2183. Dept pass White House. Eyes only forSecretary. Re: Cuba. While new Soviet texts need important revisions, we believe basic idea of short agreed declarations by US and USSR in SC plus fuller unagreed statements, either in SC or outside, has much to commend it. We do not believe, however, we should agree to Cuba making an agreed declaration (as Soviet position implies) since this would complicate negotiations greatly and provide status as third party which we have refused for good reasons so far. Cuba would of course make unagreed statement on same basis as US and USSR. We should ask USSR to provide US copy in advance to assure it will not be too obnoxious.

This procedure would meet objective of closing up transaction on relatively harmonious note, and thus maintaining momentum for possible subsequent agreements on other subjects, while at same time giving us freedom of action to say what needs be said on matters which are not agreed. Since Cubans, and, we suspect, Soviets, will be making their unagreed statements in SC rather than outside, US should be prepared to do likewise.

What would seem to us at first reading to be most important to correct in Soviet draft declaration would be (1) too narrow definition of weapons which will not be reintroduced, and (2) indications that “parties concerned”, including both Soviets and Cuba, will continue negots for “normalizing” situation in Caribbean and (3) lack ref to Khrushchev-Kennedy letters. Second observation applies a fortiori to last para Soviet draft res.

We would much prefer end SC exercise with consensus statement by SC Pres, though Soviets have so far insisted this is not enough. Believe we should argue this point, possibly being willing concede to res in last analysis, trading this for satisfactory substance.

If we accept short declaration idea, we could presumably relegate to our separate unagreed statement in SC some of points to which Sovs object, such as references to overflights and Sov military personnel. However others, such as provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, as well as ref to treaty obligations, would have to be retained in our agreed declaration.

We are preparing redrafts of US and USSR agreeddeclarations, US unilateral statement, and consensus statement and will forward them later today.Document 237.

Stevenson
236. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (Dennison)Source: Department of Defense, OSD Historical Office Files, Secretary of Defense’s Cable Files, Cuba, December 1962. Top Secret. Repeated to the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet, Commander of the Air Forces, Atlantic, and Commander of Army, Atlantic. Washington, December 7, 1962, 1:54 p.m.

7742. Ref:CINCLANT message DTG 021702Z Nov 62.This telegram, not found, was apparently a request for planning for the use of nuclear weapons.

The JCS concur that planning should proceed for employment of nuclear weapons for limited war operations in the Cuban area. In developing these plans the application of force must be selective and discriminating in relation to the objective to be achieved. Collateral damage to nonmilitary facilities and population casualties will be held to a minimum consistent with military necessity. [2 lines of source text not declassified] In view of the above, the recommendations contained in paragraph 3 of reference message are approved for planning purposes. Request the JCS be advised promptly of any case where these limitations with respect to weapon yield or height of burst prevent the accomplishment of the military objectives.
237. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-762. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates it was passed to the White House at 8:35 p.m. December 7 and to principal officers of the Executive Committee. New York, December 7, 1962, 8 p.m.

2189. Dept pass White House. Eyes only forSecretary. Cuba.

Following are preliminary (A)US draft declaration, (B) revised Sov declaration, (C) elements of supplementary US statement including essentially sections taken out of present text US declaration, and (D) draft consensus statement by SC Pres in accordance mytel 2183.Document 235. In its proposal of last night USSR is in effect asking us to agree that they have now fulfilled all of their undertakings therefore that US assurance should be categorical, and to maximize future obligation of US through SC resthat would transform our assurance into decision of SC. To achieve these purposes they suppress references to exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev in preference for references to subsequent agreements worked out in negotiations, thus eliminating all reference in their statement to verification; they also seek to revise our declaration to imply that verification has been complied with. They also are seeking to write Cuba into picture as much as possible, including support for future negotiations on “normalization” of Caribbean. Sov draft res, by approving declarations, but with no notice taken of supplemental statements would leave us in difficult future situation on overflights, Sov military personnel in Cuba and other problems. It seems to us our objective should continue to be to draw line under current crisis but only on contingent basis, and retain statement in our declaration that USSR has not fulfilled all undertakings which is justification for our continued overflights and for qualifications we place on no invasion assurance. For same reason we should keep SC action to minimum possible. Draft consensus statement we have prepared therefore is only expression of attitude of SC and not of approval or decision. We have also deleted references in Sov declaration and in res to continued negotiations to normalize situation in Caribbean. We have done this on assumption USSR means Castro’s five points and that negotiations on political settlement in Caribbean is unacceptable either with Russians or with Cubans. In light size and sophistication Sov military presence, which apparently will continue in Cuba even after present crisis is settled, however, we may want to consider whether further negotiations of some sort around this issue might be foreshadowed. If so some appropriate wording might go into our “statement”.

(A)US draft declaration

In letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of Premier Khrushchev and President Kennedy on October 28, 1962,See Documents 95, 102, and 104. firm undertakings were made regarding the settlement of the Cuban crisis.

In connection therewith the United States notes the declaration of the Soviet Union today that all weapons, on which agreement was reached in accordance with the undertaking, have been removed from Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union and that the sites have been dismantled. The United States notes further the declaration of the USSR that no weapons of this nature, that is, offensive weapons systems, will be introduced by the USSR in the territory of the Republic of Cuba. We welcome these assurances.

While the undertakings that the United Nations would be enabled to verify the removal of missiles and bombers and the destruction of sites and that suitable United Nations safeguards would be agreed upon to ensure against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been capable of being fulfilled, a procedure was arranged in cooperation with the USSR, under which the United States has verified that Soviet vessels leaving Cuba have carried away the number of missiles and IL-28 bombers which the USSR certified as having been in Cuba.

In view of the substantial steps that have been taken by the Soviet Union in implementation of the undertakings and in the hope that a termination of the present crisis will lead toward progress on other issues:

The United States on its part, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine instituted on October 23, 1962, and the United States further gives assurance that, provided no nuclear weapons and no offensive weapons systems are present in or re-introduced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not commit aggressive acts against any nation of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at this press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.

The undertakings stated herein do not alter or impair the rights and obligations under all existing treaties to which the United States is a party.

(B) Revised Soviet declaration

Being guided by the interests of strengthening peace throughout the world and seeking to conclude peaceful settlement of the dangerous crisis in the Caribbean according to undertakings reached in letters of President Kennedy on October 27 and of President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev on October 28, 1962;

Taking into consideration that on November 20, 1962 the Government of the United States suspended the quarantine it introduced on October 23, 1962 regarding the ships bound for the Republic of Cuba;

Taking further into consideration the statement of the United States Government as contained in its declaration of (blank) 1962 to the effect that the United States will not invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba;

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics states the following: All weapons regarding the dismantling and withdrawal of which from Cuba agreement was reached in accordance with the undertakings between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, have, with the consent of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, by this time been removed from Cuba and returned to the Soviet Union, and all the sites dismantled. Weapons of this nature shall not in the future be introduced by the USSR into Cuba.

(C) Elements of supplementary US statement

The undertakings to which this declaration refers were stated in President Kennedy’s letter of October 27 along the following lines: The USSR would agree to remove from Cuba, under appropriate United Nations observation and supervision, all weapons systems capable of offensive use and would undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba. The United States would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments—(A) to remove promptly the quarantine measure now in effect, and (B) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. The President also expressed his confidence that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise.

In addition to the removal of those weapons systems capable of offensive use to which I have already referred, the US takes note of the stated intention of the USSR to withdraw all military units and personnel placed in Cuba for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.

The United States regrets that the undertakings for United Nations verification of the removal of missiles and bombers and destruction of sites, and for suitable United Nations safeguards against further introduction into Cuba of weapons systems capable of offensive use have not been capable of being fulfilled. In the absence of such fulfillment the United States will employ such other means of observation and verification as may be necessary to ensure that no such weapons are present or introduced into Cuba.

We earnestly trust that this session of the Security Council marks the achievement of a peaceful solution of the crisis caused by the introduction of offensive weapons systems into Cuba, and that the door to a solution of other outstanding problems might now be opened.

[The United States will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall one day be truly free.]Brackets in the source text.

(Other elements might have to be added after we see Soviet and Cuban statements. Last para suggested on assumption their statements would necessitate it.)

(D) Draft consensus statement

The President and the Security Council:

Members will have taken note of the declaration and statements made by the representatives of the United States of America, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with respect to the Cuban crisis which gave rise to the Security Council meeting of October 23, 1962, as well as the statements of the Secretary General, and by members of the Council and Cuba.

I am confident that all members of the Council will join me in an expression of satisfaction that the crisis the world has recently faced in the Caribbean has been terminated through direct negotiations with the active participation of the Secretary General, and of earnest hope that the door is now open to the solution of other outstanding problems.

Stevenson
238. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Files: Lot 72 D 242, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, December 8, 1962, 11 a.m.

G: My reaction to this latest set of messages from New YorkApparent reference to Documents 235 and 237. has not been one of immediately going along with it.

GB: No, I think it is terrible. It seems to me they have gone directly contrary to what we agreed at the Ex Com meeting also. As a matter of fact, there is a message in from the President to that effect—which Brom Smith was going to pass on to you.No written record of this message has been found.

G: He called me.

GB: He had already drawn up over here, even before we got these messages down, some instructionsApparent reference to a draft telegram to USUN, December 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) See the Supplement. which attempted, based on our conversation with McCloy, that said in effect since the Soviet Union is taking this line which means watering down what we feel are essential reservations and trying to get them out in a way where they wouldn’t be nearly effective that we just can’t buy this and that a move ought to be made now to fold this up as quickly as possible on a basis of unagreed statements, preferably filed with the Security Council. There are really three possibilities: (1) is unagreed statements filed with the Security Council; (2) a meeting of the SC in which these statements would be made orally; and (3) nothing done in the SC butsimply to go back to a press statement and reaffirmation. Of those three the first is the one we would strongly support.

G: I would also choose in that order.

GB: What we think is the meeting of the SC is not a good idea. I would take one and three against two, because the meeting of the SC would almost certainly mean the Cubans would come in and it would be out of control. I would propose to try to get out this afternoon to the Ex-Com some suggested draft instructions in the hope that those could be the subject for the discussion at the meeting Monday afternoon.See Document 241. Stevenson is coming down for the meeting because he is going to a concert in Washington that night. I don’t think McCloy will be here; but I think we just have to go ahead.

G: There is no doubt about it all. I was rather surprised, because I thought Jack was so clear that no matter what happened to put in the proviso about overflights and that if we couldn’t make any progress with the Soviets on restatement with the changes he had in mind, we would go on other basis. I know he is getting impatient and wants to get back into law practice.

GB: I can well understand his feeling, and I think he would like to feel he had folded the thing up now. Any normal good workman would in a situation like this.

G: Sure. We all like to draw lines under things, but this is one where I don’t think we’re doing any good for ourselves.

GB: I agree. And this is the line which Dean [Rusk] and I are prepared to take, and if it meets with your and Bob’s [McNamara] approval, then we will try to circulate something so that you will get it Monday morning.See Document 239.

G: I am sure from a conversation with Bob that he agrees with me. Bob is leaving Monday night and will be there Monday afternoon.

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.3722/12-862. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by Cleveland. Washington, December 8, 1962, 7:23 p.m.

MISUN 22. Eyes only Stevenson, McCloy and Yost from Cleveland. Following is draft instruction, approved by George Ball, which is being circulated this weekend for consideration by NSC Executive Committee Monday afternoon:

“For Stevenson and McCloy.

We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec 6 (urtel 2178),Document 233. text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),Document 234. and your suggestions in urtel 2189.Document 237. It emerges clearly that Soviets will not agree to procedure in Security Council which would associate them in any way with our determination continue overflights in absence acceptable international verification arrangements to assure against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. Numerous Soviet objections to our declaration, unacceptable Cuban declaration, and Soviet rejection our final position on US declaration all attest to this. We believe there is no further advantage to us in attempting reach for ‘agreed’ statements by further modification of our position, or by prolonging further an essentially sterile negotiating process. Soviet tactics seem clearly designed to obtain formal US and Security Council acceptance of concept that Khrushchev has fully discharged his obligations under agreement reached in exchange of letters with President October 27, which of course he has not. In addition Soviets obviously hope to squeeze out one more drop of blood from us in form of elaboration of non-invasion guarantee. As far as we are concerned, the bargain on Cuba has already been struck on the basis defined in the President’s November 20 press conference statement. In return for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles and IL-28’s, we have lifted the quarantine. We have also made the declaration of non-invasion in President’s press conference of November 20. We do not intend to go any further on substance without acceptable safeguards arrangements assuring compliance with Soviet promise not to reintroduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba, which have not been obtained and may be unobtainable. Proposal (urtel 2189) to have Security Council meeting at which agreed material would be expressed in agreed statements, and disagreed material would be expressed separately in disagreed statements, does not appear to be an exit from this box. If differentiation between two kinds of declarations, agreed and disagreed, is designed to be a matter of substance—that is, if agreed declarations thereby acquire more standing than the disagreed declarations—then it would obviously be very bad from US standpoint to declare our intention to continue air surveillance in a manner which accords it only second-class dignity. If, on other hand, the split into two different kinds of declarations is intended to be merely matter of form, then there is no point in having two different kinds of declarations. Accordingly, you should seek meeting with Kuznetsov with a view to settling on one of the following procedures for wrap-up. Procedures are listed in order of strong preference: Unagreed statements are filed by US and USSR with SYG, who will distribute them to members of SC for information. Unagreed statements are made by US and USSR separately in whatever public manner they choose. (Ours would be at a Presidential press conference or in statement issued by White House.) Meeting of SC at which unagreed statements are made by US and USSR. In none of these cases should a Cuban declaration be a part of the scenario. Disadvantage of SC meeting is that it would be impossible not to seat Cuba or to permit Cuban Representative to be heard, presumably at length, on all sorts of matters that are not germane to understanding between the President and Khrushchev. If SC route were taken, Soviets would have to agree at minimum not to take up cudgels on behalf Cuba. This would enable Cuban speech to be made, but not other member of SC would comment on it and it would not be regarded as part of IR-USSR discussion. One tactical question remains: If we are sufficiently sure Soviets would turn down proposal in urtel 2189, it has been suggested that it be given to Soviets on take-it-or-leave-it basis, in order to demonstrate that reasonable terms for agreed declarations are not obtainable. But since we would not ourselves want to get into the double-declaration procedure for reasons outlined above, we do not believe it is desirable to make the offer.” Rusk
240. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III. Secret. Washington, December 10, 1962.

We should soon reach a decision regarding the use of Cuban exiles in broadcasts beamed to Cuba. The following is suggested for your consideration.

On the assumption that United States policy toward Cuba will continue to be one of exerting economic pressures and making Soviet support as expensive as possible, it is recommended that Cuban exile broadcasts urging economic sabotage and passive resistance could play a valuable role. This recommendation also assumes that CIA can exercise a certain guidance and control over these broadcasts.

The following considerations would be involved in such a program: The Cuban individuals and groups doing the speaking should be carefully selected for their reputation and credibility with the people in Cuba. Students should do the speaking to students; labor leaders to labor, teachers to teachers, etc. The Cuban audience should be urged to act with care and cautioned against open rebellion. The program would be based upon work slowdowns, purposeful inefficiency, purposeful waste, and relatively safe forms of sabotage. Specific examples of the activities urged would be putting glass and nails on the highways, leaving water running in public buildings, putting sand in machinery, wasting electricity, taking sick leave from work, damaging sugar stalks during the harvest, etc. The program would be strictly attributable to the Cuban exiles with no open participation by USIA or other government agencies. If real results were achieved, the Voice of America could report these as evidence of opposition to the Castro regime through interviews with refugees and extracts from letters.

The advantages of such a program would be: 1) it would lend direct support to the U.S. economic pressures; 2) provide the Cuban exile community, now straining at the bit in inactivity, an outlet for their energies with a potential for real accomplishment; and 3) give the opposition inside Cuba a purposeful line of action not tied to open revolt.In a December 11 memorandum to Murrow, McCone replied that in light of the discussion at the Executive Committee meeting (see Documents 241 and 242) the CIA would resume non-attributable Cuban exile radio broadcasts on or about December 14. (Kennedy Library National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III)

Edward R. Murrow
241. Summary Record of the 34th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/4/62-12/17/62. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting lasted until 7:12 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, December 10, 1962, 5:40 p.m.

There was a general discussion on how to bring the New York negotiations on Cuba to an acceptable conclusion. Two papers were circulated—a UN plan and a Washington plan.Apparently a reference to Documents 234 and 239.

Ambassador Stevenson reported that the Soviet proposals had been put in at the same time as ours. He handed to the President a paper listing the advantages and disadvantages of several courses of action.Not found. He urged that a Security Council session be called so that the Security Council could be put on notice by means of an unagreed U.S. statement of our intention to overfly Cuba.

Mr. McCloy said that there was not much difference in the procedural recommendations but he preferred we try to get one statement agreed with the Russians and disagreed statements from both the U.S. and the USSR. He felt it was better to give one agreed statement and then file our own views in a separate document.

The President said the key part of any statement is the no-invasion assurance. If we could put in no more than a reference to the November 20th press conference statement, this would be acceptable.

Secretary Rusk suggested that both sides make a full statement in the Security Council, revealing their differences, and then introduce a separate paper containing agreed sentences.

Under Secretary Ball argued that we were not anxious to end the Cuban affair because the Cuban problem will continue to be with us. The Soviet military presence remains in Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson argued for a prompt agreement in New York. He thought an agreement would make it easier for Khrushchev to remove the remaining Soviet troops.

Secretary Rusk noted that all we were doing was ending the offensive weapons phase of the problem. The Cuban problem is still with us.

The President asked why we had to take the overflights problem into the Security Council. Mr. McCloy replied that we must cover our no-invasion pledge by stating the exception, i.e., our continuance of overflights. Secretary Rusk noted that the Rio Treaty makes our overflights legal, as spelled out in the OAS Resolution.

Ambassador Stevenson predicted that the Russians would reject our statement, but we should go back to them again and discuss it. Mr. McCloy agreed. If the Russians again rejected our position, then we could go the route of filing separate statements.

Secretary Rusk said it was important to us in Latin America and for our domestic public to get out our full statement. Once we have done this the Soviets could point out what they disagree with.

Ambassador Stevenson read the statement which the Security Council President hoped we and the Russians could accept.U Thant’s statement has not been found. The President called attention to the implication that the Cuban crisis was over. He preferred more general language. Mr. Bundy said that if the Soviet presence in Cuba was important to us, we do not want to draw a line under the crisis. How can we give no-invasion assurances if the Soviet miliary presence remains in Cuba? The President said we do not want to have the Soviets restating our no-invasion statement. Ambassador Stevenson reviewed his position again, calling attention to his telegram and noting that the Soviets expect to conclude the Cuban negotiations in the UN.

Secretary Rusk said we should be careful not to paper over our disagreement. Our agreement with the Russians is not real. Mr. Ball noted that if a Security Council meeting were held, the Cubans would be given a chance to voice their complaints.

The President favored Secretary Rusk’s plan. We should try to get our statement out. We and the Russians could file disagreed statements. We should avoid a Security Council meeting and we should abandon any attempt to get a consensus in the Security Council because this would be misleading.

Secretary Rusk said that others might try to force us into the Security Council, but they might not if they know we will be unable to agree with the Russians. We might tell Kuznetsov that no agreed statement was possible.

Mr. McCloy said that we cannot throw out entirely Kuznetsov’s plan. He urged that we try again to get an agreement with the Russians.

The President said our best position is to go for separate statements filing it with the UN, but without a Security Council meeting. The least desirable position is a Security Council meeting. We could live with agreed/disagreed statements without a Council meeting.

Secretary Rusk suggested that we do not break up the negotiations this week during the plenary session of the Communist Presidium in Moscow. Mr. McCloy hoped that we could record an agreement and Ambassador Stevenson said that if we told the Russians we could not agree on a statement with them, the Russians would not want a Security Council meeting. He said we could create a mood of trying to reach an agreement.

The President expressed his concern that the OAS States and the domestic public opinion, including Congressional opinion, will exert great pressure on the Government in the next few months. We must not go too far down the line of no-invasion assurances. We may have a showdown with the Russians later. We will be going no place on Berlin. Thus, there may be a difference of view among those in New York thinking of the UN climate and those in Washington who are looking at our overall relations with the Russians.

Mr. McCloy said the negotiations in New York would have an effect on worldwide problems.

There followed further discussion of what our position should be in New York. Ambassador Stevenson summarized his view again and Secretary Rusk made clear that our position was to discuss our proposal as well as theirs. The President concluded the discussion by saying we could discuss the Russian plan but we should keep the negotiations out of the Security Council.

In response to a request by Mr. Murrow, the President authorized CIA, in coordination with USIA on policy matters, to resume broadcasts by Cuban refugees on transmitters under Agency contract. Such broadcasts had been forbidden during the earlier phase of the missile crisis.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting stating that there was discussion on how to bring the negotiations in New York to an acceptable conclusion and a decision by the President to resume broadcasts by Cuban refugees to Cuba. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62) See the Supplement.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
242. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Meetings with the President. Secret;Eyes Only. Washington, December 10, 1962, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT Executive Committee Meeting—10 Dec 1962—5:30 p.m. All Present plus Stevenson and McCloy

McCone covered most recent intelligence, indicating no developments, intense study of photography was continuing and then reported on the telegram covering the interview with Ricardo Nunez (IN 32394),Not further identified. reading and emphasizing the underlined portions. McCone then pointed out to the Committee that Guantanamo involved 7,000 officers and enlisted men, replacement value of $400 million whereas in current estimates the Soviets had 12,000 officers, enlisted men and technicians and equipment valued in excess of a billion and it appeared very logical to answer the arguments about Guantanamo by emphasizing that the real occupier and the real military threat to Cuba is the Soviets, not the U.S. Note: We should consider ways and means of playing this up on radio and further news media.

There followed a long discussion which involved a sharp difference between Rusk, Ball, Johnson and Martin on one hand and Stevenson and McCloy on the other as to negotiating procedures to be followed in attempting to reach a sign-off arrangement with Kuznetsov. Stevenson and McCloy wished to take our statement and the Soviets’ and attempt to draft a statement in which the areas of agreement were pointed out, and in a second chapter, the areas of disagreement would be set forth. The consensus was that this would be a wrong procedure; that it would down-grade the importance of on-site inspection and continued aerial inspection and it would be misunderstood by the public and Latin American states and therefore was undesirable. The President expressed himself as favoring a presentation of our position with a unilateral presentation by the Soviets with their position (there was some indication that an attempt would be made to reach agreement on these two statements in advance of their publication), and let the Secretary General or the public reach their own conclusions as to where the areas of agreement and disagreement lie. At the end of almost two hours of discussion the disagreement seemed to prevail and, although attempts were made to reconcile the differing opinion, it was my conclusion that in the actual execution of the agreement or the talks with Kuznetsov in the next couple of days there will evolve a procedure favored by Stevenson and McCloy and opposed by the Secretary of State.

Mr. Murrow brought up the question of resuming the clandestine radio broadcasts which had been sponsored by CIA and carried on by the Cuban refugee community. He pointed out to the President that these efforts had been “stood down” following the October 22nd speech and during the complicated negotiations. He strongly recommended that they be reinstituted. The President and the Executive Committee approved and instructed CIA to reinstitute the broadcasts or to permit the Cuban refugee groups to go right ahead. Action:CIA should act upon this question at once and should report to me as to the actions taken so that I in turn can report to the President.

Note: In the evening at the White House I discussed the meeting with the President and the Attorney General. Both were amused by the argument but obviously somewhat disturbed that such a difference should be brought before the Executive Committee. Undoubtedly the President “heard”Stevenson because of recent publicity. I continue to be concerned over the danger of placing undue reliance on photography. We seem to be drifting into a frame of mind that high-level photography is all we need, that it will show everything that must be seen, that it is preferable to on-site inspection, that really on-site inspection is undesirable because it would be impartially conducted and the institution of it would automatically end over-flights and that there is little to be gained from low over-flights.

I wish General Carter and appropriate members of the staff to consider this very seriously and to discuss it at the level of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and NRO to be sure that we are not becoming overly dependent upon aerial photography and so rUN the risk of making a serious error. I would like this taken up at once and reported back not later than Monday, December 17th. Also I would like to personally discuss this with the Joint Chiefs and the President prior to leaving for the West Coast on December 21st.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
243. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662. Top Secret; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by McGeorge Bundy. Washington, December 11, 1962, 7:59 p.m.

1593. Eyes Only Stevenson and McCloy.

We have carefully studied report of your meeting with Kuznetsov Dec. 6 (urtel 2178),Document 233. text suggested Soviet draft declaration and resolution (urtel 2179),Document 234. and your suggestions in urtel 2189.Document 237.

You are authorized to seek the agreement of Kuznetsov to the following text of a joint report to be made to the SYG:

“As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Councilof Ministers on October 27-28 arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union wish to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

The Soviet Union has stated that it has dismantled all missiles in Cuba which it caused to be erected or was in the course of erecting for the purpose of launching nuclear missiles from Cuba and has removed from Cuba all such missiles which it introduced into Cuba, as well as all the components of such missiles and their launching apparatus. The Soviet Union, in cooperation with the United States, arranged a procedure whereby substantial verification was afforded the United States of the fact that 42 missiles, which the Soviet Union declared was the total number of such missiles introduced into Cuba, have in fact been removed from that island.

The Soviet Union likewise has stated that it has removed 42 IL-28 bombers from Cuba, that being the total of such bombers which the Soviet Union states it introduced into Cuba, and the Soviet Union has made possible a similar means of identification by the United States of the fact that 42 such bombers were in fact removed.

The Soviet Union has also stated that it has removed all nuclear weapons which it previously introduced into Cuba, as well as the components of such weapons.

In connection with the removal of the above-mentioned missiles, bombers, and nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union has stated that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable offensive character. The United States has, as of November 20, 1962, lifted the quarantine which it imposed around the island of Cuba on October 24, 1962. This has been done upon the basis of the statements and acts of the Soviet Union above referred to.In telegram 2291 from USUN, December 12, the Mission reported it made several drafting changes in the preceding paragraphs in the interests of shortening the text before submitting it to Kuznetsov. The changes did not affect the substance. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262) See the Supplement.

It was contemplated by the above mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that there would be created an effective system of international inspection on the island of Cuba so as to verify the dismantling of the sites and the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, as well as to provide safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba. Apart from the verification procedures above mentioned, it has not been possible thus far to effect an international verification system on the ground, particularly one such as would provide the safeguards against the future maintenance and introduction of such weapons in the island of Cuba.

The President of the United States has stated in his press conference of November 20 that it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.

The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement in this regard and repeats his assurances that the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba on the above conditions. In reaffirming the President’s statement and the assurances referred to above, the United States wishes to make it clear, however, that, pending the installation of an adequate system of international or other effective verification on the island of Cuba to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, it intends to employ all necessary means of observation and verification of its own in order to insure against this eventuality.

The Soviet Union, believing that it has substantially complied with the spirit of the exchange of communications between the President and the Chairman above referred to, believes that any further inspection, observation or verification is unnecessary and unjustified, but with this position the United States cannot agree.

Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which either the United States of America or the Soviet Union is a party.

The President of the United States and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union express the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war.”

 It is hoped that, in negotiating this, it would be possible for you to obtain affirmation, even though not expressed in the above text, of the Soviet intention to remove all Soviet military units from Cuba. This supersedes draft instructions contained Deptel 1580.Telegram 1580 to USUN not seen by the President, authorized Stevenson and McCloy, as a negotiating tactic, to discuss the Soviet proposal for unagreed statements incorporated into a single document with equal status. It informed the mission the United States could not agree to a Security Council resolution and would prefer to avoid a consensus statement, and that Stevenson and McCloy should not agree to a consensus statement without further instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-662) Ball
244. Message From Chairman Khrushchev to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. III-C, 11/28/62-12/30/62. No classification marking, but the Department of State classified the message Top Secret and Eyes Only. (Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163) A note on the source text indicated that copies were sent to Ball, Thompson, Robert Kennedy, and U Alexis Johnson. This document was sent to the Soviet Embassy at 2:15 Moscow time, December 10. (Problems of Communism, Special Edition, Spring 1992, p. 60) Moscow, December 11, 1962.

Dear Mr. President, It would seem that you and we have come now to a final stage in the elimination of tension around Cuba. Our relations are already entering now their formal course since all those means placed by us on the Cuban territory which you considered offensive are withdrawn and you ascertained that to which effect a statement was already made by your side.

That is good. We appreciate that you just as we approached not dogmatically the solution of the question of eliminating the tension which volved and this enabled us under existing conditions to find also a more flexible form of verification of the withdrawal of the above mentioned means. Understanding and flexibility displayed by you in this matter are highly appreciated by us though our criticism of American imperialism remains in force because that conflict was indeed created by the policy of the United States with regard to Cuba.

More resolute steps should be taken now to move towards finalizing the elimination of this tension, i.e. you on your part should clearly confirm at the U.N. as you did at your press conference and in your messages to me the pledge of non-invasion of Cuba by the United States and your allies having removed reservations which are being introduced now into the U.S. draft declaration in the Security Council and our representatives in New York should come to terms with regard to an agreed wording in the declarations of both powers of the commitments undertaken by them.

I believe that you already had an opportunity to familiarize yourself with the text proposed by usSee Document 234. of a brief declaration of the Soviet Government in which the Soviet Union’s main commitments resulting from the exchange of messages between us are formulated. We proceed from the assumption that an analogous brief declaration should be made by the U.S. Government and that the main U.S. commitments resulting from the exchange of messages will also be fixed in it. Have a look, Mr. President, at this proposal submitted by us through your representatives in New York.

But notwithstanding what the agreement on the concrete texts of our declarations at this concluding stage will be, anyway the basic goal has been achieved and tension removed. I will tell you frankly that we have removed our means from Cuba relying on your assurance that the United States and its allies will not invade Cuba. Those means really had the purpose of defending the sovereignty of Cuba and therefore after your assurance they lost their purpose. We hope and we would like to believe—I spoke of that publicly too, as you know—that you will adhere to the commitments which you have taken, as strictly as we do with regard to our commitments. We, Mr. President, have already fulfilled our commitments concerning the removal of our missiles and IL-28 planes from Cuba and we did it even ahead of time. It is obvious that fulfillment by you of your commitments cannot be as clearly demonstrated as it was done by us since your commitments are of a long-term nature. But it is important to fulfill them and to do everything so that no doubts are sown from the very start that they will not be fulfilled. I already told you at one time that our friends especially those of them who regard us with certain lack of understanding are trying to convince us that imperialism cannot be trusted, that is that you cannot be trusted, as a representative of such capitalist state as the United States of America.

It goes without saying that you and I have different understanding of these questions. I shall not go into details as to what my understanding is because in this regard you and I cannot have common opinion since we are people representing different political poles. But there are things that require common understanding on both sides and such common understanding is possible and even necessary. This is what I would like to tell you about.

Within a short period of time we and you have lived through a rather acute crisis. The acuteness of it was that we and you were already prepared to fight and this would lead to a thermonuclear war. Yes, to a thermonuclear world war with all its dreadful consequences. We took it into account and, being convinced that mankind would never forgive the statesmen who would not exhaust all possibilities to prevent catastrophe, agreed to a compromise although we understood—and we state it now—that your claims had no grounds whatsoever, had no legal basis and represented a manifestation of sheer arbitrariness in international affairs. We agreed to a compromise because our main purpose was to extend a helping hand to the Cuban people in order to exclude the possibility of invasion of Cuba so that Cuba could exist and develop as a free sovereign state. This is our main purpose today, it remains to be our main purpose for tomorrow and we did not and do not pursue any other purposes.

Therefore, Mr. President, everything—the stability in this area and not only in this area but in the entire world—depends on how you will now fulfill the commitments taken by you. Furthermore, it will be now a sort of litmus paper, an indicator whether it is possible to trust if similar difficulties arise in other geographical areas. I think you will agree that if our arrangement for settling the Cuban crisis fails it will undermine a possibility for manoeuvre which you and we would resort to for elimination of danger, a possibility for compromise in the future if similar difficulties arise in other areas of the world, and they really can arise. We attach great significance to all this, and subsequent development will depend on you as President and on the U.S. Government.

We believe that the guarantees for non-invasion of Cuba given by you will be maintained and not only in the period of your stay in the White House, that, to use an expression, goes without saying. We believe that you will be able to receive a mandate at the next election too, that is that you will be the U.S. President for six years, which would appeal to us. At our times, six years in world politics is a long period of time and during that period we could create good conditions for peaceful coexist-ence on earth and this would be highly appreciated by the peoples of our countries as well as by all other peoples.

Therefore, Mr. President, I would like to express a wish that you follow the right way, as we do, in appraising the situation. Now it is of special importance to provide for the possibility of an exchange of opinion through confidential channels which you and I have set up and which we use. But the confidential nature of our personal relations will depend on whether you fulfill—as we did—the commitments taken by you and give instructions to your representatives in New York to formalize these commitments in appropriate documents. This is needed in order that all the peoples be sure that tension in the Caribbean is a matter of yesterday and that now normal conditions have been really created in the world. And for this it is necessary to fix the assumed commitments in the documents of both sides and register them with the United Nations.

You, Mr. President, do not want to agree with the five conditions put forward by Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba Fidel Castro.In Prime Minister Castro’s letter to U Thant, October 28; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Document, 1962, pp. 447-448. 2 But, indeed, these five principles correspond fully to the provisions of the United Nations Charter which is a legal basis for the relations among states, a sort of foundation for securing peace and peaceful coexistence. I will tell you frankly that such position of yours is surprising. Maybe you have some difficulties. But, Mr. President, we who occupy such responsible position in the world and who are endowed with high trust, have to overcome those difficulties. The peoples will appreciate that because for them it means insuring lasting peace on earth.

I would like to express to you my disapproval of certain things. We read now various articles by your columnists and correspondents and we are concerned that in those articles they are widely commenting on the confidential exchange of opinion and it is being done by the people who as it would seem have no relation to confidential channels set up between us. Judging by the contents of these articles it is clear that their authors are well informed and we get an impression that this is not a result of an accidental leak of the confidential information but a result of benevolence for those people into whose hands gets the information they make public. This evidently is done for the purpose of informing the public in a one-sided way.

Frankly speaking, if we use the confidential communications this way, it will be far from facilitating confidence in those channels. You yourself realize that if your side begins to act in the way that our exchange of opinion by way of confidential channels will leak through fingers these channels will cease to be of use and may even cause harm. But this is up to you. If you consider that those channels have outlived themselves and are of no use any longer, then we also will draw appropriate conclusions in this respect. I tell you this straightforwardly and I would like to know your opinion on this matter. I have been denouncing American imperialism. But on the other hand I consider it useful for us to continue to maintain the possibility of confidential exchange of opinion because a minimum of personal trust is necessary for leading statesmen of both countries and this corresponds to the interests of our countries and peoples, to the interests of peace all over the world.

Let us, Mr. President, eliminate promptly the consequences of the Cuban crisis and get down to solving other questions, and we have them in number. [Here follows portions of the letter dealing with the test ban and the German question; for text, see volume VI, Document 83.]

Please, excuse me for my straightforwardness and frankness but I believe as before that a frank and straightforward exchange of opinion is needed to avoid the worst.

Please, convey to your wife and your whole family wishes of good health from myself, my wife and my entire family.Printed from an unsigned copy.

245. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1262. Top Secret. Priority. New York, December 12, 1962, 8 p.m.

2292. Dept pass White House. Eyes only Secretary. Cuba. Fol is report of three-hour mtg this afternoon Stevenson, McCloy and Yost with Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and Counselor of Sov Emb in Washington.According to a 16-page memorandum of conversation, the meeting took place at the Soviet delegation headquarters and lasted from 2:30 to 5:45 p.m. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, 1B December/January Meetings) Passed to the White House at 9:30 p.m. December 12.

Our impression was that Sovs firmly rejected single joint document on grounds (1) that it contains certain elements, particularly provisos on our no-invasion assurance and reference to overflights, to which they cannot in any form lend their name, and (2) that Cubans would not be participants in this declaration. Sovs continued to express strong preference for SC mtg to terminate affair but we had feeling that this position not unshakable and that they might ultimately agree to filing separate declarations with SYG.

Stevenson opened meeting by saying that he thought it was in interest of both sides to reach maximum possible agreement and to demonstrate to public that we are doing so. To this end it seemed preferable to us, after further consideration, to present single agreed declaration signed by both parties than separate declarations. It also seemed decidedly preferable to us to submit such declaration to SYG for transmittal to SC Pres rather than to present declarations at SC mtg. It seemed to us inevitable that latter would result in controversy and recriminations and would tend to destroy the effects of partial agreements which we had reached.

McCloy continued by saying that he had just discussed problem thoroughly with President and Secretary and that it is President’s desire to end this affair by stressing note of agreement rather than of disagreement. Therefore we have drawn up single document in which agreements and disagreements are equally frankly stated though fact that there is but one document strengthens impression of overall agreement. If there were too many documents, one or two Sov, one or two US and a Cuban, chance of misinterpretation and confusion in public mind would be great. He too stressed dangers involved in SC meeting which we might not be able to control and in which Cubans as well as some SC members would become involved in acrimonious controversy.

McCloy pointed out following major points omitted from Sov draft declaration which we felt must be included: (1) Indication agreement between President and Khrushchev on verification and future safeguards have not been fulfilled, (2) provisos attached to our non-invasion assurance, and (3) our determination to apply own means of verification pending agreement on international arrangements. He also rejected implication in Sov drafts that we are entering into an agreement with Cubans to normalize our relations with them. He then went over draft joint declaration transmitted Deptel 1593 modified as indicated ourtel 2291,See Document 243 and footnote 4 thereto. emphasizing that, while this draft based on instructions from Washington, it is informal document prepared here and was passed to Sovs at this time as illustrative rather than final text.

McCloy emphasized President’s strong feeling that agreed and disagreed elements of our position must have same status and adduced this as further reason for single, joint document or at least single document on each side. He said Cubans could of course file separate declaration if they wished and, if it were not too provocative, we might not have to reply. If there should however be SC meeting in which Cubans spoke there would almost certainly be LA and probably US replies, Sovs would support Cuba, whole history of Cuban crisis would be rehashed and atmosphere of agreement would be destroyed.

In conclusion McCloy made two points (1) that we would wish to include in joint declaration before it was finally approved paragraph in regard to withdrawal Sov military units, and (2) that if we cannot agree on joint declaration and have to file separate declarations we would probably wish to go back in some cases to language used in our earlier drafts.

Kuznetsov replied that he would of course report our new proposal to his govt but that he was convinced idea of single document would not be acceptable. You have your problems, he said, but you should also take ours into account. If there is joint declaration without Cuba, this will not be understood. If there is to be joint declaration it must be on behalf of all three govts. Stevenson and McCloy interjected that this would be entirely unacceptable to US.

Kuznetsov continued by stating that, though our joint draft contained some changes in wording and some new paragraphs, it still contains many points with which Soviet Union does not agree. It would be impossible for Sovs to put their signature on this document since our viewpoints on certain elements differ radically. He claimed sentence commending “it was contemplated by the above-mentioned exchange of letters” was inaccurate insofar as Sovs concerned since Khrushchev in his letter of Oct 27 had made on-site inspection dependent on Cuban agreement. This point had been made many times, Kuznetsov said, issue is closed and he hopes we will not have to come back to it. As to verification for future, Soviet Union is not opposed provided obligations are reciprocal and has therefore supported U Thant plan for inspection throughout Caribbean. Kuznetsov also repeated at length his objections to provisos attached to non-invasion assurance, claiming that they would give us excuse for violating this assurance whenever we desired. As to overflights, he said Sov Union cannot agree to statement of this kind being presented to SC for approval in Soviet Union’s name. He claimed paragraph in which it is stated that Sov Union believes any further inspection, observation or verification unnecessary and unjustified does not represent Sov position.

Kuznetsov then returned to Sov draft declaration and resolution submitted to us Dec 6See Document 234. and asked why these were not acceptable. There would be agreement, he said, on short drafts and supplementary disagreed statements could be shown by each side to other in order to minimize SC debate. His govt feels it more expedient that declarations be presented to SC rather than to SYG since subject was raised with SC at beginning of crisis. He was disturbed at McCloy’s statement that, if we cannot agree on joint declaration, US will go back to earlier and worse wording in separate declarations. He urged negotiations be carried on sincerely and on the basis of the greatest possible degree of mutual agreement. Our two countries face many important international problems on solution of which destiny of peace depends and manner in which we deal with Cuban problem will affect solution of all others. President and Khrushchev have shown wisdom and patience in solution of this dangerous crisis and it is most important it be wound up in same spirit.

Stevenson went over again advantages of joint declaration over single declaration and of filing with SYG rather than of presenting to SC. If we should go to SC he foresaw great difficulty of working out res acceptable to both sides and suggested consensus statement would be decidedly preferable.

Kuznetsov reiterated his objection to joint declaration and argued in favor of two separate declarations as closely agreed as possible. He agreed to consider again whether SC meeting or more filing of declarations with SYG would be preferable.

McCloy emphasized Sovs had no need to worry about US not fulfilling its obligations. It would certainly do so and that was why it was insisting on citing them fully and clearly. It was impossible for US to give assurance against invasion without provisos which we had included. As to going back to earlier language in case there is no agreement on this document he pointed out he had been authorized to modify our language in some cases in order to obtain agreement, but that if no agreement were reached and separate disagreed declarations were filed, he had previously made it clear we would feel free to revert to some of our earlier language.

There was some discussion of the phrase “those or other weapons systems of a similar or comparable and offensive character”. Kuznetsov wished to substitute “those or similar weapons”. He objected particularly to the word “offensive”. McCloy said he would consider whether the word “offensive” could be dropped leaving the words “similar or comparable” but said he could make no commitment on this score. McCloy also referred at some length to dangers of aggressive acts by Castro, recent Che Guevara interview in London Daily WorkerIn this interview on December 4 Che Guevera promised subversion in the rest of Latin America based on and inspired by the Cuban model. (Telegram 1531 from London, December 7; Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-762) which underlined necessity for second of our provisos on non-invasion assurances.

Meeting concluded with further expanded discussion of procedures in which it once more appeared clear Sovs would not accept single declaration but would press at least for two declarations as closely agreed as possible.

Sovs continued to express preference for SC meetingbut were less strong on this point. US side made it clear that if there were SC mtg it could only end in consensus statement more or less along lines of that proposal shown to them. Kuznetsov quoted Khrushchev’s statement at today’s Supreme Soviet mtg in favor of rapid conclusion of negotiations and sealing the agreement under authority of UN.

Meeting concluded with understanding that Soviets would get in touch with us when they had obtained Moscow reaction to our latest proposals.

Stevenson
246. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Director of Central Intelligence McCone and the Under Secretary of State (Ball)Source: Department of State, Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations—Cuba. No classification marking. Washington, December 14, 1962, 12:30 p.m.

McCone said that the negotiation of Donovan seems to be coming to a head. The President wants the Attorney General to go down because he now has commitments to cover the Castro list. McCone further said that this raises a problem of how to get down there because there is no transportation. McCone suggested, last night, that his Sanchez, head of the Family Committee, call Beratta, a close adviser of Castro’s—that woman who has been described in various reports as being his advisor, his secretary or his mistress—can arrange for him to come down. McCone said that if he comes down, they would allow him in and then we would have him charter a Pan American plane and fly down there. McCone doesn’t know how this will work out, but it is about the only way to do it. Ball agreed.

McCone said that he thinks this should be done rather overtly; last time it was done very secretly, and Ball had no objection to it being done overtly. McCone said the reason he thinks it ought to be done overtly is because there is no government involvement here. The second thing is that we have been freezing the three Cuban defectors, and there have been some very significant reports. He said that Hilsman has them.

McCone said that an appraisal of Soviet intentions had been made which he would like Ball to take a look at. McCone thinks that some place along the line, they are either going to take a shot at one of our birds or threaten to do so. It might be that we might be able to prevent it by some kind of a leak or statement at Ball’s level or at the President’s level that we have to carry this on and if they take a shot at one of those birds, we are going to have to take such action as is appropriate. Ball said that that is not a bad idea. McCone asked if Ball would give a little thought to it.

247. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence (Cuba), Vol. II, 11/20/62-12/14/62. No classification marking. Washington, December 14, 1962.

Dear Mr. Chairman: I was glad to have your message of December 11Document 244. and to know that you believe, as we do, that we have come to the final stage of the Cuban affair between us, the settlement of which will have significance for our future relations and for our ability to overcome other difficulties. I wish to thank you for your expression of appreciation of the understanding and flexibility we have tried to display.

I have followed with close attention the negotiations on the final settlement of the Cuban question between your representative, Mr. Kuznetsov, and our representatives, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy, in New York. In these negotiations we have tried to understand your position and I am glad to note that Mr. Kuznetsov has also shown effort to understand our problems. It is clearly in the interest of both sides that we reach agreement on how finally to dispose of the Cuban crisis. To this end, Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. McCloy presented on Wednesday a new draft of a joint statement which by now has certainly reached you.See Document 243. I wish to assure you that it is our purpose to end this affair as simply and clearly as possible.

You refer to the importance of my statements on an invasion of Cuba and of our intention to fulfill them, so that no doubts are sown from the very start. I have already stated my position publicly in my press conference on November 20th, and I am glad that this statement appears to have your understanding; we have never wanted to be driven by the acts of others into war in Cuba. The other side of the coin, however, is that we do need to have adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere. As I understand you, you feel confident that Cuba will not in fact engage in such aggressive acts, and of course I already have your own assurance about the offensive weapons. So I myself should suppose that you could accept our position—but it is probably better to leave final discussion of these matters to our representatives in New York. I quite agree with you that the larger part of the crisis has now been ended and we should not permit others to stand in the way of promptly settling the rest without further acrimony.

With regard to your reference to the confidential channels set up between us, I can assure you that I value them. I have not concealed from you that it was a serious disappointment to me that dangerously misleading information should have come through these channels before the recent crisis. You may also wish to know that by an accident or misunderstanding one of your diplomats appears to have used a representative of a private television network as a channel to us. This is always unwise in our country, where the members of the press often insist on printing at some later time what they may learn privately.

Because our systems are so different, you may not be fully familiar with the practices of the American press. The competition for news in this country is fierce. A number of the competitors are not great admirers of my Administration, and perhaps an even larger number are not wholly friendly to yours. Here in Washington we have 1200 reporters accredited to the White House alone, and thousands more in other assignments. Not one of them is accountable to this government for what he reports. It would be a great mistake to think that what appears in newspapers and magazines necessarily has anything to do with the policy and purpose of this government. I am glad to say that I have some friends among newspapermen, but no spokesmen.

But let me emphasize again that we do indeed value these confidential channels. I entirely share your view that some trust is necessary for leading statesmen of our two countries; I believe that it is important to build the area of trust wherever possible. I shall of course continue to hold and to express my convictions about the relative merits of our systems of government, and I will not be surprised if you do the same.

In particular, we have been very glad to have opportunities for private exchanges with and through Mr. Bolshakov, and I am sorry to learn that he is returning to Moscow. It is our impression that he has made a real effort to improve communications and understanding between our two governments, and we shall miss him very much.

I appreciate your writing me so frankly, and in return I have tried to be as straightforward, for I agree with you that only through such frank exchanges can we better understand our respective points of view. Partly for this reason I refrained in my last press conference from commenting on certain aspects of your speech before the Supreme Soviet with which you realize, of course, we could not agree.

We also are hopeful that once the Cuban crisis is behind us, we shall be able to tackle the other problems confronting us and to find the path to their solution.

[Here follow 2 paragraphs on the test ban and the German question; for text, see volume VI, pages 231–233.]

Thank you for your expressions of good wishes to me and my family, and let me in turn send you and your wife and family our personal good wishes for the coming year.Printed from an unsigned copy.

248. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 208. Top Secret. Washington, December 15, 1962.

This memorandum is in reference to NSAM #208 dated December 6 transmitting a memorandum entitled “Guide lines for the planning of Cuban overflights”,Document 232. and requesting “An estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth …”

On December 6, I wrote to youNot found. stating that I was of the opinion that two regularly scheduled U-2 missions per day would reasonably satisfy the requirements, with the understanding that postponed flights, because of weather, would be flown when weather permitted, and with the further understanding that low-level flights would be requested if considered necessary because of a special interest in targets or protracted postponement of the high level missions.

With reference to the assumption expressed in NSAM #208 that an energetic program for the collection of information by all other available means would be used to supplement photography, the United States Intelligence Board has considered these carefully.

I can report to you that: CIA is increasing its effort in a variety of ways, including an expanded use of agents, legal travellers, refugee interrogations both in this country and in other countries, and through liaison arrangements with third countries. In addition, CIA is prepared to endeavor to insert additional intelligence collecting teams as soon as policy decisions are reached in this respect. NSA will continue an intensive program in the SIGINT field which has during recent weeks added materially to all other intelligence. The United States Intelligence Board has also considered ways for more energetic utilization of resources available in the military serv-ices, most particularly the Army and the Navy, and will take such actions as might be appropriate to increase their unilateral activities without duplicating the activities of CIA.

I think the combination of the photography and other measures can give us a reasonably satisfactory body of intelligence. However, it will not, in my opinion, be totally satisfactory nor as dependable as an arrangement for well organized on-site inspection, which is politically not attainable at the present time.

John A. McCone
249. Summary Record of the 36th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 12:28 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, December 17, 1962, 10 a.m.

Director McCone presented intelligence summaries on Cuba and on the Congo.

The President sent instructions to Mr. McCloy in New York to remind the Russians of our often repeated statement that if any U.S. planes are attacked over Cuba we will retaliate.See Document 252. McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. The actions relating to the discussion of Cuba indicated that McCone presented a current intelligence summary and the President asked Rusk to instruct McCloy to remind the representatives of the Soviet Union in New York that if U.S. planes were attacked over Cuba, the United States would retaliate. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62) The instructions grew out of a discussion of whether the President, at his next press conference, should make public our position to retaliate if our reconnaissance planes were attacked. The repeated warning is to be done as a reminder of our position, not as if we were making a new point.

The President commented on the rise in the price of sugar which is benefiting Cuba. He asked whether there was anything that could be done about this but was told that the price was set by the world market and was not easily affected.The CIA sent OCI No. 3622/62, December 16, “Rising World Sugar Prices and the Effect on Cuba,” to the White House on December 20. The conclusions of the memorandum were that sugar market was tight and Cuba would benefit economically. (Ibid., Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) See the Supplement.

Secretary Rusk summarized his recent meeting with the NATO Council in Paris. He said the NATO powers expressed great satisfaction with the way the Cuban missile crisis had been handled. De Gaulle had the same view.

With respect to NATO problems, Secretary Rusk said he had stressed the need for increased European continental forces. NATO is marking time on organization problems and on nuclear questions pending the completion of the Common Market negotiations. The NATO meeting was so placid that reporters had to resort to sensationalized stories.

Returning to Cuba, Secretary Rusk said there was no sense of urgency. The Russians apparently want more time prior to deciding what to do in New York. We appeared to be heading toward separate statements on the Cuban crisis.

The remainder of the meeting was taken up with the discussion of a Congo plan and policy recommendations of the Subcommittee on South Asia.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
250. Editorial Note

The 37th meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council was held at 3:45 p.m., December 17, 1962. According to Bromley Smith’s summary record:

“At the conclusion of the meeting there was a discussion of the U.S. statement which was to be released if it is decided to make separate and disagreed U.S./USSR statement on Cuba to the UN.”

“Ambassador Stevenson handed to the President a draft of the proposed statement. The President received it, saying that he would make a decision later in that day.”

McGeorge Bundy’s record of action of the meeting states:

“A U.S. statement for use in the event it is decided to make separate and disagreed U.S. and USSR statements on Cuba to the UN Secretary General was revised and agreed upon.” (Both December 17;Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Vol. III, Meetings, 33-37, 12/6/62-12/17/62)

The draft statement discussed and approved at the Executive Committee was sent to the Mission at the United Nations; see Document 251.

251. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource:USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-002, Incoming Telegram (TS, Exdis, etc.) 1962. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. Washington, December 17, 1962, 9 p.m.

1677. Following is approved text of statement US would make in event Soviets prefer two separate statements rather than one joint statement that includes both agreed and disagreed points. This text reflects changes suggested by McCloy to Cleveland December 16No record of those suggestions were found. and changes agreed with Stevenson in Washington December 17.See Document 249. While this text can be used with Soviets at your discretion, we assume next move is still up to Kuznetsov, whose reaction to December 12 draft of joint statementSee Document 243. we still await.

Begin text

As a result of the exchange of communications between the President of the United States and the Chairman of the USSR Councilof Ministers on October 27-28, 1962, arising out of the recent Cuban crisis, the Representative of the United States wishes to make the following report to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

The United States takes note of the statement of the USSR that it has dismantled all of the missile sites and that it has removed from Cuba all of the missiles, all of the IL-28 bombers, and all nuclear weapons, missile components, and launching apparatus. It also takes note of the statement of the USSR that it will not reintroduce into Cuba those or other weapons systems of similar or comparable character. The United States also notes that in connection with the removal of the above-mentioned weapons, the Soviet Union has stated its intention to withdraw all military units and personnel placed in Cuba for the servicing or guarding of these weapons systems.

The United States wishes to inform the Secretary General that on the basis of such statements and acts the United States on November 20, 1962 lifted the quarantine which it had imposed around the Island of Cuba on October 24, 1962.

It was contemplated by the above-mentioned exchange of letters between the President and the Chairman that there would be created an effective system of international inspection in Cuba to verify the dismantling of the missile sites and the removal of the weapons, and to provide suitable safeguards against the further maintenance and introduction of such weapons in Cuba.

A procedure was arranged between the USSR andthe United States for verification at sea of the removal of the missiles and bombers which the Soviet Union declared it had introduced into Cuba. However, it has not been possible thus far to effect on the ground the contemplated international system of verification and safeguards.

Pending the installation of such a system to insure against the maintenance and reintroduction of such weapons and weapons systems into Cuba, the United States is compelled to continue to employ the means of observation and verification it has found necessary.

The President of the United States stated at a press conference on November 20 that provided all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in future, and provided Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, it was not the intention of the United States to invade Cuba.

The President of the United States reaffirms his previous statement and repeats his assurance that, subject to the above conditions, the United States has no intention either to invade or support an invasion of Cuba.Confirming a U. Alexis Johnson-McCloy telephone conversation of the morning of December 18, the Department sent a substitute paragraph for paragraphs 7 and 8 in this telegram. The new paragraph reads: “The United States further gives assurance that provided no nuclear weapons or other weapons capable of offensive use are present in or reinforced into Cuba, and provided Cuba does not take action to threaten the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, it does not intend, as the President made clear at his press conference on November 20, to invade Cuba or support an invasion of Cuba.” (Telegram 1685 to USUN, December 18, 12:27 p.m.;USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-002, Incoming Telegram (TS, Exdis, etc.) 1962)

Nothing herein contained in any way affects the rights and obligations of any treaty or existing agreements to which the United States of America is a party.

The President of the United States expresses the hope that the action taken by the United States and the Soviet Union following the above-mentioned exchange of communications to avert the threat of war arising from the Cuban situation will lead to further constructive negotiations between the two countries to adjust the differences existing between them and generally lessen the tensions which might induce further danger of war. End text.

Rusk
252. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-1862. Top Secret. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared in substance with the President. Washington, December 18, 1962, 2:09 p.m.

1687. Eyes only for Stevenson and McCloy. At a suitable occasion in our negotiations with Kuznetsov and in connection with any discussion with him on the question of our continued reconnaissance, you should express to Kuznetsov our growing concern over fact Soviets are continuing work at and improve anti-aircraft arsenal in Cuba. We are concerned that someone might have the motive of interfering with our reconnaissance. We have made it amply clear to the Soviets that, in the absence of other safeguards, we must and will continue that reconnaissance. We have no desire to return to the days of late October and assume this is also shared by the Soviets. The Soviets must recognize that destruction of American aircraft and loss of American life arising from this deliberate activity of the Soviet Union could well have such consequences. We hope Kuznetsov will understand that our motive in bringing this to his attention is simply to make sure that there is no misunderstanding on this point. In short, we feel it would be unwise continue this buildup in view of the non-belligerent and non-provocative character and intent of our reconnaissance.

Rusk
253. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource:USUN Files:FRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January meetings. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Yost. New York, December 18, 1962, 7:02 p.m.

2401. Re: Cuba. At meeting this morning Stevenson, McCloy and Yost—Kuznetsov, Mendelevich and Counselor of Sov Emb in Wash, Kuznetsov presented new Sov proposal.In a December 18 memorandum to Rusk, Cleveland informed the Secretary of this proposal. Cleveland stated that he talked to McCloy by phone and they agreed it would be appropriate to ask for clarification from Kuznetsov on two points: was it necessary for the Cubans to submit anything as part of the scenario and could the respective two letters be submitted separately by the two delegations? (Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1862) See the Supplement. Gist of it was that four letters, two from President dated Oct 27 and 28 and two from Khrushchev dated Oct 27 and 28, be registered at UN and passed to SC Pres for distribution to SC membersas official UN documents. Cuban Rep would follow same procedure and separately submit statement from his Govt. No SC meeting would be held and no further action would be required or taken.

Kuznetsov opened meeting by recapitulating history of attempts to work out draft declarations, emphasizing that U.S. drafts of both separate and joint declarations had contained “completely unacceptable” condition to non-invasion assurance which were not contained in exchange of letters between Pres and Khrushchev and that Sovs could not approve in any form statement implying that U.S. has right to overfly Cuba.

Noting that U.S. does not favor SC mtg, Kuznetsov then put forward proposal summarized above.

Stevenson raised two questions. First, he pointed out it was Khrushchev’s letter of Oct 26, not his letter of Oct 27, which was referred to in President’s letter of Oct 27 and formed basis of agreement. Second, he asked whether Sovs had draft of joint letter to SYG or whether it was purely letter of transmittal.

McCloy noted that Sov proposal omitted any recitation of progress since exchange of letters, such as dismantling and removing of missiles and bombers, lifting of blockade and assurances in Pres’s Nov 20 press conference, as well as omitting any reference to points on which agreement not achieved, such as UN verification system and need for U.S. to use own means of verification in absence of system.

Kuznetsov replied that President’s Oct 27 letter does refer to Khrushchev’s Oct 26 letter but also refers to its fifth para to Khrushchev’s Oct 27 letter. Moreover he claimed President’s letter of Oct 27 in its substance dealt with points made in Khrushchev’s letter of Oct 27 rather than in his Oct 26 letter. He cited President’s reference to Sov willingness to withdraw weapons systems and not to reintroduce them in future, which Kuznetsov claimed were specified in Khrushchev’s Oct 27 letter.

As to joint letter of transmittal, he said it should be brief and formal and not set forth differences between us. It should be limited to following points: Rep’s report they are sending 4 letters; They ask SYG to register letters in UN; They ask SYG to send letters to SC Pres for distribution to SC members as UN documents.

If U.S. accepts proposal Sovs can then within one day prepare draft letter of transmittal for discussion.

As to McCloy’s remarks, Kuznetsov said that if we attempt to include in letter of declarations points which have not been agreed, such as that U.S. will continue overflights, then we would be starting negotiations all over again. Sovs cannot be party to any document containing such provision or give impression they approve it. They cannot also agree in any way to making non-invasion assurance condition of Cuba’s not threatening other states. New Sov proposal does not mean that all questions concerning Cuba will be settled. Some points we would like to include and some points they would like to include would be omitted.

Stevenson emphasized we had always understood agreement between us rested essentially on two letters, Khrushchev’s of Oct 26 and President’s of Oct 27 which says Khrushchev’s Oct 26 letter provides basis of agreement. It would be inappropriate to include in group of letters constituting our agreement Oct 27 letter to which U.S. never adverted except in connection with future disarmament. Moreover Khrushchev’s Oct 27 letter deals with proposal on concurrent action relating to Cuba and Turkey, which was never adopted and which was irrelevant. Moreover Sov proposal omits all account of what has transpired since exchange of letters. He suggested there might possibly be two letters of transmittal. He welcomed efforts to end negotiations quickly but said his first reaction was to be troubled by difficulties he had mentioned.

McCloy added that if only letters proposed were submitted there would be irresistible pressure to publish also Khrushchev Oct 26 letter which was referred to in President’s Oct 27 letter. Moreover there is so much discussion in Khrushchev’s Oct 27 letter of weapons in Turkey that inclusion of this letter would disturb rather than tranquilize atmosphere. He also repeated his difficulty with the omission of any statement of what has been accomplished on both sides. He pointed out that U.S. has in fact, taking into account President’s Nov 20 press conference, carried out all its obligations even though we have not had benefit of on-site inspection. We must therefore continue overflights. Also if we register with UN our intent not to invade we must also register in document of equal dignity our intent continue observation by our own means until other means of verification can be established. He also pointed out that assurance we had offered in various drafts “not to support invasion” goes beyond what is set forth in exchange of letters and was offered in order to meet objections Sovs had raised.

Kuznetsov replied that he had listened attentively to objections but hopes U.N. will carefully study new proposal with view to reaching final solution. We have negotiated for weeks and if we seek to include in documents all points U.S. wants and all points Sovs want, it will be very difficult ever to conclude. Sov idea is not to raise in these documents points on which we cannot agree but to limit ourselves to letters which are already known to world as basis for settlement which has been achieved. They had selected only four letters which were concerned with settlement and which have been published. If U.S. thinks Khrushchev Oct 26 letter should also be published they would consult their govt whether do so. As to references to Turkey in Oct 27 letter, these are nothing new and Sov views in regard to foreign military bases around its borders are well known. Sovs, as concession to U.S. viewpoint, have given up idea of SC meeting and res. Essence of their proposal is to avoid stirring up all of the moot questions we have been discussing for a long time and on which no agreement has been reached. World is already aware of what has been done since letters were exchanged and is reasonably well satisfied. Sovs are still much interested in all of points covered in protocol, normalization of situation in Caribbean, but are not going to insist on inserting them in these documents. As to overflights, U.S. creates vicious circle by repeating it will continue them until international arrangements are established, while at same time it does not state what sort of international system it contemplates and rejects that which has been put forward by U Thant.

In conclusion he repeated his appeal that U.S. think seriously about latest proposal. There has been attempt on each side to understand position of other side. However, if U.S. insists on putting in documents reference to overflights and conditions as to assurances, we will be once again at very beginning of our negotiations and solution will be far away.

McCloy concluded that we would of course study proposal. However he would not want to give impression through this procedure that we have reached full agreement when in fact we have not. If the documents prove to be inadequate we might find ourselves in position of seeking SC meeting to expound our point of view more fully there. He said he had been more optimistic before this meeting than he now is, as he had hoped we were moving toward separate documents to be submitted to SYG.

Stevenson
254. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-1962. Top Secret. Drafted by Cleveland. Also sent to U. Alexis Johnson. Washington, December 19, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba

Mr. McCloy called to report on his luncheon with Kuznetsov today. He will try to do a cable on it later on this evening.Telegram 2416 from USUN, December 19, 5:30 p.m. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings) See the Supplement. A 12-page memorandum of conversation of this meeting indicates that the discussion lasted from 11:15 a.m. to 1:30 p.m. and was held in Stevenson’s office. (Ibid.) Meanwhile, this is my understanding of what he was saying: Kuznetsov was “intrigued” with the general idea of separate submissions to the Secretary General of the documents in the public record on Cuba since the last Security Council meeting, which was October 25. Mr. McCloy got the impression that Kuznetsov would favorably recommend our proposal to Moscow. The Soviets continue to be sticky about using the word “register”. Assuming there are two separate submissions to the Secretary General, they would presumably use the word “register” in theirs, but we would be free to use any word we wanted to describe our submission. The problem is that the “Prime Minister” (Khrushchev) used the term “register” in “his” correspondence. Kuznetsov “winced” at the idea of the President’s November 20 Press Conference being included in our package of documents. He conceded that there was much in the Presidential statement that was good from the Soviet point of view but said that “25% of it is bad”, notably the reference to overflights and the provisos on the President’s non-invasion assurance. Kuznetsov said that he didn’t know whether the Soviet Government would want to publish the October 26 letter. He had reread it and saw nothing discreditable in it, but as we could probably tell, it had a rather special style and was in fact written by Khrushchev himself. Mr. McCloy explained we would have to show this letter to the Congression-al leaders on request, since it is referred to in the President’s letter of October 27. But, McCloy added, we would not ourselves publish it unless the Soviet Government wants it published. During the discussion of overflights, Mr. McCloy threw in the warning that if any plane is shot down we will be “right back in October”. Kuznetsov was unclear of what the Cuban submission would consist of. He referred vaguely to an early statement by Castro (which might be his long television speech answering the President’s original October 22 address) and to a document dated November 13 which we are still trying to identify here.Possible reference to Castro’s letter to U Thant, November 15; for text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 459-460. Kuznetsov said he appreciated that we were trying to wind this negotiation up without delay, and that this was also the desire of the Soviets.

255. Circular Telegram to All Latin American PostsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/12-2262. Limited Official Use;Niact. Drafted by Hurwitch and approved by Martin. Washington, December 22, 1962, 1:23 p.m.

1135. James B. Donovan, private US citizen and counsel for Cuban Families Committee, reported last night Castro signed agreement with him release 1113 Bay of Pigs prisoners on following conditions: Assurances to deliver $53,000,000 pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and foodstuffs and possibly some related products such as insecticides. Delivery of goods in Habana amounting to 20% of above value before prisoners released.

American Red Cross acting in collaboration Cuban Families Committee has vessel now loading which together with air cargo now being prepared will deliver the 20% by December 23 in order begin airlift prisoners Miami area dawn December 23. Three Cuban Red Cross represent-atives arrived Miami last night to inspect cargo being loaded. Transaction is therefore on Red Cross to Red Cross basis.

Goods donated by US private companies to ARC nowtotal about $45,000,000; contributions continue to be made. (FYI. If necessary US prepared to make available upon ARC request powdered skim milk from surplus stocks in amount not to exceed about $10,000,000 which represents less than 10% existing surplus this commodity. Such release can be made within existing statutory authority. End FYI.) These donations by private companies allowable under current tax legislation. Rulings rendered by Internal Revenue re these donations conform to existing regulations and precedent. Private companies have choice under the law between paying taxes on this amount or making charitable contributions (up to 5% of their profits) for tax deduction purposes. This choice entirely theirs.

Inland and overseas freight, insurance, handling costs and labor have been donated by railroads, airlines, steamship lines, trucking companies, insurance companies and labor unions. No USG fundsinvolved. Government role has been essentially to cut red tape in order expedite transaction.

Prisoners fought bravely at Bay of Pigs before capitulating. Since capture none has defected or publicly condemned US despite offers to reward them for doing so. Prisoners suffering severe malnutrition and disease (some may be near death).

While difficult assess precisely, Department does not believe transaction will materially affect stability Castro regime. Reports indicate veteran Cuban communists opposed transaction while 26 July group favored. Cuban normal annual imports pharmaceuticals alone over $60,000,000 hence transaction involves substantially less than year’s supply any commodity. Castro regime had budgeted approximately $1,000,000 in foreign exchange for purchase pharmaceuticals; inclusion pharmaceuticals (which comprises over half of amount) therefore releases only that amount foreign exchange for other purposes.

FYI. Donovan reports Castro prepared review cases of twenty-four US citizens now imprisoned with view clemency or amnesty provided current transaction consummated good faith. End FYI.

Bearing in mind that last minute snags may upset transaction, you authorized draw on foregoing except FYI portions in reply inquiries. Cable press and official reaction transaction.

Rusk
256. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2362. Confidential; Limit Distribution. New York, December 23, 1962, 2 p.m.

2477. Cuba. McCloy and Yost met this morning two and half hours with Kuznetsov, Zorin, and Mendelevich. Sovs stood adamantly on their last proposal that only four letters exchanged between President and Khrushchev October 27 and 28 without any other documents be transmitted to UN.See Document 253. No progress whatsoever was made. McCloy had impression from earlier conversations that Kuznetsov personally might have favored accepting our proposal that two sets of documents chosen separately be submitted but that Moscow had overruled him.

Kuznetsov opened meeting with long statement commencing with assertion that US proposal to transmit along with President’s letters of October 27 and 28 White House press statement of October 27 and President’s press statement of November 20 was entirely unacceptable. After careful thought Sovs see no need for additional documents since basic agreement between US and USSR is embodied in four letters of October 27 and 28. Reservations which US put forward in unilateral fashion are after agreement between President and Khrushchev. White House statement October 27 and President’s press statement November 20 contain same reservations as in various US draft declarations which Sovs had pronounced unacceptable. Particularly statement November 20 contains new reservations concerning export of communism, political and economic sanctions, ending of Cuban regime. US, Kuznetsov claimed, is trying to undermine value of non-invasion assurances given in President’s letters October 27 and 28 by introducing new conditions. After Sovs have removed offensive weapons, given US chance to verify, and stated readiness to give assurances re reintroducing weapons, US changing its position in trying not to reaffirm its obligations. It would appear US wishes to get rid of these obligations and have its hands free not to observe non-invasion guarantee on pretext Cuba committing aggression against US or some other country. Furthermore, from sentence in November 20 statement commencing, “We will not, of course, abandon …” it is clear US seeking overthrow Cuban Govt and install old system. This is open attempt export counter-revolution to Cuba. This is dangerous policy and pursuing this course could bring heavy consequences. Sovs cannot appear to agree in any form, directly or indirectly, to US carrying on such policy.

Kuznetsov touched lightly on October 27 White House statement, merely saying it was never considered basic document on settlement Cuban crisis and need not be included. Returning to November 20 statement, he repeated usual arguments against overflights and added they contradict recent GA resolution on “friendly relations”.

He asked why US so reluctant adopt UN system of inspection proposed by U Thant, either observation groups in Caribbean area or observation groups stationed in NY with authority visit Caribbean from time to time. US blandly rejects this proposal without even discussing it. Yet at same time US maintains that, since there is no international system, it must continue observation by its own means.

US has said Soviet Union is not obliged to agree with what was said in October 27 and November 20 press statements. However, even if documents are transmitted to SYG separately by two sides, it might appear Soviet Union had no objection to US documents and had even agreed to them to certain extent.

As to “registration”Kuznetsov said Sovs astonished US objecting to common practice wherein thousands of documents registered or filed in UN. However, he would, as further concession, drop this word and he submitted new text for joint letter of transmittal in which word not employed (text this letter set forth at conclusion this telegram).

In summing up, Kuznetsov said position of US side in negotiations in no way strengthens confidence between our govts and is inconsistent with expressed desire of US Govt to strengthen confidence. He urged US reconsider its position and accept Soviet proposal to submit to SYG four letters exchanged between President and Khrushchev October 27 and 28 and indicated these could be transmitted to SYG in either joint or separate covering letters.

McCloy replied had hoped we were close to agreement today but it appears that we have gone backward. He had described previously how US had in fact already done or offered more than was required by exchange letters between President and Khrushchev and said he saw no use going over arguments once again. Sovs have turned down three US proposals as unacceptable. We find latest Sov proposal unacceptable. Perhaps best we can do is for each side transmit SYG whatever documents it wishes without disclosing in advance what it is submitting and thereby not implying there is any approval by other side. This would not be good solution but might be only one available.

As to inspection, there had in fact been no formal U Thant proposal. US would still like inspection on the spot. It is still getting numerous reports from exiles of heavy Cuban armament, of strong Soviet military presence, and camps for training guerrillas. Satisfactory inspection system would have to be elaborate and it would at best take months to work out.

November 20 statement expresses frankly our views concerning Castro. We do not think Cuban people are free and do not like Castro’s social system but that does not mean we are gong to invade Cuba. If Sovs include Turkey letter with all its emphasis on Turkish bases we would have to include October 27 press statement. US is sincerely desirous of carrying out its obligations and believes it in vital interest both parties terminate this affair. He described possible solutions as follows: Joint declaration; Separate declarations but ours would have to include what we are going to do in our own defense; Separate transmittal of unagreed documents to UN; Separate unagreed statement outside UN by chiefs of state, Foreign Ministers or UN Reps, simply summing up, stating it had not been possible to reach full agreement but that crisis is terminated, and both sides hope for progress in future.

McCloy concluded by expressing regret that situation cannot be terminated before reconvening of Congress when whole question likely subject of Congressional debate.

Kuznetsov expressed his govt’s sincere desire reach agreement and show two govts can do something together. Much has already been done to avert disaster and we should be able to agree on documents to be submitted to UN. He then however reiterated that only document Sovs believed it necessary submit are four letters October 27 and 28.

McCloy emphasized we are not asking Sovs to agree to documents we submit. Yost suggested that there might in separate letters transmittal be clear disclaimer by each party that it did not necessarily approve all documents submitted by other party. Possibility of this suggestion was explored but Kuznetsov concluded by repeating from his instructions that “reservations contained in President’s statement of November 20 and White House statement October 27 contradict the understanding which had been reached and Soviet side cannot sanction them in any form whatsoever”.

McCloy made it perfectly clear that, while he would of course report Soviet views to Washington, he was convinced US could not accept their proposal to submit four letters alone.

It was agreed that, while there appeared to be total impasse, both parties would reflect and communicate with each other later.

At conclusion of meeting Zorin announced that for reasons of health he is leaving his UN post and returning to Moscow to resume his duties as Deputy FonMin. He emphasized that his health has been poor for some time. Kuzentsov mentioned that Zorin’s successor is present Soviet Amb to Japan, has spent more than ten years in China, and is outstanding expert on Chinese affairs.

Following is text of new joint draft letters of transmittal proposed by Sovs.

“Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

Attached herewith are the letters of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the United States of America John F. Kennedy of October 27 and 28, 1962 which contain the obligations assumed by the Govts of the USSR and the United States for the settlement of the crisis that arose in the Caribbean area.

It is requested to transmit them to the President of the Security Council for circulating these messages as documents of the Council.

Respectfully,

Representative of the USSR

Representative of the United States”

 Stevenson
257. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 12/62. Confidential. Copies were sent to Cleveland, Martin, Thompson, and McGeorge Bundy. Washington, December 26, 1962. SUBJECT Cuba New York Negotiations

McCloy called me this morning to state that after dinner yesterdayNo other record of the dinner conversation has been found. Kuznetsov took the initiative in raising the question of the negotiations for the report to the UN on the Cuban affair. McCloy said that during the course of the conversation Kuznetsov said that Khrushchev himself placed great emphasis on inclusion of his October 27 Turkish Jupiter letter, explaining that he needed this domestically as he had used his position on this in defense of his action in Cuba. Kuznetsov also reiterated their objections to the inclusion of the President’s November 20 press conference. Kuznetsov urged McCloy to come up with some new formula.

McCloy said he made it clear that he was at the “end of his string” and had no further suggestions to offer. He said he also made it clear that we could not agree to any of the proposed Soviet procedures. McCloy felt that Kuznetsov was “squirming”.

McCloy said that he did not recommend or propose to take any new initiatives and would wait for Kuznetsov to get in touch with him. I said that we entirely agreed.

258. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United NationsSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2862. Confidential; Priority. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson, cleared by Martin, Cleveland, Thompson, Rusk, and in substance with President Kennedy. Washington, December 28, 1962, 1:53 p.m.

1761. Eyes only Stevenson and McCloy. Confirming McCloy-Johnson telcon,No other record of this telephone conversation has been found. following is text of proposed US letter to SYG which you are authorized to discuss with Kuznetsov:

“In the period since the last meeting of the Security Council on the Cuban crisis, I am pleased to report that considerable progress has been made in relieving the tension which arose between the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the introduction of certain offensive weapons in the island of Cuba.

In this connection, for the Council’s record, I am transmitting true copies of the President’s letters of October 27 and October 28. Other statements relating to the United States position in this matter are contained in a White House press statement dated October 27, and in the President’s opening remarks at his press conference on November 20, 1962.

The President of the United States has asked me to express to you his hope that the steps taken by the two governments in this matter may lead to further constructive efforts on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union to adjust the differences between them.

My Government is also grateful to you for your own part in assisting both parties to find the means to avert the serious threat to the peace which the Cuban situation then entailed.

In view of the present situation, my Government, which originally requested the Cuban item to be placed on the Security Council agenda, believes it need not further occupy the Council’s attention at this time.”

If Kuznetsov rejects foregoing formulation, you are authorized subsequently to propose to Kuznetsov the following text of a proposed joint letter to the SYG:

“On behalf of our respective Governments, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting the Soviet and United States Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which arose in connection with the Cuban situation.

While our Governments regret that it has not been possible fully to resolve all of the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to be retained upon the agenda of the Security Council.”

Alternatively, the substance of the foregoing joint letter could be incorporated into separate letters by US and Soviet representatives.

Rusk
259. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.56361/12-2862. Confidential; Limited Distribution. New York, December 28, 1962, 9 p.m.

2513. Dept pass White House. Cuba. McCloy, Plimpton and Yost met this afternoon with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich (USSR).

McCloy gave Soviets following draft of suggested separate letter to be given to SYG by US, on assumption Soviets would also give SYG a separate letter in form previously submitted to US, presumably accompanied by copies of Khrushchev’s letters of Oct 27 and 28 and reference to any other documents Soviets want.

[Here follows the draft of the first letter in Document 258 with the exception of the last 2 paragraphs that were slightly revised and combined. The revised final paragraph of the letter as submitted to the Soviet delegates is printed below.]

 McCloy pointed out US draft merely referred to White House press statement Oct 27 and Presidential news conference statement Nov 20, and did not submit them as UN docs, thus moving toward Soviet position. Kuznetsov asked why the reference in the letter could not be limited only to the Presidential letters of Oct 27 and 28 since the White House press statement and news conference were matters of public record, and since the basic obligations of the two parties were contained in the four letters of Oct 27 and Oct 28. McCloy said this was impossible and that he had gone as far as he possibly could in eliminating the submission to the UN of the press statement and news conference statement and merely referring to them. Kuznetsov said the letter was not acceptable, and that the Soviets could not agree to or approve either openly or tacitly any reference to any qualifications or reservations to the US obligations under the October 27 and October 28 letters. McCloy pointed out that Soviets were not being asked to approve or agree to anything, and that the Soviet separate letter would presumably not contain any such intimation. Kuznetsov repeated that Soviets could not approve any reference to over-flights over Cuba or intrusion into Cuban territorial waters (which violation of Charter and international law) or to Cuban behavior. None of foregoing had been referred to in Oct 27 and 28 letters or negotiations incident thereto. Presidential news conference Nov 20 was first reference to Cuban behavior as a qualification of US obligation not to invade, and qualifying references to subversion, export of communism, Cuban aggression, etc., so vague as to weaken and vitiate US obligation. McCloy said that these were familiar Soviet arguments, and that he would not repeat US counter-arguments, and that neither US nor any other country could unqualifiedly and unconditionally agree not to invade another country. Kuznetsov also objected to word “offensive” as applied to weapons in US draft. McCloy said he would agree to taking out word.

Kuznetsov then submitted following new draft of joint letter to SYG by USSR and USUN Reps(accompanying Russian text being pouched Cleveland).

McCloy stated this not acceptable, since US must make reference to White House press statement Oct 27 and President’s press conference Nov. 20.

Begin Verbatim text.

Esteemed Mr. Secretary General,

Attached herewith are the letters of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev and the President of the United States John F. Kennedy of October 27 and 28, 1962 which contain the obligations assumed by the Govts of the USSR and of the US on settling the recent crisis in the Caribbean area.

It is requested to transmit them to the President of the Security Council for circulation as documents of the Council.

The Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States express the hope that the action taken to avert war arising from the crisis in the Caribbean area will lead to further constructive efforts by the parties concerned to settle differences existing between them and generally to lessen the tensions which might induce further threat of war.

On the instructions of our respective governments we express gratitude to you, Mr. Secretary General, for your efforts in the cause of a peaceful settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area.

Respectfully,

The Representative of the USSR

The Representative of the United States

End verbatim text.

 McCloy said he had done his best to meet the Soviet position in that the last US draft merely referred to the White House press statement and Presidential news conference without submitting them, thus making them of less dignity than the Oct 27 and 28 letters, but that no country could give an absolute guarantee against invasion if it or its allies were attacked, and that the US did not intend to make Cuba a sanctuary for Castro. He also pointed out that the Nov 20 press conference statement contained many provisions favorable to the Soviets, going beyond the Oct 27 and 28 letters. He also pointed out that the Nov 20 statement was made before the weapons were all removed, and that Khrushchev had publicly thanked the President for that statement. Kuznetsov said that Soviets had hoped that there could be an agreed text evidencing an agreement between the Soviets and the US which would have provided a favorable atmosphere for the future composition of differences, but that the raising by the US of new conditions, new points made the matter more complicated and gave the impression that the US did not want to finish the matter and that it would have been in the interest of the whole world to have a full agreement reached. He further referred to the US responsibility for the Bay of Pigs affair and that recent statements by US officials gave the impression that the US was continuing to do its utmost to overthrow the Castro regime mentioning great TV emphasis on returned prisoners and their statements that they would go back. He also referred to supposed US support ever since World War II of reactionary groups such as Nationalist Chinese, South Koreans, etc., and to US unwillingness to consider U Thant’s suggested reciprocal inspection plan.

McCloy, after appropriate rejoinder to Kuznetsov propaganda, said that perhaps new negotiations should be initiated for proper inspection of US, the Soviet Union and Cuba, but that time was limited and that perhaps the best thing for Soviets and US to do was to send joint letter to SYG to effect that they express their thanks to him for his efforts, that they had made progress but had not completely agreed as to the matter, and that they saw no need for further SC meeting. He then presented, as an uncleared draft of his own, the following proposed joint letter:

[Here follows the verbatim text of the second letter in Document 258.]

 McCloy said it might be possible to incorporate in such joint draft letter some of the language contained in the Soviet draft joint letter just submitted by Kuznetsov, but that any joint letter must indicate that there had not been complete agreement between the parties. Kuznetsov said he could not make a comment on the new draft, but would consider it and report it to his govt. The meeting closed with Kuznetsov’s admission that the ball was “in his net.” We would like to think this meant we had scored a goal at basketball, but realize he thought the game was tennis. Comment: Kuznetsov gave impression he had firm, explicit instructions not to agree to any reference to White House press statement of Oct 27 or Presidential press conference statement of Nov 20.Stevenson, McCloy, and Plimpton met Kuznetsov and Mendelevich on the morning of December 31. Kuznetsov said that he gave “sincere examination” to the first U.S. draft letter submitted to him on December 28, but it was still unacceptable. The two sides discussed the second joint letter, Kuznetsov suggested some minor changes, but neither side came to any final decision. (Ibid., 737.56361/12-3162) See the Supplement. Plimpton
260. Memorandum From the President’s Military Aide (Clifton) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 213. Secret. Washington, December 29, 1962. SUBJECT Cuban Focal Point in the Miami Area

During the Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting at Palm Beach,President Kennedy met the Joint Chiefs of Staff on December 27, 10:15 to 10:40 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) the question came up of the future use and employment of the Cuban brigadeOn December 29 President Kennedy addressed the members of the Cuban Brigade who had been released and returned to the United States on December 25. The text of the President’s remarks are in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1962, pp. 911-913. trainees.

For the military, the question was how many of these brigade officers could be used at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, in helping to train the Cuban trainees, how many of the Cuban officers might need a special officers’ course for updating and retraining as officers, and finally, how many of the Cuban refugee prisoners would actually go in for a 20-week retraining course.

There were no numbers involved, but it was agreed by all that certainly some of them would end up at Fort Jackson.

The next question raised was whether this Cuban brigade would be a focal point for a new political groupment. From all we could learn it looks like they might become such a party. The President pointed out that one of the tough problems in dealing with the 100,000 Cuban refugees in the Miami area is their lack of formalized party—he stated that there are four major parties and about one hundred splinter groups—and he thinks that the Cuban brigade might become a fifth rallying point, possibly a rather heavily emotionally charged one.

The Chiefs brought up the future political problems in connection with future military plans for Cuba, and it was stated that what we actually need is the establishment of a government-in-exile. This was in response to the President’s directive that in their future planning the political preparations would have to be carefully organized. By this he meant the military, political preparations: the civil affairs, military government aspects, and the preparations to receive defectors en masse, if and when it occurred; but also to be prepared for their political organization at any time that we were back on Cuban soil.

With all this as background, the question came up about how our government is going to deal with this 100,000 nucleus in the future. It was suggested that whatever we do in Washington it was essential that we establish a “focal point” in the Miami area. Right now these various groups sit down there, stew in their own juice, elect committees, become emotionally upset, and then finally call upon somebody in Washington to let off their steam. If we are to get any benefit for future operations with this large group of people, it was suggested that we have a continuing office down in that area so that these committees could be guided and they would have a place to put in their requests and let off steam before they get to such an emotional pitch.

That evening after I got home the President called me and asked me to discuss this further with General Wheeler (because of the Army’s future involvement both as a trainer of Cubans and as the executive agent for the Department of Defense in Cuban affairs), with Katzenbach of Justice, and with Director McCone (because of the Agency’s interests). I have done all this.

General Wheeler and Secretary Vance both want to sit in on any meeting that you hold to formulate recommendations for the President on this matter; Mr. Katzenbach says that the Department of Justice’s future interest is primarily one of the immigration authorities and he would very much like to have immigration represented, both in Washington and in Miami in anything that is established, including preliminary discussions. Mr. McCone has some deep feelings about the whole process, and especially his future relationships with the Cubans, and he would like to have General Carter sit in on any deliberations. He feels that if we establish a Miami “focal point,” the Agency certainly would have to work in coordination with them.

The President then asked especially that I get the matter to your attention and he will await your early recommendations, including the advice of the Department of State. All concerned felt that the Department of State should be the chief agency for the focal point, if it were established.

Last footnote: HEW is the most involved at the moment. There are 100,000 Cuban refugees down there and 60,000 of them draw money from the Cuban refugee relief program. They obviously would be very important in the Miami area and are going to be continuously involved as long as they are paying money out to these refugees.

Mr. Katzenbach has a rather large immigration installation at the Miami National Airport—it can house as many as 600 people on a transient basis. It was his suggestion that any headquarters set up in the Miami area be set up at this location because the Cubans are already used to dealing with the government at that location. HEW concurs in this.

C.V. CliftonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
261. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Cuba, Security, 1963. Secret. Washington, January 4, 1963. SUBJECT Further organization of the Government for dealing with Cuba

On your oral instructions conveyed by General Clifton, I have met with an interdepartmental group to try to work out an improved arrangement for our handling of Cuban policy and action in 1963. The time is ripe for such a reorganization, because we seem to be winding up the negotiations in New York, the prisoners are out, and there is well nigh universal agreement that Mongoose is at a dead end. The people with whom I have been working are:Vance, Yarmolinksy and General Wheeler as delegates for McNamara and Gilpatric;Nick Katzenbach as a delegate of Bobby; Pat Carter from CIA; and Alexis Johnson and Ed Martin from State Department.

The following paragraphs represent my personal sense of what we have worked out together, and while there may be some small differences of point of view or need for revision, I think they are ripe for your consideration.

The first guiding principle is that final policy responsibility should remain with you, working with the Executive Committee when necessary. There is no point pretending that major Cuban policy decisions can be made anywhere else than in the White House, and your own executive role, supplemented by the Executive Committee when there are major policy issues or interdepartmental difficulties, is indispensable.

The more complicated matter is where to put day-to-day coordinating responsibility. After considerable discussion, the unanimous con sensus is that we should locate this responsibility in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, working as a deputy to Ed Martin in the State Department and acting as chairman of an interdepartmental group on Cuba. The Coordinator would be responsible to Dean Rusk and Ed Martin for departmental business, and, under their guidance, to you and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination. Nothing in his authority would supplant the responsibility of other operating departments for management of their own assigned tasks, or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed; but it would be clear that you and the Executive Committee were looking to the Coordinator and his interdepartmental committee for effective execution of your policy decisions. In ordinary circumstances, the necessary coordination will be carried out effectively by good will and good sense on all sides. When there is an honest difference that cannot be resolved it will, of course, have to come upstairs one way or another.

The key to this administrative organization is, of course, the individual appointed as coordinator. The recommendation of the State Department is that Sterling Cottrell should be given this job. He has been doing a very solid and constructive job as head of the Vietnamese Task Force, and he is due for reassignment to Latin American Affairs, which turns out to be his preferred professional field, both by experience and by interest. He has the necessary professional seniority in the Department, and high interdepartmental acceptance. He has worked well with the White House staff.

If this arrangement should be approved, the Cuban desk of the Department would be absorbed in a new, higher level Office of Cuban Affairs under Cottrell, with Bob Hurwitch as his deputy. Hurwitch has done a very able job within the Department, but he is a little junior for a major job of interdepartmental coordination. At the same time, Cottrell would be expected to find and appoint a deputy coordinator, to be based in Miami, to handle day-to-day relations with Cuban refugees and with interested agencies of Government on the spot. Bob Orrick has been asked to expedite effective interdepartmental administrative support, as necessary, for both the Coordinator and the Miami office.

 If a Coordinator for Cuban Affairs is established, then we think the Mongoose office should be disbanded and responsibility for covert operations should be a part of the work of the Coordinator and his associates from other departments, reporting on covert activities to the Special Group (5412) in the normal way. The Special Group would in turn be guided by broader policy as established by you through the Executive Committee. The covert aspects of our Cuban enterprise are not the most important ones, at present, and they need to be handled in the wider context of an open Cuban policy, centered in a visible office of Cuban Affairs. Such a change would liberate General Lansdale for many other tasks in which his services are uniquely valuable. The problem of organization is of course less than half the battle: what we really need is to sort out our policies toward Cuba. There are a number of loose ends, large and small, of which the following are samples: The shipping orders and the broader question of economic pressure on Cuba are still unsettled. Executive Orders have been prepared along the lines of your press conference statement, but they are being held up, as I think Dean Rusk has explained to you, pending discussion with OAS and other Allies. The State Department will take any public rap for this delay. The organization and handling of refugees needs restudy. We need a much more open and continuous communication with refugee leaders, and we need clarification of the opportunities to be offered to Cuban volunteers, whether or not they are veterans of the brigade. If we can manage it, we need to get a stronger process of representation of free Cubans. We should intensify our investigation of ways and means of communicating with possibly dissident members of the Castro regime, perhaps including even Fidel himself. Donovan, for example, has an invitation to be Castro’s guest at the beach of Veradero, and there is work to be done also in our relations with men like Manolo Ray. The role of intelligence officers needs to be redefined. The very large commitment of the CIA to Mongoose activities should be reexamined, and probably substantially reduced, and the role of CIA as an apparent spokesman and agent of the United States Government in Cuban affairs should probably be reduced still further—although this in no sense reflects on the Agency, which has been trying to do what it was told to do. The political, psychological, and personal aspects of the effort to isolate Castro’s Cuba should be pursued intensively in the OAS. We do not want Cuba to be a hemispheric training ground for Communists, and we have not exhausted our weapons here. We need to keep up a continuous and high-level barrage of public statements explicitly defending our rights of surveillance. You said on television that the camera will be our best inspector and this position should be energetically sustained. The question of Pan American flights should be reviewed. My own view, which Ed Martin shares, is that it is probably to our advantage to have such flights, and that Juan Trippe should not be allowed to get away with poor-mouthing on the cost to Pan American. Over the long rUN this franchise is of the highest importance to Pan American, and nothing I have heard about their marginal losses is very impressive. It would help to have your general reaction to these matters by Monday.January 7. If you approve, we could put the organization into effect at once and have a preliminary discussion of the substantive issues by Cottrell’s people with the Executive Committee before the end of next week. McG. B.
262. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Washington, January 7, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting with the President in Palm Beach, Florida—9:45 a.m.—Saturday—5 January 1963

The meeting was brief. General discussions consumed about an hour. Secretary Rusk was present during the latter half which involved Cuban program.

McCone generally reviewed the Killian report,The final Killian report, February 4, submitted to the President, is in CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, pp. 361-371. stated it was a good report, indicating that it “called the glass of water half full, not half empty,” the report was well received but only a part of the total review being made by the Killian Board and that the DCI could not forecast a final Killian Board position. McCone stated that he personally felt the Intelligence Community had done a good job but looking back in retrospect he felt that they could have done better. DCI expressed the feeling that principal errors or intelligence deficiencies were: Failure to press aggressively overflight program between August 29th and October 14th and this was due to timidity throughout the government, including the Intelligence Community for fear of a “U-2 incident” once SAM sites were detected in Cuba. This foreclosed earlier detection of the existence of offensive missiles. A conviction on the part of government officials and intelligence estimators that the Soviets would not accept the responsibility of a confrontation which would result from placing of offensive missiles in Cuba and Because of this conviction the estimators and others in Government failed to fully evaluate many indicators which, if carefully analyzed, would lead to the conclusion that something more than defensive armament was going into Cuba.

The President seemed inclined to believe estimators should not be criticized for their judgment as it was reasonable to assume the Soviets would not place themselves in an indefensible position militarily, they would assume we would find out and would respond and this would place them in a difficult position, which it did. Furthermore he felt the SAM sites placed the Soviets in an awkward position for if they used them against one of our airplanes we would be inclined to respond militarily and they could not defend the SAM sites. In general the President agreed with Sherman Kent’s position that the Soviets made a bad guess as to our response.

 The President questioned me concerning refugee reports and I responded substantially as summarized in the Killian report, indicating the only refugee or agent reports dealing significantly with offensive missiles came in on or after September 20th and at most there were only 8 or 10 out of a total of some 1200 reports. The President asked if the 5412 Committee reviewed raw intelligence of this type and I responded that their doing was not within their province, that raw intelligence was circulated to the Intelligence Community and that matters of significance should be brought to the members of the 5412 Committee through their respective intelligence officers and, if necessary, such matters should be considered by the United States Intelligence Board. I maintained that handling of raw intelligence was not a problem for 5412 Committee.

Action: In view of the importance placed on the 5412 Committee by the President, we should insist that the Committee meet regularly and for a sufficient time for review of their responsibilities (and not be crowded off the calendar by the Special Group CI) and furthermore that action papers be sent to the members of the 5412 Committee not later than Tuesday morning for consideration the following Thursday.

With respect to Cuban policy, the President expressed concern over the welfare of the prisoners, urged that arrangements be made to barracks them at Opa Locka or elsewhere in order to avoid growing distress and criticism. DCI agreed to go into this with proper authorities.

There followed an extended discussion of policy with respect to Pan American flights. The President wished them resumed but did not feel doing so should be in response to a demand by Castro. It was therefore agreed that DCI would meet with Donovan and arrange for him to go to Havana and work out suitable considerations for the resumption of flights which would specifically avoid the appearance of responding to a Castro demand.

 The President spoke favorably of the Cuban Task Force outlined in the recent Bundy memorandumDocument 261. which would be chaired by State with departmental representation. The President also recognized the need for CIA to complete liaison arrangements with free countries, indicating that this should be pursued aggressively even if it required DCI to visit several countries personally to work out these arrangements. DCI reported proposed meetings with the Chairmen of CIA Congressional Committees and later with the Committees themselves. The President agreed. Both McCone and the President felt that DCI line should not be defensive but rather should indicate that a substantial intelligence success occurred. The President suggested that McCone prepare a briefing for the Leadership meeting on Tuesday afternoon.January 8; see Document 265. The material McCone used for the briefing of the Congressional leadership is in the Supplement. He questioned DCI concerning Keating issue,Senator Kenneth B. Keating (R-N.Y.), one of the Kennedy administration’s most persistent critics, charged that the administration was purposefully overestimating the extent of Soviet withdrawal from Cuba and downplaying the Soviet presence still in Cuba. asked where Keating had gotten his information and why Keating had stated that 95% of it came from within the government. McCone answered that he had no verification of this and that he was convinced that Keating information had come from refugee sources. In answer to a question McCone stated that he had concluded that the first offensive missiles reached Cuba between the 2nd and 9th of September. McCone advised the President that he expected an investigation by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which would probably be initiated by a demand from Senator Lausche. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
263. Editorial Note

On the morning of January 2, 1963, Vasiliy Vasilevich Kuznetsov met with John McCloy to inform him that the Soviet Union greatly preferred the short form of the draft letter as contained in Document 258. Kuznetsov handed McCloy a revised joint letter of which the second paragraph was substantially different from the U.S. draft. According to telegram 2558 from the Mission to the United Nations, January 2, the Soviet Union’s draft second paragraph reads:

“The USSR and USA Govts believe that in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis in the Caribbean area there is no further need for this item to occupy the Security Council attention at this time, though it has not been possible fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this crisis.”

After consultation by telephone between Stevenson and Rusk, the United States Mission was authorized to transmit the following draft second paragraph to Kuznetsov:

“While it has not been possible for our Govts fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the considerable progress that has been made, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time.”

If the Soviets objected to this second paragraph, McCloy was prepared to agree to substitute the following:

“The Govts of the Soviet Union and the United States of America believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them and of the progress in the settlement of the crisis, there is no further need for this item to occupy the attention of the SC at this time, although it has not been possible fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with it. (USUN Files:NYFRC 84-84-001, 1-B December/January Meetings)

McCloy and Francis T.P. Plimpton met with Kuznetsov and Mendelevich, Kuznetsov’s assistant, at the Soviet Mission at 5 p.m. on January 3. Kuznetsov deplored the omission of the reference to “understanding” in the new U.S. draft’s second paragraph. Kuznetsov maintained there was an understanding and it was in the interests of both sides to include the word.

Kuznetsov presented a new Soviet draft of the second paragraph which reads:

“While it has not been possible for our govts fully to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and of the progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is no longer necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the SC at this time.”

Kuznetsov pointed out that the Soviet draft closely followed the United States draft. McCloy countered that he was disappointed that the Soviet Union did not accept the United States draft. Both men agreed to minor stylistic revisions in the third paragraph of the letter. McCloy told Kuznetsov that he would consider the Soviet draft and let Kuznetsov know his answer. (Telegram 2587 from USUN, January 4; ibid.)

After discussion with U. Alexis Johnson in Washington, McCloy telephoned Kuznetsov on January 4 and told him that the United States agreed to the insertion of the word “understanding,” but within the context of the phrase “degree of understanding.”McCloy also insisted on the phrase “extent of progress.”Kuznetsov objected to these qualifiers, but McCloy commented that his opposition seemed weak by reason of the inclusion of “understanding.” (Telegram 2600 from USUN, January 4; ibid.)

On the afternoon of January 5 the Soviets accepted the U.S. draft as conveyed to Kuznetsov by McCloy in the January 4 telephone call. The two sides agreed to sign and release the joint letter on January 7. (Telegram 2617 from USUN, January 5; ibid.) All the telegrams referred to above are in the Supplement.

The joint letter as submitted to the United Nations Secretary General, January 7, reads:

“On behalf of the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our Governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.

“While it has not been possible for our Governments to resolve all the problems that have arisen in connexion with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.

“The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connexion with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war.” (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, page 243)

264. National Security Action Memorandum No. 213Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 213. Secret. Copies were sent to the Secretary of Defense; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare; the Director of Central Intelligence; and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency. Washington, January 8, 1963. TO The Secretary of State SUBJECT Interdepartmental Organization for Cuban Affairs

The President has approved the following organizational arrangements to facilitate the coordinated management of all aspects of our current policy toward Cuba; final policy responsibility of course remains with the President, working with the Executive Committee of the National Security Council when necessary.

Day-to-day coordinating responsibility will be vested in a Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the Department of State, acting as Chairman of an Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba. The Coordinator will be responsible to the Secretary of State for State Department business, and under his guidance to the President and the Executive Committee for interdepartmental coordination. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee shall consist of the Coordinator and representatives of the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Representatives of other departments will be associated with the work of this committee as necessary in particular cases. Officers shall also be detailed to the Office of the Coordinator from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, HEW, CIA, and USIA. Other departments and agencies may be requested to participate in the work of the Interdepartmental Committee and in the work of the Coordinator’s Office as appropriate. A White House officer will maintain liaison with the Coordinator and with his Interdepartmental Committee. The President and the Executive Committee will look to the Coordinator for effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions, and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The Coordinator will work through his assigned officers and with the Interdepartmental Committee in meeting these responsibilities. The Coordinator’s authority will not supplant the responsibility of other operating departments or agencies for the management of their assigned tasks or their right to be consulted before their resources are committed. Differences which arise will be promptly referred to higher levels of resolution. The Coordinator will name a full-time representative who will open an office in Miami to represent the U.S. Government in relations with Cuban refugee organizations and coordinate the implementation of all Federal programs being carried on in the area, relating such programs to State, local and private programs. The Coordinator will assume the same responsibility for covert operations as he does for overt actions. However, he will report on covert matters to the Special Group which will be guided by broader policy established by the President through the Executive Committee. McGeorge Bundy
265. Editorial Note

On January 8, 1963, President Kennedy, Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with the bipartisan Congressional leadership from 5:30 to 6:35 p.m. Attending were Senators Mike Mansfield, Hubert H. Humphrey, George Smathers, Richard Russell, Everett Dirkson, Thomas Kuchel, Leverett Saltonstall and Bourke Hickenlooper and from the House of Representatives were Speaker John McCormack, Representatives Carl Albert, Hale Boggs, Carl Vinson, Thomas Morgan, Charles Halleck, Leslie Arends, and Frances Bolton. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book)

McCone drafted a brief memorandum for the record of the meeting, noting that McNamara gave a briefing on South Vietnam “expressing an optimistic point of view”;Rusk briefed the Congressional leaders on the Cuban negotiations at the United Nations and on the Congo; and McCone briefed them on Cuba. McCone noted that there were “no significant questions” from the Congressional leadership.

McCone’s January 8 briefing statement was attached to his January 9 memorandum for the record. In it he stated that the Soviet Union had withdrawn 42 strategic missiles, 42 jet bombers and their related equipment and about four or five thousand military personnel associated with the maintenance and operation of this equipment—leaving approximately 17,000 Soviet troops still in Cuba. McCone noted that the Intelligence community believed, but could not prove by aerial reconnaissance, that these withdrawals represent all the strategic weapons placed in Cuba by the Soviet Union. Aerial reconnaissance would reveal if strategic missiles were reintroduced or reactivated. McCone stressed that there was still a substantial Soviet military presence in Cuba. McCone summarized the situation as follows: “Castro remains in control, his attitudes seem unchanged, but the Soviets have retained sufficient military capability in Cuba to give them powerful leverage on Castro should he oppose their policies too actively.” McCone finished his briefing with an overview of the current areas in Latin America in danger of subversion directed by Moscow and Havana. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963) For McCone’s briefing paper and memorandum for the record, see the Supplement.

266. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Guthrie, cleared in draft by Thompson, and approved by the White House on January 14. The meeting was held at the White House and lasted until 6:02 p.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) The Department of State prepared a January 9 briefing memorandum for the President for this discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 033.1161/1-963) See the Supplement. Washington, January 9, 1963, 5 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS U.S. The President Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV USSR Vasiliy Vasilyevich Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador Lev Isaakovich Mendelevich, Assistant to Kuznetsov Viktor Pavlovich Karpov, First Secretary of Embassy (Interpreter)

Kuznetsov thanked the President for receiving him, saying that he considered this an honor, particularly in view of how busy the President is. He said that he had come to New York on Khrushchev’s instructions to assist the UN Secretary General in the handling of the Cuban crisis. The Soviet Government considered that this part of the negotiation has been completed and that it would therefore be useful to meet the President and pay his respects. Everyone in the USSR understandsthat Khrushchev’s instructions played a crucial role in the troubled days of crisis in the Caribbean and that as a result the danger of a thermonuclear war had been averted. The President had also displayed understanding. And so he had been instructed by his Government to make certain observations on the situation and related matters.

The President said that he appreciated Kuznetsov’s coming to Washington and noted that Mr. McCloy had told him he had been very courteous throughout the New York negotiations and had made every effort to work out a satisfactory solution. He noted that Kuznetsov’s stay in this country, while not as long as Mikoyan’s in Cuba, had been lengthy and that he appreciated his efforts in New York.

Kuznetsov said that Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson and others had been very experienced. The atmosphere of the talks had been business-like and they had clearly expressed the United States viewpoint. He agreed with the President that the results had not been everything that had been hoped for. He said that under instructions he wished to comment on the results of the situation in the Caribbean. The Soviet Government and people are constantly working to improve relations with the U.S. In Moscow great significance is attached to the fact that throughout the Caribbean crisis the United States and the U.S.S.R. acted on the basis of trust and mutual understanding. Whether this basis can be maintained, including that personally between the President and Chairman Khrushchev, and whether the clear and definite commitments made during the negotiations and exchange of letters can be maintained would determine whether other international problems could be settled in the future. The Soviet Government will firmly adhere to the commitments it undertook toward Cuba and proceeds on the assumption that the United States Government will do the same. The fulfillment by both sides of these agreements will be a touchstone of the ability of the two powers to trust each other’s word and to avert a military conflict. Speaking frankly, he had to say that during the course of the talks in New York on the settlement of the Caribbean crisis, especially during the last stages, the U.S. side handled the matter not in a way it seems it should have if it were also seeking to create trust between the two states. The Soviet Government would like to believe that the United States Government will in the future act in a manner which would not bring the world to the abyss of a thermonuclear war. The crisis in the Caribbean demonstrated with great clarity that both countries should act in accordance with the United Nations Charter concerning relations between all nations, large and small. Without this, there could be no guarantee that the United States and the U.S.S.R., which possess powerful armaments, will not confront each other again. Furthermore, the demonstrative welcome by the President of the Cuban refugees could not but be noted in Moscow; demonstrations like this revive the shadows of the past and leave their mark on the present. The overcoming of the crisis on the basis reached, puts other problems in the forefront: Chairman Khrushchev spoke of this in messages to the President and in public speeches. Two main problems to be solved are the question of the German peace treaty and the question of general and complete disarmament. Without eliminating the remnants of World War II it will be impossible to achieve normal relations and without the trust such relations engender general and complete disarmament would be impossible. The Soviet Government will make every effort to move the 18 Nation Disarmament Committee ahead and is prepared to do everything that would contribute to the success of these negotiations.

The President said that he thought Kuznetsov knew from his talks with McCloy and Stevenson of the particular sensitivity in the United States to anything involving Cuba. This is a delicate nerve in the United States stretching back to the beginning of our country. On the other hand, the President said, he was anxious to maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. He had noted before that these two most powerful countries have no national interests which bring them into collision. The President had spent a good deal of time defending this viewpoint prior to the Cuban crisis. Now that the matter had quieted down he saw no reason why the United States and the U.S.S.R. should be involved again in the same way. He asked Kuznetsov to explain to his principals American sensitivity over Cuba. The fact that there are 15 to 17,000 Soviet troops still in Cuba causes difficulties for the United States Government and for those in the United States who seek to maintain good relations with the U.S.S.R. The President said the Soviet Government could understand how the United States felt about this if they could imagine a similar situation in Finland. He was hopeful that Soviet policies toward Cuba, including the personnel and armaments there, would lead to a further relaxation of the situation. As to the question of the Bay of Pigs prisoners, the President said he had put them on the beach and he felt responsible for them. He had not said in his address to them that the United States would invade Cuba, though he had expressed the hope for a change in the situation there. All the U.S. forces which had been mobilized during the crisis were back in their camps. If the Soviet Union can comprehend the sensitivity and difficult nature of the problems the United States faces in the Caribbean, this can lead to a solution of other problems.

In reply, Kuznetsov said that the Soviet Government will fulfill all of the obligations it undertook with the exchange of letters between Khrushchev and the President. As for the Soviet military personnel in Cuba, it seemed to him that all the agreements in the exchange of letters had been carried out. This problem had been dealt with in the course of the exchange and there was a clear understanding on both sides concerning this matter. The Soviet Government will abide by all its agreements so there is nothing new in this problem.

The President noted that Khrushchev had given a clear commitment to withdraw all military personnel connected with the missile sites in Cuba and all others “in time”. He recognized that the latter was not the same kind of commitment since no time was specified. Nevertheless, he wanted to mention this matter which occupied attention in the United States.

Kuznetsov reiterated that he thought that there was no misunderstanding on this point.

Referring to the President’s comparison of the Cuban situation with Finland, Kuznetsov noted that there were many U.S. military bases, armed with deadly weapons and occupied by troops, around the U.S.S.R. However, he had no instructions on this point and said that the U.S.S.R. is not raising the question at this time.

The President replied that the U.S. had not introduced a new major base in any country such as Finland. A thermonuclear base there would have created a new situation. He repeated that Cuba was a matter of great sensitivity to the American people and again asked Kuznetsov to communicate this to his Government. Good relations between our two countries, the President said, will be made easier if the Soviet Government understands this.

Kuznetsov reverted to the question of the President’s reception of the Cuban brigade in Florida.See footnote 2, Document 260. He said this had created the opinion in Moscow that this brigade will be maintained, that others will be created and that then there would be a fresh invasion of Cuba.

The President replied that this was not going to happen. In a backgrounder which he had given in Florida he had said that the United States had no intention of invading Cuba and noted that our position remained that which he had set forth in his press conference of November 20. He said there would be no third hand invasion of Cuba. Nevertheless, it would be easier for the United States if there were a reduction of the Soviet military presence in Cuba. The President noted that Castro makes many more speeches than the President does and in them calls for revolution in Latin America. However, Castro was of no concern to the United States. The relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. are more important and the President was anxious to lessen areas of disagreement between the two countries.

Kuznetsov replied that while the results of the New York negotiations were not as great as they might have been, the situation was better now than it had been at the end of October. The immediate threat had been averted. However, normalization of relations required that something else should be done. No one can agree that a situation is normal when a great power threatens a small one, and officially expresses a desire to strangle and overthrow the government of the smaller one. Thus, some problems remain and further normalization of the situation depends on the United States Government. During the New York talks, the Soviet side had mentioned a tripartite protocol in which the head of the Cuban Government would have obliged himself to abide by the United Nations Charter and not to interfere with the internal affairs of other countries. If the United States Government fears Cuban actions, perhaps it should reexamine this protocol.

The President reiterated that the United States was not concerned with Cuba but with the Soviet military presence there. He noted a number of speeches which Castro and Che Guevara had made during the last two months calling for armed struggle in Latin America, saying that small bands of guerrillas would act as a catalyst in the process of taking power from the hands of the Yankee imperialists and insisting that this must be done in a large number of Latin American countries. He read a quotation from an interview by Che Guevara on November 23.

Kuznetsov replied that he was not at all sure the quotes which the President had made from the Cuban speeches were exact. It seemed to him that the Cubans had far more reasons to fear and worry than the United States. Ever since the beginning of the 1959 revolution, Cuba had been under various undermining pressures. The Cuban Government and Castro had made quite clear their willingness to negotiate with the United States concerning all points awaiting solution. The United States could respond to these Cuban proposals in order to normalize relations. He noted that the New York talks had been between the United States and the U.S.S.R. but that the problem had been made more difficult by the fact that they had been talking about another country.Kuznetsov met earlier with Secretary Rusk at noon in Rusk’s office. (Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 63 D 330) See the Supplement.

267. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Meetings with the President, 1/1/63-2/17/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith on January 15. The meeting took place in the President’s office and lasted until 11 a.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, January 12, 1963, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting with the President—Cuba Aerial Reconnaissance OTHERS PRESENT Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, General Taylor, Director McCone, Assistant Secretary Nitze, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Jeffrey Kitchen, Mr. John McNaughton

Mr. Bundy said that we had evidence of greater participation of Cuban nationals in the air defense system of Cuba which raised the possibility of an attack on one of our reconnaissance planes. Although the President was not being asked to reach a decision today, the group did wish to discuss two questions: In the event there is a radar lockon of one of our planes, does the plane complete its mission or abort? Is our need for information about the cargo of a Soviet ship approaching Cuban waters sufficient to fly low-level reconnaissance, both day and night, including flights during the time the ship is being unloaded in port?

The President asked why a plane should abort in the event of a radar lockon.

Mr. Bundy replied that if the plane continued on its flight, it is possible it would be shot down. Secretary McNamara said he did not think we should permit ourselves to get into a situation where we would have lost a plane and not yet have decided how we would respond to such hostile action. He suggested that there were three possible courses of action: We could fly a reconnaissance mission, have a plane shot down, and then decide how we would react. We could fly missions equipped with our most sophisticated electronic countermeasures equipment. The cost of using the ECM equipment would be the possibility of compromising highly advanced and highly classified instruments. We could use alternative equipment such as drones.

In response to the President’s question, Secretary McNamara said we did not have yet positive proof of a radar lockon on any of our planes although we had evidence indicating radar tracking.

The President said that he thought the Defense Department should decide whether or not to use our sophisticated ECM equipment. He said he intended to believe that if it appeared that the Cubans were taking actions with a view to shooting down one of our planes, the plane should abort the first time this happened and we could then prepare ourselves for prompt reprisals in the event the circumstances were repeated.

Mr. Bundy said that during this week there would be no change in the present rules regarding aborts by reconnaissance planes.

Director McCone said he favored using the U-2 in good weather, but if the weather were bad, he thought we should fly low-level missions.

Secretary McNamara said that he did not agree with low-level aerial reconnaissance in bad weather because the loss of a U.S. plane or the controversy arising out of low-level flights would be all out of proportion to the value of the information obtained from pictures taken at a low-level. He said that the cargo of the Soviet shipMcCone prepared his own memorandum of record of this meeting on January 12. In it he indicated that the ship being referred to was the Simferopol and that the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance had recommended it be subjected to round-the-clock photography at 4-hour intervals. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963)McCone also wrote a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, January 15, explaining his views on surveillance of the Simferopol. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) For both these memoranda, see the Supplement. According to a January 17 memorandum from Chase to McGeorge Bundy on the advice of Rusk and McNamara, the President authorized only high-level surveillance of the Simferopol. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. III) probably did not consist of missiles and that certain knowledge about it was not worth the complications arising out of low-level flights.

Director McCone said that CIA was trying to find out what was in the cargo and would continue to do so during the time the cargo was being unloaded, but he was not certain that they would be able to obtain the information we wanted. He expressed a view that the cargo might contain armaments dangerous to us.

Mr. Bundy said there were political problems immediately ahead of us, such as Donovan’s proposed visit to Havana in connection with the remaining prisoners in Cuba and Kuznetsov’s visit this week. He said the group would return to the President at a later time when more information was available.

Secretary McNamara said the Defense Department would be prepared to carry out low-level missions on very short notice if the President so decided.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
268. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Kennedy Library, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, 1/62-9/62. Secret. Washington, January 18, 1963.

The President has mentioned again his interest in maximizing the information we get from Cuba by other sources than air surveillance, and has asked me to report this interest to you. He would like to know what we are now doing to encourage visits to Cuba by knowledgeable and friendly observers of other nationalities, and also whether our arrangements with friendly countries having embassies in Havana are as effective in this respect as they should be. He would like to know what additional measures are being taken in this respect. He believes that we should be able to arrange for regular visits to Cuba of visitors of a rank and sophistication which would give them access to high authorities of the Cuban government, and make their reports correspondingly valuable. He would like to know what plans are proposed for this purpose.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
269. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Research and Reports. CIA/RR CB 63-10 Washington, January 19, 1963.

THE CUBAN ECONOMY IN 1961 AND 1962 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1963 THROUGH 1965

Summary and ConclusionsThe 9-page discussion portion of the paper is in the Supplement.

The Cuban economy during 1963 probably will not decline further in total output and may show some improvement in comparison with 1962. Cuban GNP in 1962, measured in 1958 prices, is estimated to be 25 percent below the 1958 level. The total supply of available goods, however, was only about 20 percent lower than in 1958 because Cuba ran a trade deficit in 1962 that was substantially higher than the deficit in 1958.

Total agricultural output will not increase much during 1963, for the sugar harvest probably will decline slightly from last year, largely offsetting moderate gains in other crops. Industrial production will increase to some extent as Cuba’s new managerial class gains experience and the economy begins to regain some of its lost efficiency. Investment also probably will expand as a number of new industrial projects are started during the year. The dynamic upward improvement of prices in the world sugar market probably will raise Cuba’s export earnings in 1963 above the 1962 level. The increase will not be enough, however, to finance the required volume of imports, and Cuba will still require large balance-of-payments credits from the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

It appears probable that the Cuban economy will continue to improve during 1964 and 1965. The government is making vigorous efforts to expand agricultural production. The traditional failure of most Communist regimes to achieve satisfactory results in agriculture, however, precludes the prediction of any dramatic successes for Castro in this sphere during 1964-65. Continuing improvement at the managerial level may well yield further increases in industrial production. Investment activity also probably will continue to expand. Finally, the outlook for export earnings suggests that Cuba will remain dependent on the Bloc for large industrial and balance-of-payment credits.

270. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, January 19, 1963. SUBJECT Cuban Coordinating Committee

The following are some further thoughts on the work of the Committee:

Future Policy Toward Cuba—As I mentioned to you in my memorandum of January 18,Not found. Secretary Vance submitted a paper to the Committee which identified two possible courses of action in trying to overthrow the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba: (1) a policy of applying increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, and (2) a policy of applying political, economic, psychological and military pressures as appropriate opportunities present themselves.This paper, in what was apparently a final form, is Document 272. In presenting the paper to the Committee, Secretary Vance made it abundantly clear that while he had identified an alternate course of action, the identification did not include an endorsement—he had not yet reached a decision on that question.

While, on the surface, Bob Hurwitch seems to have accepted the consideration of an alternative course of action in the policy paper, he undoubtedly views it coldly. He believes strongly that such factors as (1) our hope to act with full OAS support, and (2) Presidential statements about our non-aggressive intentions, necessarily limit our policy to one of applying pressures as opportunities present themselves; this is neither a “hard” nor “soft” policy but the only politically realistic policy. Deep down, I think he regards the consideration of the so-called “active policy,” at best, as a useless exercise and waste of time and, at worst, as an insidious attempt by DOD dreamersto bring to life a policy which will earn battlefield promotions at the expense of U.S. national interest. I can’t say yet how far Mr. Cottrell goes along with this view.

On this one, I’m with Secretary Vance. The alternate course of action is substantively worth focusing on. Also, the educational aspect is important. Both Mr. Cottrell and Secretary Vance are new at the Cuban business. If they are to be really effective in their new roles, it seems worthwhile that they think through basic courses of action which may appear to others to be unattractive. The process need not turn out to be either very time-consuming or dangerous.

After you received the phone call from Secretary Vance,No record found. I passed your message to Mr. Cottrell. He and Mr. Vance planned to meet late SaturdayJanuary 19. afternoon to thrash out the policy paper.

CIA vis-a-vis the Miami Office (Mr. Crimmins)—I mentioned to you in a previous memorandum that at one meeting, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified], the CIA representative, viewed the work of the Miami office in a narrow sense; he obviously was reluctant to see Mr. Crimmins getting involved in CIA business. Bob Hurwitch tells me that this problem is under control. He said (1) that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] had simply not gotten the word, (2) that Mr. FitzGerald and others in CIA do have the word, and (3) that there is no need at present to make an issue of this point.

Timing of Meetings

The following meetings on Cuba are scheduled for this week: Monday, 2:00 PM—Cuban Coordinating Committee at State Wednesday, 10:30 AM—Mr. Cottrell, Secretary Vance, Mr. Helms, Mr. Dungan, with you in your office Thursday, 10:00 AM—ExComJanuary 21, January 23, and January 24. For the account of the Executive Committee meeting originally scheduled for January 24 at 10 a.m. but postponed until January 25 at 4 p.m., see Document 274. No records of the other meetings have been found.

Papers

Papers for the ExCom meetingSee Documents 272 and 273. will be distributed on Tuesday afternoon.

Gordon ChasePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
271. Notes of President Kennedy’s Remarks at the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council

Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, NSC Meetings, 1963, No. 508, 1/22/63. No classification marking. A note at the top of the memorandum indicated it was drafted by a “CIA Reporter.”McGeorge Bundy prepared a briefing memorandum, January 21, for the President for this meeting. (Ibid.) The portion of Bundy’s memorandum on Cuba is in the Supplement.

Other memoranda of this meeting exist. One apparently by Bromley Smith, January 22, is ibid; another by Maxwell Taylor, January 22, is in National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Taylor’s Memos for Record; a third, apparently by a Department of State official, is in Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/1-2263.

 Washington, January 22, 1963.

Notes on Remarks by President Kennedy before the National Security Council Tuesday, January 22, 1963

I will start by reviewing areas of policy which will be before us in the coming months and indicate the general attitude which I have toward them and to emphasize where we might put our emphasis in the next few months.

The responsibilities of the United States are worldwide and the U.S. is the only country which is recognizing its wide responsibilities. We are part of NATO, SEATO, etc. and support other pacts even though we are not a part of them. Other nations are not doing their share.

Would like to say a word first about Cuba.

The indications are that the importance of timing is of paramount importance in reaching judgments—both by the USSR and the US. Our big problem is to protect our interests and prevent a nuclear war. It was a very close thing whether we would engage in a quarantine or an air strike. In looking back, it was really that it presented us with an immediate crisis and the USSR had to make their judgment and come to a decision to act in twelve hours. In looking back over that four or five day period, we all changed our views somewhat, or at least appreciated the advantages and disadvantages of alternate courses of action. That is what we should do in any other struggle with the Soviet Union—and I believe we will be in one in the future. We should have sufficient time to consider the alternatives. You could see that the Russians had a good deal of debate in a 48 hour period. If they had only to act in an hour or two, their actions would have been spasmodic and might have resulted in nuclear war. It is important that we have time to study their reaction. We should continue our policy even though we do not get Europe to go along with us.

The time will probably come when we will have to act again on Cuba. Cuba might be our response in some future situation—the same way the Russians have used Berlin. We may decide that Cuba might be a more satisfactory response than a nuclear response. We must be ready—although this might not come. We should be prepared to move on Cuba if it should be in our national interest. The planning by the US, by the Military, in the direction of our effort should be advanced always keeping Cuba in mind in the coming months and to be ready to move with all possible speed. We can use Cuba to limit their actions just as they have had Berlin to limit our actions.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

272. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.000/1-2463. Top Secret. A note on the source text indicates that this paper was prepared for the Executive Committee meeting of January 24, which was postponed to January 25, see Document 274. Washington, January 24, 1963. SUBJECT United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator’s Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

Alternative I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere’.

“We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.”

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are: Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba; Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states; Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states; Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose; Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime; Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS; Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below: Await results of Mr. Donovan’s imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U.S. action could jeopardize their release. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable: Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days.) These orders: close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba; close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port; prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions: An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS memberswill be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list(strategic) items is prohibited. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation: Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba; Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

Alternative II

United States Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension; erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities, negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of four point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U.S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U.S. for “intervening” or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U.S. will not permit the maintenance of a Communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures of Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U.S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U.S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator’s Recommendation

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

Statement of DOD Representative

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U.S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

273. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Brubeck) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2463. No classification marking. Washington, January 24, 1963. SUBJECT Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers “Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations” and “United States Policy Toward Cuba” which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled “United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.”The memorandum on the Cuban Brigade is in the Supplement with the addition of the new page 8. The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are: “United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States”Attached, but not printed. and “Current Problems Concerning Cuba.”Not printed; see the Supplement.

CCWThese typed initials appear above Brubeck’s typed signature. Attachment 1 Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT Summary of Coordinator’s Recommendations

1. U.S. Policy Objectives

The following should be the objectives of the U.S. with respect to Cuba: Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba; Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba; Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states; Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states; Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes; Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States; Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime; Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere; Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled “U.S. Policy Toward Cuba.” They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation: intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime; support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

Note: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U.S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

 Attachment 2 Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Executive Committee of the National Security Council

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

SUBJECT United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.’

“We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island.”

[Here follows a list of objectives identical to that in Attachment 1.]

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials: Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime; Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence; Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan’s imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable: Inform NATO and OAS 24 hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days.) These orders: Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba; Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port; Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission Conference—January 28-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assist-ant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions: An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS actionon the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list(strategic) items prohibited. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings of internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economical measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military force. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.
274. Summary Record of the 38th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42. Top Secret; Sensitive. This record is part I; part II relates to European policy. Washington, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.

Prior to the arrival of the President, Secretary Rusk asked Ambassador Thompson to explain why he did not agree with the others on the Cuban paper under consideration.Rusk is referring to the revised version of “U.S. Policy Towards Cuba,” see attachment 2 to Document 273. Ambassador Thompson said the paper was aimed at Cuba and does not take into account some of our worldwide objectives. He thought we should act toward Cuba in such a way as not to provoke a reaction from the USSR, particularly during the current period when we are seeking to negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty and when we do not yet know what will flow from the split between the Chinese Communists and the USSR. In addition, he said there still existed a possibility of a split between Castro and the Russians. He urged that we do nothing overtly which appeared to the Russians to be contrary to what we had agreed to do during the Cuba negotiations. The proposed shipping orders, he said, would cause the Russians more concern than any of the proposed courses of action listed in the paper. He feared that if we implemented the proposed shipping orders, we might delay the withdrawal of Soviet troops still in Cuba. He acknowledged that domestically the policy he was suggesting would be difficult but suggested that key Congressmen be told exactly what the situation is.

Director McCone doubted that the Soviets would remove their troops from Cuba and downgraded preliminary evidence, cited by Ambassador Thompson, which would indicate that the Russians might be planning to withdraw highly classified equipment from Cuba.

Ambassador Thompson acknowledged that the Cuban paper placed domestic considerations in opposition to foreign policy considerations and a policy aimed at Cuba against a policy toward the USSR.

Secretary Rusk doubted that the Russians would remove any more of their troops and said he believed we must assume that the forces there are going to stay. Therefore, he felt we should accept the actions listed in the Cuba paper because the risk of delaying Soviet troop withdrawal was not great. As to the shipping orders, he called attention to the fact that they would mean very little practically. Free World trade with Cuba has, in the period January 1 to January 19, practically ceased. He acknowledged that while many of our allies would take informal actions to block the use of their ships in the Cuba trade, these same allies would oppose us if we asked them to adopt a principle, i.e. an embargo, with which they disagreed. He said that in view of the President’s press statement,2 he felt we may have to issue the shipping orders to encounter serious domestic opposition.

Apparent reference to Kennedy’s press conference of January 24, in which he admitted that “There are still approximately 16 or 17 thousand Russians there [Cuba], that the Soviets are continuing to operate the SAM sites and other technical pieces of equipment, and there are some organized units, the same organized units we’ve describe before, which are still on the territory of Cuba.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 93)2

The Secretary reported that even without the shipping orders, our economic pressures against Cuba are in fact tending to isolate Cuba economically. He preferred not to take on the task of persuading our allies to act formally to prevent Free World trade with Cuba when they appeared to be ready to block this trade by informal means. He felt that a decision had to be taken on whether the President’s press conference statement required us to issue the orders even if they were not really necessary.

Secretary Ball said that serious problems would not arise until ships which had participated in the Cuba trade came to U.S. ports and were refused admittance in compliance with the shipping orders.

The President joined the meeting.

Director McCone repeated his earlier view that there was little evidence to support a statement that the Russians were withdrawing their sophisticated equipment from Cuba. He cited numerous reports of internal disturbances in Cuba and added that Castro may be concerned by them. Referring to testimony he had given earlier in the day to a Senate Committee, Director McCone estimated that there is about twice as much Soviet equipment in Cuba as there had been prior to the Russian buildup. The largest increase in military equipment is in tanks.

The President said that Senator Keating was alleging that there is now in Cuba ten times as much equipment as there was. He asked how we made available to the press accurate statements of the Soviet increases in equipment.

Secretary Rusk praised the way in which Director McCone had handled the Senate Committee earlier in the day and then suggested that the State Department, the Defense Department, and the White House press heads reconstitute a group to be responsible for giving to the press current information on Soviet equipment in Cuba.

Mr. Bundy expressed his view that the Defense Department should be responsible for giving to the press information on the military situation in Cuba. He added that the Cuban Coordinator should know all the latest information in order to avoid giving to the press differing stories. (At the end of the meeting it was decided that Assistant Secretary of Defense Sylvester should have a man on his staff who would be the expert on the military situation in Cuba and constantly available to answer press queries. His work should be closely related to the Cuban Coordinator’s work.)

Secretary Rusk reviewed for the President the earlier discussion on removal of Soviet troops.

The President asked whether Ambassador Thompson shouldn’t raise with Dobrynin the question as to whether the Russians were going to remove additional troops from Cuba as had been suggested in one of the Khrushchev letters.

Secretary Rusk reviewed for the President the problem of the issuance of the shipping orders.

The President decided to postpone issuance of the orders. He did not think they should be issued while Donovan was negotiating with Castro on the release of the American prisoners in Cuba. He asked that we draw up a statementNot found. explaining why we were delaying the issuance of the orders, which would be released only if the press asked about the orders.

Secretary Ball said that the only part of the shipping orders which were meaningful had to do with the shipment of U.S. property on vessels engaged in the Cuba trade. He said that no Executive Order was necessary to achieve this objective because the President could give guidance to the Department of Agriculture which would cover the largest amount involved, i.e. food shipments.

The President decided that there would be no public announcement but that the Department of Agriculture and other agencies should be directed to refrain from shipping U.S. products on ships engaged in the Cuba trade.There were problems with this decision, see the January 30 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy in the Supplement. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 220) For the decision on shipping, see Document 277.

There followed a discussion of the dropping of propaganda leaflets from free traveling balloons. It appeared that no one was prepared to advocate the use of balloons. The President decided that balloons should not be used. In response to a question as to whether a balloon capability should be retained for use in an emergency, Acting Director Wilson stated that USIA wouldprefer to rely on airborne TV to meet an emergency.

Secretary Rusk explained the courses of action which he believed we should take in the OAS (see attached OAS paper).See footnote 2, Document 273. He acknowledged that the new actions proposed did risk a less than unanimous vote in the OAS.

The President expressed his strong reservations to the course of action proposed. He did not see why we should change the existing OAS resolution. He did not wish to have Assistant Secretary Martin undertake a trip to Mexico, Chile and Brazil with his hat in his hand requesting support for an altered resolution.

Secretary Rusk said the practical effect of the recommended OAS resolution on trade would be very little because the Latin American states had very little trade with Cuba. However, OAS action would provide a basis upon which to ask NATO to place Cuba under COCOM rules.

Secretary Rusk said we were now seeing in Cuba the effect of our economic embargo. Director McCone agreed and said that the lack of spare parts for U.S. equipment in Cuba was seriously affecting the Cuban economy.

The President decided that Assistant Secretary Martin should go to Mexico on other business and incidentally find out the current Mexican position toward further OAS action against Cuba. Depending on the Mexican reaction, a decision could then be made as to whether he should proceed to Chile and Brazil. Only then should we decide whether further action in the OAS should be undertaken. The President did not wish us to undertake an effort which had little chance of succeeding. He asked for a statement as to what the effect would be if the OAS adopted the resolution we favored and if NATO agreed to place Cuba under COCOM rules.

Secretary Rusk concluded discussion of the OAS by calling attention to the fact that some OAS members felt that we should act more forcefully than we have so far done.

Mr. Cottrell summarized the recommendation covering our policy toward the Cuban brigade (see attached paper).See footnote 1, Document 273. He said no one favored continuing the brigade as a “hard core” and all favored a medium course of action.

General Taylor expressed reservations about allowing members of the brigade, upon completion of their military training in the U.S. training camps, to become eligible for membership in a reserve unit. He was concerned that these reserve units would become political.

Mr. Bundy expressed his view that the proposed course of action would be difficult to sell to the brigade members.

The Attorney General explained his views in detail. He said some members should be sent to Latin America to lecture in Latin American universities or to engage in work with Latin American student groups; other members would choose to undergo military training while still others would want to return to civilian life, and, therefore, would be seeking jobs. He felt that some members could be usefully placed in special forces units assigned to Latin American countries. He felt that their firsthand experience with Communism could be used to great advantage in Latin American countries in explaining the threat of Communism.

The Attorney General said he had been told that most brigade members were opposed to Cardona, the present head of the Cuban Revolutionary Committee. Many of them wanted to stay out of politics but wished to retain membership in a group which would be a symbol to those who would eventually rebuild Cuba. He said we should first talk to the brigade members and then draw up a program. He thought that the brigade members should be treated as equal partners, and that we should try to get their ideas rather than dictate to them. In order to avoid their turning hostile, he felt they must be treated properly and must have a sense of participation. We would get a great deal out of them if we handled them correctly. One way would be to tell them honestly that we cannot now invade Cuba and that they can fight Communism much more effectively in the present by undertaking tasks suggested to them in other Latin American countries, either as special forces members or as civilians in the academic field.

The Attorney General concluded by saying that the brigade members should participate in some way in planning our Cuban intelligence actions. He thought we would benefit by their ideas and suggestions. He urged that we not merely pick brigade members and use them as agents, instructed as what to do, but rather we should encourage them to take part in the selection of targets and methods of operation. He acknowledged that one reason why this had not so far been done was because of the reputation the Cubans had of being unable to keep a secret. He doubted that all Cubans could be accused of talking too much.

Mr. Cottrell expressed his doubt that the brigade members would be accepted by the 26 July group in Cuba which considered them to be mercenaries and untrustworthy.

Mr. McCone said he did not believe the brigade was discredited in Cuba. On the contrary, he said it was considered to be a brave group of Cuban patriots. He urged that we not destroy the value of the brigade but use it as an asset, preferably by working with individual brigade members.

Secretary McNamara, in response to a question, said there would be no difficulty in providing military training for those brigade members who wished to be trained. They would be trained with the 2200 Cubans now in camp.

The President decided that in the next two weeks we should find out from individual brigade members what each would prefer to do, i.e. take a civilian job, be given military training, go to Latin America in various capacities as scholars, lecturers, student leaders, etc., or become intelligence agents. The Army, CIA and Mr. Cottrell’s office would work together, in consultation with the Attorney General. A decision as to whether there should be a brigade headquarters would be made later. The President expressed his hope that large numbers of the brigade members would choose to take military training.

Secretary Dillon referred to the basic objectives listed in the Cuban paper. He questioned objective number 5 which called for encouraging Castro to split with Moscow. He felt this objective was inconsistent with the objective of seeking the overthrow of Castro.

Mr. Bundy said this was a subordinate objective which should be kept in even though it was in some ways inconsistent with another objective.

The President said he did not think it was necessary to approve the general parts of the paper and summarized the specific actions which he had already approved.

There followed a discussion of the intelligence “objective” author-ized in paragraph 10 of the basic paper. The President expressed his strong view that we should not risk good men by sending them to Cuba to get information which was only of marginal use to us. He was reminded that the 5412 Special Group reviewed each plan to send intelligence teams into Cuba. The President said the Group should make a judgment in each case as to whether the danger of the loss of the team was worth the benefit to the U.S. derived from the information we would obtain. He said no intelligence officer should feel that he was required to send in the largest possible number of agents merely to satisfy an intelligence requirement.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
275. Memorandum for the FilesSource: Department of State, Central Files, 737.00/1-2663. Top Secret; Limited Distribution. According to a covering memorandum from Cottrell to Rusk, January 28, Cottrell sent this memorandum to Rusk informing the Secretary that McCone had similar information. When shown that information, the President stated that it “looked interesting.” Washington, January 26, 1963. SUBJECT Donovan’s Meeting with Castro, January 25, 1963

The following are, according to Donovan, the significant results of subject meeting: This was the most cordial and intimate meeting to date. Castro and Donovan with Cmte. Vallejo as interpreter spent most of the day together. (Vallejo is a physician who trained at Massachusetts General Hospital and was a Major in the U.S. Army. A 26th of July idealist, he has been very helpful to Donovan.) During an impromptu visit to a medical school, Castro led 300 medical students in chanting “Viva Donovan.” Castro agreed to release the imprisoned Americans, after a short “rehabilitation” period. He wanted to exchange Molina (imprisoned for accidental shooting of a Venezuelan child in a New York restaurant) and the three Cubans involved in the UN incident. Castro also indicated that a little more of the commodities due for the Brigade exchange should first be shipped. Castro said he would turn the Americans over to Donovan only, rather than to the Swiss, and would so inform the Swiss Ambassador that evening at a reception. Castro agreed to reply within a short time to the PAA proposal (transmitted by Donovan) for ten flights a week on a payment basis of 50 percent in dollars and 50 percent in pesos. Castro seemed receptive to the Donovan suggestion that in view of Cuban-Chinese friendship Castro might be helpful in obtaining the release of Americans imprisoned in China. Donovan told Castro his difficulties lay in his dependence upon the Soviets. Castro only grunted in reply. At Donovan’s suggestion, Castro agreed to review the cases of some Cuban political prisoners, but pointed out in irritation that if they were released, they would only attempt to return and cause trouble as CIA agents. Castro also was irritated over the U.S. press story that crutches had been taken from an invalid girl as she boarded the Shirley Lykes. He called the story untrue. Donovan and Vallejo agreed to communicate with one another by telephone regarding any matters of importance relating to their conversation. At the airport just before Donovan’s departure, Vallejo broached the subject of re-establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. Castro warmly re-issued the invitation that Donovan return to Cuba with his wife for a week or so (possibly the first week in March). Castro indicated he wished to talk at length with Donovan about the future of Cuba and international relations in general.

Note: The two high level Red Cross officials who spent two days last week in Havana with the Cuban Red Cross found the latter’s cooperation and hospitality remarkably good. Upon their departure Cervantes, head of the Cuban Red Cross, expressed the hope that the cooperation between the two humanitarian organizations presaged improved relations between the governments.

Robert A. Hurwitch
276. Summary Record of the 40th Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42, 1/25/63-3/29/63. Top Secret. The meeting was in two parts, the first on Cuba, the second on Europe. Only the first part is printed here. The meeting, held at the White House, lasted until 5:30 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) Washington, February 5, 1963, 4 p.m.

Director McCone circulated copies of the attached memorandum on the status of Soviet military forces in Cuba.February 5. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

The President asked that the U.S. Intelligence Board statement of the Cuban situation be sanitized and made public tomorrowThe statement, February 6, was made public by McCone. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Cuba, Cuba Intelligence) See the Supplement. On February 6 at 3 p.m., Secretary McNamara gave a special briefing at the Department of State on Soviet military presence in Cuba. The text of the 51-page briefing, including questions and answers, is in Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD-McNamara Files:FRC 71 A 3470, Cuba. and similar statements at frequent intervals thereafter. He said it should include the latest intelligence information. In releasing it, Mr. McCone should make clear that the Board wanted to receive all information from anyone who had it. The Board would thus be in the position of welcoming information from all sources with a view to obtaining the best picture of the Soviet military posture in Cuba. The President also asked Mr. McCone to ask Congressman Bruce for the information which he has. In the President’s view, if we acted promptly in putting out all our information within the next two or three days, we would be able to stem the tide of Congressional criticism, turn it to our advantage, and reduce the problem to manageable proportions. Secretary McNamara felt that the President should make a press statement at his press conference ThursdayThe President answered five questions on the topic at his press conference on Thursday, February 7. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 148-155. or possibly a television show should be arranged. He said the briefing on our intelligence from Cuba would be very impressive and, by the use of aerial reconnaissance pictures, we could reveal how extensive our present surveillance efforts have been and now are.

General Taylor noted that Congressional hearings on the Defense Department budget had turned into a Congressional investigation on Cuba. Most of the time Secretary McNamara has spent on the Hill was taken by Cuban questions rather than military budget problems.

The President said the way to clarify the numbers problem was to refer to the level of Soviet military forces in Cuba in July, in November, and today, rather than to compare the level from July to today. He suggested that correspondents from the Hill and the State Department be invited to join those covering the Defense Department for briefings about the situation in Cuba. He said that the 4500 Russian troops which have been withdrawn from Cuba since about November 1st is conclusive proof that there is not a Soviet military buildup in Cuba. He suggested that General Carroll’s briefing on Cuba might be made public. In addition, a backgrounder could be held following Director McCone’s statement to the Congressional Committee.

With regard to questions put to military officers concerning the implications of the Soviet military presence in Cuba, the President stressed the importance of speaking with one voice. He said we should neither exaggerate nor minimize the Soviet presence in Cuba but it was important that military and civilian officials take the same line. He acknowledged that we do not know why the Russians are keeping their troops in Cuba. They may think we are planning an invasion and therefore want their troops there. On the other hand, they may be keeping their troops in Cuba in order to control Castro.

Secretary Rusk pointed out that domestic partisan pressure for an invasion of Cuba can be dealt with by pointing out that the previous Administration did not invade Cuba when it would have been easy to do, i.e. before the Soviet buildup. Now, the cost of invasion would be greatly increased.

The Attorney General expressed his concern that in all statements about Soviet military presence in Cuba we should not forget to include a caveat that we may not be seeing everything going to Cuba. He did not think we should take the risk of being accused later of not having seen something in Cuba now which turned up there in the future. He also was uneasy about the prospect of our helping the Russians by giving the public everything we know about Soviet military presence in Cuba. In response to the President’s question, he suggested that release of sanitized intelligence information be done via Congressional Committees rather than directly to the public.

The President pointed out that his efforts along with those of the Departments of State and Defense had been unsuccessful in convincing many people that we knew exactly what was going on in Cuba. He said he believed a new effort should be made, namely, to use the USIB in the hope that doubting citizens would accept the testimony of our top intelligence officials. He repeated his belief that we should go as far as we possibly can in making public intelligence information in an effort to get the situation under control this week. Thereafter, we might talk to responsible Congressional Committee chairmen, proposing a procedure somewhat similar to that suggested by the Attorney General.

Cuban Reconnaissance

The President called attention to reports that a Soviet incoming ship would arrive on February 8th loaded with what was suspected to be military equipment. He noted the request of KOMARThe abbreviation is incorrect, it should be COMOR (Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance). for low-level reconnaissance flights in order to be certain that we knew the exact nature of the cargo of this Soviet ship.In McCone’s record of this meeting he recounted that he expressed one reservation on low-level flights: the effect on the Donovan mission. In response to a question from the President, McCone answered that the Simferopol was under careful surveillance. If the ship offloaded at Havana, low-level reconnaissance would not be productive because of the proximity of receiving warehouses to the dockside. If the ship docked at Matanzas or Mariel, low-level photography would be productive. (Memorandum for the record by McCone, February 6; Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963) The President said he felt there are two limitations on our use now of low-level reconnaissance missions; (a) negotiations to obtain the release of U.S. prisoners in Cuba, which he understood might be successfully concluded sometime in early March, and (b) possible withdrawal of Soviet military personnel. Low-level flights might influence a Soviet decision involving the removal of their troops from Cuba. The Russians might misread low-level reconnaissance flights as an indication of our preparing ourselves for military action in Cuba and decide that their forces must remain to counter anticipated U.S. actions. He requested that a letter to Khrushchev be drafted raising again the question of when the Russians plan to pull back their troops.

Director McCone said he wished to reserve on the low-level recommendation until we knew whether the incoming Russian ship would dock at Havana or Mariel. If it came into Havana, the problem of knowing the nature of the cargo was much more difficult than if it docked at Mariel where facilities were such that its cargo would have to be displayed on the dock and thereby visible to high-level cameras.

Secretary McNamara said that the USIB had listed twenty-one targets in Cuba which they wish to cover with low-level reconnaissance missions involving fourteen sorties. He said the risk of the loss of a low-level U.S. plane is very slight, but the risk of a strong Soviet and Cuban reaction is very high. In addition to the two limitations mentioned by the President, Secretary McNamara thought a low-level flight might initiate escalating actions which would place in jeopardy our current high-level reconnaissance flights. He said he saw no military need for the low-level flights but did recognize that there was a domestic political problem which had to be met. In his view, low-level flights are justified only under two circumstances; (a) when we have reason to suspect that offensive weapons are being reintroduced into Cuba, and (b) when we are preparing for an invasion and must have current information in order to do our military planning.

General Taylor acknowledged that there was a military need to know but not necessarily tomorrow. He agreed with Secretary McNamara that there was very little risk of one of our planes being shot down. He also referred to the requirement that our intelligence be kept up to date so that we could keep our invasion plans current. With respect to intelligence on incoming Soviet ships, he said the Chiefs felt less strongly about the need for intelligence and were prepared to recommend low-level flights on a case-by-case basis. He acknowledged that once a Soviet ship was in harbor we obtained a great deal of information from agents in Cuba.

The President decided that we should send a letter to Khrushchev on the Soviet troop withdrawal problem but not undertake low-level reconnaissance flights until we knew where the Soviet ship would dock.

Director McCone said that the intelligence community was very concerned about unexplained military activity taking place on Cape Francis, an island some ten miles offshore Cuba. He suggested that a low-level flight over this area would be highly useful but added that he shared the views expressed by Secretary McNamara and General Taylor as regards the U.S. prisoners in Cuba. He said he suspected that Donovan would be concerned if he were asked what effect such flights would have on his negotiations.

The President said we would decide on the reconnaissance missions on Friday. His current view was that if the Soviet ship went to Mariel we should probably overfly it. If we carried out this mission, we should probably also overfly Cape Francis.

Shipping Order

Mr. Bundy summarized the instruction to U.S. agencies which would prohibit the shipment of U.S.-owned goods on Free World ships engaged in the Cuba trade. The President approved the directive and agreed that its release should be made from the White House.See Document 277.

Deputy Under Secretary Johnson reported that the proposed action had been explained to numerous Congressmen who, in general, felt it was a proper action to take. He also reported that efforts would be made to explain the directive to the International Longshoreman’s Association in the hope that this Union and labor in general would not frustrate the implementation of the directive by refusing to accept it as an adequate measure to take against Cuba.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
277. National Security Action Memorandum No. 220Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 220. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the members of the Executive Committee. Washington, February 5, 1963. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Defense The Secretary of Agriculture The Secretary of Commerce The Administrator, Agency for International Development The Administrator, General Services Administration SUBJECT U.S. Government Shipments by Foreign Flag Vessels in the Cuban Trade

At its meeting on February 5, 1963, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council considered United States policy with respect to shipments financed by the Departments of State, Defense, and Agriculture, General Services Administration, and the Agency for International Development on foreign flag ships engaged in the Cuba trade.See Document 276. The President approved the recommendation that such cargoes should not be shipped from the United States on a foreign flag vessel if such vessel has called at a Cuban port on or after January 1, 1963. The President agreed that an exception may be made as to any such vessel if the persons who control the vessel give satisfactory assurance that no ships under their control will, thenceforth, be employed in the Cuba trade so long as it remains the policy of the United States Government to discourage such trade. The Secretary of State is to be consulted on the form and content of any such assurances.

The Secretaries of State, Defense, and Agriculture, the Administrator of AID, and the Administrator of GSA were directed to take such steps as may be necessary to carry out this policy.

The Secretary of Commerce is to make available to the appropriate Departments current pertinent information which he may have on ships engaged in the Cuba trade.

McGeorge Bundy
278. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, February 6, 1963.

On February 5, DCI met with Secretaries Rusk, McNamara and Ball to discuss the COMOR proposal for low-level overflights. There was a lack of agreement. Secretary McNamara explained the plan for seven sorties (utilizing 14 planes) to cover all of the targets. This was exclusive of the COMOR recommendations for covering the unloading of ships by day and night. McNamara did not advocate the program but merely explained it. DCI advocated the program;Rusk stated he did not advocate it but did agree to the mission over Cayo Francis.

McCone stated he felt the situation in Cuba was more ominous than thought by many in the Administration.At the White House daily staff meeting on February 7, Bundy noted that McCone “was something between concerned and angry because some of Secretary McNamara’s statements did not agree with some of his (McCone’s) statements already on record.”Bundy appeared worried that this could result “in the first big, internal, high-level personality clash of this administration.”Bundy himself said the difference in their views “was a simple reflection that McCone is afraid of the military situation in Cuba while McNamara is not.” (Memorandum for the record by Lawrence Legere, February 7; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, February 1963) He felt that if the Soviets wished merely to control Castro and to maintain Cuba as a base for infiltrating Latin America, they could do so at much less cost and with much less provocation than the present program. He therefore warned that in his opinion we could expect a more ominous situation relative to Cuba—perhaps the introduction of offensive weapons again. DCI said that Khrushchev had taken one step backward, we could expect him to take two steps forward surreptitiously.

At 11:30 DCI met with the President and Mr. Bundy. The discussion revolved around conditions in Cuba and the presentation to be made to the Executive Committee later in the afternoon.See Document 276. McCone repeated his concern about the situation in Cuba, also the danger of either threatening to halt or actually halting our U-2 reconnaissance. The President said that would bring a new confrontation and that as far as he was concerned would require action. McCone said he felt that both Rusk and McNamara did not share this determination. It was agreed that the DCI should make a public statement on the situation in Cuba, and the President ordered a statement prepared.See footnote 2, Document 276.

John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.Director
279. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretaries of the Army (Vance), Navy (Korth), and Air Force (Stahr)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Yarmolinsky Files, Cuban Volunteer Program. Confidential. Washington, February 8, 1963. SUBJECT Armed Forces Training Program for Members of the 2506 Cuban Brigade

The attached military training programAttached, but not printed. for members of the 2506 Cuban Brigade, is approved. The Secretary of the Army, as the Department of Defense Executive Agent for all aspects of Cuban policy, will direct implementation of this program by the Services. The military departments will be prepared to begin processing both enlisted and officer Brigade members by 25 February 1963.

It is recognized that adequate personnel standards must be maintained, but the objectives of this program must not be frustrated by unduly rigid adherence to current high induction standards. The age limit for induction of enlisted men of the 2506 Cuban Brigade for the attached program will be 18 through 34. The age limit for commissioning Brigade officers will be 21 through 45. Notwithstanding existing Service policies and regulations concerning temporary appointments of non-declarant aliens as commissioned officers, Brigade personnel who apply for officer training and who meet stated requirements will be commissioned in the Service of their choice as ensigns or second lieutenants.

After completion of training, Brigade members who desire to continue on active duty will be permitted to do so if they qualify and are selected. Enlisted trainees who, upon completion of their training, do not continue on active duty may be discharged or, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve. Officers who, upon completion of their training, do not continue on active duty will be released or, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve.

The Air Force will conduct all English language training provided for in the attached program.

The Army will induct Brigade members from age 35 through 50 who volunteer and meet appropriate qualifications for a special eight week military training program. Upon completion of this training program, such inductees, if they desire and are qualified, will become members of the standby Reserve.

The Miami Armed Forces Induction and Examining Station will provide for group processing of Brigade members and for their transportation to designated training centers.

Funding and manpower requirements resulting from implementation of the program will be absorbed by the military departments. Expenditures in connection with this program should be identified separately.

Robert S. McNamaraPrinted from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
280. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CUBA-US. Secret. Drafted by Gutherie and approved in S on February 18. The meeting took place in Rusk’s office and lasted approximately 45 minutes. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) Washington, February 9, 1963, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS The Secretary Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador John C. Guthrie, Director, SOV

The Secretary told the Ambassador that Cuba is still a troublesome problem. In his talk with Ambassador Dobrynin at lunch on February 8, Ambassador Kohler had referred to Cuba as something that was poisoning our relations.No other record found. This was an accurate statement. President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev understand that the United States has no desire or intention to invade Cuba. It was not possible, however, to make a wholly unqualified commitment concerning the future, as this depends on the attitude of the Cuban Government. If Cuba wishes to live in peace then there will be peace in the Caribbean. However, we were not encouraged by the way in which Castro has attempted since January to whip up violence in Latin America. Subversive activities in Venezuela and elsewhere make the future very uncertain. As for the Soviet presence in Cuba, the United States is concerned over the fact that the movement of Soviet forces out of Cuba has stopped while additional military equipment continues to enter the island. We had supposed that the troops connected with the operation and protection of the missiles which had been emplaced in Cuba would be removed. Evidently some Soviet troops had been sent there initially to protect these weapons but these troops were still there although the weapons had been removed. Training was clearly not the mission of these troops as there are few Cubans to be found where the Soviet forces are. The presence of these troops contributes to the heightened tensions in our relationship. Therefore, we hope that the Soviet Government will find it possible to reduce tensions by making it clear there is no Soviet military build-up in Cuba and that there is an intent to further reduce the number of Soviet forces there, as Khrushchev had indicated would be the case. The Secretary had noted a press report of a conversation which Khrushchev had had with a Canadian businessman in which Khrushchev had stated all the Soviet troops in Cuba were on a training mission. Clearly, the Secretary said, not all of them are there for this purpose.

The Secretary went on to say that the President has a serious problem over Cuba. Last August and September he had tried to calm down the American people on this issue. However, the events of September and October were not only serious in themselves but had reduced the President’s credibility in the eyes of his own people. Now, it was not so easy for the President to reassure the country over Cuba. The American people remember what Senator Keating had said last August and what the President had said and Keating’s speculation had turned out to be correct. This situation makes it very difficult for the President to calm the atmosphere in the United States. We hope, therefore, that steps will be taken in Cuba to make it clear that Cuba is not being prepared as a base for adventure in the rest of the hemisphere. We do not agree that a Soviet military presence in this hemisphere is a normal situation. The Cuban question is clearly poisoning United States-Soviet relations and we strongly urge the Soviet Government to do what it can to reduce this complication.

Ambassador Dobrynin replied that he assumed the Secretary’s reference to Castro’s activities since January referred to Castro’s speech of January 2. It should be remembered that many things were being said in the United States. Castro’s speech was a point by point reply to statements made by the President. The President had just told the Bay of Pigs prisoners that their banner would again fly in Cuba. The Ambassador asked the Secretary to consider how Castro regards threats from the United States. He also noted that the Cuban Government was very unhappy with the result of the United States-Soviet negotiations on Cuba. The Ambassador said that he could not believe the United States fears Cuba and that the Cubans have a rather natural resentment against the large country only 90 miles from their shores. While he personally believed the President’s pledge not to invade Cuba, the Cubans did not believe it. The Secretary replied that we do not of course fear Cuba but that we do link Castro’s speeches with subversive activities in other countries. He told the Ambassador he would give him more precise information subsequently about Cuban subversive activities.

The Ambassador asked whether the Secretary was seeking some clarification regarding the status of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and reiterated that we were looking for some outward movement of Soviet forces now there. The Ambassador promised to report this conversation to his government.On February 18 Dobrynin handed Rusk an aide-memoire stating that the Soviet Union had decided to withdraw from Cuba “Soviet personnel connected with the protection of the types of weapons withdrawn from Cuba and likewise some of the military specialists involved in training Cuban troops. It is intended to recall from Cuba in the nearest future—before the middle of March—several thousand men.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 1/63-3/63) See the Supplement.

281. Message From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret. According to an attached covering letter from Carter to Rusk, February 13, McCone (who was in Europe) sent this message to Acting Director Marshall S. Carter, asking that he give a copy to Rusk, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and the members of the USIB. Carter assured the addressees that the Deputy Director (Intelligence) and the Office of National Estimates were at work evaluating the matters raised by McCone. Washington, February 13, 1963. I am growing increasingly concerned over Soviet intentions in Cuba. The agent report of deep verticle wells, three to four meters in diameter in Pinar del Rio is not satisfactorily answered by negative surface indications or the absence of spoils as quantities of earth involved could be trucked away and hidden from view and other signs of workings could be easily camouflaged. I therefore feel we cannot dismiss this possibility on the basis of negative photographic interpretation and analysis. Several recent events contribute to my growing concern over the possibility of reintroduction of an offensive capability in Cuba and I wish the entire Intelligence Community to intensify efforts to satisfactorily answer this question. In addition to reports mentioned, the receipt of two shiploads of unexplained military cargo and the precipitous discharging of the cargos by military personnel, together with news of a possible third cargo, is to me an ominous sign. In addition Khrushchev’s false and absolutely misleading statement that his technicians were in Cuba to train Cubans is inconsistent with the facts as were his and Dobrynin’s statements prior to the October crisis. Furthermore, the disarmament proposals by the Soviets in Geneva yesterday were so obviously unacceptable to the West (as they have been on numerous occasions during the past ten years) that I believe they were stated as a justification for a Soviet offensive weapons base in Cuba than for any other purpose. Certainly they were not advanced for the purpose of serious negotiation. In view of all of the above, I am inclined to the view that it is highly dangerous for the Intelligence Community or spokesmen for the Government to take a categoric position concerning the possible exist-ence or future clandestine development of an offensive threat and am inclined to place greater emphasis on my statement that this can only be proven by penetrating and continuing on-site inspection.
282. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Confidential. Washington, February 14, 1963. SUBJECT Isolation of Cuba

There seems to be very little doubt that Cuba has been substantially isolated from the Free World.

Only about 5 OAS countries maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba and all of the OAS countries, to a lesser or greater degree, regard Castro as a menace. Free World shipping to Cuba has fallen precipitously during recent months. There are about 1/2 as many Free World ships travelling to Cuba now as opposed to the period before the quarantine. Cuba’s trade with the Free World has dropped considerably over the past few years—trade with the Free World totaled about $1-1/2 million in 1958 as opposed to $200 million in 1962. Free World air services are extremely limited. At present only Mexico and Spain permit flights to Cuba.

This isolation has not come about accidentally. We have actively encouraged this isolation unilaterally (shipping restrictions), bilaterally (representations to certain countries trading with Cuba), and multilaterally (OAS).

If he can help it, I don’t think the President should play too hard this afternoonReference is to the President’s press conference, February 14, which included questions and answers on Cuba; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 172-180. on the great job we are doing by isolating Cuba; it may come back to haunt us. While a policy of isolation has some advantages (e.g. highlights the problem and sets the scene for more drastic action in the future) it is becoming quite clear that isolation from the Free World does not hurt Cuba in any real sense (e.g. total import levels remain the same). It may well be that at some future date we will find it in our interest to back off some of our formal and informal restrictions on contact between the Free World and Cuba. The real crux of the matter, of course, is to isolate Cuba from the Soviet Bloc.

I would much prefer to see the President steer away from the isolation issue and instead try to get across to the American people a sense of perspective in viewing the Cuban problem.

GC
283. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Top Secret. Washington, February 18, 1963. SUBJECT Report of a Possible Revolt in Cuba on February 20thThe Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared an assessment on February 18 of reports of a possible revolt. The assessment acknowledged the possibility of a small uprising in one or more parts of Cuba, but doubted the likelihood of a large-scale uprising. (Ibid.)

The discussion at State this afternoon brought out the following points regarding the possibility of a revolt in Cuba on February 20th.

Both State and CIA doubt the reliability of the report. CIA noted, however, that if such a thing were about to happen, the report of it would come in just this way. One of the tough questions—what size and type of revolt is worthwhile to support? Do you determine this by the number of people involved? The geographic area it covers? etc. The revolt should have a potential political appeal to a large cross section of Cuban people. For example, a revolt by a number of disgruntled farmers would not meet this criterion. There was some discussion of a possible outline of action. First, there could be a deniable airdrop of supplies by CIA while the U.S. military arm began to wind up. This could be followed by a limited airstrike within about twenty-four hours and a full island air-strike within seventy-two hours. It would take a maximum of eighteen days to mount a full invasion force. Between the full airstrike and the invasion, things could be going on—e.g. special forces dropped in Cuba. A diversionary action should be initiated quickly so that Castro cannot concentrate his forces on the insurgents, leaving us no one to liberate.

The presence of Russian troops, of course, presents a very sticky problem. One of the first targets would be the SAM sitesand inevitably Russians would be killed. The effect of this on Khrushchev would have to be weighed.

Perhaps we could tell Khrushchev what we are going to do and advise him to take all Russians off the SAM sites and move them to restricted areas. In this regard we could risk a flight or two over the SAM sites to test whether he has followed our advice.

If the prospects for the removal of the Russian troops in the near future look very good, we may want to dampen the revolt for now—broadcasts by Cuban exiles that Castro is setting a trap.

 The present Department of Defense off-the-cuff estimate of fighting in Cuba is that there would be four or five days of heavy fighting and another thirty days of less severe fighting. There might or might not be prolonged guerrilla activity. If the campaign is short and sweet, there probably will be less guerrilla fighting afterwards. It was noted that the invasion would violate the Havana Treaty (can respond to calls for help only by recognized governments).The Havana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife, signed at Havana on February 28, 1928; see 46 Stat. (Pt. 2) 2749.

Sterling Cottrell is zeroed in on this and hopes to have something over here between noon and 1:00 PM on Tuesday.On Tuesday, February 19, Brubeck sent Bundy a memorandum on the reports of the uprising and an attached “Alternative Course of Action in the Event the Reported Large-scale Uprising Occurs.” The plan of action envisioned recognition of and assistance to the insurgents including air strikes, unconventional warfare, and an invasion of Cuba by U.S. forces. The plan recommended no action until the uprising occurred and there was a call for help from the insurgents. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63)

GC
284. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Control. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In a covering memorandum Bundy asked for any corrections or additions. A handwritten note on the cover memorandum indicated that Rusk said it was “O.K. with him,” and Bundy’s office was informed. Washington, February 19, 1963.

As a result of a discussion on Monday, February 18th, from 5:30 to 7:30, a consensus emerged among the four of us on the following guidelines for discussion of various aspects of the Cuban problem, both in public and in Executive Session.

1. The invasion of April 1961 and its aftermath

It was agreed that only those who had had an active part in the April invasion would discuss it before Congressional committees. With respect to the prisoners of that operation and their exchange, all questions would be referred to Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach or Mr. Robert Hurwitch, who would be made available to testify to any appropriate committee. Questions relating to the future of the released prisoners would be referred to Mr. Cottrell of the Cuban Coordinating Committee.

2. Intelligence collection and evaluation in September and October 1962 It was agreed that the first responsibility in discussion of this subject belonged to the Director of Central Intelligence. With respect to statements made by Administration officials in September and October, it was our expectation that these statements would turn out to be consistent with the agreed estimates of the intelligence community at the time, except where an individual might have signalled a personal view as being at variance with the estimates. (The only individual known to me who may have done this is Mr. McCone himself.) It was agreed that CIA would prepare, in consultation with State and Defense, a full record of these estimates which could then be submitted in whatever way seemed most effective to deal with charges against such witnesses as Mr. George Ball and Mr. W.P. Bundy. It was agreed that all witnesses should explain that unverified refugee and agent reports were not normally forwarded to high policy officers and that before the 15th of October the prevailing intelligence judgment was that there was not credible evidence of offensive missiles in Cuba. (This is the conclusion of the DCI’s coordinated report to the President’s Board, pp. 47-48.)Apparent reference to the Killian Report. There were reports of sufficient interest to lead to targeting of the overflight of October 14th, but no reports which led to changes in the estimates of any intelligence agency as reported to the President’s senior advisers. With respect to overflight policy, we agreed that all flights requested of the President were authorized by him; all priorities set by the USIB were accepted; only one low-level flight was proposed by a senior intelligence officer, and this one (for overflight of Banes) was held up until appropriate efforts had been made by a high-level flight. The absence of this low-level flight did not prevent positive identification of the Banes site in intelligence publications of September 17th. It was agreed that refugee reports proved useful, but that they were not adequate for positive identification without photographic confirmation. We also agreed that Senator Keating was not in fact way ahead of the Government with respect to offensive weapons. His first assertion that there were missile bases in Cuba came on October 10th. By that time, the President had already authorized the flight of October 14, which was targeted for the verification or disproof of raw reports of the sort upon which Senator Keating appears to have relied. The Senator took a chance on unverified information. The Executive Branch made arrangements to check it in the most effective possible way. We need not feel defensive over having chosen this course of action. With respect to “management of news,” the fact is that there was no special control over the dissemination of verified information except between October 15th and October 22nd. There were justified limitations upon widespread dissemination of unverified information. There were also, by some Administration spokesmen, too energetic assertions that because we did not have credible evidence of Soviet personnel and weapons beyond those in the agreed estimates, no such personnel or weapons were in fact in Cuba. This was to assert a negative which in the nature of things could not be certain, and we should accept the fact that some overstatements were made. We agreed that, on balance, and judged by the result, a basically creditable job was done on the intelligence front. Effective and timely reports were produced on all weapons systems before they became operational. That very sensitive intelligence weapon, the U-2, was used without public clamor and with decisive effect. A denied area was penetrated accurately and in time. We also agreed that in retrospect there were discernible weaknesses in this process: as, for example, that the estimates took too little account of the possibility of a dangerous new departure in Soviet policy; that there was a lack of all-out energy in framing and presenting intelligence requirements; that delays in executing approved reconnaissance missions were not reported upward, or monitored downward; and that dissenting recommendations were not carried to the President. Remedial action on all these matters is in hand under the Director of Central Intelligence, who himself accurately anticipated the Soviet move.

3. The present situation The military position. We hoped that our current estimates could be ironed out closely between CIA and Defense, especially on the following points: That the agreed number of missiles and bombers did leave and that our inspection at sea was convincing. That our policy on surveillance is to conduct steady high-level overflight and to use low-level flights when it is agreed in particular cases that they are necessary. That our estimates on MIGs, submarine bases and FROGS are what they are, and that any apparent discrepancies are due to personal opinion or differences in methods of statement not to disagree to estimates. There is an important distinction between offensive weapons and defensive weapons—a distinction which was first made by the President in September—although many spokesmen have correctly pointed out that one must be careful about making this distinction too hard and fast. Subversion. It was agreed that the State Department would take the lead in stating our view of policy toward subversion toward Cuba, and Mr. Edwin Martin has agreed to circulate to all concerned his authoritative statement on the subject delivered to the Latin American Sub-Committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 18, 1963.

4. General assessment and policy

It was agreed that insofar as possible, we would all be guided by authoritative Presidential statements on these matters, and I shall circulate later today a set of the relevant Presidential statements since November 20, when the President first made an authoritative summary of the U.S. position as it stood after the October crisis.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
285. Editorial Note

On February 21, 1963, the U.S. Intelligence Board considered and approved a report of the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance recommending that high-level photography of activities related to impending movement of Soviet personnel and equipment in Cuba be supplemented by low-level photography and night photography. Low-level photography would target Soviet ships in Cuban ports and unidentified installations. (Memorandum to the U.S. Intelligence Board from James S. Lay, February 21; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb. thru April, 1963) For text of the memorandum and the attached report, see the Supplement.

Also on February 21 the Central Intelligence Agency submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board a special estimate, SNIE 85-2-63, “Reactions to U.S. Low-Level Overflights of Cuba.” The estimate concluded that Soviet and Cuban forces would refrain from hostile action against three or four low-level missions per week for 2 weeks. Should the flights continue without interruption or increase, Castro would press the Soviet Union for military counteraction. The Soviet Union would temporize, seeking a political or propaganda campaign against the flights. The Soviet Union might pass private warnings to the United States and initiate diplomatic negotiations to end them. Faced with continued flights and Soviet refusal to act, the estimate suggested that Castro would probably take unilateral action against low-level reconnaissance planes. The Special Estimate did not predict at what point Castro would attempt to act. (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry) For text of SNIE 85-2-63, see the Supplement.

286. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy, Tyler, and Hillenbrand. Washington, February 21, 1963. SUBJECT Visit of Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR

The Soviet Ambassador came to see me at 6:00 p.m., Wednesday, February twentieth, and informed me with reference to the statement which we propose to make in regard to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from CubaThe text of the proposed U.S. statement, given by Thompson to Dobrynin on February 19, reads: “Following discussion with the Government of USSR and in accordance with assurances received from Chairman Khrushchev in November, U.S. Government has been informed by Soviet Government that several thousand Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba before middle of March. This government understands that passenger ships are en route to Cuba for that purpose. U.S. Government considers this action by Soviet Government useful step in reduction of international tensions.” (Telegram 1755 to Moscow, February 19; Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR) that the Soviet Government proposed a substitution of the following sentence for the first sentence in our draft statement:

“The Soviet Government has informed the United States Government of its intention to withdraw from Cuba by the middle of March several thousand Soviet military personnel having to do with guarding the kinds of weapons which were removed from Cuba and also some of the military specialists who were occupied in training Cuban military cadres.”

I inquired whether he thought his Government would object to our keeping in a reference to the fact that there had been discussions between us on this subject. He said he was not authorized to agree to any change and understood that if we accepted the proposed Soviet draft, Moscow would not feel obliged to make any statement. If this were not the case, his Government would probably make a statement of its own in which it would set forth its position. I said it did not seem to be either in their interest or ours for it to appear that the Soviet withdrawal was a result of all the noise that had been going on recently about this matter and wondered if he thought there would be any objection to the President making the statement as proposed by the Soviet Government but, in reply to questions at his press conference, making reference to the discussions which we had had.For text of the President’s news conference on February 21, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 206-207. The Ambassador was reluctant to commit himself, but indicated he thought this would be all right.

The Ambassador then read me the following oral statement:

“The Soviet Government cannot disregard the fact that during recent days there has taken place in the USA a real rush and devils sabbath in connection with the question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. In this connection statements are made, one more reckless than the next. Some permit themselves even to resort to threats against the Soviet Union. It stands to reason this will in no sense contribute to a clearing of the international atmosphere and to an improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. If all this continues and if the necessary restraint is not shown, then naturally, this will require the other side to state its attitude toward such a kind of performance in the USA and give the necessary rebuff to unbridled and irresponsible people who, raising a provocational racket in connection with the question of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, are obviously trying to exert pressure on the Soviet Union.

“These persons are deeply mistaken if they think that anything is permitted to them and that there are no forces which could withstand them. They clearly fail to take into account that other countries, in this case the Soviet Union, have the possibility of putting such people in their places, if they themselves don’t know how to put themselves in their places and come to reason.

“In Moscow they wish to express the hope that the noisy and unbalanced chorus of voices hostile to the Soviet Union, which are still giving forth today, will give place to a more reasonable approach to the matter, which would meet both the interests of repairing Soviet-American relations and the interests of lessening international tension.”

I pointed out that the position of my Government on the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba was well known and I saw no need to repeat it. So far as statements by others were concerned, he was, of course, aware that we did not control nor inspire such statements. The Ambassador said he understood and that his Government had similar problems.

287. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II (Thompson). Secret. Washington, February 25, 1963. SUBJECT Aide-memoire of February 25, 1963The aide-memoire stated that the United States would appreciate further information concerning arrangements for withdrawal of troops from Cuba, and expressed the view that comprehensive information on this matter was in the interests of both sides. (Ibid.) PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

The Soviet Ambassador telephoned me about 10:00 this morning to say that he could not transmit to Moscow the attached memorandum which was handed to the Soviet Counselor by Mr. Guthrie on February twenty-third. He pointed out that the memorandum implied an agreement which did not exist. I inquired if it would be satisfactory if we left out any reference to the conversation I had had with the Ambassador.

Apparent reference to a February 21 Dobrynin-Thompson conversation; the memorandum of the conversation by Thompson reads:

“At the White House reception last night, I had just started talking to the Soviet Ambassador when the President walked up. In the course of the conversation, I said I had just been on the point of suggesting to the Ambassador that it would be in our mutual interest for them to arrange a boat drill on the vessel taking Soviet troops out of Cuba in order that we could get some good pictures.

“The Ambassador replied that he did not think we would have any difficulty whatever getting good pictures by the same methods we had used when the missiles were removed.” (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb-April 1963)

He replied that, speaking personally, he thought this would be considered in Moscow as a kind of ultimatum since the Soviet Government would have to either accept our proposed procedures or protest them. He said if we wished to propose an agreement with the Soviet Government on this subject, he would, of course, transmit our proposal, but he could not transmit the memorandum.

After discussion with the Secretary, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Bundy, who discussed the matter with Secretary McNamara by telephone, and after clearance with the President, at 1:00 p.m. today I handed the Soviet Ambassador the aide-memoire of February twenty-fifth on this subject.

After reading the aide-memoire, the Ambassador inquired what kind of information we were seeking. I replied that it would be helpful to know the names and times of departure of the ships involved, and added that if the Soviet Government could do so, I thought it would be most helpful to be informed of the numbers and types of troops involved. The Ambassador inquired whether it was intended that this information be made public. I replied that I did not think we would need to make public the fact that we might be informed of the names and departures of the ships, but that if they could give us the numbers of troops, it would be to our mutual interest that we be allowed to make this information public. I pointed out that our whole thought in this operation was that it was in our mutual interest that the public be convinced that the useful action being taken by the Soviet Government be convincingly confirmed.

Attachment Washington, February 23, 1963.

With reference to Ambassador Thompson’s discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, February 21, the United States Government wishes to inform the Soviet Government that the United States will photograph outbound special interest passenger ships from Cuba during daylight and that aircraft and/or ships approaching for photographic coverage will: Approach from the stern on a parallel course. Take station well clear on either beam. Fixed wing aircraft will dip wings: ships sound four or more blasts on the whistle, helos no special signal required.

This information is being provided in order that it will be understood by both the U.S. ship/aircraft and Soviet passenger ships involved as An intention to approach closer without hostile intent. An intent to overfly or close for photographic purposes. Provision of opportunity for the Soviet ship to have its embarked troops on topside, and An understanding that both are to come up on 500 kcs for radio communication should such be required.

288. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 2/63. Secret. Also sent to McNamara and McCone. In an attached personal memorandum to the same three men, Bundy stated that in light of their comments, he had decided not to attempt a resume of guidelines for Congressional testimony as it would be subject to misunderstanding. Washington, February 25, 1963.

In a follow-up to our discussion of last week,Document 284. I am circulating herewith certain documents which I think may be helpful to all who are called upon to discuss the problem of Cuba either in Executive Session or in public. These documents are:

First, a compendium of the President’s own principal comments on Cuban affairs.Attached but not printed. The President’s statements obviously represent the position and policy of the Executive Branch, and witnesses undertaking to explain the position of the Executive Branch on policy matters should be guided by these statements.

The second major document enclosed is a report prepared under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence with respect to intelligence on Cuba before and during the October crisis.Apparent reference to a memorandum dated and distributed on February 27. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis—Miscellaneous) See the Supplement. This account represents a coordinated report, and witnesses undertaking to discuss the matter will wish to be familiar with it. Since the subject is highly classified, it is assumed that witnesses without appropriate clearance will be cautious in commenting on it, and that witnesses who are more fully informed will take appropriate precautions as to the character of hearings in which they discuss it. Discussion of any possible modifications in our intelligence procedures growing out of this experience should be avoided by any witnesses not having direct responsibility.

Finally, I am circulating copies of a public statement presented by Assistant Secretary Martin on February 18.Printed in the Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1962, pp. 347-356 and March 18, 1963, pp. 404-412. This statement is an unusually clear and comprehensive account of the problem of subversion, and witnesses called to testify on this subject will wish to be familiar with the official position presented by the Department of State.

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
289. Memorandum for the RecordSource: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-257-69. Top Secret. Drafted by Taylor on March 1. CM-351-63 Washington, February 28, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on 28 February 1963

All the Chiefs were present at the above meeting which lasted from 5:30 p.m. to 6:45 p.m. The following subjects were the principal topics of discussion.

a. The Cuba Invasion Plan.

The Chiefs discussed the time-space factors in the implementation of CINCLANT Operation Plan 312 and 316 using the chart attached as Annex 1.Not printed. The President was shown why it would take approximately 18 days from decision to D-Day from present troop and ship dispositions. In order to reduce this time to something like 7 days, considerable prepositioning would be required in order to get Army/Marine units to the East Coast and to assemble the necessary cargo shipping. The Chiefs expressed the view that it was unlikely that a period of tension would not precede a decision to invade Cuba which would allow ample time for preparatory measures; hence, it was undesirable to make permanent changes of station of Army and Marine units which would upset the present disposition of strategic reserve forces. The President expressed particular interest in the possibility of getting some troops quickly into Cuba in the event of a general uprising. He was told that only the airborne troops could arrive with little delay, that the first Marine elements would require about 7 days before landing. He asked the Chiefs to develop specific plans in anticipation of the need for this kind of quick reaction.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

f. Rules of Engagement. The President referred to the rules of engagement transmitted by the JCS to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD (number 8756 dated 22 Feb 63).Not found. After some discussion with the Chiefs, he directed that the phrase on hot pursuit contained in line 11 of sub-paragraph 1a be changed from “into Cuban air space” to “to Cuban air space.” Following the meeting the Chairman transmitted this decision to the Director, Joint Staff for transmission to the field.In JCS telegram 8874 to CINCLANT, CINCARIB, CINCSAC, and CINCONAD, February 28. (Department of Defense, Historical Office, Secretary of Defense’s Cable File, Cuba, 1963)

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Maxwell D. TaylorChairmanJoint Chiefs of Staff
290. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Clifton Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. II. 2/28/63-9/9/63. Top Secret. Washington, February 28, 1963.

On Rules of Engagement, the President made it very clear in the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff today, and the Chiefs agreed, that they should amend the present Rules, which were approved in November, 1960. The President also made it very clear that according to the present Rules, in the case of an incident where we are attacked, etc., we can chase them to the Cuban airspace and not into it. These Rules will prevail until another incident arises. But the President feels that we must have a chance to decide in Washington whether or not this has been a political decision of Castro’s government before we risk one of our aircraft flying clear into Cuban airspace and being shot down by one of their SAM outfits. He would hate to have this sequence of events occur without having a chance to evaluate the situation.

C.V. CliftonPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
291. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone. Washington, March 4, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting with The President—4:30 p.m.—4 March 1963

The President stated he felt that an attempt was being made to drive a division within the Administration, most particularly between CIA on the one hand and State and Defense on the other. This he said worried him and he hoped we could avoid any statements on the Hill, publicly or to the Press, which would exacerbate the situation.

I replied that I felt there was no reason for all the furor and that I had prepared a background memorandumReference is to McCone’s memorandum of February 27; see the Supplement. which, if used, would correctly project what had happened, all of which was understandable, and avoid the situation that worried him. I then pointed out that I well understood the problems within CIA as they felt that throughout September they had operated under an inhibiting policy and, knowing this from innumerable discussions with high authorities, had recommended only most limited overflights in September as they felt, and I feel correctly felt, that recommendations for a more aggressive program would undoubtedly have been refused to them. Nevertheless I felt the situation was adequately covered in my memorandum (referring to memorandum of 27 February, “U-2 Overflights of Cuba…”)

In a March 6 memorandum to McCone, U. Alexis Johnson stated that the Department of State reviewed his memorandum of February 27, “U-2 Overflights of Cuba, 29 August through 14 October, 1962.”Johnson suggested that the memorandum be revised to exclude the descriptions of positions taken by various individuals and institutions. Johnson reasoned that if the U.S. Government was to “maintain that degree of frankness and freedom to state views out of which sound decisions can be reached, particularly on sensitive intelligence matters, it seems to me that we should seek to preserve the anonymity of our advice and deliberations.”Johnson recommended that the memorandum be changed to a factual account of events. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. IV) See the Supplement.

McCone responded in a March 7 memorandum to Johnson that it would not be possible to make the changes suggested by the Department of State as he had already distributed it to members of the USIB, most of whom had already testified before Congress. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 64 D 438, Cuban Missile Crisis, Miscellaneous) See the Supplement.

and, while the Sunday morning quarterbacks could possibly criticize failure to adopt a more aggressive program in September, it was my opinion that any photography prior to October 16 and 17 would not produce the type of evidence necessary for Executive action, particularly when OAS, British, German and French support was essential.

I then said there was considerable distress within CIA over their failure to act on my telegrams and I read to the President excerpts from several of the September telegrams. He expressed surprise that they were as firm, perceptive and detailed as they were and said, “You certainly had the situation sized up, but I was one of those who did not think the Soviets would put missiles in Cuba.” He recognized that there was bound to be something of an internal problem but felt that we should minimize it and should not permit it to get into an interdepartmental row. I assured him this would not happen.

We then spoke of the decoration of the four lost fliers.U.S. employees killed during the Bay of Pigs invasion. He said he would mention it at his Press conference, but seemed to favor withholding decorations for about two months. However, he favored ultimately giving the decorations posthumously.

The President queried me concerning the number of CIA people who had been killed or imprisoned in our operations and I said I would supply him with this information.

In summary the purpose of his asking me to call was to try to avoid a split within his organization and I assured him that I did not think one was necessary. However, I did point out that it was necessary for everyone to recognize and to understand that extreme caution was used through September in considering U-2 operations over Cuba.

292. Summary Record of the 509th National Security Council MeetingSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, No. 509. Top Secret. Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:30 p.m. SUBJECT Latin American PolicyOn March 11 McGeorge Bundy sent the members of the National Security Council a memorandum explaining that the President was calling the meeting to have a “broader exchange of views” on Latin American and European policy. Bundy also submitted talking points used by Secretary Rusk in a recent talk to the Cabinet, dated February 28, which noted that while it was not a formal State paper, it was a “responsible statement of the main lines of our present courses.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement. PRESENT President, Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Dillon, Attorney General, General Taylor, Director McCone, Secretary Vance, Under Secretary Ball, Ambassador Stevenson, Administrator Bell, Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Director Murrow, Director McDermott, U. Alexis Johnson, Assistant Secretary Martin, Assistant Secretary Tyler, Paul Nitze, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Dungan, Mr. Kaysen, General Clifton, Mr. Bromley Smith

The President opened the meeting by asking Director McCone for a summary of current intelligence on Cuba, as well as a summary of his recent experience on the Hill with Congressional Committees.

Mr. McCone reported that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Cuba; that between 1700 and 2000 had already left, more were probably leaving, but we had no knowledge of how many thousands would actually depart. Because there appears to be no movement of major items of military equipment, we do not know whether the Soviet troop withdrawal to date has actually affected the Soviet military capability in Cuba.

With respect to U.S. prisoners in Cuba, Mr. McCone reported that Mr. Donovan would be in Havana this week where he expects to arrange for the release of all U.S. prisoners without more conditions. Mr. McCone said we have held off flying low-level reconnaissance missions until the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba. He hoped we could fly low-level missions just as soon as the prisoners were out.

Director McCone reported that the Stennis Congressional Committee will make a favorable report.The Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, Senator John Stennis, Chairman, released a sanitized version of its report to Congress on May 9. The report concluded that while the Central Intelligence Agency and other intelligence organizations made mistakes in some areas, U.S. intelligence “performed creditably” in other areas. The report discounted the idea of an “intelligence gap” between September 5 and October 14, 1962, but expressed concern that all Soviet strategic bombers and missiles might not have been removed and that there was a minimum of 17,500 Soviet troops remaining in Cuba. (Congressional Quaterly Almanac, Vol. XIX, 1963, p. 316) All members appear to be satisfied with the performance of the Intelligence Community and their public report will cite no intelligence gap to be criticized. Mr. McCone said the Congressional group pressed very hard with respect to future policy toward Cuba and Latin America. He said he told the group policy was beyond his competence, but on being pressed he told them there was a Cuba problem and a separate Latin American problem. He said he favored taking positive steps to prevent any other country from falling to Communism. As regards Cuba, he said first we must get the Soviets out and, after that, the Castro government can be broken up by a military coup favorable to the U.S. Mr. McCone said he favored a military uprising rather than a civil uprising. He concluded by predicting that the investigation of past actions in Cuba was about finished on the Hill.

The President indicated the Soviets may be pulling away from a Cuba withdrawal and apparently are not taking out the four armored groups now there. Secretary Rusk said that if the armored groups do not come out, we can go back to the Russians and remind them that these groups, which were used to protect the missiles, should come out as part of the commitment to remove missile-associated forces.

The President referred to a State cable which reported that Khrushchev is saying that we are moving away from our no-invasion pledge.Telegram 2241 from Moscow, March 12. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR) See the Supplement. This may explain why Khrushchev is hesitant to pull out his troops. He asked that we raise this subject with Khrushchev within the week.See Document 293.

The President asked whether we are doing all we can to isolate Cuba. He cited (a) free world trade with Cuba, (b) embargo of allied shipping, and (c) the movement of students and subversives into and out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk indicated that we are keeping the pressure on, but acknowledged that unless the British take immediate action, we would have to raise with them the question of U.K. ships in Cuba trade. Assist-ant Secretary Martin called attention to the pressure which he had put on the NATO members during a recent trip to Paris.

The President asked for a report on current shipping restrictions and on what actions we would take as soon as the U.S. prisoners were out of Cuba.

Secretary Rusk commented that he did not believe it would be useful to demand the withdrawal of all Latin American missions from Havana. He said we had been working bilaterally on the Bolivians and the Uruguayans with a view to prompting them to break relations. Afterwards, we would suggest that Chile might break relations. [1½ lines of source text not declassified]

The President, referring to his forthcoming trip to Costa Rica,Reference is to the President’s trip for meetings with the Presidents of Central America, March 18-20. wanted to be certain that we avoided the impression that we want to go further on Cuba than we actually do. He was concerned that the Nicaraguans and the Guatemalans would want to take more forceful action than we are now prepared to take. He asked that we make certain that the other countries were aware of this problem prior to the opening of the Costa Rica meeting.

Secretary Rusk commented that he believed that there was a real falloff in Congressional demands for the invasion of Cuba. He felt that in the last ten days the demands for military action had been decreasing substantially.

The President commented on the problem of persons going to and from Cuba. He said we have little hard evidence on who was moving and he referred to the use by Time magazine of the word “flood” to describe persons going to Cuba.

Mr. McCone indicated that he had told Mr. Luce that the use by Time of the word “flood,” to describe the number of persons going to Cuba, was wrong. The President said he had also told Mr. Luce that the use of the word “flood” by Time’s staff was an excellent illustration of how Time overstated situations. There resulted a humorous exchange to the effect that the President was delighted that Mr. McCone supported him in telling Mr. Luce that the word “flood” was wrong and leading the President to suggest that we should have meetings more often to be sure we were taking the same line.

Mr. Martin said that on the basis of the evidence we had, the number of trainees in Cuba has dropped off since last October.

In this connection, the President asked how we could sort out the students who come back from Cuba. Some become obviously activists in the Communist movement, but not all. He asked for further information on this subject.

[Here follows discussion of Haiti, economic development in Latin America, and independence for British Guiana.]

Mr. Murrow reported that we are getting our message through to the Cubans by radio even though some of our programs are being jammed. He said the missing ingredient in our message to the Cubans is hope. He believes we must present long-range plans on the future Cuba after Communism. Now, he said that we are unable to talk about the promise of the future.

In response to the President’s question as to whether or not we had a speech on what we hope for the future of Cuba, Mr. Martin referred to the comments made to the Brigade in Miami.See footnote 2, Document 260. The President thought something should be put in the communique at Costa Rica, but he was doubtful that we could develop an agreed future program because of splits among the Cuban exiles.

Secretary Rusk wanted to be certain that we do not create false hopes. Mr. Murrow felt we are entitled to issue some promissory notes.

The President said he doubted that we could do better than to try to get a statement from the Cubans of what they want.

Mr. Murrow said what was required was a U.S. government statement. Secretary Rusk said we did not want to do anything which would get in the way of the movement of Soviet troops out of Cuba. Mr. Bundy expressed his doubts as to whether actions we take now affect the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Under Secretary Ball thought we should involve the OAS in the work of developing plans for Cuba of the future. Mr. Martin agreed and said he would discuss it with the OAS members.

The President commented on the continuing pressure which he thought we would get from the Hill when it became clear that not all the Soviet troops were leaving Cuba. He said we should protect ourselves as best we can with the shipping policy, the trade matters, and the movement of persons, with the overall purpose of increasing the isolation of Cuba.

The President suggested that the group meet every week. He postponed discussion of the European policy until his return from Costa Rica. [Here follows discussion of unrelated matters.]

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
293. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet UnionSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson; cleared with Ball, Martin, and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by Rusk and Johnson. Washington, March 13, 1963, 4:24 p.m.

1933. Eyes only for Ambassador. With reference Khrushchev’s statements to Trevelyan on US commitments with respect to Cuba reported Embtel 2241,See footnote 3, Document 292. President desires that you take advantage of suitable opportunity to point out to Khrushchev that the President’s position has been entirely consistent on this matter and that the President is concerned that Khrushchev should feel there has been any change. The President clearly set forth our policy in his November 20 press conference, which stated inter alia “as for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. As I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this Hemisphere.’”

As the President said in his message of November 21, he regretted that Chairman Khrushchev had not been able to persuade Mr. Castro to accept a suitable form of inspection or verification in Cuba, “and that, in consequence, we must continue to rely upon our own means of information. But, as I said yesterday (referring to his November 20 press conference), there need be no fear of any invasion of Cuba while matters take their present favorable course.”

As the President has subsequently been very careful not to depart from the position taken in his press conference of November 20, he finds it difficult to understand how Chairman Khrushchev could believe that he is now in any way departing from his previous policy, with which Khrushchev had expressed understanding, as noted in the President’s letter of December 14.

In your discretion and in manner you consider most appropriate, you should reiterate to Khrushchev that, in view of history this affair and in absence other means of verification contemplated in original undertaking embodied in President’s letter of October 27 and Chairman Khrushchev’s letter of October 28,Documents 95 and 102. we must continue to rely upon our own means of information and any interference with our ability to obtain such information would bring about a most serious situation.

Chairman Khrushchev should also understand that Castro’s belligerent attitude toward the other states of Latin America creates a most difficult situation for the President. Castro’s threats toward such forward-looking and progressive leaders as Betancourt, in Venezuela (as well as others), followed by terrorist attacks, sabotage and bombing by terrorists within Venezuela who are publicly supported by Castro, make it difficult to believe that Castro desires to live in peace with his neighbors. The President hopes that Chairman Khrushchev continues to share the President’s desire to reduce tensions in the Caribbean area and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end.In telegram 1950 to Moscow, March 14, the Secretary told Kohler that the last paragraph of this telegram was not intended to imply that the President “has any intention of invading Cuba under present circumstance, or otherwise modify the statement of policy set forth in the first three paragraphs.”Rusk noted that Kohler would understand that the President “cannot make to Soviets any open-ended commitment which would amend or detract from our treaty obligations in this Hemisphere.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR)

Rusk
294. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-USSR. Secret; Priority. Moscow, March 16, 1963, 8 p.m.

2315. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950.See Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto. My meeting at noon today with Kuznetsov (Embtel 2311)Telegram 2311, March 16, informed the Department that as Khrushchev was on vacation, Kohler was meeting Kuznetsov at noon, March 16. (Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR) lasted forty-five minutes.

I made oral statement to him as instructed Deptel 1933, prefacing it with sentences: “The President has been disturbed to learn of Chairman Khrushchev’s remarks with regard to the President’s position on Cuba. I have been instructed to inform you of the following in this regard, and to ask you to transmit it to Chairman Khrushchev.” (I discussed with British Minister-Counselor Barker March 15 problems involved in referring to statement made by Khrushchev to British Ambassador Trevelyan, who absent from Moscow for few days visiting Leningrad. Barker saw no particular difficulty. In view of precise manner in which it was necessary to cite Trevelyan as source for Khrushchev’s remarks, Department may wish consider providing FonOff with suitable fill-in.)

Following translation, Kuznetsov responded he should first of all say that he was very surprised by such a statement. With regard to SovGovt position on this question, it had been set forth with sufficient clarity several times, by Khrushchev in period both before and after crisis and in series of documents, as well as in discussions in New York that lasted almost two and half months. Kuznetsov was now wondering why USG was making such statement at this time. It was incomprehensible to him.

He continued, SovGovt has stated its views with regard to President’s statement in his November 20 press conference and with regard to questions he had raised there. Basic documents in this matter were letters exchanged by Khrushchev and President October 27 and 28, which contained obligations of two sides. With regard President’s November 20 statement, SovGovt could not accept it in full. He wished to recall to me that SovGovt had not agreed with claim of USG that it had assumed right to conduct flights over territory of another state. By virtue of this claim, USG was disregarding sovereign right of Cuba and was assuming policy “from position of strength” towards Cuba. This was dangerous policy.

My raising question of so-called on-site inspection evoked very great perplexity. Why was it being raised again? If legal side of matter were considered, Khrushchev’s letter of October 27 said that such inspection could be conducted if Cuban Govt agreed. Moreover, SovGovt, with agreement Cuban, had given US authorities opportunity to verify withdrawal of weapons, to photograph and count them. It seemed at time that American side was satisfied. With regard to question of future inspection, he wished to remind me of Thant proposals and others for UN presence in Caribbean, which would have involved inspections in Cuba and US on terms of equality. USG had refused to consider, let alone accept, these proposals and must bear responsibility for their non-adoption. Making such statement now to SovGovt evokes great lack of understanding.

In President’s November 20 press conference, he made statements of arbitrary character, saying USG could conduct inspections it wished to. This did not correspond to obligations assumed on October 27-28. It contained many arbitrary elements and many “ifs.” President said USG could decide unilaterally whether Cuba was danger to US and other Western Hemisphere states.

Now representatives of USG are saying that Cuba by its very exist-ence constitutes danger to US. USG officials and US intelligence even fabricated data to show Cuba has been conducting subversive acts.

If such questions exist, USG should talk to Cuban Govt.

Kuznetsov said he must resolutely reject effort to raise this now with SovGovt and attempt to engage it in discussion of question of events in Venezuela. USG always tried to explain such events by talking about “hand of Moscow”, “Communist plots”, and so forth, but all that is simply invented. Those who invent such things know they do not correspond to reality. Trouble is USG does not want to let Cuban people decide on their own way of life.

If US thinks it suffers from existence of Cuban regime, why shouldn’t USG meet with Cuban representatives and discuss these questions in effort to find solutions to them. Cuban representatives, including Premier and President, have expressed their willingness to discuss these questions.

Provisionally, Kuznetsov said, he decidedly rejected assumption contained in statement to effect that SovGovt should discuss matters relevant to Cuban Govt as though it had taken upon itself some obligation in this regard. It would be better if I did not make such statement. While he could not say definitively, he was not sure SovGovt would accept it. It was not quite clear why I was making it at all.

I said I thought there had been some misunderstanding here. This was oral statement which I was asking him to communicate to Chairman Khrushchev. It was not a demarche. Reason for statement was to be found in remarks Chairman had made to foreign diplomat. Purpose of statement was not to raise new questions, but to reassure Chairman Khrushchev that his doubts about a change in President’s policy were not founded, but that President’s policy remained unchanged. Consequently, I was surprised by what Kuznetsov had said in commenting on statement, since President wanted only to reassure Chairman. President’s policy not changed.

Kuznetsov said that what surprised him was part at end where President talked about Venezuela as though USG wanted to make SovGovt responsible for something that had happened there. He asked me to repeat this part, since that was part he could not accept.

I repeated portion of statement derived from final para Deptel 1933.

Kuznetsov said he wished to re-emphasize that this was not merely simple restatement of US policy but raised question of SovGovt and Khrushchev using influence on Castro. He could not accept these last words.

Relations between US and Cuba are very abnormal. Who is responsible?USG is responsible. American actions are things which create this tension. I knew about steps which USG had taken. It therefore sounded very funny for USG to ask SovGovt to take steps towards Cuba. Secretary Rusk had made statement few days ago to effect that existence of Cuban Republic was incompatible with US interests.Apparent reference to Rusk’s remarks before the Advertising Council, March 12. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 1, 1963, pp. 467-475. Who gave USG right to dictate? There had been all that noise in US about Cuba. There had been noise when invaders returned and about economic sanctions. Kuznetsov therefore thought that this sort of appeal should be addressed in first place to USG. It should be apparent to US from history of Bolshevik Revolution how futile our efforts were. I must know what Ryabushinsky had said on eve of revolution, that “hand of hunger would strangle revolution.”

He continued, if we wished to put responsibility on SovGovt for events in Latin America, that was really too much. President himself had recently made statement to effect that events in Latin America were not ones for which Moscow or communism could be held responsible. These charges were “nonsense, nonsense.”

I said I thought I should understand whether he wished to transmit this statement to Khrushchev.

Kuznetsov answered that he was not sure Khrushchev would accept it; he would have to ask him.

I said I should emphasize once again that this was response to Chairman’s doubts about President’s policy. We had two different analyses of Cuban situation. We regarded belligerent attitude and threats of Castro as cause of tension in Caribbean. We think he has broken his word by imposing his regime on Cubans without giving them promised opportunity to express their will.

With regard to last words in statement asking Chairman to exercise his influence on Castro, this was expression of President’s hope. Perhaps this hope would not be realized, but understandable he should express it.

At this point Kuznetsov asked which remarks of Chairman President had in mind in making statement.

I said they were remarks Chairman had made to Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, in which Chairman had expressed view President’s position had changed with regard to Cuba.

Kuznetsov then asked whether President wanted final words of statement, “and will thus exercise his influence on Castro to this end,” included. I said he did.

I then handed Kuznetsov note on aircraft violations.

While Kuznetsov was serious during this discussion, his attitude and manner were not unfriendly, and encounter ended as it had begun, with good-natured personal small-talk.

Comment: While Kuznetsov handled himself well, as usual, I got definite impression he was either not aware of what Khrushchev had told Trevelyan or, if aware, had regarded Khrushchev’s statement as routine effort warn US against increasing pressure on Cuba and consequently had not anticipated effect remarks would have. It is of course possible that, particularly in view all he said, Soviets will refuse accept statement. Regardless of this, I believe point has been made. We should nevertheless perhaps anticipate response in kind.

Kohler
295. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, March 17, 1963.

Mr. President: Attached is the latest on Cuba from Moscow. In Khrushchev’s absence, Foy Kohler delivered his oral message to Kuznetsov. Kuznetsov’s comments are at Tab 1.See Document 294. At Tab 2 for reference are Kohler’s instructions.See Document 293. Donovan called the Department this morning. He expects to have one more meeting with Castro this morning and will be back in Miami at 5:00 P.M., when we will know more. He spent yesterday with the U.S. prisoners, seeing the 17 at the Isle of Pines and the others in confinement near Miami. He has reported that all are in reasonable condition although the ones on the Isle of Pines are in better shape. He has arranged for the release of the two women and one mentally ill man. The Cubans have agreed to release the rest of the natural born U.S. citizens once all the goods are delivered, but are still holding out on the naturalized citizens.

The Department is working hard on getting shipping and hopes to have the deliveries completed in two weeks.

C. K.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
296. Report of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, Department of State (Cottrell)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Secret. Executive Secretary Brubeck sent this report to McGeorge Bundy on March 21. Washington, March 21, 1963. SUBJECT First Report of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

I. Introduction

It is contemplated that these reports will be issued twice monthly to provide, in summary form, a guide to the recent activities of the Coordinator and the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee. A separate section will be devoted to each NSAM or to Presidential memoranda directed to the activities of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee.

II. Memoranda Guiding the Coordinator’s Activities

National Security Action Memorandum No. 213 of January 8, 1963.Document 264. The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs has taken over responsibility for the day-to-day coordination of Cuban Affairs. An Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, chaired by the Coordinator, has been established. It consists of the Coordinator, Secretary of the Army Cyrus R. Vance, representing the Department of Defense, and Deputy Director Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence Agency. Officers have also been detailed to the Committee from State, Defense, Justice, HEW, CIA, and USIA to work as necessary in particular cases. A White House representative from the office of Mr. McGeorge Bundy has maintained close liaison with the Coordinator and the Committee. The Coordinator works through these assigned officers in meeting the responsibilities in (1) above. The Coordinator has named Mr. John Hugh Crimmins, a Foreign Service Officer, to represent the U.S. Government with Cuban refugee groups in Florida and to coordinate Federal programs there. He has opened a branch office of the Coordinator in Miami. The Coordinator has assumed the same responsibility for covert as for overt operations, while recognizing that he is to report on covert matters to the Special Group, which will be guided by broader policy set by the President through NSC ExComm.

National Security Action Memorandum No. 220 of February 5, 1963.Document 277.

NSAM 220 directed the Secretaries of State, Defense, Agriculture, and the Administrator of GSA to carry out a new policy on U.S. Government shipments by foreign flag vessels in the Cuban trade.

The Coordinator receives reports from these agencies indicating what steps have been taken. The Secretary of Commerce is making available to the Coordinator, through the Bureau of Economic Affairs of the Department of State, reports on current pertinent information on ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

 Memoranda from the President of February 15, February 25, and March 2, 1963.In these memoranda the President asked the Departments of State and Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare under coordination of a CIA official specific proposals on lessening and possibly eliminating the flow of labor leaders, students, and others from Latin America who went to Cuba for training and indoctrination and returned to their own countries as possible Communist organizers. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63)

These memoranda concerned the flow of students, labor leaders, etc., who go to Cuba for subversive training, the development of precise information as to their travel techniques, and the development of a program to control such traffic.

The President outlined three general avenues through which the problem should be approached. They are bilateral negotiations with friendly Latin American countries, working through the Organization of American States (OAS), and the presentation of a program by the President at the meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica.

So much work toward a solution of these problems has been done over the past month that a report of reasonable length can hope only to give the highlights of government-wide efforts. They include: The Department of State has for some time been dealing with the problem of Cuban subversive training, both bilaterally and through the OAS. It has been trying to have governments withhold permission to their nationals to travel to Cuba and to reduce further free-world air traffic, both scheduled and unscheduled, to Cuba. Several memoranda to the White House have concerned this work. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs met to study the subversive problem on February 15, and a working group headed by Ambassador Thurston submitted a report on February 25 which encompassed the SCCS Report to the OAS and the recommendations of experts drawn from appropriate government agencies.A copy of the February report is ibid. The Coordinator, on the basis of these studies, appointed a Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion. It was established on February 27, with Major General Victor H. Krulak, USMC, as chairman. The Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion submitted its first report on March 8.The report was submitted to the President. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 36 Cuba) This report on movement of personnel to and from Cuba was forwarded by the Coordinator to the White House, and the Coordinator and Major General Krulak met with the President on the afternoon of March 8. Subsequently, the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion has prepared action papers on a) the movement of propaganda materials, b) the movement of arms to and within Latin American countries, c) the establishment of a surveillance system in the Caribbean, d) the exchange of intelligence information on a bilateral and multilateral basis, and e) the movement of funds.

The Office of Regional Political Affairs in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, submitted to the Coordinator on March 8 a draft OAS Resolution on Cuba, which was forwarded to the White House via the Coordinator and the Secretary of State. This office also submitted talking points on Cuba for the President at San Jose, Costa Rica.

[2 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified]

Our posts in the Caribbean were informed on March 13 that we desire to consult with them on possible additional U.S. training and other assistance which may be required to develop or improve border and coastal patrol capabilities of their respective security forces. This program would involve possible assistance to Colombia, Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Panama, and the Central American countries of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras. This offer was discussed at the San Jose meeting. The action taken above is part of our plan for the establishment of a coordinated Caribbean surveillance system involving continued close-in surveillance of Cuba by U.S. forces; a U.S. military alerting system, by which intelligence of subversive movements will be rapidly transmitted to the American Ambassadors to countries concerned through intelligence centers at Caribbean Command and the Caribbean Sea Frontier Headquarters of the Atlantic Command; a unilateral surveillance and interception effort by each country in its own territorial waters; and U.S. assistance in the final interception in territorial waters upon request of the country concerned. Following the San Jose meeting with the Central American and Panamanian Presidents, and a study of the Subcommittee’s reports, the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee will make further recommendations on the problems raised in the President’s memoranda.

297. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, March 22, 1963.

At the President’s press briefing on Thursday morning (March 21),On March 18 a Cuban refugee group, Alpha 66, mounted attacks on a Soviet ship and Soviet installations in Cuba. On March 19 the Department of State issued a statement that it was “strongly opposed to hit-and-rUN attacks on Cuba by splinter refugee groups.” The statement continued, “such raids do not weaken the grip of the Communist regime on Cuba—indeed they may strengthen it.” The statement concluded that the U.S. Government was investigating the raid to see if U.S. law was violated. For text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 266. In his press conference, Kennedy stated that “our best information was that they did not come from the United States.” He also stated that the United States did not support the group and had no connection with it. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 277-278) the question of the activities of Alpha 66 and similar groups arose.Under Secretary Ball had nine telephone conversations with Department of State, Justice, and White House officials between 9:10 a.m. and 2:15 p.m., March 19, prior to the release of the Department of State’s statement. Ball was told by U. Alexis Johnson that the United States had no connection with Alpha 66; but as Ball observed, “nobody is going to believe this.”Ball noted that the actions of Alpha 66 were in clear violation of the U.S. neutrality laws. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) The President expressed some concern as to why we were without good intelligence on the intentions of these groups. We might well want to prevent them from engaging in further raids, and at the present we appeared to be without any capability to do so.

In consequence of this observation, I spoke with the Attorney General, Mr. Helms and, the next day, with Mr. McCone. I expressed the President’s concern and made the point that it would be undesirable for a jurisdictional boundary line between the activities of the FBI and the CIA to prevent our doing as much as we should be able to do in this matter. All agreed that the matter would be examined and an improvement in our means of dealing with it effected.

CK
298. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 3/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, March 23, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba

Here are some of the latest developments regarding Cuba.

Donovan’s meeting with Castro: As you probably know, Castro released only two female prisoners. A memorandum is attached as Tab 1 which gives some of the highlights of the Donovan/Castro meeting.Not found. Donovan hopes to go down to Havana again in about a week to pick up the nine skindivers (the Cubans indicated they would be released at that time).

Also attached as Tab 1 is Carl Kaysen’s memo to the President on press conference day. It is in response to the President’s interest in knowing whether or not Castro’s present reluctance to release the prisoners reflects a change in his December commitment to release them.

 Russian Withdrawal from Cuba: Although State, in its press briefing book, recommended that the numbers game be avoided, the President announced at his press conference on March 21, 1963 that three thousand Russian troops had been withdrawn from Cuba. Attached as Tab 2 is the pertinent excerpt from the President’s press conference.For text of the President’s March 21 press conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 273-282.

Activist Refugee Groups: On the nights of March 17-18 the Second Front of the Escambray, with the probable assistance of Alpha 66, made a raid on the port of Isabella de Sagua. Attached as Tab 3 is a memorandum describing the action,1 a brief statement giving our attitude toward such raids, and the President’s comments on March 21.See footnote 1, Document 297.

The incident highlighted a jurisdictional problem between the CIA and the FBI—i.e. who is responsible for knowing about the activities of these groups. The answer is probably that both have an interest in the activities of these groups which seem to operate both from within and without the United States. We have been in touch with State, CIA and FBI and have urged them to get together on this question (Carl’s memorandum on this subject is also attached as Tab 3).Apparent reference to Document 297. They will also get together regarding what, if anything, we want to do or can do to stop the raids.

 Exchange with USSR on Cuba: Attached as Tab 4 is the latest on Cuba from Moscow. In Khrushchev’s absence, Ambassador Kohler talked to Kuznetsov. The background cables are also included in Tab 4.See Documents 293 and 294.

The Flow of Cuban Refugees: HEW’s John Thomas told me about the recent unofficial (no-funds, no-staff) hearings held in Miami by representatives Pepper and Fascell on the depressing impact of the Cuban refugees on the Miami area. The hearings tended to exaggerate the problem and to cover up for indigenous problems in the Miami area—e.g. the bad year for the citrus fruit industry and a decline in the tourist industry. Mr. Thomas felt that while Fascell has a real interest in the Miami situation and is probably aiming to get federal works projects, etc., Represent-ative Pepper used the hearings primarily as a political device to further his own career. Mr. Thomas will send us a copy of the hearings as and when they are published.

While Mr. Thomas does not regard the Miami situation as explosive, he is not at all happy about it. Fifty-six thousand refugees have been resettled but over one hundred thousand still remain. It is necessary to increase the net outflow of refugees from the area. Just as important, it is necessary to show the Miami public that there is a substantial outflow.

Mr. Thomas noted that the problem is to make a dent in the settled refugee population. While these people are more difficult to resettle than newly-arrived refugees, Mr. Thomas hopes, within a month, to increase the rate from four hundred to eight hundred per week. (The rate of flow into Miami is now about fifty per week.) He has a number of devices for effecting the increase. Among other things, in about a week, he hopes to surface an organizational mechanism whereby Protestant resettlement facilities will be used to assist in resettling Catholic refugees. This will help a lot.

 Subversion: The Krulak Subcommittee is now working on a paper to control the movement of Cuban funds in Latin America. Also, the Subcommittee is focusing on preparations for a meeting in Managua with Central American governments. The meeting, which was called for at Costa Rica, will be held on April 3 and 4. The pertinent portion of the Costa Rica declaration which lays the groundwork for the Managua meeting is attached as Tab 5.For text of the Declaration issued at Costa Rica by the Presidents of the Republics of Central America, Panama, and the United States, March 19, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 234-238. Americans Traveling to Cuba: Attached as Tab 6 is an excerpt from the President’s March 21 press conference regarding the travel of Americans to Cuba. The Justice Department is now working on this one. GC
299. Note by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. No classification marking. Drafted by McCone. This was an addendum to a conversation between McCone and the President on March 25 lasting from 12:15 to 1 p.m. The main conversation was unrelated to Cuba. Washington, March 26, 1963.

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered that they at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague. McCone stated that indicators were conflicting. On the one hand, certain information such as the recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report of Castro’s own statements would lead one to the conclusion that a gradual and continuing withdrawal would take place; that the Cubans were trained and became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment. This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing Soviet interest in Cuba. On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale.

300. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities. Secret; Operational Immediate. Moscow, March 27, 1963, 7 p.m.

2420. Eyes only for Secretary. Deptels 1933 and 1950;Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto. Embtels 2315Document 294. and 2321.In telegram 2321, March 17, Kohler stated to Kuznetsov that the President’s message (see footnote 2 above) was a “purely private communication for the Chairman from the President which would not be published.”Kohler did warn that Khrushchev could “decide to come back hard and publicize. Consequently we should be alert to this possibility.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL Cuba-USSR) See the Supplement. Gromyko called me in at 4:00 p.m. Moscow time to make oral statement in response my March 16 statement to Kuznetsov. Translation his statement contained next following tel.See Document 301.

Subsequent 30-minute discussion began with Gromyko’s asking me transmit contents of statement to President and saying he wished to add a few words about note Embassy received earlier today regarding attack on L’Gov (Embtel 2422).In telegram 2422, March 27, the Soviet Foreign Ministry protested the attack on the Soviet cargo ship L’Gov in the Cuban port of Isabela La Sagua and insisted that the United States take measures to prevent such acts in the future. The Foreign Ministry stated that “Surely [it is] clear, that without material support of US Government and without supplying of American weapons and ships, group of traitors to Cuban people, sheltering on territory USA would not be able undertake these kinds provocation.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities) He said MFA had received word just before our meeting about analogous provocation involving another Soviet ship in Cuban port.The Lambda 66 Cuban exile group attacked the Soviet ship Baku when it was loading sugar in the Cuban port of Caibarien. The raiders had a free lance photo journalist aboard. See memoranda from Chase to McGeorge Bundy and Clifton to the President, March 27. (Ibid.) The texts are in the Supplement. On March 30 the Departments of State and Justice issued a statement that they neither supported nor condoned these attacks which were probably counter productive. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 22, 1963, pp. 600-601. MFA did not yet have details and would in due course give Embassy Soviet reaction to this new provocative act. But, it appeared USG underestimated gravity of such provocative actions against Cuba and Soviet ships. If it correctly estimated gravity of such actions, it would not permit them to take place.

I said I first wished to comment on his oral statement. President’s intention had been to give private reassurance to Chairman Khrushchev as result of doubts President felt Chairman had expressed regarding USG policy towards Cuba. President had also wished express hope that SovGovt might exercise influence to alleviate situation. I said I should certainly report statement to President and assumed this remained a private exchange.

Gromyko said that was correct; for time being Soviets had no intention of giving information on exchange to press.

I said that, since I had no new instructions, I would not reply now to statement but would stand on what I had said before. With regard to L’Gov, I said I wished to call Gromyko’s attention to Lincoln White’s March 19 statement and to President’s March 21 statement,See footnote 2, Document 298. that exiles who conducted raid had not come from US, that we did not feel these kinds of raids served useful purposes, and that we had not supported this and these men did not have connection with USG. I said these statements were already on record and it was thus appropriate to cite them today.

Gromyko said SovGovt acquainted with these statements, but has to ask itself how we can make such statements and at same time act in direct contradiction to them. SovGovt could not regard State Department statement as satisfactory. Its understanding of State Department statement is that if raids were bigger and more successful, that would be a different thing. As for SovGovt, it categorically condemns all acts of this kind. Can USG really hope to find serious people who can believe that it is not involved, when this exile scum was sitting under US wing? These groups only acted with the knowledge and connivance of USG. He wished to emphasize that USG is not attributing serious significance to these acts. On other hand, SovGovt regretted position taken by US. It was high time more sober approach was taken to such actions.

Gromyko continued, Caribbean crisis had apparently been settled, but he and I, like US and Sov representatives elsewhere, had to keep reverting to it. There was, however, one possibility for settling matter:USG should leave Cuba in peace. In Soviet view, this lies in best interests of US and whole world.

I said I felt I had to comment now because Gromyko’s additional remarks had called into question statement of President. When we make these statements, we do so because they are true. I repeated raiders had not come from US territory. With regard to “scum”, we have different understanding from Soviets of who are scum and who are honest people. As to question of fulfilling terms of Oct. 27-28 agreement, they had never been fulfilled. Provisions for inspection and verification had not been made. What did Soviets want us to do: protect Cuba from such raids? It should be clear to them we are not going to do so. Just as Soviets expect many countries to opt for communism, we expect many countries, including Cuba, to opt for freedom. Perhaps solution was for USSR to leave Cuba alone. I had pointed out to Dobrynin in Washington that this problem was poisoning our relations. If USSR would only leave Cuba alone, this poison would be removed. USG has recognized measures taken by SovGovt to reduce poison. But Oct. 27-28 agreement had never been fully realized, and that must be recognized.

Gromyko, moderating his tone, asked again whether we expected to find people who would believe our statements that USG can do nothing at all about actions of these emigre groups. He fully recognized and appreciated that it did not please US when he pointed out there was no way to reconcile statements of top US officials with facts of provocations. New provocation had occurred only today. SovGovt was expressing hope that USG and President would take more sober approach to such serious provocations and would act in spirit of agreement that had been reached Oct. 27-28. USSR had always and would always act in accord-ance with this agreement. He was sorry to have to protest and would prefer not to do it, but circumstances compelled it.

I said, as was evident from statements I had cited, USG was opposed to these raids and would do everything it could to discourage them. I did, however, want to make it clear to him that USG did not intend to institute blockade of Cuba in order to stop such raids. I assumed Sovs would not like us to do so. However, there is great deal of Soviet activity on island. Perhaps they should stop it, since it was inflaming public opinion in US. Way to solve problem was to remove this element which poisoned US-Soviet relations.

Gromyko said difference in our positions was that USG was threatening Cuba and Cubans were taking steps to protect their frontiers. That was why Sov specialists were in Cuba. Chairman had explained this to President and there was little he could add at this time to that explanation. However, he agreed it would be good to remove poison. As afterthought, Gromyko said he assumed that by “poison” I meant these raids.

I said by “poison” I meant everything involved in Cuban problem: Belligerent statements of Castro, presence of Sov military, and reaction this evokes in US. I agreed that if we could eliminate all this it would be good. I asked whether they intended publish note on L’Gov.

Gromyko said they probably would. (Subsequently, his office called Emb to specify that both L’Gov note and their reply to our Alaska aircraft intrusion note would probably be published.) But, for time being, they regarded exchange of oral statements as private and did not intend publish.

Kohler
301. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of StateSource: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/3-2763. Secret; Operational Immediate. This telegram was inadvertently filed under the discontinued decimal filing system. Moscow, March 27, 1963, 8 p.m.

2421. Eyes only for Secretary. Following is translation oral statement made to me today by Gromyko.

Begin text.

In accordance with your request,See Document 293. contents of oral statement delivered by you on March 16 were brought to attention Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers N.S. Khrushchev.

I have been instructed to deliver following oral reply to that statement.

Statement which you delivered expressed concern of President USA over certain remarks by Chairman of USSR Council Ministers N.S. Khrushchev, which were interpreted by President to mean that, in N.S. Khrushchev’s opinion, President’s position regarding Cuba had in some way changed recently. In that connection, you made reference to N.S. Khrushchev’s conversation of March 6, 1963, with Mr. Trevelyan, Ambassador Great Britain in Moscow.See footnote 3, Document 292.

What can be said in this regard? Chairman of USSR Council Ministers Khrushchev pointed out in above-mentioned conversation with Mr. Trevelyan as well as on number other occasions, that remarks are heard more and more frequently in USA to effect that USA Government had made no commitment not to invade Cuba. N.S. Khrushchev emphasized that such remarks are very dangerous and are fraught with fatal consequences, since this can lead to destruction in embryonic stage of that confidence—even though it be slight—in the (given) word, which developed during settlement of crisis in Caribbean area.

There were more than adequate grounds for these remarks of Chairman USSR Council of Ministers. Government USA is of course aware of this and there is hardly need to enumerate now all statements, including those of American officials, which cast doubt on fact that US had taken upon itself commitment not to invade Cuba.

Now US Ambassador has stated in name of President that President’s position in regard to Cuba has not undergone any kind of change. If this statement is to be understood to mean that US Government intends to abide strictly by its commitments on settlement of crisis in Caribbean Sea area, Soviet Government is prepared to welcome this. Substance of commitments which parties assumed during exchange of messages between Chairman of USSR Councilof Ministers and President of United States on October 27 and 28, 1962, are well known. It is not necessary to prove that fulfillment of these commitments by parties is most important guarantee for maintaining peace in Caribbean area.

As far as Soviet Government is concerned, it, showing its concern for strengthening of peace and normalization of situation in this region, is conforming invariably to understanding laid down in above-mentioned messages and is strictly observing commitments which it took upon itself. Moreover, Soviet Government has often undertaken steps, including some quite recently, which go even further than commitments which it took upon itself on October 27 and 28, 1962, regarding settlement of crisis in Caribbean area. Soviet Government has a right to expect from Government of USA a similar attitude toward its commitments including, of course, commitment on non-invasion of Cuba.

Unfortunately, however, statement transmitted by US Ambassador on March 16, can also be understood in different sense. One cannot but draw attention, above all, to the fact that this statement in expounding position of US Government regarding Cuba, lays emphasis not upon commitments of the parties which were assumed during settlement of crisis in Caribbean area, but upon statement of US President at his press conference on November 20, 1962. In addition, this statement bears strictly unilateral character and therefore has never been considered and cannot be considered as integral part of understanding which was achieved on settling crisis. It is in direct contradiction both to commitments of USA for settling crisis in Caribbean area and also to norms of international law. It is not difficult to imagine dangerous consequences to which such a policy could lead and serious trials to which it could subject world.

In statement, transmitted by US Ambassador on March 16, it is claimed that Government of Republic of Cuba is threatening Government of Venezuela and even supporting some sort of actions undertaken against Venezuela. Question arises: what is purpose of such arbitrary statements, all the more so since we are invited, in connection with them, to exert some sort of influence on Government of Republic of Cuba. Isn’t the real intention that of undertaking new dangerous steps against Republic of Cuba based on statement of President of USA of November 20. It is certainly well known to all that it is not Cuba which threatens Venezuela or any other states in Western Hemisphere, but, on the contrary, USA and some of its allies which threaten Republic of Cuba, call for overthrow of its government, and organize subversive activity against Cuba on wide scale.

It is precisely this policy of USA, and not any sort of “aggressive Communist initiatives,” which are source of new danger to preservation of peace in Caribbean area, new danger to peace throughout world.

In this connection, one cannot but draw attention to fact that reference was again made, in oral statement of March 16, to intention of Government of USA to continue reconnaissance flights over territory of Cuba. What is purpose of raising this question now? Can it be for purpose of legalizing such flights and obtaining our agreement to them? But Government of USA knows well that Soviet Union always opposed and continues to oppose such actions by USA, which are crude violation of international law and of UN Charter. Efforts to justify continuation of such flights by references to necessity of inspection of territory of Cuba cannot be recognized as having any basis, since question of inspection has not existed for a long time. There is no point now in returning to all the ins and outs of this question; it was resolved in course of settling crisis in Caribbean area. It is only necessary to emphasize that continuation of completely unjustified provocative flights by American planes over Cuban territory, which evoke legitimate indignation, particularly in Cuba, can lead to most serious consequences, full responsibility for which will rest on Government of United States, and only on it.

We believe that situation in Caribbean area can be normalized once and for all and that conditions can be created there for establishment of a really durable peace. For this only one thing is necessary: That USA should not interfere in internal affairs of Cuba and should renounce attempts to export counterrevolution to Cuba.

If President of USA would use his influence in this direction, he would thereby make great contribution to cause of eliminating dangerous tension which still exists in Caribbean area. Soviet Government is convinced that precisely such a course of policy corresponds both to interest of establishing peace in Caribbean area and to interest of improvement of Soviet-American relations and relaxation of international tension. As far as Soviet Government is concerned, it invariably stands for such a course in international affairs.

End text.

Kohler
302. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 3/63. Confidential. Drafted by Robert Follestad, Officer in Charge of the Office of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, and cleared by Martin, Cottrell, and U. Alexis Johnson. Washington, March 28, 1963.

Dear Mr. President: I am concerned that hit and rUN raids by Cuban exiles may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our national interest. Increased frequency of these forays could raise a host of problems over which we would not have control.

Actions such as yesterday’s exile attack which caused substantial damage to a Soviet vessel may complicate our relations with the USSR without net advantage to us.

I therefore propose several measures which could impede or deter further attacks of this nature.In a March 28 memorandum Chase alerted Bundy to the recommedations proposed in this letter. Chase also informed Bundy of his conversations at the Department of Justice on March 27. According to Chase, the discussions “indicated that the FBI is not doing a stellar intelligence job; they seem to know remarkably little about the activist groups. However, I have been told that FBI has been shaken up by this episode and that solid FBI contributions will be forthcoming today.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

First, the intelligence community could increase its efforts in Miami to develop hard information about projected raids. This is currently communicated to Customs authorities charged with investigation of violation of arms control. Second, Customs and the Coast Guard, on the basis of this information can stop and search the vessels. (They now do this, and picked up about 50 men and four boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated, and participants arraigned if a violation of law has occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels to facilitate current Customs and Coast Guard operations in the Miami area would be helpful. Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami could quietly inform suspects in the exile community that the United States intends to intensify enforcement of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids. Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down illegal radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in connection with these raids. Fifth, we can inform the British Government of our plans to try to control these activities and express our understanding that the British Government has become increasingly concerned about the possibility that British territory in the Bahamas may be used for these raids and may be considering action to police these areas more effectively.

These measures have not been discussed with any of the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I suggest that a meeting of the interested Departments be called to discuss the problem.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk
303. Summary Record of the 42d Meeting of the Executive Committee of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Executive Committee, Meetings, Vol. IV, 38-42, 1/25/63-3/29/63. Top Secret. The meeting lasted until 1:30 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) and was the last meeting of the Executive Committee. Washington, March 29, 1963, 12:30 p.m.

The President said he had asked the Council to meet in order to talk about the two recent hit-and-rUN raids staged by anti-Castro refugees. The State Department has twice said that these raids are not particularly helpful. Even so, we must anticipate that there will be more such attacks. We have said the raiders do not take off from the U.S., but it is difficult to maintain that they do not get their supplies in the U.S. The question is whether we should take direct action in the U.S. to cut off their supplies or whether we should try to advise them to attack Cuba but not the Russians, with the result that the raids would draw less press attention and arouse less acrimony in Moscow.

Director McCone agreed that more raids of this kind are probable. The anti-Castro groups purchase supplies in the U.S. and come in and go out of the U.S. The raids are actually staged from the Bahamas and other than U.S. territory. The raiders would be extremely difficult to control because they are brave men fighting for freedom of their country.

Reading from a paper,See the attachment to Document 304. Mr. McCone said the continuance of the raids would cause trouble inside Cuba and would discredit Castro in Latin America if he was unable to prevent the raids. The Soviets, if the raids continue, might reappraise their support of Castro or, alternatively, raise directly with the President the continuance of the anti-Castro raids. Mr. McCone said his personal view was that there would be intense public and press criticism if we stand down these raids. He anticipated Congressional criticism as well. He recommended that we officially disallow the raids without acting to prevent the raiders from using the U.S. as a base.

Secretary Rusk said that the hit-and-rUN raids against Cuba, in an area which is under our military umbrella, will be blamed on us no matter what we say. No one would believe that we do not have the capability of preventing the raiders from leaving the U.S. If anyone is shooting Russians we ought to be doing it, not Cubans who are acting beyond our control. He predicted that if the raids continue, the result will be to draw Cuban and Russian forces further outside the territorial waters of Cuba in an effort to stop the raiding ships at sea and before they reach Cuban ports. Our air surveillance of Cuba will be complicated and the cost of our continuing overflights will increase because Cuban planes will be patrolling farther off shore, searching for incoming raiding ships. He recommended that the least we should do is to stop the violation of our laws. If we decide that such raids should be conducted, we should plan them ourselves and see that they are carried out under our control rather than as now occurs.

The President pointed out that the U.S. private ship, the Floridian, was probably shot at in retaliation for earlier anti-Castro raids.At approximately 6 p.m., March 28, two Cuban MIG aircraft fired on the U.S. ship Floridian in international waters off the north coast of Cuba en route from Puerto Rico to Miami. (Telegram 468 to Bern, March 29; Department of State, Central Files, POL 33-6 CUBA-US) The result is that we have to put our forces into action to defend U.S. ships.

Secretary Rusk approved landing anti-Castro agents in Cuba who could be useful on the ground inside the country, but he said there was no benefit from hit-and-rUN raids which we do not control.

Secretary Dillon said it was impossible for us to control the raids. He said that after the ships leave Florida, they proceed to an island from which the raid is launched at a later time. In some cases larger ships leave U.S. ports and rendezvous with smaller ships at sea. A naval barrier off Cuba is the only sure way to stop these raids. The Coast Guard does not have enough boats to carry out this assignment. If our intelligence on the raiders improves, we can do much more to prevent the raiders leaving the U.S.

Secretary Rusk noted that in his discussions of the raid problem with Congressmen, he had noted a mixed reaction. Not all Congressmen supported the anti-Castro raids.

Mr. McCone said the Bahama Islands were being used by the raiders as the take-off point. He predicted that the number of raids will increase rapidly.

The President commented that these in-and-out raids were probably exciting and rather pleasant for those who engage in them. They were in danger for less than an hour. This exciting activity was more fUN than living in the hills of Escambray, pursued by Castro’s military forces.

Secretary Rusk doubted that the Russians would get out of Cuba as an answer to the harassment of the raiders, but rather will build up the power of the Cubans to prevent the raiders from doing any damage at sea or ashore.

Secretary McNamara said that we can stop the raiders if we use the Navy. If we don’t want to stop the raids, we can modify them, making it difficult for the raiders to attack targets not of our choosing. In any event we can so act that we disassociate ourselves from the raiders and avoid charges that the raids are based in the U.S.

The President suggested that we first tell the British and then, on a background basis, tell the press that the raiders are staging out of the Bahama Islands.

The Attorney General said that we can slow down the raids if we wish and later stop them entirely if we so desire. We can do a great deal more to stop them than is now being done. The Coast Guard can stop outgoing ships. We can prosecute cases against those who are supplying ammunition to the raiders. We can prosecute the the ten Americans who were picked up recently at sea with arms which were to be used by the raiders. We can create a deterrent against such raids.

At this point the President read part of the most recent Soviet protest, including the sentence which asked rhetorically where do these raids originate, from Europe?Reported in telegram 2435 from Moscow, March 29. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exile Activities)

The Attorney General pointed out that we would look ridiculous if the raids continue and we say we cannot control them or prevent them.

Ambassador Thompson emphasized that we must prevent any raider plane bombing a Soviet ship.

Secretary Rusk repeated his view that raids which do not result in a penetration on the ground in Cuba are fruitless.

The Attorney General commented that we did have a problem domestically of explaining why we were stopping the raids, but we can stop them by prosecuting those involved and by making the raiders’ stay in the U.S. very unpleasant.

Ambassador Thompson noted that we could say that attacks on Soviet ships could prevent the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba.

Mr. Harriman agreed with Secretary Rusk that the raids will not prompt the Soviets to leave Cuba, but rather to step up participation in Cuban military activities. He agreed that there was no value in the pin-pricking hit-and-rUN raids.

Secretary Dillon pointed out that even if we did not succeed in catching the raiders on their way out, we would have a serious effect on future raids if we caught the raiders upon their return.

The President asked that we handle this problem in such a way as to avoid the appearance of prosecuting Cuban patriots. He suggested that we tell the raiders that they must not attack Soviet ships—but could attack purely Cuban targets. The purpose would be to avoid heating up the situation to the point where the Russians would send destroyers to protect their ships in Cuban waters. We might tell the raiders that if they stop their present attacks and undertake to carry out assignments as guided by the CIA, they could continue, but if they refuse to accept CIA guidance, we would take action to prevent further raids.

Secretary Rusk felt there should be a prohibition against attacks on all kinds of shipping and a halt to all hit-and-rUN raids. He had no objection to raiding if people were actually put ashore.

Mr. McCone noted that the raiders will not go ashore because they know they will be caught. He said that even with extensive planning it is difficult enough to put in controlled agents. The CIA has means of informing the raiding groups that they should stop attacks on Soviet shipping or attacks on all shipping.

The President asked why we could not put pressure on the suppliers of the raiders. These suppliers would not be Cubans.

The Attorney General reported that the FBI is investigating the source of the raiders’ supplies. He said the raiding groups were very small and it might not be possible to communicate with every group. We could proceed to arrest the raiders and later prosecute those against whom we had sufficient evidence. It did not appear likely that before the middle of April we would have a grand jury which would be responsive to our efforts to indict the raiders. In the meantime, however, we could slow down the raiders by passing word to them through the Coast Guard, the FBI, and other channels that we would not permit the continuance of their activities.

Secretary Rusk said that more public knowledge of the pressures we are putting on the raiders would, in his view, help our position.

In reply to a Presidential question, the Vice President said we would be irresponsible if we did not act against the raiders who were carrying out irresponsible actions that could result in getting us involved in a war. He said we should stop these irresponsible people. He suggested that the military prepare a plan as to how to halt the raids and inform all U.S. Government agencies that our policy was to prevent further raids. He would proceed against the suppliers of munitions. He predicted that, just as we would, the Russians will shoot back if the raiders continue shooting at Soviet ships. He acknowledged that there would be some criticism of our action, but felt that there would be much more criticism if we did not stop the raids. He urged that we inform the appropriate Congressional Committees and other governments of our intention to stop the raiding.

The Attorney General said that one way of dealing with the raiders would be to prevent their return to the U.S. if they once leave without permission. Such action would be less drastic than prosecution. It would involve warning individual Cubans that if they left the U.S., they would not be permitted to return.

The President hoped we could pick out a good case for the first one to prosecute—not Robert Emmett, but rather an ancient arms dealer. The Attorney General noted that Americans are supplying the arms used by the Cuban raiders.

The President asked the Attorney General to meet with Mr. McCone and representatives of State, Defense, and the White House to draft an action program for his approval, to include the following points: Guidance by the CIA to the raiding groups. Discussion with the British about the use of the Bahama Islands by the raiders. Consideration of whether we should inform the press for background that the raiders are taking off from the Bahamas. Preventing the planned airplane raid, if necessary, announcing that we intend to stop the raid so that if it takes place, then all would be fairly and clearly warned. Ways of preventing the return of raiders leaving U.S. jurisdiction.

The President suggested that the group discuss their recommendations with him tomorrow.No further record of the meeting has been found. He also asked that a policy statement for issuance to the press be prepared for his consideration.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
304. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 January-31 March 1963. Secret. Drafted by McCone. Washington, March 29, 1963. SUBJECT Executive Committee Meeting—12:30 p.m.—29 March 1963 IN ATTENDANCE All present, plus Cottrell, Kaysen, Dungan and others

The President raised the question of what should be our policy on hit-and-rUN raids and asked my views. I reported my views as per the attached memorandum of 29 March. Secretary Rusk stated that the United States would be blamed for unauthorized raids, the Soviets would expect that we could stop them and they would immediately take counter actions such as escorting ships, etc. On a minimum, we should act to disassociate ourselves and do all possible not to permit the continuance of unauthorized raids.

Dillon stated that we could not stop them because of the number of ports, small ships, inadequate coast guard facilities, etc. McNamara countered by saying that we could stop them by utilizing military resources. As a second alternative he suggested we might explore modifying our course of action and finally, should disassociate ourselves from responsibility. The Attorney General outlined various steps that could be taken to identify the leadership of the various groups and to either prosecute them or exclude them from the country through immigration procedures. Thompson and Harriman expressed particular concern over the reported airplane that was ready to bomb Soviet ship. Practically all in attendance thought that we should try and guide the operation away from attacks on Soviet ships because of obvious reaction of the Soviets. The Vice President felt that we would be criticized either from letting them go on the one hand, or stopping them on the other. He felt the military should immediately study that which should be done to stop them and all actions should be taken to halt the unauthorized raids.

The President then suggested a meeting be held this afternoon to determine a number of matters.

We should establish what our contacts are with the groups so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down the operations. A policy statement which State is undertaking. The question of prosecution which the AG wouldundertake. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this originated in the Bahamas. The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, Cottrell, Douglas Dillon, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigration officials, Coast Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to: Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where they are, and what can be done about them. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami. Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA andFBI in Miami. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some of this. Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives, arms, etc. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped with DF-equipment to locate the stations. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete stand down before any attempt was made to guide the groups. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize the plane.

Attachment Secret. Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McCone Washington, March 29, 1963. SUBJECT Unauthorized Cuban Raids Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambray, Alpha 66, and Lambda 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U.S. areas. The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious courage and dedication. Apparently the organizations are building up and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future. Obviously raids of this type will exacerbate problems with Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint, are undesirable. However, successful harassment will create very considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will complicate Castro’s problems and will have very considerable effect in discrediting Castroism in Latin America. Inability of Castro to deal with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion of their presence with the United States. Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the Intelligence Community, it is my personal view that a concerted and publicized effort to “stand down” these operations would probably draw more public and press criticism in the United States than would result from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government from them through denial of both responsibility and control. John A. McConePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
305. Editorial Note

On March 31, 1963, British and Bahamian armed forces captured on Exuma Island in the Bahamas an armed motor boat, the Violynn III, carrying 16 Cuban exiles and 1 American. The United States had informed British/Bahamian authorities that the Violynn was seeking to refuel in preperation for an attack on a Soviet tanker.

At the 510th meeting of the National Security Council, April 2, the President and the Council discussed the status of the arrested raiders. According to Bromley Smith’s summary record, April 2, the discussion went as follows:

“At this point Assistant Secretary Martin and Mr. Dungan joined the group at the President’s request to discuss the current status of the Cuban raiders who have been arrested by the British in the Bahama Islands.

“Mr. Martin said the present plan was for the British to turn the raiders loose on their boat three miles off the Bahamas. The U.S. Coast Guard would pick them up there. If they refuse to go to Miami, the question before us is what do we then do?

“After a discussion of the legal points involved, the President expressed his view that we should ask the British to take away from the raiders all their ammunition, and that we would ask the leaders to come peacefully to a U.S. port. If they refuse to come into the U.S. territorial waters, the U.S. Coast Guard ship would follow them but not fire on them. We would soon know the names of the raiders on the ship and would seek to apply pressures on them to agree to enter a U.S. port. If a threat to prevent them ever again from entering the U.S. was not effective, the Coast Guard would report the situation to Washington for additional guidance.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings)

According to a memorandum from Chase to Dungan, April 2, the U.S. Government’s plan was to ask the British to confiscate the raiders’ ammunition. When, and apparently if, it returned to Miami, the Violynn would be impounded, and the American and Cubans who were not parolees would be questioned and released within a few hours. Parolees would be questioned and released in 24 to 36 hours. (Ibid., Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 4/63)

306. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Sensitive. A handwritten “(a.m.)” was placed after the dateline on this memorandum. Washington, April 3, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba Coordinating Committee—Covert Operations in Cuba

Attached is an agendaThe attached agenda lists items 1-6 included in this memorandum. which was discussed at a meeting of the Cottrell Committee on April 1. The meeting was attended by Secretary Vance, Joe Califano, Dick Helms, Dez FitzGerald, and Bob Hurwitch.

Balloon Operations Over Havana—The plan is well under way. Assuming the winds are right, CIA proposes to release balloons containing 300,000 to 500,000 leaflets on May Day (before daylight). The balloons will not be visible by radar or by the naked eye. The leaflets will (1) attack Castro’s henchmen, and (2) contain cartoons illustrating sabotage techniques.

The decision on the balloons is scheduled for another review during the week preceding May Day.

 Training of CIA-Sponsored Cuban Exiles on Military Reservations—CIA and the Army are now working on this one to find appropriate installations.

Russian Language Programs—The Committee decided in favor of instituting three programs (Radio Liberty, Radio Caribe, and an intrusion program). It decided against setting up an [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on the grounds that it is an unnecessary duplication.

In approving the three programs for Special Group consideration, the Committee recognized that they will probably be of marginal value only; however, they will cost us very little, financial or otherwise.

Sabotage of Cuban Shipping (19 ships)—The Committee discussed three forms of sabotage—limpets, incendiaries in the cargoes, and abrasives in the machinery.

The Committee decided against limpets [1½ lines of source text not declassified] and even though it would be a dramatic morale booster. Unfortunately, there is no certain way of controlling a limpet; it could sink a ship and the sinking could be billed as a U.S. submarine attack. Secretary Vance came down hard against sinkings.

The Committee will recommend to the Special Group the incendiaries which would be timed to go off in international waters and the abrasives in the machinery. While the propaganda boost might be nil, they are easier to effect than limpets and could really hurt Castro.

The Committee gave CIA the option of using either its own Cubans or of using DRE as a cut-out.

Redirection of Cuban Exile Group Operations—The Committee discussed this one briefly—i.e. what is an acceptable target?Dick Helms pointed out that although these groups may start out to get a non-Soviet target, once you let them go, you can never really be sure what they will do. Bob Hurwitch seemed to favor the approach that attacks and sabotage should appear to come from inside rather than from outside Cuba.

The Committee came to no decision on this one. More thinking is needed.

 Propaganda Inside Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops—While Secretary Vance expressed some concern about the possibility that this would lead to a conflagration between the Cubans and the Soviets (what would we do), the Committee decided in favor of this course of action. While the results will probably not be startling for our side, the costs and risks are small. (I’m not sure a conflagration would be such a bad thing for us, even if it did occur. How much chance would these 5,000 combat troops have against the huge and well-equipped Cuban army? I don’t think the Russians would dare try to impose their will by force; they would have to grin and bear it.)

Comment: In considering specifics of a covert program, I think we should keep in the back of our minds the possibility that we may want to turn our policy around sometime in the future. This does not necessarily mean that we would rule out covert operations—rather, we would probably want to direct them towards splitting the Cuba/Soviet tie (e.g. a “Russki Go Home” campaign) instead of forcing Castro to embrace the Soviets more tightly (e.g. inactivation of Cuban shipping which would lead to further Cuban dependence on Bloc shipping). In this regard, we may wish to consider carefully the gains and risks involved in directing more violent efforts against selected Russian targets within Cuba. I have a feeling that the risks are not as great as they seem. Assuming we continue our present policy or consider a turn-around policy very far down the road, I like an active covert program. It seems to me that a good sabotage program is one of the few tools we can use to really hurt Castro economically. Our present policy of isolating Cuba from the Free World is not going to bust Castro. Instead, I suspect that the Cuban economy is at its low right now. With no effective U.S. covert intervention, it will probably grow healthier from here on as the Cuban economy moves from the difficult transition stage between economic dependence on the West and economic dependence on the Bloc.

GC
307. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten “(p.m.)” was placed after the dateline on this memorandum. Washington, April 3, 1963. SUBJECT Cuban Coordinating Committee—Covert Operations

The Cottrell Committee held a meeting on Wednesday afternoon to discuss covert operations. Secretary Vance, Dez FitzGerald, Bob Hurwitch, and Joe Scott attended.

1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops

The Committee discussed the program outlined in the attached documentMemorandum from Cottrell to the Special Group, April 3, entitled “Propaganda Inciting Cubans Within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops.” (Ibid.) See the Supplement. and agreed to recommend it to the Special Group. These attacks will be useful since they will tend to exacerbate relations between every Cuban and every Russian in Cuba. Besides, the Communists are doing the same thing to us in Vietnam.

There was an interesting discussion about where to stop regarding Cuban attacks on Soviet troops and installations. The general consensus was that it was O.K. for individual Cubans to attack Soviet troops or installations (e.g. throw a grenade over the camp fence) but that it was undesirable for groups of Cubans to organize attacks against the Russians. Dez FitzGerald pointed out that, under present circumstances, any action which requires organization is highly dangerous. Also, the Committee felt that the organized attacks would initiate wide-spread reprisals by the Castro government; this was not generally considered a good thing.

2. Shipping Sabotage—Limpets

Dez FitzGerald brought up again the issue of attaching limpets to Cuban ships; this had been turned down by the Committee on MondayApril 1; see Document 306. because of the possibility that the limpets would sink a ship. Dez said that, upon further reflection, he felt we were giving up a good thing; also, the danger of a sinking was a very small one. Dez went on to say that he came away from Wednesday’s meeting with the PresidentNo further record of this meeting has been found. with the feeling that the President would like some noise level in our sabotage program for morale purposes; limpets fill the bill.

Secretary Vance was reluctant to submit the limpet plan to the Special Group on Thursday. Instead, he suggested that the limpet plan be included on the list of major sabotage acts which is due to be submitted to the President next week. The Committee agreed.

GC
308. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret. Drafted by Robert Kennedy; a copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy. Washington, April 3, 1963.

Mr. Markov of the Russian EmbassyPetr I. Markov, Attache, Soviet Embassy. called this morning and said that the Russian Ambassador wished to come by and see me. I arranged for him to come in at 3:30 p.m.

We exchanged some pleasantries. He told me that Norman Cousins had asked to see Khrushchev and he had arranged it.Editor of the Saturday Review who met Khrushchev on April 12 to discuss the nuclear test ban treaty. What was Cousins’ relationship to the President? Then, as is his custom, he handed me a so-called “talking paper.”For text, see vol. VI, pp. 250–262. This document was particularly long—approximately 25 pages. It was ostensibly to me from the Ambassador but in fact it was from Khrushchev to the President.

The paper made five or six major points, among which were the following:

[Here follows Robert Kennedy’s 2-page account of the talking paper’s points on the test ban treaty; the full text is in volume VI, pages 262–265.]

Another point that was made was a sharp and bitter criticism about the raids that had taken place against Russian ships. These were piratical acts and the United States must take responsibility for them. It isn’t possible to believe that if we really wanted to stop these raids that we could not do so. They were glad to hear of the steps that are being taken lately but in the last analysis the specific acts, namely, the arrests that we made would be the criteria by which they would judge our sincerity. The Soviet Union questions whether in fact we wish to end these attacks for our criticism of them has been not that they were wrong but that they were ineffective. The clear implication was that if the raids had been effective they would have had our approval.

Further, our efforts to isolate Cuba, to build a virtual wall around it, was a barbaric act. Our actions to stifle Cuba’s commerce and to create economic difficulties and isolate her from her neighbors in Latin America were completely unwarranted. The support given to counter-revolutionaries and the statements to the barbaric mercenaries in Miami by the President were also bitterly criticized.

The document also stated that the President should understand the continued pressure on the Soviet Union for the withdrawal of troops from Cuba was not going to be effective. The Soviet Union does not respond to pressure. As a matter of fact, they had already withdrawn twice as many troops as the largest number that had appeared in the newspapers here in the United States. However, he said that he was going to refuse to give the actual number that had been withdrawn because then public statements would be issued that they had been withdrawn because of pressure by the United States and “trumpets would have been blown” by us.

This letter took note of the criticism of the fact that the Russian SAM sites remained within Cuba. The author of the letter wanted us to know that those ground-air missiles were going to stay in Cuba for the protection of the Cuban people.

The overflights that were taking place were deeply resented by the Soviet Union and by Cuba. He then went on to say clearly and distinctly that these U-2 planes would be shot down and that this had better be clearly understood in the United States. The U-2 plane that Eisenhower sent over the Soviet Union was shot down and they had better understand the same thing would be done in those flights over Cuba.

The document then returned to the theme that we were treating the Soviet Union as inferiors; that this could not be continued; that the statements McNamara and Malinovski were making were not contributing to peaceful understanding; that Malinovski’s statements were brought about by McNamara’s warlike pronouncements. The United States was interested only in making profits from munitions, building up their efforts to dominate the world through counter-revolutionary activity. We were rUN by capitalists and we should understand that we could not push the Soviet Union around. He also expressed deep concern about the deployment of the Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean, replacing the Jupiter missiles in Turkey and Italy.

At the end of the document it said that Mr. Khrushchev had felt in the past that this confidential exchange had been helpful but he said it had not been used lately because of the provocative statements that had been made by representatives of the United States Government which were offensive to the Soviet Union. However, if President Kennedy wanted to reopen this area of contact he would be glad to accept it. He also said that as far as a meeting between Khrushchev and President Kennedy he thought that that might be helpful. This was, however, left in rather enigmatic terms.

After I read the document I returned it to Dobrynin. I pointed out to him that I had met with him frequently and that he had never talked like this before. He said that was correct. I asked what was the explanation for this document and he said that I should understand that it came from the Soviet Union. I said it demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of the United States and President Kennedy and that I thought it was so insulting and rude to the President and to the United States that I would neither accept it nor transmit its message. I said if they had a message of that kind to deliver it should be delivered formally through the State Department and not through me. I said that during our conversations in the past we attempted to work out matters on a mutually satisfactory basis. I said we might disagree but I never insulted or offended him or his country or Mr. Khrushchev. I said I felt that was the only basis for any kind of relationship. I said I thought this kind of document did not further that effort or our mutual interests and I repeated that if they intended to transmit that kind of message that it should be done through the State Department. He said he could understand my position. He was obviously embarrassed.Thompson prepared a memorandum to Rusk, April 3, suggesting possible causes and motives for Khrushchev’s message of April 3. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files, 1963) See the Supplement. Thompson also met with Dobrynin on April 6, to discuss the message of April 3. Thompson said that there seemed to be a misunderstanding developing between the United States and Soviet Union. Thompson stated that he was thinking of suggesting to the President that a special envoy who had close contact with the President should see Khrushchev. Dobrynin thought it a good idea. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR File, 1963) See the Supplement.

309. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Army’s Special Assistant (Califano) to the Secretary of the Army (Vance)Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 77-0131, Sabotage/Destruction. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, April 9, 1963. SUBJECT Presidential Action on Special Group Items Concerning Cuba The President rejected the balloon item on the recommendation of Ed Murrow. The President approved the propaganda item (inciting Cubans to harass, attack and sabotage Soviet military personnel in Cuba) provided every precaution is taken to prevent attribution. The President approved the sabotage of cargoes on Cuban ships and the crippling of ships (through sand in the gears, etc.). With respect to Russian language broadcasts, the President (a) rejected such broadcasts by exile groups over Radio Caribe in the Dominican Republic, (b) rejected black intrusion on Radio Moscow Russian language broadcasts, and (c) withheld a decision on the use of such broadcasts on Radio Liberty from North Carolina, pending consultation with Llewelyn Thompson. Pursuant to Special Group approval of the use of DoD facilities to support training of CIA agents, General Rosson and I met with CIA representatives yesterday and agreed to provide certain weapons training on a military reservation, under such circumstances that the trainees would not know they were being trained by military personnel and would not know they were on a military reservation. Such training will probably commence within the next several days. Parachute jump training under comparable circumstances will commence at a later date but within the next few weeks. We have also agreed with CIA that we would spot about 20 inductees now in training at Fort Jackson whom we consider to have the necessary characteristics for CIA operationsinside Cuba. These personnel, along with those given jump training under 5 above, would also be used in advance of the introduction of Special Forces, should there be a decision to invade Cuba. It now appears virtually certain that Dr. Cardona will resign within the next day or two. JACJrPrinted from a copy that bears these type initials.
310. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence McCone to President KennedySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, JOB 80-B01285A, DCI’s Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the top of the memorandum reads: “Read by the Pres 4/10 at 1:00 p.m. Note retained.” Washington, April 10, 1963. SUBJECT Donovan Negotiations with Castro James Donovan returned from Cuba yesterday after a four-day visit. As a result of talks with Castro, the Americans imprisoned on the Isle of Pines are to be released on 22 April. During the intervening period Castro will observe closely American policy toward Cuba and make sure that the Red Cross deliveries are being concluded in good faith. The main thrust of Donovan’s discussion, however, was political and can best be evaluated by a very confidential statement made to Donovan by Doctor Vallejo, a close personal advisor of Castro who was present at the meetings. Vallejo said Castro knew that relations with the United States are necessary and Castro wanted these developed. However, there are certain Cuban Government officials, communists, who are strongly opposed, even more than certain people in the United States. These officials are under close surveillance. They have no great following in Cuba; but if they rebelled at this time, Cuba would be in chaos. He believed that Donovan and Castro could work out a plan for a reasonable relationship between the two countries.The Donovan-Castro meetings were discussed after what McCone called an Executive Committee meeting on April 10. McCone was mistaken. it was a meeting of the full Council, dealing mostly with Laos, after which McCone and the President had a private meeting. In that meeting Kennedy expressed great interest in the information in paragraph 2 and raised questions about Castro’s future within Cuba, with or without the Soviet presence. McCone stated that the matter was under study and he proposed to send Donovan back to Cuba on April 22 to secure freedom of the remaining prisoners and also keep the channel of communication open. McCone worried that there might be a confrontation over U.S. aerial surveillance between then and April 22, but the President insisted it must continue and the U.S. Government must be prepared to act if a plane was shot down. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. Donovan had two sessions with Castro, one for five hours, the other for fourteen hours. A variety of subjects were covered including the role of Red China in world politics, the Cuban economy, and Cuba’s role in Latin America. In discussing any subject Castro came around to relating it to Castro’s plan for developing Cuba. Castro finds the Soviet Union useful, but Cuba under Castro he claims will never become a Soviet satellite. He emphasized that the Cuban role in Latin America depended upon Cuba’s viability rather than the export of subversion. Donovan has the confidence of Castro, who believes that Donovan is sincere and direct with no official ties to the United States Government. Our debriefing of Donovan is continuing. John A. McCone
311. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 83, April 18, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone. Washington, April 11, 1963. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963 PRESENT Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-3 Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4

[Here follows discussion of items 1-3, unrelated to Cuba.]

4. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April,Reference is to a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group, which outlines three specific sabotage operations proposed for April 15 to May 15. (Ibid., April 11, 1963) Another more general paper, also dated April 9, entitled “A General Sabotage and Harassment Program Against Cuba,” was sent from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs to the Special Group. (Ibid.) giving a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program, and outlining proposals in this field for the next month. The Group approved this projection. In response to a question about the status of Manolo Ray’s people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,Cottrell commented on both papers in April 11 memoranda to U. Alexis Johnson. (Ibid.) The third paper has not been identified. on the three papers being considered at today’s meeting were noted. The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known. He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals, etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups, it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma. Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the removal of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also commented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more effective than the usual run.

It was decided that probably Friday, the 19th of April, a presentation should be made to higher authority at which time all responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the preparation of this paper.Apparent reference to Document 318.

[Here follows discussion of items 5-7, unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.
312. Message From President Kennedy to Chairman KhrushchevSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-A, 1/4/63-4/11/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Washington, April 11, 1963.

Dear Mr. Chairman: It has been some time since I have written you directly, and I think it may be helpful to have some exchange of views in this private channel.In an April 11 memorandum to Rusk, Thompson stated that when delivering this message to Dobrynin on April 11 at 2 p.m., he told the Soviet Ambassador: “I wished to underscore one point in the message, and said that in doing so, I knew I was reflecting the views of my highest superiors, and that was the usefulness of continued withdrawal of troops from Cuba.” (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 77 D 163, Pen Pal Series, Special US-USSR Files) As we have both earlier agreed, it is of great importance that we should try to understand each other clearly, so that we can avoid unnecessary dangers or obstacles to progress in the effort for peaceful agreements.

[Here follow the President’s remarks on the test ban treaty and the spread of nuclear weapons; the full text of the letter is in volume VI, pages 265–268.]

Although together we found workable arrangements for ending the very dangerous crisis which was created when strategic weapons were introduced into Cuba last year, I am sure we can agree that the situation in that island is not yet satisfactory or reassuring to those who care for the peace of the Caribbean. Although the recent withdrawal of a number of your forces has been an important contribution to the reduction of tension, the continued presence of Soviet forces in Cuba can never be regarded with equanimity by the people of this Hemisphere and therefore further withdrawals of such forces can only be helpful.

Meanwhile, we on our side have been endeavoring to reduce tension in this area in a number of ways. For example, the fundamental justification of our practice of peaceful observation of Cuba is precisely that it is necessary to prevent further increase in tension and a repetition of the dangers of last fall. Without such peaceful observation in 1962, this Hemisphere would have been confronted with intolerable danger, and the people of the Hemisphere could not now accept a situation in which they were without adequate information on the situation in Cuba. It is for this reason that this peaceful observation must continue, and that any interference with it from Cuba would necessarily evoke whatever response was necessary to retain it.

We are also aware of the tensions unduly created by recent private attacks on your ships in Caribbean waters; and we are taking action to halt those attacks which are in violation of our laws, and obtaining the support of the British Government in preventing the use of their Caribbean islands for this purpose. The efforts of this Government to reduce tensions have, as you know, aroused much criticism from certain quarters in this country. But neither such criticism nor the opposition of any sector of our society will be allowed to determine the polices of this Government. In particular, I have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba; I consider that it is for the Cuban people themselves to decide their destiny. I am determined to continue with policies which will contribute to peace in the Caribbean.

[Here follows a brief call for U.S.-Soviet cooperation on Laos.]

There are other issues and problems before us, but perhaps I have said enough to give you a sense of my own current thinking on these matters. Let me now also offer the suggestion that it might be helpful if some time in May I should send a senior personal representative to discuss these and other matters informally with you. The object would not be formal negotiations, but a fully frank, informal exchange of views, arranged in such a way as to receive as little attention as possible. If this thought is appealing to you, please let me know your views on the most convenient time.

In closing, I want again to send my warm personal wishes to you and all your family. These are difficult and dangerous times in which we live, and both you and I have grave responsibilities to our families and to all of mankind. The pressures from those who have a less patient and peaceful outlook are very great—but I assure you of my own determination to work at all times to strengthen world peace.Printed from an unsigned copy.

313. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1-4/20/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, April 11, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba—Covert Actions

The Cottrell Committee met Wednesday afternoonApril 10. to discuss a number of items which are to come up at the Special Group meeting. Secretary Vance, Sterling Cottrell, Dez FitzGerald, Bob Hurwitch and Joe Califano attended. Here are some of the points.

Black Operations—A number of new intelligence operations were approved with little comment. Sabotage Targets for April/May—Dez FitzGerald presented three targets for approval—a railway bridge, some petroleum storage facilities and a molasses storage vessel. During the Committee’s discussion and approval of the three targets, a number of points were made. This will meet the President’s desire for some noise level and for some action in the immediate future. These are relatively soft targets. They will not hurt the Cubans terribly much. (Unfortunately, this is usually the case with soft targets—the ones that really hurt are hard and require extensive planning.) These targets will not be attacked before April 22, if it looks as if the American prisoners will be released on that date. The Special Group should be aware of the consequences of these raids. For example, raids from the outside may prompt Cuban firings near or at American ships. Sabotage of Cuban Shipping—The Committee split on the question of limpets. Secretary Vance was against limpets because of the possibility of sinkings. While Cott went along with limpets, Bob Hurwitch pointed out that there are dangers in attaching them in Free World ports. It could prove very embarrassing to U.S. relations with other governments; this aspect should be considered on a port-by-port basis. Dez pointed out that operating in Havana harbor was difficult.

Attacks from the Inside—Dez pointed out that, as a general rule, it was difficult to control sabotage from the inside. So far, sabotage has been taboo; our people inside Cuba have been restrained. Once the taboo is lifted, it will be difficult to restrict them to certain targets; they may hit targets we never dreamed of. Also, we will not have control over the exact timing of the raids.

Dez said that probably one of the best targets inside Cuba is the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. It would really hurt the Cubans but would be a complicated and difficult job and would take about eight months to accomplish. He urged getting started on the planning.

 Attacks from the Outside—The Committee agreed that these attacks could and should be approved on a project-by-project basis. General—Dez feels that the President wants some action. Dez is working on a program which will show continuous motion. The soft targets, which are generally unimportant, will be first because they require the least preparation. As time goes on, however, we will be hitting some harder and more important targets. GC
314. Memorandum Prepared by Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret. Washington, April 15, 1963.

As I analyze it, the situation in Cuba is about as follows: Undeniably there has been a withdrawal. A figure of 4,000 can be supported by visual observation, analyses of shipping, refugee and clandestine reports. There is no evidence of withdrawal of equipment. In fact, there is evidence of the recent introduction of some equipment of an undisclosed nature during the last several months. Some reports, including statements by Castro and other high Cuban officials, would lead to the conclusion that a continuing, gradual Soviet withdrawal is to be expected and will be completed in about a year. At this time all Soviet equipment including SAM sites will have been turned over to the Cubans. This is contradicted by evidences of Soviet intention to stay in Cuba, the most persuasive being substantial permanent construction of facilities to house Soviet personnel.

At the present time the Soviets are manning the SAM sites, coastal defense missiles, KOMAR ships, MIG-21 aircraft and maintaining their 4 military encampments of about battalion size. The appearance of Cuban tents adjacent to each of the 4 camps could mean one of two things: A Cuban training program, or Utilization of Cubans for support activities such as camp maintenance, mess hall duty, etc.

Under the latter assumption, it could be that personnel withdrawn have been support personnel, and that the combat personnel remain intact. Soviet Cuban relationships remain strained but not as seriously strained as they were last Fall. A situation has evolved which both sides seem willing to live with. Castro is asserting and declaring his independ-ence of the Soviets. He considers that he is not a satellite but he is obviously beholden to the Soviets for economic aid and military assist-ance.

We have no hard intelligence which would indicate a change in Castro’s basic attitude toward other Latin American governments. Castro’s talks with Donovan have been mild in nature, conciliatory and reasonably frank. Of greater significance is Dr. Vallejo’s private statements to Donovan that Castro realizes he must find a rapprochement with the United States if he is to succeed in building a viable Cuba. Apparently Castro does not know how to go about this, therefore the subject has not been discussed with Donovan.

315. Memorandum of a Conference With President KennedySource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone on April 16. Palm Beach, Florida, April 15, 1963, 5:30 p.m. SUBJECT Meeting with the President—5:30—15 Apr 1963

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

3. Discussed in some detail the Donovan negotiations in Cuba. Gave the President a copy of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] summary of the Donovan discussionsNot found. and a copy of my memorandum of April 15th on Cuba.Apparent reference to Document 314. President raised the question of Miro Cardona, stated that Cardona had misrepresented the facts. I urged that the President not involve himself personally in a public argument with Miro Cardona.In an undated memorandum to McCone, written after April 13, FitzGerald reported that Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, had stated his intention to resign unless he had word that President Kennedy was prepared to discuss the matter with him or unless he had a clear indication that there was a plan for the liberation of Cuba. Miro planned to publish a resignation letter denouncing U.S. policy toward Cuba. FitzGerald stated that Miro’s usefulness to the U.S. Government had ended, even if he should reconsider his decision to resign. (Central Intelligence Agency, McCone/DCI Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963)

I raised the question of the possibility of working on Castro with the objective of disenchanting him with his Soviet relations causing him to break relations with Khrushchev, to effect the removal of Soviet troops from Cuba, reorient his policies with respect to Latin America, and establish in Cuba government satisfactory to the rest of the Hemisphere. I explained to the President that the Cuban problem must be solved in one of two ways; either the manner outlined above or alternatively, by bringing consistent pressure of every possible nature on Khrushchev to force his withdrawal from Cuba, and then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of the Soviets troops (but not before) and thereafter establish a satisfactory government in Cuba. I stated to the President that we were studying both courses of action and I had not made up my mind concerning the feasibility of either plan. The President thought both approaches should be carefully examined and suggested the possibility of pursuing both courses at the same time. In any event it was decided that we should keep the Donovan channel open. I advised the President that Donovan has to return to Havana at the end of the week and that I will see him privately prior to his departure.

4. The President and I talked at some length concerning sabotage in Cuba. I expressed grave doubts and pointed out the hazards from his standpoint in view of the stand-down of the hit-and-rUN exile operations, the danger of attribution, etc. The President seemed to question whether active sabotage was good unless it was of a type that could “come from within Cuba.” I said this was very difficult and that the initial operations conceived were from the sea. I said I thought a program should be engaged in only if it was an essential building block in an agreed program to remove the Soviets from Cuba and to take care of Castro.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

316. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/16/63. Secret. Drafted by Thomas A. Parrott of the National Security Council Staff. Washington, April 16, 1963. SUBJECT Review of Cuban Operations for the Standing Group of the NSC

Bromley Smith told me today that the “revived” Standing Group of the NSCThe new NSC StandingGroup was comprised of the following officials: Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Harriman, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor, Attorney General Kennedy, Under Secretary of the Treasury Fowler, Director of USIA Murrow, AID Administrator Bell, Special Counsel to the President Sorensen, and Special Assistant to the President Bundy who served as its chairman. The task of the revived Standing Group was to deal with matters of national security which did not require Presidential determination, a role different from the earlier Standing Group which had been established to organize and monitor the work of the NSC. would consider Cuba at its first meeting, next Tuesday at 5:00April 23; see Document 322. (the “regular” time will be 10:30 Tuesdays). He said that Cottrell will be asked to prepare a paper to be ready by the close of business this Thursday, the 18th.Later—In view of the meeting with higher authority scheduled for Friday the 19th, it has been agreed that the covert annex would be more meaningful if prepared after that. Therefore, the deadline for this will be Monday afternoon. [Footnote in the source text. The annex is Document 318. Monday was April 22.] This will be a status report, not an action document. Mr. Smith said Mr. Bundy had asked that he discuss with me the handling of the Special Group input.

I pointed out to Smith that while the members of the Special Group are also members of the Standing Group (with the exception of Harriman who replaces Johnson for State), some of the other Standing Group members have never been exposed to Special Group affairs and the remainder have been only sporadically. We agreed on the desirability of not spreading knowledge of covert operations any wider than absolutely necessary, if we are to preserve the principle of deniability.

I suggested that Cottrell be instructed to put the report on covert operations in a separate annex, and urged that this not be distributed in advance of Tuesday’s meeting, as the basic paper will be. Mr. Smith agreed that this could probably be handled by passing the annex out at the meeting and retrieving it at the end.

Thomas A. ParrottPrinted from a copy that indicates Parrott signed the original.
317. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President KennedySource: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Hearings Before the Committee on Export Control. Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. Washington, April 17, 1963. SUBJECT Free World Shipping to Cuba

Present Status. Discussions which the United States has conducted with other maritime nations during the past several months about shipping in the Cuban trade resulted in positive action to remove Free World ships from the Cuban trade. Liberia, Turkey, Honduras and Panama have issued official decrees barring their ships from all trade with Cuba. West Germany has issued a decree prohibiting ships under its registry from trade between the Soviet Bloc and Cuba. More recently, a Greek decree prohibited Greek vessels not presently under charter to the Bloc from carrying cargoes to Cuba, and provided that Greek vessels will be withdrawn from the Cuban trade, as present charters expire. The Lebanese have assured us of their cooperation and state that they hope to rewrite their shipping laws within three months. Repeated approaches to the United Kingdom have not been productive, and HMG has reiterated its position that it does not have a legal basis for pulling its vessels out of the Cuban trade. However, HMG has engaged in informal discussions with British shipowners with some effect.

A further spur to action by foreign governments in this regard has been Section 107(b) of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, which in substance provides that no United States economic assistance (not including PL 480) shall be furnished to any country which “permits” ships under its flag to carry “items of economic assist-ance” to Cuba.Public Law 87-874, approved October 23, 1962; 76 Stat 1163-1170.

Another factor has been the fear of shipowners and operators that the ILA would not load cargoes in American ports if their ships engaged in the Cuban trade.

The result of all this has been that the number of Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports was reduced from 337 in the first three months of 1962, to 62 in the first three months of 1963. However, while the number of such ships reached a low point of 12 in January of 1963, it increased to 22 in February and to 28 in March. (The foregoing figures are in part based upon classified information and the public list of ships released by the Maritime Administration in accordance with NSAM 220Document 277. shows 12 in January, 19 in February, and 23 in March.) However, as a part of the increased number of vessels shown for March arrived in ballast to carry out sugar cargoes, there has not been a corresponding increase in the goods brought to Cuba by Free World ships. Preliminary information indicates that the amount of such imports was about the same in March as in January.

The following is a breakdown of the flags of the 78 ships which have arrived through April 17, 1963: United Kingdom 32, Greece 20, Norway 6, Lebanon 6, Italy 4, Yugoslavia 4, Spain 2, Japan 1, West Germany 1, Denmark 1, Morocco 1.

Since January 1, 1963, no Free World ship which has called at a Cuban port has subsequently called at a United States port. One vessel called at a United States port and then proceeded to Cuba. Pursuant to NSAM 220, commitments to withdraw their vessels from all Cuban trade have been or are in the process of being received from a line in each of Japan, Italy, Denmark, and West Germany.

Discussion. The Soviet Bloc has thus far readily replaced Free World vessels withdrawn from the Cuban trade, and can presumably do the same for the remaining vessels. Thus the effects on the Cuban economy are minimal. However, Free World vessels calling at Cuban ports have, in domestic opinion, become a symbol of the willingness of the Free World to cooperate with us with respect to Cuba. Replacement of Free World vessels also in some small degree may increase the cost to the Soviet Bloc of maintaining Cuba.

NSAM 220 was confined to vessels calling at Cuban ports rather than to all ships owned or controlled by a line largely in order at that time further not to exacerbate our relations with Poland and Yugoslavia. To have applied the NSAM to ships owned or controlled by would have meant that ships of those two countries could not have carried their customary share of PL 480 cargoes destined for those two countries. The shipping of those two countries to Cuba has averaged one or two ships per month. It is likely that they will continue their participation in the Cuban trade irrespective of whatever measures we may take short of a naval blockade. Polish and Yugoslav ships are currently carrying United States-financed cargoes under the PL 480 agreements with those countries signed on February 1, 1963, and November 28, 1962, respectively. Yugoslav ships are also carrying some merchandise financed under an outstanding Export-Import Bank credit. Subsequently, a ship of the Moroccan Government line has called at a Cuban port. As this line is also carrying PL 480 cargo from the United States to Morocco, the effects on Morocco would be similar to those on Poland and Yugoslavia.

The strict application of Section 107(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act raises serious problems of fact and policy. Questions of fact are whether a country has “permitted” its ships to carry “economic assistance” and what cargoes may in fact be “economic assistance” as opposed to normal trade. Stringent and extreme application of the Act could result in the cutting-off of all economic assistance to the United Kingdom possessions such as Kenya, British Guiana, et cetera, as well as to Greece. The political disadvantages of such drastic action are of course obvious. Nevertheless, we have and are continuing to press the countries involved to purge themselves of all actions that could require us to invoke the Act. The Battle Act administrator (the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs) is, in accordance with the law, now assembling and transmitting to the AID Administrator factual information bearing on the application of Section 107 for legal determination required of the AID Administrator.

Because of measures now taken by the Greek Government, it appears that, as their charters expire, most if not all of the 20 Greek vessels which have called at Cuban ports since January 1 will be withdrawing from the Cuban trade. (The Greek Government is now assembling exact information on the terms of the various charters.) Commitments from the lines now being obtained will also assure the withdrawal of at least one of the four Italian ships, the one Japanese ship, the one Danish ship, and a West German ship which is now completing its charter. The principal remaining problem is thus the 32 British and six Norwegian ships.

The minimal additional public action that we could now take would be the extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to all ships owned or controlled by anyone owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade. Apart from the not inconsiderable problem of exacerbation of our relations with Morocco, Yugoslavia and Poland, this could have useful and important domestic and international psychological effects. At the request of the Department of State, the Maritime Administration is now urgently studying shipping patterns in order to arrive at some estimate of its practical effect. Preliminary information indicates that its practical effects might be minimal with respect to tankers, which comprise 16 of the 32 British ships engaged in the trade. Mr. McCone feels, and I agree, that it would not be desirable to take additional public steps during the present stage of Mr. Donovan’s negotiations for the release of American prisoners in Cuba.

 Recommendations. Considering all of the foregoing factors, I recommend that: We make another approach to the United Kingdom, through their Ambassador here as well as in London, seeking United Kingdom cooperation and pointing out the necessity of our taking further action unless a prompt reduction in United Kingdom shipping to Cuba can be achieved. Similar approaches be made to Norway, Italy and Spain. We now make all administrative preparations for the issuance, at a time to be subsequently determined, of an extension of the provisions of NSAM 220 to ships owned or controlled by persons owning or controlling vessels engaged in the Cuban trade with a grace period of forty-five days to permit withdrawal of vessels in the course of a voyage at the time the extension is made public. At a time subsequently to be determined, request United States owned or controlled oil companies to refrain voluntarily, within the Western Hemisphere, from bunkering vessels known to be engaged in the Cuban trade, and seek the cooperation of the United Kingdom in the application of a similar policy by British oil companies. (This would have its principal impact on a number of very small vessels which now may be operating between Central American ports and Cuba.) Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.
318. Memorandum From the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs (Cottrell) to the Special GroupSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 77-01131, Sabotage/Destruction. Secret; Eyes Only. A note on the bottom of this memorandum indicated it was prepared for the April 18 meeting of the Special Group, which deferred consideration of this paper until April 25. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, S.G. 84 B, April 25, 1963) Washington, April 18, 1963. SUBJECT Proposed New Covert Policy and Program Towards Cuba The following guidelines are being used in our present covert policy towards Cuba: Producing comprehensive intelligence related to our basic policy objectives. (No offensive weapons reintroduced into Cuba, removal of Soviet forces, no aggressive Cuban military action, reducing subversion in the hemisphere, divorcing Castro from USSR, replacing present regime, maximizing cost to USSR, political isolation of Cuba and preparing for military contingencies.) Intensifying covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime. Supporting the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: a) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and b) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and c) secure intelligence. The use of variety of propaganda media to stimulate passive resistance and low-risk, simple, sabotage actions by the populace of Cuba. The placing of incendiary devices and/or explosives with suitable time delay within the hull or cargo to disable or sink Cuban vessels and/or damage their cargos while on the high seas. Introducing abrasives or other damaging materials into the propulsion, communication and other systems of the ship to inactivate the ship. The questions now to be decided are: Should the U.S. move beyond the above policy to a program of sabotage, harassment and resistance activities? What kind of effective action can be taken? What capabilities do we possess? What repercussions can we expect? With respect to (1.) above, the following considerations apply: U.S. policy statements have consistently reiterated the view that the liberation of Cuba is primarily a function of the Cuban people themselves. The absence of continued harassment against the regime inside Cuba will consolidate its control and indicate the success of Castro in imposing Communism upon the Cuban people. The absence of U.S. assistance inside Cuba to those who desire the overthrow of the Communist regime will deny an important asset. The U.S. effort to assist the fighters for freedom inside Cuba will involve expense and risk of lives to those Cubans who are trained for this purpose. The risk of U.S. involvement through confessions of captured personnel is a continuing one. However, world opinion in the event of such exposure is not likely to be severely damaging to the U.S. position. With respect to (2.) (3.) and (4.) above, the following additional proposals are submitted for consideration (see Annex for details).The annex, April 17, entitled “Prospects for and Limitations of a Maximum Covert Action Program Against the Castro Communist Regime,” is not printed. (Ibid., Book I, Special Group) See the Supplement.

The placing of explosive devices with suitable time delays on the outside of ships either in Cuban or non-Cuban ports.

Considerations: UDT teams can be ready by June for attack in July on a once monthly basis. This measure would place increased strain on Cuban shipping and demoralize Cuban crews. Soviet reaction is likely in form of propaganda and UN demarche. Retaliation in kind or forceful reactions are probably unlikely.

Surface attacks by maritime assets firing on Cuban ships in Cuban waters. When the maritime asset cannot reach the target, shore based attacks on shipping in port or passing the offshore keys will be undertaken.

Considerations: Attack craft from the sea would be manned by Cubans. Shore based attacks by paramilitary trained Cubans firing on ships with recoilless rifles, rocket launchers or 20mm cannon. First sea attack in May and once monthly thereafter. First shore based attack in June. These operations would disrupt coastal commerce. US would probably be blamed. Cuban reprisal measures possible. Soviets likely allege US culpability. Probably no direct Soviet counter-action outside Cuba. Soviets would probably supply additional hardware to Cubans but caution against too aggressive Cuban response.

Externally mounted hit and rUN attacks against land targets. Examples: molasses tanker, petroleum storage dumps, naval refueling base, refineries, power plants.

Considerations: Operations conducted by Cubans with paramilitary training. High possibilities of complex operations going awry. First attack in April with one per month thereafter. Effects would be increased exile morale, some economic disruption. Repercussions would include charges of U.S. sponsorship, and increased Cuban security force activities. Soviet reaction likely to be propaganda-political moves and support to Cuban patrol activity but caution to avoid escalation.

 Support of Internal Resistance Elements, providing materiel and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations.

Considerations: The internal elements being supported will attack targets of their own choosing in their own manner. They will be targets of opportunity in line with their capabilities. Effect could be cumulative and snow-balling. The materiel will be introduced by maritime infiltration, diplomatic channels and concealment in open mail. Indigenous materials will be used and instructions provided. Initial sabotage results within 30 days. This program could produce major economic damage, lift morale and keep resistance alive. Repercussions would involve increased security measures. Soviet reaction largely propaganda and supplies.

Attachment SUBJECT A Covert Harassment/Sabotage Program against Cuba

I. This paper presents a covert Harassment/Sabotage program targeted against Cuba; included are those sabotage plans which have previously been approved as well as new proposals. While this program will cause a certain amount of economic damage, it will in no sense critically injure the economy or cause the overthrow of Castro. It may, however, create a situation which will delay the consolidation and stabilization of Castro’s revolution and may cause some of his 26 July followers to doubt Castro’s ability successfully to create a new Cuba.

Losses in men and equipment with the attendant adverse publicity must be expected. Even without such losses, U.S. attribution will be claimed.

When the policy and guidelines of the overall sabotage program are established, it will be possible progressively to develop up to a limit additional covert assets and support capabilities. However, materially to increase the pace of operations, a period of four to six months is required. Ultimate limiting factors are weather, length of “dark-of-the-moon” period each month and appropriate targets. A source of additional agent personnel is from Cuban personnel trained by the U.S. Military Forces under the recent programs, but released to civilian status.
319. Editorial Note

At the 512th meeting of the National Security Council, April 20, 1963, the issue of Cuba was briefly raised. Most of the discussion at the meeting dealt with Laos; for text, see volume XXIV, pages 976–980. According to Bromley Smith’s summary record, the discussion of Cuba was as follows:

“Director McCone said that our latest information was that the remaining twenty-three American prisoners would probably be leaving Cuba on Monday. He had reports that these prisoners were being moved from the Isle of Pines to Havana. Donovan appeared hopeful that the removal would be completed Monday.

“The President commented that with the prisoners out of Cuba, we might be in a position to act against Cuba if Khrushchev made no move to halt the deterioration in Laos. He asked what action we could take against Cuba.

“Director McCone said we should fly low-level reconnaissance missions which were necessary no matter what happens in Laos. He said we need to have pictures of Soviet convoys, some of which were described in considerable detail by Donovan upon his return from his last visit to Havana.

“Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a U.S. bombing raid on Pathet Lao forces in Laos would be easier for Khrushchev to accept than U.S. action against Cuba.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, National Security Council Meetings, No. 512, 4/20/63)

William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, Directorate of Plans, Central Intelligence Agency, prepared an account of the meeting which he sent to Director of Central Intelligence McCone. Colby’s extract relating to Cuba reads:

“The President stated his belief that it was necessary to raise the pressure somewhat in Cuba. He felt that we could hardly continue to carry out a mild policy in Cuba at the time the Communists are carrying out an aggressive policy in Laos. He thus approved certain U-2 flights over Cuba. These flights and other activities against Cuba, however, will be delayed until the anticipated release by Cuba of prisoners on April 22. The President requested recommendations on April 22 for additional efforts which can be taken in Cuba.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963) The memorandum is printed in volume XXIV, pages 985–988.

320. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63, Part A. Top Secret. Washington, April 21, 1963.

THE CUBAN PROBLEM

The attached papers are circulated as background material for the meeting of the Standing Group now scheduled for Tuesday, April 23, at 5:00 p.m.See Document 322. This meeting will not aim at reaching agreed conclusions, but rather at an initial and wide-ranging discussion of the prospects and alternatives for American policy in Cuba.

The papers attached are intended mainly for reference, and much of their contents will be familiar. Except for Tab 1, which is a White House summary of the problem and of alternative approaches to it, these papers are forwarded from the Office of the Coordinator for Cuban Affairs. Through no fault of the Coordinator, these papers are not fully-up-to-date on certain special aspects of contingency planning, and they omit certain covert plans and operations on which there will be oral briefing Tuesday. The papers are as follows: Tab 1—White House summary Tab 2—(Annex 3), Current SituationAnnex 3 stated that the Cuban economy had continued to decline, with sugar production 60 percent of the 1961 levels, GNP 25 percent below the 1958 level with 20 percent less goods available. It concluded that Castro was the unchalleged leader of Cuba, with the mass of Cubans resigned to his rule and resistance weak and disorganized. The annex estimated that 9,600 Soviet troops and technicians had left Cuba, while in the same time 300-1,000 had arrived. Soviet withdrawals would continue slowly, but a large number of Soviet technicans would remain in Cuba indefinitely. See the Supplement. Tab 3—(Annex 4), Multilateral Efforts to Isolate Cuba and Combat Castro-Communist SubversionNot printed. Tab 4—(Annex 5), Cuban Hemisphere Subversion3 Tab 5—(Annex 6), Economic RestrictionsAnnex 6 suggested that economic restrictions were working. Free world shipping to Cuba was sharply reduced, international civil aviation to Cuba had almost been entirely cut off, free world trade to Cuba was 20 percent of the 1959 figure, and strategic commodities had been blocked from going to Cuba. See the Supplement. Tab 6—(Annex 7), Exile ProblemsAnnex 7 indicated that the U.S. refusal to support Miro Cardona’s demand for an alliance of exile groups for military action under the Cuba Revolutionary Council (CRC) had caused Miro’s resignation and would probably cause the disintegration of the CRC, a “desirable development.” The annex noted that uncontrolled hit and rUN raids had been stopped, members of the Cuban Brigade were offered civilian and military opportunities, and 50,000 Cuban refugees had been resettled outside the Miami area, leaving 125,000 still in the Miami area. See the Supplement. Tab 7—Military Contingency PlanningAnnex 8 contained a description of CINCLANT OPLANSfor Cuba. See the Supplement. Tab 8—The Cuban Situation in Eighteen Months or Two Years (prepared by State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research)In this memorandum, April 18, INR concluded that the Cuban economy would deteriorate, the economic cost of Cuba to the USSR would be somewhat greater, the isolation of Cuba would increase, but otherwise the situation would remain essentially unchanged. It was therefore difficult to reach a definitive judgment on whether time was running out for Castro. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 4/1/63-4/20/63)

By separate distribution I am also circulating an unclassified compilation of the President’s statements on Cuba.Attached, but not printed.

McGeorge Bundy Tab 1 SUBJECT A Sketch of the Cuban Alternatives

I. Present Policy and prospects

Present U.S. policy toward Cuba has the following elements: Prevention of a direct military threat to the U.S. or the Hemisphere from Cuba. To this end it is clear that all necessary measures will be taken. Elimination of Soviet military presence from Cuba. Currently our level of effort here is limited to quite diplomatic pressure and careful public statement. Decisions on further action are deferred pending the result of current efforts. Isolation of Cuba from the rest of the free world. To this end we are ready to exert considerable diplomatic and economic pressure on Western Allies. Counter-action against Cuban/Communist subversion in the Western Hemisphere. We are developing an extensive program of cooperation with Latin American governments in this field, and it is clearly our policy to develop this program energetically. Surveillance to Cuba by all appropriate intelligence operations. It is clear that the maintenance of this surveillance is essential in support of objective 1, above. Covert action to damage the Cuban economy. The possibilities of such action appear limited, but they have not been fully explored. It is current policy to develop additional resources for selective action in this field.

Opinions differ as to the probable result of this policy in the absence of major shifts inside Cuba or in Soviet or Cuban behavior. At Tab 8 is an informal memorandum from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department on this topic. This memorandum is to be supplemented soon by a community-wide intelligence assessment. The probability is that in the absence of new developments, the policy outlined above will not lead to early major change in Cuba.

II. Possible New Directions

Broadly speaking, major changes in the situation can be produced in one of two ways: either we can await events which would permit or require new action by the United States Government, or we can initiate actions designed to produce major change, whether or not the actions of others produce crisis opportunities.

Contingency Planning

Contingency planning currently envisages three kinds of cases in which stepped-up action is intended: Interference with U.S. surveillance Any new major Soviet military intrusion or any significant military move from Cuba against the Hemisphere Possible general action against Cuba in the context of an international crisis originating elsewhere.

Contingency planning for b. and c. is limited so far to straight military planning on a wholly hypothetical basis. Planning for a. is primarily directed toward the immediate objective of insuring continued surveillance by a minimum necessary force. The broader political question is whether these or other contingencies should be regarded as opportunities for deliberately enlarged action aimed at a major political result. On the one hand, contingency planning can be based on the premise that we wish to protect and restore the situation existing immediately before the new crisis; this was essentially the purpose of U.S. policy in the October missile crisis. Alternatively, contingency planning can be developed with the purpose of using a given critical development as a means of changing the situation in ways advantageous to us. It is obvious that greater commitments of force and greater risks are inevitable in such alternative planning, and it is equally obvious that these greater commitments and risks may not be desirable in any given case. The point here is simply that such choices are a necessary element of the choice of responses to any particular contingency. Perhaps the Standing Group should give some attention to the question whether wider contingency planning—or at least contingency thinking—is needed.

 Possible New Initiatives

A decision to force a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means.

Such a decision would imply the development of pressures which would insure gradual escalation of the confrontation in Cuba to whatever point was necessary to produce the overthrow of the present regime. Such a policy would not exclude the use of contingencies as a means for advancing U.S. policy, but it would require that the pace be forced and that pressures be sustained in such a way, at every stage, as to prevent solutions short of overthrow of the regime. A program of this kind might or might not be openly avowed at the outset. It might proceed at varying rates of speed and with varying concern for public support here and abroad. Probably its dominant feature would be a willingness to use military force to invade Cuba, and it seems probable too that this invasion would have to be carried through.

A decision to insist on major but limited ends.

The United States could deliberately adopt a policy of gradually increasing pressure designed to produce more limited results at least initially. Possible objectives are the total withdrawal of Soviet military forces, the verifiable abandonment of subversive training in Cuba, the reopening of the island to peaceful on-site visitation and inspection by non-Communists—or all three. Such a program again might be developed at varying rates of speed and with varying combinations of political and military pressure. Probably it would require a clear willingness to move to the level of a POL blockade, and at a guess such a blockade might in fact have to be established at some point.

 The U.S. could move in the direction of gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro.

Faint hints of this possibility appear in Donovan explorations and elsewhere. There is always the possibility that Castro or others currently high in the regime might find advantage in a gradual shift away from their present level of dependence on Moscow. In strictly economic terms, both the United States and Cuba have much to gain from reestablishment of relations. A Titoist Castro is not inconceivable, and a full diplomatic revolution would not be the most extraordinary event in the 20th century. The Special Group may feel that this possibility also should be explored.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the three possibilities sketched above are not wholly exclusive of one another. In particular, the process of gradual pressure outlined in b. could be developed in support of both course a. and course c. Indeed, it is possible to begin on course b. without deciding between a. and c., and conceivably the process of gradual pressure could be so developed that Castro could be made to confront a decisive choice between his overthrow and an accommodation on terms acceptable to us.

McGeorge Bundy
321. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (Kent) to Director of Central Intelligence McConeSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President’s weekend reading of April 27. Washington, April 22, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba a Year HenceA National Intelligence Estimate on the Cuban situation and prospects is now scheduled for USIB consideration in May. [Footnote in the source text.]

CONCLUSIONS

Various indications and evidence which have accumulated during the past two months seem to us to form a pattern which permits certain tentative conclusions to be drawn respecting trends in Soviet-Cuban relations and in Soviet intentions respecting Cuba. It now appears that the Castro regime and the USSR have overcome for the most part the difficulties in their relations resulting from the October missile crisis and have managed to devise a common policy aimed primarily at easing tensions over Cuba in order to be able to consolidate the present regime. They probably intend to continue this policy until they are satisfied that Cuba can again be used as a Communist base for forward action without excessive risk. The USSR has evidently decided to supply sufficient economic aid to sustain the Cuban economy at about the current level, and will probably train Cubans in the operation of the Soviet military equipment now in Cuba under Soviet control. It seems likely to us that a year hence most of this equipment, except perhaps for the SAM system, will have been turned over to the Cubans, and the Soviet military presence in Cuba will probably have been further reduced. Such a development would tend to improve considerably the Cuban and the Soviet image in Latin America, though it could not completely offset all the adverse effects of the missile crisis. For the time being, Castro, perhaps in Soviet persuasion, has toned down his inflammatory appeals for violent revolutions throughout Latin America. There is no indication, however, of a basic change in Castro’s determination to promote insurgent movements. In his mind Venezuela in particular continues to be a priority target. In our view, if present trends continue, both in the reduction of Soviet forces and the training of Cuban personnel, this would mean that the USSR did not contemplate an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons into Cuba. It is true that the risks of detection would be less than those attending the original operation. The Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible to adopt improved measures of camouflage and deception, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence will be relying upon. Thus we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles. A year hence (barring Castro’s death or some decisive US intervention in the situation) the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established than ever. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and efficiency. The “year of organization” will result in the further development of the PURS, Castro’s all-purpose political machine. The Cuban economy will probably not be much better than it is today, but also probably will not be much worse. Castro’s prestige will have been enhanced by the acquisition of advanced weapon systems, and by the consequent demonstration of his “independence.”

[Here follows the discussion portion of the paper, 14 pages; see the Supplement.]

322. Summary Record of the 2d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A). Top Secret. Washington, April 23, 1963, 5 p.m.

The basis of the discussion was a memorandum prepared by Mr. Bundy entitled “A Sketch of the Cuba Alternatives.”See the attachment to Document 320.

Secretary McNamara stated that before the group discussed substance, it should consider whether the present policy we are following would produce a major change in Cuba. He expressed his firm view that Castro’s position over the short term would improve if we took no actions other than those now under way or projected. He made clear his belief that the elimination of the Castro regime was a requirement and that, if others agreed our present policy would not result in its downfall, we should develop a program for approval which would produce changes acceptable to us. The program should aim at creating such a situation of dissidence within Cuba as to allow the U.S. to use force in support of anti-Castro forces without leading to retaliation by the USSR on the West.

Mr. McCone summarized information leading him to believe that Castro’s position in Cuba would be stronger a year or two years from now than it is at present. He expressed his belief that present policy would not cause a major change in Cuba and that the Russians could provide sufficient aid and technical assistance to permit the Cuban economy to remain about where it is now or slightly improve.

Assistant Secretary Martin did not fully agree with the views of the Secretary of Defense or Mr. McCone with respect to the effect of existing policy on the Castro regime. He cited evidence to indicate that present measures are crippling the Cuban economy, leading to shortages, lack of spare parts, and even sufficient food to permit full rations for Cuban militia. Mr. Martin saw no possibility of getting Castro to defect from the USSR. He said there was no way to finance Cuba during the transition period until Castro, by his deeds, had proved that he had broken his ties with the USSR. He said, for example, Congress would never approve the sugar quota for Cuba early enough to avoid a collapse of the Cuban economy cut loose from the USSR andnot yet aided by the U.S. Furthermore, he said Castro was the kind of a man who might make promises and not keep them, i.e. he did not stay bought. The possibility of persuading Castro to leave Cuba was not feasible because Castro was a true revolutionary who could not be induced to give up his revolution.

The Attorney General proposed three studies: A list of measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2. A program with the objective of overthrowing Castro in eighteen months. A program to cause as much trouble as we can for Communist Cuba during the next eighteen months.

Under Secretary Ball stated the view that we should not look at Cuba from the point of view of Cuba alone. He said the Cuban problem was a part of our relations with the USSR and with our global battle against Communist aggression. He urged that our policy toward Cuba always be kept in this perspective. The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Cuba and the disappearance of the Soviet presence in Cuba was of major importance to us.

USIA Director Murrow stated his view that we need promptly a statement of what we would think was an acceptable post-Castro Cuba.

Secretary Dillon raised certain questions as to what kind of a Cuba we could live with if it were no longer rUN by Castro or tied to Moscow. He said that American companies had written off their expropriated sugar properties in Cuba but the question remained as to who would own these properties in the event Castro and Communism disappeared in Cuba.

There was a discussion on what we would do for a non-Communist Cuba and what we could do to get Castro to defect from the USSR. There appeared to be some differing views as to whether economic measures we can take would wreck the Cuban economy or whether the only result would be to raise the cost to the USSR of maintaining Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen listed the seven objectives raised at the meeting as follows: Improve our present course of action by doing some things that we are not now doing. Agree on military responses which we should make to contingencies, such as the shooting down of a U-2 plane. Develop a program to get rid of Castro. Measures to disrupt the economy of Cuba. A program to induce Soviet withdrawal. The detachment of Cuba from Moscow. A program of support for dissident elements in Cuba.The Record of Action of this meeting, April 23, reads as follows: “Following discussion of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba, it was agreed that discussions would be continued at the next meeting scheduled for 10:30 am, Tuesday, April 30. It was also agreed that it is important that present lines of policy and operation should be continued.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meetings, 4/23/63 (Part A))

Overriding all these points would be a statement of our views as to the kind of a regime we would want to see in Cuba post-Castro.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
323. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, 303, Committee Meetings. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, April 25, 1963. SUBJECT Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963 PRESENT Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1-4 Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5 Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3 Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

4. Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

The DCI said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this situation.

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly, Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher authority this afternoon.See Document 324.

5. Proposed New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes. Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment. The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests; on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban retaliation. Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops, contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open intervention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympathetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major operational obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty of persuading individual Cubans of this type to place their trust in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them that the U.S. will be sympathetic to possible successors to the present government, even though such people may have been former Castro supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S. interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however, that a “scenario” will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who in the government should respond to accusations in this field and what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that covert action which might be used as a pretext for overt military intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper contains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea. He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this proposition because of the possibility that the explosions would be attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr. Vance’s argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to the proposals as follows: The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be more carefully defined. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further technical studies. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature. Externally mounted hit-and-rUN attacks against land targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which can be rUN in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with other resistance activities. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in conjunction with related operations.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Cuba.]

Thomas A. Parrott
324. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone. Washington, April 25, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting with the President, Rusk, McCone, McNamara, and Bundy, 25 April, to discuss low-level overflights

Bundy presented the DCI paperReference to an April 25 memorandum from McCone to the Special Group noting the USIB recommendation for low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. The request had been deferred until the end of the Donovan mission and then deferred once more while Harriman was in Moscow. On April 24 the USIB asked again for low-level reconnaissance on 10 priority installations and facilities and expected coverage of 15 more. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. and then explained the opposition which had been expressed to him by McNamara.Evidence of McNamara’s opposition can be found in a telephone conversation with Ball, April 19. (Kennedy Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) See the Supplement. McNamara took very strong opposition to conducting low-levels because of political consequences, and furthermore stated that, in his opinion, there was absolutely no need for overflights from the intelligence point of view. McCone contradicted this statement stating that this matter had been carefully reviewed by USIB and that on last WednesdayApril 17. each member of USIB, including all six representatives of DOD, the State representative, the CIA representative and others, had favored low-levels for the reasons expressed in the COMOR paperApparent reference to USIB-D-41, April 20, subject: “Priority Requirements for Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba,” in which COMOR reanalyzed the requirements for such reconnaissance. The paper, which has not been found, is summarized in McCone’s memorandum to the Special Group, April 25; see footnote 1 above. and because of the inadequacy of high-level reconnaissance. All of this was based on intelligence needs.

Rusk very briefly reviewed the political consequences as expressed by Johnson in the 5412 meeting,Reference is to the 5412 Special Group meeting; see Document 323. earlier in the day. However, he took no strong position. McNamara asked Rusk for a statement in writing of the political consequences. McCone put forth a very positive argument to the President, pointing out the areas in Cuba which had gone unsurveyed for as long as 12 days at a time and the incidents in which high-level photography could neither confirm nor deny reports which were ominous and gave McCone concern, and gave the intelligence community concern.

The President felt that the Administration could not very well ignore a request of DCI and USIB. He proposed three rather than six sorties on a trial basis and asked that such a recommendation be made. In any event, nothing will be done until Harriman’s return.

Action: General Carter should review this whole matter and should develop three most desirable targets including one of the armed camps. He should write a precise and full justification. (COMOR’s justifications are too broad and many other arguments are based on the need for increasing the total inventory of intelligence.) The President felt that justification should be on the basis of the fact that we did not know about specific locations, construction, or activities. He questioned whether we could justify low-levels which would be provocative if we were merely increasing our inventory of intelligence or technical information. DCI agreed this was to be done promptly.

Note: Rusk at one point mentioned that perhaps we should not escalate the tensions in Cuba but should wait until there was an indication of escalation by the Soviets and the Cubans, then go with low-levels. McCone reported that this might be too late, that it was possible that the Soviets would, in secrecy, develop some move which might threaten the United States and that we would not detect them. Therefore, we could not wait for the Soviet “escalation” to take place. What we have to do is keep the island under surveillance, develop all comprehensive intelligence, so that we would know in advance of any such escalation of ominous move on the part of the Soviets.

Note: I expect quite an argument over this problem. I therefore think our case should be very carefully prepared. I took the position that the intelligence community felt that they could not depend exclusively on high-level photography and still say with assurance that we knew all there was to know about what was going on in Cuba.

325. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President KennedySource: Department of State, Central Files, POL 30-2 Cuba. Secret. Drafted by Hurwitch, and cleared by Cottrell, Martin, and Ball. Washington, April 25, 1963. SUBJECT U.S. Relations with the Present Cuban Revolutionary Council

Miro’s resignation and the accompanying withdrawal of most of the CRC componentorganizations and personalities has converted the CRC into a rump organization of little attraction in the exile community. This CRC remnant, which within itself is divided, essentially constitutes “Tony” Varona’s effort to preserve his personal political machine, established through his control over the years of fifty per cent of the U.S.-supplied CRC funds. Varona, who lacks wide support, is actively seeking adhesion from a wide variety of exile leaders including Batista elements. We doubt that unity of the exiles under present circumstances is an achievable goal. The highly individualistic Cubans, who were really not “unified” in the pre-Castro era, are usually not inclined to submerge differences and organize themselves. The frustrations of exile life in general and the absence of “proof that Castro’s end is in sight” in particular combine to aggravate rather than decrease differences.

The CRC has been receiving $137,000 monthly. In addition, seven exile organizations (some of which are CRC members) receive a total of $103,500 monthly. The next monthly installment of U.S. financial assist-ance is due the CRC on May 1. While some possibility exists that the CRC may dissolve of its own accord before May 1, its demise would be virtually certain were U.S. aid withheld. If the CRC disappeared, some of its present and many of its former component organizations would require our financial assistance to enable us to accomplish the intelligence, propaganda and other clandestine tasks we have set.

In causing the CRC rump to disappear by withholding the May installment we would: Reduce substantially our intimate involvement in exile politics. Sever our relationship with an unrepresentative exile group, thus avoiding charges of imposing our will on the exile community. Enhance the possibility of the eventual emergence of a more widely supported exile leader by enabling exile political forces to operate more freely. Avoid the possibility of a “Miro resignation” recurring at a more inopportune time from the domestic political standpoint. Create the opportunity for an unencumbered review in depth of what our basic policy toward the exiles should be. Incur criticism from some sectors of the exile community and of U.S. public opinion that we were engaging in further “persecution” of the exiles.

Temporizing with the CRC by provisionally extending its life for another month or so would increase the difficulty of disengaging later.

On balance, the Department recommends:A note at the top of the source text indicates Chase called from the White House to say that this memorandum was “O.K.” and the decision to call off aid had been made. Chase stated that “something should be done for Varona.” that the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs at Miami be authorized to inform CRC officials before May 1 that while we wish to maintain cordial relations with exile leaders and continue to consult them frequently, we do not believe that the CRC as presently constituted warrants continued U.S. financial support. Discontinuance of salaries would be accomplished gracefully, i.e. accompanied by notice and lump sum termination payments. that certain former and present CRC componentorganizations essential to achieving our intelligence and other missions continue to receive U.S. financial assistance.

Dean RuskPrinted from a copy that indicates the original was signed by Rusk.
326. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Central Files, POL CUBA-US. Secret. Approved in M on May 6. The source text indicates that it is Part II of IV. Moscow, April 25, 1963, 3 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PLACE The Kremlin, in the Office of the Chairman of Council of Ministers PARTICIPANTS USSR N.S. Khrushchev Andrei Gromyko S.G. Lapin Viktor Sukhodrev—translator US Under Secretary W. Averell Harriman Ambassador Foy D. Kohler Mr. Michael V. Forrestal Mr. William H. Sullivan

Governor Harriman raised the President’s concern with Cuba. Khrushchev answered with some emotion: “What can Cuba do with her seven millions? You have laid a dozen Cubas around us, Turkey, Greece, Iran, Norway, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Japan”—to which Gromyko added South Korea.

Harriman said we had no substantial troops in any of the countries the Chairman mentioned, except Germany and Japan. The President is concerned about Soviet troops in Cuba and had expected Khrushchev would make a significant reduction in Soviet forces on the basis of their understanding.

Khrushchev claimed they have removed three to five times the number of troops reported in the American press, but that he would not disclose the exact numbers “because if I do you will boast that you have squeezed new concessions from the Russians. Anyway, this is a question for us and the Cubans”.

Harriman said that we had reported the removal of about 4,000 Soviet troops from Cuba since the end of the year; five times that number was 20,000 and since the Soviets presumably had only 17,000 in Cuba at that time this left us with a figure of minus 3,000 which was apparently some sort of special Russian arithmetic. Khrushchev replied he would have to have a special report prepared to know exactly what numbers were involved, and there wasn’t time for this now.

Harriman said that because Soviet troops remain in Cuba President Kennedy was having a great deal of difficulty keeping the country quiet on the Cuba issue. If Mr. Khrushchev could either correct the President’s understanding about the numbers of troops that had been withdrawn, or withdraw more, he was sure the President would cooperate in avoiding any embarrassment for the Soviets.

Khrushchev replied that this had become a very complicated and difficult question mostly because there was so much clamor in the United States. There is nothing the Soviets can do to satisfy those who are the chief critics of the President on this issue. The President must take care of them himself.

Harriman said the President would not want to use erroneous figures in confronting his domestic opposition and it would be very helpful to him if he could have some more accurate figures. Khrushchev, somewhat excited, replied that this matter affects the sovereignty and pride of the Soviet Union … the Soviet Union is not accountable to the United States and cannot appear before the world as constantly conceding to American pressure. While he did not want to complicate life for the President and would in principle be ready to furnish information to the President, the latter’s critics would only say this proved the need for more pressure on the Soviet Union because only pressure produced results, and that would make the situation worse. He could state that the Soviet military personnel were there only temporarily, teaching the Cubans to use the equipment they had received from the Soviet Union, after which they would return.

Harriman asked why the Soviets could not remove all their organized troop units, leaving only the instructors behind. Khrushchev replied this was a matter for the Soviets and the Cubans, and they were not accountable to anyone else. Harriman said he hoped Khrushchev understood that this was a very serious subject and that organized military units are more difficult problems than instructors. If these units were removed, feeling would be improved. Khrushchev said if the United States wants normal relations with the Soviet Union, don’t aggravate the issues, don’t ask questions which cause tensions for us, don’t irritate our national pride. Even with a million Soviet troops there, Cuba could not be an invasion springboard. Let the President deal with his own problems at home and keep the lid on the Americans. If he doesn’t want to do that, let him escalate the matter. We are ready for friendship, but are prepared to deal with the other alternative. Neither of us wants to start anything over Cuba, but if anything is started, the Soviets have retaliatory strength.

Governor Harriman said Cuba is creating much tension in the whole Caribbean area and if it is not important to the Soviets to have troops in there why don’t they take them out, and leave only instructors.

Khrushchev repeated sharply that that was the business of the Soviets and the Cubans. It is a question of sovereignty. He asked about the Polaris and American bases in the UK, Greece, Turkey, Spain, Portugal, all directed against the USSR. Still we want them to report to the United States on their troops. The Soviets long ago raised the question, in the context of disarmament proposals, of mutual troop withdrawals from all foreign territory. Why don’t the Americans agree to this? Moreover, why don’t we leave Guantanamo? “By what right do you stay, because you are strong?” However, the Soviets will not raise this point; that is strictly between Cuba and the United States, even though the whole world knows the Americans aren’t welcome there and that the Soviet Union supports Castro’s position. The Soviets will not try to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba and the United States in this regard. That sort of interference can only lead to war.

Khrushchev repeated that “we really have withdrawn a lot of troops,” and “we have not replaced any … we have withdrawn. All the troops needed to guard the rocket installations were withdrawn after the rockets were taken out”. He understood the President’s difficulties and believed the President has a very sound understanding of the situation. Recent statements by the President and Secretary Rusk indicate there is in the United States a sober appreciation of the situation. This fact will help the Soviets in dealing with the Cubans, and the Soviets intend to train the Cubans as fast as possible in order to make the presence of Soviet instructors unnecessary. The Russians didn’t like the Cuban climate.

Harriman pointed out that, in addition to United States statements, the President has taken many actions which should not be overlooked. Khrushchev agreed that the President’s actions and his words were very encouraging. Immediately after the crisis last fall, United States policy had been somewhat irritating, but now it seemed quite reasonable. Moreover, he believed that an absolute majority of the American people were behind the President in his sober policy and that his opponents had no clear program.

327. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, Feb thru April 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, April 29, 1963.

Are we keeping our Cuban contingency invasion plans up to date? I notice that there have been a number of new judgments on the amount of equipment that the Cubans have. I thought last October the number of troops we planned to have available was rather limited and the success of the operation was dependent upon, in large measure, our two airborne divisions getting in and controlling the two airfields. It seems to me that we should strengthen our contingency plans on this operation.

John Kennedy
328. Editorial Note

On April 29, 1963, President Kennedy received a letter from Chairman Khrushchev through a private communication channel. It was in response to President Kennedy’s message of April 11;Document 312. The letter is printed in full in volume VI, pages 265-268. The following extract of the letter relates to Cuba:

“Already for a protracted period, in the exchange of opinions between us no matter in what channels they took place, one and the same question has inevitably arisen—concerning the situation around Cuba. To a considerable degree this is understandable if one considers how we passed through a most dangerous crisis in the fall of last year. But it is impossible not to recognize also that tension around Cuba decreases too slowly and at times rises anew not unlike the way the mercury jumps in the thermometers of the present spring.

“And of course when one thinks about where the abnormalities are coming from which are making the atmosphere in the region of the Caribbean Sea ever more feverish, one comes to the conclusion that a one-sided approach can least of all help the situation.

“If one allows that in the Western Hemisphere uneasiness is evoked by the presence in Cuba of a certain small number of Soviet troops which are helping Cubans to master the weapons delivered by the Soviet Union for the purpose of strengthening the defense capabilities of Cuba, then how much more uneasiness should be evoked in the countries of Europe, Asia and Africa by the hundreds of thousands of American troops in the Eastern Hemisphere? It is sufficient to make such a comparison in order that things can be seen in proper perspective. At our meeting in Vienna we seemed to have agreed to proceed from the fact that the forces of our states were equal. Well, then, if our forces are equal, then there should also be equal possibilities. Why does the United States forget about this?

“You know that we have withdrawn from Cuba a significant part of our military personnel. I can tell you that we have withdrawn several times more people than has been stated in the American press. How this matter will develop in the future depends on a number of circumstances and in the first place on the pace at which the atmosphere in the region of the Caribbean Sea will be normalized, and whether, as could be expected, the reasons which occasioned the necessity for assistance to the Cubans by Soviet military specialists and instructors will disappear.

“I would like to express the thought of how important it is in eval-uating what is happening around Cuba that one rise above one-sided understandings and base his judgments on the respective estimate of the situation of the interested parties. From your point of view, as set forth in your message, the reconnaissance flights of American aircraft over Cuba are only “peaceful observation.” But if one were to characterize these flights objectively, without even considering the point of view, understandable to everyone, of the country over which they are being carried out, then they cannot be described other than as an unrestrained intrusion into the air space of a sovereign government and as a flagrant violation of the elementary norms of international law and the principles of the UN Charter, to which are affixed the signatures of both the USA and Cuba. It is natural that no state prizing its sovereignty, no government solicitous of the interest and dignity of its people, can tolerate such flights.

“Perhaps it is desired that we recognize the right of the USA to violate the Charter of the United Nations and international norms? But this we cannot do and will not do.

“We have honestly carried out the obligations we assumed in the settlement of the crisis in the region of the Caribbean Sea, and withdrew from Cuba even more than we promised to withdraw. There are no grounds for you to doubt the readiness of the Soviet Union to carry out firmly in the future as well the agreement which was reached between us. Why then are reconnaissance flights by American aircraft over Cuba necessary? What are they looking for there when there is not a single thing, seen in the light of the agreement reached, which could cause concern? Trampling on sovereignty in this way can lead to quite serious consequences for us if it is not stopped in time.

“And can one pass over in silence or recognize as in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter the continuing efforts to strangle the economy of Cuba? I shall not address myself to this in more detail although of course I could find many words with which to characterize these actions, even from a purely humanitarian point of view.

“The Soviet Union gives due credit to the measures which have recently been undertaken by the USA, as well as by England, in connection with the attacks which have taken place on Soviet vessels near the Cuban coast. We of course do not underestimate the significance of these measures and hope that they will be sufficiently effective to preclude the possibility of a repetition of armed raids against Cuba.

“I read with a feeling of satisfaction that passage of your message in which you confirm that you have neither the intention nor the desire to invade Cuba and where you recognize that it is up to the Cuban people to determine their fate. That is a good statement. We have always stressed that, like any other people, the Cuban people possess the inalienable right to determine their own fate as they see fit.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Khrushchev Correspondence, Vol. IV-B, 4/15/63-5/8/63)

329. Agenda for the April 30 Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, Standing Committee 4/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Prepared by McGeorge Bundy. Washington, April 29, 1963.

I have not been able to make special assignments to individual members of the group in this first week, but I have had helpful discussions with several members, and I know that other members have had conversations with each other. What I hope we can do tomorrow is to fill out the outline which follows of major areas of interest, and to make preliminary decisions as to ways and means of getting forward with the necessary spade work.

The possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. Illustrations which come to mind here are: Interference with overflights. Possible death of Castro. The occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary.At this point Bundy wrote, “Cubans vs Cubans.” Attributable interference by CastroAfter Castro Bundy wrote, “or USSR.” in other countries. Reintroduction of offensive weapons. Programs which might be initiated by the United States Government with both immediate and long-rUN objectives. Examples which come to mind are: Greater pressure against the Soviet presence, perhaps by additional OAS resolutions and then naval action to interrupt all military traffic to Cuba.In the left margin of this paragraph Bundy wrote, “President.” In the right margin he wrote, “talk to him hard?” Expanded economic action,Next to this paragraph Bundy wrote, “sugar, POL, money.” possibly including encouragement of cooperative sabotage on a much larger scale than anything attempted up until now. Within this category additional possible gambits are of great interest to higher authority and it is hoped that some may be offered.Bundy added by hand paragraph c which reads: “Appraisal of small-scale sabotage over a long period.” The possible defection of Castro. This is a wholly separate kind of undertaking and there seemed to be considerable agreement last week that it was not very promising, but it has been properly pointed out that it could be pursued on a separate track while some or all of the things proposed above were going on.Next to this paragraph Bundy placed a bullet. An information program for post-Castro Cuba. There was general agreement last week that this also is a matter of high importance and that it could be pursued independently of decisions in other categories.

Documents which members may want to look at before the meeting are attached:Not printed. Tab A: Draft intelligence estimate of the situation in Cuba a year from now. Tab B: The first outline of an OAS Resolution about the Soviet military presence. This item is of considerable present interest to higher authority.

It is recognized that the diet here is relatively thin, but I think we can usefully spend one more meeting making sure that we have the elements of the problem in proper shape before we go into more detailed work.At the end of the agenda Bundy wrote, “levels of attribution.”

McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
330. Summary Record of the 3d Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 4/30/63. Top Secret. Washington, April 30, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

CUBA

Under Secretary Harriman reported on his talks with Gromyko and Khrushchev on the subject of Cuba. (He read extracts from a long summary, copies of which he later left with the President and Mr. Bundy, copy attached.)See Document 326. Mr. Harriman did not think that Khrushchev was in trouble personally but his policies are being criticized by the hard line Communists. The Soviets are using Castro as an exhibit of the success of their Cuban policy. They are also seeking to handle him in such a way that he will not turn toward the Chinese Communists. Khrushchev does not think that Soviet troops in Cuba are really important, but Harriman believes the Russians will go to great lengths to ensure that Castro remains in control of Cuba. After Cuban troops are trained, the Russian troops can be expected to leave, but Soviet economic aid will be continued at a level necessary to ensure a going economy in Cuba.

The attached copy of Mr. Bundy’s summary covers the assignments which have been made as a result of the discussion of Cuba.See Document 333. Points not covered in that summary follow:

There was a discussion of whether the U.S. could destroy Castro’s halo by an information program aimed at Cuba and Latin America. Under Secretary Ball said Castro was becoming a symbol and an effort should be made to undermine this symbol. Mr. Harriman pointed out that we could make fUN of Castro. This is an effective way of attacking Communists who, in his opinion, can take almost anything except ridicule.

Secretary McNamara noted that he had initiated a study of how to reduce to a minimum the reaction time of U.S. forces in the event a decision was taken to use force against Cuba. He has under study a plan which would mean that within ninety to one hundred days we would have a capability of destroying all the SAM sites in Cuba with twenty-six missiles.

The Attorney General commented that the President was hopeful that we could take actions now in the OAS which would permit us in the future to act effectively in the event the Russians or the Cubans started shipping large amounts of arms to other Latin American states. The purpose would be to prepare now a basis for drastic U.S. action to halt any attempt to introduce a Soviet military presence in another Latin American country.

It was agreed that pressure against the Soviet presence in Cuba will be kept low-key for the next month in order to give Khrushchev an option of carrying out quietly the prompt withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

The preparation of a study covering the possible defection of Castro was deferred for the present. All that can be done in this connection now is to keep open the line of communication to Castro which was opened by Mr. Donovan during the negotiations about the U.S. prisoners. Director McCone’s interest in this matter prompted the postponement of the discussion of this possible course of action until the Director’s return.

There was recognition of the importance of relating what we are now doing to what we are planning to do in Cuba. Secretary McNamara expressed his view that small-scale sabotage over a long period of time would produce no real change in the situation and therefore was not an acceptable course of action.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
331. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to Secretary of State RuskSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Secret. A note on this memorandum indicates it was part of the President’s weekend reading, May 11. Washington, May 1, 1963. SUBJECT Probable Soviet Reaction to Low-level Flights Over Cuba

Obviously, Soviet reaction to low-level flights over Cuba would be affected by a number of factors, such as timing and scope. The reaction to a one-shot mission would be far less than that to a sustained series. Also, if the flights were such that they were widely known in Cuba, the reaction would be stronger than it would in the case of a single mission in an isolated area. Soviet reaction would, to some extent, be affected by Castro’s reaction, which I should think would be quite strong, particularly as indicated above if knowledge of the flights was widespread.

So far as timing is concerned, the present would appear to be an extremely unfavorable time. Castro is in Moscow and will be there apparently for several weeks. It is assumed that he is putting the squeeze on the Soviets for more economic aid and low-level flights would put him in a position both to press the Soviets for some radical action such as firing on a U-2 flight, or at least would increase his leverage to get more economic assistance, as well as possibly to cancel or slow down any intended removal of Soviet troops.

In addition, it would appear that the Soviet Government is in the process of making a number of important decisions which could be affected by low-level flights. These include determination of Soviet policy on Laos, a general review of Soviet policy toward the United States specifically, as well as probable negotiations with the Chinese Communists over Communist Bloc policy as a whole. There would appear to be sufficient evidence to believe that Khrushchev has been having a difficult time recently, and it is quite possible that he would read into low-level flights an intention on the part of the United States to proceed vigorously to bring down Castro, which, if accomplished in a short period of time, would put him in an almost impossible situation in maintaining his leadership position and in withstanding pressures to turn Soviet policy in the direction desired by the Chinese Communists. In addition, there are important decisions pending on internal affairs which will probably be taken at the meeting of the Central Committee on May twenty-eighth.

Finally, there are some indications that Khrushchev may be having trouble with his own military, and, if so, low-level flights at this time might give the military ammunition to force a change of policy, or even challenge Khrushchev’s leadership. Whatever the decision on low-level flights in general, I should think that the next six weeks would be about the worst possible time in which to take this action.

332. Letter From Acting Director of Central Intelligence Carter to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V. Secret. Washington, May 2, 1963.

Dear Mr. Bundy: With respect to the Lisa Howard report,Lisa Howard of the American Broadcasting Company had a 10-hour interview with Fidel Castro on April 22. During that interview Castro made a number of points, the most important of which was that Cuba was looking for ways to establish a rapprochement with the United States. Cottrell summarized the main points of the interview in a May 2 memorandum to Martin, and Richard Helms prepared a more detailed account in a memorandum to McCone, May 1. The President read Helms’ summary. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 15-1 Cuba and Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Intelligence Material, Vol. V) Mr. McCone cabled me this morning stating that he cannot overemphasize the importance of secrecy in this matter and requested that I take all appropriate steps along this line to reflect his personal views on its sensitivity. Mr. McCone feels that gossip and inevitable leaks with consequent publicity would be most damaging. He suggests that no active steps be taken on the rapprochement matter at this time and urges most limited Washington discussions, and that in these circumstances emphasis should be placed in any discussions on the fact that the rapprochement track is being explored as a remote possibility and one of several alternatives involving various levels of dynamic and positive action.

In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the Lisa Howard report be handled in the most limited and sensitive manner.

Faithfully yours,

Marshall S. CarterPrinted from a copy that indicates Carter signed the original.Lieutenant General, USA
333. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Washington, May 2, 1963.

The following assignments have been made as a result of the discussion in the Standing Group on Tuesday, April 30th:Document 330. There will be an examination of the possible developments in Cuba if Castro were to disappear from the scene. This analysis will be developed by Mr. Sherman Kent and will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th. There will be an analysis of the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives. This analysis will be conducted under the direction of Mr. Alexis Johnson and Mr. Paul Nitze, and its first results will be available for discussion at the meeting of the Standing Group on May 14th. This first analysis will provide: a. A detailed examination of possible action in the event of interference with surveillance; and b. a more general assessment of possible use of other contingencies in Cuba or in the waters around Cuba. The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a general paper on the possible forms of effective interference with the economic life of Cuba by sabotage or other means. In particular, CIA willreport on the oil problem in relation to Cuba. It is hoped that a first report on this study may be available next week for distribution. The Department of State will examine the possible use of the sugar market as a means of complicating the life of the Castro regime. It is hoped that this study will be available next week. The principal topic of discussion for the meeting of the Standing Group on May 7th will be the development of a U.S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba, and the initial lead in the discussion will be taken by Mr. Wilson for USIA. Appropriate papers will be circulated before noon on Monday, May 6th.

McGeorge Bundy
334. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) to Acting Secretary of State BallSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret. Washington, May 3, 1963. SUBJECT Sugar

I have been requested to comment on a suggestion made at the meeting of the Standing Group on April 30See Document 330. that we try to figure out some way to diminish the Cuban income from the sale of sugar. It was particularly noted that the present high prices and tight market have prevented Cuba from suffering the losses which would normally be expected from the sharp fall off in her production.

I attach an INR memorandum,Memorandum from Hughes to Rusk, RES-15, April 19. (Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 50, Cuba-Standing Group) See the Supplement. a copy of which has already been sent to Mr. Bundy, on the sugar situation.

From this memorandum and discussions with sugar experts I am convinced of several things: The present high prices and tight market represent a real shortage of sugar in the world. The Soviet Union is not holding sugar off the market—Cuban or otherwise. In fact there is some evidence that satellites are exporting more than usual. Therefore the high price is not the result of Soviet rigging of the market. To keep United States prices down the Department of Agriculture is doing everything it can to increase supplies of sugar in the world and for the United States in the foreseeable future. Even with a good beet crop in Europe this year and a good cane crop in early 1965, the sugar situation will still not return to the surplus and low price condition of a year ago. It will take until the end of 1964 with another beet crop but more probably into 1965 before there is any material change in the situation.

I conclude from this that there is no feasible way in which the Cubans can be deprived of the prices they are now getting for their sugar or of free world markets for a year and a half and possibly two years. I therefore suggest that this idea be shelved for at least a year.

335. Record of Actions at the 4th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63. Secret. Washington, May 7, 1963, 10:30 a.m.

There was a discussion of a U.S. program and policy toward post-Castro Cuba.

There was preliminary agreement on the need by mid-summer for a U.S. Government statement from a high source, possibly the President, expressing our view of post-Castro Cuba.On May 4 USIA Deputy Director Wilson sent Bundy a memorandum advocating making a statement and attaching a proposed one. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. An analysis is to be prepared by State, CIA, and USIA covering specific aspects of the Cuban society (1) under Batista; (2) under Castro, including the revolution’s aims as stated and as realized to date; and (3) under a post-Castro regime, including actions we would be prepared to take to help in the reconstruction of Cuba. Among the subjects to be included in the comparison are: education, tax system, defense, housing, land ownership, economic development, religion, and civil rights, including press freedom, race relations, and the administration of justice. There was a recognized need to interest non-governmental institutions such as the Council on Foreign Relations or the Brookings Institution in preparing studies on post-Castro Cuba. A White House officer is to initiate action on this problem.

PRESENT

Under Secretary of State (Ball)

Attorney General

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

Administrator of AID

Deputy Director of USIA

Deputy Under Secretary of State (Johnson)

Major General A.J. Goodpaster (JCS)

Special Counsel

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

336. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President KennedySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret. Washington, May 7, 1963. SUBJECT Contingency Plans for Cuba (U) In response to your inquiry, dated 29 April 1963,Document 327. I wish to assure you that our contingency plans for invasion of Cuba have been and are being maintained up to date. A revision of CINCLANT’s basic invasion plan for Cuba was reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 26 February 1963. Intelligence reports received since last October do indicate the assignment of additional materiel to the Cuban armed forces. Responsible commanders are being kept fully informed of the changing intelligence picture and our plans are continually updated to insure that the U.S. forces and equipment and their planned employment reflect the latest information available. For example, the order in which U.S. forces and their supporting equipment are committed is being restudied in the light of the estimated increases in Castro’s T-34 medium tanks and self-propelled anti-tank guns. The most significant change in the basic invasion plan since last October has resulted from our increasing capability to introduce larger numbers of troops and heavy combat equipment into the objective area early in the operation. This capability is being achieved by the reactivation of 11 LST’s, which will materially expedite the delivery of combat forces and equipment. In the longer term, programmed acquisition of additional C-130 aircraft into the air lift force will expedite the delivery of airborne and airlanded forces during the initial assault. Through these measures the weight of our early attacks will be increased and the probability of their success further enhanced. The time factors for the Cuba operation are today as follows:

[6 lines of source text not declassified]Duration of air attacks depends upon post-strike reconnaissance, supporting intelligence, and readiness to execute the assault. [Footnote in the source text.]

Robert S. McNamara
337. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nitze) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, May 10, 1963. SUBJECT Contingency Studies with Respect to Cuba

In accordance with the request made at the Standing Group meeting of April 30, 1963,See Document 330. there are attached: A paper setting forth a possible scenario whereby an attack on a United States reconnaissance aircraft could be exploited toward the end of effecting the removal of the Castro regime; A paper discussing in broad outline other contingencies which might be exploited to the same end.

We desire to emphasize that while we have used a few members of our staffs in preparation of these papers, they have not been fully staffed in either State or DOD, have not been seen by the JCS, and thus do not necessarily represent the views of our respective Departments. We also make no recommendation with respect to the possible courses of action set forth in these papers, which are presented only in accordance with the desires of the Standing Group to provide a basis for discussion.

U. Alexis JohnsonPrinted from a copy that bears these typed signatures.Paul H. Nitze Attachment 1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive. Memorandum for the Standing Group SUBJECT Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights—A Contingency Plan

1. The Problem.

To capitalize on an attack on a US aircraft engaged in reconnaissance of Cuba by taking reprisals designed to place pressure on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

2. Facts Bearing on the Problem.

U-2 flights are currently conducted over Cuba at the rate of approximately two sorties per day. These flights have come to be accepted as a US right emanating from Cuban refusal to fulfill the Soviet commitment of October 28, 1962, for on-the-ground safeguards against the presence and reintroduction of offensive weapons. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available, but the quantity of data that could be obtained by these alternative methods is smaller than that obtainable with the U-2 and would not meet the stated requirements. A prolonged hiatus in high altitude surveillance would be intolerable in view of the continuing Soviet option of reintroduction of MRBMs. This need has also become public knowledge as a result of the widespread news coverage and the Secretary of Defense’s briefing of the public; hence, there would be substantial political support for the US insistence on maintaining an acknowledged vital right. Present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington would have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM shortly after the attack. There is also a probability that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. A possibility exists that a U-2 could be attacked by MIG aircraft using air-to-air rockets and special attack techniques. In this case also, information would probably be available promptly. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss. If the US did institute increasing surveillance by low and medium altitude aircraft, ostensibly and partly in order to acquire more detailed information, the chances of an incident triggered by the firing on a US reconnaissance overflight would be increased.

3. Political Considerations.

a. Balancing Objectives—The fundamental political judgment in this problem involves balancing the opportunity to achieve our long term objective in Cuba, the overthrow of Castro’s regime and elimination of Communism from Cuba, with the risks of the US-USSR confrontationand the political acceptability of our means of attaining that objective. Since the political and power realities argue against arbitrary and unilateral action without provocation, the exploitation of Cuban provocations is the most feasible means for taking the action necessary.

The political costs of using an incident to press courses of action and reaction leading to the achievement of US objectives in Cuba, possibly including the removal of the Castro regime, have been considered. We conclude that such costs will be least, and will be acceptable, if (a) initial Cuban provocation is internationally recognized, and (b) a measured pattern of increasing US military reprisal, in reaction to escalating Cuban actions, is established.

4. Scenario—Phase I. The most appropriate reprisal to destruction of a US reconnaissance aircraft engaged in overflying Cuba would, if the attack were made by a SAM, be either (1) a limited number of SAM sites in the vicinity of the action (depending on the geographical location, three or four nearby sites), or (2) to eliminate all SAMs in the initial attack. In the case of an interceptor attack, either (1) the facilities of the nearest (or, if known, the offending) fighter airfield, or (2) facilities of the few active fighter airfields, should be completely taken out. At the same time, the US would initiate a high volume of harassing medium and low level reconnaissance overflights, in addition to maintaining the U-2 coverage. The US would promptly initiate (without publicity) generation of the necessary invasion force, so that it would be ready as soon as possible, in the event Cuban escalation were to lead to a decision to invade. US forces would be placed on appropriate readiness (DEFCON 3 for SAC). The US would inform selected heads of government, NAC, and the OAS governments immediately prior to the reprisal action, of the reprisal and of the UN proposals we planned to make, and would initiate promptly consultations with the NAC andOAS groups on possible future measures which might be required—especially a new quarantine. The US would call for prompt consideration of the crisis in the Security Council, and would vigorously attack Cuba and defend the necessary but limited US reprisal. We would concentrate our charges against Castro’s regime, rather than the Soviet Union, and we would take the initiative in hauling him before the UN. We would, in addition to defending the requirement for reconnaissance, offer to end all aerial reconnaissance over Cuba if the Cubans would accept UN (including US) ground inspection adequate to insure against the presence or introduction of offensive weapons or offensive training, and when all Russian military personnel were returned promptly to the USSR.

5. Phase II. It is unlikely that the USSR would react to the US Phase I actions by instituting serious counterpressures at Berlin or elsewhere, unless of course they had shot down the first reconnaissance aircraft intending to use our reaction as a pretext to create a crisis in Berlin or elsewhere. If that were the case, we would in any event be faced by a Soviet created crisis. If this were not a deliberate Soviet action to touch off a crisis, the Soviets would probably be cautious at least while assessing our intentions in Cuba. During this period, they would probably give strict orders to Soviet personnel manning the SAMs and in other positions on Cuba to avoid any reprisal or provocative action. The Cubans would almost certainly initially reject the US offer. The Soviets and Cubans would exert maximum political and propaganda pressure on the US in the UN and in general. It is possible that the Cubans might shoot down another US aircraft, either through lack of discipline or miscalculation of the consequences. As a general principle, the most appropriate level of reprisal would seem to be graduated suppression of Cuban air defenses. Thus, if the first plane had been destroyed by a SAM and only a few SAMs had been knocked out in the initial reprisal, and if a second aircraft were attacked by a SAM, all SAMs would be destroyed. If the initial attack had been by a fighter, and the second by a fighter or a SAM, any remaining SAMs and fighter airfields would be taken out on the second offense. If the second attack were by AAA, the problem would be more complicated but all AAA in the area of the attack could be promptly suppressed, as well as any remaining SAMs.

6. Phase III. In the second round of US initiative (Phase III), there are two broad alternative courses of action, depending upon whether the enemy reaction (Phase II) had involved military engagement. Alternative 1. If the Cubans have made a second military attack in Phase II, the US, in addition to the immediate further military reprisal sketched above (in 5.c.), would note that since the Cubans did not accept our offer of an equitable arrangement to dispense with US overflights, and were continuing to interfere with them, a quarantine (on everything but food and medicine) was being established. The US would either seek OAS authorization, for which a majority but not unanimity could probably be gotten, or would undertake it unilaterally on the basis of its earlier consultations with the OAS and NAC, and the OAS resolution of October 1962. US justification for a quarantine would include stress on the vital Hemispheric need for information on military activities in Cuba, the fact that the Cuban action demonstrated a determined effort to overthrow the status quo established in October-November 1962, and the fact that such action further raised suspicions of Cuban military intentions. We were compelled by these facts to interdict all direct and indirect military support to the Island until complete assurance of the security of the Hemisphere could be obtained. We could further note that the US had chosen to exercise a restrained course of action which would involve minimum sacrifice by the innocent Cuban people. We might publicize our earlier offer, and the reasons why the quarantine was necessary, in leaflets to be dropped over Cuba. Quarantine might be initiated even in the absence of a second Cuban attack, for example if our reconnaissance detected suspicious signs of new threatening military activity, or perhaps if the Cubans or Soviets instituted reprisals elsewhere. Once the quarantine was established, in due course something would have to give. Assuming the Soviets would comply with the blockade, Castro or some other element of Cuban leaders might decide that there was nothing that the Soviets could or would do to help them, and that agreeing to the removal of Russian military men and inspection, in exchange for withdrawal of the quarantine and harassing reconnaissance, would be their best deal. The US would, in that case, settle for that agreement. The Soviets would, in the case of a quarantine, be under conflicting pressures to do something but not to overcommit themselves. They might risk an incident in challenging the quarantine, which would have to be strictly enforced. If they did undertake counterpressure on access to Berlin, the existing contingency plans would be put into effect as necessary. The US would have to persevere in maintaining the quarantine until Castro cracked or capitulated, or the deterrent effect of our will to stand up to Soviet pressures and counterpressures in other cases would be badly undermined. It is possible that an effective quarantine would provoke an uprising. In that case, the US would support the uprising by whatever means are necessary, up to and including invasion, to insure its success. (This represents a new situation for which a different scenario applies.) Alternative 2. If there is no military counteraction to the harassing reconnaissance, and no other persuasive trigger for a quarantine, the US could undertake various measures designed to stimulate the Cubans to provoke a new incident. The US might initially intensify its reconnaissance with night flights, “show-off” low-level flights flaunting our freedom of action, hoping to stir the Cuban military to action. The US might extend its actions to large scale leaflet drops, drops of agents, “CARE”-type packages delivered to known or possible guerrilla areas, and the like. This course might stir the Cubans to military action or induce them to agree to the US terms. It also might stimulate an uprising. In any of these cases the subsequent course of action would be clear, and would be to our advantage: either invasion if an uprising occurred or the Cubans undertook military action, or removal of the Russians and ground inspection if the Cubans agreed. If, however, the Cubans did not react, this kind of activity on our part would give them propaganda ammunition. Such measures must therefore be gradual, geared to world political reactions. Perhaps the US could use some drone aircraft as “bait,” flown at low speeds and favorable altitudes for tempting Cuban AAA or aircraft attacks. Soviet politico-military counterpressures elsewhere, beyond a vigorous political offensive and propaganda, would not be likely. Soviet commitments to Cuba might rise at whatever time the Soviets decided we did not intend to escalate the crisis—perhaps a few weeks after the invasion force had been readied but not committed. It is possible that the Soviets might approach us privately with an offer of quiet withdrawal of their military men from Cuba in exchange for our dropping the harassing reconnaissance (by implicitly accepting the U-2’s only) and our demand for inspection. Thus, depending above all on whether the Cubans were or could be made to be trigger-happy, the development of the initial downing of a reconnaissance plane could lead at best to the elimination of Castro, perhaps to the removal of Soviet troops and installation of ground inspection in Cuba, or at the least to our demonstration of firmness on reconnaissance and, if our initial reprisal had eliminated all the SAMs, we would have greatly increased our future military freedom of action and political options.

7. Conclusions.

If this course of action were to be pursued,

Medium and low level reconnaissance overflights of Cuba, on a scale paralleling present U-2 high altitude flights and as a supplement to them, should be instituted. Authorization should be given for programs to reduce the present eighteen day period required for the generation of invasion forces, by prepositioning some equipment, buildup of sealift, etc., so that the US would be able to support more quickly an uprising on the Island, if that were necessary.

Addendum

We have considered the question of a fabricated incident and conclude that it would not be feasible or desirable to contrive a mock Cuban attack on a US reconnaissance aircraft. This plan applies to a genuine attack on a US aircraft over to near Cuba.

 Attachment 2Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Top Secret; Sensitive. Memorandum for the Standing Group SUBJECT Certain Cuban Contingencies The Problem. To capitalize on various Cuban provocations by taking reprisals to place pressures on, or to effect the removal of, the Castro regime.

A. Internal Revolt

An internal revolt could take one of two general forms: (i) a revolt within the structure of the existing regime or (ii) a revolt essentially outside the governmental structure against which the full power of the Government might be arrayed. In addition (i) might trigger (ii) or vice versa. Either might also involve Soviet troops in countering the insurgency. Any of these cases could provide the basis for increasing US military pressures to eliminate the Castro regime. Case (i) is the most likely, and also the case most likely to succeed without outside intervention. It would draw its inspiration and support from nationalistic elements who had become disenchanted by the abject dependence of the regime on the Communist Bloc, isolation within the Hemisphere, deepening of the economic crisis, a threatened or actual Communist accession to complete control of the regime at the expense of the remaining members of the 26th of July Movement, or the death of Castro. Case (ii) might take the form of widespread disruptive behavior supported in whole or in part by elements of the militia, or an uprising in one of the mountainous areas which might attract local militia elements. There are several variants to case (i), in particular: A “palace coup” either by hard-line Communists, or by members of the 26th of July Movement. A revolt by the Cuban armed forces or militia. Palace Coup. A palace coup by hard-line Communists might be the trigger for a counter-coup by elements of the armed forces or militia. Each of these cases has a great danger of involvement by Soviet forces, but presumably the Communist coup is most dangerous from this standpoint. Since the world is on notice that the US would tolerate no interference by local Soviet forces in an attempt by the Cuban people to throw off the Castro yoke, it would provide a platform for US intervention on behalf of the Cuban people. A palace coup by members of the 26th of July Movement would probably arise from a broad conspiracy involving support from elements of the armed forces and militia. Such a coup might start with the assassination of Castro and a plea to the US to fend off intervention by Soviet forces. Clearly, if both Army and militia arrayed themselves against the putschists, the opportunity for US intervention would be fleeting. The attitude and actions of Soviet forces would vitally affect the outcome. The most favorable case for persistence of the coup would ensue if both elements of the Cuban forces supported them and the Soviets remained aloof. On the other hand, were the latter to intervene, the basis for forceful US action would be more solid. Military Revolts.

Local or general revolts by the Army or militia coupled with attempts to seize the seat of Government or proclaim an alternate regime are possible quite apart from any links to a conspiracy within the regime. It is possible that an action within one of these elements might be the catalyst for similar action within the other. A militia revolt opposed by the Cuban Army and the Soviet troops would provide the least time for the US to react while the revolt was still alive. It is conceivable, however, that the revolutionists could take to the hills, prolonging resistance and giving us more time to react.

 Popular Uprising. Case (ii), a revolt outside the governmental framework, could manifest general discontent through the appearance of a number of guerrilla bands operating at widely separated points and supported with food by the peasants. Alternatively, a single guerrilla leader, operating in a particularly disaffected province, might expand his operations to the point where the Government was compelled to react massively. Suffice it to say, in the atmosphere of present-day Cuba neither of these possibilities is very likely. The Government has an excellent surveillance network, both internally and with respect to the air and sea approaches to the Island, and the peasants as yet are unwilling to risk their necks until the Government’s chances appear poorer than they now are.

B. Cuban Intervention in Latin America

A flagrant case of Cuban interference and violence in the internal life of another country (such as Venezuela or the Dominican Republic) could provide the basis for OAS sanctions, including a quarantine or perhaps a demand for inspection at Cuban ports and airfields. It would be difficult to use such an incident directly as justification for an invasion. However, in addition to the institution of a quarantine, the US could use the resulting tension as justification for a quiet buildup of the invasion force, and then use a new incident in quarantine enforcement, Cuban incursions on Guantanamo, or an uprising as justification for invasion. It might be desirable in preparation to highlight Cuban training and dispatch of subversives, instruction for sabotage, etc., as background for “the incident.” The incident itself should be domestic, violent and quickly identified as part of a pattern of Castroist export of revolution which would threaten other Latin American governments. (A “one-two” series of incidents would excellently serve to underline this point.) In this manner, the need for a drastic quarantine would be established. A quarantine should cover POL as well as all arms entering, and arms and “agents” leaving, Cuba; it should probably not cover food and medicine. In the long run, a POL blockade should be effective in disrupting Cuba internally. If Castro sought to negotiate an end of it, we should set an unacceptably high price such as unlimited inspection to verify no subversive training being undertaken, no arms shipments in or out (except returns to the USSR), etc. An “uprising” in this situation would be similar to any other, except that the US would have been able to generate US invasion forces for its support during the blockade.

C. Incidents at Guantanamo

An incident at Guantanamo, such as a Cuban incursion, or cutting off of the water supply (the source of which is off the US reservation), could provide an opportunity for protective action beyond the perimeter of the base. In particular, restoring the source of water and protecting it from further interference would provide a reasonably good justification for the US to react with whatever degree of force was deemed necessary for this task. Assuming the Cubans resisted, the security of the element would justify broadened actions. This could come to involve pitched battles, and require US invasion. Expansion and escalation from an incident at Guantanamo would be fully supported in the US and by some Allies, but it would have the political disadvantage of stemming from a US base held against the desires of the incumbent government. In general, justification based on protecting US rights would be less suitable than support to a Cuban uprising or strong action after Cuban export of revolution. While the scenario of events following from an incident might escalate to full-scale US-Cuban combat, it might not. The Cubans might, at once or after some initial skirmishes, break contact and withdraw to permit the US to restore the water supply and even to keep guards outside the US military reservation. In that case, especially if the Cubans had offered to restore the water supply, it would be very disadvantageous for the US to appear to be “picking a fight” over a broad definition of our base rights. An uprising fortuitously located within range of US assistance from the Guantanamo Bay base would be militarily favorable, but it might appear to be contrived by the US.

D. Incidents at Sea

There are two categories of possible incidents at sea which might justify reprisal against Cuba: Castroite hi-jacking of a Latin American vessel; or Cuban naval attacks on or harassment of a US or Latin American ship.

The former would not, in itself, seem to provide clear opportunity for reprisals of a direct effective nature. The latter could be met by attacking the offending Cuban vessels and perhaps counter-harassment of Cuban ships with the possibility of an incident arising.

 Escalation at sea might lead to US reprisal against Cuban gunboats in port as well as at sea, but unless such action led to shooting down a US plane it is difficult to see how it would justify US quarantine or invasion. If a US attacking aircraft (at sea or over a Cuban port) were attacked, we might start the scenario of reprisals against Cuba’s air defense. Thus, an incident at sea could trigger the air defense scenario; otherwise, incidents at sea do not seem promising.
338. Draft Memorandum Prepared by the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence AgencySource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a covering memorandum from Sherman Kent to McGeorge Bundy, May 13, while this memorandum was a “draft” at Bundy’s instruction, it “represents our best and most careful effort in the time available. A number of knowledgeable people from parts of the Agency other than the Office of National Estimates participated.” Washington, May 13, 1963. SUBJECT Developments in Cuba and Possible US Actions in the Event of Castro’s DeathThis memorandum is a general analysis of the situation and prospects for US action after Castro’s death. We have not sought to work out in detail Latin American, Western European, or other third party reactions in the various contingencies adverted to in our examination of the problem. In paragraph 13 we consider very generally the problem of Soviet reactions. [Footnote in the source text. Paragraph 13 stated that the Soviet Union’s interest in Cuba would not be lessened by Castro’s death, but it would react cautiously behind the scenes to influence events if a power struggle developed. If the struggle reached open conflict or the United States intervened, the Soviet Union would have to act. Such potential action was outside the scope of the paper.]

SUMMARY

We believe the odds are that upon Castro’s death his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control. However, there is a good chance that a power struggle would ensue, and a lesser chance that such a struggle would spread, either into a many-sided conflict or with the Moscow-oriented Communists lined up on one side and those who are essentially Cuban nationalists on the other. In any case the loyalties of the military commanders, now committed to Fidel but probably divided after his death, would significantly influence the outcome. Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive US help in order to win, and probably US military intervention.

[Here follows the 12-page discussion portion of the memorandum.]

339. Summary Record of the 5th Standing Group Meeting of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63. Top Secret. Washington, May 14, 1963.

Mr. Alexis Johnson presented the paper he and Mr. Nitze had prepared entitled “Cuban Attacks on Reconnaissance Flights—a Contingency Plan.”Printed as attachment 1 to Document 337. He said two basic problems are (1) getting the Cubans to act in such a way that we can escalate in a manner adequate to achieve our objectives of overthrowing Castro, and (2) how to go about this in such a way as to obtain the maximum amount of support in the UN and domestically. He said a major effort could be made to deal with the resulting situation in the OAS, but we should acknowledge now that we would not be able to keep our action from being discussed in the UN. Therefore, we should go to the UN immediately after our actions as a plaintiff rather than as a defendant. We will receive far less support for any of the actions contemplated in the paper than we did last October at the time of the crisis over the Soviet missiles.

Following a discussion of medium-level aerial reconnaissance, it was agreed that a paragraph would be added explaining the rationale for such expanded aerial surveillance.

Mr. Johnson agreed that if the Cubans or the Russians do not react to our actions, we are unable to make them do so.

There was some discussion as to whether the paragraph on page eightReference is to sub-subparagraph (4) of subparagraph b of paragraph 6, “Phase III.” stated the reaction of the Soviets accurately. There was also discussion as to whether the Soviets would respond in another area, such as Berlin, if we put into effect a full quarantine of Cuba.

Mr. Sorensen suggested that a paragraph be inserted listing as an alternative a situation in which the U.S. would announce that a state of war existed with Cuba. This might be done in lieu of a full blockade. If a state of war were announced in Phase 2, a blockade would become legal.

In connection with aerial surveillance, Mr. Bundy referred to the new international law of peaceful observation.Not further identified. He suggested that more public attention be drawn to our belief that observation from outer space is entirely peaceful and not a violation of national sovereignty.

Mr. Ball read part of page five,Reference is to paragraph 5, “Phase II,” subparagraph a. commenting that the Soviets would have to respond elsewhere if our actions in Cuba resulted in our killing Soviet soldiers.

The Attorney General said he believed the Russians would attempt to force upon us a choice involving the continuation of our aerial overflights of Cuba. He said Khrushchev had said he would try to bring about termination of our overflights. He foresaw a situation in which the Russians might take the overflights case to the UN after withdrawing their forces from Cuba.

It was agreed that a paper would be prepared to deal with the contingency of the Russians’ attempt to end our U-2 and aerial surveillance flights by measures short of force.Reference is to a May 27 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to McGeorge Bundy. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63) See the Supplement.

There was a discussion of the April 24 paper which is the current draft of our contingency plans in the event a U-2 plane is shot down.Not printed. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, U-2 Flights—Contingency Plans) See the attachment to a May 15 memorandum from Johnson to Brubeck in the Supplement. This paper has been approved by Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara, but has not been presented to the President. It is being held in the event that the contingency materializes and will be used by the President at that time in deciding how to retaliate against a shootdown.

Mr. Bundy suggested that the threat of Cuba to the U.S. was an appropriate subject for officials to emphasize publicly. He referred to the study on post-Castro Cuba, adding that we are not in a position to undertake some of the actions described in the Johnson-Nitze paper unless we are convinced an improved situation in Cuba will result.

On page ten,Reference is to paragraph 7. the heading “Conclusions” was deleted in order to avoid confusion. The actions which follow this heading are aimed at building up the importance of aerial reconnaissance, thereby serving as a rationale for serious actions taken following an attempt to prevent us from continuing aerial reconnaissance.

The paper is to be revised to include the state of war suggestion by Mr. Sorensen and other suggestions. It will be considered further at a later meeting.

The second paper, entitled “Certain Cuban Contingencies” was discussed briefly.Printed as attachment 2 to Document 337. It consists of a catalog of other contingencies which have not been studied in depth as was the contingency of an attack on a reconnaissance plane. It contains no recommended actions or plans. Study of actions to meet these possible contingencies was not thought profitable. The military question centers around the necessity of obtaining a tenable presence in Cuba in a very short time after a decision has been made to react. The political problem is how to generate a right of intervention. The catalog of contingencies reveals that all are either unlikely or unhelpful. Even the contingency of a so-called Hungarian situation, namely, Russians attacking Cubans, is highly unlikely. Our statement that we would not permit such a situation to develop in Cuba is a good noise but deals with a highly unlikely contingency.

There was a discussion of the sugar paper presented by the State Department.Apparent reference to Document 334. Mr. McCone disagreed with the State recommendation that nothing be done to affect the world sugar market. He thought this was an area where action could be taken to prevent the Russians from financing their aid to Cuba by means of buying Cuban sugar cheaply and selling it at the much higher world market price.

There was a discussion of the current world sugar market. Mr. McCone cited a 4% increase in sugar consumption and an 8% decrease in production, very low stocks, resulting in a sugar price of 10# per pound.

It was agreed that Secretary Freeman be asked to produce a study of the current situation with particular reference to the effect of the very high sugar price on the future Cuban economy.See Document 340. This study will consider increasing U.S. production to force down the world market price, as well as to benefit domestic producers.

The paper produced by Sherman Kent of CIA entitled “Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro’s Death,”See Document 338. was not discussed because of lack of time.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, May 16. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/14/63)

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
340. National Security Action Memorandum No. 244Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/1-5/15/63. Confidential. Copies sent to all members of the Standing Group of the National Security Council. Washington, May 15, 1963. TO The Secretary of Agriculture SUBJECT The Future of the World Sugar Market

The current situation in the world market for sugar is a matter of considerable concern to the Standing Group of the National Security Council. The unusually high price of sugar is significant both in its relation to the economic prospects of Cuba and in its relation to restrictions on the production of sugar in free countries, and not least in the United States. It is requested that you take the lead in a study of the current situation and of alternative courses of action that might best serve the economic interests of the United States and of other free countries, bearing in mind the particular interest which we have in preventing any long continuation of unjustifiably high prices for Cuban sugar on the world market.

It is hoped that a report might be available for distribution not later than Monday, May 27,The paper, May 27, is ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. See the Supplement. and that you might be willing to join with the Standing Group in a discussion of this matter on Tuesday, May 28, probably at 5:00 p.m.See Document 344.

Both the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have expressed their interest in this study and their readiness to cooperate, and I assume that you will draw on other agencies of the government in any way you wish. Here at the White House I am ensuring that Myer Feldman is informed of the Standing Group’s interest in the problem.

McGeorge Bundy
341. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Dictated by McCone. Washington, May 21, 1963. SUBJECT Memorandum of Discussion of Low-Level Flight Over Cuba, attended by The President, Vice President, Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, General Taylor, Secretary Ball, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Thompson, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone Colonel Steakley presented a plan for a flight over Remedios. Lundahl displayed the relative photography of high- and low-level from previous missions. McCone stated that high-level photography gave no evidence of whether people were at a base. He said the intelligence community did not know whether the four military bases were fully occupied, partially occupied, or not occupied at all. Low-level photography might (but this is not absolutely sure) throw some light on this important question. Ambassador Thompson pointed out that a low-level flight during Castro’s visit in Moscow would exacerbate relations with Castro and would enhance the prospect of Castro and Khrushchev agreeing to some retaliatory action against our missions. After a brief discussion concerning the pros and cons of the issue, the President decided as follows: that low-level flight was necessary, however, there was no immediacy and therefore he suggested it be postponed until after Castro had departed the USSR, now estimated to be about May 28th; if we rUN one low-level flight, there should be at least two and possibly three, and he therefore would like one or two additional missions to be developed.

The issue is to be raised again.

Action: NRO and Colonel Steakley should develop three priority missions, following the established groundrules, to cover the most important COMOR targets.

342. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 5/16-5/31/63. Secret. This memorandum was briefly discussed at the 6th meeting of the Standing Group, May 21. It was circulated with general agreement to the assignments. (Summary Record of 6th NSC StandingGroup, May 21; ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/21/63) Washington, May 22, 1963. SUBJECT Committee Responsibilities in Cuban Affairs The Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, acting as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cuba, is responsible for the coordination of day-to-day actions. Examples of such problems are: efforts to reduce Cuban Free World shipping, problems of refugees, problems of countering Cuban subversion, and supervision of ongoing propaganda and information efforts. This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. On covert matters, the Coordinator reports to the Special Group (NSC 5412). The Standing Group is responsible for the development of contingency plans and the assessment of long-range policy objectives and means for meeting them. The Special Group (NSC 5412) is responsible for covert activities, with appropriate liaison to the other two committees. McGeorge BundyPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
343. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Members of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, May 28, 1963.

The meeting this afternoon will be devoted to a number of special problems on Cuba, but I hope we may have a few minutes at the end to take a reading on the general position as it appears to be developing.

First, we will turn to the problem of sugar as presented in the papers of the Department of Agriculture.Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman sent Myer Feldman a preliminary memorandum of May 16, bringing him up to date on what the Department of Agriculture had been doing about sugar and its thoughts on future action. Freeman also sent a copy to Bundy. (Ibid.) On May 24 Agriculture submitted another more definitive paper without any indication of authorship. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. For this part of the discussion, Under Secretary Sundquist will be present for Secretary Freeman. We should briefly discuss a paper on possible U.S. actions in the event of Castro’s death.Document 338. For this part of the discussion Mr. Sherman Kent will be present. There are two highly sensitive CIA papers which Mr. McCone has requested that we hold for distribution at the meeting. They deal with a list of possible actions under consideration at CIA and with the specific problem of Cuba’s oil supplies.The analysis of Cuban supply and demand of crude oil and refined petroleum products, May 6, and an undated annotated list of additional covert actions against Cuba. (Both in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series) See the Supplement. I propose at the end to make a brief oral comment on the results of our discussions thus far, as I understand them. My own preliminary conclusions are not optimistic, but that is not an excuse for avoiding the issue. McGeorge Bundy
344. Summary Record of 7th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/28/63. Top Secret; Sensitive. Washington, May 28, 1963, 5 p.m.

The discussion of the attached sugar paperReference is to the second paper cited in footnote 1, Document 343. emphasized the necessity of increasing domestic and world sugar production. Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist was asked to develop for consideration a program of action to force down the world sugar price. The interest of the Standing Group in this subject is a desire to deny high sugar prices to the Castro government. The attached Record of Action summarizes the study which the Department of Agriculture and a task force will make.According to Bundy’s May 28 record of action, the Department of Agriculture would develop for consideration a U.S. program to reduce substantially the price of sugar on the world market. The program should outline measures to be taken, their estimated costs, and take into account U.S. balance of payments consequences as well as consequences to friendly sugar-producing countries. The Department of State, CIA, and IAD would make available to the Department of Agriculture experts to assist in the study. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series)

There was a brief discussion of Sherman Kent’s paper on “Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro’s Death.”See Document 338. The general view was that all of the courses of action discussed were singularly unpromising.

Mr. Bundy asked the question: What do we do about Cuba? He said he was coming to believe that we could not say that by a date certain we could overthrow Castro. He believed that we should face this prospect. Of the various contingencies which we might exploit, none were controllable by us. It is possible that changes in the Castro government cannot be brought about until Soviet troops are out of Cuba. Even a blockade involves a naval confrontation with the USSR. Because the level of danger is now equal to that of last October, a nuclear confrontation with the Soviets is not feasible. He suggested that at the next Standing Group meeting the comments he had made should be fully discussed.

Mr. McCone argued for courses of action which would increase economic hardship in Cuba. Such actions, supplemented by sabotage meas-ures, would create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow Castro. He acknowledged that any sabotage measures taken in Cuba would create a very high noise level.

Secretary McNamara repeated his view that sabotage measures would not be conclusive and suggested an examination of those economic pressures which could upset Castro.

Mr. FitzGerald summarized a paper containing a list of all covert actions which could be taken against Castro Cuba. (Copy attached)Reference is to the second paper cited in footnote 3, Document 343.

Secretary McNamara said there were three lines of action. The first would be to over-react to some action taken by Castro or made to appear to have been taken by him. For example, a Cuban attack on Guantanamo, even one inspired by us, might create a situation which we could exploit and thus justify courses of action adequate to overthrow Castro. The second line would be long-range economic warfare against Cuba. The third would be to buy off Castro.

Mr. McCone said Castro’s visit to Moscow was inspired by a Russian desire to forestall any effort by the U.S. to negotiate with Castro. Under Secretary Harriman flatly disagreed, saying that Khrushchev invited Castro to Moscow in order to prove the success of Russian policy toward Cuba and to refute Chinese accusations that Khrushchev’s “softness” toward the U.S. had produced no returns.

There followed a discussion as to where we thought Cuba would be five years from now. Secretary McNamara indicated his belief that the Russians would and could make Cuba a showcase for Communism in the Western Hemisphere. Under Secretary Harriman doubted they would try to do this and stated that they could not, even if they tried.

The Attorney General, who entered the meeting in the middle of Mr. FitzGerald’s briefing, said the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though we do not believe our actions would bring him down.

Mr. Bundy acknowledged that we can give an impression of busyness in Cuba and we can make life difficult for Castro.

Mr. McCone said that economic measures, such as restriction of trade, were wasting assets because of the increasing reluctance of our allies to act with us. In addition, Cuba has money obtained from selling sugar futures. Such sales amount to $40 million already. Thus, economic warfare is very difficult to carry on. In response to a question by the Attorney General as to what Mr. McCone recommended should be done, the Director repeated his earlier proposal of sabotage and subversion of the Cuban military.

Mr. Bundy summarized by saying that the best we could do was to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, acknowledging that the measures practical for us to undertake will not result in his overthrow.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
345. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 5/63-6/63. Confidential. A handwritten “P.M.” follows the dateline. Washington, May 28, 1963. SUBJECT Cuban Exiles

Attached is a draft paper, prepared by the Cuban Coordinator, on the subject of U.S. policy towards exile unity. It is being circulated to Coordinating Committee members for comments and clearance.

The Coordinator recommends that the U.S. follow a “hands-off” policy towards exile efforts to achieve unity and that public statements of all U.S. officials be consistent with the recent Ed Martin statement,The statement is quoted in the paper. It was made on May 22 before the Senate Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees and is attached to a May 28 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, on U.S. policy toward exile unity. (Ibid.) See the Supplement. as amended. Judging from the tenor of the last Coordinating Committee meeting, I suspect that the draft will be approved with few substantive changes.Bundy wrote the following on Chase’s covering memorandum: “Good: I have cleared this in principle with the President (altho I would not exclude a shift if Bobby felt strongly the other way).”

GC Attachment DRAFT MEMORANDUM SUBJECT United States Position on Efforts by Cuban Exiles to Achieve Unity

Problem

To determine the position of the Government with respect to efforts by Cuban exiles in the United States to achieve unity.

Background

As a result of developments in the past two months especially the U.S. measures against hit-and-rUN raids, Miro Cardona’s resignation as head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the withdrawal of U.S. support for the Council, and its consequent decline—a vague, confused and still embryonic movement toward “unity” (usually conceived of as a single body or organization speaking or acting for all exiles) has taken place in the Cuban exile community. The search for a unifying formula arises from a variety of motives: a psychological need on the part of the exiles for a single organization which they can consider as their repre-sentative an instructive belief that unity in itself will advance the cause of liberation; the desire for an organization which can address governments, international bodies, and public opinion; the belief that to work toward unity is to conform to the wishes of the U.S. Government, which is the only potential source of major material support; and the hope on the part of the ambitious that participation in unity will lead to political preference in post-Castro Cuba.

So far the developments in the effort for unity have resulted in the following line-up:

Left. The Second National Front of Escambray, Alpha-66, the Anti-Communist Liberation Front, and elements of the People’s Revolutionary Movement and the 30th of November Movement have reached a working agreement. Although the working agreement is essentially action-oriented, the member organizations tend to the view that the original revolution promised by Castro should be reclaimed and redirected. The adherence of Manuel Ray’s Revolutionary Junta (JURE) would increase the influence of this grouping, which probably has the most potential appeal to Castro’s opponents within Cuba, but which is an object of concern to more conservative exiles.

Center. Revolutionary Unity (UR), Revolutionary Recuperation Movement (MRR), Christian Democratic Movement (MDC), Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE), and other less well-organized center groups, have held aloof from attempts at unity.

Right. The Alliance for Cuban Liberty (ALC), and the Association for Economic Recovery of Cuba (AREC) have had difficulty attracting adherents. They principally look to the return of their lost property, rather than action and politics. Recent discussions by these groups with U.S. nationals promising large-scale financial support appear to have had no results.

“Letter of Integration.” Stimulated by old-line politicians, Alonso Pujol and Carlos Prio, this grouping has secured a number of signatures of prominent exiles on a document which calls for the liberation of Cuba, the extirpation of Communism, and the return to the 1940 Constitution. Rightist in makeup, heavily weighted on the side of discredited politicians, it is unlikely to have much support within Cuba.

Plebiscite. Jose (Pepin)Bosch (Bacardi Rum) is forming a committee to organize a plebiscite to elect a single leader. There has been little forward movement to date.

Enrique Ruiz Williams. He has formed a unity committee and claims the personal support of Attorney General Kennedy. His efforts have shown only limited results thus far.

Students. Student sectors of eleven organizations are reported to have reached a working agreement. The extent and significance of this attempt is unknown. Significantly, the DRE is not included in this bloc.

Brigade. An association of Brigade veterans, formed in April and claiming a membership of 900, is primarily—at least at present—a fraternal organization, but some of its leaders appear to have hopes that the group might form a nucleus for unity of all exiles.

The public attitude of the Government toward unity efforts was expressed by Assistant Secretary Martin last week as follows:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community if it is to have vitality.

It is desirable that a point implicit in the foregoing statement be made explicit, that is, the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

 It is unlikely that the exiles will be able to achieve a unity which meets the criteria set out in the Martin statement. So far the efforts toward unity have been tentative and competitive. Political divisions, both ideological and personal, are deep and there appears to be little disposition or ability to effect a real accommodation of views. The groups on the left distrust those on the right and vice versa; the center groups are wary of both. Any formula for unity would have to be so diluted as to be almost meaningless. Moreover, the ability of a united exile organization to reflect, to any meaningful degree, the attitudes and aspirations of those within Cuba would be minimal.

1. Support of Unity Efforts

Considerations: Through judicious use of our resources, we might be able to force or induce unity among all or the principal democratic groups from right to left. Such a movement or organization would have to be of the least-common-denominator type. It would generally be recognized as an artificial creation of ours, although it might have some favorable effect on domestic public opinion. Our interference would probably be resented by many of the best exile elements (as in the case of the CRC), would deprive any unity movement of spontaneity (one of the sole virtues of a Cuban-originated and directed effort), would commit us to continuing support of the movement or organization, and would probably be suspect within Cuba. Even beyond these considerations, unity in itself does not significantly contribute to the achievement of our present objectives in Cuba. In fact, it is quite possible that a continuation of the present situation in which there is no pre-eminent central organization would be easier and more effective from an operational standpoint.

2. Opposition to Unity Efforts

Considerations: By judicious use of our resources, we probably could thwart movements toward unity. Our interference in this sense would be strongly resented and would be widely interpreted as a demonstration that we are “giving up” on the Cuban question. It would be very difficult to explain, particularly to domestic public opinion, since “unity” on its face is attractive. In any case, the prospects for a spontaneous, effective, and meaningful unity are hardly good.

3. Hands-Off

Considerations: If we were to remain as aloof as a decent public posture allows, the chances are considerably better than even that unity efforts would fail. There is an outside possibility, however, that a unified organization or movement meeting our standards would emerge. If it did, it would have the strength endowed by the free, undistorted (by U.S. interference), competitive play of political currents, and it would not carry the taint of U.S. sponsorship.

A “hands-off” policy incurs the risks of permitting the possibly embarrassing intensification of division among the exiles, of sacrificing some sound but poorly financed groups to the necessitudes of exile politics in which less sound but better-financed elements might become dominant, and of being faced, should a unity movement or organization be formed, with demands for U.S. support. In the last case, the fact that we had not participated in the formation of the movement would give us maximum flexibility.

Conclusions The U.S. Government should follow a “hands-off” policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity. The statement of position made by Assistant Secretary Martin is a good expression of this policy, provided it is expanded by a reference to the requirement that unity reflect the basic desires of the people within Cuba.

Recommendations That the U.S. Government follow a “hands-off” policy toward exile efforts to achieve unity. That public statements by all officers of the U.S. Government on the subject of exile unity be consistent with the following:

Although many proponents of unity claim to have the approval of the United States Government, we have not been involved in these efforts, which are entirely Cuban in origin and direction. Of course, we believe that in principle a sound and broadly representative unity which reflects real identity of views is desirable. This, however, must come from within the Cuban community and be consistent with the desires of the people within Cuba if it is to have vitality.
346. Paper Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency for the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/63. Secret; Eyes Only. According to a covering memorandum from Smith to Bundy, June 10, this paper was to be submitted to the NSC Standing Group on June 11. The next (8th) meeting of the Standing Group was held on June 18, not June 11. Bundy’s record of action of the June 18 meeting indicated that the group discussed this paper and approved it for final decision by the President. (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 6/18/63) Washington, June 8, 1963. SUBJECT Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba

I. Introduction

1. Submitted herewith is a covert program for Cuba within CIA’s capabilities. Some parts of the program have already been approved and are being implemented. Being closely inter-related, the total cumulative impact of the courses of action set forth in this program is dependent upon the simultaneous coordinated execution of the individual courses of action.

2. This program is based on the assumption that current U.S. policy does not contemplate outright military intervention in Cuba or a provocation which can be used as a pretext for an invasion of Cuba by United States military forces. It is further assumed that U.S. policy calls for the exertion of maximum pressure by all means available to the U.S. Government, short of military intervention, to prevent the pacification of the population and the consolidation of the Castro/Communist regime. The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/Communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba.

3. While the effect of a program of maximum pressure is unpredictable, it is suggested that a sustained intensive effort undertaken now to prevent the consolidation of the Castro/Communist regime may in the future present the United States with opportunities and options not now foreseeable. The consequences of a policy of allowing Castro to “stew in his own juice,” however, are foreseeable. According to current estimates, barring Castro’s death or a decisive change in the U.S. posture or Soviet policy towards Cuba, the Castro regime is likely to be more firmly established a year hence, despite possible economic setbacks. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as the population and elite groups in Cuba become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in administrative experience and the security organs become more efficient. Over the longer run, the existence of an organized party apparatus as well as a stable governmental machinery could reduce the indispensability of Castro’s personal leadership. Thus, if left to chance, the U.S. must be prepared to accept for the indefinite future a Communist regime in Cuba closely tied to and a significant component of the Soviet world power structure.

4. Within the context of the policy assumptions and estimate of the situation in Cuba outlined above, CIA submits a program consisting of the following interdependent courses of action: Covert collection of intelligence, both for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers. Economic denial actions on an increased basis. General sabotage and harassment. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

5. A vital feature of the foregoing program to exert maximum pressure on the Castro/Communist regime is the dependence of the impact of each course of action on the simultaneous and effective execution of the other courses of action. Thus, intelligence information is needed to permit the planning and mounting of operations against economic denial and sabotage targets. Covert propaganda actions are designed to produce a psychological climate in Cuba conducive to the accomplishment of the other courses of action in the integrated covert program. Only after the effects of economic denial and sabotage actions are deeply felt by the populace and the elite groups can one hope to convert disaffection in the armed forces and other power centers of the regime into militant revolt against the Castro/Communist entourage. It is also at this point where CIA-controlled and autonomous activist elements in the Cuban exile community can begin to assume genuine resistance proportions. As a consequence of this inter-related and continuous process, it is reasonable to expect a considerable increase in the volume and quality of the intelligence product on the basis of which additional and increasingly more effective operations can be mounted. Unless all the components of this program are executed in tandem, the individual courses of action are almost certain to be of marginal value, even in terms of achieving relatively limited policy objectives. This is clearly a cause where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

II. Discussion of Components of an Integrated Program

6. In amplification of the courses of action listed in paragraph 4 above, the following additional description and terms of reference are offered:

A. Covert collection of intelligence, both for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.

Covert collection of intelligence continues to be a major CIA mission. Without detracting from our strategic intelligence efforts, emphasis is being given to increasing the volume and quality of intelligence needed for planning and mounting the operations contemplated in the integrated program described in this paper, particularly for defections and penetrations and for economic denial and sabotage actions against vulnerable sectors of the Cuban economy.

B. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.

In accordance with a previously approved psychological program in support of U.S. policy on Cuba, CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba encourage low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance. These media also seek to stimulate and exacerbate tensions within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc, taking advantage of Sino-Soviet tensions. All of these propaganda operations are calculated to create a psychological atmosphere within Cuba which will facilitate the accomplishment of the other courses of action within the integrated covert action program.

C. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and other power centers.

We are undertaking an intensive probing effort to identify, seek out and establish channels of communication with disaffected and potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime, particularly in the armed forces hierarchy. The objective is to promote the fragmentation of the regime and possibly lead to an internal coup which would dislodge Castro and his entourage, and make it possible to eliminate the Cuban Communists from positions of power and force the withdrawal of the Soviet military presence and the termination of its economic aid. Several promising operations are already underway.

D. Economic denial actions.

Overt official U.S. economic sanctions in conjunction with covert economic denial operations (such as denial of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]) is causing a marked adverse effect on the Cuban economy. For maximum impact on the Cuban economy this effort must be coordinated with sabotage operations. We propose to continue and intensify economic denial operations which would be greatly enhanced by an inter-agency committee with a charter enabling it to call upon member agencies for rapid action.

E. General sabotage and harassment.

Sabotage in this program is both an economic weapon and a stimulus to resistance. As an economic weapon, it is a supplement to and therefore must be coordinated with the economic denial effort. As a stimulus to resistance, there must be visible and dramatic evidence of sabotage to serve as a symbol of growing popular defiance of the Castro regime.

These operations will be conducted either by externally held assets now available or by existing internal assets or those to be developed. Assets trained and controlled by CIA will be used as will selected autonomous exile groups. Initially, the emphasis will be on the use of externally held assets with a shift to internal assets as soon as operationally feasible.

The types of sabotage considered appropriate for this program are: Simple low-risk sabotage on a large scale stimulated by propaganda media (approved and being implemented). Sabotage of Cuban ships outside Cuban waters (approved and being implemented). Externally mounted hit-and-rUN attacks against appropriately selected targets. Support of internal resistance elements, providing materiel and personnel to permit them to undertake a variety of sabotage and harassment operations.

It must be recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate significant resistance. However, it is our opinion that a well-planned series of sabotage efforts, properly executed, would in time produce the effect we seek. Each action will have its dangers: there will be failures with consequent loss of life and charges of attribution to the United States resulting in criticism at home and abroad. None of these expected consequences should cause us to change our course if the program as outlined can be expected to be successful.

Annex A is an elaboration of a proposed sabotage and harassment program against Cuba.

F. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

In the past, CIA has utilized only fully controlled and disciplined agent assets as a safeguard against unilateral and irresponsible action by Cuban exiles intent upon the liberation of their country. If sabotage and resistance activities are to be undertaken on a larger scale, it will be necessary to accept the risks involved in utilizing autonomous Cuban exile groups and individuals who will not necessarily be responsive to our guidance. CIA proposes the following “rules of engagement” to govern the conduct of these autonomous operations: It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance. The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, it cannot be resumed. All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States. The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U.S. complicity. The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations. These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule.

III. Recommendation

7. Policy authority already exists for courses of action described in paragraph 6 A-D. In order that full advantage can be taken of an integrated covert action program, the Standing Group is requested to approve courses of action outlined in paragraph 6 E and F within the terms of reference and rules of engagement therein.

Annex A SUBJECT Sabotage/Harassment Program

The broad target categories against which the sabotage/harassment operations would be mounted and a preliminary evaluation of their effect, can be summarized as follows:

A. Electric Power

Disruption of any of the existing power grids which might be effected by damage to or destruction of the generating facilities or of the critical sub-stations in the distribution network, would significantly weaken the existing economic and social structure, particularly in view of the fact that in many areas the power now available is not adequate to meet the demands of industrial and public consumers. Smaller acts of sabotage/harassment by the populace such as throwing chains over high tension lines to short them out, would also exacerbate the current power shortage, and the cumulative effect of all such actions could cause a prolonged breakdown of the power system as there is already a shortage of spare parts and replacement materiels.

B. Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

Damage to or destruction of POL production and/or storage facilities would seriously affect almost all aspects of the Cuban economy. The electric power industry depends almost entirely upon POL as fuel for the generating plants and the sugar industry depends upon POL powered processing and transportation facilities as does all intra-province transportation. Production and storage facilities are susceptible to external attacks by heavy weapons or by more subtle methods if internal assets having an appropriate degree of accessibility can be developed. The loss of refining facilities could be offset by increased Bloc shipments of refined products but such a shift would require a period of readjustment during which there would be a heavy strain on the Cuban economy. An additional burden on the Bloc refining capacity would also exist until Cuba’s refining capacity is restored.

C. Transportation

Damage to or destruction of railway and/or highway rolling stock or the destruction of key bridges would lead to breakdowns in the regional economics which to a large degree are dependent on the distribution of imported products. The processing and export of the vitally important sugar crop is also entirely dependent on transportation. It is not anticipated that we could achieve that degree of disruption which would cause a collapse of the economy or social structure, but even a minor degree of disruption will adversely affect the standard of living and the output of the economy, both of which are key factors in the stability of the regime. The type of operations envisioned in this category would range from fairly sophisticated attacks by external or internal assets against the rolling stock, key bridges and repair facilities to simple low risk acts by the populace such as the derailing of rail transportation or placing tire puncturing material on highways.

D. Production Processing and Manufacturing Facilities

While the Cuban economy primarily depends on imports for indigenous consumption and even though the sugar crop is by far the most important item in Cuban exports, there are still a number of other facilities such as the nickel complex at Nicaro, cement plants, distilleries, and the myriad industries associated with the provision of food, clothing and shelter, which are worthwhile targets in that stopping or lessening their output will weaken the economy and breed discontent against the regime. These targets are particularly susceptible to attack by external or internal assets in that due to their profusion and their relatively low strategic importance they are not well guarded or otherwise secured against attack.

The selection of specific targets within the above categories and the determination of timing and tactics will be predicated upon detailed analysis of the following factors: The extent to which the target can be physically damaged. The resultant effect upon the Cuban economy. The cost or effort required if additional burdens are placed on Bloc support. The psychological effect on the Cuban population. Anticipated adverse reactions. Operational capabilities and limitations of CIA assets.

347. National Intelligence EstimateSource: Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 79-R01012A, ODDI Registry. Secret. According to covering sheets this estimate was submitted to the U.S. Intelligence Board by the Central Intelligence Agency on June 14. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the National Security Agency participated in its preparation. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred with it with the exception of the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside his jurisdiction. This NIE superseded NIE 85-2-62, “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba,” August 1, 1962, and SNIE 85-3-62, “The Military Balance in Cuba,” September 19, 1962. For texts, see vol. X, Documents 363 and 433. NIE 85-63 Washington, June 14, 1963.

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA

Conclusions

After a period marked by bitterness on Castro’s part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties now appear to have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cuba favors this consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains in experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismatic appeal continues to be the most important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (Paras. 1, 15, 18, 31-32, 41) Dependence on the person of Castro is, however, a major vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and without goals—and these would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appeal to a majority of Cubans—no opposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however much equipment or support it might get from the outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime’s leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro’s ability to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. Furthermore, even under the most favorable circumstances, any opposition would have to have the support of a large part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops. (Paras. 15, 42-43) On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba is in transition with a scaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be about 12,000 to 13,000, but we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets will maintain a significant presence there. (Paras. 2, 5, 12-14, 35, 37) With respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, we doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date for transfer of operational control or would carry out such an agreement if subsequent developments produced new dangers. We believe that the Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the risks involved. (Para. 36) The capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have been augmented by increased training, new equipment, and some reorganization. The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. In the event of US invasion, however, they would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense or guerrilla operations, but only a relatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type. (Paras. 8, 12-14) In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplatesan attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillance remains a major deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. Greatly enhanced Soviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled “offensive” by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. (Paras. 38-40) The joint Khrushchev-Castro communiqueThe Joint Soviet-Cuban Statement signed in Moscow by Castro and Khrushchev, May 23, 1963; for a partial text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 269-271. held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro’s earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime’s exhortations on the subject have been muted recently. The outlook is for a mixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking to avoid a crisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. (Paras. 46-48) While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have not reached a fundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insist on a unique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Nevertheless, Castro has taken a long step toward the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received a strong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economic support; the commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba’s special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed. (Paras. 49-51)

[Here follow a 13-page discussion section and an annex listing major Soviet military equipment in Cuba. See the Supplement for both.]

348. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 April-30 June 1963. Secret. Prepared by FitzGerald. Washington, June 19, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting at the White House concerning Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba PRESENT Higher Authority Secretary McNamara Under Secretary Harriman Mr. McCone Mr. McGeorge Bundy Mr. Thomas Parrott Mr. Desmond FitzGerald Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, General W.F. McKee The program as recommended by the Standing Group of the NSCSee Document 346. was presented briefly to Higher Authority who showed a particular interest in proposed external sabotage operations. He was shown charts indicating typical targets for this program and a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages ensued. It was well recognized that there would be failures and a considerable noise level. [2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Bundy described the integrated nature of the program presented and made the point that, having made the decision to go ahead, we be prepared to take the consequences of flaps and criticisms for a sufficient period to give the program a real chance. Mr. Harriman stated that the program would be “reviewed weekly” by the Special Group. (It is believed that an arrangement can be made with Mr. Bundy for less detailed control by the Special Group than was indicated by Mr. Harriman.) Higher Authority asked how soon we could get into action with the external sabotage program and was told that we should be able to conduct our first operation in the dark-of-the-moon period in July although he was informed that we would prefer to start the program with some caution selecting softer targets to begin with. Higher Authority said this was a matter for our judgment. Although at one stage in the discussion Higher Authority said that we should move ahead with the program “this summer” it is believed that Mr. Bundy will be able to convince him that this is not a sufficiently long trial period to demonstrate what the program can do.McCone added an addendum to this memorandum stating that he emphasized to the President “the importance and necessity for continuous operations,” and he also pointed out that the activities “would create quite a high noise level.”McCone also stated that the noise level “must be absorbed and not create a change in policy.” He concluded that “no single event would be conclusive.” Desmond FitzGeraldChief, Special Affairs Staff
349. Paper Prepared by the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs of the Department of StateSource: Department of State, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba—1963. Top Secret. According to a covering memorandum, Assistant Secretary Martin sent this paper to U. Alexis Johnson on June 20. Washington, June 20, 1963.

FUTURE RELATIONS WITH CASTRO

I. Background

The cardinal point of Castro’s foreign policy until the missile crisis was to bind Cuba tightly to the USSR as a means of ensuring the regime’s survival in the shadow of United States power—based on the proposition, as Cuba goes so goes world communism. Soviet refusal to rUN the quarantine and its acquiescence in withdrawing the missiles shook the foundation of Cuban foreign policy.

Since the missile crisis, Castro has indicated, sometimes vaguely, sometimes rather clearly, through various channels, public as well as private, that he is interested in an accommodation with the United States. His immediate disillusion over the Soviet missile crisis posture probably prompted him to grope for a policy which would diminish his depend-ence upon the Soviet Union, lessen his ties with the communist world and enable him to establish counter-balancing relations elsewhere. In casting about for some sort of new alignment, he may possibly have envisioned Cuba’s emergence as a neutralist state. (Given Castro’s temperament and ambition, any such neutralization would have to be dynamic and proselytizing rather than passive.) Although it is of course impossible to be certain, it would seem that Castro, at least in his early post-missile crisis flirtings with accommodation, was acting essentially in his own interest and may have been prepared to move further from the Bloc than the USSR, despite its general urging that Castro seek ways to reduce tensions, would have liked.

Castro’s Moscow visit re-cemented Cuban-Soviet relations, at least for some time. In his TV broadcast upon his return to Cuba, Castro left no doubt that he accepted Khrushchev’s leadership of a communist world that included Cuba, and he specifically and flatly rejected the possibility that he might stray. Whatever possibility may have existed immediately after the missile crisis that Castro might in fact adopt an independent and more neutralist policy has probably vanished under present circumstances. Viewed in this context, Castro’s latest gesture toward “normalcy” in United States-Cuban relations appears clearly to constitute a concerted Soviet-Cuban initiative, encouraged by the Soviets and fully consistent with the policy of “peaceful co-existence.”

Castro’s comments have not made clear what he envisages as the terms of such an action. Castro has indicated a willingness to negotiate concessions for expropriated properties, though his opening position is a rather onerous one, involving the use of Cuban receipts from the sale of sugar to the United States in excess of 3 million tons at 5.56#. He has implied that his subversive activities in Latin America would be no problem, but largely by denying that he is currently engaged in anything of the sort. He has made clear that nothing can change the fact that his regime is Communist and must continue to have the closest of political ties to the Soviet Union.

There have been indications from Soviet sources that Soviet military presence in Cuba could be removed if that is an obstacle.

The general tone of Castro’s discussion of this subject in his TV broadcast on his return from Moscow is that we need a settlement more than he does and therefore we should offer the concessions. In this connection he again mentions the abandonment of Guantanamo as one of the conditions he would affix to a reconciliation.

II. Motivation

It seems likely that the motives both for Castro and the Soviets in seeking some kind of an accommodation are both economic and political. Castro’s economy is not doing well, and he needs trade with the United States both as a market for sugar and source of supply for spare parts and equipment generally. He may even hope to get some United States technical aid to supplement that from the bloc with which he seems to have considerable dissatisfaction.

The Soviets probably wish to get some relaxation of the burden they are now carrying to keep the economy going at all. It would certainly cost them nothing not to have to buy Cuban sugar whatever the price.

It may be also that Castro retains some interest in such an accommodation in order to have more maneuverability vis-a-vis the Soviets. From a long-term standpoint as well as in the incidents at the time of the missile crisis, an independent egoist such as Castro must find his dependence on the Soviets galling.

From a longer-term standpoint Castro and the Soviets may also feel that there will be a better opportunity to make Cuba more nearly a showcase of communism in the hemisphere rather than a glaring example of economic failure, if an accommodation with the United States is possible. Not only would economic benefits accrue but the respectability and prestige that Castro would derive from successful accommodation, which would be played as “victory over the United States,” would significantly advance both the Soviets and Castro toward their long range goals in the hemisphere. Support for the regime from within Cuba might well become wider and more active with an effect on economic prosperity as well as political attitudes.

III. Concessions

For any negotiation to have a prospect of success, we should probably have to agree to the following: Stop overflights. Stop giving support to Cubans who are attempting to overthrow the regime. Pass legislation restoring a sugar quota to Cuba. Take legislative action, and executive action in consultation with Congress, permitting trade with Cuba on at least as extensive a basis as the Soviet bloc. Possibly seek to remove the strictures against Cuba and her activities in the hemisphere adopted in the Inter-American System and perhaps accept Cuba back into the OAS and its subordinate bodies. Agree to continuation of political, economic and some international ties with the USSR.

In return it may be presumed that Cuba might agree to the following: Send back Soviet personnel except for training missions in connection with Soviet military assistance programs of a type similar to those which accompany United States military assistance programs. Halt Cuban assistance to subversion in Latin America. Agree that Cuban armed forces will not be used outside of Cuba except in accordance with decisions of the Inter-American System. Agree that the Soviets will not be permitted to use Cuba as a base for armed action. Negotiate an agreement for some compensation for seized properties, presumably tied to the level of export earnings from sales of sugar to the United States.

IV. Conclusion

This is not an acceptable arrangement for the following reasons: It would be an agreement with Castro and in no general sense with the regime as a whole or the people as a whole. It would fall with his fall. Even with his continuation, his word has too frequently been demonstrated as worthless to give us much long-term assurance of quiet in the Caribbean. Without the political break with Moscow a precedent would be established for other communist regimes in the hemisphere and the whole effort to keep them out of this area and to establish its special status would fall to the ground. It could mean the death of the Inter-American System. Since subversive activities in Latin America are to a very considerable extent covert anyway, there would be no effective means of ensuring that Castro had kept his word. Moreover, it would be all too simple for activities which he has been conducting to be shifted in large part to other bloc countries, who are already extensively engaged. Approval of a communist regime would be a great encouragement to native communists in Latin America and would increase their power. With the threat perhaps increased or at least substantially unchanged, there would inevitably be a major relaxation of anti-communist effort on the part of the Latin American countries since there has been so much focus on the threat of Cuba. The prospect of communist take-over would thus be enhanced. It is exceedingly difficult to envisage this as a two stage operation with the second stage the elimination of communism or Castro. Any such compromise would enormously strengthen him with the Cuban people and make the regime less dependent on him personally than it has been. A communist regime in Cuba would be even more securely entrenched than it is now. An essential component of the economic aspects is legislative action by the United States Congress. This must take place before Castro limits in any way his present dependence and close relations with the Soviet bloc. He cannot afford economically the possible gap. It is probably not feasible at any time, but particularly under these circumstances, to secure Congressional assent to the economic measures while Castro maintains his full present relationship with the bloc. The sugar legislation will be made particularly difficult by the need to deprive other friendly countries of sugar quotas and to assign a sugar quota before adequate assurances have been secured with respect to compensation for United States sugar property owners. Any such settlement will cause serious problems of order within the United States so far as a couple hundred thousand Cuban exiles are concerned. They, and all parties of the right in Latin America, in many cases supported by Cuban exile groups, will denounce the United States for surrendering to communist pressure. Our posture in Latin America would be seriously prejudiced in important circles heretofore friendly to us. The United States attitude toward communism and expropriation which such an accommodation would reflect and the encouragement to subversion in Latin America from this acceptance of a communist regime will completely dry up investment there as well as encourage capital flight. The success of the Alliance for Progress will become clearly impossible.

350. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, Memos for the Record. Secret. The meeting was held on June 21 from 3:40 to approximately 4:40 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) Washington, June 22, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting in the Office of the Secretary of State re Discussion of Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba PRESENT The Secretary of State Under Secretary Harriman Deputy Under Secretary Johnson Director Hughes Mr. McCone Mr. FitzGerald The undersigned briefed the Secretary concerning the components and rationale of the program. The first specific item in the program to be discussed in detail was “autonomous operations.” It was explained that these operations would be based outside of the United States and that every trace of U.S. involvement in the program possible would be concealed. It was also pointed out that the concept of autonomous groups is open-ended and the purpose is to develop resistance capabilities inside Cuba. Any exile group having capabilities in the field of resistance could be included and supported. For instance, Manolo Ray and his JURE will be offered financial support within the next day. The Secretary stressed the need to document and publicize Castro’s subversive and terrorist operations in Latin America and to seize the opportunity to place raids against Cuba in the guise of retaliation for these acts on Castro’s part. It was pointed out that autonomous operations are particularly well designed to fit into this concept. There ensued a discussion of sabotage and harassment operations and their place within the program. It was stated that the hit and rUN operations, whether staged by autonomous groups or unilaterally by the Agency, are primarily designed to encourage resistance within Cuba which must in turn bear the main burden of coordinated and extensive sabotage. Commencing in mid-July the frequency of hit and rUN operations would be two to three per month with a probable average of two. The Secretary noted that the mid-July date for the commencement of these operations would coincide with Governor Harriman’s presence in Moscow. Mr. McCone stated that the program should be considered as an integrated and continuing thing which could not be put on a stop and go basis if it could be expected to achieve its goal. He stated that the Special Group would have the program under continuous review but would recognize the need to permit the program to flow forward as planned without requiring each operation to be justified in political and economic terms without regard to the total plan. Governor Harriman said that it was obvious that the Soviets have put their prestige on the line in Cuba and will undoubtedly deliver aid, both military and economic, on any scale deemed necessary. Governor Harriman said that this aspect of the matter should be kept under continuous scrutiny with the realization that these Soviet efforts may well affect the present program one way or the other. The Secretary pointed to certain signs of trouble in the Berlin area early next Fall. He said that this should be watched carefully as again Soviet actions in Berlin might influence and be influenced by the program under discussion. Mr. McCone asked the Secretary whether he favored the program. The Secretary replied that he did but that the only portion of it which gave him concern was the hit and rUN operations. He underlined the desirability to have these tied in some manner to retaliation against Castro’s actions in Latin America. The Secretary asked for views concerning the prospects of Castro’s reconciliation with the United States and his Latin American neighbors. He mentioned that Castro’s statements since his return from Moscow had appeared to be on the whole conciliatory. Mr. McCone said that he had read these statements of Castro’s as meaning that Castro was even more firmly tied to the Soviet Union and that any reconciliation with the U.S. would have to be on Castro’s and the Soviet Union’s terms. He said that he felt that any rapprochement on the part of the U.S. with Castro which retained Soviet troops in Cuba, maintained Cuba as a closed society and permitted no on-site inspection could not be acceptable to the U.S. He also pointed out that it would make Castro respectable in the eyes of Latin America without reducing Castro’s ambitions and pressures there. It was agreed however that we should continue to probe wherever possible to find out what Castro really has on his mind. The Swiss Ambassador to Cuba should be debriefed in detail and Donovan should be encouraged to return to Cuba if invited. Desmond FitzGeraldChief, Special Affairs Staff
351. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A. Secret. Prepared by McCone. Washington, June 24, 1963. SUBJECT Meeting with Secretary Rusk—21 June 1963—re Cuba IN ATTENDANCE Secretary Rusk, Gov. Harriman, Secretary Johnson, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. McCone Details of the meeting are summarized in Mr. FitzGerald’s memorandum,Document 350. which is complete. However I have the impression that Secretary Rusk is not enthusiastically behind the CIA program. He seems to feel that there is some opportunity of a rapprochement with Castro as referred to in the FitzGerald memorandum. I insisted on the meeting with Rusk because I sensed his reservations and, although he approved the program, it was obvious he did so reluctantly and I think the first evidence of “noise” will call for reconsideration. This is a subject that I have discussed with him on several occasions in the past. Mr. Rusk offers no explanation for his attitude but it has prevailed for a long time. [5 lines of source text not declassified] I made it abundantly clear during the meeting, and privately to Secretary Rusk afterwards, that I felt a rapprochement out of the question in view of the relationship between Castro and Khrushchev resulting from Castro’s trip. Therefore I felt nothing could be done until some event occurred which would impair this relationship. I emphasized both in the meeting and afterwards that it was a very dangerous subject to approach from a political point of view; I did not think the American people would accept the concept of a rapprochement unless: Castro disavowed any ideas of exporting his revolution; That he broke his Moscow tie and expelled the Soviets from Cuba together with such equipment as they chose to take with them; and He open up his country for free access and travel by Americans so that we could have continuing on-site inspection and hence knowledge of what is going on.
352. Telegram From Acting Secretary of State Ball and the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) in IrelandSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Top Secret; Eyes Only. President Kennedy was in Ireland June 25-29. Rusk was in the United Kingdom during the same time. Washington, June 25, 1963, 7:45 p.m.

Sitto 8. From Ball and Kaysen. Bundy eyes only for the President and Rusk. In note from Cuban GovernmentThe full text of the note, June 24, is ibid. See the Supplement. Ball had telephone conversations with McCone, Kaysen, McNamara, U. Alexis Johnson, and Martin on June 25 on the question of the Cuban note and U-2 reconnaissance. (Ibid., Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Cuba) Memoranda of these conversations are in the Supplement. (delivered by Czech Ambassador this afternoon but intended for delivery June 21 or 22) protesting various exile activities directed against Cuba, following passages included: “GOC protests … the recent low-level flight over Cuban territory, for the purpose of espionage, of a US military plane, which the US press itself has taken upon itself to reveal and warns that Cuban gunners have orders to fire against any foreign war plane which flies at a low level over our territory.” (After referring to recent seizure by US customs of small plane loaded with explosives apparently for attack on Habana refineries.) “This event, as well as the attack carried at the end of April against this same Cuban refinery by a plane which took off from US territory carrying powerful explosive charges, obliges us to accelerate our defensive preparations in order to be in conditions to intercept and shoot down any war plane which violates our air space at any altitude.”

On June 22, GOC requested Swiss Embassy Habana notify USG urgently that GOC did not intend publicize note in order avoid increasing existing tensions and that GOC protesting precisely because fact which motivated note increases tension. GOC addedthat if USG gives publicity GOC will do same.

This note must be read against fact that on three occasions from June 19 through June 24 MIG 21s have engaged in zoom climbs that have brought them in general proximity of U-2s. As a result, U-2s have followed existing procedures and aborted.

Have discussed foregoing situation with McNamara and Kaysen, and we are agreed on following procedure:

As previously decided, there will be no low-level flights before President’s return. High-level flights will continue under existing procedures which call for aborts when Cuban aircraft within 40 miles of U-2 and at altitude in excess of 40,000 feet.

Taking into account need for current intelligence, we believe this provides proper margin of safety to justify continued flights even under special conditions when President out of country.

353. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Rusk in the United KingdomSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Cuban Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret; Priority. This telegram was apparently also sent as White House telegram CAP 63345 to Ireland. There is a notation on it that the President read it. Washington, June 26, 1963, 8:21 a.m.

Tosec 17. Deptel Sitto 8.Document 352. FYI. Following is ARA and INR analysis of Cuban note:

Since (a) references to action against overflights surrounded by protests against exile activities even though purpose note clearly was to get across message on overflights, and (b) there was unusual lapse time between June 10 incident in which two Cuban coast guard personnel captured and another killed and delivery Cuban note, Department concludes note carefully considered (very likely in consultation with Soviets) and drafted. Only prior reference June 10 incident which would normally have resulted swift stiff protest occurred June 19 in Castro speech at Cardenas when incident mentioned only in passing.

General tone of note (as distinct from substance) restrained and appears designed to be unprovocative. Although overflights have evidently been object continuing concern Cubans, tone, together with express desire transmitted through Swiss avoid publicity (which otherwise Castro could have based upon public references to “violation air space” contained both joint Cuban-Soviet communique during Castro visit and Castro TV interview in Habana thereafter), would indicate GOC, very likely in concert Soviets, proceeding cautiously. Fact that Cubans went unusual length stress intention give no publicity suggests they may be anxious avoid locking themselves or us in. They may look upon note as at minimum probe our determination on overflights.

Differences in language between reference to low-level flights and reference to flights at any altitude indicate harder line on former than latter which can be accounted for by Soviet control SAM’s. Note that reference to overflights at any altitude significantly refers to taking steps “in order to be ready” (official translation) and refrains from flat commitment they will fire.

In sum Department regards note as (a) cautiously and unprovocatively worded and carefully handled warning against overflights which affords Cubans flexibility with respect actual response they might make at least to high level flights; and (b) as important step (additional to use MIG-21’s vicinity U-2 flights) in effort force cessation overflights. High-level flight today was without incident.

Ball
354. Summary Record of the 9th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/9/63. Secret; Sensitive. Washington, July 9, 1963, 5 p.m.

1. Progress report on integrated action program toward Cuba

Desmond FitzGerald reviewed developments and actions of the past three weeks since the approval by the group of the integrated action program for Cuba. He mentioned two events which are scheduled for the 26th of July. He was reading from notes.

Mr. Harriman called attention to the relation of action in Cuba to his mission to Moscow.Reference is to Harriman’s trip to Moscow to negotiate the nuclear test ban agreement, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963. He said he hoped to be out of Moscow by the 25th or 26th of July. He appeared anxious to avoid giving the Russians an opportunity to raise with him our Cuban policy on the basis of actions which had taken place during the time he was in Moscow.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be a discussion of the State/USIA paper containing a draft statement of what we hoped to see develop in a post-Castro Cuba.A draft of the statement is in the Supplement attached to a memorandum from USIA Deputy Director Wilson to McGeorge Bundy, May 4. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 5/7/63) A revised version of the paper, July 12, is ibid., Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. See the Supplement.

There was a discussion as to how to handle press inquiries about developments in Cuba such as raids from outside Cuba and sabotage actions within Cuba. It was agreed that we should flatly deny any U.S. Government involvement in any of these activities. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, July 9, which stated that the Group heard an oral report on the integrated action program toward Cuba. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/9/63)

[Here follows a report on U.S. policy toward Spain.]

Bromley Smith
355. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. Confidential. Washington, July 13, 1963. SUBJECT NSC Standing Group Meeting Tuesday, July 16, 5 P.M.: CubaSee Document 356.

Attached for circulation to members of the Standing Group for the July 16th meeting are the following papers: A proposed statement on Cuba to be made by the President, drafted jointly by ARA and USIA.See footnote 2, Document 354. A proposed statement on Cuba drafted by ARA as a statement to be made by the President on July 26.The draft statement, undated, is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. See the Supplement. A “Cuban Balance Sheet” prepared by INR and incorporating the suggestions of CIA.The 12-page paper was an undated memorandum from Hughes to Johnson. The paper compared the Batista and Castro regimes in terms of their abilities to respond effectively to the needs and aspirations of various parts of the Cuban population. The paper also weighed the promises of the Castro regime before and upon its attainment of power against its performance. The CIA reviewed the paper, and its suggestions were incorporated into the final version. The paper gave Castro some credit for reforms in such areas as health care, housing, education, lowering rents, honest administration, and racial equality, but noted in other areas like civil liberties, economic diversification, new investment, and independence from foreign influences Castro’s record was worse than Batista’s. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63)

The first draft statement represents the draft ARA and USIA were requested jointly to prepare, and meets the minimum views of both of them. It could be issued at any time; a possible occasion would be the Alliance for Progress Commemorative Ceremony in Washington on August 17, to which the President was been invited.

The second statement, which is addressed specifically to the July 26 date, represents the flavor, content and approach to a statement that would be preferred by ARA.

The INR paper examines group attitudes in Cuba toward Batista and Castro Regimes and seeks to assess performance in certain key sectors during the Batista period as well as against Castro’s promise and performance. It should be read in conjunction with the proposed statements.

U. Alexis Johnson
356. Summary Record of the 10th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63. Secret. Washington, July 16, 1963, 5 p.m.

1. Proposed U.S. Statement on Cuba

Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson introduced the three papers which were circulated to the group under his memorandum of July 13th.See footnotes 2, 3, and 4, Document 355. Because any Presidential statement on Cuba would have an impact on the Harriman negotiations in Moscow, no one favored asking the President to issue a statement on July 26th. If it is decided to issue a statement, consideration will be given to making it on August 17th, which is the anniversary of the Alliance for Progress.

With respect to the content of the statement, Mr. McCone called attention to the following sentence which appears in both the proposed statements: “I am confident that all true friends of the Cubans share my conviction that the day is not too far distant when these aspirations will be fulfilled.” His view, shared by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Martin, was that this prediction was too strong and gave a false impression that there would soon be a free Cuba.

General Goodpaster noted that in both papers it appeared that we were saying that Castro was sincere at the time he made promises to the Cuban people prior to his coming to power. He doubted that we should indicate that we believed that his promises were genuine. It was agreed that changes would be made to reflect Castro’s promises as being assertions without appearing to give him the benefit of saying that his promises were genuine.

The Attorney General asked what effect the Harriman talks would have on the timing and content of the statement on Cuba. Mr. McGeorge Bundy replied by saying that Harriman had asked that there be no loud noises about Cuba during the time he was in Moscow.

Mr. Martin said that the State Department had given Secretary Rusk a paper covering suggestions to negotiate with Castro.See Document 349. Although this paper recommended against such negotiations, Mr. Martin felt that the paper should be considered by the Standing Group before the group made any decision on a proposed Presidential statement on Cuba. He said a number of proposals had been made which involve negotiation with Castro. Two Congressmen had asked whether or not we should find out if Castro was ready to make a deal with us. One Congressman volunteered to go to Havana to talk to Castro along these lines.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy suggested that the group should look at the negotiation paper. It was agreed that at the next meeting the paper would be considered. In the meantime, a decision on a proposed Presidential statement on Cuba would be deferred.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that he felt that things would have to get much rougher for Castro before he would consider any deal with us which we could accept. However, this did not mean that we should say now that we would never talk to Castro.

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department recommendations covering suggestions that Cuba shipping orders be made more restrictive would be coming to the White House tomorrow. Following an intense study of this problem, Mr. Johnson said he had reached the conclusion that no sharpening of the existing orders would reduce the amount of free world shipping to Cuba. The ships now in the trade are beyond our control. He concluded that the only way to reduce free world shipping would be to make the orders apply to the flag of the ship rather than the ownership. Unless we did this, which would result in our banning British ships such as the Queen Mary, the problem was not within our control. If we acted against the Yugoslavs and the Poles we would hurt our relations with them and gain little in terms of reducing trade with Cuba. For example, one Yugo ship a month goes to Cuba. In order to stop that ship, we would have to be ready to prevent forty-six Yugoslav ships coming to the U.S. monthly.

General Goodpaster referred to the INR paper on the Cuban balance sheet and asked whether the economic estimates contained in it meant that we believed the Cuban economy was as far down as it would go. Mr. McCone acknowledged that he did not know whether the economic predictions in the balance sheet paper were consistent with those in the latest National Intelligence Estimate.Not further identified. Mr. Martin said it was impossible to predict with accuracy what would happen to the economic situation in Cuba. Some believed that it would not get worse and would gradually improve in view of the massive Soviet aid now going to Cuba. He was not persuaded that the Russians could organize the Cuban economy in a way which would result in a very great improvement. He was not prepared to say that the Cuban economy had reached the bottom, adding that there was a possibility that the situation would get worse than it now is.

[1 paragraph (18 lines of source text) not declassified]On July 8 the United States blocked all assets of Cuba in the United States or of persons in Cuba; prohibited the transfer by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction of U.S. dollars to or from Cuba; and prohibited all unlicensed transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals or transactions involving property in which there was a Cuban interest. For text of the announcement of the decision, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 276-277.

2. Contingent Plan to Reduce Price of Sugar

Deputy Under Secretary of Agriculture Sundquist commented on the contingent plan which he had been asked to prepare.The report, dated July 5, was entitled “A Contingent Plan for Increasing World Production of Sugar.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63) See the Supplement. He noted that sugar producers throughout the world had reacted quickly to recent sharp rise in the price of sugar.

Mr. McCone thought that nature was doing pretty well in solving the sugar shortage. Hysteria had gone out of the situation and the price had dropped from 14# to 9#. Sugar producers were actively planning increased production. He personally opposed increasing the domestic quota and favored borrowing from existing quotas.

Mr. Sundquist said that very shortly we would have an over-supply of sugar facing us. He opposed the plan he presented because it would cause more problems than it would be worth, i.e. approximately $22 million annually to Cuba.

The group agreed that the plan should not be undertaken, but that we should adopt a policy of watchful waiting. Mr. McCone added that there was nothing else that we could do.

Report by Mr. FitzGerald—There was a discussion of the wide-spread press reports that the U.S. was backing Cuban exiles who are planning raids against Cuba from Central American States. One news article shown the Attorney General was headed “Backstage with Bobby” and referred to his conversations with persons involved in planning the Cuban raids.The story, by Hal Hendrix, was in the Miami Herald, July 14, 1963.

In the discussion as to how to deal with the press reports, the Attorney General suggested that we could float other rumors so that in the welter of press reports no one would know the true facts. Mr. McCone agreed that it would be possible to confuse the situation in this manner. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. McGeorge Bundy mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson the President’s interest in a declaration or doctrine which would put the Russians and the Latin Americans on notice that the U.S. would not accept a second Castro in this hemisphere. Mr. Bundy said some work on this declaration had been done, that the President had it very much in mind, and suggested that the State Department continue its work on a draft declaration.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting. Bundy noted that the President would not make a statement on Cuba on July 26, that further consideration would be given to a statement on August 17, and that the content of the statement would be reexamined after consideration of the Department of State paper on negotiations with Castro. Second, Bundy noted that U. Alexis Johnson reported that tightening existing restrictions on free world shipping would only be effective if restrictions were revised so that they affected the country whose flag the ship was flying rather than the country of ownership. Third, Bundy noted that Agriculture’s contingent plan for increasing world production of sugar would not be acted upon because of the drop in sugar prices from previous actions. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 7/16/63) See the Supplement.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
357. Memorandum From the Chief, Special Affairs Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret. Washington, August 9, 1963. SUBJECT Luis Somoza’s Involvement in Cuban Exile Operations The so-called Somoza plan has probably not yet jelled. Recent talks between ex-President Luis Somoza and Manuel Artime, prominent exile leader, may have resulted in modifications. Inconclusive secondhand reports would seem to suggest that Somoza’s thinking on the subject of Cuba is oriented toward commando raids, guerilla warfare and sabotage of mounting scope and intensity, culminating in a general uprising. Hardly concealed is his conviction that such an uprising would give the United States Government little choice but to intervene militarily on the side of the insurgents, especially should Soviet troops be committed to quell the uprising. As a corollary to the above-mentioned long-range considerations, the brothers Somoza, especially Anastacio who is director of the National Guard, have taken into consideration the prospect of exposure to a serious military threat if Nicaragua lends herself as a base for aggressive acts against Cuba. Reportedly Luis Somoza has stated that in the event that Cuba takes retaliatory action against Nicaragua, the United States would be forced to come to the aid of Nicaragua and thereby a confrontation would be achieved. In this context, the assurances which Luis Somoza claims to have been given by leading United States Government officials take on particular significance and continuing probing by him for more tangible promises of support can be anticipated. Attached herewith is a listing of the names of prominent Cubans reported as having talked with Somoza about operations against Cuba from Nicaraguan bases.Not printed. These include one former President of Cuba (Carlos Prio Socarras), one former Prime Minister (Jorge Garcia Montes) and one former Ambassador to Washington (Guillermo Belt). It remains to be seen whether the Somoza concept can be sufficiently refined to accommodate and keep out of the limelight of public curiosity a project which, as we now see it, is essentially designed to rebuild an indigenous resistance movement inside Cuba. There is some question whether the Somozas could temperamentally adjust to the essential characteristics of such a program representing a long-term effort that can only prosper in an atmosphere of conspiratorial tranquility. We consider that most if not all of the exile plans (with the exception of Artime’s) which have been discussed with Luis Somoza will probably come to naught in typical exile fashion. As to Artime, we believe that any ill effects of Somoza’s long-range concepts could be contained by the following lines of action: Artime to forego raids and externally based sabotage actions and to concentrate on resistance within Cuba. While leaving elements of his operational mechanism in Nicaragua and not breaking with Luis Somoza, Artime to shift to the use of the more limited facilities Costa Rica has to offer.

If additional pressures be needed, it should be remembered that ex-Ambassador Whelan, who is considered to enjoy the trust of the Somoza brothers, could be asked to help in tempering their zeal.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

 Sources of varying reliability have cited Luis Somoza as claiming to have received the following assurances: The “green light” to rUN anti-Castro raider and resistance operations obtained in Washington discussions with President Kennedy and the Attorney General. Asked by President Kennedy and the Attorney General to take four Brigade leaders to Nicaragua. Appointed by President Kennedy to represent him in dealings with the five Central American presidents who are interested in overthrowing Castro. To have talked with United States Government representatives who promised “not to intervene” (i.e., in Somoza’s plan to offer Nicaragua as a base for operations against Cuba). To have found “that there are no obstacles, despite the fact that the United States Government did not tell me anything concretely.” Desmond FitzGerald
358. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to President KennedySource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 330-77-131, OSD Misc.—1963. Top Secret; Sensitive. This memorandum was undated and unsigned, but it was attached to an August 20 memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric recommending that the Deputy Secretary send it to the President. On August 26 Bundy sent Gilpatric a memorandum indicating that the President had signed this memorandum on August 22. The President asked Gilpatric to undertake the Top Secret and Sensitive distribution of this addition to rules of engagement. Washington, undated. SUBJECT U.S. Action in the Event of Cuban Attack on U.S. Aircraft/Ships (U)

At your direction on 28 February 1963, Rules of Engagement were promulgated with respect to action by U.S. forces in event of a Cuban attack on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.See Document 290. These rules prohibit U.S. forces from penetrating Cuban territory in pursuit of Cuban forces involved.

Under these rules, overflight of Cuban territory while en route to the scene of attack is not included in the authorized military options for responses to an attack by Cuba on U.S. aircraft or ships operating outside Cuban territory.

Incidents of Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, which are considered most likely, would involve aircraft engaged in reconnaissance efforts, but also could involve U.S. shipping and cases where lives of U.S. nationals or national interests are in jeopardy. Should attacks occur, for example, south of western Cuba and north of eastern Cuba, the en route time for U.S. fighter support can be reduced by 10 to 30 minutes, with a comparable increase in time for action at the scene, by routing over Cuban territory. This quicker en route reaction time could be the difference between providing an effective defense for U.S. interests and arriving too late for action.

In light of the fact that occasions may arise where the presence of U.S. forces on the scene with least possible delay would be in the best national interests, a draft statement of policy which would authorize overflight of Cuban territory in certain instances, and under certain conditions, has been prepared and is attached. The draft policy has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, coordinated with the Department of State and, based on the recommendation of that Department, delineates the individuals in the military chain of command authorized to approve overflights of Cuban territory.

I recommend its approval.

Attachment STATEMENT OF POLICY ON US ACTION IN EVENT OF CUBAN ATTACK ON US AIRCRAFT/SHIPS (U)

The following policy is issued pertaining to US action in the event of Cuban attack in the area surrounding Cuba against US aircraft/ships: In specific instances in which adherence to international airspace would delay significantly the arrival of US fighter aircraft at the scene of a Cuban attack against US aircraft/ships operating outside of Cuban territory, overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized subject to the following: It must be established that the US aircraft/ship is being attacked, or the US aircraft/ship has been attacked and lives of US personnel are endangered. Overflight times are minimized with due regard to risk to aircraft. While en route every effort will be taken to avoid provocative acts. Engagement will not be undertaken during the overflight except for self-defense against aircraft attack. From the time of arrival at the scene current rules of engagement will pertain, with return to home or diversion airfield via air space over international waters, if practicable. The most expeditious means possible will be used to inform highest national authorities that overflight of Cuba has been directed, and details on the action shall be furnished in the same manner. Decision to overfly Cuban territory may be delegated to but not below the level of Commander Naval Base, Key West and Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo.

359. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Drafted by Thompson, approved in the White House on August 28 and in Thompson’s office on August 29. The discussion was held at the White House and lasted from 11 to 11:53 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) Washington, August 26, 1963. SUBJECT Possibility of further agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR The President Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, Department of State

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see volume V.]

The President then referred to Cuba, and said that apparently the Soviets had withdrawn many of their troops, but we did not know how many were there now.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev had recently stated that all combat units had been withdrawn from Cuba. The President asked what would happen over the next six months with the Soviets. Would the Soviets withdraw more or would the number remain the same?

Dobrynin said that he had no instructions to say anything on this point, but his strong impression was that when the Soviet instructors there had finished their jobs, they would leave.

Dobrynin said it was Khrushchev’s intention to go to Cuba toward the end of the year, but that no exact date had been set. He inquired whether the President intended to go to the United Nations General Assembly and make a speech there.

The President said that he had not yet decided.

Dobrynin said that Khrushchev definitely did not plan to go to the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, although there had been some thought that he might appear in connection with his trip to Cuba.

The President said he was sure Mr. Khrushchev was aware of the sensitivities involved in his visiting Cuba. This was Mr. Khrushchev’s affair, but he wanted him to know of these sensitivities.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

360. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, General, 6/24/63 Protest Note, 6/63-8/63. Secret. Washington, August 22, 1963. SUBJECT Reply to Cuban Note on OverflightsFor a summary and discussion of the note, see Documents 352 and 353.

We have for various reasons, including most recently a request of the Swiss Ambassador in Habana who is negotiating on Cuban efforts to take over our Embassy building, delayed replying to the Cuban note of June 24 on overflights. However, in order to keep the record clear, we feel a reply should now be made.

As you know, the Cubans have thus far taken no action to follow up on threats made in that note on overflights. Secretary Rusk feels that our reply should be non-polemical and not of a nature that would encourage the Cubans to feel it necessary to respond in strong verbal terms and possibly match their actions to their words.

The attached draft, upon which I would appreciate your comments, has therefore been drawn along these lines. In referring to the “publicly expressed position” of the USG in the attached note, we particularly have in mind Secretary Rusk’s statements of March 12 and April 13, 1963,Attached, but not printed. and, when handing the note to the Czechs, we would orally call these statements to the attention of the Czechs.

U. Alexis Johnson Enclosure On August 26 Bundy sent Johnson a memorandum stating that he had shown the President the draft reply to the Cuban note. The President approved it. Bundy suggested when passing the note to the Czechoslovaks, the United States should call to their attention the public statements by the President on the importance of surveillance. DRAFT

The Government of the United States has taken note of the statements contained in the note of the Government of Cuba of June 24, 1963, that Cuban gunners have orders to fire at any foreign war plane that makes low-altitude flights over Cuban territory; and that the Government of Cuba is stepping up its defense preparations in order to be ready to intercept and shoot down any war plane that violates Cuban air space at any altitude.

The Government of the United States wishes again to call the attention of the Government of Cuba to the well-known, publicly expressed position of the Government of the United States on this question. The position of the Government of the United States on this matter has not changed.
361. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, August 26, 1963. SUBJECT Cuban Note Protesting Exile Raids

The Cubans will probably circulate a note in the UNThe Cuban Permanent Representative sent the note to the United Nations on August 20, where it was received on August 23. A copy was sent to the Department of State in airgram A-257, August 28. (Department of State, Central Files, CUBA-US) today protesting one of three recent exile raids on Cuba; [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. USUN recommends that, in view of the Department’s press disclaimer last week,Apparently a reference to a press briefing of diplomatic correspondents at the Department of State. we wait for UN reaction before deciding whether or not to reply to the note.

Bill Bowdler tells me that it is standard procedure for the Cubans to circulate this sort of note in the UN; for example, they also circulated the note protesting US blocking controls. State agrees with USUN’s decision to wait for UN reaction before deciding whether or not to reply to the note. If asked, State’s public position is roughly “Beyond the reports of the Cuban Government, we have no knowledge of these events.”

GC
362. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) Washington, August 26, 1963. [Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. 1 page of source text not declassified.]
363. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk. Washington, September 10, 1963. SUBJECT United States Actions in Cuba PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

Ambassador Dobrynin said he had a personal message for the President, and he considered it so confidential, that he had not had it typed but would read from his handwritten notes. He said that the Soviet Government considered that things had recently taken a turn for the better in the international situation and in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. With the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the exchange of views with Secretary Rusk, there had developed a relaxation of tension and the prerequisite for the settlement of other questions had been established. This could lead to a real turning point, and the end of the cold war. The Soviet Union took satisfaction from the willingness of the United States to look for the solution of other international problems. If both countries were determined to accomplish this, it was important that nothing be done contrary to this intention. The Soviets wished to tell the President, frankly, what was of concern to them. There were certain facts which did not fit in with the situation and these were the provocative actions against Cuba, which had increased in recent weeks. Unknown planes had shelled industrial establishments and there had been landings of saboteurs on the Cuban coast. These actions had been intensified after the conclusion of the nuclear Test Ban Treaty. It had been stated that the United States had nothing to do with these actions, but no one could believe this. When the United States took a position against the attacks on Soviet ships in Cuban waters, these attacks had stopped. This action had been understood by the Soviet Union as a measure showing the good intentions of the United States. How then could these recent actions be interpreted? If such attacks continued—and they could only be taken from the United States proper or from countries allied with the United States and with the knowledge and connivance of the United States—this could only lead to a new crisis.

The Soviet Union did not want a new crisis to emerge. Both sides had expressed their satisfaction over the elimination of the last crisis, which had been resolved after each side had undertaken certain commitments. The President had said that these commitments should be carried out. The Soviets agreed with this. They believed that for the future of our relations, it was important that effective measures be taken to stop the piratic attacks against Cuba. The Soviet Union had undertaken certain commitments in respect to the protection of the independence of Cuba which were aimed exclusively at preventing Cuba from becoming a victim of aggression, and the Soviet Union would certainly fulfill its commitments if aggression were unleashed against Cuba.

The Soviet Union hoped for understanding of the motives that prompted them to convey to the President, personally from N.S. Khrushchev, this assessment of the effect of the activation lately of provocative actions against Cuba.

364. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Dobrynin Talks, Vol. II. Top Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Copies were sent to McGeorge Bundy and Rusk. Washington, September 10, 1963. SUBJECT United States Actions in Cuba PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thomson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

On the occasion of his call on me today, Ambassador Dobrynin referred to the possibility of Mr. Khrushchev stopping in New York and the possibility that at that time there might be demonstrations against him or other unpleasant developments. He said he realized that I had mentioned this in a private way, and he had so informed his Government. He also referred to the fact that the President had told him how deeply the Cuban problem was felt in the United States. He said his Government understood that these remarks were prompted by good intentions. He said, however, that when one side expressed concern about speeches that had not yet been made, how should one regard speeches that were being made, particularly in connection with the Test Ban Treaty.

He said Mr. Khrushchev wished to convey to the President that he did not have in mind to speak on subjects that do not arise from the situation, but this depended not only on the Soviet Union, but on the United States. If provocations against Cuba continued, Mr. Khrushchev would be put in such a position that he would be compelled to react. The Soviet Union believed that if there were a real desire to improve relations, there is a wide field for action. If there is such a desire, it would have complete understanding and support on the part of the Soviet Union. It was expected that the United States Government and the President would adhere to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries. In this case, it is only the Cubans, as the President himself had said, who should decide how Cubans are to lead their lives. If the principle of noninterference were violated in Cuba, a situation would arise where both the Soviet Union and the United States would be driven to extreme poles. It was the conviction of Mr. Khrushchev and the Soviet Union that we should make every effort to avoid such a development in the interests of our countries and of peace.

I asked Ambassador Dobrynin if his remarks about speeches meant that the Chairman had decided to speak at the General Assembly. Dobrynin said he had no information other than the fact that before leaving Moscow to return to the United States he had asked the Chairman what his plans were. The Chairman had said he would probably visit Cuba about the end of this year or the first of next year, and that then might stop over in New York. Dobrynin said he understood that U Thant had suggested to the Chairman that he visit the United Nations.

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if it were true, as indicated in the paper this morning, that the President would address the General Assembly. I said this had not yet been decided and probably would not be before the end of the week. I said that we would let him know and added that it was my understanding that if the President did speak, he would probably remain in New York only one day.

365. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Cuba, Exiles, 7/63-9/63. Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, September 12, 1963. SUBJECT Exile Raids From Outside Areas—Pros, Cons, and Public Position

I understand that the President may be interested in stopping free-lance exile raids which originate from outside the U.S., as well as those which originate from the U.S. I find the case for stopping raids from the U.S. vaguely convincing because the possibility of Russian reaction to our direct involvement is greater. However, I find less convincing the case for trying to stop raids which originate from outside the U.S. Here are a few thoughts I jotted down, admittedly in a hurry, this morning; anyway, you might find them useful for the press conference.Reference is to the press conference of September 12, at which questions were asked about Cuba in general, but none specifically about exile raids. For a transcript of the conference, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 672-679.

Arguments in Favor of Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S. They might provoke a Russian reaction. They don’t hurt Castro much. They are haphazard and kill innocents. Inter alia, this might mean a bad press in some friendly countries. They might provoke the Cubans to extreme retaliatory meas-ures. They increase Cuban alertness, [1 line of source text not declassified].

Arguments Against Trying to Stop Raids Originating from Outside the U.S. The exile action program seems to be gaining momentum. Pretty soon, as they become more expert, they may start to hit something worthwhile. There is a fair chance that these raids hurt Castro more than we think; he seems to be screaming louder than necessary if the raids don’t hurt him at all. At the least, intelligence reports indicate that the raids cause a considerable amount of activity in the Cuban armed forces—and this is undoubtedly not inexpensive. [2½ lines of source text not declassified] The raids may cause more psychological damage than we now think. I keep thinking of my own reaction (and I am a red-blooded American) if I were working in a sugar mill and the mill down the road were attacked. The fact that it was a Piper Cub which dropped two bombs, 100 yards wide of the mark, wouldn’t be terribly reassuring to me. Inter alia, absenteeism in Cuba, which is already a serious problem, conceivably could be made more serious. If our opposition to the raids becomes known we rUN into a number of problems. First, exile reaction. Second, reaction of activists in Latin America; among other things, we may get another cooling-down period in which it will be very tough to get cooperation in our isolation policy. Third, reaction of the hard-noses in the U.S. (e.g. “the Administration won’t even let others try to solve the Cuban problem”). Fourth, Cuban and Soviet reaction. If our opposition is known and we are successful in stopping the raids (and I think we could be successful if we really set our mind to it), substance will be lent to the Soviet/Cuban belief that we can control all the activities in the Caribbean. [1 line of source text not declassified] The Soviets and the Cubans will certainly raise the noise-level when some U.S. sponsored attacks really hurt them and when the history of such operations clearly indicates that we control them. Fifth, we can probably expect Castro to crow as he did last spring. “The U.S. has capitulated on one of my 5 points.”

I personally think we should be very careful about the way we handle this problem. As it stands now, we should seriously consider the desirability of taking the public position (1) that we have already made our position clear with respect to attacks originating from the U.S., (2) that we intend to enforce this policy, (3) that while we sometimes doubt the effectiveness of attacks originating in third countries, we are obviously not in a position to control them; these are sovereign nations which determine their own foreign policy.

I am a complete non-expert in Russian policy but feel that we may want to take the following line with them, when and if pressed; (1) that we have made our policy clear with regard to raids from within the U.S. and (2) that we have no control over raids originating from areas outside of the U.S. In this regard we might note that the Russians seem to have no control over Communists in Laos, Vietnam, Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia, etc. These people, like the anti-Castro forces, seem intent on overturning established governments.

GC
366. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163, Special US-USSR Files, 1963. Secret. Drafted by Thompson. Washington, September 13, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

I made the oral statement which is attached hereto. The Ambassador said he wished to ask how he should translate the sentence reading “The United States could, of course, consult with any government in this Hemisphere from whose territory we have information that flights were originating against Cuba … .” He asked if this meant that we knew where these flights were coming from. I replied that we probably had some suspicions. I did not think the information was specific, and asked him to add the word “indicating” after the word “information.”

The Ambassador said he hoped that Mr. Khrushchev’s motives in raising this question were understood. He said that the Chairman believed it was to our mutual interest to reduce tension in the Caribbean and to avoid a crisis over the Cuban problem.

I said I was sure that the President did understand, and thought that our position was clear from the statement which I had just made to him.

Attachment ORAL STATEMENT

The President wished Mr. Khrushchev to know that he shares his view that the signing of the Test Ban Treaty and the recent exchange of views with the Soviet Government is encouraging, and he hopes it will be possible to proceed to the solution of other problems. The President is hopeful that the Test Ban Treaty will be approved by the United States Senate in the course of next week.

With respect to the Cuban situation, the President also agrees that the emergence of a new crisis would be in the interest neither of the Soviet Union nor of the United States, and can assure him that the United States will faithfully carry out its commitments.

With respect to any air attacks on Cuba, it can be stated categorically that not only was the United States not involved in any way in such attacks, but has been making every effort to prevent them. It is possible, but not likely, that a light private aircraft could take off from one of the large number of private fields in the southeastern portion of the United States. No such illegal flights have been detected by the means available to us. The President has directed, however, that the measures already taken be reviewed to see what further steps could be taken.

In keeping with the March 30, 1963 declaration by the Departments of State and Justice concerning hit and rUN attacks by Cuban exile groups against targets in Cuba, the law enforcement agencies are taking vigorous measures to assure that the pertinent laws of the United States are observed.

Apparently it is assumed that the United States exercises control over the policies and actions of the other sovereign, independent states of this Hemisphere. This assumption betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the relationship between the United States and the other American Republics. The history of inter-American relations makes abundantly clear that the American Governments will not tolerate interference with their foreign or domestic affairs. The states of this Hemisphere jealously defend the principle of juridical equality of states and reject any insinuation that difference of size and power in any way modifies this fundamental rule governing their relations.

The United States could, of course, consult with any government in this Hemisphere from whose territory we have information indicating that flights were originating against Cuba, but, in all candor, we must point out that such consultation would be greatly complicated by the increasing sense of outrage among the governments of this Hemisphere about Cuba’s deliberate stimulation and support of subversive activities throughout the Hemisphere in direct violation of international norms. This is not simply a matter of speeches or words by Castro, as has sometimes been indicated. Clear evidence of Cuban involvement in this form of aggression is to be found in the fact that: The Cuban Government is recruiting Latin Americans, sending them to Cuba for training in guerrilla tactics and returning them to their countries to engage in terroristic activities. A case in point are the Cuban-trained Peruvians captured on May 14 and 15, 1963, at Puerto Maldonado as they attempted clandestinely to enter Peru from Bolivia. The Cuban Government is furnishing funds to revolutionary groups seeking the overthrow of governments by force and violence. By way of illustration, in May 1963, two leading members of the Ecuadorean Communist Party, Jose Maria Roura and Alejandro Roman were seized as they were returning to Ecuador. They were carrying over $30,000 which they confessed had been given them by Chinese and Cuban sources. The Cuban leaders continue to exhort revolutionaries in Latin American countries to resort to sabotage, terrorism and guerrilla action. Premier Castro returned to this theme in his July twenty-sixth address when he called on activists in Venezuela and other countries to “open the breach” and begin fighting. Major Ernesto Guevara, in an article published in the September issue of Cuba Socialista, strongly advocates guerrilla warfare as the surest road to power in Latin America. Information available to us shows a direct connection between terroristic activities in Venezuela and the Castro regime. In addition to being guilty of such aggression against other American Republics by promoting these and other activities, the Cuban Government recently embarked on a most risky venture of direct violation of the territory and territorial waters of another country in this Hemisphere using units of its armed forces. On August 14, 1963, a Cuban helicopter and two patrol boats furnished by the Soviet Union forcibly removed from Cay Anguila, one of the islands of the Bahamas group, nineteen persons who had sought refuge on the island. This incident led to a vigorous protest by the British Government on August 21, 1963, requesting an apology and return of the persons taken prisoners.

In sum, it is not the United States, but the behavior of the Castro regime that is to blame for the difficulties in the Caribbean area.
367. Memorandum by William AttwoodSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. No classification marking. Attwood was Ambassador to Guinea March 29, 1961-May 27, 1963. In August 1963, he joined the U.S. Mission to the United Nations as an adviser. McGeorge Bundy wrote the following note on this memorandum: “G[ordon] C[hase]. Speak to me on this. McG B.” Washington, September 18, 1963.

This memorandum proposes a course of action which, if successful, could remove the Cuban issue from the 1964 campaign.

It does not propose offering Castro a “deal”—which could be more dangerous politically than doing nothing. It does propose a discreet inquiry into the possibility of neutralizing Cuba on our terms.

It is based on the assumption that, short of a change of regime, our principal political objectives in Cuba are: The evacuation of all Soviet bloc military personnel. An end to subversive activities by Cuba in Latin America. Adoption by Cuba of a policy of non-alignment.

This memorandum is also based on the assumption that our present policy of isolating Cuba economically and politically will not overthrow the Castro regime in time to keep Cuba out of the 1964 campaign. So long as he receives Soviet aid and keeps his power base among the peasantry, his position seems secure.

It follows that the effect of our present policy is mainly negative: It aggravates Castro’s anti-Americanism and his desire to cause us trouble and embarrassment. In the eyes of a world largely made up of small countries, it freezes us in the unattractive posture of a big country trying to bully a small country.

Since we do not intend to overthrow the Castro regime by military force, is there anything else we can do which might advance U.S. interests without risking charges of appeasement?

According to neutral diplomats and others I have talked to at the U.N. and in Guinea, there is reason to believe that Castro is unhappy about his present dependence on the Soviet bloc; that he does not enjoy being in effect a satellite; that the trade embargo is hurting him—though not enough to endanger his position; and that he would like to establish some official contact with the U.S. and go to some length to obtain normalization of relations with us—even though this would not be welcomed by most of his hard-core Communist entourage, such as Che Guevara. All of this may or may not be true. But it would seem that we have something to gain and nothing to lose by finding out whether in fact Castro does want to talk and what concessions he would be prepared to make.

The most propitious time and place to find out would be at the U.N. during the present General Assembly. Without appearing to take the initiative for a meeting, we could easily feel out the Cubans as follows: As a former journalist who spent considerable time with Castro in 1959, I could arrange a casual meeting with the Cuban Delegate, Dr. Lechuga. This could be done socially through mutual acquaintances. I would refer to my last talk with Castro, at which he stressed his desire to be friends with the U.S., and suggest that, as a journalist, I would be curious to know how he felt today. If Castro is ready to talk, this should provide sufficient reason for Lechuga to come back to me with an invitation.

It would be understood that I would be going as an individual but would of course report to the President before and after the visit.

My reasons for suggesting that I undertake this mission are threefold: Although Castro did not like my final article in 1959, we got along well and I believe he remembers me as someone he could talk to frankly. I have had considerable experience in the past seventeen years talking with Communist and neutralist leaders on both sides of the iron curtain. I have enough rank to satisfy Castro that this would be a serious conversation. At the same time, I am not so well-known that my departure, arrival or return would be noticed.

Two other points are worth emphasizing: Such a meeting would be purely exploratory. I would make no offers, promises or deals. I would simply sound him out as to whether he would be willing to take the three steps listed in paragraph three, and on what terms. I would report to the President and the decision to pursue negotiations or not could then be taken. The risk that the press would get wind of this project is minimal. For their part, the Cubans would not want it known they had solicited a meeting. On our side, it is of course important that the fewest possible people know of it. But in any case we are on firm ground so long as the invitation comes from the Cubans, since we are always ready to listen to an offer that could advance U.S. interests.

For the moment, all I would like is the authority to make contact with Lechuga. We’ll see what happens then.

William AttwoodPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
368. Summary Record of the 14th Meeting of the Standing Group of the National Security CouncilSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Standing Group Meeting, 10/1/63. Secret. Washington, October 1, 1963, 5 p.m.

Cuba

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald of CIA reviewed the situation in Cuba, emphasizing that a swing of the pendulum was taking place. Because things were becoming so bad for Castro momentarily, we should not overreact and conclude that the Cuban problem was on the way to being solved.

Several items were discussed: The Defense Department agreed to review the feasibility of monitoring planes flying out of Cuba suspected of carrying arms to other Latin American countries. Allied trade with Cuba—The Central Intelligence Agency will prepare a list of critical items [2 lines of source text not declassified]. The list will be sent to the Commerce Department, which will devise ways of preventing such items [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to Cuba, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. A proposed Presidential statement on Cuba, originally suggested by USIA but not yet been made, will be looked at again with a view to recommending to the President that he comment on the future Cuba in a forthcoming speech. Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended sabotage actions—General Goodpaster asked whether the Agency had considered the two covert actions which the Joint Chiefs had suggested, i.e. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] dropping U.S. arms into Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald replied that CIA had never gotten the Joint Chiefs’ suggestions. The Attorney General expressed some concern about whether suggested Cuban actions were being followed up. (It later developed that the Joint Chiefs’ suggestions had been sent to the Defense representative on the Special Group who had chosen not to recommend these actions to the Special Group. Further consideration of the Joint Chiefs’ recommendations will be undertaken by the Special Group.) Sugar price program—It was agreed that this exercise had been completed and that there was nothing further to be done on this item. Economic warfare group—Mr. FitzGerald urged the prompt establishment of a proposed economic warfare group which would coordinate all economic warfare measures taken against Cuba.McGeorge Bundy prepared a record of action of this meeting, October 1. Bundy noted that “the Department of Defense agreed to review the feasibility of monitoring planes flying out of Cuba suspected of carrying arms to other Latin American States;” that CIA and Commerce “will consider together how to block the movement of specific critical items [text not declassified] to Cuba;” and noted that the “proposed statement on the future of Cuba will be reviewed with a view to recommending that the President include it in a forthcoming speech.” (Ibid.)

Brazil

A draft policy paper on Brazil was circulated to the group but not discussed. The Latin American Policy Committee is scheduled to deal with the paper on Thursday.

Bromley SmithPrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
369. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Confidential. This memorandum, drafted by Judd and approved in the White House on October 15, was part 5 of 6 separate memoranda of conversation. The meeting was held at the White House. The full conversation lasted until 11:25 a.m. (Kennedy Library, President’s Appointment Book) Washington, October 4, 1963, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Cuban Shipping PARTICIPANTS United States The President William R. Tyler, Assistant Secretary European Affairs Thomas M. Judd, EUR/BNA [Great Britain] Lord Home, Foreign Secretary Sir David Ormsby Gore, Ambassador to the U.S. Oliver Wright, Foreign Office

The President showed Lord Home and the British Ambassador the latest figures on free world shipping in the Cuban trade.Apparently a list attached to Document 370. British ships were in the lead followed by Greek ships. The number of Greek ships could be expected to decline drastically as a result of the Greek Decree recently issued. The President said the situation was embarrassing to us. He was constantly being asked why he didn’t speak to our Allies, and why they did not cooperate with us. He asked Lord Home if the British Government could not do something about the situation.

Lord Home said that HMG would see what could be done. The trouble was that legislation would be needed. Also, a number of the ships were registered in Hong Kong and it was almost impossible to do anything with them. As a result of U.S. measures, the charter rates on ships on the Cuban trade had gone up, making the trade more attractive.

The President said that there must be some way that the British could get at this problem and Lord Home again said that he would see what could be done.

In passing, Lord Home mentioned that the UK wasnegotiating with Cuba for the sale of some buses.

370. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Carroll) to Secretary of Defense McNamaraSource: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May through Dec. 1963. Secret. Washington, October 8, 1963. SUBJECT (U) Appraisal of Bloc and Free-World Shipping to Cuba, Soviet Forces Remaining in Cuba, and the State of Cuban Economy as Compared to a Year Ago Forwarded for your information are copies of three appraisals prepared in response to an oral request from the Military Aide to the President.According to an attached covering sheet sent to Clifton, the oral request was made on October 4. The three attached appraisals were a review of shipping to Cuba over the past year, an estimate of Soviet personnel remaining in Cuba, and an estimate of economic conditions in Cuba as compared to last year. The appraisals are ibid. The comparative assessment of Soviet Bloc and Free-World shipping points out that total shipping averaged 48.1 dry cargo and 19.2 tanker arrivals per month during the past year, as compared with an average of 90.6 dry cargo and 25.5 tanker arrivals during the first nine months of 1962. No significant decline in Soviet Bloc shipping is noted, attributable to the fact that in the preceding period Bloc ships were carrying large quantities of military materiel while during this year they have carried primarily foodstuff and industrial equipment in order to make up for the significant drop in Free-World shipping. The assessment of the status of Soviet military personnel in Cuba, prepared in collaboration with CIA, concludes that Soviet military personnel withdrawals are continuing and that total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be between 5,000 and 8,000—representing a reduction to date of at least two-thirds of the number originally estimated to be on the island during the crisis. Most of those remaining are advisors and technicians engaged in training Cuban personnel in the operation of Soviet weapons, in supervising the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment turned over to the Cubans, and in operating the Soviet-controlled air defense system. No organized Soviet ground combat units remain in Cuba. The appraisal of the economic situation cites a continuing decline in Cuban production—on the order of 5 to 7 per cent, with 20 per cent decline in sugar harvest (the main stay of Cuba’s economy) and with living conditions continuing to deteriorate. So far, however, the continued economic decline has not adversely affected the Cuban military establishment. Joseph F. CarrollLieutenant General, USAF
371. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, USSR, Gromyko talks with President. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Akalovsky and approved by the White House on October 21 and by S on October 16. The meeting was held at the White House. This memorandum was one of eleven covering a conversation that lasted until 6:10 p.m. (Ibid., President’s Appointment Book) For conversations on U.S.-Soviet relations in general as well as an accounting of the other memoranda of this conversation, see volume V. Washington, October 10, 1963, 4 p.m. SUBJECT Cuba PARTICIPANTS US The President The Secretary Ambassador Thompson Assistant Secretary Tyler Mr. Akalovsky, A CDA/IR USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Sukhodrev, Foreign Ministry

Mr. Gromyko recalled the President’s remark about Soviet personnel in Cuba and said that, as Mr. Khrushchev had told Mr. Harriman, there were now no Soviet troops in Cuba. The Soviet personnel now in Cuba were specialists training the Cubans in the use of arms supplied by the USSR. When this limited task was accomplished these would be withdrawn. As to what had been done in Cuba so far, there was no need to repeat that now because the President was informed on this matter. The Soviet Government was acting in Cuba on the basis of the understanding the President and Mr. Khrushchev had reached in their correspondence.

The President asked how many Soviet military specialists would remain in Cuba in, say, six months.

Mr. Gromyko said that he was unable to answer this question. He preferred not to speak in terms of dates but he wished to ask the President to understand that the USSR had in Cuba only military specialists with a limited mission.

The President commented that it would be helpful if, when the specialists were completely withdrawn, Mr. Khrushchev were to consider making a statement to that effect.

Mr. Gromyko said he would inform Mr. Khrushchev about this. However he suggested that the President take into account the difficulty of mentioning specific dates. So if Mr. Khrushchev did not mention any dates, this did not mean that specialists would stay forever.

The President said this might be so, but perhaps Mr. Khrushchev could make such a statement to one of the visiting newsmen in terms of an accomplished fact.

Mr. Gromyko said that he did not think there was any need to remind the President that Cuba was being subjected to constant pressure and provocation on the part of some forces which engaged even in such things as sending planes with bombs. The President probably knew better than he, Gromyko, who those forces were. The Soviet Government was convinced that if the US Government and the President personally wished to stop these activities, they would cease immediately.

The President said we believed we had stopped harassment by planes and had given warning, although perhaps if someone was close enough he could still fly in and drop a bomb. In any event, he did not see any benefit to the US from harassment. This would not unseat Castro and serve no useful purpose.

Mr. Gromyko commented that those air raids must be originating somewhere. If they originated outside the US, they could be stopped too, because the USSR had a high opinion of US influence in Latin America.

The President said we were not sure that the planes came from Latin America. Of two recent flights over Cuba, one has perhaps come from Central America, and some plane may have come even from Florida. We tried to stop the planes, but there were many fields in Florida, light planes were used and it was very difficult to keep them under control.

The Secretary recalled his remarks to Mr. Gromyko about activities in the other direction, noting this made it more difficult for us to deal with this situation. He also observed that the Chinese may be involved in this matter.

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the USSR had no information about such activities. If the US regarded speeches by Castro or other Cuban leaders as subversive, then Soviet speeches about capitalism and US speeches about communism were also subversive. In any event, the USSR had no information about any subversive activities from Cuba.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Gromyko thought Cuba had said its last word regarding the signing of the Test Ban Treaty.

Mr. Gromyko said the US was familiar with the Cuban position on this matter. As he had told the Secretary earlier, the USSR believed that this question was under consideration by Cuba. Thus the USSR believed that the Cubans had not spoken their last word, although they did take the position that the policy of the US Government prevented them from signing. However, Mr. Gromyko noted that he could not speak for the Cubans.

The President commented that the Cubans might not like our policy; we did not like Cuban policy, but we wanted the Cubans to sign. He wondered whether the Cubans took this attitude because of China.

Mr. Gromyko said the USSR had no information which would confirm such a supposition. The USSR gave credence to the Cuban statement that it was the US policy which was the reason for their present stand.

372. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, October 21, 1963. SUBJECT Accommodation with Castro

As you requested, I spoke to Ambassador Attwood in New York about the attached.Apparent reference to Document 367. He gave the following information. (The conversation was necessarily vague and we didn’t go into much detail.)

Adlai Stevenson had received approval for the approach. Ambassador Attwood spoke to Lechuga. Lechuga expressed interest (he is a soft-liner) and suggested that someone from our side should go down to Cuba to talk with Castro. Attwood replied that the UN wasa more appropriate talking place. Lechuga said he would convey the message to Havana. Attwood concluded that the ball is in Cuban hands and the door is ajar. However, he is not hopeful. While Lechuga and Castro, himself, might be interested, he feels that Castro is too well boxed in by such hard-liners as Guevara to be able to maneuver much. GC
373. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR Historical Files, S.G. 104, November 14, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on November 6. Copies were sent to U. Alexis Johnson, Gilpatric, and McCone. Washington, November 5, 1963. SUBJECT Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group, 5 November 1963 PRESENT Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon, and Colonel Steakley were present for Items 1 and 2. The Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3

[Here follows discussion of items 1, a report of an unsuccessful sabotage operation of October 21-22 in Southeast Pinar, and item 2, a proposal for low-level sabotage to be carried out on the north coast and tentative approval of a sabotage operation in northern Oriente province and infiltration of a radio operator into Cuba.]

3. Cuba—Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that it has come to the attention of the White House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about some kind of “arrangement” with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro. The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to “war game” this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo Ortiz, Castro’s aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico with Castro’s proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious discussion can take place about a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr. James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo. Vallejo might be flown to the UN forsuch talks or better still Donovan could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and attack it again.

Paul EckelPrinted from a copy that indicates Eckel signed the original.
374. Memorandum From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council StaffSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Secret. New York, November 8, 1963.

Following is a chronology of events leading up to Castro’s invitation on October 31, to receive a U.S. official for talks in Cuba:

Soon after joining the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on August 26, I met Seydou Diallo, the Guinea Ambassador to Havana, whom I had known well in Conakry. He went out of his way to tell me that Castro was isolated from contact with neutralist diplomats by his “Communist entourage” because it was known he was unhappy with Cuba’s satellite status and looking for a way out. He, Diallo, had finally been able to see Castro alone once and was convinced he was personally receptive to changing courses and getting Cuba on the road to non-alignment. Diallo added that the exile raids were an obstacle since they strengthened the hand of the hard-liners both with Castro and the public.

In the first week of September, I also read ABC correspondent, Lisa Howard’s article, “Castro’s Overture”,War/Peace Report, September, 1963, pp. 3-5. based on her conversation with Castro last April. This article stressed Castro’s expressed desire for reaching an accommodation with the United States and his willingness to make substantial concessions to this end. On September 12, I talked with Miss Howard, whom I have known for some years, and she echoed Ambassador Diallo’s opinion that there was a rift between Castro and the Guevara-Hart-Alveida group on the question of Cuba’s future course.

On September 12, I discussed this with Under Secretary Harriman in Washington. He suggested I prepare a memo and we arranged to meet in New York the following week.

On September 18, I wrote a memorandum based on these talks and on corroborating information I had heard in Conakry.Document 367. In it I suggested that discreet contact might be established with the Cubans at the United Nations to find out whether Castro in fact wanted to talk, and on our terms. I showed this memo to Ambassador Stevenson, who felt the matter was worth exploring quietly and who indicated he might discuss it with the President.

3 See Document 372.

On September 19, I met Harriman in New York. After reading my memo, he suggested I also discuss it with the Attorney-General because of the political implications of the Cuban issue.

On September 20, I made an appointment with the Attorney-General in Washington. Meanwhile, Stevenson obtained the President’s approval for me to make discreet contact with Dr. Lechuga, Cuba’s chief delegate at the United Nations.

On September 23, I met Dr. Lechuga at Miss Howard’s apartment. She has been on good terms with Lechuga since her visit with Castro and invited him for a drink to met some friends who had also been to Cuba. I was just one of those friends. In the course of our conversation, which started with recollections of my own talks with Castro in 1959, I mentioned having read Miss Howard’s article. Lechuga hinted that Castro was indeed in a mood to talk, especially with someone he had met before. He thought there was a good chance that I might be invited to Cuba if I wished to resume our 1959 talk. I told him that in my present position, I would need official authorization to make such a trip, and did not know if it would be forthcoming. However, I said an exchange of views might well be useful and that I would find out and let him know.

On September 24, I saw the Attorney-General in Washington, gave him my September 18 memo, and reported my meeting with Lechuga. He said he would pass the memo on to Mr. McGeorge Bundy; meanwhile, he thought that it would be difficult for me to visit Cuba without it being known and risking the accusation that we were trying to make a deal with Castro. He wondered if it might be possible to meet Castro—if that’s what he wanted—in another country, such as Mexico, or at the United Nations. Meanwhile, he agreed it would be useful to maintain contact with Lechuga. I said I would so inform Lechuga and wait to hear from him or Bundy.

Back in New York, I informed Stevenson of my talk with Lechuga and the Attorney-General.

On September 27, I ran into Lechuga at the United Nations, where he was doing a television interview in the lobby with Miss Howard. I told him that I had discussed our talk in Washington, and that it was felt that my accepting an invitation to go to Cuba would be difficult under present circumstances, especially in view of my official status. I added, however, that if Castro or a personal emissary had something to tell us, we were prepared to meet him and listen wherever else would be convenient. Lechuga said he would so inform Havana. Meanwhile, he forewarned me that he would be making a “hard” anti-U.S. speech in the United Nations on October 7. I remarked that it wouldn’t help reduce tensions; he replied he couldn’t help making it because of the “blockade.”

On October 7, in his reply to Lechuga’s tough speech, Stevenson suggested that if Castro wanted peace with his neighbors, he need only do three things—stop being a Soviet stooge, stop trying to subvert other nations, and start carrying out the promises of his revolution regarding constitutional rights.

On October 18, at dinner at the home of Mr. .Eugene Meyer, I talked with Mr. C.A. Doxiades, a noted Greek architect and town-planner, who had just returned from an architects’ congress in Havana, where he had talked alone to both Castro and Guevara, among others. He sought me out, as a government official, to say he was convinced Castro would welcome a normalization of relations with the United States if he could do so without losing too much face. He also said that Guevara and the other communists were opposed to any deal, and regarded Castro as dangerously unreliable; and that they would get rid of Castro if they thought they could carry on without him and retain his popular support.

On October 20, Miss Howard asked me if she might call Major Rene Vallejo, a Cuban surgeon who is also Castro’s current right-hand man and confidant. She said Vallejo helped her see Castro and made it plain to her he opposed the Guevara group. They became friends and have talked on the phone several times since the interview. Miss Howard’s purpose in calling him now was that she thought any message from Lechuga would not get past the foreign office, and she wanted to make certain, through Vallejo, that Castro knew there was a U.S. official available if he wanted to talk. I told her to go ahead, so long as she referred to my talk with Lechuga and made it quite plain we were not soliciting a meeting but only expressing our willingness to listen to anything they had to say. She then called Vallejo at his home. He was out and she left word for him to call her back.

On October 21, Gordon Chase called me from the White House in connection with my September 18 memo. I brought him up to date and said the ball was in their court.

On October 23, Vallejo called Miss Howard at her New York apartment. She was out of town; he left word with the maid that he would call again.

On October 28, I ran into Lechuga in the U.N. Delegates Lounge. He told me that Havana did not think sending someone to the United Nations for talks would be “useful at this time.” But he hoped he and I might have some informal chats from time to time. I said it was up to him and he could call me if he felt like it. He wrote down my extension.

On October 29, Vallejo again called Miss Howard at home. He assured her, in response to her question, that Castro still felt as he did in April about improving relations with us. As to his going to the United Nations or elsewhere for such a talk, Vallejo said it was impossible for Castro to leave the country at the present time. But he said he would relay her message to Castro (that there was now a U.S. official authorized to listen to him), and would call her back soon.

On October 31, Vallejo called Miss Howard, apologizing for the delay and saying he had been out of town with Castro and “could not get to a phone from which I could call you.” He said Castro would very much like to talk to the U.S. official anytime and appreciated the importance of discretion to all concerned. Castro would therefore be willing to send a plane to Mexico to pick up the official and fly him to a private airport near Veradero where Castro would talk to him alone. The plane would fly him back immediately after the talk. In this way there would be no risk of identification at Havana airport. Miss Howard said she doubted if a U.S. official could come to Cuba but perhaps he, Vallejo, could come and see the official at the U.N. or in Mexico, as Castro’s personal spokesman. Vallejo replied that Castro wanted to do the talking himself but did not completely rule out this situation if there was no other way of engaging a dialogue. It was agreed Miss Howard would relay the invitation to me and call Vallejo back as soon as possible with our reply. At this point she identified me as the U.S. official. Vallejo asked for the spelling, and recalled having met me in 1959 (I do not remember him). Miss Howard got the impression that Lechuga’s previous message to Havana had not reached Vallejo or Castro.

On November 1, Miss Howard reported the Vallejo call to me and I repeated it to Chase on November 4.

On November 5, I met with Bundy and Chase at the White House and informed them of the foregoing. The next day, Chase called and asked me to put it in writing.

375. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 1 July-30 November 1963. Secret. Drafted by McCone. A draft copy was sent to Helms. Washington, November 12, 1963, 10:30 a.m. SUBJECT Meeting on Policy Relating to Cuba—10:30 a.m.—12 Nov 63 IN ATTENDANCE The President, Secty. McNamara, Secty. Rusk, Secty. Gilpatric, Attorney General, Secty. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Johnson, Mr. McCone, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Shackley McCone opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba along thes Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of dissension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to economic sanctions and Flora. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMs. There are recent evidences of considerable rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMs. It is not clear whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban control; however it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.

McCone then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.

FitzGerald then made a presentation.FitzGerald’s presentation was on the six-point integrated program against Cuba that included covert collection of intelligence, propaganda actions to stimulate low-level sabotage and passive resistance, economic denial actions, exploitation of disaffection with the Cuban military and power centers, general sabotage and harassment, and support of autonomous anti-Castro groups. FitzGerald’s presentation is described in detail in a memorandum for the record of this meeting by Bruce B. Cheever, November 14. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

With respect to sabotage, McCone stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. There have been 109 events since April which were probably internally-inspired sabotage.

The President then raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose.

Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length, the thrust of his remarks being opposed to sabotage. He stated we should concentrate on obtaining information as to what Castro is doing with respect to other countries, particularly sending arms to Latin American countries. Rusk said we must replace Castro; we must accomplish a reduction in Soviet troops, however sabotage might result in an increase in troops. Rusk had no problem with infiltration of black teams; furthermore internal sabotage gave him no problem and the more of this, the better. In addition he strongly supported our economic efforts. However he opposed the hit-and-rUN sabotage tactics as being unproductive, complicating our relationships with the Soviets and also with our friends and indicated a connection between our sabotage activities and the autobahn problem.

McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-rUN sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

McNamara could see no connection between the Cuban operations and the Berlin autobahn incidents. He saw many advantages to going ahead which he advocated but ordered a careful watch.

The President asked questions concerning the immediate operations, and the next one on the schedule was approved.

FitzGerald explained the independent operations of the Artime group. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

376. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Department of State, INR Historical Files, Special Group Meeting No. 105, December 6, 1963. Secret; Eyes Only. For McCone’s account of this meeting, see Document 375. Washington, November 12, 1963. SUBJECT Cuban Operations

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and Mr. Shackley.

Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro’s internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has developed a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective. The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane “Flora” although its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba although recently 1,000-2,000 troops have come in. There now seems to be a kind of “Soviet MAAG” program concerned mainly with training Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of missiles. There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, estimates rUN from 25 to 50.

Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial, (d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and (f) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.

Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) “singleton,” (2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in “black net” operations. While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentration of agents in the Havana area.

A question was raised as to how many agents in all of these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year. The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness of Castro’s internal security forces and discovery brought about when agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.

 Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are the mailing of leaflets and radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana. Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S. economic denial program is contributing to Cuba’s declining economy. Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effective if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going into Cuba in 1962 from the free world reached $101 million. While this represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high. Disaffections in the Military. While the military is loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that some leaders would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity. Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are some 45 which look interesting from CIA’s operational viewpoint. Mr. FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in the military or who have highly placed contacts in such circles. The aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot Castro’s downfall with each other. Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald mentioned four successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a floating crane in one of Cuba’s harbors. It is believed that the publication of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the growing economic problems facing the country. Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question was asked from where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in Nicaragua. Also it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica. Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous groups once they become operational.

A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr. FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges, harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should proceed with its planning for this type of activity looking toward January.

The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a relationship between such hit and rUN attacks on Cuba and the delay of American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations, especially since it is so difficult to keep them from being directly attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and rUN type effort might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin responsibility for these activities on Castro. The U.S. in fact must be ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any Latin American country.

The consensus was that since CIA’s sabotage operation is in the main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some essential commodities, stimulates some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed, CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end (November 15 though 17).

The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries. It was determined that during the next 90 days from this date an attempt would be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships carrying weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin American countries.

Paul Eckel
377. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Secret; Sensitive. Washington, November 12, 1963.

I talked this afternoon with William Attwood and told him that at the President’s instruction I was conveying this message orally and not by cable. I told him that the President hoped he would get in touch with Vallejo to report that it did not seem practicable to us at this stage to send an American official to Cuba and that we would prefer to begin with a visit by Vallejo to the U.S. where Attwood would be glad to see him and to listen to any messages he might bring from Castro. In particular, we would be interested in knowing whether there was any prospect of important modification in those parts of Castro’s policy which are flatly unacceptable to us: namely, the three points in Ambassador Stevenson’s recent speechNot further identified. of which the central elements are (1) submission to external Communist influence, and (2) a determined campaign of subversion directed at the rest of the Hemisphere. Reversals of these policies may or may not be sufficient to produce a change in the policy of the United States, but they are certainly necessary, and without an indication of readiness to move in these directions, it is hard for us to see what could be accomplished by a visit to Cuba.

I left it to Attwood how much of this he would convey in the initial message to Vallejo, and I also gave him discretion as to how this message was to be transmitted, with the proviso that it must be clear at all times that we were not supplicants in this matter and that the initiative for exploratory conversations was coming from the Cubans. Attwood indicated to me that he expected Lisa Howard to telephone Vallejo and then probably to get on the line himself to handle the conversation along the lines stated above. Attwood will report the results of this communication and in the event that an arrangement is made for Vallejo to come to New York Attwood will come to Washington to concert a position for his use in this conversation.

McG. B.Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
378. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, November 25, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba—Item of Presidential Interest I assume you will want to brief the PresidentPresident Johnson. President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas, Texas, on November 22. on Bill Attwood’s Cuban exercise which is presumably still in train (see attached).Reference is to a November 19 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, reporting that Attwood had talked with Castro’s confidant, Dr. Vallejo, who invited him to Cuba and promised that the visit “would be very secure.”Attwood replied that he could not come at this time and preliminary talks in New York were essential. Vallejo could not come to New York, but Cuban U.N. delegate Carlos Lechuga would discuss an agenda for the talks with Attwood in New York. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 6/63-4/65) My own thinking on this one, vis-a-vis the events of November 22, is still very fluid; but here it is. Basically, the events of November 22 would appear to make accommodation with Castro an even more doubtful issue than it was. While I think that President Kennedy could have accommodated with Castro and gotten away with it with a minimum of domestic heat, I’m not sure about President Johnson. For one thing, a new President who has no background of being successfully nasty to Castro and the Communists (e.g. President Kennedy in October, 1962) would probably rUN a greater risk of being accused, by the American people, of “going soft”. In addition, the fact that Lee Oswald has been heralded as a pro-Castro type may make rapprochement with Cuba more difficult—although it is hard to say how much more difficult. If one concludes that the prospects for accommodation with Castro are much dimmer than they were before November 22, then Bill Attwood’s present effort loses much of its meaning. We would appear to have three alternative courses of action in handling the present status of the Attwood-Lechuga tie-line. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls, Attwood should tell Lechuga that in view of recent events, he is not now prepared to talk about an agenda with Lechuga. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga does not call over the next couple weeks (the Cubans may feel that November 22 has stopped all bets), he should take the initiative and get a message across to the Cubans, that despite recent events, we are still prepared to hear what is on Castro’s mind. We can tell Attwood that if Lechuga calls about setting up an appointment between Attwood and Lechuga, that Attwood should schedule such a meeting for a few days later and call us immediately. However, if Lechuga does not call him, Attwood should take no initiative until and if he hears from us. I choose 3(c) above. While November 22 events probably make accommodation an even tougher issue for President Johnson than it was for President Kennedy, a preliminary Attwood-Lechuga talk still seems worthwhile from our point of view—if the Cubans initiate it. We have little or nothing to lose and there will be some benefits; at a minimum, we should get a valuable reading as to what Castro regards as negotiable (e.g. the Soviet tie-line?) and a hint as to how he views the effect of November 22 on Cuban/U.S. relations. At the same time, if the Cubans, who have the ball, feel that all bets are off, we should take no initiative until we have thought the problem through carefully.

If we decide that course 3(c) is the right one, the sooner we call Attwood, the better. In view of his and Stevenson’s activist tendencies in this matter, it seems conceivable to me that, not hearing from Lechuga in the near future, they will approach him and assure him that we feel the same way and that we are still prepared to hear what Castro has on his mind.

GC
379. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Washington, November 25, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba—Bill Attwood Attached is an unsolicited chronology from Bill Attwood which describes the activities of the Cuba-Attwood tie-line from November 11 to the present. Apparently, the memo was dispatched on November 22, but because of the recent events, did not reach us until today. I do not think that Bill’s chronology changes the sense of the memo which I sent to you earlier today.Document 378. It does bring up a couple other points however. Assuming we decide to let the Lechuga-Attwood tie-line continue its present limited course, shouldn’t we tell Bill to gently ease Lisa Howard out of the picture? (November 22 offers him a good excuse—“We are naturally re-studying the situation in light of recent events.”) Her inclusion at every step so far (see attached), frankly, makes me nervous. In view of the fact that you once mentioned to me that you wanted the written tracks of this operation kept to a minimum, do you want me to tell Bill that he needn’t send us any more chronologies? Or did you mean that you wanted no written tracks between Bill and the Cubans? (I personally feel that the chronologies are valuable; they give us a more accurate picture of what is going on in New York than oral briefings and permit us to exercise a closer control.) GC Attachment Secret. Memorandum From William Attwood to Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff New York, November 22, 1963.

Following is an addition to my memorandum to you dated November 8, 1963:Document 374.

On November 11, Vallejo called Miss Howard again to reiterate their appreciation of the need for security and to say that Castro would go along with any arrangements we might want to make. He specifically suggested that a Cuban plane could come to Key West and pick up the emissary; alternatively they would agree to have him come in a U.S. plane which could land at one of several “secret airfields” near Havana. He emphasized that only Castro and himself would be present at the talks and that no one else—he specifically mentioned Guevara—would be involved. Vallejo also reiterated Castro’s desire for this talk and hoped to hear our answer soon.

On November 12, Bundy called me and I reported Vallejo’s message. He said this did not affect the White House decision that a preliminary talk with Vallejo at the United Nations should be held in order to find out what Castro wanted to talk about—particularly if he was seriously interested in discussing the points cited in Stevenson’s October 7 speech. Bundy suggested I transmit our decision to Vallejo, stressing the fact that, since we are responding to their invitation and are not soliciting a meeting, we would like to know more about what is on Castro’s mind before commiting ourselves to further talks in Cuba.

On November 13, I went to Miss Howard’s apartment and called Vallejo at home. There was no answer. She then sent a telegram asking that he call her at his convenience.

On November 14, Vallejo called her. She gave him my message—that we would want to talk to him here at the United Nations before accepting an invitation to go to Cuba. She said that, if he wished to confirm or discuss this further with the U.S. official, he could call him (Vallejo) at home on the evening of November 18. Vallejo said he would be there to receive the call. Meanwhile, he did not exclude the possibility of his coming to the United Nations and said he would discuss it with Castro.

On November 18, Miss Howard reached Vallejo at home and passed the phone to me. I told him Miss Howard had kept me informed of her talks with him and that I assumed he knew of our interest in hearing what Castro had in mind. Vallejo said he did, and reiterated the invitation to Cuba, stressing the fact that security could be guaranteed. I replied that we felt a preliminary meeting was essential to make sure there was something useful to talk about, and asked if he was able to come to New York. Vallejo said he could not come “at this time”. However, if that’s how we felt, he said that “we” would send instructions to Lechuga to propose and discuss with me “an agenda” for a later meeting with Castro. I said I would await Lechuga’s call. Vallejo’s manner was extremely cordial and he called me “Sir” throughout the conversation.

On November 19, I called Chase, and reported the conversation.
380. Memorandum of ConversationSource: Department of State, Presidential Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 66 D 149. Secret. Drafted by Akalovsky. Approved by the White House on December 2 and by Thompson on November 27. Washington, November 26, 1963, 11:35 a.m. PARTICIPANTS US The President Under Secretary Harriman Ambassador Thompson Mr. Tyler-EUR Mr. Bundy—The White House Mr. Akalovsky—ACDA/IR USSR Mr. Mikoyan Ambassador Dobrynin Mr. Smirnovski, Chief of the American Section, Foreign Ministry Mr. Sukhodrev SUBJECT Call by Mr. Mikoyan on the President

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; for text, see volume V.]

The President then noted that the United States was not planning to invade Cuba, but that the Cuban problem was a very serious one with our people. He hoped that as days came and went we would be able to find a solution there which would make it possible to lead our peoples further towards peace and understanding. Actions already taken had gone part of the way and some lessening of tension had taken place. We had a number of problems at home which were quite troublesome, and if there was any indication at any time that we could in some way bring about better understanding and better relations we would go our part of the way. We were dedicated to our system and intended to preserve it, but this did not mean that we wanted it to dominate or enslave any other people.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was happy to hear these words uttered by the new President of the United States. The President’s desire to live in peace and friendship with the USSR and with other nations was in full accord with the views of the Soviet Union.

The President stated that there would be no change in the Kennedy policy. We were very happy that Congress had shown evidences of approving negotiations and exchanges of views between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev. This had offered us real encouragement not only in their attitude but also in our people’s attitude. Our constant purpose, each day, would be to seek to travel the road of peace and to find solutions to many problems that engaged the two sides and to many differences existing between them.

The President continued that as an immediate comment he wished to say that the problem which was the biggest with our people was the result of the Castro-promoted subversion. This inevitably and invariably gave us strained relations. He hoped, however, that in future both sides would find that they had moved further to peace and had made gains greater than even those made by his predecessor and Mr. Khrushchev.

Mr. Mikoyan said he was very much gratified to hear this. However, there was only one point he wished to comment on, namely, the President’s remark concerning Cuban subversive activities. He said he could not understand how a small nation like Cuba could subvert anyone, let alone a big power. On the contrary, the whole world could see how small Cuba was being subverted by a number of various, well-financed organizations. The Soviet Union believed that all subversive activities should be ended everywhere. He asserted that he knew Cuba did not want to subvert anyone. In his conversation with Castro, the latter had told him that he wanted good relations with the United States. In his statement on the occasion of the tragedy falling upon the United States, Castro had shown himself as a great humanitarian as he had voiced deep regret about President Kennedy’s death. Therefore, Mr. Mikoyan continued, he wished to ask the President not to accept the allegations which were sometimes mentioned in the press. He wanted the President to believe him that good relations with Cuba were in the interest of the United States.

The President responded that his intention had been simply to give an evaluation of the feelings of our people and of what gave them problems. He said he had spoken sincerely and earnestly about US intentions with respect to Cuba. We had no plans for invasion, and we believed that there was no justification for Cuba to invade others by subversion or otherwise. The President reiterated that what he was seeking now was merely to give Mr. Mikoyan an evaluation and expressed the hope that better understanding could flow from this.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

381. Editorial Note

On November 28, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone met with President Lyndon Johnson at Johnson’s residence for approximately 30 minutes. According to McCone’s memorandum for the record, November 29, the discussion on Cuba was as follows:

“The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro. He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations. In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study carefully various courses of action.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963)

On November 30 McCone again met with President Johnson with McGeorge Bundy also present. The meeting lasted for approximately 1-1/2 hours and according to McCone’s memorandum for the record, December 2, the discussion on Cuba was as follows:

“The President again raised the question of what we were going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th, September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the action was a Hemispheric action I didn’t see that the USSR could do much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy meeting on Monday.”

Later on in the memorandum, McCone noted that he reviewed the Cuban overflight program and advised the President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which the flights were being carried on. (Ibid.)

The reference by McGeorge Bundy to the meeting of Monday, was to a meeting with the President on December 2; see Document 383. The statements by President Kennedy of September 4 (not 5), September 13, and November 20, 1963, all dealt in part with the danger of Cuban subversion to the Western hemisphere and the United States intention to prevent it. For texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pages 369-370, 373-375, and 461-463.

382. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive. Washington, December 2, 1963. SUBJECT Bill Attwood Activities Last week, (after President Kennedy’s death)Lechuga told Lisa Howard that he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to have a discussion with Attwood. Lechuga wondered whether things were still the same. Miss Howard said she didn’t know anything. She later passed the information to Attwood. Bill ran into Lechuga today at lunch, by accident. After Lechuga expressed condolences, Bill mentioned that Miss Howard had told him that Lechuga had received the above mentioned letter. Lechuga confirmed that he had been authorized to have a preliminary discussion with Bill (he did not mention from whom the letter had come although he had previously told Miss Howard that the talks were authorized by Castro).Lechuga wondered how things now stood. Bill told Lechuga he would let him know. They also agreed, that from this point on, there was no further need to use Lisa Howard as an intermediary. Bill doesn’t know whether Castro wrote the letter before or after the death of President Kennedy. In any event, Lechuga has apparently received no stop-order since the assassination. One might assume, therefore, that the assassination has not changed Castro’s mind about talking to the U.S. The ball is in our court;Bill owes Lechuga a call. What to do?Bill thinks that we have nothing to lose in listening to what Castro has to say; there is no commitment on our side. Also, it would be very interesting to know what is in the letter.

I am also dying to know what’s in the letter and two weeks ago I would not have hesitated. But things are different now, particularly with this Oswald business. At a minimum, such a talk would really have to be a non-event. I, for one, would want to think this one over carefully.

GC
383. Editorial Note

At 6 p.m. on December 2, 1963, Secretary of State Rusk met with President Johnson to discuss Cuba. Also attending were Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Director of Central Intelligence McCone, Director of the United States Information Agency Donald Wilson, and Special Assistant to the President McGeorge Bundy. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Edwin Martin, who apparently also attended the meeting, prepared a paper setting forth talking points for Secretary Rusk, December 2. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 501, Cuba) See the Supplement.

According to a memorandum from Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, Bundy asked Chase to produce a “Cuban monograph” for the meeting. Chase produced a paper that he described as “an effort which attempts to give a broad sense of the main threads and problems of our policy towards Cuba, with an indication as to where we appear to be heading.”Chase admitted to Bundy, “I do not yet have a real feel as to how much the President knows about Cuba,” and he was not sure his paper would meet Bundy’s needs, but he suggested Bundy was free to do with it what he thought best. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65)Chase’s paper has not been found. Chase was slated to be the notetaker at the meeting, but in light of President Johnson’s inclination to “abhor a crowd,”Chase volunteered to drop out. (Memorandum from Chase to Bundy, December 2; ibid.) If Chase did not attend, there may have been no notetaker and thus no record of the meeting.

384. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret; Eyes Only; Sensitive. Washington, December 3, 1963. SUBJECT Bill Attwood’s Activities

I refer to our conversation this morning about the next step in the Bill Attwood story. In the event we are going to move soon on this one (after your assurances re Oswald, I, for one, am in favor), for a starter, here are some rough guidelines which you may want to consider.

Bill Attwood should call Lechuga and make an appointment to see him. At the meeting he should say the following: The new Administration has not yet had an opportunity to examine the Cuban question in detail. However, in deference to the late President’s judgment that it is worthwhile to hear what is on Castro’s mind, and in view of the fact that what Castro says may have a bearing on the new Administration’s eventual assessment of the Cuban situation, I am authorized to hear you out. (After hearing Lechuga’s story.) You can rest assured that the information will be passed on to the proper people. If we are interested in further talks, I will let you know. We should emphasize to Bill that the meeting must be held with complete discretion; should news of the meeting leak out, Bill should be in a position to issue a foolproof denial. In this regard, we are glad that Lisa Howard is now out of the picture. She should be given no intimation that further U.S./Cuban contact is taking place.

One main problem is that, in his meeting with Lechuga, Bill may tend to convey a spirit of accommodation, which, when reported, could relieve Castro of an increased anxiety which the assassination of President Kennedy seems to have produced and which is in our interest to maintain. Therefore, we should stress to Bill that he must convey the sense of an interested but non-committal listener, completely confident of his position. Expressed in words, the mood should be roughly as follows:

“Fidel, we are content to let events continue on their present course. We intend to maintain, and whenever possible, to increase our pressure against you until you fall; we are pretty certain that we will be successful. Moreover, you can forget about getting ‘another Cuba’ in the Hemisphere. We have learned our lesson and ‘another Cuba’ is simply not going to happen. However, we are reasonable men. We are not intent on having your head per se; neither do we relish the suffering of the Cuban people. You know our central concerns—the Soviet connection and the subversion. If you feel you are in a position to allay these concerns, we can probably work out a way to live amicably together and to build a prosperous Cuba. If you don’t feel you can meet our concerns, then just forget the whole thing; we are quite content to continue on our present basis.”

 I agree that it is questionable whether Bill Attwood is the man to convey the message. On the other hand, an Ed Martin type who, in his bones, probably does not believe in the possibility of accommodation would not lend the right flavor to the meeting either. There must be a delicate balance. Given the choice between the two types, I would pick the believer, Bill, and arm him with a good, stiff brainwashing and education in Cuban affairs before he meets with Lechuga. Frankly, if really given my choice, I would pick you for the job. Is there any way you could do it and not be conspicuous (e.g. outside New York or Washington)? GC
385. Memorandum From Gordon Chase of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65. Top Secret. Washington, December 4, 1963. SUBJECT Cuba Meeting (Without President) Next Tuesday, December 10, 1963 I spoke to John Crimmins at some length about preparations for the meeting next week regarding new courses of action we can take, short of invasion, to make life difficult for Castro. He plans to produce the following type of document for the meeting. The paper will include State’s recommendation on how we plan to proceed in the OAS as a result of the Cuban arms cache issue.There were actually two papers, one, entitled “OAS Action Against Cuba” and undated, is ibid. Regarding the second paper, see footnote 2 below. For example, should we push for a break in diplomatic relations among the “soft 5”, a break in economic relations between Latin America and Cuba, a break in communications between the OAS countries and Cuba? The paper will then describe a number of possible bilateral and unilateral actions which we can take (e.g. unleashing of the exiles, low level flights, military feints (at a level which will make the Cubans, but not the Soviets, jumpy), intensification of covert program). There will be a brief discussion giving the advantages and disadvantages of each of these courses of action, along with State’s recommendation in favor or against.The second paper, entitled “Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba (Short of Use of Force),” undated, was submitted to the Standing Group on December 12. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) See the Supplement. John will get the paper distributed by SaturdaySaturday, December 7. According to a December 9 memorandum from Chase to Bundy the second paper on unilateral and bilateral action was withdrawn from consideration by the Standing Group by Secretary Rusk for further consideration in State. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) afternoon so that the agencies will have time to consider State’s recommendations before the Tuesday meeting.The Standing Group met on Tuesday, December 10, to discuss “OAS ActionAgainst Cuba,” see footnote 1 above. The Group placed emphasis on measures designed to harass Cuba and restrict arms shipments to Latin America. (Memorandum from Califano to Gilpatric, December 18; Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 330 77 131, Misc. 63-65) See vol. XII, p. 355. John plans to meet with Alexis Johnson and the Secretary this evening. Among other things he hopes to clear the above menu. Bromley feels that we should try to maintain this meeting as a Standing Group meeting (among other things, this will allow us to invite the AG). Attendance at the meeting would be roughly as follows:Ed Martin, somebody from the 7th floor of State, John McCone, Dez FitzGerald or Dick Helms, Roswell Gilpatric, another person from Defense, Don Wilson, and the AG. Do you have any problems with such a list? How about Douglas Dillon, Maxwell Taylor, Ted Sorensen? GC
386. Editorial Note

On December 13, 1963, the Standing Group of the National Security Council met to discuss Cuba. Two papers were on the agenda. The first was a Department of State draft entitled, “Possible Further Unilateral and Bilateral Actions to Increase Pressure on Cuba,” see footnote 2, Document 385. The second was a December 12 Central Intelligence Agency memorandum entitled “Cuba—A Status Report.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65) See the Supplement. These two papers were only briefly discussed as the participants were more concerned with the unsatisfactory results of a November 14-18 surveillance and intercept operation against suspected arms smuggling into Colombia. The Standing Group did approve certain actions recommended in the two papers. The Group gave authorization to CIA to develop the capacity to conduct air attacks against selective Cuban targets by autonomous exile groups. Assets were to be in place within 90 days, but this did not constitute authority to conduct the raids. A general consensus favored endorsement of intensification of the current program of exile raids on Cuba. Intensified Department of State action against Free World shipping to Cuba was also approved. Since the Standing Group was not able to consider all the actions recommended in the two papers, further decisions were delayed until a December 19 meeting with President Johnson. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files:FRC 330 77 131, Misc. 63-65) Regarding the meeting with the President, see Document 388.

387. Memorandum for the RecordSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65. Top Secret. Prepared by Smith. A copy was sent to Chase. Washington, undated.

The President reacted to the attached memorandum of December 9 from Mr. Attwood by asking Mr. Moyers what instructions had been given to Attwood. Where he got the memo I do not know.

I reviewed for Mr. Moyers the actions taken since December 9 and reported that consideration of using Attwood in negotiations with representatives of Castro had been under review almost weekly. Timing of a contact had not been considered right.

I recommended that, in the light of the recently announced USSR-Cuba trade agreement and the renewed Russian pledge to aid Cuba by all means if an invasion should be launched,Announced in Khrushchev’s December 13 speech before the the Plenary Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in which he declared that “revolutionary Cuba will not remain defenseless if the aggressive militaristic circles of the U.S.A. attack it.” For text, see The Current Digest of Soviet Press, vol. XV, No. 49, January 1, 1964, pp. 3-13. The trade agreement for long-term purchases by the Soviet Union of Cuban sugar was signed by Castro and Khrushchev on January 21, 1964, but apparently was announced earlier. any contact between Attwood and Castro representatives should be avoided lest we convey to the Cubans we were reacting defensively to the latest Russian actions. I said that a no-contact-now policy reflected the current situation and did not forestall use of Attwood at a later date if a decision was made to do so.On December 11 Chase sent Bundy a memorandum on Attwood’s activities. Attwood told Chase there was no pressure to reply as “Lechuga, and the Cubans in general, probably feel that the situation has changed since President Kennedy’s assassination. Deep down, they probably don’t expect anything hopeful from us.”Attwood told Chase that Lechuga “seemed somewhat reluctant to bring up the subject of a letter he had received from Cuba.” If the contact was to continue, Attwood wanted to call Lechuga within a couple of weeks, otherwise the matter “would lose momentum and wither on the vine.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Contact with Cuban Leaders, 5/63-4/65)

BKS Attachment Secret. Memorandum From William Attwood to the Permanent Representative to the United Nations (Stevenson) New York, December 9, 1963. SUBJECT Latest Cuban Developments for your talk with the President

As you know, President Kennedy in September authorized me to establish a discreet contact with the Cuban UN representative to verify reports that Castro—if not his Communist advisers—was prepared to go quite far in meeting our terms for normalizing relations.

McGeorge Bundy has the chronological account of what this initial contact led to during October and November. At all times I was in contact with the White House. We never indicated to the Cubans that we wanted to make a deal but only that we were prepared to listen.

Finally, on October 31, Castro invited me to meet him in Cuba and guaranteed both discretion and security. We replied that we would prefer preliminary discussions here at the United Nations to make sure there was something worth talking about.

On November 18, Castro’s right-hand man, Rene Vallejo, informed me by telephone that instructions were being sent to the Cuban Representative, Dr. Lechuga, to discuss an agenda with me.

On December 2, Lechuga told me he had received a letter from Castro authorizing him to talk with me about certain problems “in a general way”.Lechuga said that in view of the President’s death he did not know whether we still wished to have such a talk. I told him I would let him know. I then reported this to Gordon Chase in Bundy’s office and am now waiting for further instructions.

Personally, I feel that we have nothing to lose by finding out what is on Castro’s mind and what he wants to talk about.
388. Memorandum of Meeting With President JohnsonSource: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Meetings, 12/63-3/65. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Chase on December 27. Washington, December 19, 1963, 10:55 a.m. SUBJECT Cuba OTHERS PRESENT Acting Secretary Ball; Ambassador Thompson; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Martin;John Crimmins; Acting Secretary Gilpatri c; Secretary Vance; General Wheeler; Secretary Dillon; Acting Director General Carter;Richard Helms;Desmond FitzGerald; Deputy Director Wilson;McGeorge Bundy;William Moyers;George Reedy;Gordon Chase

The primary purpose of the meeting was to brief the President in depth about some of the basic Cuban issues. Essentially, the discussion described where we have been since January, 1963, where we are now, and where we can go. (An outline which was prepared for the discussion is attached.)Chase is apparently referring to a long draft memorandum for the President, prepared by McGeorge Bundy on December 15. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.

A large part of the meeting was devoted to a briefing by Mr. FitzGerald and a general discussion on CIA’s present covert program and on the U.S. Government’s economic denial program. Essentially, this part of the discussion covered 6 areas. Mr. FitzGerald described covert intelligence activities directed against Castro’s regime, including the numbers, characteristics, and geographic spread of CIA assets within Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald described CIA-controlled radio programs and other propaganda media directed at Cuba which have been used to encourage low risk, simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance, and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc. He noted the recent increase of spontaneous anti-regime propaganda inside Cuba.

Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA has worked with State and other agencies to deny to Cuba commodities from the Free World which are critical to the economy. The results have been mixed. For example, while we have been able to penetrate certain European firms which deal with Cuba, we also know that equipment vitally needed in Cuba, some of U.S. origin, reaches the island via Canada and Great Britain.

The group agreed that this is not an easy problem; Mr. Ball said that our allies have always been reluctant to interfere with private traders and have always had a different view of Free World/Bloc trade than we have had. Nevertheless, it was also agreed that we should intensify our efforts and that there are still things we can do. First, Mr. Crimmins noted that we could consider ways in which the new amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act (prevents assistance to any country whose planes or ships carry commodities to Cuba) can be used to reinforce our economic denial program.Public Law 88-205, passed December 16; 77 Stat. 379. Second, Mr. Ball said that the question of Canadian trade in sensitive items would be taken up with the Canadian Minister of Economics and Trade on December 20; later, Mr. Ball will talk to other appropriate Free World governments also. Third, the President directed that the agencies prepare a detailed memorandum (including the names of companies and commodities involved in Free World trade with Cuba) which, inter alia, will be useful for his forthcoming talks with Prime Ministers Home and Pearson.

Mr. FitzGerald spoke about CIA’s program to identify, seek out, and establish contact with potentially dissident non-Communist elements in the power centers of the regime with a view to stimulating an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. Our effort is based on the premise that a popular uprising in Cuba is unlikely, primarily because Castro is capable of controlling such an uprising. Instead, we are trying to penetrate the Cuban regime’s power structure. In this regard, we have had only limited success. On the one hand, we have been able to make an important penetration in the Cuban army. On the other hand, the dissident elements, while willing to act, are not yet willing to act together. They simply don’t trust each other, mainly because Castro has been successful, in the past, in penetrating dissident groups.

The President asked whether there is any significant insurgency within Cuba. Mr. FitzGerald said there is some but that there is no national movement on which we can build. Mr. Bundy noted that the insurgents generally seem to suffer heavy losses at Castro’s hands.

Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA has directed four small scale, externally mounted sabotage operations for the purpose of stimulating resist-ance and hurting Cuba economically. The discussion then focussed on a proposed attack on a major target—the Matanzas power plant. Mr. FitzGerald noted that this would have a significant favorable impact, psychologically as well as economically; the dissidents would view the attack as evidence that the Johnson Administration is not giving up the fight for Cuba.

But there are a number of disadvantages to the power plant attack. First, the chances of total success (e.g. target destroyed, no one caught) are less than 50-50 while the chances of partial success (target destroyed, people caught) are only somewhat better than 50-50. Second, if the raiders get caught, they will undoubtedly admit their CIA connection. (General Carter believed this point was weak—we get blamed for everything that happens in Cuba anyway.) Third, such an attack will be highly visible and will have a high noise-level. In this regard, Mr. Bundy said that we might want to lie low for now so that Castro, presently under a strain because of the arms cache discovery, will not be able to shift the accusing finger in our direction. Fourth, Mr. Ball said that it might slow up the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Fifth, Ambassador Thompson said that the timing seemed bad—the Soviets now appeared to be in a situation where they may be thinking of cutting back aid to Cuba. They will draw a lot of conclusions from the first acts of President Johnson. An attack on a big Cuban target could give Castro important leverage in his negotiations for more Soviet aid.

General Wheeler thought that, to improve the chance of success, we might want to try to hit the Matanzas power plant from the air; it should be noted that there have already been some free-lance raids over Cuba. Alexis Johnson pointed out that an air strike might cause retaliation against one of our U-2 flights.

In response to a question, Secretary Vance indicated that he was in favor of an attack on Matanzas.

It was decided that there will be no air or ground attack on the Matanzas power plant at this time, primarily because of its high probability of failure and because of the Soviet dimension. However, it was agreed, in principle, that low-risk sabotage efforts could go forward along with the planning necessary to develop an air strike capability.Both Acting Director of Central Intelligence Marshall Carter and Chief of the Special Affairs Staff Desmond FitzGerald produced memoranda for the record of this meeting. They both indicated that it was President Johnson who made this decision. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963) See the Supplement.

 Mr. FitzGerald described CIA’s program in aiding two autonomous Cuban exile groups, which will be operating from outside the U.S. One group, which is headed by Manuel Artime, will start operating out of Costa Rica and Nicaragua in February; the other group is headed by Manolo Ray who is somewhat to the left of Artime, but probably has the best following within Cuba. Both of these groups will conduct externally mounted raids on Cuba, and will send teams inside Cuba to conduct internal sabotage and to establish contact with dissidents. Mr. FitzGerald added that there are some disadvantages in these operations—the groups aren’t trained by CIA andthey operate outside of CIA control. But there are advantages too—they operate from outside United States territory and we will have relatively little trouble denying U.S. association with these groups.

Mr. Bundy noted, and Mr. FitzGerald agreed, that these groups operate a long distance away from the target; we cannot expect too much effect from their raids.

Mr. Bundy gave a very quick briefing on some other aspects of the current Cuban situation. (The group paused to read the attached CIA situation brief.)Apparent reference to December 18 briefing notes for Acting Director Carter, entitled “The Situation in Cuba.” The notes summarized Soviet withdrawals, analyzed remaining Soviet forces in Cuba, assessed the Cuban military as fully capable of deterring internal dissidence and exile raids, and concluded that despite economic problems Castro was very much in control. (Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 65 D 438, Cuba Meeting—12/19/63) See the Supplement. Also in the Supplement is a related CIA Special Report, OCI No. 0310/63B, December 13, “Fidel Castro’s Growing Military Power.” (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, Cuba, White Label) With respect to Soviet/Cuban military strength on the island, Mr. Bundy noted that one of our primary objectives is to ensure that there is no reintroduction of offensive missiles. The camera is our best inspector and, so far as we know, there are no offensive missiles now in Cuba. Mr. Bundy added that we are concerned about the transfer of SAM control to the Cubans in about mid-1964, and we will have to watch this development carefully. As for the Soviet troops, the general consensus of the group was that the big withdrawals are over and that, from here on, the withdrawals will proceed more slowly. Mr. Bundy noted, in passing, our anti-subversion efforts. The key to the problem is to build up the will and capabilities of the Latin American countries to counter the threat. Our efforts in the field of controlling travel between Latin America and Cuba are also important. Mr. Bundy described briefly the very tenuous, sensitive, and marginal contacts we have established with Castro himself. The initiative is on Castro’s part and we are essentially faced with a decision as to whether or not we are prepared to listen to what Castro has to say.In a December 20 memorandum from Chase to Bundy, Chase reported a conversation with Attwood who stated that Adlai Stevenson had mentioned the U.S.-Cuba contact recently to President Johnson. Chase did not know what the nature of the President’s reaction was, but he noted “from the tenor of the President’s Thursday meeting [December 19], I would surmise that it was somewhere between lukewarm and cool.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Cuba, Memos re. Cuba Miscellaneous, 11/63-6/65) Mr. Ball noted that such U.S./Cuban contacts could have an unsettling effect on Soviet/Cuban relations.

Mr. Bundy described several unilateral and bilateral courses of action we can take in the future to make life difficult for Castro. Air attacks, unleashing of exiles (allowing them to use U.S. territory as a base for attacks on Cuba), and low level flights are aggressive-type acts which have distinct advantages but which are similar in that they all tend to raise the noise-level. Low level flights, for example, would provide us with more intelligence and would irritate and harass Castro. At the same time, they could precipitate the shooting down of a U-2. Mr. Bundy said that we can take further unilateral shipping measures—e.g. close ports and deny U.S.-financed commodities to lines engaged in Free World shipping to Cuba. He noted, however, that we have found through past experience that bilateral measures are more effective in reducing Free World shipping to Cuba. At the same time, we should not deceive ourselves. We should recognize that the Soviets are capable of handling all Cuba’s shipping needs even if we are able to eliminate Free World shipping to Cuba. Mr. Bundy said that the President could make a public statement in the near future, taking a more vigorous line than we have in the past. He noted that in his November 18 speech,Reference is to an address before the Inter-American Press Association, in Miami on November 18. For text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:John F. Kennedy, 1963, pp. 872-877. President Kennedy made two points about Cuba—the first was designed to encourage anti-Castro elements within Cuba to revolt, and the second was to indicate that we would not permit another Cuba in the Hemisphere. Bilaterally there are possibilities of increasing our pressures against Free World trade to Cuba. Spain should be a high priority target.

Note: At this point the President left the room and there was a brief discussion about the exiles in Florida. Mr. Crimmins said that resettlement remains our basic policy. It is true that the exiles feel that the pressure for their resettlement is intense. In fact, it is no more intense now than it has been for some time.

 On the President’s return to the room, Mr. Bundy introduced the subject of the discovery in Venezuela of the Cuban arms cache.Reference is to the discovery on November 3 by Venezuela of an arms cache on the beach of Paraguana Peninsula, Venzuela. On November 28 Venezuela announced that the arms were of Cuban origin. For documentation on the reaction of the United States and the Organization of American States, see vol. XII, pp. 352–354. Mr. Helms gave a graphic presentation of the link between the arms cache and a plot to upset the elections in Caracas. Mr. Martin explained the status of the OAS investigation of the arms cache. The evidence is convincing in showing that the arms were from Cuba. The OAS investigating team is still working on its report. Hopefully, it will be able to tie the arms cache into a general plot to subvert Venezuela. The report should be ready by about January 10. Mr. Bundy described the types of action we can hope to get in the OAS as a result of the discovery of the arms cache. The most interesting is the surveillance action where we have essentially two basic choices—we may want to push for a system which involves search and seizure of Cuban vessels on the high seas; this implies the possible use of force. Or we can push for a system involving the search and seizure of Cuban vessels in territorial waters; this evades the issue of force. Mr. Bundy added that it is still too early to know how far the Latin Americans will go in support of force against Castro. We have put out feelers. Mr. Bundy brought up the problem of lifting travel restrictions on Americans who wish to go to Cuba. Mr. Ball noted that a great number of students want to go down to Cuba during the Christmas holidays and that Justice Department recommends that we lift our travel restrictions. If we don’t, we will probably be obliged to put many of the students in jail when they return; this will be embarrassing. Mr. Ball added that the State Department is tentatively opposed to lifting the travel restrictions because of the effect it will have on Latin American countries. We have been trying to get the Latin Americans to impose restrictions on travel to Cuba; if we lift our own restrictions, our position will be considerably weakened. Mr. Ball said that he would be meeting with the Attorney General later in the day to talk about the subject.

Tentatively, the President indicated that he favored maintaining the travel restrictions and a policy of selective prosecution.On December 21 the Department of State announced that the prohibition of unauthorized travel to Cuba was “an essential part of this country’s foreign policy.” Department of State Press Release No. 640; for text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1964, pp. 10-11.

Gordon ChasePrinted from a copy that bears this typed signature.
389. National Security Action Memorandum No. 274Source: Department of State, S/S-NSC Files: Lot 72 D 316, NSAM 274. Secret. Copies were sent to the Departments of Defense and the Treasury. Washington, December 20, 1963. TO The Secretary of State The Secretary of Commerce The Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Cuba—Economic Denial Program At his meeting on Cuba on December 19, 1963,See Document 388. the President stated his deep concern with the extent of Free World trade with Cuba, and his desire for a detailed memorandum on the subject. Accordingly, it is requested that State coordinate with Commerce and CIA and prepare a memorandum which includes, but is not necessarily restricted to, the following information. The extent of the trade between the Free World and Cuba—e.g. the value of the trade and the countries involved. The commodities involved in Free World trade with Cuba, paying special attention to items which are critical to the Cuban economy. The names and addresses of the principal firms which are directly or indirectly involved with the shipment of commodities to Cuba. Steps we have taken with foreign governments and private companies to stop trade with Cuba, including the responses of such governments and companies to our pressures. Recommendations for further action. McGeorge Bundy
390. Editorial Note

On December 27, 1963, Director of Central Intelligence McCone met with President Johnson at his ranch in Texas. According to McCone’s December 29 memorandum for the record Johnson told McCone that he wanted to “‘change the image of the DCI’ from a cloak and dagger role to the role of adviser to the President.”McCone responded that was very much in line with his thinking and he was prepared to do anything the President desired. McCone and Johnson then discussed specific items, one of which was Cuba. Their discussion on Cuba went as follows:

“I reviewed briefly the most recent summary (the CIA-DIA assessment of 20 December) of the situation in Cuba, advising the President that there had been no additions to the Soviet forces but no appreciable withdrawal. There had been a substantial turnover in recent months and the probability was that a few hundred—and not more than a few hundred—Soviets had departed. This was about the extent of the net reduction. I said that it appeared that the Soviet activities were entirely of a training nature, that the Cuban SAM traineeshad been deployed at SAM sites and that there was a possibility that autonomous Cuban control of the SAM sites would present us with a very difficult situation in the immediate future. The President then asked what could be done if the Cubans decided to use the SAMs against our U-2’s. I stated that we could not go without continuing aerial surveillance. We had two choices: either use our ‘new development,’ which I opposed because of its importance for other purposes, or tentatively to actually ‘take out’ the SAM sites. The President remarked that this would then mean war and I responded that certainly the destruction of the SAM sites would mean war, that the degree of escalation could not be determined in advance. I stated that this was the most ominous situation that confronted us in Cuba in the immediate future. The President made no comment.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI/McCone Files, Job 80-B01285A, DCI Meetings with the President, 23 November-31 December 1963)

The CIA-DIA summary, December 20, entitled “Status of Soviet Military Personnel in Cuba,” is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD (C) A Files:FRC 71 A 2896, Cuba 381, May through Dec. 1963. See the Supplement.

Index Accommodation between U.S. and Cuba. See U.S.-Cuban accommodation. Acheson, Dean G., 110n, 147, 165–167 Air strikes against missile sites option, 97–98, 119, 120 Adenauer, Konrad, 15 Aerial photography. See Reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Air strikes against missile sites option, 10–11, 100, 105, 156, 265, 266, 272 Kennedy administration discussions, 31–32, 33–37, 39–40, 43, 54–58, 63–71, 80, 96, 97–99, 100n, 107, 108–109, 118–121, 129–136 Plan of attack, 139–140 Soviet reaction, estimate re, 124–125 Stevenson’s position, 101–102 Akalovsky, Alexander, 110, 335, 344, 382n, 400n, 402n, 875, 894 Albert, Carl, 657 Alphand, Herve, 167, 288n Alsop, Stewart, 567n Anderson, Maj., 320, 324 Anderson, Adm. George W., 10, 146, 147, 156, 298, 380, 477 Aramburu, Pedro, 394 Arends, Leslie, 657 Arms control, 251, 295–296, 307, 312–313, 493–494 Test Ban Treaty, Cuban policy re, 876–877 Artime, Manuel, 853–855, 907 Attwood, William, 868–870, 877, 878, 879–883, 888–893, 897, 898–900, 903–904, 908n Ball, George W., 96, 151–152, 169, 180n, 227n, 285n, 287n, 291n, 305, 309n, 348–349, 365n, 378n, 436, 446, 451n, 489, 514n, 517n, 523n, 577n, 603, 613n, 718, 719n, 728n, 786n, 906, 909 IL-28 aircraft in Cuba, 415–417, 424–432 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 415, 454–456, 491–492 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 253, 267–268 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 220, 611–613 McCloy-Kuznetsov informal meeting, 455, 458–459 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 601–602, 606 Stevenson’s plan for ending negotiations, 420–422, 424 Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill, 188–198, 219–220 U.S. instructions to negotiators, 321, 342–344, 522n, 611–613 U.S. negotiators’ failure to receive documents from Washington, 409–410 U.S. planning, 417–419 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 455–456, 504–508, 510–513, 567–568, 579–581 Prisoners held in Cuba, release of, 75, 621–622 Quarantine of Cuba, 182, 222, 252 Kennedy administration discussions, 89–90, 130, 133, 135 Resumption on expanded basis, scenario for, 428–429 Stopping of ships, 184–185, 192, 219 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 622, 694, 815, 845–847 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 7 U.S. response, 64, 69, 71–72, 75, 77, 84–85, 89–91, 93, 94, 96, 100n, 109 Sugar market, 800 Trade with Cuba, 3–4, 5n, 683, 684, 905 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 908 U.S. information policy, 796 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 586, 781, 796 Verification of missile withdrawal, 380, 384–385, 386–393, 420 Barker, W., 720–721 Bartlett, Charles, 567n Batian Pinto, Luis, 228 Bay of Pigs invasion, 61, 113, 703, 714 Bell, David E., 765n Belt, Guillermo, 854 Beratta, 621 Berlin issue, 37, 71–72, 95, 109, 169, 251, 260–261 Blight, James G., 275 Blockade of Cuba. See Quarantine of Cuba. Boggs, Hale, 657 Bohlen, Charles, 30, 44, 96, 97, 99, 107, 128–129, 167 Bolshakov, Georgi, 492, 624 Bolton, Frances, 657 Bosch, Jose (Pepin), 825 Bowdler, Bill, 860 Bowles, Chester A., 26–29 Brazil, 224, 228–229, 278 Brubeck, William H., 295n, 676, 702n, 725n Bruce, David K. E., 147, 150 Bruce Donald C., 689 Bubnov Igor D., 545 Bundy, McGeorge, 142, 151–152, 170, 172, 180, 201, 203, 222, 226, 248, 255, 276n, 285n, 293, 295n, 298, 304, 305–306, 331, 342, 352, 362n, 363n, 373n, 375, 378n, 406, 408n, 451n, 488, 503, 509n, 532n, 569n, 608n, 640n, 668n, 698n, 715n, 718, 719n, 725n, 738n, 751n, 757, 765n, 799–800, 813n, 820–821, 828n, 848n, 849, 860, 861n, 862n, 868n, 872n, 883, 894 Air strikes against missile sites option, 39–40, 66–67, 119, 120, 130, 132, 156 Bay of Pigs invasion, 703 Covert operations against Cuba, 75, 705, 748, 750, 761, 784, 837–838, 906 Cuba, travel to and from, 650–651, 909 Cuban Brigade, 685 Cuban exile groups, 646, 823, 824n Cuban subversion in Latin America, 711 Exile raids against Cuba, 784, 853, 860, 864, 907 IL-28 aircraft in Cuba, 394–395, 415–417, 441, 442, 467, 489 Intelligence gathering by U.S., 665, 703–704, 710 Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs, 648–651, 656–657 Jupiter missiles, 108, 253, 265, 275 Mongoose program, 230–231 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 195–198, 219–220, 409–410, 424, 522n, 607, 627 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 506–507, 524–526, 530, 567–568, 585 Nuclear testing, 350–351 Prisoners held in Cuba, release of, 75, 458 Quarantine of Cuba, 88–90, 118, 119, 132, 135, 136, 182, 184–185, 219, 441, 442 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 14, 481n, 582, 624 Attacks on planes, 663, 664 Cuban protests, 845, 858, 859n Directive on, 543–544, 590 Low level missions, 694, 782, 785 Overthrow of Castro regime and, 804, 815 Soviet military personnel withdrawal, 709, 731 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 29–30, 72 U.S. response, 36, 37, 38, 39–44, 50, 52–53, 59, 60, 65, 66–67, 72–79, 81, 83–93 Sugar market, 817–818 Trade with Cuba, 692, 693, 910 U.N. inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 372, 467 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 798 Attwood initiative, 877, 878, 888–889, 890, 891, 893, 897, 898, 903n, 907–908 U.S. doctrine on Castro-like governments in Western Hemisphere, 853 U.S. information policy, 319 Presidential statement on Cuba, 850–851, 853n U.S. policy toward Cuba, 14, 699, 701 Committee responsibilities in Cuban affairs, 819–820 Coordinating Committee’s development of, 666, 676 Johnson (Lyndon B.) reassessment, 896, 898, 900, 906, 907–909 Overthrow of Castro regime, 586–587, 804, 905 Standing Group’s consideration of, 774–778, 794–795, 820–821, 822, 823 Verification of missile withdrawal, 384–385 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 283 Burris, Col. Howard L., 575–576 Califano, Joseph A., Jr., 748, 754–755, 761 Carroll, Lt. Gen. Joseph F., 230, 690, 873–874 Carter, Lt. Gen. Marshall S., 11, 29, 40, 44, 46, 405, 457n, 544, 647, 648, 698n, 786, 798–799, 906n, 907n Soviet missiles in Cuba, 49–53, 60–61, 64, 80, 82, 89, 92 Castro Ruz, Fidel, 19, 464, 519–520, 533, 546, 583n, 662, 849n, 902n Cuban subversion in Latin America, 697–698, 868 Defection, possible, 794–795, 796–797 “Five points”, 345n Future prospects, U.S. report on, 834–836 Prisoners held in Cuba, release of, 635, 636, 687–688, 729, 755 Thant-Castro negotiations, 289–290, 301, 308, 323–325, 333, 336 U.S.-Cuban accommodation: Attwood initiative, 870, 877, 879–883, 892–893, 897, 903–904 Castro’s position, 756, 763, 798n, 880 Verification of missile withdrawal, 308, 321, 324–325 Castro Ruz, Raoul, 546 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (see also Carter, Lt. Gen. Marshall S.; McCone, John A.; Mongoose program), 610, 667–668, 800, 834n, 849n, 871, 888 Covert operations against Cuba, 221, 828–834, 906 Cuban economic situation, 665–666 Cuban exile groups, military training for, 748, 754–755 Exile raids against Cuba, guidance for, 742, 749, 901–902, 907 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 706, 713–714. Soviet missiles in Cuba, reports on, 115, 125–126, 535–537 U.S. policy toward post-Castro Cuba, planning for, 813–814 Charyk, Joseph V., 291–292 Chase, Gordon, 664n, 667–668, 729–731, 738n, 747, 787n, 860, 868n, 898, 909 Covert operations against Cuba, 748–751, 761–762 Cuban exile groups, 823–824 Exile raids against Cuba, 860, 864–865 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 877, 879, 882, 890–892, 897, 898–900, 903n, 908n U.S. policy toward Cuba, 666–667, 699–702, 900–901 Chayes, Abram J., 5, 232n Cheever, Bruce B., 884n China, People’s Republic of, 227, 314–315, 583n, 688 Chinese-Indian war, 485–486, 494 Cleveland, J. Harlan, 188, 220, 232n, 302n, 309n, 325n, 404n, 408n, 514n, 517n, 532–534, 603, 628, 631n, 634–635, 640n, 641n Clifford., Clark, 544 Clifton, Gen. C.V., 11n, 381, 477, 646–648, 712–713, 873n Cline, Ray, 18, 116, 127, 141, 200, 361n Colby, William, 773 Congress, U.S., 158–161, 657–658, 692, 715–716, 740, 766 Cordier, Andrew, 275 Cottrell, Sterling, 649, 667, 687n, 702, 703, 761, 765, 786n, 798n Coordinating Committee’s guiding memoranda, 725–728 Covert operations against Cuba, 769–772 Cuban Brigade, 685, 686 Cuban exile groups, 823–827 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 670–681 Cottrell Committee. See Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs. Cousins, Norman, 751–752 Covert operations against Cuba (see also Mongoose program), 29, 75, 221, 705, 784, 904–905 Coordinating Committee planning, 649–650, 672–673, 677–678, 679, 748–751, 761–762, 769–772 Deniability issue, 765, 848 Future policy, 589–590 Inciting Cubans to attack Soviet troops, 749, 750–751, 754 Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba, 828–834, 837–838, 842–845, 848, 884n, 886–888 Leaflet drops, 684, 748, 754 Sabotage operations (see also Integrated Program above), 748–749, 751, 754, 757–758, 761–762, 764, 772, 783–784, 830–831, 832–834, 871, 884–885, 887–888, 906 Track Two program, 14, 22–25 Crimmins, John Hugh, 667, 725, 900–901, 905, 908 Cuba (see also Covert operations against Cuba; Economic embargo of Cuba; Invasion of Cuba; Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union; Quarantine of Cuba; Soviet missiles in Cuba; Trade with Cuba), 377, 574, 835, 849n Attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, 712–713, 855–856 Economic situation, 665–666, 851–852, 874 Future prospects, reports on, 445–446, 834–836 Khrushchev’s visit, 858, 863 Mikoyan’s visit, 339, 545–547, 583n Prisoners, release of, 18, 19–20, 75, 457–458, 621–622, 635–636, 687–688, 715, 724, 729, 755, 773 Revolt against Castro, possible, 701–702, 810–811 Subversion in Latin America, 285, 290, 292, 359, 433, 662 Evidence of, 867–868, 888, 909 Overthrow of Castro regime and, 811–812 U.S. position, 711, 726–727, 730 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 696–698, 876, 894–895 Travel to and from, 650–653, 717, 726, 731, 909 U.S. policy toward (see also Covert operations against Cuba), 14, 412, 542, 764, 819–820 Coordinating Committee’s development of, 666–667, 670–681 Isolation of Cuba, 699–700, 716 Johnson’s (Lyndon B.) reassessment, 896, 898, 900–901, 904–909 Overthrow of Castro regime, 586–588, 666–667, 673–675, 804–813, 814–816, 822–823, 905–906 Post-Castro Cuba, planning for, 795, 799, 801–802, 813–814, 821 Revolt against Castro, response to, 701–702 Standing Group’s consideration of, 774–778, 780–782, 794–797, 820–823 U.S. information policy, 717–718 Cuban Brigade (see also Prisoners held in Cuba, release of), 25, 646, 678, 685–686, 825–826 Military training program, 695–696 Cuban exile groups (see also Exile raids against Cuba; specific groups), 304, 337, 589 Alpha 66, 303, 728 CIA military training for, 748, 754–755 Focal point in Miami area, 646–648 Intelligence on, 728, 729–730 JURE, 24–25 Lambda 66, 732n Radio broadcasts into Cuba and; 605, 608, 610 Track Two program and, 24–25 Unity among exiles, U.S. policy re, 823–827 Cuban Families Committee, 635 Cuban missile crisis. See Soviet missiles in Cuba. Cuban refugee problem, 730 Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC), 24, 25, 764n, 775n, 786–788 Dean, Arthur, 307 De Gaulle, Charles, 147, 165–167, 626 Dennison, Adm. Robert L., 184, 350, 597 Diallo,Seydou, 879–880 Dillon, C. Douglas, 146, 201, 204, 206, 207, 208, 222, 225, 226, 253, 341, 406, 434, 471, 489, 584, 686, 781 Air strikes against missile sites option, 118, 120, 130, 132, 133 Exile raids against Cuba, 740, 742, 744 Quarantine of Cuba, 132, 143, 145 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 38–39, 59, 62, 64, 77, 108 Dirksen, Everett, 657 Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., 77–78, 110, 162n, 196–197, 317n, 344, 373, 460n, 501n, 503, 545, 658, 759n, 875, 894 Bowles’ meeting with, 26–29 Cuban subversion in Latin America, 696–698 Exile raids against Cuba, 861–863, 866 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 404, 443 “Insulting” Soviet document for Kennedy, 751–754 Kennedy (Robert F.) meetings with, 175–177, 270–271, 284n, 373, 443, 751–754 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 404–405 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 696–698, 706–709, 857–858 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 175–177, 270–271 Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, 28, 373 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 270–271 Donovan, James B., 13, 17–18, 19–20, 457–458, 621, 635, 653, 687–688, 715, 724, 729, 755, 763, 764, 879 Dowling, Walter C., 147 Doxiades, C.A., 881 Dulles, John Foster, 548–549 Dungan, Ralph A., 747 Eckel, Paul, 879, 888 Economic embargo of Cuba (see also Trade with Cuba), 47–49, 684–685, 774n, 852n, 872 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 13, 15, 19, 33, 99, 137, 153, 187, 478–480, 524–526 Elder, Walter, 11n, 45n Emmett, Robert, 743 Evans, Roland, 348 Executive Committee of the National Security Council, 157, 670, 676, 678 Meetings: 1st, 168–170 2d, 172–174 3rd, 179–180 4th, 200–203 5th, 204–209 6th, 221–226 7th, 252–256 8th, 264–268 9th, 271–273 10th, 283–285 11th, 291–293 12th, 298–299 13th, 303–304 14th, 320–322 15th, 333–334 16th, 339–342 17th, 348–352 18th, 353–355 19th, 356–361 20th, 371–372 21st, 393–396 22d, 405–407 23rd, 412–413 24th, 432–437 25th, 441–442 26th, 468–472 26th-A, 480–481 27th, 487–490 28th, 502–503 29th, 508–509 31st, 541–545 32d, 568–569 32d-A, 576–577 33rd, 583–586 34th, 606–610 36th, 626–627 37th, 627 38th, 681–687 40th, 689–692 42d, 739–745 Unnumbered meeting, 443–444 Subcommittees, 169n, 172, 203n, 248–251, 260–262 Reports of, 216–218, 293–296, 331–333 Exile raids against Cuba, 279, 303, 728n, 729, 732n, 740, 758, 759–760, 784, 860 CIA guidance for, 742, 749, 901–902, 907 Intelligence reports on, 745–746 Somoza’s involvement, 853–855 Soviet protests, 732–734, 741, 752, 861–863, 876 U.S. response, 866–868 U.K. arrest of raiders, 746–747 U.S. position, 334, 738–745, 852–853, 864–865 Fascell, Dante, 730 Feldman, Myer, 820n Finletter, Thomas K., 5n, 165n, 180–181, 213–215, 272 FitzGerald, Desmond, 668, 748, 750, 751, 757, 758, 761–762, 764n, 783–784, 822, 837, 842, 848, 852, 853–855, 871, 872, 884, 885, 886–887, 904–906 Florida, Cuban threat to, 59–60 Foley, Edward, 457 Follestad, Robert, 738n Fomin, Alexander S., 227, 241, 356, 493–494 Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, 766 Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Republics meeting (Oct., 1962), 8–9 Forrestal, Michael V., 187, 788 Fowler, Henry H., 156, 765n France, 135–136, 148, 165–167 Frankel, Max, 29 Freeman, Orville, 816, 817, 820n Fulbright, J. William, 160–161 Garcia Montes, Jorge, 854 Germany, 251, 313–314 Gilpatric, Roswell L., 5n, 11, 132, 141, 229, 255, 291n, 349, 403, 408n, 491, 581, 757n, 765n, 784, 878n, 883 Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, U.S. policy re, 855–856 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 601–602 Quarantine of Cuba, 120, 132, 173 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 66, 91, 97 Verification of missile withdrawal, 322, 339, 385n, 386, 402, 405, 420 Glenn, Edmund S., 545n, 563n Goodpaster, Gen. Andrew J., 850, 851, 871 Gordon, Lincoln, 278 Gromyko, Andrei A., 35, 38, 76, 109, 153, 176–177, 196, 788, 876 Exile raids against Cuba, 732–734, 876 Kennedy’s meetings with, 110–114, 875–877 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 304–305 Soviet military personnel withdrawal from Cuba, 875–876 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 110–114 Test Ban Treaty, Cuban policy re, 876–877 Guantanamo naval base, 73, 134, 137–138, 148, 310–311, 345, 368, 533, 609, 812 Guevara, Ernesto (Che), 546, 574, 620, 662, 868, 877, 881 Guthrie, John C., 658, 696, 708 Halleck, Charles, 159, 160, 657 Hamilton, Fowler, 459 Hare, Raymond A., 80–181, 273 Harriman, W. Averell, 187–188, 294, 742, 744, 765n, 783, 822, 837, 843, 848, 880, 894 Khrushchev’s meeting with, 788–791, 795–796 Harvey, William K., 16, 230, 249, 333 Haworth, Leland J., 355. Helms, Richard, 45n, 545, 728, 749, 798n, 878, 883, 909 Helseth, William A., 296 Hendrix, Hal, 852n Heyser, Maj. Richard D., 29 Hickenlooper, Bourke, 158, 161, 657 Hillenbrand, Martin J., 110 Hilsman, Roger, Jr., 7–8, 108n, 215–216, 227, 309n, 622 Home, Lord, 872–873 Hoover, Herbert, 153 Houser, Capt. William D., 5n Howard, Lisa, 798, 880, 881–883, 889, 892, 893, 897, 899 Hughes, Thomas L., 842, 849n Hull, Cordell, 550 Humphrey, Hubert H., 657 Hurwitch, Robert A., 22n, 45–47, 248, 294, 635n, 649, 667, 688, 703, 748, 761, 786n IL-28 aircraft in Cuba, 130, 131, 160, 339 Buildup of, 18, 19, 360, 361, 366 Reconnaissance photographs, 18, 339, 340, 341–342 “U.S.-Cuban problem” option, 415–417, 424–432 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 242, 284, 343, 347, 350n, 359, 404, 576 Intelligence reports on, 657–658 JCS position, 474–475 Khrushchev proposal, 437–441 Military action by U.S., possible, 489–490, 491–492 Negotiations on, 382–383, 403, 414, 465–466 Remove planes end overflights proposal, 451–456, 486, 487 Remove planes lift quarantine proposal, 443, 449–451, 460–461, 467, 470, 483–484, 486, 500 Soviet pledge to withdraw planes, 493–501 U.S. information policy, 359, 394–395 U.S. policy re, 397–399, 407, 415, 441–442, 444 U.S.-U.K. discussions, 463–464 Verification issue, 461–462, 503 Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba. See under Covert operations against Cuba. Intelligence gathering by U.S. (see also Reconnaissance flights over Cuba), 18, 577, 625, 652, 665, 687, 703–704, 710 Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs, 586, 649 Covert operations planning, 649–650, 672–673, 677–678, 679, 748–751, 761–762, 769–712 Creation of, 648–651, 653 Guiding memoranda, 725–728 Organizational arrangements, 656–657 U.S. policy toward Cuba, development of, 666–667, 670–681 International Longshoreman’s Association, 692 Invasion of Cuba (see also Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee), 155, 160, 597, 717 CINCLANT OPLANS, 381, 472–474, 477, 711–712 Civil defense precautions, 172, 173–174 Contingency planning, 6–7, 20–21, 791, 802–803 Soviet missiles in Cuba and, 34, 43, 55–57, 58, 69–70, 74, 138, 145–146 Soviet policy re, 279–280 U.S. information policy, 155 Iron Bark report, 115 Italy, 215n Javits, Jacob, 13 Johnson, Gen., 45, 229 Johnson, Lyndon B., 267, 657, 909 Cuban subversion in Latin America, 894–895 Exile raids against Cuba, 742–743, 744 Mikoyan’s meeting with, 894–895 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 575, 911 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 41–42, 76 Trade with Cuba, 905, 910 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 890, 902, 908n U.S. policy toward Cuba, 896, 898, 904–909 Johnson, U. Alexis, 11, 22, 72, 127, 141, 149n, 227n, 228n, 229, 232n, 255, 276n, 287n, 296, 302n, 363n, 404n, 408n, 492, 503, 523n, 613n, 630n, 634n, 640, 641n, 648, 709, 714n, 719n, 728n, 738n, 757, 766n, 799, 838n, 842, 845n, 849–850, 878, 883 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 409–410, 419, 629n, 655 Quarantine of Cuba, 119–120 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 782–783, 804–809, 814–816, 858–859 Trade with Cuba, 692, 851 U.S. policy to overthrow Castro regime, 804–813, 814–816 Verification of missile withdrawal, 354, 380, 386–393 Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) (see also Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D.), 230, 475, 476, 646, 871 Air strikes against missile sites option, 55, 69, 100 Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, 712–713 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 474–475 Invasion of Cuba, 6, 160, 597 CINCLANT OPLANS, 472–474, 477, 711–712 Kennedy meeting with, 477–478 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 224, 476 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 538–539 State of alert for U.S. forces, 538–540 Jorden, William, 249 Judd, Thomas M., 872 Jupiter missiles, withdrawal from Turkey, 37, 128, 134, 136, 148, 369, 564 Kennedy administration discussions, 108, 252–256, 267–268 Military offsets, 214–215, 250 NATO and, 181, 213–214, 264–266, 271, 272–273 Soviet proposal re, 253, 257–261 U.S. analysis of, 273–274 Turkish position, 180–181, 213, 296–297 U.S. policy re, 261–263, 271, 275 Karpov, Viktor p., 658 Katzenbach, Nicholas deB., 116–117, 120, 647, 648, 703 Kaysen, Carl, 5, 355, 724, 728, 729, 845 Keating, Kenneth, 41, 154, 542, 653, 683, 697, 704 Kennedy, John F. (see also Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence), 9, 26, 151–152, 249n, 333, 349, 356, 567n, 626, 630n, 657, 687n, 876 Air strikes against missile sites option, 10, 101, 140, 156, 272 Kennedy administration discussions, 39, 40, 43, 55–57, 64–71, 129, 131, 133, 135 Cuba (also see Quarantine of Cuba below), 574, 726, 858 Covert operations against, 75, 754, 764, 837–838, 884, 885 Invasion of, 43, 69–70, 74, 145–146, 155, 173–174, 381, 472, 477, 711–712, 714, 717, 791, 802 Travel to and from 652–653, 717, 726 Cuban attack on U.S. forces operating outside Cuban territory, U.S. policy re, 712–713, 855 Cuban Brigade, 686 Cuban exile groups, 304, 646, 647, 728, 786, 824n Cuban subversion in Latin America, 285, 292, 359, 433 Exile raids against Cuba, 303, 334, 738, 742, 747, 759–760, 876 U.S. policy development, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744 France, 135–136, 148 Gromyko’s meetings with, 110–114, 875–877 Guantanamo naval base, 134, 137–138, 148 IL-28 aircraft in Cuba, 18, 424 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 284, 350n, 437, 460–461, 489–490 U.S. policy re, 359, 397–399, 407, 441, 442 U.S.-U.K. discussions, 463–464 Verification issue, 461–462 Intelligence gathering by U.S., 18, 665, 687 Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban Affairs, creation of, 648, 653 JCS, meeting with, 477–478 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 134, 136, 148, 275, 564 Kennedy administration discussions, 108, 253–256 NATO and, 264–266, 272–273 Kuznetsov’s meeting with, 658–662 Mikoyan’s meeting with, 534, 545–565 Mongoose program, 46, 221 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, , 424 641n Joint report to end negotiations, 622–623 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 551–552, 606, 607, 608, 627 Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill, 183, 188–191, 202, 244–248 U.S. instructions to negotiators, 325n, 357, 378 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 113–114, 224, 266, 358 “informal assurance” option, 502–503 Kennedy-Khrushchev dialogue, 510, 623 Kennedy-Mikoyan discussion, 553–562 U.S. declaration, 524, 553–562, 584–585 U.S. policy re, 434, 436, 470, 471, 509, 510–513, 541, 568 U.S. response to Soviet proposal re, 268–269 “Verbal statement” option, 557–558, 561–562 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 462 Nuclear testing, 350–351, 355 Prisoners held in Cuba, release of, 18, 19–20, 75, 621, 724, 729, 755 Quarantine of Cuba, 143, 147, 212, 222, 252, 322, 334, 362 Congressional leaders informed of, 158–159, 160, 161 Kennedy administration discussions, 129–130, 133 Kennedy’s decision on, 114n, 118, 134–135 Kennedy’s speech on, 135, 136, 142–145 Lifting of, 441, 442, 479n Proclamation of Interdiction, 168, 172, 203 Rationale for, 152, 153–156 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 202, 223, 226, 252, 264, 267 Rules of engagement, 173, 181 Stopping of ships, 202, 208, 209, 211, 272 U.S. information policy, 153, 179–180, 223 U.S.-Soviet communications, 162–163, 170–171, 174–175, 185–187, 188, 198, 237–238 U.S.-U.K. communications, 140–141, 152, 163–165, 210–212 Radio broadcasts into Cuba, 334, 395, 608, 610, 754 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 435, 481, 488, 590, 759 Attacks on planes, 168–169, 340, 341, 472, 488, 626, 663–664 Cuban protests, 845, 847n, 859n Kennedy administration dissension re, 713–714 Kennedy-Mikoyan discussion, 554–555 Low level missions, 691, 692, 694, 773, 785–786, 819 Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba, 399–400, 436, 468, 469 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 660, 689–690 Soviet military personnel withdrawal, 683, 716, 729, 731, 759 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 709, 857–858, 875–876 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 62, 669 Halt in site construction, 265, 266, 268–269 Hidden in caves, 394, 435, 543 Kennedy-Soviet discussions, 110–114, 547–551 Reconnaissance photographs, 17, 29–30, 107, 134–135, 169 Refugee reports on, 435, 541 Soviet motivation, 36, 71–72 Types of missiles, 49–52 U.S. information policy, 40, 44–45, 58–59, 63, 435 U.S. intelligence failure, 651–652 U.S. response, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42–45, 49–52, 55–82, 108, 109 Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, 235, 237, 373, 397–399 Soviet shipments to Cuba, 664n, 691 Soviet submarine base in Cuba, 354–355, 379–380 Soviet Union, U-2 overflights of, 264, 286 State of alert for U.S. forces, 271–272, 432 Trade with Cuba, 304 Free world shipping to Cuba, 3, 5, 766 OAS and, 684, 685 U.K. policy re, 872–873 U.S. shipping orders, 683–684, 693 U.N. inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 371–372 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 756n, 880, 888–889 U.S. information policy, 303–304, 348, 349, 351, 359, 542 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 412, 542, 587, 716–718, 764 Verification of missile withdrawal, 298, 357, 407 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 284, 291, 292, 293, 298–299, 303, 321, 334, 340–341, 342, 353–354, 372, 396, 406 Ship-at-sea inspections, 349–350, 354, 380, 385n Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 225, 284–286, 405–406, 478–480 Kennedy, Robert F., 19, 114n, 134, 137, 151–152, 169, 317n, 340, 376, 436, 451n, 469, 503, 542, 613n, 656n, 765n, 822, 871, 883 Air strikes against missile sites , option, 96, 119, 130, 131–132, 140 Cuban Brigade, 685–686 Cuban exile groups, 728, 824n Dobrynin’s meetings with, 175–177, 270–271, 284n, 373, 443, 751–754 Exile raids against Cuba, 741, 742, 743, 744, 852–853 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 443, 492 “Insulting” Soviet document for Kennedy, 751–754 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 255, 256, 271, 272–273 Mongoose program, 12, 45–47, 230 Prisoners held in Cuba, release of, 19–20, 75, 457–458, 621 Quarantine of Cuba, 121–122, 131–132, 143, 145, 154, 173, 322 Legal dimension of U.S. actions, 116, 120, 152 OAS position, 117–118 Stopping of ships, 206, 207, 208, 272 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 373, 815 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 690 Soviet missiles in Cuba: Halt in site construction, 265, 266 Meetings with Dobrynin re, 175–177, 270–271 Strategic impact, 61–62 U.S. response, 43, 61–62, 63, 65, 71, 73, 75, 78, 96 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 879, 881 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 781, 796, 850 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba,. U.S. ultimatum re, 270–271 Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence: Kennedy’s letters, 162–163, 174–175, 198, 268–269, 285–286, 362, 393–394, 397–400, 460–462, 509–510, 613–617, 622–624, 759–760 Khrushchev’s letters, 170–171, 185–187, 235–241, 257–260, 279–283, 309–317, 373–375, 437–441, 451–454, 495–501, 519–521, 791–793 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union re, 630–633, 637–643 Kent, Sherman, 165, 167, 778–779, 799, 813n, 821 Khrushchev, Nikita S. (see also Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence), 182, 239, 902n Arms control, 312–313 China, People’s Republic of, 314–315 Cuba visit, 858, 863 Economic embargo of Cuba, 47–49 Exile raids against Cuba, 863 Germany 313–314 Guantanamo Naval Base, 310–311 Harriman meeting with, 788–791, 795–796 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 437–441, 451–454, 493–501 Invasion of Cuba, Soviet policy re, 279–280 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 257–261 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 283, 640 Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill, 183, 188–189, 205, 238 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 500–501 Kennedy-Khrushchev dialogue, 519, 613–617 Soviet proposal re, 239–240 Soviet questioning of U.S. sincerity, 719–720, 735–737 Quarantine of Cuba, 186, 310 U.S.-Soviet communications, 162–163, 170–171, 174–175, 185–187, 188, 198, 237–238 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 282, 792–793 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 499, 788–791 Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, 235, 237, 373–375 Soviet Union, U-2 overflights of, 281–282 Talking Paper for Kennedy 751–754 U.N. inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 499–500 U.S.-Soviet communications, 616–617 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 239–240, 279–283 Killian report, 651 Kitchen, Jeffrey C., 248, 294 Klein, David, 195 Kohler, Foy D., 162n, 170–171, 241, 304–305, 318, 696, 719, 737, 788 Economic embargo of Cuba, 47–49 Exile raids against Cuba, 732–734 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 720–724 Korth, Fred, 695 Krulak, Maj. Gen. Victor H., 727 Kuchel, Thomas, 657 Kushnir, N., 545 Kuznetsov, Vasiliy V., 170, 283, 307, 318, 344, 504, 565, 732n IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 366, 486, 576 Negotiations on, 382–383, 403, 414, 465–466 Remove planes-lift quarantine proposal, 449–451, 486 Kennedy meeting with, 658–662 Joint report to end negotiations, 617–621, 631, 643–645, 654–655 McC1oy-Kuznetsov informal meeting, 459, 482–487 Release of Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence to end negotiations, 630–633, 637, 643 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 593, 619–620 Sessions, 306–307, 336–338, 366–370, 382–384, 400–403, 413–414, 446–451, 464–467, 526–529, 569–573, 591–594, 617–621, 630–633, 634–635, 637–641, 642–645 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 368, 570, 592, 720–724 U.S. declaration, 526–529, 569–573, 591–594 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 335, 336, 402–403, 446–449 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 571, 660–661 Soviet,submarine base in Cuba, 368–369 U.N. inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 465 Verification of missile withdrawal, 361, 367 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 306–307 Red Cross inspections, 299–300, 369–370, 383, 401 Ship-at-sea inspections, 367–368, 401–402, 420 Warheads removal, 383–384, 402 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 300, 336 413, 414, 486–487 Lambda 66, 732n Lansdale, Brig. Gen. Edward G., 12, 13, 16, 23, 45, 230, 231, 650 Laos, 112–113, 463, 773 Lapin, S.G., 788 Lausche, Frank J., 653 Lechuga Hevia, Carlos, 869–870, 877, 878, 880–883, 890n, 897, 899, 903–904 Lee, Adm. John M., 260 Legere, Lawrence, 319n, 694n LeMay, Gen. Curtis, 10, 138, 334, 477 Lemnitzer, Gen. Lyman, 173, 198n, 265 Lima, Hermes, 228, 278 Lincoln, Evelyn N., 93 Lovett,Robert, 142, 181 Luce, Henry, 717 Lundahl, Arthur, 94, 106, 107, 116, 127, 141, 818 Macmillan, Harold, 147, 244–248, 463–464 Quarantine of Cuba, 149–151, 152, 163–165, 210–212 Mahon, George H., 7n, 17 Malinovski, Radion Y., 753 Mansfield, Mike, 657 Markov, Petr I., 751 Martin, Edward, 296 Martin, Edwin M., 70, 108n, 119, 127, 228n, 232n, 278, 532n, 542, 635n, 640n, 641n, 648, 684, 705, 711, 717–718, 719n, 738n, 747, 780, 786n, 798n, 826, 838n, 845n, 850, 851–852, 898, 909 Quarantine of Cuba, 99, 117–118, 120, 144 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 53–54, 62, 63, 70, 99 Sugar market, 800–801 Track rwo program, 22–23 McCIoy, John J., 169, 223, 224, 232n, 291n, 366, 408, 434, 470, 520–521 Chinese-Indian war, 485–486 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 382–383, 491–492 Remove planes-end overflights proposal, 454–456, 487 Remove planes-lift quarantine proposal, 449–451, 483–484, 486 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 262 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 357, 471, 577–578 Joint report to end negotiations, 611, 617–621, 643–645, 654–655 McC1oy-Kuznetsov informal meeting, 220, 455, 458–459, 482–487 Release of Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence to end negotiations, 630–633, 637–641, 642–643 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 606, 607, 608, 628, 629n Sessions, 336–338, 344–347, 366–370, 382–384, 413–414, 446–451, 526–529, 532–534, 565–566, 569–573, 591–594, 617–621, 630–633, 634–635, 637–641, 642–645 Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill, 220, 242–244 U.S. instructions to negotiators, 363, 378, 514, 519, 522, 523, 530, 603, 611 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 368, 484, 592 U.S. declaration, 524–529, 566, 569–573, 578, 579–581, 584, 591–594 U.S. policy re, 455–456, 504–505, 510–511 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 336, 446–449, 488, 630 Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba, 369, 485 Soviet submarine base in Cuba, 368–369 U.N. inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 485 Verification of missile withdrawal 301, 361 366–367 Red Cross inspections, 299, 369–370 Ship-at-sea inspections, 335, 367–368 Warheads removal, 383–384 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 336 McCone, John A., 94n, 109, 120, 153, 168, 201, 221, 252, 333, 341, 348, 353, 358, 376, 460n, 487, 490n; 626, 656n, 687n, 689, 702n, 710n, 765n, 768, 845n Air strikes against missile sites option, 99, 118, 130, 131, 132, 140 Covert operations against Cuba, 221, 784 Integrated Program of Action towards Cuba, 838n, 843–845 Sabotage operations, 758, 764, 783, 884, 885 Cuba, 377, 574, 851 Long-term outlook, 445–446 Prisoners, release of, 19–20, 457–458, 621–622, 715, 755, 773 Travel to and from, 653, 717 Cuban Brigade, 686 Cuban exile groups, 647, 728 Cuban subversion in Latin America, 433 Economic embargo of Cuba, 684–685 Exile raids against Cuba 745–746, 853 U.S. policy development, 739–740, 741, 742, 744–745 Guantanamo Naval Base, 137–138, 609 IL-28 aircraft in Cuba, 18, 19, 360, 361 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 444, 657–658 Intelligence gathering by U.S., 18, 577, 625 652, 665, 703 Killian report, 651 Mongoose program, 11–13, 230, 545 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 609–610 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 525, 526, 530 Quarantine of Cuba, 98, 132, 143, 145, 154, 158, 173, 177, 204, 206 Radio broadcasts into Cuba, 605, 610 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 481n, 435, 610, 911 Directive on, 543–544, 590 Kennedy administration dissension re, 713–714 Low-level missions, 664, 691, 692, 694, 773, 782, 785–786, 818 Number of flights for U.S. security purposes, 624–625 Restrictions on, 14, 544 Soviet threat to, possible, 582–583, 622 Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba, 376, 698–699 Soviet military personnel withdrawal, 682, 683, 731 Intelligence reports, 715, 762–763, 883–884, 911 Soviet military presence in Cuba following crisis, 469–470 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 133, 209 Cave-hidden missiles, 394, 479, 543 Confirmation of missiles at sites, 138–139 Congressional report on crisis, 715–716 Number of missiles, 360, 361, 371 Reconnaissance photographs, 106, 107 Soviet motivation, 37, 97, 103 Strategic impact, 60–61, 97 U.S. intelligence failure, 320–321, 651–652 U.S. response, 95, 97, 98, 99, 103–106 Soviet policy toward Cuba, 15, 778 Soviet shipments to Cuba, U.S. monitoring of, 664, 691n Sugar market, 816, 852 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 799, 879 Castro’s position, 756, 763 McCone’s position, 844, 845 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 14, 764, 780, 896, 898 Verification of missile withdrawal, 339, 354, 361 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 291, 303 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 225 Eisenhower position, 478–480 Intelligence reports on, 657–658 McCormack, John, 657 McDermott, Edward A., 141 McKee, Gen. W.F., 837 McNamara, Robert S., 110n, 121, 151–152, 198n, 224, 231, 256, 267, 292, 298, 379, 460n, 585, 656n, 657, 664, 698n, 702n, 710n, 753, 822, 837, 845n, 873 Air strikes against missile sites option, 10–11 100, 265, 266 Kennedy administration discussions, 33–34, 36–37, 55–58, 63, 66–71, 80, 99, 108, 131, 132–133 Covert operations against Cuba, 75, 885 Cuban Brigade, 686, 695–696 Exile raids against Cuba, 303, 741, 744 1L-28 aircraft in Cuba, 339, 340, 432n IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 359, 441 Invasion of Cuba, 155, 381 Contingency planning, 6–7, 791, 802–803 Soviet missiles in Cuba and, 34, 58, 70, 74, 138, 145–146 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 108, 128, 254 Quarantine of Cuba, 142, 143, 147, 155, 169, 179, 222, 322, 333, 441 Congressional leaders informed of, 159, 160–161 Kennedy administration discussions, 88–90, 119, 128–129, 130 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 200–201, 202 , 206, 207 , 208, 222–223, 252, 264, 267 Rules of engagement, 147, 173 Stopping of ships, 184, 192, 200, 204–205, 207–208, 222, 252, 350 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 481n, 488, 502, 509, 541–542 Attacks on planes, 472, 488, 663 Low-level missions, 664, 691–692, 694, 785 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 689, 709 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 60, 97, 138–139, 160, 542 Reconnaissance photographs, 51–52, 106, 134–135, 169 U.S. information policy, 41, 44–45, 63–64 U.S. response, 33–34, 36–37, 38, 40, 41, 44–45, 51–52, 53, 55–58, 59, 60, 63–64, 66–71, 74, 80, 82–93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 107–109 State of alert for U.S. forces, 58, 271–272, 432, 502, 538, 54On U.S. policY toward Cuba, 780, 796, 797, 822, 823, 898 Verification of missile withdrawal, 385n Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 284, 292, 293, 299, 303, 333, 334, 339, 340, 353, 371, 396, 406 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 284 McNaughton, John T., 325n Meeker, Leonard C., 116, 117, 119, 120 Mendelevich, Lev I., 382, 400, 402n, 413, 482, 529, 532, 565, 569, 591, 617, 630, 637, 642, 645n, 654, 658 Menemencioglu, Turgut, 296–297 Menshikov, Mikhail A., 344 Merchant, Livingston, 261 Merck company, 457 Mikoyan, Anastas I., 318, 338, 358, 487, 520, 531, 574 Cuban subversion in Latin America, 894–895 Cuba visit, 339, 545–547, 583n Johnson (Lyndon B.) meeting with, 894–895 Kennedy meeting with, 534, 545–565 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union: Separate declarations to end negotiations, 551–552 Sessions, 344–347, 532–534, 565–566 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 532–534, 553–562 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 554–555 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 547–551 Minow, Newton, 395 Miro Cardona, Jose, 24, 25, 755, 764, 775n Missiles in Cuba. See Soviet missiles in Cuba. Mongoose program, 11–13, 16, 45–47, 221, 229–231, 545, 648, 649 Morgan, Thomas, 657 Morocco, 767–768 Morozov, P.D., 347, 369 Moyers, William, 902 Murrow, Edward R., 490, 585, 605, 608, 610, 656n, 717–718, 754, 765n, 781 Narasimhan, C.v., 242, 290, 300, 308, 309 National Intelligence Estimates: NIE 85-63, 834–836 National Security Action Memoranda: No. 194, 4–5 No. 196, 157 No. 208, 590–591 No. 213, 656–657 No. 220, 693 No. 244, 817–818 No. 274, 910 National Security Council (NSC) (see also Executive Committee of the National Security Council; Standing Group of the National Security Council): Meetings: 505th, 126–136 506th, 141–149 507th, 152–156 508th, 668–669 509th, 715–718 51Oth, 747 512th, 772–773 Special Group, 878–879 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 146, 220, 283, 357, 364, 585 Closing out, 577–578 Declarations by U.S. and Soviet Union. See Separate declarations to end negotiations below. Joint report to end negotiations, 611–613, 617–621, 622–623, 631, 642, 643–645, 654–655 McCloy-Kuznetsov informal meeting, 455, 458–459, 482–487 Release of Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence to end negotiations, 630–633, 637–643 Security Council meeting, proposed, 516–517 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 551–552, 568, 593, 594–596, 597–602, 603–604, 606–610, 619–620, 627, 628–629, 634 Sessions, 306–307, 336–338, 344–347, 366–370, 382–384, 400–403, 413–414, 446–451, 464–467, 526–529, 532–534, 565–566, 569–573, 591–594, 617–621, 630–633, 634–635, 637–641, 642–645 Soviet policy re, 304–305 Stevenson’s plan for ending negotiations, 420–424, 433–434 Thant’s efforts, 183, 188–198, 199, 201, 202, 203–204, 205, 219–220, 223, 225, 232–234, 238, 242–248 U.S. instructions to negotiators, 321, 325–331, 342–344, 357, 363–365, 378–379, 409–410, 514–519, 522–524, 530–532, 603–604, 611–613 U.S. planning, 249–251, 295, 417–419 Nitze, Paul H., 20, 120, 169, 172, 203n, 222, 224, 226, 232n, 294, 394, 489, 492, 799 IL-28 aircraft in Cuba, 340, 432n Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 136, 148, 252–253, 261 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 407, 410–411, 804–809 U.S. policy to overthrow Castro regime, 804–813 Nixon, Richard M., 453–454, 550, 551 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee (see also Joint report to end negotiations and Separate declarations to end negotiations under Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union), 113–114, 224, 243, 266, 337, 341, 345n, 358, 404–405, 476, 500–501 “Informal assurance” option, 502–503 Kennedy-Khrushchev dialogue, 510, 519, 613–617, 623 Kennedy-Mikoyan discussion, , 553–562 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba and, 527–528, 529, 570, 592 Soviet proposal re, 227, 239–240 U.S. response, 268–269, 273–274 Soviet questioning of U.S. sincerity, 719–724, 735–737 Treaty issue, 456, 484 U.N. declaration, 484 U.S. declaration: Amendments, 578, 579–581, 584–585, 591–593 Eisenhower position, 524–526 Kennedy-Mikoyan discussion, 553–562 Negotiations on, 517–519, 522–523, 526–534, 565–568, 569–573, 591–594 Text of, 514, 523–524 U.S. policy re, 378–379, 434, 436, 455–456, 470, 471, 504–509, 510–513, 541, 568 “Verbal statement” option, 557–558, 561–562 Norstad, Gen. Lauris, 172, 173, 272 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 55, 173, 247, 276–277, 489, 626 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 181, 213–214, 264–266, 271, 272–273 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 205, 223–224, 354, 358, 405, 462, 476, 585 Nuclear testing, 350–351, 355 Nunez, Ricardo, 609 O’Donnell, P. Kenneth, 127 Organization of American States (OAS), 9, 32, 42, 144, 148–149, 224, 322, 332, 489, 588, 896, 909 Quarantine of Cuba, 117–118, 152, 160, 171, 186 Trade with Cuba, 684, 685 Ormsby Gore, Sir David, 140–141, 288–289, 872 Orrick, Bob, 649 Orrick, William, 222 Oswald, Lee Harvey, 890, 897, 899 Parrott, Thomas A., 11n, 45n, 231, 758, 765, 784, 837 Patchell, Col., 45 Penkovsky, Col. Oleg, 115 Pepper, Claude, 730 Pfizer company, 457 PHIBRIGLEX-62 military training exercise, 30 Phleger, Herman, 456 Pittman, Steuart L., 172 Plimpton, Francis T.P., 242, 244, 262, 642, 645n, 654 Poland, 767-768 Prio Socarras, Carlos, 854 Quarantine of Cuba, 105, 106, 169, 173, 179, 206, 222, 252, 322, 362, 475 Congressional leaders informed of, 158–161 De Gaulle informed of, 165–167 Implementation of, 146–147 Kennedy administration consensus, 121–122 Kennedy administration discussions, 33, 35, 88–90, 98, 99, 100n, 108, 109, 118–121, 128–136 Kennedy’s decision on, 114n, 118, 134–135 Kennedy’s speech re, 135, 136, 142–145 Legal dimension of U.S. actions, 116–117, 120, 152, 160 Lifting of, 291–292, 310, 337, 434, 441–442 Announcement of, 479n, 502 IL-28 withdrawal and, 443, 449–451, 460–461, 467, 470, 483–484, 486, 500 Thant’s request, 289–290 OAS position, 117–118, 171, 186 Proclamation of Interdiction, 168, 172, 203 Rationale for, 152–156 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 200–201, 202, 206, 207, 208, 222–223, 226, 252, 264, 267, 273 Reinstitution following Thant’s visit to Cuba, 333, 334 Resumption on expanded basis, scenario for, 428–429 Rules of engagement, 147, 173, 181–182 Soviet reaction, U.S. estimates re, 124, 177–179 Soviets informed of, 162–163 Soviet strategy, 216–218 Stopping of ships, 184–185, 192, 200, 202, 204–205, 206, 207–209, 211, 219, 222, 252, 272, 350 Term, 135, 143 Turning back by ships, 181–182, 208, 212, 215–216 U.S. information policy, 153, 155, 179–180, 223 U.S.-Soviet communications, 162–163, 170–171, 174–175, 185–187, 188, 198, 237–238 U.S.-U.K. communications, 140–141, 149–151, 152, 163–165, 210–212 Radio broadcasts into Cuba, 145, 334, 395, 588, 717, 905 Cuban exiles in U.S. and, 605, 608, 610 Russian language broadcasts, 748, 754 Ray, Manolo, 24–25, 757, 843, 907 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba (see also under Quarantine of Cuba; Soviet missiles in Cuba; Verification of missile withdrawal), 481, 488, 502, 509, 541–542, 610, 663 Attacks on planes, 267, 270, 335, 336, 340, 341, 343, 373, 402–403, 464 U.S. response policy, 168–169, 407, 472, 488, 626, 663–664, 804–809, 814–816, 911 Cuban protests, 845–846, 847, 858–859 Directive on, 543–544, 576, 590–591 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba and, 451–456, 486, 487 JCS position, 538–539 Kennedy administration dissension re, 713–714 Kennedy-Mikoyan discussion, 554–555 Long-term surveillance requirements, 410–411, 412, 435 Low-level missions, 575–576, 664, 691–692, 694, 705, 773, 782–783, 785–786, 818–819, 845–847 Soviet-Cuban reactions, 706, 797–798 Mongoose program, 12–13 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee and, 527–528, 529, 570, 592 Number of flights for U.S. security purposes, 624–625 Overthrow of Castro regime and, 804–809, 814–816 “Peaceful observation” dimension, 759, 792–793 Restrictions on, 14, 544 Soviet military personnel withdrawal and, 709–710 Soviet policy re, 282, 446–449 Soviet threat to, possible, 582–583, 622, 630 Red Cross (see also Red Cross under Verification of missile withdrawal), 635, 688 Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba, 369, 376, 399–400, 436, 468–469, 485 Intelligence reports on, 698–699, 835–836 Rikhye, Brig. Indar Jit, 242, 243, 244, 291, 308, 309, 325 Roman, Alejandro, 868 Rosson, Gen., 754 Rostow, Walt W., 169n, 172, 203n, 207, 209, 222, 248–249 Planning Subcommittee reports, 293–296, 331–333 Quarantine of Cuba, 181–182 Track Two program, 14, 22–25 Roura, Jose Maria, 868 Rowen, Henry R., 248, 294 Ruiz Williams, Enrique, 825 Rusk, Dean, 37, 110, 151–152, 162n, 175, 198, 215, 249n, 264, 269, 286, 299, 333, 353, 355, 373n, 405, 433, 545, 566, 583n, 626, 631n, 634, 651, 657, 662n, 664n, 687n, 702, 706, 710, 717, 722–723, 729, 754n, 759n, 861n, 862n, 876 Air strikes against missile sites option, 31–32, 35–36, 54–55, 98–99, 107, 119–120, 129, 131, 132, 133 Covert operations against Cuba, 842–845, 884–885 Cuba, release of prisoners, 635–636 Cuban Revolutionary Council, 786–788 Cuban-Soviet split, U.S. proposal re, 224, 228–229 Cuban subversion in Latin America, 359, 696–698, 876 Exile raids against Cuba, 738–739, 740, 741, 742, 744 Foreign Ministers of the Latin American Republics meeting, 8–9 IL-28 aircraft, 349, 343, 395, 441, 442, 470 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey, 180–181, 253, 254, 266, 272, 275 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 434, 585, 640–642, 654 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 603–604, 606, 607, 628–629 Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill, 191–192, 199, 201, 205, 223, 232–234 U.S. instructions to negotiators, 325–331, 342–344, 363–365, 378–379, 514–519, 522–524, 530–532, 603–604 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 224, 358 Soviet questioning of U.S. sincerity, 719–720 U.S. declaration, 517–519, 523–526, 530–532, 580, 584 U.S. policy re, 378–379, 436, 470, 471 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 276–277, 626 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 205, 223, 224, 354 Quarantine of Cuba, 33, 119–120, 121, 130, 132, 135, 152, 155, 158–159, 171, 205–206, 222 Kennedy speech on, 142–143, 144, 145 Lifting of, 292, 434, 441, 442 Rationale for, 154, 155, 156 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 223, 252 Stopping of ships, 209, 272 Term for, 135, 143 U.S.-U.K. communications, 149–151, 152 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 435, 481, 488, 542, 630 Attacks on planes, 335, 343 Cuban protests, 845, 847, 859 Low level missions, 694, 785, 786, 797 Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba, 468–469, 698 Soviet military personnel in Cuba 541, 690, 696–698 Soviet military personnel withdrawal, 682, 698n, 716 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 37, 53, 54, 406 U.S. response, 31–33, 35–36, 37, 38, 39, 41, 51, 52, 53, 54–55, 59, 60, 69, 96, 98–99, 100n, 107, 108 Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, 393–394, 408–409 Trade with Cuba, 682–685, 766–769 U.N. inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 372, 523 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 844, 845 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 412, 716, 718, 898 Verification of missile withdrawal, 308, 361 Latin American inspectors, proposal for, 406, 407 On-site inspections, 233–234, 321, 371 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 287, 291, 292, 302, 303, 309, 321, 333, 339, 343, 372, 396 Red Cross inspections, 298, 302, 322 Ship-at-sea inspections, 322, 335 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 270, 283, 284, 323, 356 U.S.-U.K. discussions, 288-.289 Russell, Bertrand, 182, 187, 240 Russell, Richard, 158, 159–160, 584, 657 Ryan, Hewson, 46 Salinger, Pierre, 153, 304, 356, 405 Saltonstall, Leverett, 160, 657 Scali, John, 227, 241, 356, 493–494, 503 Schaetzel, J. Robert, 261 Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr., 187–188, 320, 443, 492, 567n Schroeder, Gerhard, 76, 81 Scott, Joseph W., 750 Seaborg, Glenn T., 355 Semenov, 110, 875 Shackley, 883 Sheldon (CIA), 18, 361 Ship-at-sea inspections. See under Verification of missile withdrawal. Shoup, Gen. David M., 477 Sisco, Joseph, 203n,’309n, 386n, 514n, 517n Smathers, George, 657 Smirnovski, Mikhail N., 894 Smith, Abbot, 177–179 Smith, Bromley, 127, 142, 209, 226, 256, 268, 273, 285, 293, 299, 304, 322, 334, 341, 355, 359, 372, 396, 413, 437, 442, 443, 490, 509, 542, 569, 586, 608, 627, 663n, 687, 692, 718, 743, 747, 765, 772, 782, 797, 817, 823, 828n, 848, 872, 901, 902–903 Somoza, Luis, 853–855 Sorensen, Theodore C., 114n, 120, 130, 133, 137, 144, 176, 224, 254, 255, 304, 492, 765n, 781, 815, 816 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 2, 407, 475, 499, 502, 541, 571 Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba and, 485 U.S. information policy, 576, 689–690 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 660–661, 696–698 Withdrawal of, 682, 683, 698n, 716, 731, 759, 874 Intelligence reports, 715, 762–763, 883–884, 911 Reconnaissance photographs, 709–710 U.S. information policy 706–708, 709, 729, 752 U.S.-Soviet discussions, 708–709, 788–791, 857–858, 875–876 Soviet missiles in Cuba (see also Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba; Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba): Cave--hidden missiles, 394, 406, 435, 479, 499, 543 CIA reports on, 115, 125–126, 535–537 Confirmation of missiles at sites, 52–53, 138–139 Confirmation of missile sites, 1–3, 29 Congressional report on crisis, 715–716 Deliveries of missiles, 7–8 Halt in site construction, 242–243, 265, 266, 268–269 Kennedy-Gromyko discussion, 110–114 Kennedy-Mikoyan discussion, 547–551 Kennedy (Robert F.)-Dobrynin meetings, 175–177, 270–271 Nuclear warheads, 50, 133 Number of missiles, 360, 361, 371 Range of missiles, 2–3 Reconnaissance photographs, 17, 29–30, 51–52, 81, 106, 107, 127, 134–135, 154, 169 Refugee reports on, 154, 435, 541, 542 Soviet motivation, 36, 37, 71–72, 97, 103, 123 Strategic impact, 60–62, 97 Types of missiles, 49–52 U.N. activities (see also Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill under Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union), 171 U.S. information policy, 40–41, 44–45, 58–59, 63–64, 435 U.S. intelligence failure, 320–321, 651–652 U.S. message to Castro, 53–54 U.S. response (see also Air strikes against missile sites option; Quarantine of Cuba): Alternatives for action, 104–106 Invasion option, 34, 43, 55–57, 58, 69–70, 74, 138, 145–146 Kennedy administration discussions, 31–45, 49–93, 94–100, 107–109 McCone’s position, 103–104 Soviet reaction, estimate re, 122–125 Warning option, 123–124 Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba (see also IL-28 aircraft headings; Reintroduction of weapons in Cuba; Soviet missiles in Cuba), 15, 27–29 list of weapons, 373–375, 408–409 U.S. definition of, 326–327 U.S. policy re, 363–364, 393–394, 397–399 U.S.-Soviet communications, 235–237 Soviet Union (also see Khrushchev, Nitika S.; Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union; Soviet missiles in Cuba), 294 Policy toward Cuba, 112, 239, 718–779, 834–836, 902 Shipments to Cuba, 664, 691, 692 Submarine base in Cuba, 354–355, 368–369, 379–380 U-2 overflights, 264, 281–282, 286 Special Group of the National Security Council, 878–879 Special National Intelligence Estimates: SNIE 11-18-62, 122–125 SNIE 11-19-62, 125n SNIE 85-2-63, 706 Stahr, Elvis J., 695 Standing Group of the National Security Council, 765, 837 Meetings, 901–902 2d, 774–778, 780–782 3rd, 794–797 4th, 801–802 5th, 814–817 6th, 819n 7th, 820–823 8th, 828n 9th, 848–850 lOth, 850–853 14th, 871–872 State of alert for U.S. forces, 32, 58, 271–272, 432, 502, 503, 538–540 Steakley, Col., 12, 757, 818, 819 Stennis, John, 715–716 Stevenson, Adlai E., II, 5n, 137, 169, 171, 187, 290, 307, 335, 338, 370, 408, 436, 466, 487, 504, 532, 567n, 640 Air strikes against missile sites option, 101–102, 134 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 442, 576 Negotiations on, 382–383, 403, 465–466 Remove planes-lift quarantine proposal, 449–451 Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey 134, 136, 262–263 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 409n, 410n, 471, 577–578, 585, 630–633 Joint report to end negotiations, 611, 617–621, 654 Separate declarations to end negotiations, 568, 595–596, 597–601, 606, 607–608, 627 Sessions, 306–307, 344–347, 382–384, 400–403, 413–414, 446–451, 464–467, 565–566, 617–621, 630–633 Stevenson’s plan for ending negotiations, 420–423, 433 Thant’s efforts to achieve crisis standstill, 190–191, 193–195, 196–197, 199, 203–204, 225, 232–234 U.S. instructions to negotiators, 363, 378, 514, 519, 522, 523, 530, 603, 611 U.S. planning, 417–419 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 434, 566, 578, 584, 585 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 358, 585 Quarantine of Cuba, 122, 134, 144, 145, 223 Lifting of, 289–290, 442 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 402–403, 446–449, 464, 630 Thant-Castro negotiations, 289–290 U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 877, 880, 881, 903, 908n Verification of missile withdrawal, 301, 433 Cuban policy re, 308, 324–325 On-site inspections, 357–358 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 287, 301, 306–307, 358 Red Cross inspections, 299, 401 Ship-at-sea inspections, 386–393, 401–402 Warheads removal, 383–384, 402 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 300, 323–324 Strong, Sir Kenneth, 200 Sugar market, 626, 666, 800–801, 816, 817–818, 820n, 821, 852, 871 Sukhodrev, Viktor, 110, 788, 875, 894 Sullivan, William H., 788 Sundquist, James L., 820, 821, 852 Suslov, Mikhail A., 333 Sweeney Gen. Walter C., Jr., 66, 139, 140 Sylvester, Arthur, 683 Taber, John, 17 Taylor, Gen. Maxwell D., 11, 230, 284, 298, 319n, 476, 685, 692, 765n, 883 Air strikes against missile sites option, 35, 39, 40, 56, 63, 66–71, 80, 99, 118–119, 120, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 139 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 474–475 Invasion of Cuba, 6, 155 CINCLANT OPLANS, 472–474, 477, 711–712 Soviet missiles in Cuba and, 56–57, 70, 74, 145–146 Mongoose program, 230 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 224, 476 Quarantine of Cuba, 35, 98, 118, 130, 143, 207, 226, 267, 475 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 435, 488, 542, 692 Attacks on planes, 267, 407, 472, 488 Soviet military personnel in Cuba, 475, 689 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 36, 40–41, 61 U.S. response, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 43, 56–57, 59, 61–63, 66–71, 73, 74, 78, 79–80, 86, 87, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 108 State of alert for U.S. forces, 432, 538–540 Verification of missile withdrawal, 292, 293, 333, 334, 339, 341, 342, 353, 395–396 Test Ban Treaty, Cuban policy re, 876–877 Thant, U, 262, 529n, 532n, 405, 863 Crisis standstill, efforts to achieve, 183, 189, 191, 192, 193–194, 196–197, 199, 203–204, 242–244 Quarantine of Cuba, 289–290 Thant-Castro negotiations, 289–290, 301, 308, 323–325, 333, 336 Verification of missile withdrawal, 299–300, 301, 309, 406 Thomas, John, 730 Thompson, Llewellyn E., 44, 84–85, 110, 209, 227n, 248, 256, 265, 285n, 357, 362n, 394, 408n, 451n, 460n, 470, 480, 488, 503, 532n, 545, 613n, 64On, 641n, 658, 754n, 759n, 773, 857, 875, 894, 906 Exile raids against Cuba, 741, 742, 744, 861–863, 866 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 404, 442 Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee, 404–405 Quarantine of Cuba, 98, 99, 108, 120, 134, 144, 145, 158, 442 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 481n, 783, 797–798, 819 Soviet military personnel withdrawal, 706–709 Soviet missiles in Cuba, 97 U.S. response, 95, 97, 98, 99, 108, 109 U.S. policy toward Cuba, 412, 681–682 Verification of missile withdrawal, 322 Tobin, Irwin M., 296 Track Two program, 14, 22–25 Trade with Cuba, 304, 716, 871, 873–874 Free world shipping to Cuba, 3–5, 766–769 OAS and, 684, 685 U.K. policy re, 872–873 U.S. policy, 905, 910 Soviet shipping orders, 682--684, 692, 693, 851 Trevelyan, Sir Humphrey 719, 720–721, 723 Truman, Harry S., 153 Turkey (see also Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey), 267 Twitchell, Gen., 261 Tyler, William R., 149n, 180n, 288, 296–297, 532n, 872, 875, 894 Unger, Maj. Gen. F.T., 20–21 United Kingdom: Exile raids against Cuba, 738, 746–747 IL-28 aircraft withdrawal from Cuba, 463–464 Negotiations between U.S. and Soviet Union, 244–248 Quarantine of Cuba, 140–141, 149–151, 152, 163–165, 210–212 Trade with Cuba, 716, 768–769, 872–873 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba, 288–289 United Nations (see also Verification of missile withdrawal), 144, 148–149, 171 Chinese representation, 314–315 Exile raids against Cuba, 860 Inspection system of Caribbean, proposed, 233, 241, 371–372, 376, 465, 466, 467, 469, 476, 485, 499–500, 523 Nuclear-free zone in Latin America, 462n U.S.-Cuban accommodation, 798–799 Attwood initiative, 868–870, 877, 878–883, 888–893, 897, 898–900, 902–904, 907–908 Castro’s position, 756, 763, 798n, 880 McCone’s position, 844, 845 U.S. analysis, 838–842 U.S. doctrine on Castro-like governments in Western Hemisphere, 853 U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 180, 223, 351 U.S. information policy (see also Radio broadcasts into Cuba under specific subjects), 303–304, 319, 348, 349, 351, 359, 542, 544, 796 Presidential statement on Cuba, 850–851, 853n, 871 U.S. Intelligence Board, 705, 834n U-2 flights. See Reconnaissance flights over Cuba. Vallejo Ortiz, Rene, 687–688, 756, 763, 878, 881–883, 888–889, 89On, 892–893, 903 Vance, Cyrus, R., 647, 648, 667, 695, 749, 751, 754, 761, 784, 878, 883, 906 Varona, Tony, 787 Venezuela, 334, 359, 720, 722, 736, 909 Verification of missile withdrawal, 280, 301, 361 Administration and finance of operations, 330–331 Cuban policy re, 308, 321, 324–325 Incoming cargoes. See Red Cross inspections below. Latin American inspectors, proposal for, 406, 407, 433 On-site inspections, 233–234, 321, 329–330, 339, 357–358, 366–367, 371 Reconnaissance flights over Cuba, 284, 287, 291–293, 298–299, 301, 302, 303, 306–307, 309, 321–322, 327–328, 333–334, 339–342, 343, 346, 353–354, 358, 371, 372, 395–396, 406 Red Cross inspections, 298, 299–300, 302, 322, 329, 346, 357, 369–370, 383, 401 Ship-at-sea inspections, 322, 324, 335, 349–350, 354, 356, 367–368, 401–402, 405 Reports on, 420 U.S. policy re, 380, 384–385, 386–393 U.S.-Soviet agreement, 402n Two-phase program, 327 U.N. inspection teams, 243–244 Warheads removal, 378, 383–384, 402 Vietnam, 294 Vmo-Gradov, Yuriy N., 545 Vinson, Carl, 160, 161, 657 Wheeler, Lt. Gen. Earle G., 381, 477, 647, 648, 906 White, Lincoln, 733 White Paper on the Cuban crisis, 296 Whitman, 332 Wiesner, Jerome B., 169n, 170, 179–180, 355 Wilson, Donald, 145, 223, 229, 304, 334, 351, 395, 684, 800, 848n, 898 Withdrawal of missiles from Cuba (see also Verification of missile withdrawal), 225, 243, 356 Eisenhower’s views, 478–480 Intelligence reports on, 657–658 Process of withdrawal, 300, 323–324, 336 Quid pro quo issues. See Jupiter missiles withdrawal from Turkey; Non-invasion of Cuba guarantee. Soviet agreement, 279–283 U.S. reaction, 283–286 Soviet reports on, 413, 486–487 Soviet strategy, Kohler’s analysis of, 318 U.S. information policy, 405–406 U.S.-U.K. discussions, 288–289 U.S. ultimatum, 270–271 Warheads removal, 414 World War I, 27 Wright, Col. John R., Jr., 1n Wright, Oliver, 872 Yarmolinsky, Adam, 648 Yost, Charles W., 242, 244, 262, 299, 357, 392, 400, 413, 464, 527n, 529, 532, 565, 591, 595, 603, 617, 637, 639, 642 Yugoslavia, 767–768 Zhukov, Grigory K., 344 Zorin, Valerian, 151n, 203, 243, 244, 263, 299, 344, 368, 382, 400, 413, 482, 487, 532, 565, 569, 637, 639 Zumwalt, Capt. Elmo, 386n