--- name: finding-discipline description: Use when about to record, claim, rate the severity of, or report any security finding — before marking anything [CONFIRMED] or writing it into the report --- # Finding Discipline ## Overview **The Iron Law: No `[CONFIRMED]` without proof.** A finding is a claim about real, demonstrated impact — not a status code, a reflected string, or a hunch. This is the offensive equivalent of test-driven development: the proof is the test, and the finding does not exist until it passes. **Violating the letter of this rule is violating its spirit.** ## The three tiers - **`[CONFIRMED]`** — impact demonstrated AND grounded in an evidence artifact that exists on disk. - **`[POSSIBLE]`** — reachable but the class proof bar is not yet met. Keep digging; do not report as real. - **`[INFO]`** — true but no security impact at the claimed severity. ## The proof bar (per class) A status code is not impact. See `skills/references/finding-evidence-standards.md`: SSRF needs the internal response; IDOR needs *another principal's* data; RCE needs command output; XSS needs script execution; open redirect needs an external destination. ## Required mechanical gate Before any finding is recorded or reported: 1. Set the structured proof signal and run `python skills/vulnerability-analysis/scripts/validate_findings.py --findings f.json --evidence ./evidence` — it rejects ungrounded findings and per-class false positives. 2. Pass it through the **REQUIRED** `finding-validator` agent (PASS / KILL / DOWNGRADE). 3. Only a `[CONFIRMED]` survivor goes in the report. Severity must match what was demonstrated (CVSS honest). See `skills/references/finding-validation-runtime.md` for the 7-question gate. ## Read-first, never name-guess If a function calls another, **read the callee** — do not infer what it does from its name. `sanitize()`, `is_safe()`, `validate_input()` are exactly where vulnerabilities hide; a name is a claim by the author, not evidence. The same applies to a config key, a decorator, or a CVE title: open the thing before you reason about it. An unread dependency in a data-flow claim is a hole. ## Quote-grounded confidence tiers Every claim in a finding carries a confidence grounded in *what you can quote*, not in how it feels: - **High** — a **direct quote** from the artifact (the exact source line, the response body, the decompiled instruction) supports the claim. - **Medium** — an **explicitly stated assumption** bridges a gap you could not directly observe. State the assumption; do not hide it. - **Low** — an **inference** you are flagging as unverified. Acceptable to record, never to report as fact. This is orthogonal to the `[CONFIRMED]/[POSSIBLE]/[INFO]` tier (which is about *impact*); confidence is about *how well-grounded the claim is*. A High-confidence claim of a Low-impact bug is still Low. ## Red Flags — STOP, downgrade to `[POSSIBLE]` - "I'm sure it's exploitable" (but haven't shown impact) - "The payload reflected, so it's XSS" / "I got a 200, so it works" - "The DNS callback fired" (SSRF with no internal response) - "I changed the id and got data" (but it was my own — self-IDOR) - "It probably works on a real target" (default-deployment unproven) **All of these mean: it is `[POSSIBLE]`, not `[CONFIRMED]`. Get the evidence.** ## Rationalizations | Excuse | Reality | |--------|---------| | "Pattern-matched, clearly vulnerable" | Pattern ≠ exploit. Demonstrate impact or it's POSSIBLE. | | "I'll attach evidence later" | No artifact on disk = ungrounded = REJECTED now. | | "Blind RCE counts" | No output / no OOB confirmation = POSSIBLE, not CONFIRMED. | | "Severity is obviously Critical" | CVSS must reflect demonstrated impact, not the worst case. | | "The validator is overkill here" | Untested findings are how false positives ship. Run it. | | "The function is called `sanitize`, so it's safe" | A name is the author's claim, not proof. Read the callee. | | "The solver timed out, so it's not exploitable" | A tool limit is `feasibility:null` (manual), never `false`. | A short list of CONFIRMED findings beats a long list of POSSIBLEs. Killing a false positive is success.